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Folder Title:

Milosevic [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. form	Fax Cover. [partial] (1 page)	12/08/1998	P3/b(3), b(7)(C)
002a. form	Cover Sheet. Record ID: 9830272. (1 page)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	James Steinberg from Greg Schulte. Subject: Summary of Conclusions, Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] (1 page)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)
002c. memo	For Leon Fuerth, Kristie Kenney et al. Subject: Summary of Conclusions, Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] (1 page)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)
002d. memo	Summary of Conclusions, Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] (2 pages)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)
003. report	Serbia. (1 page)	11/00/1998	P1/b(1)
004. report	Serbia Inc., Part of the Problem, Not the Solution. [Duplicate of vz6261_002g and vz6336_003c, this case] (8 pages)	11/30/1998	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: FRY: Milosevic Appointed...[with marginalia] (1 page)	12/01/1998	P1/b(1)
006. report	Duplicate of 004. [Duplicate of vz6261_002g and vz6336_003c, this case] (8 pages)	11/24/1998	P1/b(1)
007a. form	Cover Sheet. Record ID: 9830269. (1 page)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6338

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. memo	For James Steinberg from Greg Schulte. Subject: Restricted DC on Kosovo....[Record ID: 9830269] [See 9830298, vz6261_002c, this case] (2 pages)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)
007c. paper	Subject: [Milosevic] [See 9830298, vz6261_002d and vz6337_001c, this case] (8 pages)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)
007d. paper	Subject: [Annex II: Action] [See 9830298, vz6261_002e and vz6337_001e, this case] (2 pages)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
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FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F

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SERBIA WATCH #81 December 16, 1998

The Financial Times report also noted: "Mr. Avramovic believes the time has come to unite disparate opposition groups, supported mainly by the urban middle class, with an equally fragmented and weak trade union movement..." The history of the Alliance members is checkered and difficult, Mr. Avramovic, a former World Bank economist, admits. "But this time no one can afford to pull out. The question is whether we will be able to mount an effective campaign"... Avramovic, known as 'super grandpa' with a high ranking in opinion polls, says the burning question is how long the regime can stave off complete economic collapse, and at what point people will start to protest."

The report also noted that "a purge of the security forces [in Serbia] is now penetrating to the lower ranks. Rumblings of discontent are being neutralized."

The Toronto Star reported Sunday from Belgrade: "As their country continues its downward spiral of political and economic decline, Serbian liberals who want to oust Milosevic are stopped in their tracks by the thought that Seselj is his likely successor."

SERBIA vs. MONTENEGRO

When asked if the subject of Montenegro came up during US Envoy Richard Holbrooke's visit to Belgrade this week, US Secretary of State James Rubin said today: "Without getting into the specifics of that kind of discussion, let me say we've said many times that we do not want to see the kind of repression that occurred in Kosovo occur in Montenegro. That we do not support secession of Montenegro; on the contrary, we support democracy and Montenegro working successfully with Serbia in a parliamentary system. And so we do have concerns about Montenegro. We've been very supportive of President Djukanovic, and we take the opportunity when appropriate to raise those issues with the Serbs. But I wouldn't be able to specify what was said on that subject between Ambassador Holbrooke and President Milosevic."

BETA reported yesterday that "U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sent 'a very sharply worded message' to FR Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milosevic, claim well informed diplomatic sources in Brussels. The message asks Milosevic to withhold any movements by Yugoslav army troops in the direction of or inside of Montenegro, which could in any manner bring into question the legitimate, elected authorities in Podgorica, say those sources, adding that the administration in Washington says it 'has certain indications' of such. Senior diplomats in Brussels say that the NATO Council discussed the subject on Dec. 14, and that the Russian side has been informed of it at the meeting of the sitting council of NATO and Russia, which was held at the level of ambassadors."

Independent daily Vijesti (Podgorica) said December 9 that Montenegro's Justice Minister Dragan Soc "announced yesterday that senior Montenegrin politicians would hold a preliminary meeting to devise a strategy to defend Montenegro from the 'expected attempt to topple' the current republican activities. It is obvious that things are starting to move quickly in Serbia and Montenegro... Slobodan Milosevic will not give up his position easily, so we expect yet another attempt to bring down the authorities. There is no point in speculating how this will develop, but changes in the army and police leadership in Serbia can be viewed in this light, Soc told a news conference."

BETA also noted December 10: "Montenegrin Premier Filip Vujanovic said: Despite the 'many irritating things about the Yugoslav federation,' Montenegro will make not a single hasty move in which the results cannot be predicted. 'I do not advocate breaking up something that is in the best interest of the Yugoslav and Montenegrin people, which is their community, because of a bad regime or a bad leadership of Yugoslavia, individually or as a married couple,' Montenegrin Premier Vujanovic emphasized in an interview to the Montenegrin television. Vujanovic also expressed the hope that the Yugoslav Army's new chief-of-staff, Dragoljub Ojdanic, would pursue the same professional path in running the army, which means that the army will remain away from political conflicts."

Radio B-92 noted that "Montenegro's Minister for Labour and Social Issues, Predrag Drecun told media [Tuesday] that the Montenegrin Government will tomorrow debate a parallel currency. Drecun said that, although the weekend fall in the black market rate of the dinar had recovered, another monetary strike could be expected by the end of the year. He added that the National Party, of which he is deputy leader, would initiate a debate on the protection of Montenegro's interests."

BETA reported that Montenegro's Vice Premier Predrag Goranovic said December 11 that Montenegro "would be forced to take over monetary jurisdiction from the federal government and protect its own interests, if the 'monetary chaos in Yugoslavia continues.' In the same show, Montenegrin Minister of Industry, Energy and Mining, Vojin Djukanovic, labelled as 'nonsense' explanations by Serbian officials that the 'independent media and psychological factor' caused the current monetary coup. 'The exchange rate is rising because the economy is not generating enough income and cannot cover large public spending,' said Djukanovic, adding that 'Montenegro is ready to activate mechanisms to protect its citizens even without introducing its national currency.'"

SERBIA WATCH #81

December 16, 1998

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SERBIA

In an interview conducted last week with Newsweek correspondent Lally Weymouth, published Sunday by the Washington Post and official Belgrade news agency Tanjug, Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic called the creation of an outer wall of sanctions "unfair," said he was "proud of my role" on behalf of the "interests of my people and my county," and denied that Serbia was harboring war criminals.

When asked about his recent firings of former Yugoslav National Army chief of staff Momcilo Perisic and intelligence chief Jovica Stanisic, Milosevic replied: "This was just a regular change. In any democratic country, that is normal."

Milosevic also threatened to treat as an "act of aggression" any attempt to enter Yugoslavia by NATO's Macedonia-based rapid reaction force, formed to rescue members of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission from life-threatening situations in Kosovo.

Republika Srpska official news agency SRNA (Pale) cited a statement by Serbia's Democratic Party (DS) saying Yugoslavia's President "Milosevic's interview for the Washington Post shows that he has no...intention of allowing any kind of democratic reforms in the economy and society, and that he sees [Serbia's deputy Prime Minister and Serbian Radical Party chairman Vojislav] Seselj and [Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) chairman] Vuk Draskovic as supporting pillars of his loser's policies."

The statement cited by SRNA also noted: "Milosevic is deluding himself with economic success, growth in production exports, and living standards, the DS said, and added that he had no answer to the question of why 24,000 companies — which employ 500,000 people — are facing bankruptcy, why 800,000 workers have been laid off, why there are 600,000 unemployed and why every third Serbian citizen is facing starvation."

BETA reported that "the Serbian education union [Tuesday] called all primary school and high school teachers to stop working starting Feb. 2, 1999, until all their demands are met. The union demands regular payment of salaries, payment of salary arrears, and the promised raise."

Reuters reported that "the Yugoslav central bank played down devaluation fears on Friday and instead offered a set of measures to stabilize the dinar on the black market, where it has slipped sharply in value since Monday. 'There will be no devaluation and the exchange rate of the dinar will remain fixed,' the National Bank of Yugoslavia Governor Dusan Vlatkovic told a news conference. The dinar recouped some of its losses on Friday and was changing hands at 8.2-8.7 to the German mark on Yugoslavia's thriving black market, compared to 8.5-9.0 on Thursday [the official rate is set at 6.0 dinars to the German mark]." Reuters noted that Vlatkovic announced several measures intended to take hundreds of millions of dinars out of circulation, including "draining excess liquidity" from the official foreign exchange market and increasing reserve requirements for banks.

Independent news service BETA (Belgrade) reported December 10 that "leading Yugoslav economists estimated that the huge public expenditure which, according to the government's plan, would be around 70 percent of the gross social product, is threatening to cause hyper-inflation. At the annual consultations of economists to discuss the planned economic policy, held on Dec. 9, the director of the Institute for Economic Studies, Tomislav Popovic, said that the federal government's economic policy plan for next year was 'the worst concept in the past 30 years.'"

BETA reported today that the "economic system board of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce demanded, on Dec. 15, that the federal government adopts a program of measures in case basic elements of the 1999 economic policy fail to materialize, such as Yugoslavia's membership in international financial institutions, the lifting of the ban on investments in our country, and the approval of the EU trade preferences. The board chairman, Dragan Srejovic, pointed out that it was obvious the International Monetary Fund would discuss Yugoslavia's status only in June, when the European Union will also decide whether to grant trade preferences to Yugoslavia in the second half of 1999."

The Financial Times reported today that "Western embassies differ in their assessments [of Yugoslavia's economic situation]. Some see a deepening crisis just around the corner, estimating the government has exhausted its reserves and can only print money to pay the state sector and keep a lid on social unrest. Last week the dinar plummeted on the black market as state banks pumped out freshly minted notes to try to suck up the 'under the mattress' hard currency savings of the beleaguered population. Others disagree. 'Milosevic has got 1999 banked,' commented one diplomat. 'The country has got food, and oil from Libya. And with an openly declared enemy in the US, he can call on the population for another year of sacrifice.'

The Financial Times noted today that Yugoslavia's former central bank governor Dragoslav Avramovic "has become the inspiration for the most coherent threat to Mr. Milosevic yet... [he] has emerged to become the brains behind...[the] newly formed opposition coalition the Alliance for Change... Last week Mr. Avramovic spoke at an outdoor rally for the first time in more than two years. Organized by independent trade unions it drew about 6,000 people in the southern town of Kraljevo — a reasonable turnout given the snowy weather. More rallies are planned across Serbia."

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6338

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 13
 FROM Robert S. Gelbard S/SR 647-3774 6219
 (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Memo from Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
CIA/BTF	(b)(3)		
DOD/BTF	Mr. Bernd McConnell	(b)(7)c	
AID/AA/ENI	Mr. Don Pressley	712-0290	5.06-193 RRB
AID/OTI	Mr. David Costello	712-5231	8.06 RRB
NSC	Mr. Greg Schulte	456-9101	386 OEOB

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REMARKS: _____

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 Initials: RL Date: 4/26/2024

2008-1144-F.3



United States Department of State

Special Representative of the President
and the Secretary of State for Implementation
of the Dayton Peace Accords

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:12/04/08

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 4, 1998

TO: CIA/BTF
DOD/BTF
JCS/J-5
NSC/Dayton Directorate
STATE/EUR/SCE
STATE/EUR/EEA
AID/ENI
AID/OTI

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VR NARA, Date 4/26/2024

2008-0994-F.3

FROM: S/SR - Robert S. Gelbard *RG*

SUBJECT: Public line regarding U.S. policy in the FRY vis-a-vis Milosevic

There have been a number of press reports in the last week concerning U.S. policy in the FRY, and particularly efforts to undermine the stability of the Milosevic government, that are inaccurate and detrimental to U.S. interests. Most recently, Belgrade's independent B-92 radio has produced a piece implicating the Open Society Institute in some sort of anti-Milosevic conspiracy. This report -- which is wholly inaccurate -- puts the OSI in a dangerous position and increases the risk that the Soros fund's operations in Belgrade will be shut down. Although the source of these reports is not clear, there is reason to believe that some of the "information" is coming from USG officials.

