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Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Greg Schulte to @NSA. Subject: Terms of Reference for the Holbrooke Mission. (2 pages)	03/20/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Robert Bell, Susan Braden et al. Subject: Cautioning Bonn Against "Carrots" for Milosevic. (3 pages)	03/03/1999	P1/b(1)
003. presentation	[Printed Powerpoint Slides] Kosovo Update, North Atlantic Council, 17 February 1999. [NATO] (2 pages)	02/17/1999	P1/b(1)
004. timeline	Military Implementation Timeline. [NATO] (1 page)	02/15/1999	P1/b(1)
005. presentations	Operation Joint Guardian Mission. [NATO] (4 pages)	02/15/1999	P1/b(1)
006a. letter	SG(99)0097. Secretary General Javier Solana to President Slobodan Milosevic. [NATO] (2 pages)	01/28/1999	P1/b(1)
006b. letter	SG(99)0098. Secretary General Javier Solana to Ibrahim Rugova. [NATO] (2 pages)	01/28/1999	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	SG(98)1020. To Permanent Representatives and Heads of Missions of the Three Invited Countries from Secretary General Solana. Subject: NATO-Kosovo Verification Mission. [NATO] (1 page)	10/16/1998	P1/b(1)
007b. paper	NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [NATO] (7 pages)	10/16/1998	P1/b(1)
007c. letter	SG/98/1013wp. Secretary General Javier Solana to President to Slobodan Milosevic. [NATO] (2 pages)	10/15/1998	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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2008-0994-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. letter	SG(98)1068. Permanent Representatives and Heads of Mission of the Three Invited Countries. Subject: Report of meeting between CMC, SACEUR, and FRY authorities (Belgrade, 24-25th October 1998). [NATO] (1 page)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)
008b. letter	Annex 1 to SG(98)1068. General Klaus Naumann and General Wesley Clark to General Secretary Javier Solana. [NATO] (5 pages)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)
008c. letter	Annex 2 to SG(98)1068. Record of the Meeting in Belgrade, 25 October 1998. [NATO] (1 page)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)
008d. statement	Annex 3 to SG(98)1068. Statement. [NATO] (3 pages)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)
008e. memo	Annex 4 to SG(98)1068. Understanding Between KDOM and Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia. [NATO] (1 page)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)

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GREGORY L. SCHULTE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON ACCORDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20504

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FAX (202) 456-9150

Notations

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 1999 8:17 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: Sapiro, Miriam E.; Hurley, C. Michael; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: Terms of Reference for Holbrooke Mission ~~(SECRET)~~

Sandy -
cc: Jim, Don

For the record, these are the "terms of reference" for the Holbrooke trip as I heard them emerge from today's PC:

- Secretary Albright will dispatch Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade to impress upon President Milosevic that NATO military action was imminent and that he faced a stark choice between pulling back his forces and accepting an interim settlement, or the consequences of NATO's action.
- Ambassador Holbrooke should seek to secure Milosevic's agreement on two basic points: (1) an immediate cease-fire and (2) reductions in the VJ/MUP and establishment of a NATO-led implementation force based on Chapter 7 of the Rambouillet Accords.
- Ambassador Holbrooke should make clear that we would only be willing to consider changes to other parts of the agreement after acceptance of those two points and if the changes can be agreed by the Kosovar Albanians.
- NSC Principals would need to consider any requests from Milosevic for sanction relief.
- Ambassador Holbrooke should be ready to leave Belgrade immediately if Milosevic launches a major offensive.

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208-0494-F.3

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No: ---

Date: March 19, 1999

Fax No: (202) 586-7573

His Excellency
Mr. Bill Richardson
United States Secretary for Energy
Washington, DC

*Pres: to SRB.
Failed to
at FR Y
request*

Dear Mr. Richardson,

Since the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia H.E.Mr. Slobodan Milosevic has been informed of the possibility of your visit to Belgrade, I wish to convey to you his best wishes and cordial welcome. The President would be very pleased to talk to you about all important issues of Yugoslav-American relations which, in his opinion, are unjustifiably very bad at this moment of time. The President is convinced that the lack of substantial contact at a higher level has been one of the major reasons for the state of these relations for quite some time. I trust and believe that your visit to Belgrade might provide an opportunity to set our relations on a course of normalization, which would be in mutual interest.

I am at your disposal to help you arrange the visit and all other details whenever you decide to realize it.

Sincerely,

CO:

- His Excellency
Mr. Samuel Berger
National Security Advisor
- His Excellency
Mr. Jim Dobbins
High Representative of the
President and the Secretary of State

Nebojsa Vujovic
Nebojsa Vujovic
Charge d'affaires, a.i.

18 March 1999

**The Kosova Delegation to the Rambouillet Process
on the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-government in Kosova**

THE DELEGATION OF KOSOVA,

Acting on behalf of the people of Kosova and of its legitimate and lawful political and military institutions and after full consultation,

Committed to the political and economic development of Kosova according to the principles of democracy, a free market economy, human rights and the equal treatment of all,

Determined to promote peace and stability in Kosova, and the exercise by the legitimate authorities of Kosova and the people of Kosova of self-government, permanent sovereignty over natural resources and self-determination,

Recognizing with appreciation the contribution made to this end by the members of the Contact Group, the Co-Chairmen, Negotiators and hosts of the conference, the international institutions involved in the negotiating and implementation process, and especially the tireless efforts for peace made by US Secretary of State Albright,

Stressing the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Kosova, the withdrawal of FRY/Serb military, paramilitary and police forces and full compliance with mandatory demands of the United Nations Security Council by all parties, including the duty to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

Noting the grave humanitarian situation in Kosova and the need for immediate acceptance of the Interim Agreement by all parties in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, which is already well on the way,

Noting also that this present situation has been found by the United Nations Security Council to constitute a threat to international peace and security and respectfully but urgently reminding NATO in this context of its humanitarian responsibilities and of the firm determination to hold those preventing the completion of the interim agreement or provoking further hostilities 'fully accountable'.

UNANIMOUSLY DECLARES AND CONFIRMS THE FOLLOWING:

In formally affixing the signatures of the authorized representatives of the Delegation of Kosova to the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-government in Kosova of 23 February 1999, Kosova confirms its acceptance of said Interim Agreement as indicated in the Declaration made by the Kosova Delegation on 23 February 1999 at the conclusion of the international conference on Kosova held at Rambouillet and expresses its consent.

In so doing, the Delegation of Kosova registers its understanding of certain points as follows:

The Delegation of Kosova confirms that its consent relates to the text as presented and accepted on 23 February 1999 as an integrated whole. This text is definite and not subject to further negotiations or modifications other than purely technical changes. As provided in the rules of procedure of the Conference, such technical changes shall not be introduced without the approval of Kosova. The interpretation and application of the text shall be subject to the established rules of treaty interpretation, consistent with Article II of Chapter 8 of the Interim Agreement.

As already expressed on 23 February 1999, Kosova invites and expects the rapid deployment of NATO and the full and effective exercise of the functions provided for it and others charged with the implementation of the Interim Agreement strictly in accordance with the modalities for command and control and the time-table established in the Interim Agreement. Full implementation also of this aspect of the Interim Agreement constitutes a condition essential to the overall package and to the consent given by Kosova. Kosova looks forward to being consulted about the precise pattern of NATO deployments.

In addition to the rapid implementation of the military aspects of the Interim Agreement through the NATO presence, Kosova also invites and expects the rapid deployment and full and effective exercise of the functions of the civilian elements of implementation. It looks forward to the establishment of an accelerated time-table for the taking up of these functions by the relevant international bodies and their representatives and pledges its full support also for this task. In this context, Kosova notes with gratitude the undertaking given by the European Union and others to contribute rapidly and significantly to the reconstruction of Kosova on the basis of full equality of all segments of the Kosova population supporting the implementation of the Interim Agreement.

The Delegation of Kosova confirms again that at the termination of the interim period of three years the people of Kosova will exercise their will through a referendum, conducted freely and fairly. The expressed will of the people of Kosova will be conveyed to the international meeting to determine the mechanism for a final settlement for Kosova, consistent with the Interim Agreement, in particular Article I (3) of Chapter 8.

The Delegation of Kosova again notes the intention of the KLA to exercise the opportunity to engage in a process of transformation and welcomes assurances also as to cooperative bilateral contacts to carry out this process consistent with the Interim Agreement.



Hashim Thaci

Chairman of the Presidency of the Delegation of Kosova



DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Meeting in Paris

Paris, 16 March 1999

Co-Chairmen:

H.E. Mr. **Hubert VEDRINE**

Minister for Foreign Affairs of France

Right Honorable **Robin COOK**

Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

Excellencies,

The Delegation of the Government of the Republic of Serbia actively participates, with the best of intentions, in the talks aimed at reaching a political Agreement for Self-Government in Kosovo and Metohija.

In our letter of 23 February in Rambouillet, we have precisely stated that "all elements of self-government at the time of defining the Agreement have to be known and clearly defined".

In line with this, on 15 March 1999, at the beginning of the talks in Paris, our delegation submitted in a written form the proposals ensuring the finalization of the text of Political agreement for Self-Government in Kosovo and Metohija in line with the ten principles of the Contact Group (29 January 1999).

The Agreement finalized in such a way ensures a substantial autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija, guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and of the FR of Yugoslavia, ensuring that there is no independence of Kosovo and Metohija nor the third republic, creating the conditions for full equality of all citizens and national communities – Serbs, Albanians, Muslims, Turks, Romanies, Goranies and Egyptians.

We are deeply convinced that these proposals bring the solutions which are fully consistent and can be implemented. They establish democratic institutions ensuring to the citizens and national communities a safe future and common life in Kosovo and Metohija.

