

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Kosovo - Situation / Assessments [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1708

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Balkan Update, Issue No. 1394 [with cover sheets] (7 pages)	09/29/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C), b(6)
002. report	Balkan Update, Issue No. 1393 [with cover sheets] [Duplicate of jp399_005b, 2006-0206-F (1.09, 2013-0830-M)] (10 pages)	09/28/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C), b(6)
003. report	Subject: [Bosnian Displaced Persons] (1 page)	09/25/1998	P1/b(1)
004. report	Senior Executives Memorandum [with cover sheet] (3 pages)	09/25/1998	P1/b(1)
005a. form	Fax Cover Sheet. [partial] (1 page)	09/18/1998	P3/b(3)
005b. report	Kosovo Humanitarian Update #3 (9 pages)	09/18/1998	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Memorandum for Samuel Berger from Jock Covey. Subject: Bosnia Elections [Record ID: 9805883] [Duplicate of vz6229_002, this case] (2 pages)	08/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Situation/Assessments [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, September 28, 1998 7:27 PM
To: Bouchard, Joseph F.; Braden, Susan R.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Hurley, C. Michael; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: Kosovo-Yugoslavia

CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: AP/East
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 980928191757 A0159016

a0736

^AM-Kosovo-Yugoslavia, 1st Ld-Writethru, a0654,0593<

^Serb premier says special police units will be pulled out of Kosovo<

^Eds: LEADS throughout to RAISE details of new fighting; No pickup<

^AP Photos BEL103,PRI101<

^By DUSAN STOJANOVIC=

^Associated Press Writer=

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia (AP) Hoping to avert a NATO attack, the Serbian premier on Monday promised to withdraw special police units from Kosovo, declaring that separatists in the province had been defeated.

Premier Mirko Marjanovic said the Serb crackdown would resume, however, if ethnic Albanian separatists stage new attacks. And Vice Premier Vojislav Seselj said if NATO carries out threatened strikes, Serbia would take hostage pro-Western Serbs who work for independent media, peace and rights groups.

NATO recently has stepped up plans for airstrikes against Serb forces after repeated warnings that it would attack unless violence ends in the restive province.

Kosovo is located in the south of Serbia, Yugoslavia's dominant republic. Most ethnic Albanians who make up 90 percent of the 2 million inhabitants favor independence.

The Kosovo Liberation Army, which is fighting for Kosovo's independence, issued a statement pledging to continue what it called "the holy war" against Serbia and demanding NATO action.

Despite word of the special forces' imminent pullout, more fighting was reported in Kosovo on Monday.

The Kosovo Information Center, which is close to the ethnic Albanian leadership, reported Serbian shelling in the region of Suva Reka and Urosevac, south of Kosovo's capital, Pristina.

Reporters saw thick columns of smoke blurring the horizon of Suva Reka, and flames consumed at least four nearby villages. Police and the Yugoslav army, backed by tanks and heavy artillery, had surrounded several villages in the area and denied entry to journalists and foreign diplomatic observers.

The state Tanjug news agency later reported that all KLA strongholds were destroyed, dozens of rebels killed and hundreds arrested in the past several days.

The Kosovo Information Center also claimed that 15 members of two ethnic Albanian families were massacred by Serb troops in the central Drenica region on Sunday. The report could not be independently confirmed.

Hundreds of people have been killed and about 275,000 have fled their homes since February, when the forces of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic began cracking down.

Marjanovic, who made his remarks during a parliamentary session, said the government would grant amnesty to Kosovo Albanians who have not committed "war crimes," provided they surrender their weapons within 10 days.

A NATO spokesman in Brussels, Belgium, who spoke on condition of anonymity, repeated the alliance's position that Milosevic must

fulfill the conditions laid down in a U.N. resolution Wednesday that called for a cease-fire in Kosovo. ``Words are nifty, but we want to see action," he said.

There was no visible withdrawal of the police units Monday.

Marjanovic said Serb and Yugoslav forces would remain in their barracks for an unspecified period to guard against any resumption of attacks by the KLA, which has been largely routed.

The U.N. Security Council has insisted since March that Serbs withdraw special police units and other forces from Kosovo and begin talks with ethnic Albanians on the province's future.

On Wednesday, the council threatened additional action if Milosevic did not stop the offensive against Kosovo's separatists and allow for the safe return of refugees.

APE- 09/28/98 19:13:00

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, September 28, 1998 1:40 PM
To: Bouchard, Joseph F.; Braden, Susan R.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Hurley, C. Michael; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: KOSOVO UPDATE - SEPT 28

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 281637Z SEP 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9393
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 6554
TOR: 980928124044 M3484674

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 4/26/2024
2008-0994-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 006554

ROME ALSO FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/28/08
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, PINS, ASEC, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO UPDATE - SEPT 28

REF: BELGRADE 6504

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TANDY BARRETT, POLITICAL
SECTION, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SERBIAN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE - "NO SPECIAL PLAN" ...

2. (C) THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC PARLIAMENT CONVENED AN
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 28 TO DISCUSS THE
SITUATION IN KOSOVO. IN PREPARATION FOR THE MEETING,
THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED A DRAFT RESOLUTION THAT HAS
ALREADY OBTAINED THE SUPPORT OF THE FOUR STRONGEST
PARTIES IN THE PARLIAMENT: THE GOVERNING COALITION
PARTNERS (SOCIALISTS, RADICALS, AND JUL) AND VUK
DRASKOVIC'S SERBIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT. COMMENTING ON
EVENTS, THE SERBIAN MINISTER IN CHARGE OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF KOSOVO, DJURO LAZIC, SAID THAT SERBIA
WAS NOT PREPARING ANY SPECIAL PLAN FOR THE SOLUTION OF
KOSOVO, AND THAT -- IN PRINCIPLE -- IT ADHERED TO
RESOLVING ISSUES ON THE BASIS OF THE FRY AND SERBIAN
CONSTITUTIONS.

... SEPARATISM DEFEATED, AMNESTY FOR UNARMED INNOCENTS.

3. (C) PRIME MINISTER MIRKO MARJANOVIC'S REMARKS TO
THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION AND THE GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT
RESOLUTION WERE CONSISTENT WITH PAST PRONOUNCEMENTS.
MARJANOVIC STATED THAT TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE BEEN
DEFEATED AND THAT SECURITY IN THE PROVINCE HAS BEEN
RESTORED. HE ANNOUNCED THAT VJ FORCES AND MUP SPECIAL
FORCES WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR BARRACKS AND THAT,
ABSENT TERRORIST PROVOCATIONS, FURTHER OPERATIONS BY
SECURITY FORCES ARE NOT ENVISIONED. MARJANOVIC ALSO
STATED THAT CITIZENS WILL BE AMNESTIED, PROVIDED THEY
SURRENDER WEAPONS IN THEIR POSSESSION AND ARE NOT
GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES.

