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Folder Title:

Milosevic [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: State Department Discussion Paper. [Duplicate of vz6261_004b, this case] [Likely Record ID: 9830321] (1 page)	12/21/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Subject: [Milosevic] [See Record ID: 9830298] (2 pages)	12/02/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	Subject: [Annex II: Action] [See Record ID: 9830298; vz6261_002e, this case] (3 pages)	12/21/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	Subject: [Serbian Opposition]. [See Record ID: 9830298; vz6261_002f, this case]. (8 pages)	12/21/1998	P1/b(1)
002. report	Political Developments. [page 3 of unknown document] (1 page)	12/00/1998	P1/b(1)
003a. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830319. [Duplicate of vz6261_003a, this case] (1 page)	12/21/1998	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: [Tuesday's PC on the FRY] [Record ID: 9830319] [with cover sheet] [Duplicate of vz6261_003b, this case] (5 pages)	12/19/1998	P1/b(1)
003c. report	Serbia, Inc.: Part of the Problem, not the Solution. [Duplicate of vz6261_002g, this case] (8 pages)	11/24/1998	P1/b(1)
003d. report	BTF Memo. (8 pages)	12/10/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6336

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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'99 MAY 28 12:42	WASHFAX RECEIPT Department of State	8
	B S/S #	

MESSAGE NO 019495 CLASSIFICATION ~~Confidential~~ NO. PAGES 2

FROM:

Paaden
(Officer Name)

(Office Symbol)

(Extension)

(Room Number)

MESSAGE
DESCRIPTION:Indicting Milosevic

TO: (Agency)

NSC

DELIVER TO:

Schulte

EXTENSION

ROOM NO.

FOR:

Clearance ☐Information ☒Per Request ☐Comment ☐

REMARKS:

My views on the indictment - FYI

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RL Date: 4/76/2024

2002-0994 -F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(11)

May 27, 1999

NOTE FOR Jim Dobbins

FROM Jim Pardew

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 4/26/2024
2008-0994-F.3

SUBJECT: The Indictment of Milosevic

I have been involved in many conversations with Milosevic about The Hague Tribunal, and I spent a good deal of time with Karadzic and Mladic after they were indicted. This note describes how I think the indictment will play with those indicted today.

First, Milosevic sees the Tribunal as a political instrument, not a legal one. He rejects the legitimacy of the Tribunal completely. I doubt that he is totally surprised about the indictment; he probably thought he was under a sealed indictment anyway. He will ignore or trivialize the indictment in public, however, this open ICTY action will make him furious because he now knows he is poison on the international scene. There will be no more Presidential meetings, much less lavish Parisian peace ceremonies for him. His position as the personal center of US and European attention is a major motivation for him. He is making the world respect Milosevic and the Serbs in his own perverted way.

Milosevic will be convinced that the United States, specifically Secretary Albright, caused the indictment, and he will spend hours with cronies concocting political conspiracy theories about why the US did it now. Milosevic sees this conflict as a big international game in which we are absolutely dictating events in opposition to him. He has said that to me directly.

He will characterize the indictment with cronies as another attack on the beleaguered Serbs. We can expect him to be confrontational on the subject. He will certainly be hard on Chernomyrdin when he arrives in Belgrade. I think the timing of the indictment probably may end any Milosevic relationship with Chernomyrdin.

Privately, the situation will be different. Milosevic knows how the indictment process marginalized the Pale Serb leadership over time, eventually ending in their removal from power. Milosevic will be concerned that the indictment will have a corrosive effect on his public support. He can avoid this for the short term, but he must fear the effect over time. Therefore, we can expect him to be more

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repressive internally. Any opposition figure or movement will be dealt with harshly.

Milosevic also recognizes that Karadzic and Mladic have evaded capture, and he knows that we were willing to develop acceptable diplomatic mechanisms to engage them in the pre-Dayton shuttle. Therefore, he expects to continue to be a player in deciding the outcome of conflict. He will seek tactical opportunities to force the international community to deal exclusively with him.

I think the impact of the indictment will be greatest on the cronies, who are generally weak personalities. Those indicted will stay with him. They have no choice. Others will see the handwriting on the wall and try to position themselves to avoid indictment. They will break at the appropriate moment.

The great unknown is the Serbian public. Given enough time and emphasis, the indictment may help move them away from Milosevic. The question is how long it will take to have an effect.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Yulee, Florida)

For Immediate Release

May 27, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I welcome the decision of the International War Crimes Tribunal to indict Slobodan Milosevic and four other senior Serbian leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes. It will reassure the victims of Belgrade's atrocities in Kosovo and it will deter future war crimes by establishing that those who give the orders will be held accountable. It will make clear to the Serbian people who is responsible for this conflict and who is prolonging it. I call on all nations to support the Tribunal's decision and to cooperate with its efforts to seek justice.

For six years, the United States has strongly supported the work of the Tribunal, and urged it to pursue its investigation of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia as far up the chain of command as the evidence leads. The Congress recently approved my request for supplemental funding for the Tribunal, which will provide \$9 million for the Tribunal trust fund, \$4 million for technology that will speed up our providing information to the tribunal, \$10 million to interview Kosovar refugees, and \$5 million for forensic teams to go into Kosovo once conditions there allow the gathering of evidence.

The objectives of NATO's military effort remain unchanged. The Kosovar refugees must be able to go home with security and self-government; Serb forces must leave Kosovo; and an international security force with NATO at its core must deploy. We intend to persist with our efforts until our objectives are achieved.

30-30-30

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Hachigian, Nina L.
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 1999 8:44 AM
To: Schulte, Gregory L.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @KOSOVO; @WHSR - WH Situation Room
Subject: RE: revised points on Milo [CONFIDENTIAL]

Here are the TPs as cleared by Jim. PLEASE FINE ED RICE AND DELIVER THEM TO HIM ASAP

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 1999 8:30 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @KOSOVO
Subject: revised points on Milo [CONFIDENTIAL]

Using the Indictment of Milosevic

TO ADD TO POTUS TPs

- While unanticipated, the indictment of Milosevic and four others provides an opportunity to further our objectives.
- The indictment should widen the fissures we are already detecting around Milosevic, in the military and the Serb public more generally. It should be even more clear to them that Milosevic is responsible for the destruction that they are facing, and that his continued leadership poses a threat to them personally and to Serbia more generally. This makes it even more likely that they will take matters into their own hands
- The indictment will increase the international isolation of Milosevic. Fewer international envoys will make him realize that we're not looking to compromise on our conditions. It should be increasingly clear to Milosevic that we will outlast him, not the reverse.
- There is some risk that the indictment will make Milosevic more intransigent. But if he digs himself deeper into his bunker, he risks losing his power base, who are not likely to follow him down a dead end path. So even with the indictment, he will have reasons to agree to our conditions.
- The indictment, combined with the ever increasing pressure of our air campaign and economic pressure, will help us to prevail.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 4/26/2024
2008-0444-F.3

OPINION ANALYSIS

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC 20547

USIA

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND MEDIA REACTION

JANUARY 29, 1999

M-20-99

Serbs Disenchanted with Milosevic and Most Opposition Leaders

With the situation in Kosovo heading toward another confrontation, the Serb public expresses largely negative opinions of Serb leaders, including those in government and those in the opposition. This just-completed USIA survey suggests that widespread lack of confidence in government leaders and institutions will likely make it difficult for any party to gain the trust of the public.

KEY FINDINGS

- Favorable opinion of President Milosevic and support for the SPS have dipped to levels found at the beginning of the Kosovo crisis in March 1998. Favorable opinion of Vojislav Seselj and support for the SRS has dropped substantially. More now than in earlier surveys do not express a political party preference (43%).
- Equal percentages name Dragoslav Avramovic (20%) and Milosevic (21%) as the Serbian leader they trust the most. Avramovic's Alliance for Change appears to capture supporters of its constituent parties as well as some of the undecided and disaffected.
- Confidence in government institutions is down, but confidence in the Church, army and police is up compared with recent years.

Opinion of Milosevic Slips to Earlier Level

Six in ten (59%) Serbs do *not* believe that their political leaders "are doing the best they can for our country given the current circumstances." Only a third (32%) think they are. Supporters of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) tend to agree, opposition supporters tend to disagree, and Serbian Radical Party (SRS) supporters are evenly divided. Opinion of President Milosevic (59% unfavorable, 36% favorable) is somewhat less favorable than in April and on par with March 1998 findings (Table 1).