Our delegation is ready for intensive work towards finalizing the document. The obstacle is the fact that the negotiators have not as yet responded in a written form to our proposals. We request that it be done as soon as possible so that we may be able to study them and continue further work.

We suggest that our proposals be adopted and included in the final text of the Agreement. If these proposals are respected in the final version of the political agreement, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Serbia is ready to sign such text of the agreement.

Please accept, Excellencies, the assurances my high consideration



Prof. Dr. Ratko MARKOVIĆ
Head of the Delegation

C.C.:

- H.E. Mr. Christopher HILL, Ambassador
- H.E. Mr. Wolfgang PETRITSCH, Ambassador
- H.E. Mr. Boris MAIORSKY, Ambassador

16 mar

Distributed to CG
Already used by
co-chairs' spokesman

PRESS LINES

- The Contact Group and the negotiators have throughout made it clear that :
 - * the goal of the meeting in Paris is finalisation of all aspects of implementation;
 - * discussions on the political chapters should be limited to technical adjustments which should be settled without delay;
 - * the parties must conclude the agreement as a whole, including all the modalities of implementation.
- The Co-Chairmen have set out this position plainly, in particular to the Yugoslav authorities. Ministers Cook and Vedrine spelt this out in the declarations of 5 and 11 March, and also in a letter of 27 February to President Milosevic.
- As regard to the political chapters, the three negotiators have reported that the many amendments proposed by the Yugoslav delegation raise issues of substance and would reopen key parts of the Rambouillet accords.
- The negotiators in full agreement with the Contact Group, have reminded the Yugoslav delegation that only technical adjustments will be considered.
- At the same time, the negotiators have stressed that discussions of the various aspects of implementation must begin without delay. This is the purpose of this conference.
- The FRY must seize the opportunity which the Rambouillet accords represent, by concluding the agreement as a whole, as the Kosovo Albanian delegation yesterday announced it was ready to do. The Yugoslav delegation must now dedicate its efforts to this end./.

**The United States of America
State Department
To the Secretary of the State**

Dear Mrs. Albright,

After the consultations of the Kosova delegation with political and military factors, as well as with the people of Kosova, concerning the Agreement for Peace and Self-governance (dated February 23, 1999) from the Rambouillet meeting, this delegation and I personally say „Yes“ to this Agreement. We would be honored to sign the Agreement in your presence at a time and place of your choosing.


The Agreement creates a chance and a perspective for Kosova and its people. Our consultations in Kosova were necessary and very important. Now that a positive mood on behalf of the Agreement has been created within the political and military structures, the Kosova delegation is able to sign the Agreement.

In this success of ours, your contribution as well as the contribution of the administration of your country was great. The fate of the Albanian people of Kosova is at a historical turning point, and the Kosova delegation has a big responsibility. You have shown attention and patience concerning this fact. Our delegation, and I, are very thankful for this.

We will expect your help, as well as the help of the United States, in the future. The people of Kosova have been and will continue to be allies of the United States, and you can count on this. Kosova needs freedom and democracy. Your personal contribution and that of the United States are essential and respected.

Paris,
On March 15, 1999

Sincerely,

The Albanian delegation
Chairman
Hashim Thaçi


3/14/99

Rambouillet Process – Paris Meeting

Rules of the road

- No solemn opening ceremony. In the afternoon of Monday 15 March, the co-chairmen Ministers Védrine and Cook will go to the Centre de Conférences Internationales to meet quickly with the negotiators and the parties
- On Monday 15 March, the parties will be informed by the negotiators that the aim of this meeting should be the finalisation of all aspects of implementation of the Rambouillet Accords. The negotiations on the political Chapters shall be limited to technical adjustments that must be settled without delay. The parties must conclude an agreement as a whole including all the modalities of implementation.
- During the day and due security and confidentiality reasons, the members of the delegations shall refrain from any contact with people who are not taking part in the talks, particularly with the press, and shall only shuttle between the hotel and the Centre de Conférences Internationales.
- The members of the Yugoslav/Serbian and Kosovo Albanian delegations taking part in the talks will be approved by the negotiators..
- During the negotiations, Contact Group members have free access to the Centre de Conférences Internationales.
- On the co-chairmen's initiative, a daily meeting between the negotiators and the Contact Group members will review the situation and, if needed, set guidelines, including presslines.
- The negotiators can ask Contact Group representatives or other experts to assist them in the talks.
- No access for the press to the Centre de conférences internationales. No press center. Next to the C.C.I, a room will be available, if needed, for press briefings by the co-chairmen's spokespersons, the three negotiators or their spokespersons. The negotiators will recall the parties that the should refrain from any contact with media.

2
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No: ---

Date: March 5, 1999

Fax No: 647-0555

Mr. Lawrence Rossin
Director, EUR/SCE
United States Department of State
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Rossin,

Please find enclosed herewith the Statement by the Office of
the President of the Republic of Serbia, issued on March 5, 1999.

Nebojsa Vujovic
Nebojsa Vujovic
Charge d'affaires, a.i.

No. of pages including cover: 5 (five)



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PRESS RELEASE March 5, 1999

REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Office of the President
Belgrade, 5 March 1999

STATEMENT

The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Serbia held a meeting on Friday, presided by Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ratko Markovic to review the results of talks that recently closed in Rambouillet, France, and to discuss the preparations for the March 15 resumption of the talks on the resolution of problems in Kosovo and Metohija.

The President of the Republic of Serbia Milan Milutinovic also took part in the meeting of the delegation.

The delegation assessed that initial success towards a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo and Metohija issue had been achieved in Rambouillet, thanks to the fact that the delegation has called for a concrete implementation of 10 principles of the Contact Group, especially for an unambiguous respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and also for a full equality of all ethnic communities in determining a future concept for autonomy in Kosovo and Metohija.

The Rambouillet talks have been temporarily discontinued without any concrete results, since a lot still needs to be done. It is well-known that a political agreement has not been adopted and is far from being signed soon. A series of key provisions has been put forth unilaterally and they considerably contravene the ten principles of the Contact Group. Therefore, hard work on the political agreement is pending. Furthermore, there has been a transparent and inappropriate attempt only a few hours before the talks were about to close to deliver the documents which had not even been discussed by the Contact Group. These documents are the so-called Annexes 2 and 7 (dealing with the police issues and troops).

The public abroad and especially at home are aware of this. Unfortunately, over the past few days we have seen false reports about what has been done and achieved in Rambouillet. The United States, including some other Contact Group members, are deliberately creating confusion claiming that the talks are at a stage in which, in fact, they are not and also that the political agreement was practically adopted and only needs to be signed on March 15, to be followed by a beginning of talks on its implementation. By "political agreement", they mean the entire text of the agreement, including chapters on police and troops, namely the text that has not been discussed at all.

In short, a great sham stage-managed by the U.S. is in the offing. Requests are being made for the signing of an agreement whose major part (over 56 pages) has not been discussed either within the Contact Group or in the talks. Moreover, what is even more cynical and fraudulent is

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the fact that the parties of Albanian separatist and terrorist movement are requested to sign the agreement they had made themselves, namely to agree to NATO's occupation of Kosovo and Metohija. Requests are also being made for an interim agreement, for the holding of a referendum after 3 years, for granting full equality to the ethnic Albanian community alone and not to all ethnic communities in Kosovo and Metohija, for accepting a quasi state in the territory of Serbia and Yugoslavia. What it really means is tantamount to substituting one idea for other completely different. Ethnic Albanian separatist parties, terrorists and drug mafia are asked to accept something they have been asking for, over the past years in Kosovo and Metohija: independence with the assistance of their NATO allies. On the other hand, a theory has been advanced that if Serbia does not sign, it will be seen as a party opposing the political settlement.

In addition to this, the Serbian Government delegation bitterly pointed to gross forgeries of a part of the text of the political accord which has been agreed earlier. One of them is a section which has been agreed upon and written down with representatives of the international community, especially with U.S. envoy Ambassador Christopher Hill, when it was established that after three years, the signatories will examine the agreement with a view to promoting its implementation and reviewing the proposals of any signatory for additional measures whose adoption shall require the consent of all signatories.

A version presented on the last day of the Rambouillet talks referred to the same problem, but contained also a forged new stand that changed things essentially, saying that three years after the agreement takes effect, there will be an international conference to establish mechanisms for the final settlement for Kosovo, based on the will of the people, opinion of relevant bodies, both sides' efforts toward the implementation of the agreement, the Helsinki Final Act and there will also be a comprehensive assessment of the agreement and consideration of both sides' proposals for additional measures.

What we have been warning and saying all along is now actually taking place, resulting in an unprecedented sham, fraught with forgeries. They have never wanted the agreement. The bottom line of this game of talks has been troops and troops alone. Pressure to deploy foreign troops reveals their true goals - an attempt to occupy a strategic part of Europe under a transparent pretext of "imposing peace", although it is common knowledge that there has never been nor is there any "military confrontation". The entire scenario is aimed at creating artificial "conditions" at one point for proclaiming "independence" of part of the Serbian territory. There are attempts at making a good excuse for an aggression against a sovereign state. No excuse has ever been good enough for something like that.

Most importantly, we have been presented with totally unacceptable documents whose almost every other page directly or covertly contradicted the 10 Contact Group principles.