4. (C) THE RESOLUTION LAYS THE BLAME FOR "PROBLEMS"

IN THE PROVINCE AT THE FEET OF SEPARATISTS WHO RESORTED TO TERRORISM TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL. IT ALSO STRESSES THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO PROTECT SERBIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NOTES THE STATE HAS TAKEN -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE -- ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO INSURE THIS GOAL. THE RESOLUTION DOES ENCOURAGE POLITICAL DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN KOSOVO, BUT NOTES ANY SOLUTION MUST RESPECT, INTER ALIA, SERBIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS THE EQUALITY OF ALL CITIZENS, ALL NATIONAL COMMUNITIES, AND ALL ETHNIC GROUPS, "WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE DOMINATION OF ANY." IN THIS CONNECTION, THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO ESTABLISH AN "EXECUTIVE COUNCIL" TO GOVERN DURING THE NEGOTIATING PERIOD. ZORAN ANDJELKOVIC, A MINISTER IN THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT, HAS BEEN PROPOSED TO HEAD THE BODY.

5. (C) THE RESOLUTION COMMENDS THE VJ AND SPECIAL POLICE, "WHO PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES "HONORABLY, WITH FULL RESPONSIBILITY, PROFESSIONALISM, COURAGE, AND SELF-SACRIFICE." IT CONDEMNS THOSE COUNTRIES THAT AIDED TERRORISM OR SUPPORTED MILITARY INTERVENTION. FINALLY, THE GOVERNMENT ASSERTED THAT WHILE HUGE NUMBERS OF CITIZENS WERE DISPLACED, THEY ARE NOW RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES, WORK, AND LIFE IN PEACE. THE GOVERNMENT PLEDGED TO COMMIT ITSELF TO ADDRESS ALL HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS, INCLUDING HOME REPAIR, HEALTH SERVICES, AND THE NORMALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY.

DEBATE TO END BY 8:00 P.M.; KOSOVO MOMENTARILY CALM?

6. (C) PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC HAS AGREED TO RECEIVE THE CHARGE AND CONTACT GROUP AMBASSADORS AT 8:15 P.M. TONIGHT. IT IS LIKELY THAT HE WILL USE THE MEETING TO HIGHLIGHT THE RESOLUTION AND TO CLAIM THAT FIGHTING IN KOSOVO HAS CEASED. U.S. KDOM REPORTED MID-AFTERNOON THAT THE FIERCE FIGHTING THAT CHARACTERIZED THE WEEKEND APPEARED TO BE OVER. ALTHOUGH THE REPORTING OFFICER COULD COUNT SOME 50 FIRES BLAZING IN A 5-MILE STRETCH NEAR SUVA REKA, HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SOUNDS OF ARTILLERY AFTER NOON. THAT SAID, HE DID REPORT SECOND HAND REPORTS OF FIGHTING -- AND ARTILLERY -- AS LATE AS 2:00 P.M. NEAR STIMLJE.

ALBANIANS RESTATE POSITION

7. (C) AT HIS SEPTEMBER 25 PRESS CONFERENCE, DR. RUGOVA CALLED FOR AN END TO THE SERBIAN OFFENSIVE.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 006554

ROME ALSO FOR EASSY VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/28/08
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, PINS, ASEC, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO UPDATE - SEPT 28

REF: BELGRADE 6504

HE WELCOMED THE ADOPTION OF THE UN RESOLUTION AND "THE READINESS OF NATO TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVO." RUGOVA ONCE AGAIN CALLED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORATE FOR KOSOVO AS AN INTERIM STAGE TO FULL INDEPENDENCE. COORDINATOR OF THE KOSOVO ALBANIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM FEHMI AGANI, ADDRESSING AN INTERIM SOLUTION FOR KOSOVO, SAID ON SUNDAY THAT KOSOVO SHOULD BE AN ENTITY WITHIN THE FRY WITH IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR COMPETENCE'S TO THOSE OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO. FINALLY, EIGHT KOSOVO

ALBANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ASSOCIATION OF LAWYERS SENT AN APPEAL TO THE UN ON SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 26TH. THE APPEAL ASKS FOR "AN IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO ON THE BASIS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO STOP THE WAR AND THE SERBIAN TERROR WHICH ALREADY TAKING THE FORM OF ETHNOCIDIC."

FIGHTING INTENSIFIES DURING THE WEEKEND

8. (C) ON SUNDAY FIERCE NEW CLASHES BETWEEN THE SERBIAN POLICE AND FORCES OF THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY (UCK) TOOK PLACE IN SUVA REKA, STIMLJE AND UROSEVAC, ACCORDING TO KDOM. THE POLICE ATTACKED FROM THE DIRECTION OF SUVA REKA, CONCENTRATING OPERATIONS ON ELEVEN VILLAGES INHABITED MOSTLY BY ALBANIANS. AROUND 15,000 PEOPLE RETREATED FROM THE VILLAGE. ACCORDING TO SERBIAN MEDIA SOURCES, A TOTAL OF TEN POLICEMEN WERE KILLED OVER THE WEEKEND IN THE DRENICA REGION. ALBANIAN SOURCES REPORT THAT 83 ALBANIANS WERE KILLED IN THE CICAVIDA MOUNTAIN REGION.

ICRC DENIES PRESSURING IDPS NOT TO RETURN HOME

9. (C) THE ICRC HAS FORMALLY PROTESTED ALLEGATIONS THAT APPEARED IN A TUNJUG REPORT CARRIED BY SEVERAL LOCAL MEDIA OUTLETS OVER THE WEEKEND. THE ARTICLE, WHICH REPORTED ON A MEETING OF FEDERAL INFORMATION SECRETARY GORAN MATIC AND A DELEGATION OF VISITING CHINESE JOURNALISTS, QUOTED MATIC AS SAYING THAT THE AUTHORITIES "HAD DATA AND PROOF" THAT THE ICRC HAD EXERCISED PRESSURE ON DISPLACED PERSON NOT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. HE FURTHER ALLEGED THAT ICRC HAD LOST ITS HUMANITARIAN FUNCTION AND BECOME A MEANS FOR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THE ICRC TOTALLY REJECTED THE ACCUSATION, NOTING THAT IT SUPPORTS IDP RETURNS TO THEIR HOMES, AS SOON AS CONDITIONS ALLOW. THE ICRC ALSO REJECTED SUGGESTIONS THAT IT HAS POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRESSED THAT IT WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE PEOPLE'S DECISIONS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. THE ICRC DID UNDERLINE THAT INSURING SECURITY FOR RETURNEES IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FR.

