

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Milosevic [5]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830174. (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Sandy Berger from Jock Covey. Subject: Karadzic. [Record ID: 9830174] (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. form	Profile Sheet. [with annotations] [Record ID:9830174] (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	For Samuel Berger from Jock Covey. Subject: Breakfast Topic....[Record ID: 9830174] (2 pages)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)
001e. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830167. (1 page)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)
001f. memo	For Samuel Berger from Jock Covey and Mary McCarthy. Subject: [Milosevic] [Record ID: 9830167] (4 pages)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)
001g. report	Subject: [The FRY: the End]. (9 pages)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1)
002a. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830167 [with annotations]. (1 page)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Jock Covey and Mary McCarthy. Subject: [Milosevic] [Record ID: 9830167] [See also 001f] (4 pages)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)
002c. report	[Duplicate of 001g] (9 pages)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Paper. Subject: [Milosevic] [See 9830298, vz6261_002d, vz6337_001c and 007c, and vz6339_009a, this case] (8 pages)	10/00/1998	P1/b(1)
004. report	Serbia: Economic Troubles Test Milosevic's Political Stamina. [with fax cover] (10 pages)	10/09/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	[FRY: Loyalists in Policy Implementation] [with fax cover] (7 pages)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1)
006. report	[A Ruthless Approach] [with fax cover sheet] (3 pages)	09/14/1998	P1/b(1)

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To: Jim
From: Mike Hurley

Jim,

State is writing a paper (which we expect in the near future) on building democracy in Serbia. Here are some of the initiatives that the USG has taken to date:

- Two years ago USAID reestablished its presence in Serbia and Montenegro after a five-year hiatus. **In FY 1997, \$3.8 million** in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding was obligated to support the development of independent media, to increase independent oversight of the electoral process, and to strengthen non-governmental organizations. **In FY 1998, the program increased to \$15.3 million** and now includes an economic reform program for Montenegro and a community building program in Kosovo.
- **Civil Society Programs:**
 - The Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe is conducting a train-the-trainers program in NGO management and is organizing a series of town meetings, seminars, and publications to increase communications between NGOs in Serbian and Montenegro.
 - The Solidarity Committee is providing education on labor code standards, economic transition issues and organizational development skills to independent trade unions.
 - The STAR Program of Delphi International is working with women's groups to focus their mission, strengthen their organizational capacity, and promote women's rights.
 - A Rule of Law program that will provide legal education to judges and other legal professionals, launch a street law program designed to answer the most commonly asked questions about the legal system, and introduce a legal clinic to provide Belgrade law students with practical experience.
 - The Kosovo Community Building Initiative encourages local governments to set priorities and assists with community self-improvement programs such as repairing and equipping local schools.
 - The Parent-School-Partnership Program assesses school needs, sets priorities, and develops action plans to improve children's education.
 - Health Reform Program that will launch a long-term maternal and infant health care project; improve pre-natal care to expecting mothers; and promote continuing education for doctors and nurses.
 - An agricultural initiative will be launched in December that will support small holder dairy development in Montenegro to improve

- production, processing and marketing capabilities.
- The Center for International Private Enterprise will offer training for small entrepreneurs and businesses.

- **Independent Media**

- International Research and Exchange Board provides journalism and media management training to print and radio professionals throughout Serbia.

- **Political Process and Electoral Reform**

- Republican and Democratic parties work with a wide range of political parties at the local level. They also assist in election monitoring missions.

- **International Development Assistance**

- USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which promotes democracy, human rights, and basic freedoms, has offices in Belgrade, Nis, Podgorica and Novi Sad.
- **Since 1996, OTI has awarded 173 grants in goods and services valued at \$2.1 million** (\$1.5 million on media-related grants) to 107 Serbian- and Montenegrin-based organizations. Grantees have included Belgrade independent media organizations such as Media Center, B 92 TV, ANEM TV network, and Danas news daily.
- OTI aids media organizations in delivering peace, tolerance, reintegration and democracy messages; publishing and distributing newspapers, magazines and pamphlets; producing informative TV and radio broadcasts; organizing public debates, discussions, and mass demonstrations; establishing links with other like-minded organizations.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

File

October 27, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MELANNE VERVEER

THROUGH:

GREG SCHULTE

ERIC SCHWARTZ

*I recommend that
you invite Jamie Metzel
to the meeting.*

FROM:

JAMIE METZEL

SUBJECT:

FLOTUS October 28, 1998 Meeting with George Soros
Regarding FRY Independent Media Crackdown

Background:

With assistance from international donors, a nascent independent media has developed in the FRY over recent years. While State-controlled media remains the primary information outlet, independent media has become a crucial source of unbiased and unofficial reporting to the population of FRY. This summer, Milosevic launched a renewed attack on free media in the FRY, closing TV and radio stations throughout the country. This crackdown has intensified in recent weeks.

On October 7, the FRY Information Minister imposed a regulation obligating mass media to "safeguard the Republic of Serbia" by barring these media from disseminating foreign programs or articles or other information "directed against the interests of [Serbia] or spreading fear, panic, or defeatism." Under this regulation, three leading Belgrade independent daily newspapers, *Danas*, *Nasa Borba*, and *Dnevi Telegraf*, were shut down. On October 20, the Serbian parliament passed a restrictive information law which establishes massive fines on media outlets for not publishing information the FRY authorities deem important and for carrying foreign programming. This law was first applied on October 24, when a \$244,000 fine was levied against the editor of the Belgrade weekly *European*, and its founder, editor-in-chief, and executive director. *Danas* and *Nasa Borba* have since reopened, although *Dnevi Telegraf* remains closed.

USG Support for Independent Media:

The USG has taken significant action to build up independent media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Since April 1996, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has awarded 567 grants, valued in excess of \$7.6 million to 158 independent media organizations in the former Yugoslavia. These grants have supported the development of fifty-nine independent newspapers and magazines, eight-two independent television and radio stations, and nine independent journalists associations and centers. OTI has also funded extensive media training, and has been a major supporter of the Open Broadcast Network (OBN) in Bosnia, and ANEM TV and Radio in Serbia.

Collaboration with Soros Foundation:

USAID/OTI has worked closely with the Soros Foundation's Open Society Institute (OSI) in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro. This partnership has been a natural one given the emphasis of both organizations on the support of free and independent media and civil society groups in the former Yugoslavia. In addition to co-funding projects, there is a significant informal working relationship between USAID/OTI and OSI on the ground. In Bosnia, for example, OTI and OSI have directly collaborated and matched funds in twelve projects totaling \$320,000. Almost half of OTI's portfolio in Serbia-Montenegro contains grants co-funded with the Soros Foundation. USAID and OSI have also been the two most consistent and largest donors to the ANEM radio and Television networks.

Response to Media Crackdown:

The USG has taken numerous steps to condemn Milosevic's crackdown on Serb media and to keep independent media voices alive. These have included:

- Issuing State Department and White House statements condemning the crackdown;
- Encouraging similar statements by NATO SYG Solana, OSCE Chairman Geremek, European allies, NGOs and others;
- Demarching FRY authorities regarding the closings;
- Working to enhance indigenous radio capabilities in Kosovo;
- Enhancing indigenous radio broadcast capabilities in the RS and Montenegro, particularly to allow the rebroadcast of VOA and other international programs into Serbia;

- Supporting other forms of expression by banned Serb journalists, including leafleting and postering.
- Further developing internet and e-mail listserve systems to maintain and develop networks to provide reliable alternative information to the population of the FRY;
- Pushing to establish Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) radio station.

Additional Issues:

The Soros Foundation's Washington office has called on the USG to "draw the line" with Milosevic regarding his attacks on the free media. While we have taken a number of significant steps, we realize that independent media outlets in Serbia remain vulnerable. We would welcome Mr. Soros's view on what more we might consider doing.

