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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Roderick von Lipsey. Subject: Evacuation of American Citizens from FRY Background Paper for 30 Sep Kosovo PC Meeting. [Record ID: 9820840] [See rs230_002b, 2009-0983-M] (2 pages)	09/29/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. timeline	[Draft Evacuation Timeline] [Duplicate of rs230_002c, 2009-0983-M] (3 pages)	09/00/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Mary Davis to Charles Allen. Subject: RE: Input for Kosovo pol-mil memo. (2 pages)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1)
003. outline	Outline of a Possible Ultimatum. [Duplicate of rs228_001c, 2009-0983-M (1.50)] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Kosovo Pre-Settlement Pol-Mil Planning. (5 pages)	08/27/1998	P1/b(1)
005. memo	To Leonard Hawley from Robert Beecroft. Subject: Comments on NSC Kosovo Pre-Settlement POL-MIL Planning Document. (7 pages)	08/26/1998	P1/b(1)
006. email	Alexander Vershbow to Donald Bandler. Subject: Kosovo. [Likely duplicate of re: Kosovo - Time for another "endgame" strategy at vz5835_006, 2019-0935-F. See also vz5877_005, 2019-0935-F] (4 pages)	08/27/1998	P1/b(1)
007. note	[Handwritten notes. Draft of POL-MIL Settlement. Leon Input, 27 March.] (3 pages)	03/00/1998	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Politico-Military Framework for NATO Operations in Kosovo. (3 pages)	08/04/1998	P1/b(1)
009a. chart	Kosovo: Objectives, Triggers, Military Options. [Duplicate of rs228_001b, 2009-0983-M] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)

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POL-MIL Doc [4]

2008-0994-F

vz6346

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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009b. outline	Outline of a Possible Ultimatum. [Duplicate of 003 and rs228_001c, 2009-0983-M (1.50)] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)
009c. paper	Illustrative Road Map. [Duplicate of rs228_001d, 2009-0983-M] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)
010. draft	Kosovo Post-Settlement Pol-Mil Planning Policy Issues. (1 page)	09/11/1998	P1/b(1)

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SUBJECT. ISI Planning for Kosovo

PAGES 6
(INCLUDING COVER)

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Fax: (202) 401-6893

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Date: August 27, 1998

To: NSC - Jamie Metzl

Fax:

Re: IPI Planning for Kosovo

Sender: EEN - Robert E. McCarthy

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 5 PAGE(S), INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET. IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL (202) 619-4563.

**United States
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Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

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MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC - Jamie Metzl
(phone: 456-9361; room 302)

FROM: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USIA/EEN - Robert E. McCarthy

SUBJECT: IPI Planning for Kosovo

As requested at your August 25 meeting, attached is a draft public-diplomacy plan for supporting NATO military action in Kosovo prepared by the USIA team. It is divided into two parts: (a) getting agreement of our allies to undertake military action and (b) enlisting mass and elite support before and after the action.

You also asked for thoughts on specific action to be taken now. Given the centrality of NATO to success, we recommend you immediately propose to NATO coordinated planning on an information campaign to support military action in Kosovo. We must engage them early if our IPI effort is to be coherent. Because external broadcasting is so important for Serbia-Montenegro, especially for Kosovo, we also recommend you invite a representative from USIA's International Broadcasting Bureau to attend our next meeting. We would be happy to identify the right person.

Finally, please note the attached plan does not address specific programs and activities. USIA has the full range of public-diplomacy tools available, from electronic information transmission to well connected representatives in the field. Once a strategy is approved, we are prepared to move forward with dispatch.

Attachment: as stated

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PER E.O. 13526
2013-0830-14
8/2/2015 KJH

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A KOSOVO IPI STRATEGY

CONTEXT:

West Europe/NATO Members: International public support, especially from NATO allies, is critical to success of military action in Kosovo. A unilateral American step, or one that is perceived as mainly American with only grudging allied backing, would engender anti-American antipathy--the "hegemony factor." Allied support cannot be assumed, but it is obtainable. Opinion polls demonstrate West European publics believe their governments have not responded adequately to the crisis in Kosovo. Majorities would support NATO moves to ease the humanitarian crisis but most would stop short at this time of endorsing military action. Most would prefer that any action have multilateral approval; when asked directly, a narrow plurality favors a UN mandate for any NATO intervention. Polling results suggest that if political leaders explain the need and rationale for NATO action, with or without a UN mandate, they could win broad public approval.