10. (U) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ZETKULIC

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 1998 7:11 AM
To: Bouchard, Joseph F.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Hurley, C. Michael; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: YUGOSLAVIA-KOSOVO-POW

CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: Reuters
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 980929070437

a0670

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-KOSOVO-POWERS 1STLD

^Albanians reject provisional Kosovo government
BELGRADE, Sept 29 (Reuters) - Kosovo Albanians on Tuesday rejected Serbia's new provisional government for the province and official claims that a Serb offensive against the Kosovo Albanian population was over.

Fehmi Agani, chief negotiator for the Democratic League of Kosovo (KLA), the biggest Albanian party, said it would not join the provisional government and did not expect other Albanian parties to do so.

"There is absolutely no possibility of us participating in the work of the provisional executive council because this is an organ of the Serb authorities," he told the Belgrade news agency Beta.

"I do not expect any party in Kosovo will agree to take part in the work of that body."

The separatist ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo has boycotted all direct contact with Belgrade while the population of the southern Serbian province is under attack by security forces.

Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic, announcing the creation of the provisional government on Monday, said police and troops would withdraw to their barracks after defeating a seven-month insurgency by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

Western eyewitness said Serb attacks continued south of Pristina on Monday despite Marjanovic's statement and Agani rejected claims that the offensive had ended.

"We are guided by the situation on the ground and there were attacks yesterday," he told Beta. "Some 10 villages were burned in the vicinity of Suva Reka."

Ethnic Albanian human rights workers and Western observers said the bodies of 14 people, including women and children, were found on Monday in a village at Gornja Obrinja in western Kosovo. It was not known when they were killed.

Ambassadors of the six Contact Group countries -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Italy and Germany -- met Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic on Monday and urged him to make progress towards a settlement.

The United States and its European allies have threatened Milosevic with air strikes if he does not cede to United Nations pressure to end the conflict and negotiate.

More than 800 people have been killed and around 300,000 made homeless during the fighting.

^REUTERS

RB-- 09/29/98 07:00:00

<^TOR>980929070437

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Subject: KOSOVO UPDATE - SEPT 29

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 291618Z SEP 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9419
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 6579
TOR: 980929125858 M3486588

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 4/26/2024
2008-0994-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 006579

ROME ALSO FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/08

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, PINS, ASEC, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO UPDATE - SEPT 29

REF: A) STATE 177450 B) BELGRADE 6574

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TANDY BARRETT, POLITICAL
SECTION, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

CONTACT GROUP COMS ON TRUTH PATROL IN KOSOVO

2. (C) CHARGE JOINED CONTACT GROUP AMBASSADORS, EU
ENVOY PETRITSCH, AND EC CHARGE GRAHAM FOR A TOUR IN
KOSOVO TODAY. THE GROUP VISITED WITH APPROXIMATELY
3,000 IDP'S LIVING IN A RAVINE NEAR KOMORANE. THE
GROUP ALSO ATTEMPTED TO VISIT THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT
DISTRICT CENTER IN MALISHEVO BUT, AS REPORTED BY
KDOM EARLIER, FOUND IT CLOSED. THE GROUP SPOKE IN
GLUBOVAC WITH THE SOLE SURVIVOR OF A SECOND APPARENT
SERBIAN POLICE MASS KILLING OF 14 MEN FROM THAT
VILLAGE ON SATURDAY. THE GROUP WILL MEET WITH LDK
PRESIDENT RUGOVA THIS EVENING TO CONVEY POINTS
CONTAINED REF A. AND MAKE A PRESS STATEMENT
THEREAFTER BEFORE RETURNING TO BELGRADE LATE
TONIGHT.

DOCTORS AND HEALTH WORKERS TARGETED

3. (C) MEDECINS SAN FRONTIERES CONTACTED THE CONTACT
GROUP ABASSADORS AND REPORTED THAT DOCTORS AND
HEALTH CARE WORKERS IN KOSOVO HAVE BEEN TARGETED BY
SERBIAN SECURIT_ FORCES. MSF REPORTS THAT AFTER
INTENSE FIGHTING IN THE DRENICA, CENTRAL, AND PEC
REGIONS SEVERAL DOCTORS WHO PROVIDED MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE TO IDPS ARE MISSING. MSF ASSERTS SOME
HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND OTHERS KILLED. SEVEN DOCTORS
ARE CURRENTLY MISSING, ONE HAS BEEN ARRESTED AND ONE
WAS ALLEDGEDLY TORTURED AND KILLED.

KOSOVO NOT QUITE

4. (C) EU KDOM'S PRISTINA TEAM--WHICH WAS DENIED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BY SERB AUTHORITIES--GAVE POLOFF A PRELIMINARY ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SUVA REKA AND UROSEVAC AREA FOR TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 29. DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT CLAIM THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS HAVE CEASED, APPROXIMATELY 10 VILLAGES IN THE AREA 8 KM EAST OF SUVA REKA HAD BEEN SHELLED AND WERE BURNING. VILLAGES 3 KM WEST OF UROSEVAC WERE ALSO BURNING. THE BLAZES WERE THOUGHT TO BE THE FINAL STAGE OF SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS IN THE TWO AREAS. IN A SEPARATE INCIDENT, POLOFF LEAVING THE KOSOVO AREA SPOTTED FOUR VJ MILITARY VEHICLES AND SEVERAL COMBAT-READY SOLDIERS HEADING INTO PRISTINA THIS AFTERNOON (SEPTEMBER 29).

5. (C) ON SEPTEMBER 28, KDOM REPORTED THAT SERBIAN FORCES CONTINUED THEIR OFFENSIVE. U.S. KDOM OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY 50 ACTIVELY BURNING FIRES TO THE SOUTH AND EAST OF SUVA REKA. SERBIAN AND ALBANIAN SOURCES CONFIRMED THAT ON MONDAY CLASHES BETWEEN SERBIAN POLICE AND THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY (UCK) CONTINUED IN SOUTHERN KOSOVO NEAR UROSEVAC, SUVA REKA AND STIMLJE. ALBANIAN SOURCES SAY THAT THE POLICE ON MONDAY SHELLED VILLAGES EAST OF SUVA REKA MUNICIPALITY AND THAT 15 VILLAGES WERE BURNED IN THE AREA. THESE SOURCES SAY THAT ABOUT 15,000 ALBANIAN CIVILIANS ARE SPENDING THEIR SECOND NIGHT IN THE WOODS NEAR MT. VRANIC.

6. (C) ALSO ON SEPTEMBER 28, U.S. KDOM FOUND SEVERAL LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF IDPS IN CENTRAL KOSOVO. THEY LOCATED SOME 3,000 IDPS LIVING WEST OF KISHNA REKA. MOST OF THE IDPS ARE IN NEED OF WARM CLOTHING AND ALL ARE LIVING ON THE GROUND WITH ONLY THE MOST RUDIMENTARY SHELTER.