Following up on the First Lady's meeting with Radio B-92 Chief Veran Matic and Soros foundation head John Fox, we have asked Ambassador Elizabeth Bagley to begin seeking programming support for ANEM TV. (Ambassador Bagley arranged for 5,000 hours of virtually free programming to be provided to the Open Broadcast Network in Bosnia.) According to Ambassador Bagley, limited funding may be needed to pay for programming at a reduced rate. If this is the case, USAID/OTI has expressed its willingness to match funds with the Soros Foundation, if the Soros Foundation is willing to do so.

Attachments

- Tab A October 21 Statement by the Press Secretary on FRY Media Crackdown
- Tab B Talking Points for Meeting with George Soros

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 21, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The United States condemns the draconian law on Information passed yesterday by the Serbian parliament. This law establishes massive fines on media outlets for failing to publish information the FRY authorities deem important and for carrying foreign programming. It also requires publishers to forward copies of each issue to the public prosecutor and the Ministry of Information. This repressive law follows a series of hostile actions taken against independent media outlets in the FRY over the past weeks, including the closure of newspapers Danas, Dnevi Telegraf, and Nasa Borba and Radio Index in Belgrade, and Radio Senta in Vojvodina.

The government's actions are clearly designed to intimidate Serbia's independent media and to prevent them from reporting the truth about President Milosevic's campaign of repression in Kosovo. Milosevic is also trying to hide from his own people the substantial concessions he has been forced to make under the threat of NATO air strikes. This includes an unprecedented international presence in Kosovo, that until now he had steadfastly resisted, with 2,000 OSCE verifiers on the ground and NATO surveillance in the air.

The United States is committed to promoting free and open media across the globe, including in the FRY. We are actively supporting the courageous work of civil society and independent media organizations in the FRY who are struggling to keep independent media voices alive. We have expanded Voice of America's Serbian and Albanian broadcasts, and have begun broadcasting medium wave transmissions which can be received on AM radios throughout the FRY. We are also utilizing the Internet to enhance the level of information flowing in and out of the country.

In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, independent radio stations and newspapers have provided valuable perspectives to the population of Yugoslavia about issues which strongly affect these citizens' lives. Without independent media voices, the people of FRY will be less able to make the informed decisions that will determine their future.

The Belgrade leadership should immediately halt its repression of independent media. Developing a vibrant civil society with free and independent media will be a crucial step in building the type of civil society which can return the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to its place among nations. Unfortunately, the current leadership in Belgrade seems determined to keep that country a pariah and to deny its citizens the benefits of democracy and integration into Europe.

Talking Points for Meeting with George Soros

- Like you, we believe that independent media and civil society organizations are crucial to fostering democratic development in the former Yugoslavia, and around the world.
- Through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), we have supported many such organizations in the former Yugoslavia.
- OTI has worked closely with the Soros Foundation's Open Society Institute in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro. I understand that almost half of OTI's portfolio in Serbia-Montenegro contains grants co-funded with the Soros Foundation.
- The partnership between OTI and the Soros Foundation has been a natural one given the emphasis of both organizations on supporting independent media and civil society groups.
- Like you, we are extremely concerned by the recent crackdown on the independent media in Serbia.
- We have condemned this crackdown in the strongest terms, and have actively encouraged our allies, NGOs, NATO, and OSCE to do the same.
- Through OTI, we are increasing our support for independent media outlets in Serbia.
- We are also working to enhance independent media in the RS, Montenegro, and Kosovo, which can "spill over" into Serbia.
- We welcome your advice on what further actions we might consider taking in this regard.
- Following my recent meeting with Veran Matic from the ANEM network, and John Fox, we have asked Ambassador Elizabeth Bagley to begin seeking program support for ANEM TV.
- According to Ambassador Bagley, limited funding may be needed to pay for programming at a reduced rate. If this is the case, USAID/OTI has expressed its willingness to match funds with the Soros Foundation, if you are willing to do so.

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, November 09, 1998 10:51 PM
To: Bouchard, Joseph F.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Gregory, Susan J.; Hurley, C. Michael; McCarthy, Mary O.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sherman, David J.; Ward, Steven R.
Subject: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): PARTICIPATION

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 100235Z NOV 98
MSGTO: RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: PRIORITY
SSN: 9183
TOR: 981109214149 M3549864

UNCLAS STATE 209183

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, CWC, UK

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): PARTICIPATION
BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY) AS OBSERVER IN
THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES

REFS: (A) STATE 195368 (AUSTRALIA GROUP REPORTING), (B)
THE HAGUE 03672 (SCENESETTER FOR THE THIRD CONFERENCE),(C)
LONDON 10707

1. DEL HAS LEARNED (REF B) THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY) HAS REQUESTED OBSERVER STATUS TO THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES (CSP) TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OPCW) (NOVEMBER 16-20,; 1998). DEL HAS REQUESTED GUIDANCE ON FRY OBSERVER STATUS-AT THE THIRD CSP. MOREOVER, EMBASSY LONDON HAS REQUESTED (REF C) GUIDANCE TO RESPOND TO THE U.K. ON THIS ISSUE.

BACKGROUND

2. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS -CONVENTION (CWC), WHICH OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN 1993 AND ENTERED INTO FORCE IN APRIL 1997, PROHIBITS THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING,

AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) AND MANDATES THE DESTRUCTION OF CW AND CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 120 STATES PARTIES AND 49 STATES SIGNATORIES TO THE CWC.

3. THE FRY IS NOT CURRENTLY A CWC STATE PARTY. HOWEVER, THE OTHER SUCCESSOR STATES -- BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, CROATIA, THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, AND SLOVENIA -- ARE ALL CWC STATES PARTIES.

4. DURING THE TWELFTH CWC EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING (OCTOBER 6-10), SERGUEI BATANOV, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL PROJECTS FOR THE OPCW, INDICATED TO A U.S. DEL MEMBER THAT, AS PART OF OPCW EFFORTS TO MAKE THE CWC A TRULY UNIVERSAL CONVENTION, DIRECTOR-GENERAL BUSTANI WOULD LIKE TO ALLOW THE FRY TO PARTICIPATE AS AN OBSERVER AT THE THIRD CSP. HE ASKED FOR THE U.S. VIEW ON THE MATTER. A RESPONSE TO BATANOV'S QUESTION FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 12.

5. IN AN OCTOBER 19 STATEMENT TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUSTANI TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE CWC. HE NOTED THE "PROBLEM" OF THE FRY AND EMPHASIZED, "FOR THOSE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE PROSPECT OF (THE FRY) BECOMING A STATE PARTY.. "-THAT CWC MEMBERSHIP REQUIRES ACCEPTANCE OF "IMPORTANT RESTRICTIONS BACKED UP BY AN INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION REGIME AND... THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A REGION OF THE WORLD WHICH CONTINUES TO BE A SOURCE OF INCREASING APPREHENSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."

6. ACCORDING TO THE OPCW RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE CSP, THE CSP COULD DECIDE TO GRANT THE FRY OBSERVER STATUS. SPECIFICALLY, RULE 30 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE STATES THAT ANY NON-SIGNATORY STATE "WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE XX OF THE CWC, MAY ACCEDE TO IT MAY APPLY TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR OBSERVER STATUS, WHICH WILL BE ACCORDED ON THE DECISION OF THE CONFERENCE. SUCH A STATE SHALL BE ENTITLED TO APPOINT AN OBSERVER TO ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OTHER THAN THOSE DESIGNATED PRIVATE MEETINGS AND TO RECEIVE DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE."