Table 1. Opinion of President Milosevic

	January 97	August 97	March 98	August 98	October 98	January 99
Very Favorable	20	33	21	22	22	19
Somewhat Favorable	20	14	18	23	24	17
Somewhat Unfavorable	16	15	19	16	17	17
Very Unfavorable	37	36	39	35	32	42

This report is based on face-to-face interviews with 1000 adults age 18 and older in Serbia (excluding Kosovo). Interviews were conducted between January 11 and 18, 1999. The firm Medium in Belgrade conducted the interviews for USIA.

Among those who support any political party, only those who favor Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Mirjana Markovic's Yugoslav United Left (JUL) express a favorable view of Milosevic. Six in ten Serbian Radical Party (SRS) supporters and eight in ten or more among most opposition party supporters have a negative opinion of Milosevic. Students, those under 35 and those who do not express a political party preference also tend to view Milosevic negatively.

Table 2. Most Trusted Leader

	March 1998	August 1998	October 1998	January 1999
Milosevic	22%	26%	25%	21
Avramovic	14	9	13	20
Seselj	18	11	11	8
Draskovic	7	6	6	5
Kostunica	6	4	3	4
Obradovic	n/a	n/a	n/a	4
Djindjic	4	3	2	2
Panic	n/a	2	3	2
Markovic	--	--	--	2
Pesic	1	1	1	1
None	18	28	31	21
Don't know/ No answer	6	9	6	8

Avramovic and Milosevic Considered Most Trusted Leaders

Asked what politician in Serbia they trust the most, as many now say former National Bank Governor and leader of the Alliance for Change Dragoslav Avramovic as say Milosevic (Table 2). Only 8 percent name SRS party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj -- half as many as named him nearly a year ago. Other opposition leaders have about the same number of core supporters as in October 1998.

Public Expresses Negative Opinion of Most Politicians

Negative opinion of most other political leaders has remained generally stable since October 1998 (Table 3). In addition to Milosevic, Seselj and Bulatovic and, to a lesser extent, Milutinovic are viewed less favorably now than in October 1998. A favorable opinion of Seselj reaches a majority only among supporters of his own party, the SRS. Half among SPS and JUL supporters are favorable toward him, and overwhelming majorities of opposition supporters and "undecideds" are negative.

Table 3. Serb Public Opinion of Leaders

		March 1998	August 1998	October 1998	January 1999
Avramovic	<i>Favorable</i>	75	62	64	72
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	20	30	27	22
Perisic*	<i>Favorable</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	46
	<i>Unfavorable</i>				36
Kostunica	<i>Favorable</i>	48	36	38	38
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	43	54	52	53
Panic	<i>Favorable</i>	n/a	27	26	35
	<i>Unfavorable</i>		62	64	58
Obradovic	<i>Favorable</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	34
	<i>Unfavorable</i>				49
Djukanovic	<i>Favorable</i>	33	37	35	34
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	58	54	57	56
Covic	<i>Favorable</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	31
	<i>Unfavorable</i>				57
Milutinovic	<i>Favorable</i>	35	n/a	35	30
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	61		59	64
Seselj	<i>Favorable</i>	45	43	44	29
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	53	52	52	67
Bulatovic	<i>Favorable</i>	35	28	32	26
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	57	64	61	65
Draskovic	<i>Favorable</i>	26	24	27	25
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	68	68	66	69
Pesic	<i>Favorable</i>	23	18	18	22
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	69	74	73	68
Djindjic	<i>Favorable</i>	26	18	21	20
	<i>Unfavorable</i>	70	74	72	73
Stanisic	<i>Favorable</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	19
	<i>Unfavorable</i>				49

* While a plurality (47%) say they have not heard enough to say, of those who have an opinion, more (34%) say Perisic's dismissal was unjustified than say it was justified (9%).

The leaders of the new Alliance for Change are viewed *more* favorably now than in October: Avramovic (72% favorable, up from 64%) and Milan Panic (35% favorable, up from 26%). Avramovic is viewed favorably by Serbs across the political spectrum, including SPS and SRS supporters and also those who do not specify which political party they support. Panic's support comes mainly from those who say they would support the Alliance for Change or the constituent parties.

Support for SPS, SRS Slips

When asked in general terms, only a quarter express confidence in "the ruling political parties" (27%) or the "opposition political parties" (26%). Support for the ruling SPS, like opinion of Milosevic, has returned to the level found in March 1998 (Table 4). Support for the SRS has fallen substantially since March. Support for the SPO, which has recently joined the federal government, remains at 6 percent. Four in ten (43%) do not express a preference: a fifth say that they would not vote if there were an election and a quarter say they are undecided.

Alliance for Change Unites Many Opposition Supporters

When asked to choose among likely coalitions, supporters of smaller opposition parties including the DS, the SDP, the GSS and the DA are joined by some who are "undecided" in supporting the Alliance for Change coalition (21%) (Table 5). Overall support for this group trails support for a combined SPS-JUL-SRS-SPO grouping (38%), although it is not at all clear that this current cooperation agreement will hold through to an election.

Low Level of Confidence in Civil Institutions

Reflecting low levels of support for the ruling parties, confidence in most domestic institutions remains low. Confidence in the Serbian government (32%) and parliament (29%) has fluctuated in recent years, rising in the spring of 1994 and winter of 1996 and falling in the fall of 1995 and winter of 1997. It is currently at a low ebb. Few express confidence in the Federal Yugoslav government (32%) and parliament (30%), local government (29%) or the judiciary (34%). Confidence in the army (67%) and police (55%) has been rising over the past several years. Seven in ten (70%) now voice confidence in the Orthodox Church, including majorities across the political spectrum.

Table 4. Party Support

	March 1998	August 1998	October 1998	January 1999
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)	20%	24%	24%	20
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	20	14	13	8
Yugoslav United Left (JUL)	3	1	1	3
New Democracy (ND)	1	—	—	--
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)	8	5	6	6
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)	6	4	3	5
Democratic Party (DS)	5	3	3	3
Social Democratic Party	6	2	2	5
Civic Alliance (GSS)	—	1	1	1
Democratic Alternative (DA)	2	1	1	1
Alliance for Change	n/a	5	6	n/a*
Other Parties	7	5	4	4
Will not vote	16	21	18	19
Don't know / No answer / Undecided	9	15	17	24

*In August and October 1998 surveys, the Alliance for Change was offered in the list of political parties. In this January 1999 survey the it was not included in the list of parties but was offered in a question about probable coalitions. See Table 5.

Table 5. Party Support if Alliance for Change Included

SPS-JUL	23
Alliance for Change	21
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	9
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)	6
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)	4
Other Parties	2
Will not vote	16
Don't know / No answer / Undecided	20

How This Poll Was Conducted

This survey is based on face-to-face interviews with a nationwide representative probability sample of 1000 adults age 18 and older in Serbia, excluding Kosovo. Interviewing was conducted between January 11 and 18, 1999. The firm Medium in Belgrade conducted the interviews for USIA. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor and reviewed by the Office of Research and Media Reaction staff.

In theory, 19 times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in Serbia. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within the population. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

The refusal rate for this survey was unusually high, likely because of concerns surrounding violent incidents in Kosovo during fieldwork and some suspicion on the part of respondents about expressing political views.

For further information, please contact the analyst.

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UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX I: DEMOCRATIZATION IN SERBIA-MONTENEGRO

Achieving real political and economic reform in Serbia-Montenegro is essential for building a stable, democratic FRY contributing to regional peace and playing a positive role in Euro-Atlantic institutions. The moribund political opposition in Serbia will not be able to bring about the necessary change without considerable financial, technical and moral support from the West. Any actions that support the growth of political pluralism in Serbia and the FRY weakens Milosevic's control over the levers of power. The recommendations below should be pursued vigorously, but with the understanding that it is in support of change in the FRY over the long-term. The opposition is simply too weak and fragmented to capitalize immediately and seize the initiative from Milosevic.

Strengthen Political Alternatives

- **Help the opposition help itself.** Experienced NGOs, including NDI and IRI, are prepared to expand their efforts to help opposition political parties build a strong organizational base. Milan Panic's *Alliance for Change* in particular will need good expert consultants to avoid the internal frictions that doomed the Zajedno reform coalition in 1997. Current funding for democracy-assistance projects should be increased substantially.

-- We should continue efforts to build up ex-Socialist (and now "Democratic Alternative" head) Nebojsa Covic as a national figure. Also explore possible link with wealthy ex-pat Boris Vukobrat. A Panic-Vukobrat alliance would bring significant financial resources to the table.