EU AND U.S. KDOM TEAMS VISIT MASSACRE SITE

7. (C) ON MONDAY SEPTEMBER 27, JOINT EU AND U.S. KDOM VISITED A MASSACRE SITE AT THE VILLAGE OF GORNJE OBRINJE (REF B). JOINT KDOM CONFIRMED 14 DEATHS: TWO MALES, SIX WOMEN (ONE PREGNANT), AND SIX CHILDREN. JOINT EU/U.S. KDOM OBSERVED THAT MOST OF THE VICTIMS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN EXECUTED WITH SHOTS TO THE HEAD.

8. (C) A LOCAL VILLAGER TOLD THE EU AND U.S. KDOM THAT ON THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 23 GORNJE OBRINJE CAME UNDER SIEGE BY VJ SERBIAN POLICE AND SPECIAL FORCES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 006579

ROME ALSO FOR EMBASSY VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/08 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, PINS, ASEC, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO UPDATE - SEPT 29

REF: A) STATE 177450 B) BELGRADE 6574

AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF SHELLING, FOOT SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY ENTERED THE AREA, BEGAN LOOTING, BURNING HOUSES AND KILLING CATTLE AND OTHER ANIMALS. (COMMENT: ACCORDING TO KDOM, THE VICTIMS APPEARED TO BE HIDING FROM THE ATTACK. END COMMENT)

SERBIAN OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO DENY IDP PROBLEM

9. (C) SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER MIRKO MARJANOVIC IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE PARLIAMENT MONDAY SEPTEMBER 28,

SAID, "THERE IS NO HUMANITARIAN DISASTER IN KOSOVO-METOHIIJA. NONE OF THAT IS TRUE. ALL OF IT IS LIES AND FABRICATION." ADDING, "LIFE IN KOSOVO-METOHIIJA IS BACK TO NORMAL."

TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR KOSOVO FORMED

10. (U) THE SERIAN PARLIAMENT ON MONDAY ESTABLISHED "THE TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KOSOVO-METOHIIJA." DEPUTY OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA AND MINISTER OF SPORT ZORAN ANDJEKOVIC WAS DESIGNATED "PRIME MINISTER" OF THE TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (TEC) AND SHOULD APPOINT THE MEMBERS OF THE TEC WITHIN A WEEK. "THE COUNCIL WILL BE MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN KOSOVO," ANDJEKOVIC STATED.

KOSOVO ALBANIANS' REACTION TO PARLIAMENT DECISION

11. (U) THE PRESIDENCY OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE OF KOSOVO (LDK) SAID ON SEPTEMBER 28 "THE BELGRADE REGIME IS MANIPULATING THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC BY CLAIMING IT HAS STOPPED ITS ATTACKS IN KOSOVO." XHEMAIL MUSTAFA, SPOKESMAN FOR LDK LEADER IBRAHIM RUGOVA SAID THAT YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC SHOULD BE GIVEN AN ULTIMATUM AND THREATENED WITH THE USE OF NATO FORCE, "BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONLY WAY HE CAN UNDERSTAND HIS OBLIGATION." FEHMI AGANI, COORDINATOR FOR THE KOSOVO ALBANIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM, SAID THAT THE SERBIAN PARLIAMENT ACTION WAS A STEP BACKWARDS FOR KOSOVO AND THAT MARJANOVIC'S SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT WAS "A PATHETIC EULOGY FOR VIOLENCE, WITHOUT ANY EFFORTS TO UNDERSTAND THE TRUE DIMENSIONS OF THE KOSOVOdc9 ARE HEADED BYmAn>CaAz<9O@PXNTY FORCES.

13. (U) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.w

ZETKUC

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Balkan Update, Issue No. 1394 [with cover sheets] (7 pages)	09/29/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C), b(6)

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Kosovo - Situation/Assessments [2]

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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	Balkan Update, Issue No. 1393 [with cover sheets] [Duplicate of jp399_005b, 2006-0206-F (1.09, 2013-0830-M)] (10 pages)	09/28/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C), b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Situation/Assessments [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, September 28, 1998 5:38 AM
To: Bouchard, Joseph F.; Braden, Susan R.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Hurley, C. Michael; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: YUGOSLAVIA-KOSOVO-PRE

CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: Reuters
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 980928045212

a0394

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-KOSOVO-PREMIER -2 BELGRADE

``As of today, all anti-terrorist activities (in Kosovo) have ended," Marjanovic told a special parliament session on ways to resolve the seven-month conflict which has cost some 800 lives and driven 300,000 people from their homes in the mainly Albanian populated province.

Serbian security forces would renew their offensive ``only if any new bandit and terrorist activity reappears," he added.

Marjanovic pledged that ``all those who have turned their weapons over within 10 days will be amnestied if they haven't personally committed any crime."

A Serb summer offensive against guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was still being waged on Sunday when Western reporters saw attacks on villages in an area south of Pristina, the provincial capital.

^REUTERS

RB-- 09/28/98 04:48:00
<^TOR>980928045212

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003. report	Subject: [Bosnian Displaced Persons] (1 page)	09/25/1998	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Situation/Assessments [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6335

RESTRICTION CODES

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CLASSIFICATION

8

MESSAGE NO 00013174NO. OF PAGES ATTACHED 1

'98 SEP 28 A7

20 SEP '98 7:14

WASHFAX SITE 4



TO: GLYN DAVIES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CENTRAL
OPERATI

FBIS: VIA

USIA OPE

FROM: KRISTIE KE
DEPARTME
202/647-151

THE STATE DEPART
THE FOLLOWING PR

OVERI

AFTER

X SPOT

WORL

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

YUGOSLAVIA

X	BERGER		PASCUAL	X	SCHWARTZ
X	STEINBERG		ELKIND		BUSBY
X	KERRICK		WEISS	X	HAWLEY
X	DAVIES			X	NAPLAN
X	RICE			X	METZL
X	MALLEY	X	BANDLER	X	WIPPMAN
X	HACHIGIAN		BROWN		
X	COSGRIFF	X	BUTLER		RIEDEL
X	SIGLER	X	SCHULTE		Countryman
		X	DOWLING		GREER
X	FUERTH	X	HURLEY		MARTY
X	OVP STAFF		McEldowney		TODD
			SAPIRO		
	SMITH		LEE	X	CLARKE
	Barks-Ruggles		BRAINARD		SIMON
	Prendergast		HENDRICKS		BOBBITT
	SANDERS		MARCHICK		BENJAMIN
					Gordon-Hagerty
			McCARTHY		GREEN
	LIEBERTHAL		GREGORY		ROSA
	BADER		KNEPPER		SISSON
	GAGNON		SHERMAN		WECHSLER
	PRITCHARD		WARD		
					SAMORE
X	FLANAGAN		DOBBINS		CARAVELLI
X	BRADEN		ARMSTRONG		HARRIS
			GALLUCCI		TUCKER
	BELL		PICCONE		
	ANDREASEN			X	McCURRY
	BOUCHARD		BAKER		LEAVY
	MULLIGAN		ALLEN		CROWLEY
	Von LIPSEY		DeROSA		
	WITKOWSKY		HIGHSMITH	X	SDO
	PIMENTEL				COMMS
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13

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIEDEXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center

SPOT REPORT NO. 1
LATEST CRISIS IN KOSOVO
0600 EDT, Monday, September 28, 1998

BELGRADE DECLARES VICTORY, SAYS OFFENSIVE IS OVER...