7. IN THE RECENT AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG) MEETING IN PARIS OCTOBER 9-15 (SEE REF A), ONE PARTICIPANT-RAISED ITS CONCERNS ABOUT GRANTING THE FRY OBSERVER STATUS AT THE

OPCW, NOTING THAT IT WAS NOT A CWC STATE SIGNATORY, AND URGED AG PARTICIPANTS TO URGE THE FRY TO ACCEDE BEFORE GRANTING IT OPCW OBSERVER STATUS.

8. ON OCTOBER 29, THE U.K. BROKE SILENCE ON AN EU PROPOSAL (PUT FORWARD BY AUSTRIA AS EU PRESIDENT) TO "NOT OBJECT" TO FRY OBSERVER STATUS AT THE THIRD CONFERENCE. THE U.K. OBJECTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT "THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT" FOR FRY PARTICIPATION IN THE OPCW CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN KOSOVO. THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE U.K. POSITION THAT THE FRY SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED OBSERVER STATUS AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL SIGNAL THIS COULD REPRESENT. (NOTE: EMBASSY LONDON REQUESTED GUIDANCE ON THE U.S. POSITION ON FRY OBSERVER STATUS TO THE CSP (REF C); GUIDANCE IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 12. EMBASSY MAY PASS THIS INFORMATION TO THE APPROPRIATE U.K. OFFICIALS. END NOTE.)

9. (NOTE: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FOR EMBASSY/DEL USE ONLY. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES DEL'S OBJECTION TO FRY OBSERVER STATUS WILL BE BETTER RECEIVED IF SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE "OUTER WALL" IS NOT MADE AS THIS IS A UNILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME. END NOTE.) BECAUSE THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA HAD A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND BECAUSE THE WEAPONS AND EXPERTISE LIKELY REMAIN IN BELGRADE, THE NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FRY ARE SIGNIFICANT. SECURING FRY MEMBERSHIP IN THE CWC COULD BE ONE STEP TOWARDS ADDRESSING THOSE CONCERNS. HOWEVER, THE U.S. MAINTAINS "OUTER WALL" SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO ELICIT BELGRADE'S COOPERATION ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT ARE CRUCIAL TO ESTABLISHING LASTING PEACE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. THESE SANCTIONS INCLUDE A PROHIBITION ON MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, -ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

10. THE ADMINISTRATION-TIES THESE SANCTIONS TO MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ON TWO CRITICAL ISSUES: (1) FULL COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND (2) A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT FOR AUTONOMY

FOR KOSOVO. IN ADDITION, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO BELGRADE THAT FRY INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS ALSO DEPENDENT ON ITS CONTINUED COOPERATION IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS, DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE FRY, AND THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING STATE SUCCESSION ISSUES.

11. THE ADMINISTRATION IS PREPARED TO LIFT THE OUTER WALL SANCTIONS EITHER IN STAGES OR ALL AT ONCE DEPENDING ON BELGRADE'S ACTIONS. AT THIS TIME, BELGRADE'S RECORD IN THESE AREAS HAS FALLEN FAR SHORT OF ACCEPTABLE. (NOTE: FOR EMBASSY/DEL INFORMATION ONLY: FRY ACTIONS IN KOSOVO SINCE LAST FEBRUARY LED THE USG AND THE EU TO IMPOSE A NEW SET OF SANCTIONS THIS SUMMER, MAKING IT MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER TO DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE TO THE MILOSEVIC REGIME THAT AS LONG AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER DAYTON AND RELEVANT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS THEY WILL NOT BE A WELCOME MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. END NOTE.) THEREFORE, THE U.S. OBJECTS TO FRY PARTICIPATION AS AN OBSERVER IN THE THIRD CSP.

GUIDANCE

12. IN RESPONSE TO BATSANOV'S QUESTION TO THE U.S. DEL, DEL SHOULD ADVISE THE OPCW THAT THE U.S. OPPOSES FRY PARTICIPATION IN THE THIRD CSP. EMBASSIES LONDON AND BUDAPEST MAY SHARE THIS POSITION WITH THE APPROPRIATE U.K. OFFICIALS. U.S. DEL IN THE HAGUE AND EMBASSIES LONDON AND BUDAPEST MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS, AS APPROPRIATE. INFO ADDRESSEES MAY ALSO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS,

--BECAUSE THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA HAD A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND BECAUSE THE WEAPONS AND EXPERTISE LIKELY REMAIN IN BELGRADE, THE NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY) ARE SIGNIFICANT.

--SECURING FRY MEMBERSHIP IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) COULD BE ONE STEP TOWARDS ADDRESSING THE NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FRY.

--HOWEVER, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THE FRY MUST MAKE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES BEFORE THEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. - THESE ISSUES INCLUDE: FULL COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT FOR AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO, CONTINUED COOPERATION IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS, DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE FRY, AND THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING STATE SUCCESSION ISSUES.

--TO DATE, THE FRY HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES. IN FACT, BELGRADE'S ACTIONS HAVE FALLEN FAR SHORT OF ACCEPTABLE. THEREFORE, THE U.S. OBJECTS TO FRY PARTICIPATION IN THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES.
ALBRIGHT

EUROPEAN OPINION ALERT

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC 20547

USIA

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND MEDIA REACTION

November 10, 1998

L-74-98

Coalition Politicians Most Trusted in Montenegro

A majority in Montenegro have confidence in those politicians who espouse moderate policies of economic and political reform, while politicians and parties linked to Milosevic and the federal Yugoslav government receive little public support. However, the Montenegrin public expresses less confidence in its political leaders now than in USIA's April 1998 pre-election survey.

Ruling Coalition Ahead of Socialist People's Party

If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, four in ten say they would support the ruling coalition "For a Better Life" (24%) or one of the parties that make up the coalition (17% total). Half as many would vote for the Socialist People's Party (19% now, 23% in April 1998). Another 12 percent of probable voters are undecided, and 17 percent said they would not vote.

Djukanovic Most Trusted

When asked which politician they trust most, four in ten (39%) name Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic. Few (10%) name his predecessor, Momir Bulatovic. Nearly one in three are either unsure (13%) or do not trust any politician (16%).

Overall views of politicians in the present coalition government are more favorable than others. Nearly two in three have *somewhat* or *very favorable* opinions of Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic, although this is down from Spring 1996 (74%). Almost six in ten are favorable toward Montenegrin prime minister Filip Vujanovic.

A majority express *somewhat* or *very unfavorable* opinions of Momir Bulatovic and Slobodan Milosevic, with each seen less favorably by the Montenegrin public than in Spring 1996 (77% and 61% respectively).

While a majority in Montenegro support the governing coalition's stance on implementing reform in the republic, there is little support overall for ethnic minority politicians, some of whom support Montenegrin independence. The public has an unfavorable view of Harun Hadzic, Ferhat Dinosa, and Mehmed Bardhi, consistent with the 1996 USIA survey. There is also little sympathy for Kosovar politicians, with 72 percent overall having an unfavorable impression of Ibrahim Rugova (64 percent in Spring 1998.).