-- The United States should **deliver a tough private message to SPO leader -- and would-be Milosevic partner -- Vuk Draskovic that entering into coalition with the Socialists would be the end of his political career.** Milosevic may be counting on Draskovic and the SPO to fill the void that would be created if he decided once again to move against his current partner, the ever obstreperous Vojislav Seselj. The consequences for Draskovic of choosing collaboration with Milosevic must be made absolutely stark and clear.

-- An offer of a significant amount of assistance for the FRY contingent in moves toward political and reform could

UNCLASSIFIED

boost the opposition, but Milosevic has already weathered significant economic crisis without serious problems.

- **Manipulate divisions within the Socialists.** It is more likely that Milosevic will be replaced from within his own party than by either a Radical or an opposition figure. The recent purge of senior Socialist party officials demonstrates that Milosevic is sensitive to this threat. An information campaign against corruption of the Milosevic family could help in exploiting the divisions within the party structure.
- **Develop reform-minded leaders at the local levels into national figures.** The only demonstrably effective leadership in the opposition parties is at the municipal level. We should increase efforts to provide support -- including training and technical assistance -- to build a new generation of democratically-inclined leaders.

Building Other Centers of Opposition

- **Build the Unions.** The independent trade union movement led by Branimir Stokich is a potentially powerful tool. The union suffers from poor organization, factionalism, and serious financial constraints -- nearly all of its membership is un- or under-employed. We are working with AFL-CIO to help professionalize and shape the independent unions.
- **Revitalize the student movement.** Student activism in Serbia collapsed along with the Zajedno movement. Rebuilding the student movement is critical. Focus should be on youth exchanges and building student organizations at the local and University levels. Democratically-inclined academics purged from the faculty by Milosevic would be likely allies. We should offer material support to breakaway professors looking to found an alternative University.
- **Expand ties to the Church.** The Serbian Orthodox Church is no fan of Milosevic or the Socialist Party -- which Church leaders see as an extension of communist anti-clericalism. Although the Church's influence is limited, we should broaden our contacts with the Church hierarchy and encourage the Church leaders to support the development of democracy in the FRY. The Montenegrin Church could also be expected to play a constructive role in this regard.

Support Independent Media

- **Strengthen the independents.** Unlike in the former Soviet Union, international media has little credibility among most Serbs in the FRY. We should concentrate on building indigenous media -- particularly electronic media -- rather than looking at ways to make western news outlets more widely available in the FRY (i.e. VOA/RFE, BBC, etc).
- Milosevic does not hesitate to crack down on the independent press when it suits his purposes. We are already spending nearly USD 5 million per year on assistance to independent media. Need to consider **possible "force multipliers" for the resources available**, including:
 - Providing expert advice on marketing for independent media, including support to produce a "TV guide;"
 - Expert/tech support in producing news magazines (modeled on *Eateline* and *60 Minutes*) and other unique programming unavailable on state-run TV;
 - Making competitive programming (NBA basketball, etc. available to ANEM TV and other independents;
 - Building additional networks linking independent print and electronic media (synergy).
- We can work closely with Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic on this issue and use Montenegro as a base of operation, including for electronic media and for print media banned in Serbia.
- If the ANEM network is shut down, we should consider re-broadcasting indigenous Serb media through a network of transmitters in neighboring states, including Montenegro, Bosnia, Hungary, Romania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. ANEM is already preparing to broadcast into Southern Serbia using a transmitter based in Montenegro.

Bolster Djukanovic and Montenegro, the Vanguard of Perestroika

- Djukanovic has national aspirations and represents **the only viable current (as opposed to potential) threat to Milosevic's control of the FRY**. SR Gelbard has developed a strong working relationship with Djukanovic and has

already discussed with him additional steps to promote political and economic reforms in Montenegro.

- **Immediately expand diplomatic representation in Montenegro**, beginning with TDY officers at the information center in Podgorica and moving rapidly to an embassy branch office and then a full consulate. This will send a strong message of support for the reform-minded Montenegrin government.
 - Initiate a Washington-based training program for Montenegrin diplomats as part of the SEED program in the FRY.
 - Press the OSCE to establish a permanent presence in Montenegro -- perhaps in a support capacity for the Kosovo Verification Mission. The OSCE could use the port of Bar to deliver material for the KVM.
- Search out creative sources of **financial assistance for Montenegro**, including: possible IFI access, distribution of one-half of the FRY share of gold reserves in the BIS, and EU trade preferences for Montenegrin goods.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	Subject: [Annex II: Action] [See Record ID: 9830298; vz6261_002e, this case] (3 pages)	12/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6336

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	Subject: [Serbian Opposition]. [See Record ID: 9830298; vz6261_002f, this case]. (8 pages)	12/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6336

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	Political Developments. [page 3 of unknown document] (1 page)	12/00/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6336

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**NATO****PRESS AND MEDIA
SERVICE****OTAN****SERVICE DE PRESSE
ET DES MEDIAS****NATO/OTAN, 1110 BRUSSELS/BRUXELLES • TEL : 707 41 11
TELEFAX/TELECOPIEURS : 707 50 57 - 707 50 58****PRESS COMMUNIQUE M-NAC-2(98)143****For immediate release
8 December 1998****STATEMENT ON KOSOVO**

Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels,
on 8th December 1998

1. NATO's aim has been to contribute to international efforts to stop the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, end the violence there and bring about a lasting political settlement. NATO's decisions in October made a crucial contribution to the withdrawal of forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from Kosovo and helped to avert a humanitarian disaster. The Alliance's enhanced state of military readiness continues.

2. The security situation in Kosovo remains of great concern to us. Since the beginning of November, violent incidents provoked in some cases by Serbian security forces and in others by armed Kosovar elements have increased tension. These incidents show that both the Belgrade authorities and the armed Kosovar elements have failed to comply fully with the requirements set out in UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203. We call upon the armed Kosovar elements to cease and desist from provocative actions and we call upon the FRY and Serbian authorities to reduce the number and visibility of MUP special police in Kosovo and abstain from intimidating behaviour.

3. We insist that both sides maintain scrupulously the ceasefire and comply fully with the UN Security Council resolutions. We also expect them to facilitate the war crimes investigations by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In this connection, we deplore the denial of visas to ICTY investigators. Continued violence between FRY and Serbian forces and armed Kosovar elements jeopardises prospects for a political settlement for which an opportunity now exists.

4. We remain firmly convinced that the problems of Kosovo can only be resolved through a process of open and unconditional dialogue between the authorities in Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovar leadership. We therefore strongly urge all parties to move rapidly in a spirit of compromise and accommodation to conclude the negotiating process led by Ambassador Hill in which they are engaged. We reaffirm our support for a political solution which provides an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration, and which preserves the territorial integrity of the FRY, and safeguards the human and civil rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo, whatever their ethnic origin. We believe that stability in Kosovo is linked to the democratisation of the FRY and we support those who are genuinely engaged in that process. In this regard, we condemn recent actions taken by President Milosevic to suppress the independent media and political pluralism in Serbia. We welcome the steps the Government

of Montenegro has taken to protect the independent media, promote democratic reforms and ensure respect for the rights of all its citizens.

5. We will continue the Alliance's air verification mission, Operation "Eagle Eye", in accordance with the agreement between the FRY and NATO, and communicate periodically to the UN Secretary-General NATO's views on compliance.

6. We intend to cooperate fully with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The security and safety of the OSCE verifiers is of the utmost importance to us. We call on the FRY government to meet its responsibilities in this regard, as set out in UNSCRs 1199 and 1203 and the OSCE-FRY agreement of 16th October. We expect the FRY and Serbian authorities, as well as the Kosovar communities, to cooperate fully with the OSCE KVM, in particular by respecting its freedom of movement and right of access and by ensuring that its personnel are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind. We also expect the FRY and Serbian authorities to continue to allow unhindered access to international relief organisations including by issuing the necessary visas.

7. The North Atlantic Council has authorised an Activation Order (ACTORD) for a NATO-led Extraction Force, Operation "Joint Guarantor". We will quickly deploy the standing elements of this force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ to provide the ability to withdraw personnel of the OSCE KVM in an emergency. We greatly appreciate the cooperation and support of the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for providing facilities for the basing of NATO forces.

8. We welcome the willingness of Partner countries to join with NATO in contributing to the solution of the Kosovo crisis either by participating in the NATO-led air verification mission or by offering the use of their airspace or other facilities in support of NATO's efforts. We will continue to consult closely with all Partner countries on the Alliance's actions in respect of the Kosovo crisis.

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.