I want to reinforce with all concerned with FRY policy the importance of maintaining a clear consistent line in conversations with foreign government officials and particularly with members of the media.

You should restrict any comments on the question of U.S. views regarding the Milosevic regime to cleared guidance. State Department Spokesman James Rubin recently addressed the issue in detail on the record and I refer you to that briefing (transcript attached).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: S/SR Robert S. Gelbard
Reason: Reason. 1.5 (b) and (d)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

In conversations you have on this, I would urge you focus on our democratization efforts, emphasizing the following:

- The United States has a clearly articulated policy of supporting democracy and democratic reforms throughout the world. This includes the FRY.
- We have an active AID-funded democratization program in the FRY that includes, support for independent media, the development of a civil society and the professionalization of democratically-inclined opposition political parties.
- Democratization is a key element of the Outer Wall of sanctions against the FRY. Meaningful democratic reforms are essential if the FRY is ever to join the community of nations as a full and productive partner.
- We are deeply concerned about recent attacks against the independent media in Belgrade and are doing everything possible to support independent voices.
- Also concerned about increasing pressure directed against Montenegro, where the Djukanovic government has made significant progress in instituting democratic and economic reforms.
- We will continue our efforts to facilitate the growth of democratic institutions in Serbia and reinforce the gains that have already been made in Montenegro.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

December 4, 1998

DRAFTER: MPALMER

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TEL. 67479

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1998, 12:50pm

Briefer: JAMES P. RUBIN

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, relevant section

QUESTION: Yesterday's statements that were made here about Yugoslavia and Milosevic - one thing I noticed is that it states that until there is democracy in Serbia there will not be a lifting of the outer wall of sanctions. In that democracy in Serbia is associated with, I suppose, the removal of Milosevic, is that to say that there will be no lifting of the outer wall until Milosevic goes, in effect?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we try to make our policies clear; you sometimes try to connect the dots. What I can say about our policy is that we want to see democracy in the FRY itself. Democracy is more than an election; democracy is a process. It is a process that doesn't include shutting down independent media. It doesn't include harassing and jailing political opponents, and it doesn't include many other aspects of the behavior that has come to mark the Milosevic period in Yugoslavia's history.

We believe that President Milosevic's grip on power is weakening. We believe far from the "greater Serbia" he envisioned several years ago, things have shrunk. Not only is Croatia whole and independent, the Serbs of Bosnia have an assembly and government control by moderates which rejects Milosevic's influence. Montenegro has elected officials in open rejection of President Milosevic, and key municipalities in Serbia itself are controlled by opposition political parties.

And now Kosovo, which for ten years President Milosevic considered his own backyard with no outside interference, is now a location where up to 2,000 or at least 2,000 international verifiers are envisaged to supervise election. This most recent purge of senior officials in Belgrade, including the head of state security and the chief of staff of the army, smacks of desperation and distrust on his part.

Milosevic has been at the center of every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply part of the problem; Milosevic is the problem. We have been promoting democratic practices and reforms in Serbia in a number of ways, including through independent media, including democracy assistance programs for fledgling opposition parties. That is something we are going to continue to do.

As far as what standard we will apply to the three issues -- that is Kosovo, cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal and democracy in Serbia itself -- in order to change the sanctions policy, I don't want to prescribe for you exactly what those issues would require. Simply to say we will know cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal when we see it; we will know democracy in Serbia when we see it; and we will know a real change in the situation in Kosovo when we see it. We haven't seen any of those three things now.

QUESTION: But if Milosevic is the problem -- and there is a lot of evidence to back what you are saying -- then how can you continue to deal with the problem? And how should the people of Serbia, or perhaps the various forces in or out of the government at the moment, deal with the problem?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let's remember there are sources of the problem, and clearly Milosevic is the source of the problem and the original sinner in this whole catastrophe that has befallen Yugoslavia in the last decade. We have no illusions about that.

At the same time, we did face this summer and fall the prospect of an humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo -- hundreds of thousands of peoples' lives were at risk. In order to deal with that humanitarian catastrophe, that very near-term disaster, we did meet with President Milosevic. And as a result of his belief that air strikes would ensue, he changed his policies, removed his forces, stopped marauding in the country side and, as I understand it, the UNHCR said that there is now no internally displaced persons without some form of shelter.

So this humanitarian catastrophe was dealt with in a way that we felt met the needs of the world in trying to prevent that catastrophe from unfolding in a rather unique way. In an unprecedented action, NATO made a decision to use military force inside Yugoslavia if he failed to meet the international community's demands. So we took unprecedented action in that regard and we dealt with President Milosevic, and he reversed course and stopped pursuing the behavior that was causing this grave risk to the people there and this grave risk of a humanitarian catastrophe. That is the reason we did so.

We have no interest in propping up President Milosevic. We do have an interest in preventing humanitarian catastrophe. We meet with many other - when Secretary Albright was there, for example, I know, she met with many of the opposition groups. She, I believe, spoke to B52, the radio. Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Gelbard and others who have been in the region make it a point to try to lift up, through their activities and through financial assistance, the opposition groups and the independent media. That's how you balance principle and pragmatism in a very complicated situation like Serbia.

QUESTION: You say you have no interest in propping up Milosevic. Are you prepared to turn that around and say the US has an interest in seeing him leave office?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think I've stated rather clearly our views on President Milosevic. Nobody gets up in the morning thanking the Lord that President Milosevic is the leader of Serbia. On the other hand, we do go about promoting democratic change in Serbia as we do in other places through these programs. I certainly don't think anybody would lose any sleep if that changed.

QUESTION: One last thought. Kosovo is of great importance to Serbia. And you describe the fragmentation of, first, of Yugoslavia, the problems with what remains of Serbia - of what remains of Yugoslavia. Why then -- you're coming awfully close to being happy with a destabilizing situation. But why do you maintain a policy, then, of not wanting to see Kosovo go independent? Because, in a sense, that might be the last nail in his whatever - if he lost Kosovo.

MR. RUBIN: Those points were designed to make clear the extent to which Milosevic has harmed the interests of Serbs in Serbia and Serbs everywhere. We have demonstrated that, I think, through the points that I've made about the harm that his rule and his policies have caused. To the extent that Serbs better understand the harm that President Milosevic has caused them, perhaps they will understand better the danger of his rule to them. But that's a very different point than changing our view as to how borders should be changed in Europe in the modern era.

QUESTION: For the most part, I want to ask, has Milosevic kept the deal that he was forced to change his mind about, change his policy about? And if he's keeping the deal for the most part, then perhaps isn't he a guy that NATO would want to deal with if they have a proven track record of getting him to turn around? What do you say to that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, turning him around on problems he causes is not something we take great joy in. If he didn't cause the problem, he wouldn't have to reverse course and solve the problem. So that's the first answer to that question.

With respect to is he complying, let me say that largely, yes; largely Kosovo is relatively quiet. There are no cease-fire violations that have been reported. Our observers continue to accompany police patrols in the Malisevo area, and in that regard there is a concern we do have - that is the excessive Serbian police presence at Malisevo remains a troubling instance of Serbian failure to comply fully with the UN Security Council resolutions.

It is the primary cause of the high level of tension in the Malisevo area. The police presence in Malisevo is an issue that we have raised directly with the

government in Belgrade, and we have underscored to them the importance of complying with UN resolutions in this as in all other cases.

As the verification agreement authorizes them to do, our observers are accompanying Serbian police patrols in the Malisevo region in an effort to reduce tensions in an area where the KLA is particularly visible. Our monitors' efforts have borne fruit over the last few weeks, as the number of incidents of violence has dropped significantly. But we still do have a problem with the excessive presence there.

QUESTION: But largely stable?

MR. RUBIN: Well, largely the compliance has largely occurred, as evidenced by the lack of cease-fire violations.

QUESTION: I'd like to go at Barry's question from a little bit of a different angle. There's a large British newspaper basing a report, as far as I can see, from your statements yesterday; saying that the Clinton Administration is actively seeking the overthrow of Milosevic. Is that true?

MR. RUBIN: As I said, I don't think we would lose any sleep if he passed from the scene. With respect to our policies and what we are pursuing, the policies that we are talking about are the ones that I am describing to you in promoting democracy. I know there are a lot of reports out there about other things that I just make it a practice never to talk about one way or the other. And that's not implied meaning there's any truth to them, either.

QUESTION: Let me put it another way. If Milosevic complies in all these areas to your full satisfaction, you're willing to continue to work with him?

MR. RUBIN: We want to see democracy in Serbia. There is no democracy in Serbia. That is the long-term policy of the United States - to have democracy in Serbia.

When you talk about dealing with Milosevic, as in response to the last question, and is he complying with a particular promise, let me point out the promise that he's complying with is something that was only necessary because of the policies that he pursued in the first place, which generated the humanitarian catastrophe that then he turned around in the face of NATO air strikes and solved.

So we prefer not to have the problem in the first place that Milosevic would then have to reverse course to help solve.

QUESTION: But if he woke up a different person tomorrow morning and did everything you want him to do, it's fine with you if he stays in power.

MR. RUBIN: Democracy in Serbia is the goal. It's not a personality-driven policy; it's a process-driven policy - the process of democracy.

QUESTION: Can we move to another undemocratic country? Senator Lugar yesterday, I think, in The Washington Post, wrote a list of suggestions on what might be done regarding Yugoslavia. Do you have any reservations about the various proposals he's made?

MR. RUBIN: Well, when we looked at them, in large measure we supported them. That is largely because many of them are things we are trying to do. We'd love to have additional support from the Congress for additional programs to assist the media and to assist the promotion of democracy there. That is something that we have been doing. It's a cornerstone of our policy in the Balkans, to promote democracy and to assist in the development of a free and independent media.

As I indicated yesterday, we are spending \$15 million in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including \$2 million for independent TV. So the kind of measures that Senator Lugar helpfully emphasized are measures that we do agree with. We're always looking at ways to pursue such policies better, and we'll take a careful look at his ideas.

QUESTION: What about his (inaudible) perspective, though; do you share that as well?

MR. RUBIN: You need to be more specific.

QUESTION: Well, he does say that there is -- no lasting solution to the Balkan crises is possible without fundamental change in Serbia and in the leadership of Yugoslavia. Do you have any reservations --

MR. RUBIN: We have no illusions about President Milosevic. We do not see him as a guarantor of stability in Kosovo or elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia. We also recognize quite clearly, as I have in several responses this morning said to you, that we believe he is the cause of many of these problems not the solution to many of these problems.

Beyond stating these positions as I have, I don't know how to be more specific in response to your question.

QUESTION: You're not exactly stating a reservation to what Lugar is saying.

MR. RUBIN: We read it with interest.

QUESTION: Then the other issue that comes up that I think you mentioned earlier was Montenegro. That's really a place where they are trying to go their own way, but it's a direct threat to Milosevic's rule. I was just wondering, should the Montenegrins continue down the path they're taking and find themselves in some jeopardy as a result, to what extent is the United States willing to support them so that they are not put in jeopardy or put at risk?

MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright had a very constructive with Mr. Djukanovic when he was here in the United States. Other than being a very tall person, which was astounding, he was someone who had a very tall view of democracy and a view that we found quite appealing.

We have not taken the position that we are in favor of some breaking away of Montenegro. We have said, and I can repeat, that we respect the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the final act of Helsinki commits us to do. But we will insist that the authorities in Belgrade, including President Milosevic, meet their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to allow for democracy, independent media and freedom of association and expression in Montenegro.