"Please tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of:"

	Favorable	Unfavorable	Don't know
Milo Djukanovic (DPS)	64%	31%	5%
Filip Vujanovic (DPS)	59	35	6
Svetozar Marovic (DPS)	56	38	7
Slavko Perovic (Liberal Alliance)	51	39	10
Milica Pejvanovic- Djurisic (SPD)	48	43	10
Novak Kilibarda (People's Party)	40	50	10
Momir Bulatovic (SNP)	34	60	6
Mehmed Bardhi (DAA)	28	59	23
Ferhat Dinosa (DUA)	25	59	17
Harun Hadzic (SDA)	13	64	23
Slobodan Milosevic	30	63	7

EUROPEAN OPINION ALERT

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC 20547

USIA

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND MEDIA REACTION

November 10, 1998

L-75-98

Ethnic Differences Central To Montenegrin Politics

Political preferences among Montenegro's ethnic minorities are sharply divided. Ethnic Serbs tend to support the Socialist People's Party, while not one surveyed Muslim or ethnic Albanian would do so. Muslims and ethnic Albanians support the coalition government, but some may be disappointed if the coalition continues to pursue political and economic reform within the Yugoslav federation, rather than seeking independence.

Ethnicity Plays Key Role in Partisan Cleavages

As the majority national group in the republic, the views of ethnic Montenegrins dominate overall opinion. Ethnic Montenegrins tend to support the governing coalition "For a Better Life," with four in ten supporting the coalition parties. More than one in three (37%) ethnic Montenegrins also trust Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic. However, a fairly consistent minority of ethnic Montenegrins are similar to ethnic Serbs in their political views. One in five support the Socialist People's Party, and a similar number name either Milosevic (10%) or Momir Bulatovic (11%) as the politician they most trust.

Serbs Support Status Quo

Ethnic Serbs prefer parties and politicians more closely associated with Serbia and the federal government. Half would vote for the Socialist People's Party, and only a few would support the Democratic Socialist Party (DPS) or the governing coalition. Serbs are skeptical towards politicians. Almost half trust either Milosevic (24%) or Bulatovic (23%), but a further 23 percent say they do not trust *any* politician.

Muslims Are Coalition's Strongest Supporters

Four in ten Montenegrin Muslims would support "For a Better Life," and another quarter would vote for the DPS. Coalition politicians are also the most trusted by Muslims. A wide majority (76%) select Djukanovic as the politician they *most* trust, with Montenegrin Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic (DPS) selected by a further 25 percent of Muslims.

Albanians Divided Between Coalition, Nationalist Candidates

While one in five ethnic Albanians support the coalition, a greater number favor nationalist parties (36% support the Democratic Union of Albanians, 10 % the Democratic Alliance of Albanians). A plurality of Albanians (36%) trust Djukanovic the most, but nationalist politicians such as the DUA's Ferat Dinosa (22%) and Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova (9%) are also cited.

"If elections for the Montenegrin Parliament were held tomorrow, which political party would you vote for or might you be inclined to vote for?"

	"For a Better Life"	DPS	Socialist People's Party	Liberal Alliance	DUA	Undecided
Montenegrins	24%	14%	22%	6%	0%	14%
Serbs	6	8	47	0	0	15
"Yugoslavs"	21	5	14	9	0	5
Muslims	40	25	0	5	1	4
Albanians	19	3	0	4	36	16
Overall	24	14	20	5	3	10

"Undecided" includes probable voters undecided on party choice only. "Don't know" and "Will not vote" are excluded from this table.

Prepared by Janice Bell, R/EU (202-619-5133; reu@usia.gov); Issued by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA. This report is based on data from face-to-face interviews in Montenegro among 1057 adults 18 years and older from October 4-12, 1998. The Institute for Social Sciences in Podgorica conducted the survey for USIA.

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 1998 11:55 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hawley, Leonard R.; Hurley, C. Michael; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Schwartz, Eric P.
Subject: IN MONTENEGRO, KOSOVO LOOMS AS A THREAT TO DJUKANOVIC'S

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 121519Z NOV 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0178
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 8698
TOR: 981112113059 M3553950

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By N NARA, Date 4/30/2004
2008-0944-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 008698

ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/08
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, PHUM, SR
SUBJECT: IN MONTENEGRO, KOSOVO LOOMS AS A THREAT TO DJUKANOVIC'S COALITION

REF: BELGRADE 7415

1. (C) CLASSIFIED BY NICHOLAS HILL, POLITICAL OFFICER, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: KOSOVO IS AN INSTRUMENT USED BY SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC TO PREVENT DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE FRY. THAT WAS A COMMON SENTIMENT OF MONTENEGRIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HEARD BY A CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DELEGATION LED BY JOHN HERZBERG ON A NOVEMBER 8-9 VISIT TO PODGORICA.

OFFICIALS INCLUDING MONTENEGRIN PRIME MINISTER FILIP VUJANOVIC EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MILOSEVIC IS USING THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO TO UNDERMINE THE REFORM GOVERNMENT IN MONTENEGRO AND TO CRUSH CIVIL SOCIETY IN SERBIA. A CLOSE ADVISOR OF MONTENEGRIN PRESIDENT DJUKANOVIC TOLD THE VISITING DELEGATION THAT MILOSEVIC AND HIS WIFE ARE KEEN TO DESTABILIZE DJUKANOVIC'S MULTI-ETHNIC COALITION IN PODGORICA AND, IF THAT FAILS, ARE READY TO JETTISON MONTENEGRO FROM THE FEDERATION. END SUMMARY

KOSOVO CRISIS: BAD FOR BUSINESS

3. (C) A HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE DELEGATION HEADED BY JOHN HERZBERG MET A SERIES OF MONTENEGRIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN PODGORICA NOVEMBER 8-9. MONTENEGRIN PRIME MINISTER VUJANOVIC AND OTHER OFFICIALS UNDERScored THEIR CONCERN OVER THE EFFECT OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS ON MONTENEGRIN DEMOCRATIZATION. VUJANOVIC SAID THAT THE KOSOVO CRISIS WAS BEING USED BY FRY PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC TO UNDERMINE MONTENEGRIN PRESIDENT DJUKANOVIC. IN PARTICULAR, HE SAID THAT MILOSEVIC WAS USING IDPS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THIS POLICY IN AN ATTEMPT TO "BANKRUPT THE MONTENEGRIN STATE." VUJANOVIC NOTED THAT SERBIAN POLICE DURING THE SUMMER, WHEN HOMES WERE BEING TORCHED AND INTERNAL REFUGEES WERE RUNNING INTO THE HILLS, WERE DIRECTING IDPS AWAY FROM THE MACEDONIAN AND ALBANIAN BORDERS AND TOWARD MONTENEGRO.

4. (C) THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO UNDERMINES MONTENEGRO IN SEVERAL WAYS, THE STAFF DELEGATION WAS TOLD. IN ADDITION TO THE FINANCIAL BURDEN--INCLUDING A \$2.8 MILLION HEALTH CARE BILL THE REPUBLIC-LEVEL

GOVERNMENT HAS ASSUMED TO TAKE CARE OF THE INTERNAL REFUGEES--THE INFLUX OF ETHNIC ALBANIANS HAS PUT ADDED POLITICAL PRESSURE ON DJUKANOVIC'S MULTI-ETHNIC COALITION. "IT'S HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE IDPS WERE NOT PART OF A POLITICAL PLAN TO DESTROY MONTENEGRO," VUJANOVIC ASSERTED. HE POINTED TO THE "MISUNDERSTANDING" THAT DEVELOPED OVER THE SUMMER BETWEEN DJUKANOVIC AND HIS ETHNIC ALBANIAN COALITION PARTNERS OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO STOP THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES. DJUKANOVIC FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR MILAN ROCEN TOLD THE DELEGATION THAT THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES HAD "DESTABILIZED" THE GOVERNMENT AND FORCED IT TO CUT OFF REFUGEE FLOWS. THE NEARLY 50,000 ETHNIC ALBANIAN IDPS ON TOP OF 30,000 SERBIAN REFUGEES ALREADY IN THE REPUBLIC FROM THE WARS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA MEANT THE OVERALL REFUGEE POPULATION WAS WELL OVER 10 PERCENT OF MONTENEGRO'S POPULATION.