(SBU) During a special session of parliament, FRY Prime Minister Mirko Marijanovic declared victory over ethnic Albanian insurgents in Kosovo and announced that all anti-terrorist activities had ended, reports the press. Marijanovic said Serbian security forces would renew their offensive only if bandit and terrorist activities reappeared. He offered amnesty to all those who had not personally committed crimes, and called on them to turn in their weapons within 10 days. The FRY has made similar declarations in the past, notes Embassy Belgrade, but seldom have they been so public or prominent. (Watch/Embassy Belgrade telcon, Watch/Embassy Skopje telcon, Reuters)

...AFTER DAYS OF INTENSIFIED MILITARY OPERATIONS

(SBU) The FRY announcement followed a huge upswing in military activity in Kosovo, comments Embassy Belgrade. Heavy shelling southwest of Pristina continued on the morning of September 28, reports the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission. KDOM teams had not returned to the area following the announcement to confirm whether shelling had stopped. (Watch/Embassy Belgrade telcon, Watch/KDOM telcon, Reuters)

Drafted: JPDeHart

Dist: S D P C G E T M H SP SRPP SS SSO PA INR USUN DS CIA FBIS NSC USIA UNW
EUR SSR DRL PRM

Approved: JMRoberts

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, September 10, 1998 9:37 AM
To: Bandler, Donald K.; Clarke, Richard A.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Schwartz, Eric P.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Wippman, David
Subject: MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY ON KOSOVO

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 101211Z SEP 98
MSGTO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9809
ORIG: AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 3131
TOR: 980910090522 M3458892

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 4/26/2024
2008-0994-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003131

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM A/S SHATTUCK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/8/08

TAGS:PHUM, PGOV, PREL, SR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY ON KOSOVO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT. CLASSIFIED BY DRL A/S SHATTUCK. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

1. SUMMARY: I WANT TO REPORT TO YOU MY CONCLUSIONS AFTER A FOUR-DAY FACT-FINDING MISSION TO KOSOVO AND BELGRADE, WHERE I WAS JOINED BY BOB DOLE, AND MONTENEGRO, WHICH I VISITED AFTER DOLE'S DEPARTURE. MY KEY CONCLUSION IS THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL AND CHILLING EVIDENCE THAT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES ARE BEING COMMITTED ON AN ONGOING BASIS, MOSTLY BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES, WHICH ARE INFLECTING MASSIVE AND LETHAL PUNITIVE DAMAGE ON CIVILIAN POPULATION GROUPS THROUGHOUT KOSOVO. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING OUR TWO DAYS IN KOSOVO, WE COVERED 150 KILOMETERS OF ROADS DESERTED BY ALL BUT POLICE TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES BESIDE HEAVILY SHELLLED AND SOMETIMES BURNING HOUSES (KDOM ESTIMATES 18,000 HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR DAMAGED AS OF TODAY), AND FLEEING CIVILIANS WHO USED ALL THEIR ENCOUNTERS WITH US TO EXPRESS THEIR FEAR OF FURTHER SHELLING AND ABUSE BY SECURITY FORCES. IN ONE DISTURBING AND INCREASINGLY COMMON INCIDENT JUST BEFORE OUR ARRIVAL, A LARGE GROUP OF CIVILIANS WERE REPORTED BY KDOM ON AUGUST 29 TO HAVE BEEN SHELLED BY SECURITY FORCES IN A RAVINE ABOVE THE VILLAGE OF SENEK AS THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOMES AFTER A MORTAR ATTACK; SCORES WERE WOUNDED AND SEVEN WERE KILLED, INCLUDING TWO SMALL CHILDREN AND AN ELDERLY WOMAN. WE VISITED THE SITE OF AN ALLEGED MASS GRAVE SITE IN A GARBAGE DUMP NEAR OROHAVAC. EQUALLY DISTURBING IS THE TREMENDOUS DESTRUCTION. WHOLE VILLAGES HAVE BEEN RAZED, AND IN THE PAST FEW DAYS SERB SECURITY FORCES HAVE TURNED TO DRIVING DISPLACED PERSONS TO SITES THROUGH MORTAR ATTACKS. AS WE LEFT KDOM WAS REPORTING THAT MORE THAN 60,000 IDPS WERE SURROUNDED BY SECURITY FORCES IN PEC, WHERE THEY HAD BEEN HERDED IN AN AGGRESSIVE

ROUNDUP. THESE REPORTS REQUIRE OUR URGENT ACTION.

3. DURING OUR TRIP WE RECEIVED SEVERAL FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS FROM CIVILIANS OF POLICE ROUND-UPS ON SEPTEMBER 4 AND 5 OF HUNDREDS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS NEAR THE VILLAGE OF PONORAC, AND THE SEPARATION OF MEN AND BOYS FROM WOMEN AND CHILDREN. 400-600 MEN WERE HELD FOR TWO DAYS IN A SCHOOLHOUSE AND ON SOCCER FIELD, WHERE THEY WERE ALLEGEDLY BEATEN AND ABUSED. 536 WERE RELEASED YESTERDAY FOLLOWING OUR STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND IMMEDIATE PROTEST TO BELGRADE.

4. AN INTRANSIGENT AND SELF-CONFIDENT MILOSEVIC REJECTED THE REPORTS OF ATROCITIES THAT WE PRESENTED TO HIM, REJECTED OUR APPEALS FOR ACCESS BY WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATORS, AND DENIED THAT HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS WERE OCCURRING IN KOSOVO. MILOSEVIC IS RIDING HIGH. HE MUST BE JOLTED ON KOSOVO AND BROUGHT TO ACCOUNT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR THE SITUATION WILL WORSEN IN KOSOVO AND POSSIBLY SPILL OVER TO DESTABILIZE THE PEACE PROCESS IN BOSNIA. CURRENTLY, HE HAS EVERYTHING HE WANTS, AND WESTERN ACTION OR INACTION, EITHER THROUGH ESTABLISHING DE FACTO SAFE HAVENS BY PARCELING OUT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, OR BY FAILING TO DELIVER A CREDIBLE NATO THREAT, MEANS THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO PURSUE HIS GOALS AND CONTINUE TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE SERBS.