Balkan Region: USIA survey data shows the polarization in the region and also suggests public diplomacy could be effective. A mid-August poll in Serbia indicates large majorities support Serb police actions in Kosovo and oppose any significant change in Kosovo's political status. But a small majority are willing to grant Kosovo some increased autonomy within Serbia. About four in ten believe the government should compromise on Kosovo if it meant some lifting of sanctions (43%) or in response to NATO's stationing troops in neighboring countries (37%). Yet as many or more oppose concessions. Significantly, nearly half (46%) would support compromise to end NATO air strikes, but a third (35%) would oppose. Compared to June, fewer Belgrade residents are now willing to make concessions when presented with these scenarios. Despite the recent escalation in violence, Serbs are as likely now (35%) as they were in March to support a family member going to fight to keep Kosovo part of Serbia. About four in ten would be opposed (44%). Thus, despite their views on Kosovo, fairly substantial numbers of Serbs appear willing to support changes if they will forestall/end NATO military action, and this group would be predisposed to our IPI effort. Obviously, opinion trends can be unpredictable; we must be alert for a hardening of opinion as a result of any military action.

Russia: We should recognize NATO military action in Kosovo will be a hard sell in Russia, and could have political implications that affect other U.S. interests. Russia's historic cultural and political association with the Balkan Serbs will make it particularly difficult to convince the public that military action against the FRY is justified. Moreover, Russians are already concerned about NATO enlargement and fear it may be directed at them; thus, they are unlikely to support NATO action in what is acknowledged to be FRY sovereign territory. Military action might trigger a sharp official reaction or have domestic political implications affecting our longer-term interests. That having been said, many thoughtful Russians are uncomfortable with Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. If and when a decision is made to intervene militarily in Kosovo, NATO must make the strongest possible case that such action is necessary, and let facts speak for themselves. Significant support for NATO peace keeping in Bosnia (54% of Moscow elites), in which Russians participate, gives us a solid starting point.

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0830-M (1.07)

8/2/2015 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**STRATEGY:**

This set of circumstances presents several diplomacy challenges. The first is to convince our NATO allies to take a more activist role by bringing along their publics. We can build public, and thereby government support for NATO military involvement in Kosovo by targeting major European media with stories about the growing humanitarian problem and potential refugee crisis at their doorsteps. Emphasizing the growing humanitarian/refugee crisis will also create a sense of urgency and a need to act, out of self-interest as well as humanitarian concern. Rallying allied support is a job specifically for the United States, until NATO decides to act.

Second, we have to make sure that when NATO does decide on a military course, that there is no question in the international community that this is a joint action. To do that, Secretary General Solana must have the lead in announcing NATO intentions and actions. All of the allied nations should speak in support of the NATO action, drawing on common talking points. NATO's spokesman, Jamie Shea, should be the primary source for information and explanation about alliance actions. (Obviously, individual countries would speak about their own specific military contributions, in addition to those of the alliance as a whole). USG statements should follow Secretary Solana's initial announcement, and all USG policies and actions thereafter should be characterized as support to the NATO-led mission.

To prepare for this secondary course of action, the United States should raise the need for a Kosovo public diplomacy campaign in the appropriate NATO forum. Our Public Affairs Officer at NATO HQ in Brussels is positioned to create and present an international public diplomacy plan, with NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, to the NAC for consideration and joint action. The NAC and the NATO Information Program (NATIP) are the proper institutional vehicles for launching an allied international public diplomacy effort. The primary target audiences would be publics within alliance countries (via their major media outlets), as well as publics and elites in the Balkans, Russia, and other countries with particular interest in the region, especially current members of the UN Security Council.

Obviously, the Balkans (and the FRY in particular) would be a special focus for public diplomacy effort. We should stress the same themes that we employ elsewhere (see below), but emphasize that NATO military action is designed to bring a quick and peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis and push all parties to find a political accommodation that will restore stability to the region. Currently we have excellent access to local media, but we must also be prepared for a Milosevic crackdown. In that event we can reach audiences in Serbia and Kosovo through 'spillover' effect from broadcasters in neighboring countries and via USG (and other) external broadcasting. VOA Serbian and Albanian have large audiences and VOA's new TV program "Open Studio" has a large direct-satellite viewership. If programmatically and technologically feasible, we can increase air time of VOA Albanian and VOA Serbian broadcasts. If Serbian authorities curtail local Internet service providers, we can disseminate USG policy messages by fax to local opinion leaders, NGOs, and political opposition.