BAD FOR BUSINESS, THE SEQUEL

5. (C) IN ECONOMIC TERMS, THE KOSOVO CRISIS HAS BEEN MORE THAN AN IMMEDIATE BURDEN ON THE REPUBLIC-LEVEL BUDGET. ACCORDING TO VUJANOVIC, INSTABILITY IN KOSOVO HAS SCARED AWAY PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS. HIMSELF A FORMER MONTENEGRIN INTERIOR MINISTER, VUJANOVIC ASSERTED THAT THE PROBLEM HAS LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS AS WELL; IF ALLOWED TO FESTER, KOSOVO COULD BECOME ANOTHER FOCUS OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS. ECONOMICALLY, HE SUGGESTED, THIS WOULD BE BAD FOR BUSINESS FOR THE REPUBLIC. HE SAID THAT ALREADY PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS HAVE BEEN SCARED AWAY FROM DOING BUSINESS IN THE REPUBLIC. THIS PROBLEM MOREOVER IS ENCOURAGED BY MILOSEVIC AND HIS WIFE. OVER DINNER MONTENEGRIN FOREIGN MINISTER BRANKO PEROVIC, CITING A LOCAL BREWERY WHICH SOUGHT FOREIGN CAPITAL AS AN EXAMPLE, NOTED THAT A BLOCKADE ON THE BORDER WITH SERBIA HAS BLUNTED INTEREST OF INVESTORS WHO SAY THEY WOULD NEED THE SERBIAN MARKET TO JUSTIFY REVITALIZING MONTENEGRIN BUSINESSES.

GRATITUDE AND CONTEMPT

6. (C) ECHOING OTHERS, VUJANOVIC EXPRESSED TO THE STAFF DELEGATION ATTITUDE FOR THE U.S. POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN MONTENEGRO AND SERBIA. WASHINGTON, THE STAFF DELEGATION WAS TOLD, UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMOTING DEMOCRATIZATION IN MONTENEGRO AS A MEANS NOT ONLY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA'S JUNIOR REPUBLIC BUT IN MILOSEVIC'S FRY. THEY EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PLEASURE WITH THE ATTENTION AMBASSADOR GELBARD HAS GIVEN MONTENEGRO AND EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE VERY PRODUCTIVE MEETING DJUKANOVIC HAD WITH GELBARD IN BRUSSELS LAST WEEK. COUNSELOR FOR THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY MARK KIRK NOTED THE CONGRESS' STRONG SUPPORT FOR DJUKANOVIC, OUTLINED LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO DIFFERENTIATE MONTENEGRO FROM THE REST OF THE FRY, AND UNDERScored CONGRESS' CONTINUING INTEREST IN HELPING THE REPUBLIC'S MULTI-ETHNIC COALITION GOVERNMENT.

THE EUROPEANS ARE HOPELESS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 008698

ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/08

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, PHUM, SR

SUBJECT: IN MONTENEGRO, KOSOVO LOOMS AS A THREAT TO DJUKANOVIC'S COALITION

REF: BELGRADE 7415

7. (C) BY CONTRAST, THE MONTENEGRIN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR FULSOME DISSATISFACTION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION. "EUROPE DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF MONTENEGRO FOR PROMOTING DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE FRY," DJUKANOVIC FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR ROCEN ASSERTED TO THE DELEGATION. HE TOLD THE CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS THAT THE EUROPEANS

SEEM TO FEAR THAT IF THEY HELP MONTENEGRO--FOR EXAMPLE, WITH AUTONOMOUS TRADE PREFERENCES--THEY WOULD BE SUPPORTING MONTENEGRIN SUCCESSION. ROCEN ASSERTED THAT THE REVERSE IS TRUE. IF WE WANTED TO BOLT THE FEDERATION, ROCEN ARGUED, "WE WOULD SAY SO OPENLY." ECHOING OTHER MONTENEGRINS, ROCEN SAID THAT THE REGIME IN BELGRADE, NOT PODGORICA, IS DESTROYING FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS; THE BEST WAY TO SAVE THE FEDERATION IS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION AND GET RID OF MILOSEVIC. THE EUROPEANS, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY THE ITALIANS, THE OFFICIALS SUGGESTED, SEEM EAGER TO LUMP THE MONTENEGRINS TOGETHER WITH THE SERBS AS A MEANS TO PLACATE MILOSEVIC. IT IS A COMPLETELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE POLICY, PEROVIC ASSERTED.

DJUKANOVIC'S CLOSE FRIEND

8. (C) NOBODY IN PODGORICA HAS ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE PROBLEMS THE MONTENEGRINS FACE, RATKO KNEZEVIC, A CLOSE FRIEND OF DJUKANOVIC'S AND THE FORMER HEAD OF THE MONTENEGRIN TRADE OFFICE IN WASHINGTON, TOLD THE STAFF DELEGATION OVER COFFEE. HE SAID THAT MILOSEVIC AND HIS WIFE MIRA MARKOVIC ARE DETERMINED TO UNDERMINE DJUKANOVIC'S REFORM GOVERNMENT--AND THE SOONER THE BETTER. KNEZEVIC, A RELIABLE EMBASSY CONTACT, SAID HE HAD GOOD INFORMATION THAT MIRA ORDERED THE SACKING OF SERBIAN STATE SECURITY CHIEF STANISIC (REFTEL) BECAUSE THE REGIME PLANS TO FOCUS NOW ON UNDERMINING DJUKANOVIC'S COALITION GOVERNMENT BEFORE JANUARY. IF THE EFFORT FAILS, KNEZEVIC STATED, HIS SOURCES SAY THAT MIRA WOULD PREFER TO JETTISON MONTENEGRO FROM THE FRY THAN HAVE TO DEAL WITH A REFORM GOVERNMENT IN PODGORICA. THE MILOSEVIC REGIME'S SURVIVAL INSTINCT TELLS IT THAT, WHILE IT WELCOMES FOREIGN INVESTMENT THAT DOES NOT THREATEN THE CRONY SYSTEM IN PLACE, A TRUE OPENING UP WOULD BE POISON.

COMMENT

9. (C) THE MESSAGE THE STAFF DELEGATION HEARD IN PODGORICA IS FAMILIAR: MILOSEVIC IS THE BALKANS' CENTRAL SOURCE OF INSTABILITY NOT ITS GUARANTOR OF PEACE. DJUKANOVIC'S GOVERNMENT IS GRATEFUL TO THE U.S. FOR DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN MONTENEGRO ON THE ONE HAND AND SERBIA AND ITS FEDERAL SPONSORS ON THE OTHER. THEY ASKED IN PARTICULAR FOR HELP IN CONVINCING THE EUROPEANS TO ADOPT A SIMILAR POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION, INCLUDING THE NEED TO OFFER AUTONOMOUS TRADE PREFERENCES TO MONTENEGRO. OWING TO THE EU MARKET'S IMPORTANCE, UNLESS THE EUROPEANS ARE PERSUADED, MILOSEVIC MAY YET SUCCEED IN CRUSHING DJUKANOVIC. ALREADY, ACCORDING TO PEROVIC, IF AN ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY IN MONTENEGRO, THE PUBLIC'S UNTIL NOW STRONG SUPPORT FOR REFORM COULD BE SEVERELY TESTED.

10. (C) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

(THIS CABLE WAS NOT CLEARED PRIOR TO THE STAFFDEL'S DEPARTURE FROM POST.)