5. IN MONTENEGRO I MET WITH PRESIDENT DJUKANOVIC, WHO OFFERED A STARK CONTRAST TO THE LEADERSHIP IN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA. HE HELD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT MILOSEVIC'S HUZSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY, PREDICTING AN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN SERBIA AND POSSIBLE CIVIL UNREST IN THE NEXT SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS.

6. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS IMMEDIATELY:

-- KEEP THE SPOTLIGHT ON VIOLATIONS IN KOSOVO OF HUMANITARIAN LAW AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. WE SHOULD PUBLICLY AND REPEATEDLY STATE THAT WE ARE HOLDING MILOSEVIC PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR RESOLVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CRISIS HE CREATED.

-- REESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NATO THREAT, AND BE PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT IT, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY AND POLICE TARGETS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003131

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM A/S SHATTUCK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/8/08

TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, SR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY ON KOSOVO

-- REINFORCE THE BAN ON NEW INVESTMENTS IN SERBIA, AND WORK WITH THE RUSSIANS TO GET THEM TO UNDERSTAND THE GRAVITY OF THE CRIMES BEING COMMITTED IN KOSOVO. LAST YEAR, THE SALE OF THE YUGOSLAV TELECOM MONOPOLY FOR USD 2 BILLION TO ITALIAN AND GREEK INVESTORS PROVIDED CRUCIAL WORKING CAPITAL TO KEEP THE MILOSEVIC MACHINE

RUNNING. THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ARE REPORTEDLY EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL PURCHASE OF MAJOR PARTS OF THE SERBIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY.

-- KEEP THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL ON THE FRONT BURNER. WE SHOULD GET CONTACT GROUP AND EU COUNTRIES TO JOIN US IN PUBLICLY STATING THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION IN KOSOVO AND PRESS FOR ACTION IN THE HAGUE. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS MILOSEVIC TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL FORENSIC EXPERTS TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED MASS GRAVE SITES, BOTH ETHNIC SERB AND ALBANIAN. WE SHOULD SUPPORT THE ICTY'S EFFORT TO BRING THE FRY'S NONCOOPERATION BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

-- GIVE THE US KOSOVO DIPLOMATIC OBSERVER MISSION THE TOOLS IT NEEDS BY PROVIDING WAR CRIMES, FORENSIC, AND HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTISE, AS WELL AS NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES.

-- SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN MONTENEGRO AND DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL POWER CENTERS IN BELGRADE. AS A DEMONSTRATION OF OUR BELIEF THAT MILOSEVIC'S POLITICAL POWER IN THE FRY IS DANGEROUS AND UNDEMOCRATIC, WE SHOULD PROVIDE INCREASED USAID DEMOCRACY FUNDING, POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND A FULL-TIME POLITICAL OFFICER TO ESTABLISH A PODGORICA LIAISON OFFICE AS WE HAVE IN BANJA LUKA AND MOSTAR. MONTENEGRO ALSO NEEDS HELP WITH THE TREMENDOUS INFLUX OF REFUGEES FROM KOSOVO. WE SHOULD CLOSELY ANALYZE DJUKANOVIC'S PROPOSAL TO START USING SERB PRESIDENT MILUTINOVIC, OR OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS, AS A FOIL TO MILOSEVIC'S AMBITIONS, AND PROVIDE SUPPORT TO A DEMORALIZED SERB CIVIL SOCIETY.

-- WORK TO END THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KOSOVO NOW BY DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE AND PULLBACK OF SECURITY FORCES. AS BOB DOLE NOTED, THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IS ONLY A SYMPTOM OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CRISIS THAT ENGULFS KOSOVO. FALL HAS ALREADY COME TO SOME PARTS OF KOSOVO, AND MANY IDPS WILL STARVE OR FREEZE TO DEATH WHEN WINTER ARRIVES. BUT FOOD AND SHELTER ALONE ARE NOT ADEQUATE. PEOPLE WILL NOT RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN THE CURRENT CLIMATE OF FEAR. A CEASE-FIRE AND REDUCTION OF SECURITY FORCE LEVELS IS KEY TO RETURNS. FREEDOM OF ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN NGOS IS ESSENTIAL. WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT KOSOVO ALBANIANS MAKE UP A LARGE PART OF ANY KOSOVO POLICE FORCE ESTABLISHED BY THE AGREEMENT BEING BROKERED BY CHRIS HILL.

7. SENATOR BOB DOLE WAS TRULY OUTRAGED BY WHAT HE SAW. HE ALSO SENT THE UNMISTAKABLE MESSAGE THAT THE SCANDAL OVER MILOSEVIC'S ACTIONS IN KOSOVO RUNS ACROSS AMERICA AND CROSSES PARTY LINES. HE IS ENGAGED NOW ON THIS ISSUE, AND WE SHOULD BRING HIM INTO THE PROCESS HOWEVER WE CAN.

8. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ALONE DICTATES THAT WE TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. BUT SO DOES OUR ROLE IN THE REGION AND OUR LEADHIP IN EUROPE. I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU WHEN I RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

SCHNEIDER

FAX

September 27, 1998

TO: STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER (647-1811)
FROM: USNATO - Ambassador Vershbow *W*
SUBJECT: Memo for Kosovo IWG

I understand that Marc Grossman will be chairing an IWG meeting today (Sunday) around 1700. Could you pass the attached to him, to others in EUR (DAS Asmus, DAS Malloy, EUR/SCE Director Rossin), and to other Department bureaus/offices as appropriate.

Please also relay via Washfax to NSC for Schulte, OSD for Slocumbe, Longstreth et al., and JCS for Weisman and Casey.

Thanks very much

(R) SD
9/27/98 0827
For A/S Grossman

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

September 27, 1998

TO: MEMBERS OF THE KOSOVO IWC

FROM: USNATO - SANDY VERSHBOW *W*

SUBJECT: Bringing the Strands of our Kosovo Policy Together - The NATO Track

In reflecting on Marc Grossman's read-out of yesterday's DC discussion, I am left with the following concerns, which I hope can be addressed at today's IWC meeting.