Beyond saying that, I don't know how to respond to what I think you would acknowledge is a hypothetical case. However likely it might be, it is hypothetical at this point.

QUESTION: Do you want to give an assessment, then, of what is a threat to the regime of Djukanovic? Milosevic now has a new security chief, a new army chief, people who may not be so reluctant to intervene in Montenegro as the previous people.

MR. RUBIN: It's a matter of concern for us.

QUESTION: How do you address that concern, both with regard to dealing with the Montenegrins and the Yugoslav regime?

Are you warning Milosevic or telling him what you think he should do there, or are you giving the Montenegrins some sense of --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're in regular touch with the Montenegrin authorities - part of our normal policy in the region. We have certainly made clear to President Milosevic the fact that his isolation from the world is not solely a function of what he was instigating in Bosnia or not solely a function of what he was instigating - the effect he was having on the people of Kosovo, but is also a function of permitting the kind of democratic freedoms and the freedom of independent media and association and expression in Montenegro. We've made that very clear to him.

(END Balkan section)

EUR Guidance
November 30, 1998

Milosevic

Q: Can you comment on the reports that Milosevic is losing his grip on power? Is the United States trying to keep him in place or move him aside? Any comment on Senator's Lugar's Op-Ed on Milosevic in the Washington Post this morning?

Answer:

-- MILOSEVIC'S RECENT PURGE OF A NUMBER OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IN BELGRADE -- INCLUDING THE POWERFUL HEAD OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE AND THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF OF THE ARMY -- SMACKS OF DESPERATION AND DISTRUST.

-- THESE ARE NOT THE ACTIONS OF A MAN SECURE AND CONFIDENT IN HIS LEADERSHIP.

-- MILOSEVIC'S GRIP ON POWER IS CLEARLY NOT AS FIRM AS IT ONCE WAS.

-- THIS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT. MILOSEVIC HAS BEEN AT THE CENTER OF EVERY CRISIS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA OVER THE LAST DECADE. HE IS NOT SIMPLY PART OF THE PROBLEM. IN MANY WAYS, HE IS THE PROBLEM.

-- IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO PRONOUNCE THE END OF THE MILOSEVIC ERA IN THE FRY, BUT WE HOPE -- AND THERE ARE SIGNS -- THAT THIS IS AT LEAST THE BEGINNING OF THE END.

-- SENATOR LUGAR WAS ABSOLUTELY RIGHT IN OBSERVING THAT NO LASTING SOLUTION TO THE BALKAN CRISIS IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SERBIAN AND IN THE LEADERSHIP OF YUGOSLAVIA.

-- SENATOR LUGAR HAD A NUMBER OF EXCELLENT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS REGARD, MANY OF WHICH WE ARE ALREADY PURSUING.

-- PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN SERBIA AND THE FRY AND ASSISTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA REMAIN A CORNERSTONE OF U.S. POLICY IN THE BALKANS.

-- MILOSEVIC VIEWS THESE REFORMS AS A THREAT TO HIS CONTINUED RULE AND WILL CONTINUE TO USE ALL OF HIS RESOURCES TO RESIST THE FORCES OF CHANGE.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE FRY PRESIDENT ON KOSOVO AND OTHER ISSUES ON AN AS NEEDED BASIS, BUT WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT MILOSEVIC AND DO NOT SEE HIM AS A GUARRANTOR OF STABILITY IN KOSOVO OR ELSEWHERE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

QUESTION: Does the United States have a secret plan to remove Milosevic?

-- WE DO NOT COMMENT ON PRESS REPORTS OF THAT SORT.

-- WE HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT WE CONSIDER MILOSEVIC'S CONTINUED HOLD ON POWER A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN BALKAN STABILITY.

-- WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION IN SERBIA, THE REFORM-MINDED GOVERNMENT OF MILO DJUKANOVIC IN MONTENEGRO, AND THE INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN PURSUIT OF CHANGE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

DRAFTED:

EUR/SCE:MPALMER

CLEARED:

EUR/SCE:LROSSIN

S/SR:ABAIR

P:ERUBIN

S:JO'BRIEN

H:JHAMILTON

EUR/PPA:DEBNER

EUR/TMS:MSMITH

Department of State
Office of OSCE Affairs
Tel: 202-647-2128
Fax: 202-647-1369

Fax

To: Amb. Pardew, EUR/KI - 75405
Mark Smith, EUR/KI - 77335
Laurie Dundon, EUR/SCE - 70555
Greg Schulte/Mike Hurley, NSC -456-9150
Tony Banbury, BTF - 1-703-697-2734

From: Sarah Penhune, EUR/RPM

Pages:

Date:

fyi - FYI non-paper on
"flagrant attacks" by
US.

~~Daily KVM Reporting.~~

**UNITED STATES MISSION
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Obersteingasse 11/1
A-1190 Vienna, Austria**

FAX MEMORANDUM

FROM FAX NUMBER: (43/1) 36-91-585

TELEPHONE NUMBER: (43/1) 31339-74-3104

DATE: 8 December 1998 / 3:31 PM

FAX TO NUMBER: 74-89-7-1369

TO: Jim Donegan, EUR/RPM
✓ Sarah Penhune, EUR/RPM

FROM: Mara Clariett *Mara*

NO. OF PAGES: 4 (including this cover)

REMARKS:

Jim and Sarah, Jeff Hovenier asked that I forward to you the attached non-paper on the subject "recent series of flagrant attacks by . . . the U.S." The Poles forwarded it to us, and they will not circulate it. This is FYI.

Best regards.

Attachment

C:\WINWORD\FAXES\SP0040.DOC

REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE DE
BUNDESREPUBLIK JUGOSLAWIEN
IN OSTERREICH



СРБСКА РЕПУБЛИКА ЈУГОСЛАВИЈА
У АУСТРИЈИ

TELEFAX

1320 WIEN, Rennweg 3
Tel: 712 12 05, 712 64 88, Fax: 713 25 97

NO. 1950/98 PS 02 07
6pgs

date: December 4, 1998
datum

pages (incl. cover)
страна, са овом 3

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the OSCE and has the honour to enclose the Declaration by the Federal Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia adopted on December 3, 1998, regarding the recent series of flagrant attacks by the representatives of the Administration of the United States of America against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the International Organizations in Vienna would like to ask the OSCE Secretariat that the afore-mentioned Declaration be distributed as an official document to all OSCE delegations.

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the International Organizations in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the OSCE Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, 4 December 1998

Secretariat of the
OSCE
Vienna

OSCE SECRETARIAT
- 4. Dez. 1998
4.12.1998

Sc
Adw

DGC
mm/BB
mm/kum

DECLARATION

by the Federal Assembly of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Federal Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia notes with indignation

That recently there has been a series of flagrant attacks by the representatives of the US administration against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its vital State and national interests and constitutional institutions.

That new American pressures ensued after it became clear that Serbia and Yugoslavia do not accept the thesis about the so called "dislocation of Serbia from Kosovo and Metohija", i.e. that it will defend at any cost the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in Kosmet, the solution on the basis of equality of all citizens, national and ethnic communities.

In that connection, the Federal Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

DECLARES

1. All present, as well as former US pressures, in fact represent support to separatism and terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and cause destabilization in the region.

2. The Federal Assembly resolutely rejects and condemns all instruments of pressure, threats and flagrant interference of USA in the internal affairs of the FRY. In order to achieve their destructive goals in the Balkans, the United States of America, its official representatives and agencies, render direct support and assistance to separatism and terrorism and finance those opposing the independence, stability and progress of the FRY. In that way the USA, as a super power, at the same time places itself in the service of terrorists and separatists, of those forces whose declared goal is the recharting of international borders, the creation of the so called "Greater Albania" to the detriment of territories of sovereign States in the region. This constitutes a violation of basic principles of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions, which condemned terrorism and separatism and threats to lasting peace and stability in the region.

3. It calls on the US representatives to stop deceiving the American and world general public that they, through their policy of threats and blackmail against Yugoslavia, allegedly work for human rights, protection of national minorities and democracy.

4. It energetically condemns contacts and cooperation of the high representatives of the USA with the Albanian terrorists, murderers, kidnappers and confirmed bandits of the Albanian narco-mafia and organized international crime in general. In this way, American representatives give an open support to separatism and terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, in spite of their proven connection with terrorist organizations in Asia, the

Gulf, in the Eastern and Northern Africa, which is very well known to the competent American authorities.

5. The fact that high American representatives state that they cannot dislocate Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia, that they cannot detach and annex it to some "Greater Albania" as long as the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is in power, is in fact a recognition of the policy of Yugoslavia and its President to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. The Federal Assembly gives its full support to the President of the FR of Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, to persist on the defense of vital national and State interests, on a peaceful and just solution to the problems in Kosovo and Metohija in the interest of all national communities living in Kosovo as well as in the interest of all the citizens of our country.

6. The will citizens expressed at the elections is a sovereign will, and this principle, on which modern democracies, including the USA, are based, equally applies to Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia. Constitutional organs of Serbia and Yugoslavia cannot be dismissed and established to please any foreign factor, nor can the will of the people be questioned. It is the duty of democratically elected organs and institutions to efficiently protect, by all available means, the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the country, to defend its dignity, and at this time above all to resolutely put an end to every form of separatism and terrorism. Kosovo and Metohija has always been, still is and will remain the integral part of the Republic of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia. We expect that the American public and the United States of America will realize and accept this truth, and not provoke crises, orchestrate pressures to achieve goals which they hide from their own as well as the international public.

7. If the USA truly want a democratic Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia, then they will assist it in the best way by lifting economic sanctions and pressures against Serbia and the FRY, as well as by a resolute and principled position on Albanian separatism and terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, in accordance with the UN Charter, international law and principles of modern democracy. The outer wall of sanctions and direct or indirect support to the Albanian separatists, do not encourage democratic processes, but rather seriously obstruct them.

8. The Federal Assembly points out that peace, stability and relations can be built exclusively on the principles of equality, independence, non-interference in the internal affairs and strict respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any other approach would result in inconceivable threats not only to the region, but also to international relations in general.

FAX COVER SHEET***COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA***

1299 Fourth Street, San Rafael, California 94901, USA

TO: Gregory L. Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for the Implementation of the
Dayton Accords
National Security Council

FAX: 202-456-9150

FROM: Michael Djordjevic
Tel: (415) 451-6900
(Call if any fax transmitting problems)

FAX: (415) 451-6910

DATE: November 24, 1998

PAGES: 3 (including cover sheet)

The attached document is intended for the use of the person/s to whom it is addressed, and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by telephone and return the materials transmitted to you via the United States Postal Service at our expense.

MESSAGE:

COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA

1299 Fourth Street, Suite 307, San Rafael, California 94901

Telephone: (415) 451-6900

Fax: (415) 451-6910

November 24, 1998

Mr. Gregory L. Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20504

Dear Mr. Schulte:


I appreciate your straightforward letter of November 19, 1998 and kind offer for us to meet.

I will be in Washington between December 6th and 10th (morning only). Among other things, I am endeavoring to arrange a working meeting with Messrs. Milan Panic, former Yugoslav Premier, and Boris Vukobrat, President, Peace and Crises Management Foundation (Paris and Belgrade). The purpose is to define how we in the Serbian diaspora can synchronize our efforts and agree on appropriate strategy for changes in Serbia.

If it is possible for me to meet with you during those December dates mentioned above, the timing would indeed be most opportune. The *Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia* has just received the results of a professional survey of Serbian public opinion. I would like to share this with you along with a few other matters.