We have been requested to accept: a) the President of Kosovo, the Constitution of Kosovo and Metohija and legislative powers of the Kosovo and Metohija Assembly (Parliament); b) special system of judiciary comprising the constitutional and supreme courts of Kosovo and Metohija; c) harmonization with the agreement, namely, a change of the Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions; d) the need for obtaining Kosovo and Metohija's consent for changing Kosovo and Metohija borders and declaring a state of emergency; e) the entire agreement as interim and the holding of another international conference after three years to consider the will of the people - i.e. referendum - in only one part of the Serbian state. This was the height of cynicism on part of the international community

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which has said that it will never accept referendum in Kosovo and Metohija or its "independence".

In short, it was a dictate that called for an international protectorate with a number of major requests, which the state delegation could not possibly accept.

Despite all this, the state delegation had until the last moment been submitting many amendments and very constructive proposals in line with the demands of the Contact Group for wide self-government of Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia, advocating full equality of all ethnic communities and, consequently, multi-ethnic character of the province. The state delegation expected the international community to endorse this multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-confessional approach, as opposed to the nationalistic, even Nazi-like, approach of the ethnic Albanian separatist movement.

Unfortunately, due to the obvious and open obstruction by some Contact Group members, our endeavour did not ultimately produce the desired effects, although the state delegation demonstrated great cooperativeness by demanding minimum as regards the protection of national interests, independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia.

This country has done only what any other sovereign country in the world would have done. It was to no avail although the principles were on our side. Unfortunately, the force was on the other. Force was especially demonstrated through demands that "international military presence", meaning foreign troops, be accepted even before political settlement was reached, although the scope and character of international presence had been defined in the agreement concluded between Yugoslavia and the OSCE. They wanted more: 28,000 foreign troops that should, allegedly, disarm the "Kosovo Liberation Army". This is absurd - such a big army for an alleged fight against terrorists. At the same time, demands were made for the withdrawal of a much smaller Serbian force from Kosovo and Metohija. These and other similar demands were designed to make state authorities take part in continuing ethnic cleansing of the province of its Serb and other non-ethnic Albanian population, as the international community previously allowed to happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Now, the international community wanted to cleanse Serbia of Serbs. This the state delegation could not accept. Any democracy is tested by the degree of protection it provides to all citizens and all ethnic communities equally, but this fact was not heeded. The proposed documents provided for the Albanian national community having the upper hand in all affairs, while others were only to be "protected" minorities.

Taking all this into account, and the way the talks were being held, the state delegation strongly demanded the Contact Group to protect us from all pressures, especially military ones, which were tremendous in Rambouillet. Either troops or no agreement. As if everyone had forgotten that a political settlement ruled out the use of force, which is also prohibited by the UN Charter.

Unfortunately, some representatives of the international community in Rambouillet did not take this into account. It seemed this country was at fault for not wanting war but a just and peaceful political settlement.

This outcome of the Rambouillet meeting did not surprise the state delegation, but neither did it discourage its endeavour for peace and peaceful settlement based on international law and justice and international order. The state delegation is ready to resume talks in

Paris, in Belgrade, in Pristina, or anywhere where a political settlement can be reached. This is an absolute priority. Anywhere, any time, this delegation will work for a peaceful settlement, for wide self-government within Serbia and Yugoslavia, for equality of all ethnic communities. At the same time, this delegation will not give up Kosovo and Metohija, allow its secession or transformation into a third republic. If the state delegation were to agree to this, it would become a traitor to itself, to our citizens, to Serbs, Montenegrins, ethnic Albanians, Muslims, Romanies, ethnic Turks, Goranians, Egyptians, all who live in the province and wish to continue living there in peace and equality.

The public has been informed of the conclusions of the Co-Chairmen of the Rambouillet meeting. These conclusions only give a partial picture of the meeting. They cover up the failure of the organizers and especially the behaviour and the positions of the delegation of the ethnic Albanian separatist movement. The camouflage did not work, as the ethnic Albanian delegation had written to the co-chairmen openly demanding the deployment of NATO troops and clearly explaining the purposes of a referendum and especially clearly indicating whom it considered to be the "people of Kosovo" that were to be allegedly consulted before signing an agreement.

Such an approach can hardly lead to a proper political agreement. However, the first stage of the talks has ended. Before the end of the talks, the state delegation clearly underlined in a letter to the Co-Chairmen - and they included it in their conclusions - that wide self-government for Kosovo and Metohija must also include the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia. The delegation also pointed out in its letter that there can be no independence for Kosovo and Metohija or transformation into a third republic. This is why all elements of self-rule must be understood and clearly defined when the time comes for the agreement to be concluded. This should be adequately set out and resolved in future endeavour. The state delegation is ready to attend a future meeting on this issue, the letter said.

We therefore rightfully expect the international community and especially the Contact Group to see reason and create appropriate conditions for the resumption of the talks. Negotiations and peace are in any case, especially this one, better than unprecedented war that might engulf the entire region. With this conviction, Serbia and Yugoslavia expect that talks be resumed free from bias of any kind, pressures or threats and are ready to make their constructive contribution to this end.

Terms of Reference for Holbrooke

1. Make clear to Milosevic that undertaking an offensive even before March 15 will be met with NATO force under existing ACTORD.
2. Make clear why the agreement, including NATO deployment, is in Serbia's interest (i.e. only way to maintain FRY sovereignty and protect Serb minority) and the consequences to Serbia of failure to agree (NATO airstrikes, civil war that Serbia can't win, continued isolation).
4. Make clear that NATO will not allow negotiations to be dragged out indefinitely following March 15.
3. Gain maximum Serb agreement to full Rambouillet text in advance of March 15. ~~Do not offer 1~~

Schulte, Gregory L.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Saturday, March 06, 1999 1:18 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: Hurley, C. Michael; Sapiro, Miriam E.
Subject: Points for Meeting or Phone Call with Holbrooke [CONFIDENTIAL]

By W NARA, Date 5/1/2024
2008-094-F3

Sandy -
cc: Don, Jim

I recommend that you and Secretary Albright use a meeting or phone call with Dick Holbrooke to establish clear "terms of reference" for his trip to Belgrade, once decided. Holbrooke's tasks should be as follows:

Developments in and around Kosovo

- Express international indignation over violation of Clark-Naumann limits, harassment of KVM, refusal of visa to Dole, failure to investigate Racak.
- Caution against increased repression or threats to KVM. Solana has key. No military victory possible.
- Press for cooperation with KVM and Walker. Harassment and threats will lead to KVM withdrawal, with adverse consequences for Belgrade and Serbs in Kosovo.
- Lay down marker on Macedonia. UNPREDEP termination does not mean Milosevic can stir up trouble on border without serious consequences.
- Warn against meddling in Republika Srpska. Brcko award shows consequences of non-cooperation.

Interim Settlement

- Emphasize that Rambouillet Accords are one package. Cannot separate political chapters from NATO-led force and restrictions on VJ/MUP.
- Explain that NATO troops in Kosovo are in Serbia's interest. Without them, Belgrade will face a costly and protracted guerilla war, constant threat of NATO bombing and violent disintegration of FRY. With them, Kosovo will remain in Serbia, KLA will disarm and Kosovo Serbs will be protected. KFOR to operate even-handedly; Russia will participate if Belgrade requests.
- Note that we expect talks to be concluded in "matter of days." Serb delegation will not be allowed to stall or seek substantial changes to agreement. Any changes must be agreed by Albanians and must not cross any NATO "red lines". Serb intransigence will quickly become apparent, and NATO has already warned of consequences if either side blocks an agreement.
- Note that US prepared to facilitate expanded contacts between NATO and the VJ to explain details of military presence and assuage lingering concerns.
- Do *not* open text or discuss sanctions relief. Register areas where cosmetic changes or steps outside the agreement could facilitate Serb acceptance.

Holbrooke's mission should only be announced after we have a firm "yes" from the Albanians and Secretary Albright has notified CG colleagues. The trip should be portrayed as our attempt to secure a Serb "yes" and *not* as a separate negotiating channel.

In my judgement, Holbrooke should not go to Paris. However, he should be ready to return to Belgrade at short notice after March 15 for a last-minute push on Milosevic if the talks in Paris break down due to Serb intransigence and we are moving to withdraw KVM and undertake air strikes.

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Saturday, March 06, 1999 11:10 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: MILUTINOVIC LETTER TO SECRETARY ON KOSOVO
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 061605Z MAR 99
MSGTO: ////
ORIG: DIA WASHINGTON DC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 1362
TOR: 990306110801 M3730367

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001506

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PREF, SR
SUBJECT: MILUTINOVIC LETTER TO SECRETARY ON KOSOVO
TALKS

REF: BELGRADE 1505

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.

1. (U) MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR KIKIC CALLED IN COM ON THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 6 TO DELIVER A LETTER SIGNED BY SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILUTINOVIC AND CHIEF KOSOVO NEGOTIATOR MARKOVIC FOR THE SECRETARY. THE LETTER REPEATS MANY OF THE CRITICISMS SEEN EARLIER IN THE DAY IN THE STATE-CONTROLLED PAPERS (REFTEL) ABOUT THE TALKS FOR AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. COM SAID HE DISAGREED WITH THE LETTER'S NEGATIVE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EFFORTS UNDER WAY, WITH THE APPROACH OF AMBASSADORS HILL AND PETRITSCH QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT DESCRIBED, BUT THAT HE WOULD PASS THE LETTER ON TO THE SECRETARY'S PARTY IN LONDON. (LETTER FAXED TO OPS CENTER FOR FURTHER HANDLING).

2. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE MARCH 5 LETTER TO SECRETARY FROM SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILUTINOVIC AND RATKO MARKOVIC, SERBIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AT THE MEETING IN RAMBOUILLET.