1. Over-reliance on the UN's judgment?

There are serious pitfalls if we base NATO's decision to act too heavily on the terms of UNSCR 1199 and the UN Secretary General's October 7 report on compliance with the resolution:

- If the Secretary General gives a rosier assessment of Milosevic's performance than we believe justified, we will be accused of surrendering U.S. and NATO decision-making authority to the UN, as was the case in dealing with Iraq last February. Annan's report may well reflect a bias against NATO action stemming from Mrs. Ogata's (understandable) concerns about the safety of UNHCR and NGO personnel on the ground, and the UN Secretariat's strict-constructionist views on the legal mandate question.
- Even if Annan produces an objective assessment, acting on that basis would still give added credence to the French position that NATO cannot act outside Article V without UN authority. This would have adverse consequences for the strategic concept and for U.S. domestic support for the Alliance.
- In either case, we run the risk of not having non-Contact Group allies on board when the moment of decision for NATO arrives, since they will not have been participants in shaping the political strategy or the contents of the ultimatum (see below).

2. Need to bring non-Contact Group allies on board an ultimatum before October 7

While this week may be too soon for a NATO ultimatum (given the need for Congressional consultations and other domestic spadework), it is unwise to wait until after the UNSYG's report and the October 8 Contact Group meeting to secure a NATO decision threatening air strikes by some early deadline.

- Non-Contact Group allies have made very clear that they expect to have a voice in shaping the strategy for the use of force in Kosovo, including the terms of any NATO ultimatum and the legal mandate, *before* they will go beyond the ACTWARN even to an ACTREQ, much less to an explicit threat to use force against the FRY.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

- We therefore need to use the coming week to give all 16 allies a sense of co-ownership of our political/military strategy, including answers to such questions as:
 - Which of the multiple demands in UNSCR 1199 will be cited by NATO as the litmus tests which Milosevic must pass to avoid the start of air strikes? Should NATO add its own demands, or reformulate those in the UNSCR, to preserve the autonomy of Alliance decision-making vis-à-vis the UN? (Per above, we should avoid simply linking NATO's threat to the UNSCR.)
 - Will NATO make any demands linked to the parties' acceptance of Chris Hill's draft agreement, or will that be left to the Contact Group? (As I have argued previously, we should get maximum mileage out of any NATO decision - once we have gone to all the trouble to get it - by demanding both sides' acceptance of a half dozen "basic elements" of an interim agreement.)
 - What is the mechanism for judging compliance with NATO's decision and the terms for termination of the air campaign? (Allies will insist that it is the NAC, not the Contact Group or UNSC, that decides.)
- We also need to get as many Allies as possible on board the position that, *in extremis*, UNSCR 1199 provides sufficient legitimacy for NATO action.
 - Some Allies, led by Greece, may continue to reserve their position on participation in the air operations in the absence of a second UNSCR, but I sense that many of the middle-sized Allies are coming our way.
 - On the other hand, if we find by the end of this week that a significant number of Allies are leaning the same way as Greece - or at least insist on *trying for* a second UNSCR to see if the Russians veto - then we should set the wheels in motion in New York *before* October 7.

3. Suggested NATO Timeline

In light of the above, I would recommend that we proceed roughly along the following lines at NATO, while work proceeds on the internal, Congressional, UN, Contact Group, key Allies and other tracks. By announcing the NATO ultimatum *before* the UNSYG's report while setting the deadline a few days *after* it, we can delink NATO's decision-making from the UN make sure the full Alliance is on board our proposed course of action.

Monday 9/28: Preliminary discussions in Brussels with key Allies and Italy (UK Political Director at NATO), SV having lunch with Italian Ambassador).

PJC Troika meeting to inform Russians on ACTWARN, Vilamoura discussions, seek agreement to extraordinary PJC later in week.

Tuesday 9/29: Lay out U.S. thinking on political/military strategy, contents/timing of NATO ultimatum, at Permreps' lunch.

Wednesday 9/30: Formally propose that the NAC prepare a decision to be taken no later than Monday 10/5 on issuance of ultimatum, ACTREQ and commencement of "Phase Zero" measures (prepositioning of assets, reconnaissance flights, etc.).

Hold extraordinary PJC with Russians in afternoon to give them sense of direction of NATO preparations, relationship of NATO decision-making to UN and Contact Group tracks.

Thursday 10/1- Follow-up work as necessary in subordinate committees (PCG, SPC/R)
Friday 10/2 on political/military strategy, legal mandate.

Monday 10/5 NAC decision announcing ultimatum with deadline of 3-5 days after expected date of UN Secretary General's report on compliance with UNSCR 1199, ACTREQ, and commencement of Phase Zero.

ca. 10/10-10/12 NAC to meet morning after the deadline to judge compliance and decide whether to issue ACTORD to commence limited air operations. Decision based on NATO's own assessment of compliance with NATO's terms, taking into account provisions of UNSCR 1199, UNSYG's report, results of Contact Group meeting (if any), KDOM reporting, etc.

Note: Days prior to final NAC decision could be used to seek second UNSCR, if deemed necessary.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Senior Executives Memorandum [with cover sheet] (3 pages)	09/25/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Situation/Assessments [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6335

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- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 1998 11:49 AM
To: Bandler, Donald K.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Hurley, C. Michael; Pascual, Carlos E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: KOSOVO: WHERE WE STAND

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 241146Z SEP 98
MSGTO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6623
ORIG: AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2543
TOR: 980924103144 M3479892

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2009-0583-M (3.20)
4/24/2024 VR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 002543

NODIS

PLEASE PASS TO BELGRADE FOR COM MILES
TIRANA FOR AMB LINO
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
US MISSION USUN FOR AMB SODERBERG
PASS ALSO TO JCS (CASEY) AND OSD (MCCONNELL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/08

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHERE WE STAND

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D) .

1. (C) THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS NATO ACTUALLY HAVE DRAMATICALLY QUICKENED THE PACE OF WHAT COULD WELL BE THE BEGINNING OF THE ENDGAME IN KOSOVO. AS WE ENTER THIS CRUCIAL PHASE, I WANTED TO PROVIDE SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, INCLUDING VIOLENCE AND DISPLACED PEOPLE, THE STATE OF THE KLA, AND THE NEGOTIATING TRACK -- ESPECIALLY WHERE WE CAN ANTICIPATE ENCOUNTERING SOME DIFFICULT DECISION POINTS IN THE COMING WEEKS.

2. (C) IN MY LAST MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC ON MONDAY (SEPTEMBER 21) HE HAD CLEARLY BEGUN TO UNDERSTAND THE MESSAGE COMING FROM NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE THAT OUR COLLECTIVE ANGER WITH HIS BEHAVIOR HAD REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE USE OF FORCE WAS BECOMING A PUNITIVE MATTER AGAINST HIM, NOT TO BE ASSUAGED BY HALF MEASURES ON THE GROUND. BECAUSE OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE THREAT AGAINST HIM, I EXPECT IN THE COMING DAYS TO SEE THE LAST OFFENSIVE IN THE DRENICA AREA TO BE COMPLETED AND -xAS MILOSEVIC (SIGNIFICANTLY) INDICATED IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT AFTER MY MEETING WITH HIM - "VICTORY" DECLARED OVER THE KLA.