Again, thank you for your letter. I look forward to our meeting,

Sincerely,



Michael Djordjevic
President

Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia

Enclosure

*has appointment
for Dec 7 at
4:30.*



Bank of Southeast Europe International
Banco Internacional del Sureste de Europa
Банка Югоисточне Европе

BIOGRAPHY

In 1997, Mr. Djordjevic was the principal founder of the Bank of Southeast Europe International, Inc., an offshore bank. He is currently President and Chief Executive Officer.

He was formerly Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Capital Guaranty Corporation. Prior to that time, he also served as President and Chief Executive Officer of USF&G Financial Security Company which managed the financial guaranty business of USF&G Corporation.

In 1986, Mr. Djordjevic founded Capital Guaranty Corporation, and its insurance subsidiary, with a total capital of \$200 million. After a conservative but successful growth under Mr. Djordjevic's leadership, Capital Guaranty became a public company and was listed on the New York Stock Exchange. At the end of 1995, the Company merged with Financial Security Assurance of New York for strategic reasons.

His professional activities and recognitions include: past governor, Municipal Bond Insurance Association; director, Association of Financial Guaranty Insurers; Spanek, Inc.; and past director, American Express Variable Annuity Fund, Inc. He received the 1967 Excellence Award of the American Security Council and has been included in Who's Who in America since 1983. In 1990, he founded and was the first President of the Serbian Unity Congress. To support transition to democracy in Yugoslavia and peace and stability in the Balkans, Mr. Djordjevic established the "Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia" in 1998, and is its first President.

For his extensive public and civic work, Mr. Djordjevic received the Americanism Medal from the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution. In 1986, he served on the Statue of Liberty - Ellis Island Centennial Commission.

Mr. Djordjevic received a B.S. degree in banking and insurance from the University of California, Berkeley and an M.B.A. in international finance from San Francisco State University. He has completed additional studies in financial management at Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

###

11/98

Djordjevic
7 Dec 98

MEASURES WHICH CAN BE USED TO INDUCE CHANGES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY IN YUGOSLAVIA.

SUBMITTED BY THE COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA

Advise Milosevic bluntly in private, after consultation with the EU and Russia, that the United States and Europe will no longer tolerate his autocratic and personal rule and the overall status quo in Yugoslavia. He should further be advised that there are five presidential models for stepping down from power from which he can choose: (1) **The Slovak** where President Meciar recently accepted the elections outcome and stepped down; (2) **The French** where Charles de Gaulle voluntarily stepped down, having realized the dwindling support of the people; (3) **The Indonesian** where President Suharto was forced to leave office after a popular national discontent; (4) **The Panamanian**, where President Noriega ended in jail (the Hague Tribunal route for Milosevic); and (5) **The Romanian**, where the lives of President Ceausescu and his wife ended at the bottom of a wall. In order to avert further turmoil and have a peaceful transition in Yugoslavia, the United States should then advise Milosevic:

1. To start immediately with full implementation of the Gonzalez Plan for free elections and free media which he, Milosevic, accepted in early 1997 in order to avert loss of power following the mass demonstration against the stolen municipal elections.
2. To organize with support from EU agencies early and fair elections (possibly the Spring of 1999) for the Republic of Serbia and Municipal Assemblies, and Federal Parliament as well, inasmuch as the legitimacy of all these bodies is seriously questioned by the people.
3. To stay out of Bosnia and Herzegovina – no contacts, no deals no political maneuvering within Republika Srpska. Economic relations and trade may be continued but no “political strings” to be attached.
4. To faithfully implement all existing commitments and demonstrate willingness to calm and defuse the problem in Kosovo. (Assuming here that the US and the EU will exert the same on the Albanian side.) Particularly not to use the Kosovo crisis to strengthen his power or manipulate the public (e.g., the last spring Referendum).
5. To appoint an expert, such as Mr. Danko Djunic, and let him assemble the right team to negotiate and bring to a close the matter of Yugoslav succession.

In order to be ready to impart to Mr. Milosevic its resolve and seriousness, the United States should concurrently implement the following steps:

- A. Seek from Congress a substantial increase in funds for supporting democratic alternatives within Serbia. (The Congress approved such funding for Iraq's opposition recently.)

- B. If possible without delay, set up a powerful television transmitter for VOA, or help in establishing a private television station in Podgorica, Montenegro. Persistently, publicly and privately demand full freedom for the media.
- C. Initiate, consolidate and further vigorously assemble existing information from Western sources about financial and other dealings of Milosevic and the top 100 individuals in his inner circle, such as the Karic Brothers. Get organized to start applying appropriate pressures on these individuals based on the gathered information. Target them for sanctions, not the entire nation.
- D. Follow the lead of Congress and its overwhelming consensus and start consolidating all available intelligence data in Western governments' possession on Milosevic's role in the civil war in Yugoslavia.

There should be a "Time Table of Compliance" with the requested changes given to Milosevic. If he were to reject the entire approach, or if in his fashion accepts it but then subverts it, we and our allies (preferably with Russia going along, but if not, so be it) should start tightening the proverbial screws, to wit:

- E. "Black-list" all the 100 individuals, plus Milosevic's family. For example, no more visas for the US, Europe and elsewhere where they can exert influence or benefit personally. Make it as difficult as possible for them and the companies they control to use banks, deal with Western businesses, etc.
- F. Withdraw all Western ambassadors for "consultations" and freeze all but the most necessary diplomatic relations with Milosevic personally and his henchmen.
- G. Overwhelmingly, the Congress has called for the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague to start indictment procedures against Milosevic. We have reservations about this course. While the crimes may be authentic, in the minds of the Serbian people the court is absolutely not, on both moral and legal grounds. However, the fact remains that Milosevic and his influential wife are very afraid of The Hague Tribunal.
- H. Further, intensify build up and support for democratic alternatives to the Milosevic regime, while vigorously continuing to implement all measures enumerated above.
- I. Keep reminding ourselves that there cannot be peace and stability in Southern Europe without democracy in Serbia. And there will be no democracy in Serbia as long as Slobodan Milosevic is in charge of Yugoslavia. And then continue to act accordingly.

November 1998

COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA

1299 Fourth Street, Suite 307, San Rafael, California 94901

Telephone: (415) 451-6900 Fax: (415) 451-6910

THE PATH TO A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SERBIA

The following six steps and in this sequence are indispensable:

1. The current opposition parties must form one united party, say, the United Party of Democratic Center ;
2. As its platform and program, this new party accepts the concept about transitional government of experts with all its implication (75% of the Serbian people indicated support for this approach in a nationwide poll twice this year);
3. The new party demands of President Milosevic and President Milutinovic that (a) they either give a new mandate for the government in Serbia to a group of experts who will then form the new "transitional, non-political government of experts," or (b) they dissolve the Serbian parliament and call for new elections which will be carried out in accordance with the Gonzalez plan;
4. Should this demand not be met, the united opposition will start a petition drive to have a national referendum, collecting not only the 100,000 legally needed signatures, but a million or more in behalf of the government of experts (76% of the people also indicated support for the referendum);
5. Should the Milosevic regime refuse to abide by the call for a referendum or refuse to abide by its results, massive and peaceful protests and demonstrations will begin and last until the regime caves in.
6. The Serbian Diaspora must take an active, procreative part in the above initiatives.

All along, there must be full, active and unwavering support for this plan by the USA, the EU and Russia. They will establish a small coordinating and fully operative body, which will work on a day-to-day basis with a similar group appointed by the united Serbian opposition and the Serbs in the Diaspora.

Without this type of involvement of the international community, particularly the United States of America, the aforementioned efforts will most likely fail.

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Initials: vr Date: 6/18/2004
2008-0994-63

EXCERPTS FROM

SERBIAN PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY
(EXCLUDING KOSOVO)

NOVEMBER 10 TO 18, 1998

CONDUCTED BY
THE MEDIUM PUBLIC OPINION & MARKETING AGENCY
BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA
ON BEHALF OF

THE COUNCIL FOR
DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA

ABOUT "MEDIUM" AGENCY

Public Opinion and Marketing research Agency

Savski Trg 7, Belgrade, Serbia

Tel. 36-13-230 Fax 659-920

Home page: www.medium.co.yu

"Medium" is a private, multinational company specializing in research of public opinion, business markets and media. Co-owner is the Gallup International. The firm has carried out research in Serbia, Monte Negro, Republica Srpska and Macedonia. Among its clients, the firm has had: U.S. Information Agency, BBC World Service (London), Voice of America, National Democratic Institute (Washington, D.C.), International Republican Institute (Washington, D.C.), O.S.C.E. Mission in Bosnia (Sarajevo), University of Stockholm, Reynolds Tobacco Co., Shell Oil Co. etc.

1. SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

a) For which party would you vote if parliamentary elections were held today?

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>CUM. PERCENT</u>
SPS	22.5	22.5
JUL	5.9	28.4
RADICALS	9.7	38.1
DS	5.9	44.0
DSS	3.1	47.1
SPO	7.5	54.6
SPA	0.7	55.4
SP	2.3	57.6
DA	1.2	58.8
DZVM	0.9	59.7
SOME OTHER	1.8	61.5
DON'T KNOW	17.1	78.6
WOULDN'T VOTE	20.7	99.3
N.A.	0.7	100.0
	<u>100.0</u>	

2. ALLIANCE FOR CHANGES VS. SPS AND JUL

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>CUM. PERCENT</u>
SPS/JUL	28.6	28.6
SRS (RADICALS)	9.3	37.9
SPO	5.9	43.8
ALLIANCE	22.1	65.9
DSS	3.7	69.6
SOMEONE ELSE	4.3	73.9
DON'T KNOW	25.1	99.0
N.A.	1.0	100.0
	<u>100.0</u>	

3. **OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF EXPERTS**

- (A.) Q. As you may have heard, there is a proposal to form a non-political, non-ideological government which would be made up of the best qualified experts in their respective fields. They would have a mandate of 2 to 3 years to implement fundamental economic and other reforms in the country. After the period, there would be elections and the government of experts would let the political parties form a new government.

Would you support this proposal?

	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>CUM. PERCENT</u>
YES, VERY MUCH	34.5	34.5
YES, MAINLY	40.8	75.3
MAINLY AGAINST	14.6	89.9
TOTALLY AGAINST	8.7	98.6
DON'T KNOW	1.4	<u>100.0</u>
	<u>100.0</u>	

- (B.) Q. One of the legal ways to get such a government of experts into power would be via a referendum.