BEGIN TEXT:

BELGRADE, 5 MARCH 1999

DEAR MME. SECRETARY,

YOU ARE WELL AWARE THAT ON 23 FEBRUARY 1999, THE TALKS IN RAMBOUILLET (FRANCE) HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY DISCONTINUED AND THAT IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THEY CONTINUE ON 15 MARCH, WITH A VIEW TO CONTINUING THE WORK TOWARDS FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KOSOVO AND METOHIJA. YOU ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE TEXT OF THE "AGREEMENT" HAS NOT BEEN ADOPTED AND IS FAR FROM BEING READY FOR SIGNATURE.

IN MY TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER HILL ON 2

MARCH, I CLEARLY DREW HIS ATTENTION TO ALL OF THE ABOVE.

UNFORTUNATELY, OUR WARNINGS WERE NOT HEEDDED. EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TAKING PLACE. UNPRECEDENTED CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN SET IN MOTION TO HAVE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES OF ALBANIAN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT, EVEN BEFORE 15 MARCH AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE AGREED TALKS, SIGN THE TEXT OF THE NON-EXISTENT "AGREEMENT" OF 23 FEBRUARY (AT 9:30 A.M.). IN THE ACCOMPANYING LETTER TO THE "AGREEMENT," IT IS UNAMBIGUOUSLY STATED (CONFIRMED BY AMBASSADOR B. MAIORSKY'S SIGNATURE) THAT "RUSSIA DOES NOT ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH CHAPTERS 2 AND 7." OUR DELEGATION IN A WRITTEN FORM REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE SAME (56 NEW PAGES OF THE "AGREEMENT") BECAUSE IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED EITHER IN THE CONTACT GROUP OR IN RAMBOUILLET.

MOREOVER, OUR POSITIONS ON THAT ISSUE, ALONG WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONTACT GROUP, WE CLEARLY DEFINED IN OUR LETTER (OF 23 FEBRUARY AT 3:00 P.M.), SAYING THAT "ALL ELEMENTS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME OF DEFINING OF THE AGREEMENT HAVE TO BE KNOWN AND CLEARLY DEFINED. IN FURTHER WORK, THIS SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED AND CONSISTENTLY RESOLVED. IN THAT SENSE, WE ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEXT MEETING ON THE ISSUE." THE CONTACT GROUP ACCEPTED OUR LETTER AND HAS TAKEN IT INTO ACCOUNT IN DRAFTING THE CO-CHAIRMAN CONCLUSIONS.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN TO SIGN THE NON-EXISTENT "DOCUMENT" SURPRISES US AND CAUSES INDIGNATION BECAUSE IT IS OBVIOUSLY THAT THEY ARE SEEKING TO IMPOSE THE POLICY OF FAIT ACCOMPLI, WHICH MAY SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE FURTHER CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

WE HOPE THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP WILL NOT ALLOW THAT AND WE THEREFORE RIGHTFULLY EXPECT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP, TO CREATE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS. IN THAT BELIEF, WE EXPECT FURTHER TALKS, FREE FROM ANY IMPARTIALITY, PRESSURES, THREATS, PREJUDICING AND SUCH ACTS. THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AND THE FR YUGOSLAVIA ARE READY TO MAKE THEIR SINCERE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THAT.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MME. SECRETARY, THE ASSURANCES OF OUR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 001506

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PREF, SR
SUBJECT: MILUTINOVIC LETTER TO SECRETARY ON KOSOVO TALKS

MILAN MILUTINOVIC
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

PROF. DR. RATKO MARKOVIC
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
HEAD OF DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AT THE MEETING IN RAMBOUILLET

END TEXT.

TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

MILES


The Delegation of Kosova Rambouillet Reunion

ATT: The Co-chairmen and Negotiators

Rambouillet,
23 February

This Declaration is given with full consensus.

1. The Delegation of Kosova with consensus understands that it can sign the Agreement in two weeks after consultations with the people of Kosova, political and military institutions.
2. In order to do these consultations, the Delegation has voted in favor of this Agreement as presented in the negotiations of the 23 February, which will undergo only technical review on the part of experts. In this context, the Delegation of Kosova invites and expects the rapid deployment of NATO on the ground as an essential part of the Agreement.
3. The Delegation of Kosova understands and this will be confirmed again upon signature, that at the end of the interim period of three years, Kosova will hold a referendum to ascertain the will of the people as provided in Article I (3) of Chapter 8 of the Agreement. The delegation of Kosova also notes that the KLA intends to exercise the opportunity to engage in a process of transformation and welcomes also assurances as to cooperative bilateral work to carry out this process consistent with the Agreement.



The Delegation of Kosova



DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Meeting in Rambouillet

Rambouillet, 23 February 1999

H.E. Mr. Christopher HILL, Ambassador
H.E. Mr. Wolfgang PETRITSCH, Ambassador
H.E. Mr. Boris MAIORSKY, Ambassador

The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Serbia wishes to emphasize that major progress has been achieved in the talks in Rambouillet in defining political solution on important issues related to substantial self-government of Kosovo and Metohija within the Republic of Serbia.

In the talks, our delegation pointed to eight vital issues which at the same time ensure a substantial self-government and sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and of the FR of Yugoslavia.

We would particularly like to emphasize, the same as the Contact Group that there can be no independence of Kosovo and Metohija nor the third republic.

Therefore, all elements of self-government at the time of defining of the Agreement have to be known and clearly defined. In further work, this should be adequately addressed and consistently resolved.


The FRY agreed to discuss the scope and character of international presence in Kosmet to implement the agreement to be accepted in Rambouillet.

The FR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia are fully ready to continue the work, in line with the positive spirit of this meeting. We therefore consider that it would be extremely useful to set a reasonable deadline to create appropriate conditions and different approach to successfully resume the work and successfully address those questions. In that connection, we would like to point out that direct talks between the two delegations would be very useful.

Prof. Dr Ratko Marković
Head of the Delegation



DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Meeting in Rambouillet



Rambouillet, 23 February 1999

H.E. Mr. Christopher HILL, Ambassador
H.E. Mr. Wolfgang PETRITSCH, Ambassador
H.E. Mr. Boris MAIORSKY, Ambassador

The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Serbia wishes to emphasize that major progress has been achieved in the talks in Rambouillet in defining political solution on important issues related to substantial self-government of Kosovo and Metohija within the Republic of Serbia.

We are in agreement on the following issues in particular:

- the basic elements of the Contact Group;
- preambular part and basic principles of the framework political agreement defining political bases and obligations related to self-government, guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia;
- the competencies and authorities that the Republic of Serbia, in accordance with its regulations, transfers to the Autonomous Province;
- the fact that the FR of Yugoslavia fully exercises its authority in Kosovo and Metohija;
- that the Assembly as well as its executive body has certain functions;
- the content of the rights ensuring equality of all national communities - Albanians, Serbs, Muslims, Turks, Romanies, Goranies and Egyptians - living in Kosovo and Metohija;
- additional rights of national communities affirming their national identity;
- the content of self-government functions of communes as a basic form of local self-governance;
- Ombudsman as a new additional institution for the protection of human, civil and minority rights.

In the talks, our delegation pointed to eight vital issues which at the same time ensure a substantial self-government and sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and of the FR of Yugoslavia.

In the talks, we did not reach an agreement on important elements concerning the method of functioning of the organs, the existence of certain institutions and their competencies, the most important being: the term « Constitution », decision making in the Assembly; President of Kosovo and Metohija, judicial system, Constitutional Court, property and some other issues. In addition, there is a number of issues that have not been defined at all, the most important being the work of administrative organs, inspection, financing and other administrative control - while some solutions are unworkable in practice. We are also of the opinion that some of the institutions are not necessary since they are not in line with character of autonomy.

We would particularly like to emphasize, the same as the Contact Group that there can be no independence of Kosovo and Metohija nor the third republic.

It is necessary to define the above issues precisely because this is a document with which all people and all national communities in Kosovo and Metohija should live in equality and have a certain future. Therefore, all elements of self-government at the time of defining of the Agreement have to be known and clearly defined. In further work, this should be adequately addressed and consistently resolved.

The FR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia are fully ready to continue the work, in line with the positive spirit of this meeting. We therefore consider that it would be extremely useful to set a reasonable deadline to create appropriate conditions and different approach to successfully resume the work and successfully address those questions. In that connection, we would like to point out that direct talks between the two delegations would be very useful.

Prof. Dr Ratko Marković
Head of the Delegation

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Robert Bell, Susan Braden et al. Subject: Cautioning Bonn Against "Carrots" for Milosevic. (3 pages)	03/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

INCENTIVES FOR THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS

PROVIDED TO
SECSTATE,
2/21/98

- * • U.S. to open an embassy office in Pristina and move as rapidly as possible to begin issuing visas at that office. (This would be a very strong incentive.)
- Permission to open a Kosovo office in the United States accredited to the U.S. government.
- * • An organized visit by the KLA leadership to the United States. In addition to meetings with senior Washington officials, the KLA could tour the FBI training facilities. (Very strong incentive for KLA leadership.)
- A "veteran's preference" for KLA fighters and political leaders who wish to transition into the new Kosovo police. (This is a strong incentive for the KLA.)
- Give former KLA priority in the selection of candidates for a police training program in the United States including at the FBI Academy.
- Establish an AID program in Kosovo to help individual members of the KLA acquire the skills necessary to make the transition from military to political leadership.
- To assist Kosovars in entering and leaving Kosovo conveniently and with minimal contact with FRY border control authorities, assist Kosovo government authorities in contacts with European governments and airlines to establish direct air links with European capitals. This would facilitate the return of Kosovar Albanians living in the diaspora. Develop Pristina airport so that it can handle such service.
- An AID program to train representatives of the leading political parties in modern polling and scientific sampling techniques.
- An expanded AID program working through NGO's to train the leadership of political parties in Kosovo in campaign techniques, etc.
- U.S. government support in establishing a Kosovo-American enterprise fund, modeled such existing organizations as the PAEF (Polish American Enterprise Fund). Purpose is

* ⇒ already offered to Kosovars.

to mobilize and direct private investment, particularly by Albanian Americans into job creation in Kosovo.