2

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

(Brussels, Belgium)

Text as Prepared for Delivery

Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright
Statement to the North Atlantic Council

Brussels, Belgium

December 8, 1998

Mr. Secretary-General, Mr. President d'Honneur, fellow Ministers, distinguished colleagues, it is a pleasure to see you all again.

We meet at an exciting and historic moment for NATO. Just last Friday, as all Allies completed the ratification process, the Protocols on the Accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic entered into force.

As we prepare to undertake NATO's first post-Cold War expansion next spring, prior to the Summit, the Alliance is considering its vision for the future, and initiatives critical to preparing NATO for the twenty-first century. I look forward to having three new Allies join us in this endeavor.

Much of our focus this week will be on the future, but our Alliance is seized, as well, with present responsibilities.

In Kosovo, NATO's threat to use force has halted large-scale Serb repression. A humanitarian crisis has been averted. A growing international presence is verifying compliance with commitments. And an improved climate has been created for the pursuit of a negotiated political settlement.

I want to pay special tribute to Secretary-General Solana for his leadership, and express my appreciation to each of you for your solidarity in backing up diplomacy with the credible threat of force.

Kosovo is a critical test not only for NATO, but for Europe's larger security structure. And we are fortunate to have on our team many valuable players.

- 3 -

In the meantime, we must all work together to build key Kosovo institutions, such as police and electoral structures. These will support the people of Kosovo once they reach a political settlement, and buttress the present efforts of the international community there.

Our experience over the past year is that, for diplomacy to make progress in Kosovo, the credible threat of force is required. If the ongoing political negotiations are to succeed, NATO must maintain its pressure both on Milosevic and the KLA.

At the same time, we must recognize that at the core of the problems in Kosovo is the lack of accountable, democratic leadership in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). And I hope that every nation represented here will find an appropriate way to support the democratic aspirations of the Serb people. They have been silenced and shackled for far too long.

Over the past year, Montenegro, working within the FRY, has built a more democratic system based on freer markets and a commitment to ethnic tolerance. Serbia would do well to follow that example.

It has now been three years since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, ending the brutal and senseless war in Bosnia.

Since that time, we have made significant progress in helping the nation to recover and begin to overcome the divisions exacerbated by conflict. First IFOR and now SFOR have played an indispensable role by implementing the military parts of the Dayton Agreement, and by providing the secure environment in which civilian implementation may proceed.

We are focused now on the necessary next steps, recognizing that our goal is not only the absence of hostilities, but presents of self-sustaining peace, in which Bosnians are able to take full control of their own future.

To that end, the United States looks forward to the opportunity provided by next week's meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Madrid to set the 1999 agenda for civilian implementation. We believe that the international community should pursue a number of key objectives.

For example, we should help and encourage the Bosnians to implement economic reforms required for a market economy.

We should work to develop and reinforce Bosnia's central institutions, including the adoption of a new permanent election law. We should strive to increase the momentum of refugee returns. We should help and encourage the Bosnians to implement needed education and media reforms. And we should work with the Bosnians to institutionalize the rule of law through judicial and police reform.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. form	Profile Sheet. Record ID: 9830319. [Duplicate of vz6261_003a, this case] (1 page)	12/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6336

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: [Tuesday's PC on the FRY] [Record ID: 9830319] [with cover sheet] [Duplicate of vz6261_003b, this case] (5 pages)	12/19/1998	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6336

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TAB A

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. report	Serbia, Inc.: Part of the Problem, not the Solution. [Duplicate of vz6261_002g, this case] (8 pages)	11/24/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

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2008-0994-F
vz6336

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TAB B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. report	BTF Memo. (8 pages)	12/10/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Milosevic [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6336

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

December 8, 1998

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
UPON RECEIVING THE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN AWARD
AT THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION ANNUAL AWARDS DINNER

Shoreham Hotel
Washington, D.C.

9:48 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for the wonderful welcome. My good and longtime friend, Paul Kirk, thank you for your wise words and your kindness and for the award. Generally, I don't think Presidents should get awards. But I like this one awful well. (Laughter.)

I am honored to be here with the NDI. I thank Ken Wollack, Jeanne Dunn and all the others here who worked to make your work a success. I thank you for establishing a fellowship in Cecile Ledsky's name. I thank you for honoring our other honorees who richly deserve to be recognized.

I thank the members of our government who have helped me to become involved in Ireland. I thank the members of Congress who are here whose support and interest and consistent commitment has been absolutely indispensable for the work that we have done in these last few years.

I thank our Ambassadors -- Phil Lader, our Ambassador to Great Britain; and our new Ambassador to Ireland, my longtime friend, Governor Mike Sullivan. I welcome him. Jim Lyons, thank you; Brian Atwood; all of our special guests from Northern Ireland and Ireland; my fellow Irish Americans. And a special thanks to George Mitchell. I thank you all. (Applause.)

Let me also say I'm delighted to have an award named for Averell Harriman. Hillary and I had the great honor and real joy of getting to know Governor Harriman in his later years. We spent the night with him a time or two. We once stayed up half the night listening to him talk to us about how he was Roosevelt's envoy with Churchill and Stalin. It is a pretty hard act to follow.

But I think -- I believe Governor Harriman and the men and women of his generation would be proud of America, as it stands on the eve of a new century and a new millennium. We can look ahead to the last year of this, the American Century, with confidence that we have never been a stronger force for peace and for democracy.

Some of the most entrenched conflicts the world has known have given ground in the last few years to a new spirit of cooperation. Countries dominated for centuries by strife speaking a new language, talking about a shared future -- in the Middle East, where religious hatred seemed as old as the region itself; in the Balkans, where I heard propagandists blame tensions on the battle of Kosovo in 1389; in Peru and Ecuador, where a border war had roots that went back centuries; and, of course, in Northern Ireland, where the Troubles dragged on for nearly three decades, but the arguments went back for hundreds of years.

Fortunately, the people of Northern Ireland today are looking forward to a shared 21st century in freedom, democracy and peace. So many people are making progress around the world, but we all know it's hard. It's hard right now in Northern Ireland. It's hard right now in the Middle East. Hillary and I and members of our administration are going to Israel and Gaza at the end of this week to do what we can to keep the process agreed to at Wye on track. (Applause.)

It's hard in Kosovo, where American diplomacy under Dick Holbrooke's leadership and NATO's threat of military force averted a crisis, but where we still must have a political settlement and political reform in Serbia to have a lasting peace. It is hard.

One of the things that makes it so hard, and one of the things that makes democracy so essential, is that people have to be both free to be the best they can be -- free to live their dreams and lift people according to their aspirations. They

have to know that they count just as much as anyone else. But one of the things that makes democracy so essential is they have to know that there is some restraint, on themselves and on others, beyond which they cannot go.

For how many times have I seen, these last six years, leaders of opposition factions, in talks or at the edge of conflict, or trying to get out of conflict, desperately, desperately want to reach across the lines that divide them, to advance the cause of peace -- but so frightened, that instead they had to rub salt in their adversary's wounds, so as not to lose the political support of their own folks at home. It is imperative that we push peace and democracy at the same time.

One thing I would like to say to the Irish here -- both the Irish Irish from the North and from the Republic, and the American Irish -- is that it is impossible for you to understand, perhaps, that even though all these issues may seem unrelated, a breakthrough in one area can dramatically increase the confidence and the passion of other peacemakers.

The Good Friday agreement and its overwhelming ratification by voters sent a strong signal around the world. It put a lot of extra pressure on me. Just a few days ago, I had a meeting with a group of Greek Americans and, if I heard it once I heard it 10 times, now, you did all that work in Ireland, and you sat there for nine days and got that Wye agreement, and I do not understand why the Cyprus problem is beyond reach. I know that you can make some progress there. (Applause.)

That's good. Headache for me, probably, but it's good. It's good that when people do things in one part of the world, it makes other people believe that they're not stuck in this mindless rut of conflict.

So I thank you for this award. I'm very proud of my Irish heritage. I'm proud that I could play a role in the process so far. I'm proud of what the First Lady has done with the Vital Voices movement and other ways -- (applause.)

As I can't say too many times, I'm grateful to Senator Mitchell, to the congressmen and women in this room and beyond who have reached across party lines in America to work for peace across religious lines in Ireland. And I'm very proud of the Irish American community.

But the people on the other side of the Atlantic still deserve the lion's share of the credit. Many of them are here -- Gerry Adams, Lord John Alderdice, David Ervine, Monica McWilliams, Gary McMichael, Malachi Curran -- there are others. I thank Tony Blair, Bertie Ahern, their predecessors, John Bruton, Albert Reynolds, John Major, Mo Mowlam -- one of a kind.