Would you support the demand for implementing such a referendum on the government of experts?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
WOULD SUPPORT	76.1
WOULD NOT SUPPORT	21.3
DON'T KNOW	2.5
	<u>100.0</u>

4. **A GREAT DEGREE OF DISSATISFACTION ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COUNTRY IN ALL FIELDS SINCE 1990**

	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>CUM. PERCENT</u>
VERY SATISFIED	4.1	4.1
MAINLY SATISFIED	22.3	26.4
MAINLY DISSATISFIED	33.3	59.7
VERY DISSATISFIED	39.7	99.5
DON'T KNOW	0.5	100.0
	<u>100.0</u>	

5. **PLURITY BLAMES MILOSEVIC FOR SERBIA'S WOES**

Q. Who is more responsible for the conditions we find in our country now: President Milosevic, the International Community, or someone else?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC	47.3
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	40.0
SOMEONE ELSE	8.5
DON'T KNOW	4.2
	<u>100.0</u>

6. **A LARGE MAJORITY WANTS MILOSEVIC TO STEP DOWN**

Q. If you were in a position to decide whether Milosevic should remain in power or to step down, how would you vote?

	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>CUM. PERCENT</u>
TO REMAIN	35.8	35.8
TO STEP DOWN	60.1	95.9
DON'T KNOW	4.1	100.0
	<u>100.0</u>	

7. IF MILOSEVIC IS REPLACED BY SESELJ OR PANIC: NO CONFIDENCE IN EITHER

Q. Should Milosevic be replaced by Seselj or Panic, would it be better or worse for Serbia or would nothing change?

	<u>PERCENT</u>	
	<u>Seselj</u>	<u>Panic</u>
BETTER	12.8	28.8
WORSE	52.5	42.6
NO CHANGE	33.8	27.1
DON'T KNOW	1.0	1.5
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

8. SOME PERCEPTIONS OF LEADING POLITICANS

		<u>% DISTRIBUTION</u>				
		<u>Totally Correct</u>	<u>Mainly Correct</u>	<u>Mainly Incorrect</u>	<u>Totally Incorrect</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
<u>Untrustworthy</u>	Milosevic	27	22	20	22	9
	Seselj	38	24	18	12	8
	Draskovic	42	27	11	12	8
	Djindjic	38	23	17	10	12
	Panic	27	18	23	14	18
<u>To Hold Power Most Important</u>	Milosevic	43	19	13	18	7
	Seselj	47	24	14	8	7
	Draskovic	46	26	10	9	9
	Djindjic	44	22	16	8	11
	Panic	27	22	21	13	17
<u>Working for the Good of the People</u>	Milosevic	20	17	24	31	8
	Seselj	10	19	26	36	9
	Draskovic	6	18	30	36	10
	Djindjic	4	18	27	38	13
	Panic	8	21	24	29	18

**9. PLURALITY AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, WHILE SOLID
MAJORITY WANTS ALL SERBS TO BE IN ONE STATE**

(A.) Q. In your opinion, was the previous state of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) good for the Serbs?

PERCENT

YES 36.8

NO 43.0

CANNOT JUDGE 19.1

DON'T KNOW 1.2

100.0

(B.) Q. Would you favor reconstituting Yugoslavia in one of the forms below?

PERCENT

YES, IN THE SAME FORM 19.8

YES, BUT AS LOOSE ENTITY 16.4

YES, IN WHATEVER FORM 11.9

NO, AGAINST THE IDEA 49.4

DON'T KNOW 2.5

100.0

(C.) Q. In your opinion, should all Serbs live in one country/state?

PERCENT

YES 60.8

NO 26.4

CANNOT JUDGE 11.9

DON'T KNOW 0.9

100.0

10. MONARCHY IN HELPING TRANSITION

- (A.) Q. Do you think that constitutional monarchy -- such as exists in many Western countries -- could help in the fundamental changes needed in the country, inasmuch as it would replace the existing power structure?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
YES	32.6
NO	44.7
CANNOT JUDGE	21.8
DON'T KNOW	<u>0.9</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

- (B.) Q. Would you prefer the republican form of government or constitutional monarchy?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
SERBIA AS A REPUBLIC	64.9
SERBIA AS CONSITUTIONAL MONARCHY	27.3
DON'T KNOW	<u>7.7</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

11. IMPORTANCE OF THE DIASPORA SERBS WIDELY RECOGNIZED FOR SERBIA

- (A.) Q. There has been talk for sometime regarding the Serbs in the diaspora and their inclusion in political and economic life in Serbia, particularly in relation to overcoming the current crisis. What is your opinion on the matter?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
NEED TO BE INCLUDED	75.8
NOT NEED TO BE INCLUDED	22.5
DON'T KNOW	<u>2.6</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

11. IMPORTANCE OF THE DIASPORA SERBS WIDELY RECOGNIZED FOR SERBIA

- (B.) Q. Should responsible positions, such as in government or diplomacy, be given to the Serbs from abroad?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
YES	62.2
NO	36.0
DON'T KNOW	<u>1.8</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

- (C.) Q. Should the Serbs from the diaspora be given citizenship and the right to vote?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
YES	74.7
NO	23.3
DON'T KNOW	<u>2.0</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

12. RECOGNITION FACTOR – PROMINENT DIASPORA SERBS

	<u>Independently Mentioned</u>	<u>"Heard"</u>
Milan Panic	86.7	96.8
Michael Djordjeovich	22.4	34.2
Misa Milosevich	7.4	12.3
Helen D. Bentley	8.5	17.7
Radmila Milenijevic	31.0	34.7
Boris Vukobrat	11.0	28.8

13. OPINIONS HELD

	<u>Panic</u>	<u>Djordjeovich</u>	<u>Vukobrat</u>
VERY FAVORABLE	15.0	4.3	2.5
MAINLY FAVORABLE	31.1	11.7	14.3
MAINLY UNFAVORABLE	28.3	5.3	6.1
VERY UNFAVORABLE	18.3	3.3	2.7
DON'T KNOW	<u>7.3</u>	<u>75.4</u>	<u>74.4</u>
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

**14. MILOSEVIC – HOLBROOKE AGREEMENT ON
KOSOVO: PEOPLE SKEPTICAL AT BEST**

- (A.) Q. Do you think that this agreement helps Kosovo to stay in Serbia, or decreases the chances of Kosovo staying within Serbia?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
IMPROVES/INCREASED	43.4
WORSENS/DECREASES	51.9
DON'T KNOW	<u>4.7</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

- (B.) Q. As a general observation, does this agreement represent a victory or a defeat for Milosevic?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
VICTORY	35.0
DEFEAT	46.3
CANNOT JUDGE	17.3
DON'T KNOW	<u>1.4</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

**15. DESPITE ALL THE PROBLEMS WITH THE WESTERN WORLD,
SERBS STILL PREFER THE EU AND USA OVER RUSSIA AND CHINA**

- Q. If you had a choice to decide about the Serbian foreign policy orientation, would you strategically orient Serbia towards the West (the EU or USA . . .) or towards the East (China, Russia)?

	<u>PERCENT</u>
TOWARDS THE WEST	42.5
TOWARDS THE EAST	35.6
CANNOT DECIDE	20.6
DON'T KNOW	<u>1.4</u>
	<u>100.0</u>

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trying to form a separate society, and demand that higher education be in Macedonian. Georgievski, at considerable political risk, has agreed to use state funds to support the Albanian-language university, Xhaferi said.

Georgievski said he expects no trouble from extremists in his party or in Xhaferi's; rather, he is determined to convince them to join him. "In Macedonia, we will make them part of the system," he said.

Xhaferi, who in the past has hinted that Albanians here may have to secede in order to secure political rights, now says they must learn to work with Macedonian politicians.

Foreign diplomats and Macedonian politicians say even the most radical people here now see that the landlocked country, sandwiched between Serbia, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria, will remain poor and isolated unless its leaders learn to cooperate.

Faced with an increasingly disgruntled Albanian population, Macedonian leaders decided it was smart to include some of their representatives, according to Christopher Hill, the U.S. ambassador.

"In the Balkans all the other countries are a problem," said Vasil Tupurkovski, an ethnic Macedonian who heads the other party in Georgievski's coalition. "We want to be the stable country."

Tupurkovski, a veteran politician who in 1991 was one

of the few scrambling to prevent the wars that engulfed the old Yugoslavia, said he expects the West will respond with economic aid and investment.

The extreme nationalist party is now convinced it must be more moderate, he added.

"They realized perfectly well they could never have won with the radical positions they used to hold," Tupurkovski said, "and they really wanted to win, and to have power."

Rebel KLA Goes Public

Events Mark Teacher's Death, Arrival Of Recruits

LAUSA, Yugoslavia (AP) — A memorial service Saturday for a teacher killed by Serbian police a year ago and a swearing-in ceremony for new recruits to Kosovo Liberation Army marked the anniversary of the rebels' first public appearance.

Hundreds of KLA members attended a memorial service in Lausa, about 25 miles northwest of Pristina, for Halit Geci, a schoolteacher killed last November by Serbian security forces as he sat in his classroom.

Three uniformed members of the KLA appeared at his funeral on Nov. 28 last year — the first time they had appeared in public.

"That night we decided to fight until the last Serb leaves and until we are independent," said Shaban Muslem, a KLA commander, during his speech

at the ceremony. "Our only weapons were our morale and our will," he added, while a crowd of several hundred people chanted the name of the rebel army.

"After some months, the KLA were all around Kosovo," Muslem said. "The war had started. For the first time, the Serbs saw they would have to fight to keep Kosovo."

Clashes that began in February following a Serbian crackdown on Albanian separatists in Kosovo have claimed hundreds of lives and forced more than 300,000 people from their homes. Ethnic Albanians outnumber Serbs 9-1 in Kosovo, a province of Serbia.

The Serbian security forces quickly and soundly put down the KLA rebellion this summer, but since the cease-fire in October, the guerrillas have been boldly returning to some areas from which they had been

driven.

Children from Geci's school recited poems in his honor and later accompanied his daughter, Valbona, 19, and his nephew Driton Geci as they lay a wreath of plastic flowers at his grave on the outskirts of Lausa.

About 100 KLA fighters stood at attention facing the grave for a minute's silence. In the nearby village of Prekaz, around 300 new recruits swore their allegiance to the KLA in the shadow of the Albanian flag — a double-headed eagle on a red background.

The recruits, most of whom were middle-aged, swore to fight "for the freedom of occupied Albanian lands, for unity of the lands."

"I will always be a faithful soldier, a soldier of freedom, of vigilance, brave and disciplined," they said in unison. A large crowd of civilians who

had gathered to watch the ceremony erupted in spontaneous applause at the arrival of a column of KLA special forces in black uniforms.

The special forces were renamed the Adem Jashari unit, after the local KLA leader who was killed along with another 27 members of his family by Serbian authorities last March. Saturday would have been his 43rd birthday, villagers said. His daughter, wearing a KLA camouflage uniform, cried as the assembled crowd held one minute's silence in memory of her relatives.

"On behalf of my family and my name, those who were killed and those who are alive, I congratulate you on the oath that you gave to the KLA on this day of the flag," she said, addressing the rebel group's new members. "I am the daughter of brave Kosovo."

New York Times

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Milosevic's Purges Hint At Violent End For Regime

By Jane Perlez

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia — In moves viewed here and by some in Washington as signs of weakness rather than strength, President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia has conducted an extraordinary purge of his innermost circle, dismissing the leaders of the army, the air force and the intelligence service, as well as one of his most trusted political commissars.

Few are brave enough to say how or when Milosevic, the

strongman of Yugoslavia, will go. But many officials here and in Washington agree that the dismissals represent the beginning of the end.

The purge, conducted in the wake of Milosevic's agreement on Oct. 13 to pull troops out of Kosovo, culminated last week with the dismissal of Gen. Momcilo Perisic, the long-serving army chief of staff and an architect of the war in Bosnia.

In the last month Milosevic has been seen by former asso-

ciates as increasingly insecure, even paranoid, as Kosovo drifts from his control, the enfeebled economy gets weaker and he bows to the demands of his politically powerful wife, replacing his apparatchiks with hers.

"Deep in their minds they know that there will be social unrest and they want totally loyal people around them when it happens," Bratislav Grubacic, the editor of an English-language newsletter for diplomats and others in Belgrade,

said of Milosevic and his wife, Mirjana Markovic. "He is closing the areas where he doesn't feel comfortable — people in the state apparatus who might eventually become disloyal."

A Washington official who has followed Yugoslavia for more than a decade said: "The regime is brittle. It will crack. It will break."

The dismissals have inspired open talk here of the resemblance between the ruling court of Milosevic, his wife and their two wealthy children, Marko and Marija, and that of the Ceausescu family in Romania, which was dominated by a

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ent dissidents in London urged the US "to let the Iraqi people themselves choose their national opposition leader."

Supporters say the current push is not meant to directly overthrow Saddam, but to create high-profile support for opponents that may encourage cracks or defections within the regime.