- An AID program to assist the government of Kosovo in developing a government program to encourage and assist in the return of Kosovars from the diaspora.

For 3/3/99 Meeting with Albanian-Americans

Question: Will the US allow the text of the interim settlement to be changed after it is agreed by the Kosovar Albanians?

Answer:

- We believe that the two sides should accept the whole package that emerged at Rambouillet. It is, in our judgement, a fair and balanced agreement.
- Early Kosovar Albanian acceptance of the settlement will allow us to place maximum pressure on Belgrade to sign the text as written.
- If both sides agree to technical changes at Evreux, we will be prepared to consider them. However we are not prepared to re-negotiate any substantive points in either the political or security chapters.

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

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U.S. Statements

Divider Title: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 19, 1999

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The East Room

4:01 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, as all of you know, we have been involved in an intensive effort to end the conflict in Kosovo for many weeks now. With our NATO allies and with Russia, we proposed a peace agreement to stop the killing and give the people of Kosovo the self-determination and government they need and to which they are entitled under the constitution of their government.

Yesterday, the Kosovar Albanians signed that agreement. Even though they have not obtained all they seek, even as their people remain under attack, they've had the vision to see that a just peace is better than an unwinnable war. Now only President Milosevic stands in the way of peace.

Today the peace talks were adjourned because the Serbian negotiators refused even to discuss key elements of the peace plan. NATO has warned President Milosevic to end his intransigence and repression, or face military action.

Our allies are strongly united behind this course. We are prepared, and so are they, to carry it out. Today I reviewed our planning with my senior advisors and met with many members of Congress. As we prepare to act we need to remember the lessons we have learned in the Balkans. We should remember the horror of the war in Bosnia, the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children, the faces of young men behind barbed wire, the despairing voices of those who thought nothing could be done. It took precious time to achieve allied unity there, but when we did, our firmness ended all that. Bosnia is now at peace.

We should remember the thousands of people facing cold and hunger in the hills of Kosovo last fall. Firmness ended that as well. We should remember what happened in the village of Racak back in January -- innocent men, women and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire -- not because of anything they had done, but because of who they were.

Now, roughly 40,000 Serbian troops and police are massing in and around Kosovo. Our firmness is the only thing standing between them and countless more villages like Racak -- full of people without protection, even though they have now chosen peace.

Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies, and save lives.

We must also understand our stake in peace in the Balkans, and in Kosovo. This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much more. This is a conflict with no natural boundaries. It threatens our national interests. If it continues, it will push refugees across borders, and draw in neighboring countries. It will undermine the credibility of NATO, on which stability in Europe and our own credibility depend. It will likely reignite the historical animosities, including those that can embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey. These divisions still have the potential to make the next century a truly violent one for that part of the world that straddles Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

Unquestionably, there are risks in military action, if that becomes necessary. U.S. and other NATO pilots will be in harm's way. The Serbs have a strong air defense system. But we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction. If we don't act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not be able to contain it without far greater risk and cost. I believe the real challenge of our foreign policy today is to deal with problems before they do permanent harm to our vital interests. That is what we must do in Kosovo.

Let me just make one other statement about this. One of the things that I wanted to do when I became President is to take advantage of this moment in history to build an alliance with Europe for the 21st century, with a Europe undivided, strong, secure, prosperous and at peace. That's why I have

supported the unification of Europe financially, politically, economically. That is why I've supported the expansion of NATO and a redefinition of its missions.

What are the challenges to our realizing that dream? The challenge of a successful partnership with Russia that succeeds in its own mission; the challenge of a resolution of the difficulties between Greece and Turkey so that Turkey becomes an ally of Europe in the West for the long-term; and the challenge of instability in the Balkans -- in different ways, all those things are at stake here.

I honestly believe that by acting now we can help to give our children and our grandchildren a Europe that is more united, more democratic, more peaceful, more prosperous, and a better partner for the United States for a long time to come.

I will say again to Mr. Milosevic, as I did in Bosnia, I do not want to put a single American pilot into the air; I do not want anyone else to die in the Balkans; I do not want a conflict. I would give anything to be here talking about something else today. But a part of my responsibility is to try to leave to my successors, and to our country in the 21st century, an environment in Europe that is stable, humane and secure. It will be a big part of America's future.

Thank you very much. Mr. Hunt?

Q Mr. President, as you mentioned, Yugoslav forces seem to be mobilizing for war in Kosovo, despite the warnings of NATO air strikes. After so many threats in the past, why should President Milosevic take this one seriously? And is there a deadline for him to comply? And is it your intention to keep pounding Serb targets until he agrees to your peace terms?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there are several questions there, but let me say, I think he should take this seriously, because we meant -- we were serious in Bosnia. And it was the combined impact of NATO's action in Bosnia, plus the reversals they sustained on the ground in fighting, plus the economic embargo, that led them to conclude that peace was the better course.

Now, he says here that this is not like what happened last fall, that this threatens Serbia's sovereignty to have a multinational force on the ground in Kosovo. But he has put that at risk by his decade -- and I want to reemphasize that --

his decade of denial of the autonomy to which the Kosovars are legally entitled as a part of Serbia.

My intention would be to do whatever is possible, first of all, to weaken his ability to massacre them, to have another Bosnia; and secondly, to do all that I can to induce him to take -- it is not my peace agreement. It was an agreement worked out, and negotiated, and argued over, with all the parties' concerns being taken into account.

I will say again -- for the longest time, we did not believe that either side would take this agreement. And the fact that the Kosovar Albanians did it I think reflects foresight and wisdom on their part. They did not get everything they wanted. And in a peace agreement, nobody ever gets everything they want. We've seen it in the Middle East, in Northern Ireland, everywhere else.

So it is not my agreement. It is the best agreement that all the parties can get to give us a chance to go forward without bloodshed. I believe, also, as I have said publicly to Mr. Milosevic and to the Serbs, it is their best chance to keep Kosovo as a part of Serbia and as a part of Yugoslavia. And so I would hope that the agreement could be accepted, and I'll do what I can to see that it is.

Q And the deadline, sir -- is there one?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to discuss that. We're working on that. I expect to be working on this all weekend.

Helen.

Q Mr. President, how long have you known that the Chinese were stealing our nuclear secrets? Is there any trust left between the two nations? And some Republicans are saying that you deliberately suppressed the information from the American people because of the election and your trade goals.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me try to respond to all those things. First of all, the latter charge is simply untrue. We were notified -- Mr. Berger was notified sometime in 1996 of the possibility that security had been breached at the labs, the Energy Department labs where a lot of our nuclear work is done, in the mid-'80s -- not in the 1990s, but in the mid-'80s -- and that there was an investigation being undertaken by the FBI.

And, finally, sir, you mentioned the spying in the 1980s, or the alleged spying in the 1980s. Can you assure the American people that under your watch, no valuable nuclear secrets were lost?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you asked several questions there. Let me say, first of all, it's my understanding that the Energy Department has fully cooperated with the FBI in investigating the alleged breach in the mid-'80s, including the person who was suspected. That is my understanding.

On the question of what recommendations were implemented by whom, when, that's what I've asked for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Senator Rudman to review, to report to me on, as well as to make further recommendations.

I can tell you that I have -- what I said about the espionage was that it is my understanding that the investigation has not yet determined for sure that espionage occurred. That does not mean that there was not a faulty security situation at the lab. The security procedures were too weak for years and years and years, for a very long time. And I believe that we are aggressively moving to correct that and a lot of changes have been made. I think Secretary Richardson has been quite vigorous in that regard.

The chronology about who did what, when, I think it's more important to have an independent analysis of that, which is why I asked the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to do that.

Now, you asked me another question, which is can I tell you that there has been no espionage at the labs since I have been President. I can tell you that no one has reported to me that they suspect such a thing has occurred.

Q Mr. President, you met this morning with members of Congress. And afterward, some of them came out and said that they had trouble imagining how you could justify air strikes in Kosovo unless the Serbs launched a new offensive first. In fact, Senator Nickles actually suggested that it might take a significant massacre before such a move would get public support.

In your mind, does the mere fact that the Serbs refused to sign a peace treaty justify air strikes? Or do you think they need to -- if they took military action, only then you could act?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, first, I believe they have already taken provocative actions. And there was, in the very recent past, the massacre at the village that I mentioned in my opening statement. Plus, there is the long unquestioned record of atrocity in Bosnia.

So what we have tried to do along -- and, frankly, the Russians have been with us in this; I don't mean that they support military action, but they've been with us in the peace process -- is we could see that the same thing that happened in Bosnia and that had happened to some extent in Kosovo already, and had already produced tens of thousands of refugees in Kosovo, was going to happen there. And it seems to me that if we know that, and if we have a NATO action order predicated on the implementation of the peace process, and the failure to do it triggering reaction, that we ought to do what we can to prevent further atrocities.

I understand what Senator Nickles was saying -- I think he was saying that the American public has not seen the sort of atrocities there they saw in Bosnia, that that is not fresh in people's minds. But with all the troops that have been massed, and what we know about their plans and what they have publicly said about them, I would hate to think that we'd have to see a lot of other little children die before we could do what seems to be, to me, clearly the right thing to do to prevent it.