I'm sorry I didn't get here in time to see David Trimble and John Hume off to get the Peace Prize. But I've had some good and good-natured talks with them both. I told David Trimble -- I know you noticed this tonight -- ever since he won the Nobel Prize he's dressing a lot better. (Laughter.) Now, that's a very good sign for peace, you know. (Laughter.) And my only complaint with the Nobel Committee is that they should have given it to more people involved in the process as well. And we'd have had even a bigger, broader -- (applause) -- of enthusiasm. I thank you all.

I want you to think about this, because we're at a little bit of a tough spot in the road in Ireland right now. On the day that David and John get the Nobel Peace Prize, for their own work and as stand-ins for many of you, too, the world will also celebrate the 50th anniversary of one of the greatest documents of the 20th century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The timing could not be better because, like democracy, the cause of human rights and peace are part and parcel of the same idea: the common claim to dignity of all humanity; the idea that self-respect and mutual respect are not exclusive, but two sides of the coin of peace and harmony.

In his Nobel speech a few years ago, Seamus Heaney said of Northern Ireland, "No place in the world prides itself more on its vigilance and realism. No place considers itself more qualified to censure any flourish of rhetoric or excess of aspiration." I think that is a dignified, Seamus way of saying, we don't like long speeches telling us what we have to do. So I will give you a short speech telling you what I think we have to do. (Laughter).

I hope I can strike the right note between a celebration of how far we've come with a plea to keep the work going. I hope the parties will move quickly to resolve the remaining differences, keeping an open mind, acting in good faith, remembering how much all have gained by the hard work that has already been done. Not only the letter, but the spirit, of the Good Friday Accord must prevail.

I have closely followed recent efforts to hammer out agreements for the new executive political structures, and the bodies to deal with cross-border issues. Bringing these institutions to life is absolutely essential to keep up the momentum for peace, and we urge a speedy resolution. I also applaud the tireless work of John de Chastelain toward achieving the vital goal of disposing of weapons now that the war is over.

Hillary just came back -- (applause) -- thank you -- Hillary just came back from a profoundly moving trip to Central America, where our friends and neighbors are struggling in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, the worst hurricane in 200 years. So devastating that we are concerned that, if we don't do all we can to help them rebuild, that they could lose the democracy, the freedom, the peace for which they have fought so long and hard. But one reason, we think, that it will hold on in Guatemala and El Salvador is because, as a part of their peace process, they were vigorous in decommissioning, in giving up arms and moving toward peace.

Somehow or another, sooner or later, we all have to decide we can't shoot our way out of our differences and our difficulties.

We know the real prize still lies ahead, that day in the not-too-distant future when men, women and children can walk all the streets of Belfast, Derry, Omagh without fear; when respect and trust has replaced suspicion; when machine guns and explosives are as irrelevant as suits of armor; when investors pour money into new ventures that spread opportunity to all; when the people of Ulster are known far and wide as the people who rose to this great challenge, proved they were bigger than their differences, and were able to go across the world, as I said the last time I was in Northern Ireland.

And look at the people on Cyprus. Look at the people in the Balkans. Look at the people in Central Africa, and say, we did this, and we had troubles centuries old, not just 30 years. We did it. And you can, too.

We cannot afford to be complacent or frustrated or angry. We always knew there would be bumps in the road and that -- no matter what the referendum vote was, after the Good Friday agreement -- there would be difficulties. The United States pledges again to be with you every step of the way, because all of us know that the Irish in America for more than 200 years have brought us to this day, as much as any group of people.

We all know, too, as I will say again, that we must have democracy and human rights in the end to have peace. As long as I am President, I will do everything I can to advance the cause of peace, democracy and human rights; to do everything I can to anticipate conflicts before they occur; to listen to both sides when they do occur; to do my best to persuade parties that benefits lie just ahead if they stop living in the past and began to imagine the future. Yes, in Northern Ireland, in the Middle East, in Cambodia, Nigeria, Congo, Cyprus, the Balkans -- everywhere where there are children who deserve a better future waiting to be born.

America will always stand with those who take risks for peace. I salute the NDI for keeping our democratic aspirations in sharp focus. I salute the honorees tonight, those of you whose names were called earlier. You really deserve these awards. I ask you to continue your efforts, to keep your spirits up, to keep your vision high, to remember how we felt when the Good Friday Accord was ratified -- to remember how you feel on the best days when the worst days come around; and to remember, no matter how tough it gets, it is always better for our children to reach across the line that divide and build a future that they're all a part of together.

Thank you and God bless you. (Applause.)

END

10:03 P.M. EST

QUESTION (Tom Ellis): Am I wrong to read the statement to mean that the meeting in early 1999 in Athens will include Greeks and Turks, but not Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: No, that is correct. That is a meeting of the previously-existing businessmen in Greece and Turkey. Some of them were here and wished to indicate here in Istanbul that they wanted to resume that process.

(Inaudible)

Oh, I am sorry. OK, so they may invite people from Cyprus, which would be their decision and very positive. But this is the existing forum that missed at least one meeting in the last year.

BRT TV-CYPRUS: Mr. Holbrooke, I would like to know when you look carefully at the points agreed here today, most of them need the support of the government. Political will actually. How will you achieve this? Let's say the GSM roaming system and the case of teaching Greek and Turkish as the second language in the secondary school, to establish two institutes for language training and so and so...

AMB. HOLBROOKE: This is a very important question. Let me try to be specific. We discussed each of these. There are some things which need government approval and there are some things which do not. And some of the things are in a grey area. For example, the institutes you talk about would not require government approval if they are private. But they would if they're government. We really try to define this, and every word here is quite critical, and we can go over it in private so not to waste everyone's time. They do not need government approval to set up a private school for language, but they do need government approval to put it into the school system. That is up to the participants. We came here, we the people holding this press conference, came here to assist our friends in the region reach conclusions they have reached. This is what they want to do and we -- to keep going back to Jan's word -- we are facilitating, and I said at the outset, not everything in here will happen, but a lot of it will. If some of it doesn't, we will keep trying. It is better to try and not succeed then not to try at all.

KATHIMERINI: Mr. Holbrooke, who will supply the finances, say, to establish private schools?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: When it gets to money, I always defer to the Norwegians.

JAN EGELUND: There is actually U.S. money for this; it could be international money and money at the islands.

QUESTION: So they will have to ask for the permission?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: There is U.S. Congress money appropriated for bicomunal projects in Cyprus. A lot of it goes to the Fulbright scholars and other projects. We will make it available through the UN for feasibility studies. I was teasing

Jan because the Norwegians have been extraordinarily generous in regard to this issue.

ETHNOS: Are there plans for a fourth meeting?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: There will be a fourth meeting. I assume it will be in about six months; we have not picked the location yet. We didn't announce the next site because we want to talk a little bit about it privately. But there will be definitely a fourth meeting -- as long as the Norwegians pay, the Americans will come.

JAN EGELUND: We are closing now, but certainly we also bring experience as facilitators or the experience of Ambassador Holbrooke in the several peace processes he had been with or Norwegian experience from the Oslo Agreements on the Middle East, Central America, etc. And in all of these, the Track Two diplomacy, people-to-people cooperation is central to reaching any settlement, although they are two different tracks. I think we should now wind up. There will be a possibility, of course, to discuss with any people here available outside of the room in the lobby. Thank you very much for coming to this press conference.

(End transcript)

EUR109 12/14/98

TRANSCRIPT: KOH 12/14 NEWS CONFERENCE IN THE HAGUE

(Strong cooperation between U.S., War Crimes Tribunal) (2070)

The Hague -- There is strong cooperation between the U.S. government and members of the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on the need to fulfill the tribunal's intended objectives, says Harold Koh, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor.

Koh told a news conference in The Hague December 14 that he held a very productive series of meetings with various tribunal members, and that he was going to the former Yugoslavia in part to monitor the investigation of the Vukovar Three.

The assistant secretary also said he would visit Kosovo, to ensure that humanitarian law violations get a full examination, and to promote human rights and democratization as a way forward.

Following is a transcript of Koh's news conference:

(Begin transcript)

Koh: I'm delighted to be here. The Hague is a place I have visited often, because of my prior incarnation for 13 years as a professor of international law at Yale University. As as you

(End statement)

And, let's now entertain any questions you might have to ask.

ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY (A.A.): It is known that you are one of the most influential diplomats who is able to solve international political problems. Your participation in these meetings gives some different dimension to the meeting. Would you like to make it clear your participation in this meeting?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: You mean why I am here?