The recent assassination attempt against Iraq's Vice President Izzat Ibrahim in the city of Karbala, south of Baghdad, is the kind of attack that could show the regime is not bulletproof. But one London-based opposition group said Baghdad "falsified" the report as an excuse to "increase repression" in southern Iraq.

Washington has also revitalized an idea to try Saddam for war crimes, a proposal first put forward by Vice President Al Gore in 1992.

Known to be penetrated by Iraqi intelligence, the opposition groups fall into several categories. They often have different aims, and only a few are active inside Iraq. The SCIRI is deemed by many to be

the most credible and has kept up pressure on Iraqi troops in the south. Those abroad are often dismissed as being out of touch with their target.

In the north, two Kurdish groups have been fighting for autonomy for decades. They led an uprising there after the 1991 Gulf War but have also worked hand in hand with Baghdad when it suited them. Protected now by a US-led "no-fly zone," the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) agreed to a peace in September in Washington after years of internecine fighting.

Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, is cautious about US plans: "Because of its cooperation with foreign forces, this opposition [in exile] cannot win the approval of the Iraqi people," he told an Arab television station while visiting Tehran, Iran. Last week in Damascus he said only forces inside Iraq could change the government and that "we will not take part in foreign plots."

Evolving operation since 1991

As early as May 1991,

President Bush signed a "presidential finding" authorizing the CIA to begin covert operations to undermine Saddam Hussein. By 1995 and 1996, that operation - reauthorized by Clinton - had turned into a training and support mission for guerrillas in northern Iraq.

It aimed to serve as a catalyst for the mutiny of Iraqi Army units and was run by an "umbrella" group called the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was funded by the CIA, under the leadership of Ahmed Chalabi. But the American spies and their agents in northern Iraq were overrun in 1996 by a surprise advance of Iraqi troops. Hundreds of rebels were killed.

Despite this failure - and other broken or ignored US promises to Iraqi opponents in the past - Mr. Chalabi remains a vigorous lobbyist for funding in Congress. Though he will almost certainly receive some of the money - despite accusations that he embezzled \$20 million from his failed bank in Jordan - Western diplomats here call him a "one-man band"

and say of all opposition groups: "Nobody takes them seriously."

The CIA had also recruited exiles in London - the Iraqi National Accord (INA) - who said they still had links to the Iraqi leadership, but their 1996 coup plot was foiled too. Hundreds of senior officers were rounded up, and some executed.

Any solution today, says Dirgham Kadhim, an INA leader in Amman, Jordan, "should be convincing internationally, and be accepted by the Iraqi people - this is our job."

INA carries out both overt and covert roles, he says. It runs a radio station that beams antiregime propaganda into Iraq; keeps "lines" open to anti-Saddam Iraqis inside; and serves as a low-profile exit channel for top-level defectors.

"If you wave to Iraqi soldiers on the front line and promise them something, they will join you," Mr. Kadhim says. "But if you have no plan, they will become a burden to you. That's why we need support [with a plan]."

New York Times

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In Macedonia, Slavs And Albanians Form Unusual Coalition

By Mike O'Connor

SKOPJE, Macedonia - With the war in neighboring Kosovo as the example of what could happen if they fail, the leaders of Macedonia's most radical ethnic political parties are forming a coalition to govern this fragile ex-Yugoslav republic.

After two weeks of surprisingly smooth negotiations, a government that could prove to be a significant Balkan experiment in power-sharing between ethnic groups is to be approved by the parliament on Monday.

Expressing an idea that seems whimsically romantic in the violence-racked Balkans, Arben Xhaferi, a leader of Macedonia's ethnic Albanians, said: "We can find common ground for ethnic integration through mutual understanding."

Indeed, Xhaferi himself thought this ideal impossible to achieve until very recently. He and many other Albanians, who

number about a quarter of the population in Macedonia, feared they would never have true representation because, they said, the Slav-dominated political system was rigged against them.

They saw as their main opponent the most nationalist party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. When that group, as the senior member of a coalition, won control of the parliament in elections this month, the stage seemed to be set for another hardline Balkan nationalist group to take power and oppress ethnic minorities.

Instead the leader of the nationalist party, Ljupco Georgievski, started negotiating with Xhaferi -- whose support he did not need to govern -- to see how they could work together.

Until recently Georgievski, 32, who will be the new prime minister, had accused Xhaferi's supporters of only wanting to

destroy Macedonia by seceding. In reviewing ways to settle their differences, Xhaferi said, "a small miracle" occurred.

"Actually, we had never talked before," he said. "We had shaken hands at a couple of events. But I thought, 'We are here and they are here, so let's put our problems on the table and see if they are as bad as we think.'"

Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia feel strongly that they are systematically discriminated against by the government, and foreign diplomats concur. In a very poor country, the ethnic Albanians are generally the poorest, have the worst medical care and schools, and hold proportionally many fewer jobs in the public sector.

Worst of all, many feel they have no stake in Macedonia, which broke away from Communist Yugoslavia in 1991, and see independence as the only solution, perhaps in league with Albania or Kosovo, the ethnic

Albanian province in southern Serbia.

Last June, when the insurrection in Kosovo seemed to favor the Albanian separatists, a despondent leader of Xhaferi's party said Albanians in Macedonia were beginning to believe that they too should take up guns.

Three days later that man, Alajdin Demiri, began a two-year prison sentence for raising an Albanian flag outside the city hall of Tetovo, a largely Albanian city of which he was the mayor.

When ethnic Albanian politicians began to talk with Georgievski, one of his first concessions was that Demiri and another mayor convicted of the same offense be released.

According to Xhaferi, they also agreed on a plan to give much more power to local governments and to settle a sometimes violent rallying point for both sides: a university where instruction is in the Albanian language.

Many Slavs in Macedonia fear that ethnic Albanians are

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husband-and-wife team and collapsed in a bloody downfall in 1989.

The fall of Milosevic would have important consequences for the United States. Milosevic has been treated by the Clinton administration as an important keeper of the peace in Bosnia, where U.S. troops are based, and as a negotiating partner over the future of Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanian majority is seeking independence.

Milosevic rules from behind closed doors, rarely appearing in public and almost never granting interviews, even to Yugoslav state news media, which he controls. There has been no official explanation of the recent dismissals.

The purges began shortly after the departure from Belgrade of the U.S. envoy, Richard Holbrooke, who persuaded Milosevic to agree to international observers in Kosovo, and were preceded by the closing of independent newspapers and academic dismissals at Belgrade University.

The removal of Perisic on Tuesday was perhaps the least surprising, after he publicly criticized Milosevic last month for allowing what is left of Yugoslavia to become a pariah state. Yugoslavia now consists of two republics: dominant Serbia and smaller Montenegro.

Perisic, who led the Yugoslav National Army during the atrocities in Bosnia, was reported to have opposed the use of his soldiers against ethnic Albanian civilians in Kosovo during the summer offensive there. His skepticism apparently infuriated Ms. Markovic.

The agreement on Kosovo between Yugoslavia and NATO was signed by Perisic, thus forcing Milosevic to wait a decent interval before getting rid of him. What was surprising was Perisic's decision to fight back.

On Thursday night the general taunted Milosevic with a statement saying he had been dismissed illegally and hinting that he was prepared to lead Yugoslavia down a different path.

"I was replaced without consultations, in an inadequate and illegal way," the general

said in his statement, which was issued through an independent news agency. "This establishment does not like officials with high personal integrity who use their own heads. I am still at the disposal of the army, the people and the state."

Perisic, a native of Montenegro, is reported to have the backing of that republic's president, Milo Djukanovic, a former Milosevic ally who has turned against him and has won U.S. support for his stand.

Some opponents of Milosevic, who has thrived throughout his 11-year rule by fomenting crises, fear that with Kosovo effectively now policed by the West and its ethnic Albanian guerrillas lying low in winter snows, he will use the lull to provoke a confrontation with Montenegro.

Perisic was replaced by Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic, a member of Ms. Markovic's political party who was commander of one of the army corps most active in the savage 1991 fight to wrest the city of Vukovar from the Croats, officials said.

The first senior official to be removed was Jovica Stanisic, the head of state security services, whom the West considers a clever intelligence officer. Stanisic, who knows all the dirty secrets of Milosevic's rule, was replaced by a senior police patrol officer, Rade Markovic, a loyalist of Ms. Markovic's and a member of her party, known as the Yugoslav Left. Markovic is not related to Ms. Markovic.

Along with Stanisic, a dozen top operational officers of the security service were forced into retirement or removed, a move that may undermine Milosevic in the longer term, officials said.

Milosevic next dismissed Milorad Vucelic, the deputy leader of Milosevic's Socialist Party, who served as the president's political disciplinarian.

To complete the list, the head of the air force, Gen. Ljubisa Velickovic, who protested Milosevic's agreement to allow NATO surveillance flights over Kosovo, was also removed.

Milosevic has carried out purges before, but never to this

extent. And he has never so obviously filled vacancies with loyalists of his wife.

This round is also different because it comes when there is no obvious danger to Milosevic; the Serbian opposition, which mounted vast months-long demonstrations two years ago, is weak and divided. And for the first time even courtiers of the regime speak of it in scathing terms.

Slavko Curuvija, the editor in chief of the Daily Telegraph and European magazine, which were closed down by the government last month, was until recently a confidant of Ms. Markovic.

But in an interview, he described how he went to see her in October to offer a few pessimistic predictions. "In the next year or next two years they will lose power," Curuvija said. "They are making a private regime in which nobody who is not a close friend or not a bodyguard has important positions in the government."

He said his meeting with Ms. Markovic ended abruptly. "I told her that everything her husband had done was dramatically bad and that he had to do several things to save Serbia," he said. "I said: 'If you don't stop what's going on, the end will be bloody, and that many people will be killed and maybe some will be on hanged on the Terazije,' a central square in Belgrade."

Curuvija said the outlook for the regime was very grim indeed. "If you make war in Slovenia, you can step back to Croatia," he said, referring to Milosevic's first fights within the old Yugoslavia. "If you start a war in Montenegro, you can step back to Belgrade. When you start a war in Belgrade, you have nowhere to step back to except a trench around your house."

A critical factor governing how long the government will survive is the economy, which has been battered by sanctions and bans on loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and continues its relentless decline.

But so far Milosevic has managed to manipulate the currency so that he can pay about three-quarters of the an-

nual state pensions due, and keep the police and army paid. And with help from Russia, which provides natural gas even though Yugoslavia is late in its payments, and with deals like a recent oil purchase from Libya, Milosevic is able to provide energy for the long-suffering people.

"Don't underestimate his ability to scrape the bottom for economic deals," said a Western diplomat.

Aleksandar Tijanic, a former minister of information, said he believed the government had \$1 billion to \$2 billion stashed abroad that it could draw on. "It's an enormous amount of money in this situation," he said.

There is considerable division among former members of the Milosevic circle and Western officials who expect Milosevic to fall about just how he will go.

"I don't think it will be a palace coup," said the Washington official. "It's going to be in the streets. It could develop rapidly, something we won't anticipate — say, superinflation should return and dinars in the morning can't buy bread in the afternoon."

In Grubacic's view, "No one can see him going from power normally. Something will happen next year for sure. Things are going quickly."

One sign of the times is that the new leader of the opposition coalition that organized the street demonstrations two years ago is Nebojsa Covic. Back then, he was mayor of Belgrade and a close associate of Milosevic.

Covic, who describes in vivid detail Milosevic's style of scolding underlings, including shouting at Covic and calling him a coward, acknowledged that the opposition remained weak.

But he said that eventually, he could not say exactly when, a spark would come from the streets. Then, as happened in Romania, it would be a matter of which way the mainstay of Milosevic's power, the 90,000-member police force, would go.