Q So you would act first then? I mean --

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it's accurate to say we're acting first. I think they have acted first. They have massed their troops, they have continued to take aggressive action. They have already leveled one village in the recent past and killed a lot of innocent people. I do not believe that we ought to have to have thousands more people slaughtered and buried in open soccer fields before we do something. I think that would be unfortunate if we had said we have to have a lot more victims before we can stop what we know is about to happen.

Wolf.

Q Mr. President, there has been a lot of people in New York State who have spoken with your wife who seemed to be pretty much convinced she wants to run for the Senate seat next year. A, how do you feel about that, do you think she would be a good senator? And as part of the broader question involving

Q Mr. President, it seems you're on the verge of committing U.S. forces to combat without a clear definition of your threshold for doing so. In January, Serb troops massacred 44 civilians. You called it murder and demanded that the Serb forces withdraw. They did not. Last month, you said it would be a mistake to extend the deadline, but the deadline passed. Last week, your administration said atrocities would be punished, and then after that a bomb went off in a Kosovo market and killed numerous children. What level of atrocities, sir, is a sufficient trigger? What is your threshold?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you've just made my case. I think that the threshold has been crossed. But when I said that the deadline should not be extended, Mr. Pelley, what I said was that those of us who were trying to shepherd the process should not extend the deadline. When the parties themselves asked for a delay, that's an entirely different kettle of fish. The rest of us can't be so patronizing that we can't say to both sides they had no right to ask for a delay. They asked, themselves, for a delay, and I thought it was the right thing to do. I still believe that it was the right thing to do. And it did lead to one side accepting the agreement.

You have made another point, which I did not make in my remarks, but I would like to make, based on the factual statements you made -- everything you said was right, all the factual things you've cited -- which is that there are, basically, two grounds on which, in my judgment, NATO could properly take action. One is the fact that we have already said that if the peace agreement were accepted by the Kosovars, but not by the Serbs, we would take action to try to minimize the ability of the Serbs just to overrun and slaughter the Kosovars. That's the first thing I said.

The second thing, what you said is quite right. While our threat of force last year did result in the drastic reduction of the tension and a lot of the refugees going home, it is absolutely true that there have been actions taken since then and forced movements since then that would trigger the other NATO action order to use force. The reason that has not been done, frankly, is because the peace process was going on and we knew that if we could just get an agreement from both sides that we could end the violence and we wouldn't have to act under either ground.

So from my point of view, as I made clear to the Congress today, I think the threshold for their conduct has already been crossed.

John?

THE PRESIDENT: Sir, if I might follow up -- with the OSCE monitors leaving tonight, if Serbian forces move into Kosovo, will that trigger NATO strikes?

THE PRESIDENT: I've already said, I do not believe that -- I think that whatever threshold they need to cross has been crossed. I think that, in view of the present state of things, it would be better if I did not say any more about any particular plans we might have.

Q Sir, George Stephanopoulos has written a book that contains some tough and fairly personal criticism of you. Earlier, Dick Morris had written a somewhat similar book. How much pain do these judgments by former aides cause you? And do you consider it a betrayal for people to write books on the history of your administration while you're still in office?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, like I said last night, I haven't read it. So I have absorbed no pain, since I haven't read either one of the books, but I -- or even any articles about it. I don't think that furthers the commitment I made to the American people to focus on their business and their future.

What I will say is that I very much value the loyalty and service I have received from the overwhelming majority of the people who have worked here in the White House and in the Cabinet and in the administration, often under positions of almost unprecedented pressure. And I think that very often that kind of loyalty goes unrecognized, but it is not unappreciated by me.

I remember once, in the difficult days of early 1995, a scholar of the presidency came here and said that I was a most fortunate person because I had enjoyed the most loyal Cabinet since Thomas Jefferson's second administration. It took my breath away when he said it, but the more I thought about it and the more I read about what had happened between this time and Mr. Jefferson's, the more I realized he was probably accurate. All I can tell you is I am profoundly grateful for the service and the loyalty that I have received, that our cause has

question that he has been integral to all the good things that have happened in this administration.

Q Mr. President, many young Americans learn the importance of telling the truth based on an allegory about our very first President -- George Washington reportedly said, "I cannot tell a lie." What do you think your legacy will be about lying? And how important do you think it is to tell the truth, especially under oath?

THE PRESIDENT: I think it's very important, and I think that what young people will learn from my experience is that even Presidents have to do that. And that there are consequences when you don't.

But I also think that there will be a box score, and there will be that one negative, and then there will be the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of times when the record will show that I did not abuse my authority as President, that I was truthful with the American people; and scores and scores of allegations were made against me, and widely publicized without any regard to whether they were true or not -- most of them have already been actually proved false. And it's very hard to disprove every false allegation against you.

But we have had more success, frankly, than I was afraid we would when we started. So I would hope that there would be a higher regard for truth-telling by all people in public life, and all those who report on it. I think it would be a very good thing.

Q Sir, you said on Kosovo that if we don't act, the war will spread. That's very similar to what we said when we went into Bosnia several years ago. Our troops are still there. How can you assure the American people that we're not getting into a quagmire in Bosnia?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, first of all, in Bosnia we have brought about 70 percent of our troops home. It has not been a quagmire. I told the American people we might well have some loss of life there, but I was convinced we would lose fewer lives and do more good over the long run if we intervened when we did.

I feel the same way about Kosovo. The argument that I tried to make for our putting troops there, if we could reach a peace agreement, was that we were moving in the right direction,

the Europeans had been willing to shoulder a much bigger share of the responsibility, we were only going to be asked to put up about, oh, 15 percent of the troops.

But I don't want to get in the position in Kosovo that I was in in Bosnia, where the Pentagon came to me with a very honest estimate of when they thought we could finish. And we turned out to be wrong about that. We were not able to stabilize the situation as quickly as we thought we could. And this business in Kosovo is not helping any. Keep in mind, there could be some ramifications in Bosnia, as well as in Macedonia, where we have troops.

So I can just tell you that I think that we have tried to limit our involvement, we have tried to limit our mission, and we will conclude it as quickly as we can. I think that in all these cases, you have to ask yourself, what will be the cost and the duration of involvement and the consequences if we do not move. And I have asked myself that question as well.

Again, I would say to you, I would not be doing this if I did not think, number one, whenever we can stop a humanitarian disaster at an acceptable price, we ought to do it. Two, I'm convinced we'll be dragged into this thing under worse circumstances at greater cost if we don't act. And three, this is, to me, a critical part of the objective I brought to the presidency of trying to leave office with an alliance between the United States and a more unified, more prosperous, more peaceful, more stable Europe. And this is one of the big three questions still hanging out there, as I said in my opening remarks, and I'm trying to resolve this.

April. And then Mr. King.

Q Mr. President, for many years, civil rights leaders have called for White House help in cases of police brutality and police profiling. Now, civil rights leaders say more needs to be done, like opening old brutality cases. Will you listen to those calls and expand your recent proposals allowing that, and when will you receive your completed draft of the Race Book?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me answer the second question first because it's an easier question to dispose of. I have received and gone over a number of drafts of the Race Book and I'm fairly pleased with where it's going. And one of the things we'll attempt to address is this whole issue of civil rights and law enforcement. And I would hope that it will be ready sometime in

Cavalese events. But I ask you to make an effort, could you please very sincerely say to us, are you satisfied with the answer given by President Clinton on this specific point, on the Cavalese tragedy?

And I'd like to ask President Clinton, were you expecting a verdict of acquittal on this case? Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA: Let me repeat, I appreciated President Clinton's words very much, and the commitment he has taken. I consider them to be serious commitment. We shall say we are satisfied when whoever is responsible for what happened is found guilty and punished. With so many casualties, with so many deaths, you can hardly ever say you are satisfied. It is a word I cannot use. Let me say very clearly that I have appreciated very much, and I think we should appreciate, the great human sincerity with which President Clinton has shared this tragedy, with not arrogance, with no sense of detachment.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir, let me say again, because the person involved in that court-martial is facing another action, and because there is yet another action against another person who was in the plane, another trial pending, I cannot comment on what my reaction to the verdict was, because anything I say, under our law, that goes across the airwaves, could be inferred one way or the other to have an impact on a pending proceeding, in ways that would be disastrous for what I think we all want, which is an orderly and just process.

Helen?

Q Mr. President, I have a couple of foreign policy questions. Do you expect a breakthrough on Kosovo -- especially in view of -- the policy seems to be attacking or threatening Serbia and then retreating, it's constant. And my other question is, how can you justify chipping away at the ABM Treaty, which helped keep the peace during the Cold War, and pour billions and billions into a Star Wars defense against the possibility that starving North Korea might fire a missile at us?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all -- (laughter) -- you know, she's been doing this for quite a long time. (Laughter.) And it's not a fair fight, she's better at it than I am.

Let me, first of all, say about Kosovo, I don't think it's fair to say that NATO threatens and backs away. We took

military action in Bosnia, which led directly to the peace. So I don't think Mr. Milosevic is under any illusion that if NATO has an action order outstanding, that we won't activate it. And I would be astonished to believe that our allies would back away from a commitment we had made.

I think what happened at Rambouillet was quite important, and justified the request not of Serbia, but of both parties -- both parties -- for some more time to try to sell this agreement, to ruminate on it, to decide how to respond to it. The Kosovars themselves wanted that. Finally we have an agreement not in every single point, but in large measure, between the Serbs and the Kosovars on what the nature of autonomy would be over the next three years. That's quite an astonishing achievement.

And so my perception is quite the reverse. I think we were facing a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo last summer. We came in with the threat of force and it worked and we averted it. And we didn't have to use force because we averted the tragedy, we got what we wanted. Were there violations of the cease-fire? Yes, but they were violations from both sides.