A.A. -- It is nice to see you here.

AMB. HOLBROOKE: I ask myself that all the time. I'm here because President Clinton asked me to be his special envoy on Cyprus. It is very simple. As that process unfolds it has two dimensions: official negotiations which the United States conducts or assists between the leaders of Cyprus and involving other countries in the region including Turkey and Greece. But, it also includes the Track Two diplomacy I talked about earlier, which I personally believe in very deeply. These are serious projects. The telephones in Cyprus between North and South are now working in a way they never worked before because of the efforts of this group a year ago in Brussels. Thousands of calls are being made now which could not have been made before, and there is an opportunity to do more. And I believe in these things, and therefore I am happy to participate in these meetings, indeed help to organize them. It is a part of my responsibility as the special presidential emissary on Cyprus and it is part of the American commitment to help solve the Cyprus problem, and if we cannot solve it, to help reduce tensions.

NTV: (Inaudible) ... however the progress you made is bigger than the progress made in the political arena. This is again inter-related with the political support these civilian people here get from their leaders. Do you think that you have achieved what should have been achieved today by having these meetings? You were talking about feasibility studies and there are still plans to have these studies, etc.

AMB. HOLBROOKE: I am very pleased with the results here. I think it is encouraging, I think the spirit was very good here. So am I satisfied with the Istanbul meeting? Yes, very satisfied. We have now met three times in one year, we've established a process, and the group of men and women behind us here represent a group of committed Greeks and Turks from both Cyprus and Greece and Turkey themselves who are willing to make these trips, give up their weekends, and work around the clock to make progress. That is very encouraging to us, and I am pleased with the results, but I want to stress it is the men and women behind me and Mr. Egelund and Mr. Phillips who deserve the credit. We are, to use Jan Egelund's phrase, "facilitators." It is they who made these agreements, it is they who reached these agreements, and it is they who will have to implement them.

DUNYA (ECONOMIC DAILY): After these meetings, are both sides of the businessmen now pushing their governments more strictly to find some formula?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: I want to be clear. First of all, each individual person who comes will do whatever he or she feels is appropriate. The Greek side and the Turkish side disagree on many fundamental political issues and within each delegation -- this may come as a big shock to you but not every Greek agrees with every other Greek; not every Turk agrees with every other Turk. So sometimes we argue among delegations. What each individual does in reference to his or her own government is up to them. These meetings are not designed to lobby governments; they are designed to work on practical issues that the participants and their associates can do within their own framework.

(To a group of delegates) Do you agree with that? You did not come here to create pressure groups against your governments. You came here to reach practical agreements you can do yourself, like revitalizing the Business Club at the Ledra Palace, like improving telephone systems, like the animal husbandry and dairy products, like the study of tourism. There is a lot of things in here which can be done on their own by people of goodwill, by the men and women behind us.

ASSOCIATED PRESS: Two questions, both to Mr. Egelund and Ambassador Holbrooke. How effective can Track Two diplomacy be if there is not the political will to make it work? I mean, you are talking about nuts and bolts. That's fine, but if the engine is not working, how do you make it go?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: Track Two diplomacy can sometimes create a different mood, which in time changes the political terrain for Track One, and these projects are good in and of themselves, but as we say over and over again, we did not come to Istanbul to settle the Cyprus question and we couldn't. That can only be settled by the parties themselves.

MARKET PLACE: You talk about this Track Two diplomacy but some, particularly Turkish Cypriots, have raised the question that it is very difficult to develop increasing ties, particularly in the question of business with the ongoing embargo. How do you view the embargo in this context of building up Track Two diplomacy?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: The statement speaks for itself on that question and obviously that is part of the Track One negotiations. That is the precise point at which this conference and Track Two intersect with Track One. We all understand that, but I don't want to get into a negotiation here. Read the statement carefully, and you will see the views of the participants. We are only here to facilitate.

TGRT-TV: Are you satisfied with the results of this conference?

AMB. HOLBROOKE: I am very satisfied with what has happened here today.

know. The Hague is the center for international law, and so I had many occasions to come in various capacities.

I lectured at The Hague Academy of International Law. I was involved in cases at the International Court of Justice, and at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, and I have a long-standing interest in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). So I'm delighted to be here.

I have been in office for a month and one day. I was nominated in September; I was confirmed in October; I was privately sworn in on November 13. I left immediately on one of the two foreign trips that I wanted to do before the end of the year. I went to Indonesia and Korea -- South Korea -- and looked into issues of democracy, human rights and labor. And on this trip to The Hague, we -- (turns to aide) this is Spence Spencer, a key adviser of mine and a long-time member of our Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and an expert on both war crimes issues and the former Yugoslavia. We're on our way to Belgrade, Pristina and Montenegro.

I should say also that we've had a very productive series of meetings today. In the morning we met with various members of the War Crimes Tribunal -- I met with (ICTY) President (Gabrielle) McDonald -- and a member of her staff. We had lunch with prosecutor Arbour and members of her staff. We met with the registrar of the tribunal and several members of her staff. And from this I come away believing that there is strong cooperation between the United States government and the various members of the tribunal on the need to fulfill its intended objectives.

This afternoon we had meetings with members of the Dutch foreign ministry, both on the humanitarian side and on the human rights, democratization and good governance side, and again found many issues of common concern and interest. I'm looking forward to having warm and cooperative relations with all the people that I've met earlier today.

Question: Are you going to Yugoslavia to monitor the investigation of the Vukovar Three?

Answer: That's not the only reason but that's at least part of the objective. We'll be arriving tomorrow night and we'll be meeting with NGO leaders. And on Wednesday morning we'll be meeting with a number of members of the cabinet of the FRY, and then at noon we have a scheduled meeting with Milosevic. It's not a coincidence that the Vukovar Three are scheduled to be presented for a military hearing on Thursday. So we're hoping to have a frank and full conversation on that subject.

I think our basic message is that there have been a whole series of obstructions and examples of gross non-compliance with the tribunal and its activities. They include barring the access of investigators to Kosovo; the failure over a number of years to implement commitments, to implement into domestic law an obligation to cooperate with the work of the tribunal; the failure to produce General Mladic, who is widely believed to be in the

FRY; and now the latest: a fairly blatant indication that they do not respect the primacy of the tribunal on issues over which the tribunal plainly has jurisdiction.

The tribunal has now as of Friday issued an opinion, making it clear that they believe that deferral to the tribunal's jurisdiction is appropriate, and I think that's going to come to a head on Thursday.

I think the main message from our point of view is that this is not just one incident, or a series of isolated incidents, which could be defended on a variety of technical legal grounds by Milosevic, but that it is part of a pattern and practice of systematic non-compliance with the tribunal, to which he is committed by prior agreement to comply. And it again confirms the view that was expressed strongly by our (The State) Department over the past few weeks that it's clear that Milosevic is the problem. He's not just part of the problem, but he is the problem. Until steps are taken to address these issues, there will continue to be instability in the region.

Q: What measures are the U.S. or the U.N. ready to take? Because there has been talk about this for months.

A: I think these measures (are) under discussion -- and certainly I am not free to discuss any internal negotiations -- but it is clear that with regard to flouting of Security Council resolutions there will be a resort back to a full discussion within the Security Council as to how to respond. I think one of the complicating factors for the ICTY is that the ultimate enforcement mechanism is the Security Council itself.

As you know, the Security Council has a set of particular procedures that have to be negotiated. Last week, our government strongly condemned Belgrade for failing to cooperate with the ICTY, and has clearly expressed its desire to take that matter back before the Security Council. And to enforce previous resolutions, particularly Resolution 1207.

Q: Do you know what form eventual actions by the UN Security Council would take?

A: It could take the form of sanctions, increased sanctions. This is under discussion, and certainly additional resolutions ought to be considered. I think certainly direct conversations with Milosevic should be held, making clear the United States' and the Security Council's dissatisfaction with these matters.

As you know, President McDonald sent a letter to the Security Council. And I am not completely apprised of all the different responses. The view that there has been a flouting of the Security Council is widely shared by the members who have been polled.

Q: But this has been going on for years -- since '96. The tribunal may well in FRY be viewed as a sham; what more can we do to get Milosevic to comply?

A: Part of it is a clear identification of Milosevic as someone who is the problem, and that, although because of his control he has been someone also to be dealt with. The U.S. has very strongly signaled this last week its conviction that it cannot expect profitable dealings with Milosevic, unless three conditions obtain: some degree of respect for autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; full cooperation with the tribunal; and democracy in Serbia itself.