"The police are more and more willing to go against him every day," Covic said. "But they want to make sure they are on the winning side."

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Washington Post

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Logic's Got Little To Do With It

By William Raspberry

"I'm starting to think I must be as dumb as you think I am," the cabby said. "But if you don't mind, maybe you could explain our thing with Saddam Hussein."

I thought I'd start with President Bush's regrettable decision to end Desert Storm with Saddam Hussein still in power, but the cabby interrupted me.

"Oh, I understand well enough that we want Saddam Hussein dead," he said, "and we've sure tried to make that happen. It's our fallback position I'm not understanding. If we can't manage to kill him, then what?"

"You make us sound like murderers," I protested. "Our sole purpose is to make sure he's incapable of making military mischief. That's why we have to make sure the U.N. inspectors are free to do their job of locating the facilities where he can make chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons."

"And when the inspectors locate those facilities?" the cabby said.

"Why, we then demand the right to go into them and prove they are what we suspected."

"And then: destroy them?" the cabby said.

"Of course," I exclaimed. "As soon as we get the inspectors and other U.S. and allied personnel out of harm's way."

"And while that's happening," the cabby pressed on, "won't he just put the stuff on trucks and hide it somewhere else, the way we say he's been doing all along?"

"You don't understand modern spy technology," I told him. "We've got intelligence agents on the ground, we've got resources among the Kurds and other dissidents and, lest you forget, we've got satellite surveillance fully capable of following those trucks and pinpointing the new locations."

"So why do we need inspectors?" the cabby said.

"Why are you defending this madman, this Satan?" I de-

manded. "The reason he's stuck with the U.N. inspectors is that he agreed to the inspections when he sued for peace. We could have gone on with our offensive and wiped out his Republican Guard, his air force and quite likely his insufferable person if we wanted to. He raised the white flag, agreed to the inspections and the embargo — and he's been trying to squirm out of that deal ever since."

"Let me understand," the cabby said. "We told him if he broke the bargain that halted the war, we'd just pick up where we left off. Have I got that right?"

"Perfectly," I said.

"And he broke the bargain?"

"It was in all the papers," I said, trying hard to mask my impatience.

"So why didn't we pick up where we left off?"

I explained that resuming an all-out offensive after you've interrupted it for several months makes you look like the aggressor. "It would have cost us most of our allies," I said.

"And he knew that?"

"Of course he did," I said, "and that's why we had to wait for some absolutely unambiguous breach before we could launch the sort of military operation capable of taking him — I mean, taking out his weapons of mass destruction. He provided it a few weeks ago when he kicked out the inspectors."

"And he unprovided it by letting the inspectors back in?"

"Damn him!" I said. "He must have known that once we stopped to read that stupid concession letter of his, we wouldn't relaunch the strike."

"Well, I don't see how we could have done much different," the cabby said. "I mean, you can't shoot a guy who's waving a white flag — even if you know he's going to start a stink the minute you walk away."

"It's a problem," I admitted, "but the thing about a guy like Saddam Hussein is that he'll keep pushing and testing, and finally he'll go too far. He may

have done that already by holding out those documents about his biological, chemical and missile program. The UN-SCOM people say those documents are critical."

"Yeah, I heard," the cabby said. "What I don't understand is, critical for what? He says he doesn't have them or can't find them. Suppose he's destroyed them. Would that trigger an all-out attack? Suppose he produces them but they're full of

outdated information or disinformation — like statements that X number of missiles have been destroyed?"

"Our people aren't fools," I said. "They know what the true facts are."

"So why do they need the documents?"

"We need them," I shouted, "so we have a foolproof justification for — oh, never mind. You wouldn't understand."

Washington Post November 30, 1998 Pg. 25

The Milosevic Problem

By Dick Lugar

Has Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic outmaneuvered the West?

Relying on and cooperating with Milosevic has limited our ability to support democratic change in Yugoslavia. Our democratic values have been shelved for the sake of this faulty collaboration. U.S. policy cannot work both with and against Milosevic and his allies who do not solve problems but manipulate them for their own preservation.

Clearly, no lasting solution to the Balkan crises is possible without fundamental change in Serbia and in the leadership of Yugoslavia. It should be a U.S. policy priority to help bring about these changes. A democratic Serbia with economic ties to Europe and its neighbors should be the ultimate goal. Absent real democratic change in Serbia, the Balkans seem destined for perpetual crisis and successive Western interventions.

In negotiating the 1995 Dayton Accords and the Kosovo agreement this fall, Milosevic positioned himself as the West's indispensable policy partner. The perpetrator of the two Balkan wars has presented himself as essential to their solution.

By creating the perception that he is a guarantor of the Kosovo agreement, Milosevic gained leverage at home and tolerance abroad to muzzle his democratic opposition and, if

necessary, to plan the next Balkan crisis — in Montenegro, perhaps. Unchecked, this will perpetuate crises in the Balkans, make this region a continuous security priority and prove costly to NATO credibility and U.S. interests in Europe.

Milosevic has seized upon the Kosovo crisis to crack down on the independent media, nongovernmental organizations and other democratic forces in Serbia. He has banned television broadcasts and rebroadcasts of foreign news, shut several independent radio stations and newspapers, denied visas to visiting journalists, dismissed scholars, denied broadcasting frequencies, confiscated properties and harassed pro-democracy organizations. Serbian victims have begged the West for support but have heard mostly silence. Those attacked and arrested in the internal repression have been branded as NATO lackeys, spies or traitors.

For Milosevic and his allies, the Kosovo conflict is not merely a matter of maintaining national integrity or Serb unity. It is a manufactured opportunity to manipulate internal and external forces to solidify their grip on power. The leaders live well amid the poverty and deprivation caused by international sanctions, internal corruption and refusal to adopt market reforms.

A U.S. policy of engagement with Serbian democratic forces is needed. We should

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abandon our policy that has exempted Serbia from the political reforms that we have demanded of its neighbors. Every senior U.S. and European official visiting Yugoslavia should schedule meetings with opposition members. They should insist that Yugoslavia grant visas to NGOs, foreign journalists and others wishing to engage the opposition. We also should:

Fund a program of international exchanges with a broad representation of Serbian society and invite the opposition to conferences outside the coun-

try.

Increase support for independent media, trade unions and democratic groups in Serbia.

Encourage the courageous media, such as the B-92/ANEM broadcast network, which has been attacked but remains on the air.

Extend the mandate for free elections and media reform in Kosovo to Serbia, because it is doubtful that the former can survive without the latter.

Make it clear that any easing of sanctions cannot occur without significant progress on democratic reform.

The means to support Serbian political reform already exist through the National Endowment for Democracy, private foundations and other nongovernmental organizations. However, a clear U.S. policy direction and commitment are lacking.

A U.S.-led policy of supporting the opposition in Yugoslavia does not guarantee an instant change in Belgrade's behavior. But if the Western allies hope to do more than respond militarily to repeated crises generated by Belgrade, they must take the initiative

from Milosevic. The allies have underestimated the potential influence of a concerted program to promote democratic change in Serbia. Such a program offers the best prospect for ending the cycle of conflict, establishing stability in the Balkans and ultimately integrating Serbia into the European family.

The writer, a senator from Indiana, is the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees and chairman of the Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee.

New York Times

November 28, 1998

Pg. 1

A Policy Struggle Stirs Within NATO

By Roger Cohen

BRUSSELS, Nov. 26 -- The Clinton Administration has presented NATO with a far-reaching program that seeks to define what the alliance has become since the cold war ended, and sets out its goals for the next century.

But the proposals are running into European opposition that threatens to undermine a 50th-anniversary NATO summit meeting in Washington in April.

NATO diplomats say the agenda for the meeting is intended partly to convince Congress that NATO is still central to American security, but it has raised European concerns that the United States is trying to turn the organization into a freewheeling global vehicle for its own interests.

At the root of the differences lies the American conviction that NATO should now be seen as "an alliance of interests," as much as one dedicated to the defense of a specific territory. Washington believes those interests may in some instances push the members into far-flung activities, for example, to counter chemical and biological weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons or terrorism.

"Of course, when America talks of the defense of interests, and not just territories, it leads to continued suspicions that the

United States is seeking to globalize NATO," said a senior official. "NATO is still Euro-Atlantic, but we should not artificially exclude what we might use NATO for."

The Washington meeting amounts to a watershed for NATO. It is intended to define NATO's new "strategic concept" after almost a decade of largely improvised adaptations to the post-cold-war world. It will also set out a doctrine that takes the allies a very long way beyond the commitment to mutual self-defense that lay at the core of the Washington Treaty of 1949 that set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

But after a summer and autumn largely consumed by the crisis in Kosovo, and in the light of an American agenda clearly intended to represent President Clinton's legacy for the alliance, there is widespread concern at headquarters here that agreement is far from assured.

A European official said the need to adapt and to formalize the changes that have taken place since 1989 is not in dispute. But he said several European countries are concerned that Washington wants to push the alliance too far beyond its core European commitments, and may be exaggerating threats to justify this.

"The Americans have put a program on the table that calls

for NATO to play a major role in controlling and countering weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, biological and chemical," he said. "But we worry that America may be creating a new 'threat perception' that will scare our populations with visions of anthrax and gangrene, while allowing NATO to become a global organization."

France, always concerned with what it sometimes calls American hegemony and keen to develop Europe's own military abilities, and Germany, whose new coalition of Social Democrats and environmentalist Greens has a broadly antimilitarist bent, are among those wary of giving NATO too sweeping a mission. Russia is also deeply concerned.

In particular, officials said, a sharp conflict exists over Washington's determination to include in a new "mission" or "vision" statement (the precise term is under discussion) a stipulation that the alliance may, in exceptional circumstances, act without a specific mandate from the United Nations Security Council.

In the absence of this margin for maneuver, American officials contend, NATO would effectively place itself at the mercy of a Russian or Chinese veto of a mission, even in the face of an overwhelming humanitarian crisis.

"The lesson of Kosovo is that we need a modicum of

flexibility," a NATO diplomat said. "A Security Council mandate is highly desirable but we should not tie our hands in advance."

During the Kosovo crisis, despite Russian opposition and the absence of a specific Security Council mandate, NATO authorized possible military action against Serbia. American officials, including the special Balkans envoy Richard C. Holbrooke, said this decision amounted to an important precedent, but European officials generally argued that none had been set.

Joschka Fischer, Germany's Foreign Minister and a Green Party member, is among those who have argued passionately that the rule of law would be threatened and competing regional security blocs encouraged if NATO asserted even a limited right to act without an explicit Security Council mandate.

"We are looking at language that would say something like, 'NATO will act under the authority of the United Nations, with an appropriate legal basis and, as far as is possible, a U.N. Security Council resolution,'" one official said. "But this is a difficult issue that is certain to involve painful discussions."

Other problems center on a program that Washington calls a defense capability initiative. This is intended to take full account of the end of the cold war by pushing through a radical transformation described this month by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen as a

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shift from "fixed, positional defense to a flexible, mobile defense."

In essence, the United States wants to be sure the organization can project power -- if necessary far afield -- engage it effectively, sustain it over long periods and maintain it even against chemical, biological or electronic attack.

"We need advanced, mobile communications, helicopters, lift and sustainability," one official said. "But a lot of armies in Europe, including the German, are still configured for a European land war, with tanks so heavy you can't move them."

While European governments broadly agree that the need for these changes has been demonstrated by missions like the one in Bosnia, they are concerned by the cost. Their budgets are strictly curtailed by European Union agreements. They also fear the program may be a thinly veiled invitation to buy equipment in the United States.

Encouraged by Britain, the European Union is looking at ways to make its sprawling military industry more cost effective. Annual European military spending is two-thirds that of the United States, but because of duplication the spending is much less cost effective.