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OPERATING PRINCIPLES

- The IPI message should emanate from NATO and allied sources as much as possible to illustrate broad multinational support, vice unilateral U.S. program. A formal NATO public diplomacy plan is essential to coordinate allied IPI efforts.
- The IPI message should be tailored for each major audience grouping (e.g. NATO allies, non-NATO countries, Russia, the Balkans, etc.) in order to be effective--one size will not fit all. It should also help solidify currently lukewarm allied support for a military option.
- The IPI message should be divided into a pre-ops program (initiated immediately) to build the rationale for potential NATO action as well as a post-ops package (ready to implement) to justify and explain the operation.
- IPI themes should be grounded in publicly stated policy objectives, consistently echoed throughout the USG and which are consistent with the NATO public affairs effort.

THEMES AND OBJECTIVES

PRE-OPERATION PHASE

THEMES

- Belgrade's continued use of force in Kosovo is not acceptable and cannot solve the situation. Nor can force by the UCK lead to anything but more human suffering.
- Continued unrest in Kosovo threatens the stability of the entire region. The international community has a stake in restoring calm and stability in Kosovo.
- The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is desperate and getting worse. The coming winter will bring intolerable humanitarian crisis.
- Diplomacy is the preferred tool to resolve the situation. U.S. and NATO will go the extra mile to find a peaceful solution which retains Kosovo as a part of the FRY. All the nations of the Alliance back this effort, and it has broad international support..
- NATO military action may be necessary in the face of continued diplomatic failure. The U.S. will support military action if it becomes necessary.
- Violence must be a last resort; however, military action may speed a diplomatic solution, as it spurred the parties on at Dayton.
- Belgrade's offensive military actions and undemocratic policies are largely responsible for the desperate humanitarian situation in Kosovo; Belgrade must bear responsibility for any NATO military response.

OBJECTIVES

- Make the case that NATO has exhausted every reasonable diplomatic option to resolve the Kosovo crisis peacefully. Document what has been done.
- Rally allied support for NATO military action as a legitimate, useful, option.
- Convince all parties to the conflict in Kosovo that NATO will act if they themselves do not come to a solution.
- Explain to non-members of the Alliance the justification of NATO military action.

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POST OPERATIONS PHASE

THEMES:

- The NATO military option was the only option left to avert further humanitarian disaster. The U.S., acting in concert with NATO allies, was a full participant in planning and executing the action.
- There can be no military solution to this conflict, but NATO is prepared to use military action to bring all parties to the table to come to a diplomatic settlement.
- European regional stability in general and the huge investment in Bosnian stability in particular, are protected by this operation.
- Belgrade is largely responsible--its continued offensive in Kosovo made NATO's military response necessary. However, the UCK also shares responsibility through its refusal to enter into negotiations.
- The NATO operation was lawful, proportionate, and effective in averting further humanitarian suffering. We can document careful planning to limit casualties/damage and show how strikes have relieved the humanitarian situation and deterred armed action against innocent civilians.
- NATO and the U.S. are prepared to assist with recovery efforts necessitated by the operation.
- Both Belgrade and the UCK must recognize that further military action by them will not be tolerated.

OBJECTIVES

- Stop all Serbian and UCK military and security forces' offensive activity.
- Make it possible for Kosovo refugees to return to their homes and protect them.
- Initiate meaningful negotiations for a peaceful solution.
- Preserve regional stability.
- Emphasize military operation as a concerted NATO action that has international support.

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USAID
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BHR/OTI

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fax t r a n s m i t t a l

To:

Jamie Metz

Fax #:

456-9360

From:

Nick Cox

Date:

9/3/98

Re:

Kosovo / IPI

Pages:

5 including cover

NOTES:



*U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
Office of Transition Initiatives*

M E M O R A N D U M

DATE: September 3, 1998
TO: Jamie Metzel, NSC
FROM: Nick Cox, USAID/OTI
RE: Kosovo Public Information Activities

*Rick B-lyon, 712-0962
Office of Transition Initiatives*

In looking at Kosovo, it is important to keep several broad themes in mind:

- * Kosovo is not an isolated issue. It is interrelated with and emerged from the politics in Serbia. Milosevic has consciously used the Kosovo issue to divert attention away from the deteriorating economic situation within the country and as a diversionary tactic that allows him to crack down in other areas (universities, judiciary, civil society) that represent threats to his retention of power.
- * Kosovo is a popular issue for Milosevic domestically and will not significantly weaken him or unilaterally force him into negotiations. However, he is unpopular on a host of other issues which have not been sufficiently highlighted within Serbia or abroad to have the intended effect of refocusing attention on increasing pressure on him. These wedge issues are listed below.
- * Increasing the pressure on Milosevic by placing his actions under a microscope of scrutiny will limit his ability to maneuver. So far, Milosevic has been successful at shrinking the political space available to domestic sources of opposition. These actions have not been widely reported nor criticized at the international level which is emboldening him to become even more aggressive to consolidate his grip on power.
- * Efforts to increase public information must be linked to diplomatic efforts to maintain or increase the political space available to media and civil society groups. No amount of resources will make a difference if Milosevic is free to arbitrarily deny licenses to

electronic media, harass civil society groups, and place the judiciary and universities under his thumb. He must be challenged on every level that he is cracking down. Otherwise, efforts on the ground will fail.

- * Finally, any public information efforts towards resolving the crisis in Serbia must clearly and emphatically articulate that Milosevic is the cause of Serbia's problems and that the citizens of Serbia are not targets. Otherwise, it allows Milosevic to align himself with the citizenry and portray Serbia once again as the victim being targeted by outside forces which increases his domestic support.

Specifically, there are a number of key themes which USAID has been promoting within Serbia which could be pumped up (through increased funding and greater availability of media outlets). Milosevic's current tactic is to try and bargain for removal of the economic sanctions and to join European institutions in return for negotiating on Kosovo; efforts which have so far failed. By increasing the pressure for him to address other issues of importance within Serbia and diluting the value of Kosovo as a diversion tactic, it may be possible to force him into negotiations and divert his attention so that media and civil society has greater space in which to operate.

What are the wedge issues for Milosevic?

- * Increased pressure from Montenegro. Djukonvic is using Milosevic's own legalistic tactics against him as a basis to apply pressure. Montenegro's parity with Serbia under the Yugoslavia constitution is forcing a constitutional crisis as Milosevic must bypass constitutionally established procedures to wage his war of repression. Highlighting the illegality of his actions helps to separate the issues of Milosevic and Serbia as well as providing a more solid basis for intervention. Other domestic pressure point areas include Vojvodina and the rust belt around Krusevak.
- * The deteriorating economy. The economic sanctions are hurting the country and people are suffering. Milosevic is privatizing state-owned enterprises at firesale prices to finance the intervention in Kosovo which costs approximately \$1m per day. Pensioners aren't being paid in many instances. One of our FSN's is supporting seven people on her salary.
- * Improved information about the costs of the fighting to Serbia (financial costs, international reaction, sanctions, number of Serbian soldiers being killed). Several months ago, groups of mothers protested in Belgrade and Podgorica and drove to Kosovo to protest their children being sent to fight there. The message should be that the costs outweigh any benefits to be gained.
- * Emphasizing that Serb pride is not enhanced by Kosovo -- slaughtering women and children, targeting aid workers (e.g. the three women from the Mother Theresa society), or looting and burning houses.

- * Outmigration of youth due to the economy and pessimism about the future.
- * Economic reform. Milosevic has made several pledges at reforming the economy which he has not followed through on and a thriving black market economy is developing due to the sanctions.
- * Comparing Montenegro to Serbia. Using Montenegro as a foil to illustrate that promoting democratic values and a market economy will lead to higher standards of living. Traditionally, Montenegro has been poorer than Serbia. Also comparisons with Bulgaria and Romania - also traditionally poorer.
- * Other efforts at the domestic level -- combatting radical and propagandistic reporting with more balanced information regarding Kosovo, humanizing the Kosovo issue with ordinary Serbian citizens, reporting on viable political solutions, and seeking out unexpected sources of opposition (Yugoslav military, respected elders, etc).

In reality, however, Milosevic has been the more successful one at driving wedges into the international community. He has manipulated the possibility of negotiating on Kosovo as a way to forestall more serious international action against him and to prevent a consensus from forming within the international community.