All three of these goals are being very severely compromised by his current activities. And the reason that I am going, frankly, is to investigate and report on this to the secretary (of state). I think that there is a very high degree of concern on this issue by the United States government, and a question whether a further response is now appropriate in light of what appears to be a concerted effort to defy the tribunal.

Q: What about the stand of the Russians in the UNSC?

A: Well I think that this is a subject for negotiation. It does seem that if the Russians are committed to a tribunal that can play the role that we want it to play, they will have to understand just exactly what it is, namely a rejection of what the tribunal is all about: an effort to create an international system which can promote accountability in the former Yugoslavia by rendering justice.

Concealing war criminals from the jurisdiction of the tribunal; refusing to allow investigators access into the scene of atrocities; having proceedings that are designed to avoid the jurisdiction of the tribunal are all signs of a direct, not just indifference to, but rejection of the goals of the tribunal that the Security Council, including the Russians, took great pains to establish.

Q: Just one more question. There is an interview that Milosevic gave two days ago or yesterday in which he expressed that he never intended to arrest any of these people and he won't do it. Now you are going to see him, what are you going to say to him?

A: I think I'll say that this is part of what you did commit to, and that we expect you to adhere to your commitments. And not only that but this tribunal is something with which you agreed to cooperate and we expect you to live up to your commitments. And then if you do not there will be a price to pay.

And I think that message is being sent to him by a number of different routes, not simply by this meeting, but I think that our presence in the region during this period is to send out this message on a face to face basis so this will be absolutely unmistakable.

Q: Can you tell us anything about your visit to Kosovo?

A: We will be arriving on Friday, December 18; we will be making a courtesy call on Ambassador Walker. He is the head of the KVM (Kosovo Verification Mission) and then the KVM

Democratization director Bernt Borchardt and Thomas Boserup of the KVM; we will meet with Zoran Andjelkovic, the head of the temporary executive council and then have lunch with representatives of the OHCHR, and the UNHCR. We will tour the Pristina hospital and then we will call on President Rugova, and then we will visit a clinic. Then we will meet with the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms; we will meet with the ICRC, and then we will have dinner with some journalists.

I think our main objective here is really two-fold: first to make sure that humanitarian law violations in Kosovo get a full examination by the representative of the United States government who has human rights as my primary jurisdiction; and secondly, that the KVM, which has been described as a forceful intrusive verification mission, very clearly has human rights and democratization concerns on its agenda.

The goal there is not simply verification of the deal but an effort to promote human rights and democratization as a way forward in Kosovo. I think this is a particularly important time to do that given that despite the Holbrooke/Milosevic deal there has been a recent return to sporadic violence and a fraying of relations. We are also very focused on the issue of detainees and how they are being treated and we are going to make specific representations on that subject to Milosevic.

I should say also that what I am describing here is a general approach that the United States is trying to take on human rights in bilateral relationships in what I would call an inside-outside approach.

I think the notion is that when a dialogue has been initiated to use those channels of dialogue and make a forceful, candid, and direct representation of U.S. views but at the same time when it is clear that human rights and democratization concerns are being flouted or ignored to use other methods, outside methods, to try to bring pressure to bear. Ranging from sanctions to other forms of diplomacy backed by coercive mechanisms. And I think part of this is an attempt to internalize a respect for human rights and democracy by using direct dialogue and other means.

(End transcript)

EUR110 12/14/98

**TEXT: KOH TO VISIT SERBIA-MONTENEGRO
DECEMBER 15-19**

(Will discuss key issues with officials, others) (400)

Washington -- Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, will visit Serbia-Montenegro from December 15 to 19 to discuss key issues with Serbian and Montenegro officials, opposition party

leaders, representatives of the independent media, and other representatives of Serbian and Montenegrin civil society.

Following is the text of the State Department announcement:

(Begin text)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
December 14, 1998

STATEMENT BY JAMES B. FOLEY, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN

HAROLD HONGJU KOH TO TRAVEL TO SERBIA-MONTENEGRO

At the request of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, will visit Serbia-Montenegro from December 15 to 19, 1998. Assistant Secretary Koh will meet with key Serbian and Montenegro officials, opposition party leaders, representatives of the independent media, and other representatives of Serbian and Montenegrin civil society.

Assistant Secretary Koh will visit Belgrade, Podgorica, and Pristina during his visit. He will focus on five key issues: support for independent media; restrictions on academic freedom; the failure of the Milosevic regime to cooperate with the international Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); problems with international access to detainees; and support for the families of missing persons. In Kosovo, Assistant Secretary Koh will meet with officials of the Kosovo Verification Mission and Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders to discuss human rights issues. In Montenegro, Koh will reinforce U.S. support for President Djukanovic's democratic government and his forward leaning reforms.

Assistant Secretary Koh is in Serbia-Montenegro to underscore the concern of the United States over recent events that have retarded democratic development. We strongly condemn the Belgrade regime's repeated human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law and urge it to reverse its indefensible record of noncooperation with the ICTY.

Assistant Secretary Koh will use his visit to stress that the United States wants Serbia-Montenegro to become part of Europe. However, as long as there is no free press, no right to free association and no right to democratic governance, Serbia will continue to suffer pariah status. Assistant Secretary Koh will meet with those who recognize the need for democratization and seek their ultimate integration into the European family of nations.

(End text)

EUR111 12/14/98

TEXT: BANDLER ON PLANS FOR NATO'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT

(NATO adopting new initiatives to counter new threats) (2430)

Washington -- NATO is an alliance that has not "lost its sense of purpose" since the end of the Cold War, but rather is retooling to face new challenges and adapting its internal structures to permit greater flexibility, a top White House official told a group of foreign affairs experts in Washington, D.C., recently.

Addressing the Council on Foreign Affairs in preparation for NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit to be held in Washington April 23-25, Donald K. Bandler, special assistant to the President and European Affairs Senior Director at the White House, said: "Today NATO has tens of thousands of troops keeping the peace in Bosnia; has just brought relief and hope to the people of Kosovo; is welcoming in three new members and paving the way for more; has extensive partnerships with nearly every country in Central and Eastern Europe; has adapted its internal structures to permit greater flexibility; and is retooling to deal with new challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

More than forty heads of state and government from all the countries of the Euro-American Partnership Council will be in Washington, along with their foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of military staff, Bandler noted during his November 18 address.

In planning for the summit, he said the United States and its allies are "developing an ambitious set of initiatives designed to prepare NATO for the 21st century." Added flexibility in the Alliance will afford the capability to defend against threats to Allies' common interests, he said, including "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, ethnic conflicts that directly affect alliance interests, and terrorism against U.S. and allied targets."

Bandler pointed out that the new strategic concept should "bring more attention to these new security threats, stress the need to develop more flexible and interoperable defense capabilities, and underline the importance of cooperation with Russia and other Partners."

(Begin text)

As you all know, we in Washington will have the honor of hosting next spring NATO's historic 50th anniversary summit. This will be a very special event. More than forty heads of state and government, from all the countries of the Euro-American Partnership Council, will be in Washington, along with their foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of military staff. Much of the summit will take place at the very site of the original 1949 signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mellon Auditorium, a place of rare beauty and historical

significance. It is in this spot of shared history that we will take steps to promote our common future.

The summit, of course, is not just an opportunity to celebrate the Alliance's past achievements, as important as they are. Nor is it only an opportunity to formally welcome the three new allies -- the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland -- among our ranks, as important as that is. The 50th anniversary summit is also an opportunity to ask ourselves how to preserve and strengthen this unique alliance. Later in my remarks I would like to share with you some of our specific ideas for doing that.

First, though, I would like to address the other main issue raised by the summit, and the question that I was asked to discuss with you tonight: What is NATO For? This is an excellent topic, and the summit provides a good opportunity to reflect on this question. If we did not have good answers to this question, it would not be worth having a summit -- NATO itself for that matter -- at all.

But I think we do have good answers. Indeed, whereas not long ago many pundits and even practitioners were wondering whether the Alliance had any future at all, today there is hardly a debate on the subject, and for good reason. Rather than close up shop with the end of the Cold War, today NATO has tens of thousands of troops keeping the peace in Bosnia; has just brought relief and hope to the people of Kosovo; is welcoming in three new members and paving the way for more; has extensive partnerships with nearly every country in Central and Eastern Europe; has adapted its internal structures to permit greater flexibility; and is retooling to deal with new challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is hardly an alliance that has lost its sense of purpose.

What is NATO for? Let me suggest some of the main functions that NATO continues to fulfill -- indeed for which NATO is indispensable.