Reform of European military procurement, however, is likely to be slow, and any American quest for budgetary commitments -- like the 3 percent annual increase pledged by European governments during the Jimmy Carter years -- would certainly fall on deaf ears. American officials have estimated that Europe needs to spend 10 percent more on the military each year just to maintain existing capacity.

While the first post-cold-war flush of Europe's ambitions to develop its own military arm has faded, and a broad accord exists that "separable but not separate" European units should develop within NATO, some tensions persist over what should be said about Europe's military identity in the new alliance doctrine.

A NATO "extraction force," staffed entirely by Europeans

and under a French commander but dependent on American intelligence and logistics, is about to be deployed in Macedonia to help protect monitors in neighboring Kosovo. This deployment amounts to a first for the group.

France appears to want to give priority for statements on this mission and Europe's military future to a European Union meeting in Cologne, Germany, after the Washington talks. But the United States is adamant that the issue be addressed primarily in Washington.

One issue on which there appears to be broad agreement is that there should be a period of consolidation after the formal admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO, which is to take place in Washington. It is highly unlikely that invitations to join will be issued to other nations in April, alliance officials said, a delay that is almost certain to anger several candidates, including Romania and Bulgaria.

On the question of the group's nuclear forces, it also appears clear that consolidation rather than innovative change will prevail. While the broad aim of balanced nuclear disarmament exists, most allies regard the nuclear threat as central to security.

"It is essential that we now give the public and Congress an understanding of why NATO is as essential, or more essential, as during the cold war," said a NATO diplomat. "At the same time we need to keep Russia involved in a security partnership and the Europeans on board. There are real differences, and there will be histrionics, but I think the Europeans also know we have to update NATO."

What is already clear is that the balance of power within the organization has not been changed by the end of the cold war.

"It is amazing that while Europeans are always saying we must do more to develop our own defense policy, 95 percent of the propositions on the table are American -- that is the reality," said Arnaud Jacomet, a senior official at the Western European Union, Europe's largely dormant military arm.

Washington Times November 29, 1998 Pg. B4

Invitation To Chat With The General

Philip Gold

In recent weeks, there's been a lot of talk about talk. Specifically, about the right (?) of military officers to comment publicly on their commander in chief. Whether yet another '60s vice-protest as emotional venting and self-expression has hit the military may be debated. Thankfully, however, there are other dialogues going on.

Herewith a personal tale, and a short meditation on military statesmanship.

I belong to an excellent, unofficial Internet military news service and chat room (Thanks, Webmaster Tony). Mostly Marines, but we don't discriminate. Some weeks ago, I posted a few ideas on what civilian society might learn from the military, ethically. Nothing profound or even very well-organized; just your usual invitation to yak.

Two days later, a message appeared with the subject line: "CMC Responds to..." Apparently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. C.C. Krulak, had decided to enter the conversation.

After verifying that the message came from Gen. Krulak's office, I quickly posted a reply. Several days later, I received another e-mail. Gen. Krulak wanted a mailing address to send me a letter.

First response: Uh-oh. I've got him mad and he's ordering me back to active duty. Marine Barracks Antarctica, if I'm lucky.

Second response: I am having a serious philosophical exchange with a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Who woulda thunk it?

I briefly considered using our exchange as a column, but one of the commandant's aides told me Gen. Krulak considered all private correspondence private.

How quaint, in this age of

Tape Your Friends and Leaks While U Wait.

How quaint and (dare we use the term?) how gentlemanly.

Indeed, Chuck Krulak comes from a breed not just quaint but nearly extinct, once characterized by a unique blend of gentlemanly conduct and honor, preppie bonhomie, and muscular Christianity. Son of a famous Marine general, he attended Phillips Exeter and the Naval Academy. Vietnam (two tours). Desert Storm. The right stuff in between and since.

Now, Gen. Krulak has begun the fourth and final year of his tour as commandant, and assessment of his tenure reveals something utterly remarkable in this age of nothing matters and anything goes.

Since Vietnam, the Marines have, more often than not, gotten commandants right for their times. These have come in three types: old-fashioned disciplinarians and standard setters (Lou Wilson); innovators (Al Gray); and caretakers (Carl Mundy). Chuck Krulak has managed to combine all three.

* Old-fashioned discipline and standards: While other services lowered their recruiting standards, aiming low and failing even at that, Gen. Krulak raised the requirements and exceeded the goals. He lengthened and toughened boot camp, adding the now famous "Crucible." No Marine graduates without completing this physical and mental ordeal. He moved to restore discipline in barracks too often given over to disorder, absentee leadership and alcohol.

* Innovation: He articulated the concept of the "Three Block War," in which Marines must be ready to serve as humanitarians, peacekeepers/enforcers, and warriors. He oriented the Corps toward 21st century combat in Third World urban megasprawls, while simultaneously honing old and developing new amphibious capabilities and skills.

* Caretaking: He maneuvered deftly amid the rocks and shoals of Mr. Clinton's military policies. Sometimes the results

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Kosovo crisis

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The Guardian
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KOSOVO CRISIS

Sunday November 29, 1998

Clinton tells CIA to oust Milosevic

By Paul Beaver in London, Ed Vulliamy in Washington, Chris Bird in Belgrade

President Clinton has given the go-ahead for a secret bid to topple the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and shatter what is left of federal Yugoslavia.

Clinton's approval for a campaign to remove President Milosevic came at the end of a week in which the United States put a bounty of \$5 million on the heads of his two puppets in Bosnia, the indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic.

The push for active intervention against Milosevic comes from several quarters, including the White House, where the destruction of Milosevic's regime has been discussed by Clinton's national security team, including the CIA and its opposite number in the Pentagon, the Defence Intelligence Agency. One former senior DIA official, who has been involved in the Balkans for several years, told The Observer that: "As of the past few days, the activation of a policy of the end of Milosevic and his power in Yugoslavia is very much on the table."

Other sources talked about a "major review meeting" in recent days to discuss a vigorous new policy to hasten a conclusion to the Yugoslav crisis, with "the end of Milosevic as the obvious solution". One White House source said: "Clinton is doing this right now, and it's beginning at a local level."

The focus is now on helping Montenegrin efforts to break away from Belgrade and on aiding the Opposition within Serbia. Clinton is reported to have asked a discussion group last week: "Would an independent Kosovo work?" Support for such a move would mark a dramatic about-turn, since diplomatic efforts have centred on keeping Milosevic in power and ignoring calls for Kosovo's independence.

State Department officials told The Observer that the prime mover of the new policy was the President's special envoy to the region, Richard Gelbardt, who is said to have privately argued that the time has come for the US to help to get rid of Milosevic.

The sacking by Milosevic last week of Yugoslav army chief of staff Momcilo Perisic, part of the inner sanctum of the President's security staff, is said by State Department officials to be connected to the fact that Perisic had told Milosevic that he would play no part in any police or military move against a Montenegrin bid for independence. There is even a suggestion that Perisic had discussed a possible Montenegrin secession with US diplomats.

The CIA has installed newly invigorated "analytical structures" in former and current Yugoslav republics in recent weeks. Driving the DIA's thinking is the fear that "continued power for Milosevic means an interminable US presence in the region". Observers in Belgrade are waiting to see what Perisic and Milosevic's former spy master, Jovica Stanisic - who was also dismissed last month - will do next. Both are seen as likely opponents of Milosevic with real influence compared to Belgrade's weak and disparate opposition politicians.

They are also close to Montenegrin leader Milo Djukanovic, who is seen as pro-Western and a possible contender to replace Milosevic. Djukanovic, who runs Montenegro as his personal fiefdom, has criticised Milosevic loudly over Kosovo.

As a member of federal Yugoslavia's Supreme Defence Council, he reportedly voted against Perisic's dismissal. He has also allowed newspapers closed down in Belgrade to print in the regional capital,

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002a. form	Cover Sheet. Record ID: 9830272. (1 page)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)

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002c. memo	For Leon Fuerth, Kristie Kenney et al. Subject: Summary of Conclusions, Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] (1 page)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)

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004. report	Serbia Inc., Part of the Problem, Not the Solution. [Duplicate of vz6261_002g and vz6336_003c, this case] (8 pages)	11/30/1998	P1/b(1)

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	re: FRY: Milosevic Appointed...[with marginalia] (1 page)	12/01/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6338

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006. report	Duplicate of 004. [Duplicate of vz6261_002g and vz6336_003c, this case] (8 pages)	11/24/1998	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6338

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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INTERNATIONAL

To GREG SCHULTE -

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Discuss

Gj - [Signature]

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE SIT STEINBERG
SUTPHEN

SIT: ALLEN BELL BOUCHARD BRADEN BROWN BUTLER CLARKER DAVIDSON DOWLING
FLANAGAN GORDON GUARNIERI HAWLEY HURLEY MCELDFOWNEY SCHULTE SUM2

<PREC> RUSH

<CLAS> INTERNATIONAL <DTG>

FM Reuters

a3267

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-GENERAL 1STLD

^Milosevic sacks Yugo Army chief to stifle dissent

(recasts adding detail of successor, amplifies)

By Julijana Mojsilovic

BELGRADE, Nov 24 (Reuters) - Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has sacked the chief of the Yugoslav Army, General Momcilo Perisic, the official state news agency Tanjug said late on Tuesday.

Perisic, appointed head of the Yugoslav Army in August 1993, had long appeared vulnerable to dismissal, despite his apparent loyalty to Milosevic, because of his disagreements with influential neo-communists in Belgrade ruling circles.

He was replaced by his deputy, little-known General Dragoljub Ojdanic, the 58-year-old commander of the Yugoslav First Army.

Perisic's dismissal comes just weeks after Milosevic removed the powerful head of Serbia's state security services, Jovica Stanisic, who appeared to have opposed a harsh crackdown on ethnic Albanians in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo.

The sackings of longtime loyalists reflect Milosevic's worries over high-level internal opposition to his policies, a concern stoked by the Serbian hardliners who currently have the ear of the Yugoslav President.

Perisic had long complained of the downgrading of the Yugoslav Army in preference to state police forces who were personally loyal to Milosevic and ensured the continuation of the long rule of the Balkan strongman.

But Milosevic appears to have acted now to quell dissent over his response to Western threats of a bombing campaign to force an end to a Serb military offensive in the rebellious majority ethnic Albanian province of Kosovo.

Analysts said Perisic's future became under the spotlight after he publically acknowledged at the height of the Kosovo crisis that Yugoslav armed forces were no match for the might of NATO warplanes.

Perisic was kept aboard for some time only because he signed the military part of a Kosovo ceasefire deal with NATO, outlining arrangements for the verification of a Serbian military pullback from the province, the analysts said.

A nine-month struggle this year between Serbian security forces and ethnic Albanian guerrillas fighting for independence in Kosovo left more than a 1,000 dead and forced 250,000 from

INTERNATIONAL

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PAGE 02 OF 02

their homes.

A U.S.-brokered deal brought a halt to the fighting and diplomats are now working feverishly on a political settlement for Kosovo that will cement the fragile peace.

RB-- 11/24/98 19:18:00

<^TOR>981124191411

<MSGID> R0282603

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. form	Cover Sheet. Record ID: 9830269. (1 page)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6338

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. memo	For James Steinberg from Greg Schulte. Subject: Restricted DC on Kosovo....[Record ID: 9830269] [See 9830298, vz6261_002c, this case] (2 pages)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6338

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. paper	Subject: [Milosevic] [See 9830298, vz6261_002d and vz6337_001c, this case] (8 pages)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6338

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007d. paper	Subject: [Annex II: Action] [See 9830298, vz6261_002e and vz6337_001e, this case] (2 pages)	11/10/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6338

RESTRICTION CODES

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