At the international level, public information efforts include:

- * Challenging Milosevic early and at every level that he cracks down in Serbia. Currently media, civil society, the judiciary, and the universities are being repressed with little to no international response.
- * Highlighting the extensive failed diplomatic efforts which have been undertaken to bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis possibly juxtaposed against a chronology of the continuing and escalating conflict in Kosovo.
- * Expansion of the regional opposition to the fighting in Kosovo.
- * Emphasizing the looming humanitarian crisis to the IDP's and refugees with the onset of winter and the financial costs to the international community.
- * Detailing Milosevic's record of lying and investigating more thoroughly his role in the Balkans conflict. Indicting him as a war criminal would present a serious case for his removal.
- * Providing space to voices of opposition from Serbia to emphasize the separation between Milosevic and the people of Serbia.

Finally, what more could the USG be doing now that we are not doing to increase public information efforts?

- * Dialogue with Yugoslav military (DOD/JCS to peers, media pieces by respected retired military leaders inside Serbia, journal critiques of military action against own citizens, etc).
- * Increase frequency of existing TV/radio/press programming (USAID grants to ANEM and other networks/civic organizations, work in Albania to moderate voices, strengthen VOA/international broadcasts throughout region, increased satellite time, etc)
- * Identify other voices in the Serbian political marketplace and give them increased visibility (Montenegrins, Vojvodinans, union/trades people, etc)
- * Expand new technologies in target markets (wireless cable, portable border broadcasts and telephone systems, satphones, etc)
- * Use satellite and on-site photography of war's destruction to inform Serb/Albanian publics of extent of damage (local media will use)

With military intervention an option under consideration by the international community, all USG parties should be ready to increase the people and the financial resources available in Serbia by a significant amount to try and resolve this issue by other means.

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SLH

Humanitarian Options in the Absence of Political Progress

The burgeoning humanitarian crisis in Kosovo is an outgrowth of the deteriorating security environment. Under some circumstances, however, it may be necessary to treat the symptoms if efforts to resolve the underlying pathology are unsuccessful. In particular, we need to look seriously at the possible need for a significantly expanded humanitarian relief effort beginning this winter in a non- or semi-permissive environment.

In the absence of progress towards a political solution in Kosovo -- and if NATO is unable or unwilling to use military power to force an end to the violence -- the scale of human suffering in the winter months could dwarf anything we have seen to date. The pressures on western governments to take action to assist those in need will be equally great. Even if the fighting in Kosovo follows the typical Balkan pattern of receding with the colder weather and the bulk of IDPs and refugees return to their homes the international community will need to provide nearly all the food and winterization materials for more than 250,000 people. In addition to strains on logistical and financial resources, international organizations and NGOs will likely experience serious political problems gaining access to areas in Kosovo where the need is greatest.

What Could be Done

There are two basic elements for direct international intervention to reinforce efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance. The international community can either supplement the on-ground delivery of assistance by **air-dropping supplies**, or it can enforce the delivery of assistance through **troops on the ground**. These elements are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually dependent. It is possible to employ either or both elements as part of a strategy for managing a humanitarian emergency in Kosovo.

Air Drops

It is unlikely that either air drops or troop deployments will be possible without at least some cooperation from Belgrade authorities and the tacit approval of President Milosevic. C-130s -- which can only deliver limited supplies by **air drop** but which can also reach people in isolated areas -- are extremely vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire and the Yugoslav Army (VJ) has a sophisticated air defense system. It will be important not only to secure permission from Belgrade for overflights, but also to establish a coordinating mechanism with VJ authorities to provide specific flight plans and time-on-target information to minimize the possibility of an incident.

The ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) might also choose to target aircraft dropping relief supplies -- either in the hope of pinning the blame on the Serb side or out of anger at what they will see as a policy of "feeding people to be killed." We have no information that the UCK has anything other than light weaponry, but we have heard

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from a number of sources that they are attempting to procure MANPADs on the black market. UCK behavior cannot be accurately predicted.

A variant of the air drop element would be to land larger military transport planes loaded with relief supplies at Pristina airport for distribution by UNHCR and NGOs. While this would improve the logistics for aid organizations -- and provide something of a psychological boost to the Albanian population -- getting the food into Kosovo is not the most significant bottleneck. At this point, access to the IDPs in the interior is the most serious restriction on the delivery of assistance. Road access, which is difficult now, will be even more problematic in the winter months. The Serbs are unlikely to plow the roads.