And there were problems there. But that's why we started this new process with a new NATO action order. It became clear we had to do more because, particularly, of the terrible killings in one village in Kosovo, that were precipitated by the Serbs.

Now, I do not believe that at least at the present point Mr. Milosevic could be under any illusion, based on what happened in Bosnia that -- from the point of the view of the United States, anyway, and what NATO has said -- that we will keep our word. And I think we did the right thing to give both parties the time they asked for at Rambouillet to try to figure out how to get to "yes." The most important thing here is how to get to "yes." It's a good agreement. It will save lives. It will stabilize Kosovo. It will move us toward genuine autonomy, which was working there, I might add, before it was taken away a decade ago.

Now, on the ABM Treaty, let me say, doing the research on a missile defense system, which is not a violation of ABM treaty -- it is theoretically possible that we could develop a missile defense system that, either by its nature or by where it was deployed, would be a violation of the AMB Treaty. I, personally, have told the Russians over and over again I have no

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NATO

Divider Title: _____

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Subject: KOSOVO: GUIDANCE FOR MARCH 21 NAC
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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MSGTO: RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 1288
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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By W NARA, Date 5/1/2024

2008-0904-F.3

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/18/09

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MARR, NAC, NATO, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: GUIDANCE FOR MARCH 21 NAC

REF: USNATO 804

CLASSIFIED BY JAMES SWIQERT, ACTING EUR DAS, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (C) NIACT JUSTIFICATION: THIS GUIDANCE IS NEEDED AT USNATO FOR A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON SUNDAY, MARCH 21.

2. (C) ON MARCH 21, MISSION SHOULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK WITH KEY ALLIES AND AT THE NAC FOR THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE NAC AT A MEETING ON MONDAY, MARCH 22:

-- THE NAC SHOULD AUTHORIZE SYG SOLANA TO TURN OVER THE KEY FOR PHASE 1 OF THE AIR STRIKES TO SACEUR.

-- THE NAC SHOULD DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, CONSISTENT WITH THE JANUARY 30 DECISION AND IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ALL ALLIES, TO IMPLEMENT, SUSPEND, OR TERMINATE PHASE 2 OF THE PHASED AIR OPERATION AND RESPONSES TO FRY RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST NATO FORCES OR CONTINUED LARGE-SCALE REPRESSION IN KOSOVO, TO DETERMINE THEIR SCOPE, SCAE, AND APPLICATION.

3. (C) FOLLOWING THE NAC ON MONDAY, SYG SOLANA SHOULD MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT, INCORPORATING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE SYG HAS COMPLETED CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ALLIES AND HAS DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO SACEUR TO CONDUCT AIR STRIKES AGAINST THE FRY IN RESPONSE TO BELGRADE'S CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE AND REPRESSION.

-- THE NAC HAS DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO SYG SOLANA, CONSISTENT WITH THE JANUARY 30 DECISION AND IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ALL ALLIES, TO AUTHORIZE FURTHER AIR STRIKES, IF THE FRY RETALIATES AGAINST NATO FORCES OR CONTINUES LARGE-SCALE REPRESSION IN KOSOVO.

-- NATO'S AIR STRIKES WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL. THEIR

OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO DEMONSTRATE NATO'S RESOLVE, TO DETER FURTHER ATTACKS ON THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, AND TO DAMAGE BELGRADE'S CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT SUCH ATTACKS.

4. (C) MISSION SHOULD NOT/NOT BRIEF ON THE HOLBROOKE MISSION UNTIL IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED. WASHINGTON DOES NOT PLAN TO ANNOUNCE THE HOLBROOKE MISSION UNTIL HIS APPOINTMENT IS SET WITH MILOSEVIC.

5. (U) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECSTATE 46778

PARISSVC:

INFO: USIS IPS STRASBOU DAO UNESCO CHRP

PARISSVA:

ACTION: POL

INFO: USIS DCM DAO AMB CHRP

XDMS:

ACTION: POL

INFO: READ LABO DAO

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By *vr* NARA, Date *5/1/02* *2008-08-04 - F.3*

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RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 8669

RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 4168

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RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 5934

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RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 6823

RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 3739

RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//

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RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 046778

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/09

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MARR, NAG, NATO, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: GUIDANCE FOR IMMEDIATE NMA DEVELOPMENT OF
NEW CONTINGENCY RESPONSE OPTIONS

CLASSIFIED BY E. ANTHONY WAYNE, EUR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (c) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE FOR USNATO AND ALL NATO CAPITAL POSTS.

2. (c) AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, MISSION SHOULD REQUEST A MEETING OF THE NAC TO SEEK ALLIED CONSENSUS ON TASKING NMAS TO DEVELOP IMMEDIATELY TWO NEW CONTINGENCY RESPONSE OPTIONS AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS 3 THROUGH 7. NMAS SHOULD BE TASKED TO COMPLETE PLANNING FOR THESE OPTIONS BY THE END OF THIS WEEK. NATO CAPITAL POSTS SHOULD DEMARCHE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON MARCH 15 AND OUTLINE THE NEED FOR AND THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW CONTINGENCY OPTIONS AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS 3 THROUGH 7 AND SEEK HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.

3. (c) IN THE EVENT NATO MOVES TO AIR OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF CONTINUED SERB INTRANSIGENCE, NATO MUST BE FULLY PREPARED WITH FLEXIBLE, STRUCTURED CAPABILITIES, TO DETER A POSSIBLE NEW SERB OFFENSIVE IN KOSOVO AND/OR FRY ATTACKS AGAINST CURRENTLY DEPLOYED NATO AND PARTNER FORCES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. NATO MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO DETER AND/OR REPEL FRY ATTACKS ON ITS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED GROUND FORCES IN RESPONSE TO NATO AIR OPERATIONS.

4. (c) MISSION SHOULD PRESS FOR A NAC TASKING TO NMAS FOR TWO CONTINGENCY RESPONSE OPTIONS WHICH MUST BE FULLY PREPARED PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AIR OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO TWO LIKELY SERB PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS:

-- RENEWED VIOLENT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS.

-- FRY ATTACK AGAINST DEPLOYED NATO AND PARTNER FORCES IN MACEDONIA, BOSNIA OR NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

5. (c) THESE TWO NEW CONTINGENCY OPTIONS SHOULD BE EXECUTABLE WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE TRIGGER EVENT, UTILIZING IN PLACE FORCES.

6. (c) NATO RESPONSE TO VIOLENT AGGRESSION SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO DEGRADE THE ABILITY TO SUSTAIN VIOLENT ACTIONS AND DETER FRY WILL AND ABILITY TO REINITIATE IT. THE PRIMARY FOCUS SHOULD BE ON MILITARY/MUP UNITS DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE AGGRESSION AS WELL AS C2 ORGANIZATIONS, SUPPORTING LOGISTICS FACILITIES AND THE IADS STRUCTURE REQUIRED TO SAFELY EXECUTE THE NATO RESPONSE.

7. (c) NATO RESPONSE TO A SERB ATTACK AGAINST NATO FORCES MUST BE DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE NATO'S IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL RESOLVE AND ABILITY TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY TO ATTACK AGAINST ITS FORCES. IT MUST BE A QUICK, ROBUST AND FORCEFUL STRIKE AGAINST THE OFFENDING FORCE AS WELL AS THE PRIMARY NATIONAL LEVEL C2, IADS, HIGH IMPACT INFRASTRUCTURE,

AND NATIONAL POWER PROJECTION RESOURCES.

8. (U) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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COMMUNIQUE
PR (1999) 20

19 February/fév

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
DR. JAVIER SOLANA
ON BEHALF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL**

The Alliance today recalls the demands set out in its statement of 30 January 1999, including the necessity of compliance by all parties involved with the appropriate UN Security Council Resolutions.

It expresses its full support to the efforts of the Contact Group to secure an interim political settlement for Kosovo at Rambouillet which provides for a substantially greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo, reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, protects the rights of all national communities, and contains effective measures for its implementation including an international military presence.

The deadline set by the Contact Group for the parties to come to an agreement is approaching fast, underlining the urgency of finding a peaceful solution. They must therefore accept their responsibilities and show the maximum flexibility and political will to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

The crisis in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region. NATO's strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe.

A viable political settlement must be guaranteed by an international military presence. Accordingly, the Alliance is prepared, following acceptance by the parties, to lead a multinational peacekeeping force with broad participation, to implement and enforce the military aspects of an interim agreement, which include specific commitments by both parties, and to contribute to an environment which supports the OSCE and other organisations in the implementation of the civil aspects.

As clearly spelled out in the statement by the North Atlantic Council of 30 January and if no agreement is reached by the deadline set by the Contact Group, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary – in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands – to avert a humanitarian catastrophe by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement. These include the use of air strikes as well as other appropriate measures.