MILES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830174. (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Sandy Berger from Jock Covey. Subject: Karadzic. [Record ID: 9830174] (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. form	Profile Sheet. [with annotations] [Record ID:9830174] (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

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Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. memo	For Samuel Berger from Jock Covey. Subject: Breakfast Topic....[Record ID: 9830174] (2 pages)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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001e. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830167. (1 page)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. memo	For Samuel Berger from Jock Covey and Mary McCarthy. Subject: [Milosevic] [Record ID: 9830167] (4 pages)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. report	Subject: [The FRY: the End]. (9 pages)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830167 [with annotations]. (1 page)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Jock Covey and Mary McCarthy. Subject: [Milosevic] [Record ID: 9830167] [See also 001f] (4 pages)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. report	[Duplicate of 001g] (9 pages)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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OCTOBER 15, 1998

M-161-98

Events in Kosovo Show Little Effect on Milosevic's Popularity

This just-completed USIA survey in Serbia -- conducted just before the U.S.-brokered agreement on Kosovo was announced -- suggests that recent events in Kosovo have not affected public views of particular political leaders. With an increasing percentage of Serbs disaffected with all political leaders and parties, it remains to be seen whether the agreement will influence the way Serbs view Yugoslav President Milosevic in the future.

KEY FINDINGS

- Since USIA's August survey in Serbia, opinion of most leading politicians has remained stable.
- Yugoslav President Milosevic remains the single most-trusted politician in Serbia. But a plurality now say they do not trust any leader.
- Support for the ruling SPS and SRS has remained stable since August. Six percent support the SPO and the Alliance for Change and fewer choose other opposition parties.

Public Views of Political Leaders Marked by Disaffection

Asked which politician they trust most in "today's

Serbia," Serbs are increasingly likely to say they do not trust any leader. Currently, a plurality (31%) say they do not trust any and an additional 6 percent say they do not know (Table 1). Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is trusted most by a quarter -- more than any other single politician, and

Table 1. Most Trusted Leader

	March 1998	August 1998	October 1998
Milosevic	22%	26%	25%
Seselj	18	11	11
Avramovic	14	9	13
Draskovic	7	6	6
Kostunica	6	4	3
Djindjic	4	3	2
Panic	n/a	2	3
Pesic	1	1	1
None	18	28	31
Don't know/ No answer	6	9	6

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj by one in ten (11%). About a third altogether name an opposition figure, but only Dragoslav Avramovic, former National Bank Governor and

This report is based on preliminary data from face-to-face interviews with 1000 adults age 18 and older in Serbia (excluding Kosovo). Interviews were conducted October 2 - 8, 1998. The firm Medium in Belgrade conducted the interviews for USIA.

founder of the Alliance for Change, is mentioned by at least one in ten. Six percent trust Serbian Renewal Movement President Vuk Draskovic most. Few name other opposition leaders.

The third who do not trust any leader tend to view Milosevic and Seselj as well as leading opposition figures negatively. They also seem to view all political parties unfavorably: a majority of them say they would not vote or do not know which party they would vote for if there were a parliamentary election "tomorrow." This group's disaffection does not seem to stem from their views on Kosovo. They are as likely as others to support the activities of the Serbian Security Forces against the UCK and are evenly divided between those who approve and those who disapprove of Milosevic's handling of the situation. But they would be slightly less willing than the public overall to support a family member going to fight to keep Kosovo part of Serbia.

Support for Leaders Coincides with Party Support

Older Serbs and the lesser educated are more likely than others to name Milosevic as the politician they trust most (57% of those over 65 name Milosevic compared with 18% of those under 30). Serbs under age 30 are more likely than others to say they do not trust any politician (35%) or decline to answer (7%). Serbs' trust of politicians tends to differ according to party lines. Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Yugoslav United Left (JUL) supporters are more likely than others to name Milosevic as the Serbian politician they trust the most. Serbian Radical Party (SRS) supporters name party leader Vojislav Seselj, and Alliance for Change supporters divide evenly between Avramovic and Milan Panic.

Opinion of Milosevic Polarizes Public

In this survey, conducted before the recent agreement reached between U.S. Special Envoy Holbrooke and President Milosevic, as many express a favorable (46%) as an unfavorable (49%) opinion of Milosevic (Table 2). Overall opinion of Milosevic has remained fairly stable over the past year. Broadly consistent with

	Table 2. Opinion of President Milosevic				
	January 97	August 97	March 98	August 98	October 98
Very Favorable	20	33	21	22	22
Somewhat Favorable	20	14	18	23	24
Somewhat Unfavorable	16	15	19	16	17
Very Unfavorable	37	36	39	35	32

previous findings, those with a negative opinion of Milosevic are more likely to hold this view *strongly* than are those with a positive opinion. Those with a favorable view of Milosevic also tend to have a positive opinion of Vojislav Seselj and Serbian Prime Minister Milan Milutinovic and negative opinions of leading opposition politicians.

Despite divided overall opinion of Milosevic, a majority (56%) approve of his handling of the situation in Kosovo. Large majorities of those with a positive view of Milosevic and supporters of the ruling coalition approve of his actions in Kosovo, but three in ten of those who view Milosevic negatively and roughly a third among each opposition party (fewer among DS supporters) also approve.

Favorable opinion of Milosevic seems to have increased somewhat in the Belgrade region. Past surveys have found residents of the capital more critical of government than others, but recent surveys have found favorable

opinion of Milosevic increasing (56% favorable now; 37% in August; 30% in June). This increase could be due in part to the fact that Belgrade residents are somewhat less likely than residents outside the capital to blame Milosevic for the situation in Kosovo. In addition, they tend to be more critical of international involvement in the situation.

Two-Thirds Respect Avramovic; Other Leaders Viewed More Critically

As with opinion of Milosevic, public views toward most Serbian political figures remain largely unchanged since this summer (Table 3). Dragoslav Avramovic remains the only political figure commanding a positive rating from a majority. Milan Panic, who is also a participant in Alliance for Change, is viewed much less favorably than Avramovic. Opinions toward Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj are fairly closely divided, and half or more view most other opposition leaders negatively.

Those with a favorable opinion of Seselj, Milutinovic or Yugoslav Prime Minister Bulatovic are especially likely to approve of Milosevic's handling of the Kosovo situation, while those favorable toward Djindjic, Pesic, Panic and Montenegrin President Djukanovic are particularly critical of Milosevic.

Table 3. Serb Public Opinion of Leaders

		March 1998	August 1998	October 1998
Avramovic	<i>Favorable</i>	n/a	62	64
	<i>Unfavorable</i>		30	27
Seselj	<i>Favorable</i>	45	43	44
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	53	52	52
Kostunica	<i>Favorable</i>	48	36	38
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	43	54	52
Milutinovic	<i>Favorable</i>	35	n/a	35
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	61		59
Draskovic	<i>Favorable</i>	26	24	27
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	68	68	66
Panic	<i>Favorable</i>	n/a	27	26
	<i>Unfavorable</i>		62	64
Djindjic	<i>Favorable</i>	26	18	21
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	70	74	72
Pesic	<i>Favorable</i>	23	18	18
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	69	74	73
Djukanovic	<i>Favorable</i>	33	37	35
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	58	54	57
Bulatovic	<i>Favorable</i>	35	28	32
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	57	64	61

Table 4. Party Support

	March 1998	August 1998	October 1998
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)	20%	24%	24%
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	20	14	13
Yugoslav United Left (JUL)	3	1	1
New Democracy (ND)	1	—	—
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)	8	5	6
Alliance for Change	n/a	5	6
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)	6	4	3
Democratic Party (DS)	5	3	3
Social Democratic Party	6	2	2
Civic Alliance (GSS)	—	1	1
Other Parties	7	5	4
Will not vote	16	21	18
Don't know / No answer / Undecided	9	15	17

Those with a favorable view of Avramovic are only slightly more likely to view Milosevic negatively (53%) than positively (45%).