Troops

By themselves, air drops would not be an adequate response to a truly large-scale humanitarian emergency in Kosovo. To ensure delivery of relief supplies to all affected areas of Kosovo, the international community would need to put **troops on the ground** -- as it did in Bosnia through the UNPROFOR operation -- to protect convoys and negotiate passage through both MUP and UCK checkpoints. Force protection issues would necessitate a deployment of at least several thousand armed troops with supporting equipment. It is important that any deployment be international in composition -- with a significant Russian as well as NATO component. As this would be primarily a logistics exercise, a leading U.S. role would be essential to a successful mission. The U.S. role may be even more significant in this kind of humanitarian operation than it would be in a straight settlement-enforcement mission that did not carry the same logistical burdens.

The mandate for the operation and the ROEs will also need to be carefully considered. A large-scale humanitarian operation would need to be structured in such a way as to reinforce existing USG efforts to promote IDP/refugee returns. We do not want to see large concentrations of people in a few select sites, but we do want to encourage IDPs to return to the towns and villages from which they fled and where humanitarian organizations will have better access. The ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo is likely to have unrealistically high expectations that the deployment of western troops will significantly constrain the actions of Serbian security forces. Managing these expectations would be an additional challenge.

Force protection issues would necessitate Belgrade concur with the deployment of international troops to Kosovo. In the absence of a credible threat of force, Milosevic would be unlikely to cooperate unless there was some clear return on investment -- meaning in this instance some relief from international sanctions. It may be necessary to consider trading some concessions on sanctions for permission to deploy armed troops in Kosovo. We should anticipate that there would be some political costs -- and significant public criticism -- associated with this course of action.

It is also **possible to plan for a lower level of involvement** -- several hundred unarmed military personnel in a multi-national effort to support the logistical operations

of UNHCR and other aid organizations. An ad hoc coordinating committee, perhaps under Contact Group auspices, would have overall responsibility for operational issues, including control of all ships, transport aircraft and rolling stock associated with the relief effort. Such an operation would, of course, require a clear understanding with Belgrade about the role and function of international personnel. Expanding the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) may be easiest way to initiate this kind of lower-level involvement.

A significant international presence on the ground in Kosovo would obviously complicate any decision at a later stage to move to use of force should the situation warrant it. There is a risk that Serbian security forces could seize unarmed USG personnel as hostages. Friendly-fire casualties would also be possible and could constrain any planned Allied military action in Kosovo. In addition, moving from a strictly humanitarian operation to a military operation might jeopardize any future humanitarian missions in other regions by establishing a precedent in the mind of uncooperative leaders.

Both the airdrop and ground deployment options raise serious mandate issues that would need to be addressed. An invitation from the FRY government would provide a legal basis for international involvement, but we might want to press for a Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution to reinforce the justification for military intervention in the event humanitarian workers come under attack or their mission is blocked. Paris and London are already pressing for a UNSCR focused on humanitarian concerns and the Dutch have also expressed interest. This is primarily an Allied management issue.

Lessons Learned From UNPROFOR

Although it was widely criticized, the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia was relatively effective in ensuring that aid convoys were able to reach their intended destinations with minimum risk. The UNPROFOR mission, however, was not without considerable cost. Over the 4 years of the operation, more than 100 soldiers and relief workers were killed. Some additional critical lessons learned from the UNPROFOR experience, include:

- **Food is easier to supply than shelter.** To the best of our knowledge, nobody in Bosnia died of starvation, but there were hundreds of deaths from exposure. The burning of homes in Kosovo by MUP units makes shelter a particularly important issue.
- **UNHCR is a reluctant partner.** They welcome financial support and assistance with logistics but will likely resist any efforts at providing security for convoys and aid workers as "provocative" and at odds with its mandate.
- **There must be agreement with local and national authorities on the rules of the road.** This agreement must be formalized and strictly enforced. The Bosnian Serbs were able to turn off deliveries to Sarajevo airport at will.

- **Airdrops are of limited utility.** In Bosnia, the rarely hit the intended target. Without direct international supervision, distribution of aid too often became a Darwinian process in which soldiers from all sides controlled the bulk of the assistance. Airdrops are also extremely expensive.
- Working through the UN will necessitate a complex coordinating process and restrictive ROEs -- which limited UNPROFOR's ability to influence the behavior of military forces, particularly the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). Arrangements for the Sarajevo airlift -- **an independent coordinating body operating with UN authorization** -- were much more efficient.
- **A humanitarian initiative can supplement, but cannot substitute for, progress on the political track.**

Applicability of the UNPROFOR Model to Kosovo

The most important lesson to be drawn from the UNPROFOR experience is that **no serious humanitarian relief effort in Kosovo will be possible without at least passive cooperation -- and in some instances active support -- from the Belgrade government.** Belgrade will need to issue visas to international personnel, establish authorized transport routes through Montenegro and across the Macedonian and Albanian borders, provide flight clearances for both airdrops and airport landings, and instruct MUP/VJ personnel at checkpoints to allow convoys through.