NATO has taken appropriate steps to prepare its forces to ensure that they are ready in the event that military action is necessary.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. presentation	[Printed Powerpoint Slides] Kosovo Update, North Atlantic Council, 17 February 1999. [NATO] (2 pages)	02/17/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6347

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. timeline	Military Implementation Timeline. [NATO] (1 page)	02/15/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

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Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. presentations	Operation Joint Guardian Mission. [NATO] (4 pages)	02/15/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6347

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. letter	SG(99)0097. Secretary General Javier Solana to President Slobodan Milosevic. [NATO] (2 pages)	01/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. letter	SG(99)0098. Secretary General Javier Solana to Ibrahim Rugova. [NATO] (2 pages)	01/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F
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


Press
Release
(99)12

30 Jan. 1999

Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo

1. NATO reaffirms the demands set out in its statement of 28th January 1999. It stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international community, and observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions, in particular the provisions of Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203.
2. NATO gives full support to the Contact Group strategy of negotiations on an interim political settlement which are to be completed within the specified timeframe. It welcomes the Presidential Statement of the United Nations Security Council of 29th January 1999.
3. NATO recalls that those responsible for the massacre at Racak must be brought to justice and that the FRY authorities must cooperate fully with ICTY. They must also cooperate fully with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and ensure the security of its personnel.
4. The crisis in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region. NATO's strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe. Steps to this end must include acceptance by both parties of the summons to begin negotiations at Rambouillet by 6 February 1999 and the completion of the negotiations on an interim political settlement within the specified timeframe; full and immediate observance by both parties of the cease-fire and by the FRY authorities of their commitments to NATO, including by bringing VJ and Police/Special Police force levels, force posture and activities into strict compliance with the NATO/FRY agreement of 25 October 1998; and the ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in accordance with these commitments.
5. If these steps are not taken, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement. The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY territory. The NATO Secretary General will take full account of the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all Kosovar armed elements in and around Kosovo in reaching his decision on military action. NATO will take all appropriate measures in case of a failure by the Kosovar Albanian side to comply with the demands of the international community.
6. NATO is also studying how to support measures to curb arms smuggling into Kosovo.
7. NATO's decisions today contribute to creating the conditions for a rapid and successful negotiation on an interim political settlement which provides for an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserves the territorial integrity of the FRY and protects the rights of all ethnic groups. NATO is resolved to persevere until the violence in Kosovo has ended, and a political solution has been reached.



NATO HQ
Brussels

Statement to the Press

30 Jan. 1999

by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana

Good evening Ladies and Gentlemen,

NATO stands ready to act. We rule out no option to ensure full respect by both sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international community.

We welcome the results of the Contact Group meeting. NATO gives full support to the Contact Group strategy of negotiations. We will put all of our capabilities behind this push for an interim political settlement.



(61Kb)

Today, we have made clear that we are maintaining all of our demands on both sides and which I gave in my warning last Thursday evening.



(61Kb)

If these demands are not met, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary. Therefore, the Council has agreed today that I may authorise air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory.

I will take my decision in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement.

I will also take full account of the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all Kosovar armed elements in and around Kosovo in reaching my decision on military action. NATO will take all appropriate measures in case of a failure by the Kosovar Albanian side to comply with the demands of the international community.

NATO is studying how to support measures to curb arms smuggling into Kosovo.

NATO's decisions today contribute to creating the conditions for a rapid and successful negotiation on an interim political settlement which provides for an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserves the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and protects the rights of all ethnic groups. NATO is resolved to persevere until the violence in Kosovo has ended, and a political solution has been reached.



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PRESS RELEASE (99)11

28 January 1999

**STATEMENT TO THE PRESS
BY NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
DR. JAVIER SOLANA**

Good Evening Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to make the following statement on behalf of the North Atlantic Council:

1. NATO fully supports the early conclusion of a political settlement under the mediation of the Contact Group, which will provide an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserve the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and protect the rights of all ethnic groups.
2. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities must immediately bring the Yugoslav Army and the Special Police force levels, posture and actions into strict compliance with their commitments to NATO on 25 October 1998 and end the excessive and disproportionate use of force in accordance with these commitments. All Kosovar armed elements must immediately cease hostilities and any provocative actions, including hostage taking. All parties must end violence and pursue their goals by peaceful means only.
3. The appropriate authorities in Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian leadership must agree to the proposals to be issued by the Contact Group for completing an interim political settlement within the timeframe to be established.
4. NATO demands that the parties to the conflict in Kosovo cooperate fully with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Verification Mission, ensure the security of its personnel and provide full freedom of movement and lift all restrictions on institutions monitoring the situation in Kosovo. We demand that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities fully respect all commitments undertaken in relation to the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and ensure that Ambassador Walker is able to continue to carry out his responsibilities fully as Head of the Kosovo Verification Mission.
5. NATO fully supports and shares the demands of the international community that the parties must cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia including by granting immediate and unrestricted

access to its representatives to carry out their investigation of the Racak massacre and by ensuring the safety of its personnel. We also demand that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities take immediate steps to ensure that those responsible for the massacre are brought to justice.

6. We reaffirm our support to international efforts to bring peace to Kosovo and to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, including by the Security Council of the United Nations, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the countries of the region, and the current efforts of the Contact Group. NATO stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides of the demands of the international community, and in particular observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions. NATO is also intensively studying how to support measures to curb arms smuggling into Kosovo. It calls upon the international community, particularly neighbouring countries, to take all necessary steps to prevent the smuggling of arms and will work with other international bodies to this end.
7. In addition to the measures implemented last week, the North Atlantic Council has decided to increase its military preparedness to ensure that the demands of the international community are met. The North Atlantic Council will follow developments closely and will decide on further measures in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements and their response to the Contact Group's demands.

That concludes the statement of the North Atlantic Council.

I would like to add for my own part that we are at a critical turning point in the Kosovo crisis. The next few days will be decisive. What we have seen in Yugoslavia during the past decade is that it is very difficult to stop internal conflicts if the international community is not willing to use force – and when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the Former Yugoslavia.

The Contact Group meeting in London tomorrow will launch an important initiative. It will be fully backed by NATO's military capabilities. We are ready to act, if necessary. The parties must seize this opportunity. It is the only way to overcome the Kosovo conflict and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. The entire international community has come together to push for a diplomatic solution. You have seen from the visit of the United Nations Secretary General to NATO earlier today that the United Nations shares our determination and objectives. In this endeavour, NATO has a key role to play and will make a full contribution – but the parties must finally face up to their responsibilities. We will keep them under strong pressure until they do so. The North Atlantic Council will be meeting round the clock and we will be ready to take further measures as the situation develops.

*NATO Information is available on Internet
<http://www.nato.int>
Further information can be requested by e-mail:
NATODOC@HQ.NATO.INT*

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TELEFAX/TELECOPIEURS : 707 50 57 - 707 50 58****PRESS RELEASE (99)3**

17 January 1999

**STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, DR JAVIER SOLANA ON
BEHALF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL FOLLOWING ITS MEETING ON SUNDAY,
17TH JANUARY 1999**

- The Council condemns the massacre of Kosovar Albanians that was carried out in the village of Racak last Friday. This represents a **flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.**
- The Council calls on the Yugoslav Authorities to **cooperate fully with the ICTY in accordance with UN resolutions, including by granting immediate and unrestricted access to Chief Prosecutor Arbour, and international investigators including Finnish forensic experts.** We also call on the FRY Authorities to ensure the security of the ICTY personnel.
- The Council demands that the Government of the FRY take immediate steps to ensure that those responsible for this massacre are brought to justice. **The names of those who participated in the killing and those who gave the orders must be divulged and they must be handed over to the ICTY for prosecution if requested.**
- Milosevic must comply with all his commitments to NATO and to the OSCE which are based on UNSC Resolution 1199.
- The FRY must bring VJ and MUP force levels and posture into compliance with its commitments to the Alliance last October. **As the signatory of this agreement, President Milosevic is responsible for ensuring that these force levels are respected. He is also personally responsible for the behaviour of his security forces.**
- The North Atlantic Council received briefings from the Chairman of the Military Committee and SACEUR on the military situation and on the status of NATO planning. **It reaffirmed that the ACTORDS for air operations remain in effect.**
- The North Atlantic Council has decided to send the Chairman of the Military Committee and SACEUR to Belgrade to impress upon the Yugoslav Authorities the gravity of the situation and their obligation to respect all their commitments to NATO, and to report back to the NAC. **The Chairman of the Military Committee and SACEUR will also**

-2-

reaffirm NATO's support to international efforts to bring peace to the region, including by the United Nations, OSCE and the European Union.

- The Council fully supports the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head, Ambassador Walker. It expresses its strong condemnation of the attack against two members of this mission last Friday and calls for those responsible to be brought to justice.
- The Council insists that the FRY authorities respect their obligations to ensure the security of the verifiers. Both sides must refrain from actions that put OSCE verifiers in danger.
- Finally, NATO condemns all acts of violence. It calls on both sides to cease hostilities immediately and to begin negotiations towards a lasting political solution which provides greater autonomy for Kosovo and which preserves the territorial integrity of the FRY.

-2-

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	SG(98)1020. To Permanent Representatives and Heads of Missions of the Three Invited Countries from Secretary General Solana. Subject: NATO-Kosovo Verification Mission. [NATO] (1 page)	10/16/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6347

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. paper	NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [NATO] (7 pages)	10/16/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. letter	SG/98/1013wp. Secretary General Javier Solana to President to Slobodan Milosevic. [NATO] (2 pages)	10/15/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schutle, Gregory)
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008a. letter	SG(98)1068. Permanent Representatives and Heads of Mission of the Three Invited Countries. Subject: Report of meeting between CMC, SACEUR, and FRY authorities (Belgrade, 24-25th October 1998). [NATO] (1 page)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

Post Racak [to] Rambouillet [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6347

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. letter	Annex 1 to SG(98)1068. General Klaus Naumann and General Wesley Clark to General Secretary Javier Solana. [NATO] (5 pages)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008c. letter	Annex 2 to SG(98)1068. Record of the Meeting in Belgrade, 25 October 1998. [NATO] (1 page)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008d. statement	Annex 3 to SG(98)1068. Statement. [NATO] (3 pages)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008e. memo	Annex 4 to SG(98)1068. Understanding Between KDOM and Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia. [NATO] (1 page)	10/25/1998	P1/b(1)

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