Party Standings Hold Steady Since Summer

Support for most Serbian political parties has remained stable since the summer survey (Table 4). A quarter name the SPS as their choice "if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow" and over one in ten name Seselj's SRS. While support for these ruling coalition partners is holding steady, opposition support remains fragmented among several parties, including the Serbian Renewal Movement (6%), the Alliance for Change

o), the Democratic Party of Serbia (3%), the Democratic Party (3%), the Social Democratic Party (2%) and the Civic Alliance (1%).

A third overall say either that they would not vote for any party or they are undecided. More women (41%) than men (33%) do not state a party preference. As with those who do not trust any leader, those who do not support any party do not differ significantly in their views toward Kosovo. They are just as likely as the overall public to favor increased autonomy for Kosovo and slightly more likely to approve (48%) than disapprove (40%) of Milosevic's handling of the Kosovo issue. A majority of this group has a negative overall opinion of both Milosevic (58% negative, 34% positive) and Seselj (62% negative, 30% positive). Their views of other opposition leaders tend to mirror those of the overall Serb public.

How This Poll Was Conducted

This survey is based on preliminary data from face-to-face interviews with a nationwide representative probability sample of 1000 adults age 18 and older in Serbia, excluding Kosovo. Interviewing was conducted between October 2 - 8, 1998. The firm Medium in Belgrade conducted the interviews for USIA. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor and reviewed by the Office of Research and Media Reaction staff.

In theory, 19 times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in Serbia. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within the population. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

The refusal rate for this survey was unusually high. Many who refused to participate cited concerns about Kosovo and potential international military action against Serbia.

For further information, please contact the analysts.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. draft	Paper. Subject: [Milosevic] [See 9830298, vz6261_002d, vz6337_001c and 007c, and vz6339_009a, this case] (8 pages)	10/00/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Serbia: Economic Troubles Test Milosevic's Political Stamina. [with fax cover] (10 pages)	10/09/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	[FRY: Loyalists in Policy Implementation] [with fax cover] (7 pages)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [5]

2008-0994-F
vz6340

RESTRICTION CODES

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OPINION ANALYSIS

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC 20547

USIA

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND MEDIA REACTION

October 30, 1998

M-169-98

Relations with Serbia Top Concern for Montenegrins

Ethnic groups divided on future political status of republic

On October 22, the President of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, reiterated that although he seeks to further market reforms and to distance the republic from the "undemocratic" policies of Yugoslav President Milosevic, declaring independence from Yugoslavia would expose Montenegro to the "numerous internal problems and ambitions of its neighbors." This just-completed USIA survey suggests that **while many Montenegrins support Djukanovic's policies, few would back independence — except ethnic Muslims and Albanians.**

KEY FINDINGS

- **Three in four say relations between Serbia and Montenegro are bad.**
- **Despite these tensions, most Montenegrins favor remaining in the Yugoslav federation.**

- Politicians from Djukanovic's "For a Better Life" coalition have gained in public support, and Milosevic remains unpopular — except among Montenegrin Serbs.
- Ethnic cleavages are key factors for confidence in both federal and republic level institutions.

Many Montenegrins Dissatisfied With Current Relations With Serbia

As in USIA's April 1998 poll, a majority in Montenegro express a favorable overall opinion of Serbia (75%), but think current relations with Serbia are bad (78%; 31% very bad). Just 21 percent say they are good. Nearly six in ten overall (56%) believe that Serbia is exercising too much influence over Montenegro, and agree that "Serbia expects us to give in to its wishes in matters that concern Montenegro and Serbia."

The various ethnic groups in Montenegro differ sharply in their views of Serbia-

This report is based on data from face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 1057 adults age 18 and older in Montenegro conducted from October 4-12, 1998. The Institute for Social Sciences in Podgorica conducted the interviews for USIA.

Montenegro relations.¹ Broadly speaking, two in three ethnic Serbs do not think Serbia exercises too much influence (Table 1). Ethnic Montenegrins think the opposite and believe Serbia has too much influence. Ethnic Albanians and Muslims most widely believe Serbia has too much influence, while "Yugoslavs" are divided.

Public Attributes Poor Relations to Excessive Serb Influence

When asked to name the most difficult issue or conflict between the two republics, most in Montenegro mention tensions with Serbia (including the "supremacy of Serbia," the "unequal position of Montenegro" and "Serbian policies"). But some ethnic Serbs and (fewer) ethnic Montenegrins mention "Montenegrin separatism" and "Montenegrin leaders' policies." Many are dissatisfied with the level of influence Montenegro exerts. Half believe that Montenegro's influence in affairs at the Federal Yugoslav level is *too little* (52%), compared to 28 percent who think it is *about the right amount* and 3 percent who think it is *too much*. Majorities of all ethnic groups except for ethnic Serbs think Montenegrin influence is too little; Serbs tend to think it is about the right amount.

Table1: "Serbia is exercising too much influence in its relations with Montenegro"

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know
Montenegrins	52%	34%	14%
Serbs	24	66	10
Yugoslavs	39	43	18
Muslims	87	6	7
Albanians	83	6	12
All	56	32	13

Strong Support for Remaining Part of FRY

Despite criticism of Serb dominance, the overall public tends to believe there are more advantages (52%) than disadvantages (31%) to remaining part of Yugoslavia, and a wide majority (78%) agree that "Montenegro should remain part of the FRY". Asked about possible options for the future, almost half (47%) think it would be better if Montenegro remained part of the FRY but insisted on equal treatment with Serbia – the preferred approach of ethnic Montenegrins, Muslims and "Yugoslavs" (Table 2). A third overall (30%) are satisfied with Montenegro's current status within the FRY (mainly Serbs and some ethnic Montenegrins and "Yugoslavs.") Just 18 percent prefer that Montenegro become independent – the overwhelming choice of ethnic Albanians. These views are fairly consistent with attitudes from last April, though ethnic Albanians have grown far more supportive of independence.

Table 2: There have been several suggestions for the future of Montenegro. Please tell me which of the following you think would be best for our future? Do you think Montenegro should:

	Those in Montenegro who identify themselves as:											
	Montenegrins		Serbs		Muslims		Albanians		Yugoslavs		Total Public	
	4/98	10/98	4/98	10/98	4/98	10/98	4/98	10/98	4/98	10/98	4/98	10/9
Remain part of FRY and keep things as they are	39%	34%	63%	63%	8%	1%	3%	--	39%	43%	33%	43%
Remain part of FRY but insist on equal treatment with Serbia	45	50	32	33	60	65	28	15	56	41	44	41
Become an independent state	14	12	3	2	27	30	43	75	--	7	17	18
Don't know/no response	3	4	2	2	2	4	17	10	6	9	6	4

¹ In this sample, 60% of the respondents are Montenegrin, 16% Muslim, 12% Serb, 7% Albanian, 4% Yugoslav, 1% Croatian and 1% other.

As in April 1998, half (49%) of all Montenegrins are not concerned that frictions will come to military conflict in the next few years. But nearly as many *are* concerned (44%; up from 34% in Spring 1998). Among Serbs and ethnic Montenegrins, the level of concern has remained largely unchanged over recent months. Likely reflecting the current situation in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians and Muslims show rising concern that fighting will erupt. While in Spring 1998, 52 percent of Muslims and 42 percent of Albanians feared military conflict, presently 74 percent of Muslims and 68 percent of Albanians voice this concern.