In Bosnia, the United Nations was invited in by the central government in Sarajevo. Belgrade is unlikely to be so accommodating. Milosevic may be convinced to accept the lower-level ground operations described above -- he may actually be counting on it -- but he is almost certain to reject the deployment of any armed international military personnel in Kosovo as an infringement on the FRY's sovereignty.

As in Bosnia, an international aid operation on the scale envisioned would subsidize Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. Humanitarian assistance efforts can keep the level of human suffering -- which will be extraordinarily high in any event -- just below the level that could galvanize an international military response. Milosevic understands this as well. He may calculate that a well-timed gesture on the humanitarian front will offer him some protection from NATO's wrath. This would be fully consistent with past behavior and his predilection for trading process for substance.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Mary Davis to Charles Allen. Subject: RE: Input for Kosovo pol-mil memo. (2 pages)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

POL-MIL Doc [4]

2008-0994-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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September 9, 1998

**Addressing Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues:
in the Absence of a Political Settlement in Kosovo**

In preparation for presentation to Principals, SVTS participants are requested to be prepared to comment and elaborate on the following actions as well as rank them in priority order.

Actions by October 15:

- Humanitarian logistical hubs in Kosovo fully supplied and staffed.
- Press for increased PVO access (and permission to use radios), and IO and PVO presence in potential areas of return.
- Promote humanitarian demarches to Serbian authorities by EU and Russia.
- Increase number of KDOM vehicles and staff, and press for inclusion of trained human rights monitors.
- Prepare for airdrops in Kosovo for those who cannot return.
- Additional support for other human rights field monitoring operations.
- Encourage additional high-level visits – Mary Robinson, other international and U.S. officials.
- Additional resources to the ICTY for Kosovo work; provide additional intel support for work in Kosovo.
- Additional public statements on Kosovo war crimes issues; UNSC statements/action.

Options/how to deal with shelter if Kosovars do not return:

Negotiate with Milosevic for –

- Enhanced (international) security presence in areas of return?
- Internationally protected areas?
- Corridors out of Kosovo to third countries?
- Role for UNPROFOR-like force?

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Classified by: Eric Schwartz
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. outline	Outline of a Possible Ultimatum. [Duplicate of rs228_001c, 2009-0983-M (1.50)] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. draft	Kosovo Pre-Settlement Pol-Mil Planning. (5 pages)	08/27/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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PAGES: 8 (Including cover) DATE: 26 Aug 98

TO: NSC - Leonard Hawley

FAX: 757-2679

TEL: 456-9141

FROM: Dept of STATE - Robert B. Boscroft

FAX: (202) 647-7589

TEL: 202-647-7714

MESSAGE: Dennis asked me to send this to
you after it was coordinated,
Jan Dailuy

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	To Leonard Hawley from Robert Beecroft. Subject: Comments on NSC Kosovo Pre-Settlement POL-MIL Planning Document. (7 pages)	08/26/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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from [Signature]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Alexander Vershbow to Donald Bandler. Subject: Kosovo. [Likely duplicate of re: Kosovo - Time for another "endgame" strategy at vz5835_006, 2019-0935-F. See also vz5877_005, 2019-0935-F] (4 pages)	08/27/1998	P1/b(1)

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007. note	[Handwritten notes. Draft of POL-MIL Settlement. Leon Input, 27 March.] (3 pages)	03/00/1998	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Politico-Military Framework for NATO Operations in Kosovo. (3 pages)	08/04/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. chart	Kosovo: Objectives, Triggers, Military Options. [Duplicate of rs228_001b, 2009-0983-M] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)

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009b. outline	Outline of a Possible Ultimatum. [Duplicate of 003 and rs228_001c, 2009-0983-M (1.50)] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009c. paper	Illustrative Road Map. [Duplicate of rs228_001d, 2009-0983-M] (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

POL-MIL Doc [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6346

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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M. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. draft	Kosovo Post-Settlement Pol-Mil Planning Policy Issues. (1 page)	09/11/1998	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 1709

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