1. Common Defense. The commitment to collective defense -- embodied in article 5 of the Washington Treaty -- remains the bedrock of the Alliance, even after the end of the Cold War. Fortunately, we no longer face a threat that might invoke this commitment, but we need to continue to work together to make sure that none arises. The NATO collective defense commitment remains critical contribution to the security of its members.

2. A Forum for Military Cooperation. NATO is also essential because it provides a unique forum for transatlantic military cooperation. It is the place where allies plan together, train together, assess interests and threats together, and procure common military assets. NATO's integrated military structure is the best way to ensure that our troops and commanders can talk to each other, that our doctrines and procedures are compatible with one another, and that our equipment is interoperable. I would not want to imagine having had to put together forces for our recent operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, without all this behind us. And even when allies do things together not under the NATO flag -- such as

surveillance flights over Iraq or humanitarian missions in Africa -- this common NATO basis is of enormous benefit.

3. Crisis Response Operations. Much more than during the Cold War, NATO is also useful for planning and executing non-article 5 crisis response operations. In September 1995 in Bosnia, for example, it was only NATO's determined action -- the first military operation the Alliance ever undertook that brought an end to a war that had killed some 200,000 people, and displaced many more. Since then, NATO has effectively separated the former warring parties and given civilian authorities an opportunity to help restore that divided country. In Kosovo over the past two months we have again seen quite vividly "what NATO is for." I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that only NATO's decisive action prevented real humanitarian catastrophe this winter. NATO provided the forum for US leadership and engagement, political consultations, and the credible military threat that was indispensable in getting President Milosevic to withdraw his security forces from Kosovo and begin peace negotiations.

4. Integrating Europe/Outreach. Contrary to the predictions of many, NATO has also turned out to be a force for the integration of the European continent. We will take the historic step next spring of welcoming nearly 60 million more Europeans as full members of the alliance. The Partnership for Peace, which now involves 44 allies and partners, has proven to be an effective forum for pan-European dialogue and joint military training. And now, since the July 1997 signing of the Founding Act with Russia, we also have a Permanent Joint Council that allows for extensive dialogue and consultation with our Russian partners. In both Bosnia and Kosovo we have vivid proof of how NATO can bring together allies and partners for the common good.

5. Addressing New Security Challenges. NATO is also increasingly relevant to the new types of transnational security challenges that are emerging in a world in which threats know no borders. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, for example, is becoming one of the most important security issues of our time. NATO has since 1994 been taking active measures to prepare itself to prevent and deal with this problem, and we are proposing further initiatives in this area for next year's summit.

6. Binding the U.S. to Europe. Finally, NATO is the bedrock of the U.S. commitment to Europe. The past century has proven that European and North American security are inextricably bound together, and NATO is the embodiment of U.S. engagement in Europe. With the strong and developing U.S.-EU relationship, the OSCE, the G-7, and many other bodies, NATO is hardly the exclusive expression of the U.S. commitment to Europe, but it is the essential one on the security field. So long as NATO is useful in ensuring active American engagement in Europe, it will be in the common interest of Americans and Europeans alike.

What does this all add up to? It adds up to a list of concrete contributions that are essential to the security and well being of

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EVERY GREAT TRIP STARTS WITH A TEST DRIVE...

December 13, 1998

U.S. Hardens Stance on Yugoslav Leader

By STEVEN ERLANGER

WASHINGTON -- The United States, trying to plot an eventual endgame to its military involvement in the countries that once were part of Communist Yugoslavia, is moving to undermine President Slobodan Milosevic's tight control over Yugoslavia, senior U.S. officials say.

U.S. officials have toughened their tone against Milosevic in recent days and are openly supporting the democratic government in Montenegro, a part of Yugoslavia that Milosevic has hinted he might move against.

Milosevic's political grip has weakened because of his mishandling of the rebellion in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo, U.S. officials say. But they flatly deny reports of some covert or even overt new plan to oust Milosevic, saying that his fate is up to the Serbian people. And he remains an important actor in Western efforts to keep the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo, they say.


The officials were speaking after a series of high-level meetings of the administration's national security team, with the special envoy Richard Holbrooke taking part by a secure video link.

While they argue that the essence of U.S. policy -- support for the democratization of the region -- has not changed, they concede that the U.S. tone about Milosevic has hardened. "There is a generalized feeling now throughout the administration that Milosevic is the problem in the Balkans, and less vital for the solutions," a senior U.S. official said.

In Brussels last Tuesday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called on the NATO alliance to find "an appropriate way to support the democratic aspirations of the Serb people," who "have been silenced and shackled far too long." Her spokesman, James Rubin, said last week: "Milosevic has been at the center of every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply part of the problem -- Milosevic is the problem."



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But while urging democracy in Yugoslavia, the officials have not called for Milosevic's removal and are wary of a further breakup of the country, which is now made up of the dominant Serbia and Montenegro. "We're not supporting the secession of Montenegro, which the Montenegrins themselves don't advocate," an official said. "That could produce another unraveling in Europe, starting with the Bosnian Serb republic."

Despite Milosevic's weaker position now, he withstood huge rallies of 200,000 people calling for his ouster two years ago, and today the democratic opposition is splintered badly, making its repression easier. The officials are concerned that Milosevic could be replaced by someone worse, like the fanatical Serbian nationalist Vojislav Seselj.

In September a slightly moderate Serb nationalist, Biljana Plavsic, whom Washington supported, was defeated by a harder-line Serb, Nikola Poplasen, in the Bosnian Serb republic.

Washington has decided to do its best to protect Montenegro and to revive support for a democratic opposition in Serbia itself, even as Milosevic has moved to crush it.

Last week, for instance, the State Department welcomed a number of Serbian democrats and news media figures who have been attacked by Milosevic, including Slavko Curuvija, publisher of the newspaper Dnevni Telegraf, which Milosevic shut down on Oct. 13 but which has been revived and publishes from Montenegro. They also testified at a hearing in the House before the Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Milosevic has used the new U.S. oratory "to circle the wagons," a European diplomat noted, drawing closer to old cronies and cracking down harder on the independent news media, much of which has withdrawn to Montenegro.

The administration hopes to roll out an explicit program at the beginning of the year, the officials said, which will include aid to independent news organizations, academic institutions and civic organizations, many of which Milosevic has been trying to repress in Serbia. Washington will also direct further support to Montenegro, whose president, Milo Djukanovic, has been diverging from Belgrade and Milosevic and providing safe haven for a number of the news organizations and academic institutions that were shut down.

"There has been real progress toward democracy and economic freedom in Montenegro, and we want to support them any way we can," a senior U.S. official said. "It's also a way to show the Serbs in Belgrade, who are watching, that we are not anti-Serb per se, which is what Milosevic always cries."



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The United States is currently spending about \$15 million a year, including \$2 million for independent television, to promote democracy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which includes Kosovo. There, Washington hopes to help independent news organizations in preparation for hoped-for elections for a local parliament.

Also early in 1999, the administration will make public posters and publicity for a new "bounty" of \$5 million a head for the capture of accused war criminals in the region, including Kosovo -- money pushed on the executive branch by Congress, in particular by Rep. Benjamin Gilman, R-N.Y., who is chairman of the House International Relations Committee.

Among the targets of such a bounty are the former Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic, and his military commander Gen. Ratko Mladic. Both men have been indicted by an international war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia but have not been arrested by NATO-led forces in Bosnia. The two men are believed to be living now in Serbia, officials said.

But the details for such a bounty program are still being worked out, especially with the Justice Department, officials say. It will be run out of the office of Robert Gelbard, who is in charge of carrying out the Dayton accords, and the secretary of state will determine who qualifies for any reward.

The administration continues to press negotiations to find a political solution to the conflict in Kosovo, between the ruling Serbs and the ethnic Albanians who make up about 90 percent of the province's population.

But Holbrooke and the chief U.S. negotiator, Christopher Hill, have had difficulty getting a coherent political response from the badly divided ethnic Albanians. The essence of the problem is that the United States and the West want a solution -- enhanced autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia -- that is favored by neither the Serbs nor the population of Kosovo.

Increasingly, urged on by the Kosovo Liberation Army, the ethnic Albanian residents of the province want independence, while the Serbs are reluctant to grant any real autonomy, let alone an enhanced autonomy beyond the status Milosevic removed from Kosovo in 1989.

Hill, who is currently circulating his fourth draft agreement among the various parties, has been criticized by both sides. U.S. officials say they do not expect quick success, but are still pushing to find a political settlement before the spring, when the Balkan thaw could produce new fighting in Kosovo.



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
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