Djukanovic Evokes Most Favorable Opinions, Bulatovic and Milosevic Down

Montenegrins' views of politicians tend to reflect their appraisals of federal-republic relations. Two-thirds (66%) say they are not confident that the decisions made by Yugoslav President Milosevic will be in the best interests of Montenegro (28% are confident). Overall views of Milosevic tend to be negative (63%; 30% positive), as are views of former Montenegrin President and current Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic (60% unfavorable; 34% favorable). Both politicians have lost public support since Spring 1996, when 61 percent viewed Milosevic favorably and 77 percent viewed Bulatovic favorably. Only ethnic Serbs continue to view Milosevic more positively than negatively.

By contrast, a majority of the public (57%) is confident that Montenegrin President Djukanovic's decisions will be in the best interests of Montenegro (36% lack confidence), and nearly two in three ethnic Montenegrins rate Djukanovic (64%) and Montenegrin Prime Minister Vujanovic (59%) positively. Confidence in Djukanovic also varies by ethnic group, with large majorities of ethnic Albanians and Muslims, half of Montenegrins and a plurality of "Yugoslavs" expressing confidence. A majority of ethnic Serbs lack confidence in Djukanovic.

Majority Have Confidence in Montenegrin Institutions

Further reflecting their dissatisfaction with FRY relations, the Montenegrin public has more confidence in political institutions at the republic than at the federal level (Table 3). Yet while attitudes toward Montenegrin institutions have remained stable, attitudes toward Yugoslav institutions are less positive now than in 1996.

Table 3: "Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the..."

		3/96	4/98	10/98
Federal parliament	Confidence	42%	24%	34%
	No confidence	47	57	58
Federal government	Confidence	42	31	34
	No confidence	46	58	58
Montenegrin parliament	Confidence	58	57	58
	No confidence	35	38	38
Montenegrin government	Confidence	58	63	57
	No confidence	33	29	39
Yugoslav army	Confidence	58	63	58
	No confidence	33	31	37

Ethnic Serbs in Montenegro, and to a lesser extent "Yugoslavs," place higher confidence in federal institutions, while Montenegrins, Muslims and ethnic Albanians prefer republican bodies. An exception is the army – Montenegrins are as confident in the Yugoslav army as Serbs. Pluralities of "Yugoslavs" have confidence in the Yugoslav parliament and the Montenegrin government.

Table 4: Confidence in political institutions by nationality

		All	Montenegrin	Serbian	Yugoslav	Muslim	Albanian
Federal	Confidence	34%	38%	50%	45%	6%	5%
parliament	No confidence	58	55	29	42	87	67
Federal	Confidence	34	38	66	35	5	2
government	No confidence	58	55	29	53	90	72
Montenegrin	Confidence	58	56	23	41	90	83
parliament	No confidence	38	41	73	55	9	11
Montenegrin	Confidence	57	53	19	48	91	88
government	No confidence	39	43	76	43	8	8
Yugoslav army	Confidence	58	73	75	56	12	7
	No confidence	37	22	22	32	87	76

Prepared by Dina S. Smeltz and Janice Bell (202-619-4490; reu@usia.gov).
 Issued by Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA.

Methodology

This report is based on data from face-to-face interviews conducted from October 4-10, 1998 with a nationally representative sample of 1057 adults (age 18 or older) in Montenegro. The research firm Institute for Social Sciences in Podgorica conducted the interviews for USIA.

Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor and reviewed by Office of Research and Media Reaction staff.

In theory, 19 times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in Montenegro. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within the population of Montenegro. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

For further information, please contact the analysts.



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER PAGE

TO: Greg Schulte

ORGANIZATION: NSC

FAX NUMBER: 456-9150

SENDER: Daniel Serwer **PHONE:** 202-429-3840 **FAX:** 202-429-6063

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS COVER): 3

DATE: SEPTEMBER 24, 1998

RE: FRY Presidency Succession

MESSAGE



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September 24, 1998

To: Mr. Greg Schulte, NSC

From: Daniel Serwer  USIP

Subject: **FRY Presidency Succession**

Thinking further about my note yesterday, it occurs to me that we should consider what would happen if Bozovic assumed Milosevic's duties as president of the FRY and a new election were held for the FRY presidency in the Federal Assembly, as presently constituted. The existing anti-Milosevic parties do not control enough votes to determine the outcome.

Article 97(1) of the FRY Constitution stipulates that the two house Federal Assembly elects the President of Yugoslavia by secret ballot. Attached is a breakdown of the House of Citizens. Parties that support Milosevic have 58 percent of the seats. All other parties comprise 42 percent of the House of Citizens. Assuming that Serbian President Milutinovic controls Serbia's 20 seats in the Chamber of Republics, and Montenegrin President Djukanovic controls Montenegro's 20 seats (in fact he does not, because his withdrawal of the mandates of the Bulatovic delegates has not been implemented), a vote in the combined Federal Assembly could still be won by Milosevic supporters, if they held together.

The election law, which we have not yet found, may determine whether the new President would be selected by the existing Federal Assembly or whether a new Assembly has to be chosen first.

House of Citizens, FRY**Total members: 138**

"Bad Guys"	# seats	"Good Guys"	# seats
SPS, JUL, ND	64	Zajedno	22
Serbian Radical Party	16	DPS of Montenegro	20
		(Djukanovic's party)	
		People's Party of	8
		Montenegro	
		Union of Vojvodina	3
		Hungarians	
		Vojvodina Coalition	2
		List of Sandzak	1
		SDP Montenegro	1
		DAP of Montenegro	1
TOTAL	80	TOTAL	58
% of total seats	58%	% of total seats	42%

Chamber of Republics, FRY**Total members: 40 (20 Serbia and 20 Montenegro)**

House of Citizens	80	58
Chamber of Republics	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	100	78



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FAX NUMBER: 456-9150

SENDER: Daniel Serwer **PHONE:** 202-429-3840 **FAX:** 202-429-6063

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS COVER): 3

DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 1998

RE: FRY Presidency Succession

MESSAGE



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September 23, 1998

To: Mr. Greg Schulte, NSC

From: Daniel Serwer, USIP

Subject: FRY Presidency Succession

I attach the relevant articles (97 and 98) of the FRY constitution. In the event of termination of the President's mandate, or temporary inability to carry out his duties, it is the President of the Chamber of Republics of the Federal Assembly who performs the duties of President (Article 98(4)). This office is now held by Srdja Bozovic, a Montenegrin who is deputy chairman of Bulatovic's Socialist National Party. It is my understanding that Bozovic is one of the people whose mandate Djukanovic believes has been withdrawn.

There appears to be no constitutional requirement that new elections be held within a given time frame. Procedures for the election and dismissal of the President are governed by a Federal law that we are still trying to find.

Serbia & Montenegro - Section V Organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Title 2 President of the Republic

Article 97 []

- (1) The President of the Republic shall be elected by the Federal Assembly for a four-year term of office, by secret ballot.
- (2) The same individual may not be reelected President of the Republic for a second term.
- (3) As a rule, the President of the Republic and the federal prime minister may not be from the same member republic.
- (4) The President of the Republic may not hold other public office or engage in professional activities.
- (5) The President of the Republic shall enjoy the same immunity as a federal deputy.
- (6) The Federal Assembly shall determine the immunity of the President of the Republic.
- (7) The President of the Republic may only be dismissed if the Federal Assembly ascertains that he has violated the Constitution.

Article 98 []

- (1) The President of the Republic may resign from his office.
- (2) The mandate of the President of the Republic shall be terminated on the day he submits his resignation or is dismissed.
- (3) In the event of termination of the mandate of the President of the Republic, until the election of a new President of the Republic, or in the event of temporary inability of the President of the Republic to carry out his duties, these duties shall be performed by the president of the Chamber of Republics of the Federal Assembly.
- (4) The procedure for the election and dismissal of the President of the Republic shall be determined by federal law.

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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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