3. (C) WE HAVE LONG WANTED MILOSEVIC TO DECLARE AN END TO HIS OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE KLA, BUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NOW AND THE SPRING IS THAT THIS TIME HE WILL BE ABLE TO DECLARE THE END THROUGH A VICTORY ACHIEVED BY BRUTE FORCE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE KLA IS FOREVER DEFEATED. MILITARILY IT

COULD WELL BE BACK IN SOME FORM IN THE SPRING. BUT PSYCHOLOGICALLY, THE KLA, AND ESPECIALLY ITS SWISS-BASED CORE ORGANIZATION, HAS BEEN DEALT A HUGE BLOW. IT HAS BEEN HUMILIATED IN THE EYES OF THE ALBANIAN PUBLIC AS BEING RECKLESS AND LACKING ANY CONCEPT OF WHAT IT WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE APART FROM "LIBERATING KOSOVO." TO BE SURE, THE PRISTINA PRESS WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE KLA. KOHA DITORE, FOR EXAMPLE, REGULARLY ISSUES STATEMENTS AND APPEALS ON THE PART OF THE KLA CALLING FOR RECRUITS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BLASTING RUGOVA AND ANY EFFORTS (INCLUDING OUR OWN) TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. MANY ALBANIANS, HOWEVER, INCLUDING ONES I RECENTLY ENCOUNTERED LIVING UNDER PLASTIC TENTS IN A MUDDY CLEARING EAST OF MALISEVO (I DIDN'T SEE ANYONE THERE FROM KOHA DITORE) HAVE NO PATIENCE FOR THESE COFFEE HOUSE HEROES AND JUST WANT TO GET BACK TO WHAT IS LEFT OF THEIR HOMES IN SAFETY.

4. (C) AS FOR THE KLA ITSELF, IN MANY CASES (MALISEVO, DECANI, ISTINIC) IT DEPARTED THE BATTLEFIELD EVEN AHEAD OF THE POPULATION IT WAS SUPPOSED TO DEFEND. IN JUNIK, THE KLA DROPPED WEAPONS ON THE GROUND, INCLUDING 82 MM MORTARS, AND LEFT BEHIND 75 MM RECOILESS RIFLES WHICH HAD BEEN DRAGGED OVER CRAGGY PEAKS FROM ALBANIA AT GREAT COST AND DIRE RISK. THE RESULT OF THIS HUMILIATION IS A KLA THAT IS ITSELF FRACTURED (THERE HAS NEVER BEEN MUCH EVIDENCE THAT THE "DRENICA COMMAND" EVER HAD MUCH CONNECTION TO THE "DECANI COMMAND," ETC., ETC.) AND TEMPERIS ARE CONSEQUENTLY RISING. THE RECENT KIDNAPPING OF 13 LDK LEADERS IN DRENICA (WHO WERE THERE ASSESSING THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION), THE MURDER OF THE "SHADOW GOVERNMENT" DEFENSE MINISTER IN TIRANA (A MURDER WHICH, BY THE WAY, WILL PROBABLY BE AVENGED), AND THE BIZARRE "RESIGNATION" OF KLA "POLITICAL LEADER" ADEM DEMACI ALL POINT TO AN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS SOME SERIOUS RESTRUCTURING AHEAD.

5. (C) MEANWHILE, THE SERBS WILL ALSO SEEK TO ASSUAGE WORLD OPINION WITH A MASSIVE EFFORT TO FORCE PEOPLE BACK TO THEIR VILLAGES, WHETHER RETURNEES FEEL SECURE IN THOSE VILLAGES OR NOT. THIS PROCESS, ACCORDING TO MOST RECENT KDOM OBSERVATIONS, IS ALRDY WELL UNDERWAY IN THE DECANI, DJAKOVICA, AND JUNIK AREAS, AND I SUSPECT THAT WHEN THE ORDER IS GIVEN, THE NOW EMPTY CORRIDAR BETWEEN KOMORANE AND MALISEVO WILL SOON FILL UP WITH FRIGHTENED VILLAGERS STRETCHING THEIR UNHCR PLASTIC WRAP BETWEEN THE REMAINING STANDING WALLS OF THEIR BURNED-OUT HOUSES. IT WILL NOT BE A PRETTY SIGHT - THE SERBS HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY COULD CARE LESS ABOUT THESE ALLEGED VICTIMS OF KLA "TERRORISM" - BUT THE SERBS WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT PEOPLE ARE BACK IN THEIR "HOMES" AND "WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS?"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SKOPJE 002543

NODIS

PLEASE PASS TO BELGRADE FOR COM MILES
TIRANA FOR AMB LINO
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHERE WE STAND

6. (e) THOUGH THE SERBS' MOTIVATION WILL CONTINUE TO FALL BELOW THE LEVEL OF INSPIRATION, I ALSO EXPECT WE WILL SHORTLY BEGIN TO SEE SOME KIND OF "WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES." I TOOK SEVERAL RUNS AT MILOSEVIC OVER THIS ISSUE LAST MONDAY AND IT WAS CLEAR THEN THAT HE WAS NOT YET READY TO BEGIN THE PROCESS. BUT A COMBINATION OF THE TIME GAINED DURING THE INTERVENING DAYS AND THE DEVELOPMENTS FROM NEW YORK AND PORTUGAL SHOULD BE ENOUGH TO GET HIM MOVING. AND SO, ASSUMING THAT THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION -- HOWEVER UGLY -- WILL SHOW IMPROVEMENT AND THAT THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE WILL ALSO DIE DOWN SOON, WE WILL NEED TO CONSIDER SOME TOUGH QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATION TRACK.

7. (e) WE ARE CURRENTLY WAITING FOR SERB COMMENTS ON OUR DRAFT. WHEN WE GET THESE - AND WE EXPECT THEM TO BE NEGATIVE AS THOSE OF THE ALBANIANS - WE WILL INCORPORATE BOTH SETS INTO THE DOCUMENT AND SEE HOW FAR APART THE TWO PARTIES ARE. DEPENDING ON THE SERB COMMENTS, WE MAY WANT TO TAKE THE DOCUMENT TO THE CONTACT GROUP IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO, OR WE MAY TAKE ANOTHER STAB AT REDUCING THE DIFFERENCES. OUR GOAL IS TO HAVE THE CONTACT GROUP ENDORSE THE PLAN AS ITS OWN AND PRESENT IT TO BOTH SIDES AS A FINAL COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD THEREFORE PROVIDE COVER TO BOTH SETS OF NEGOTIATORS.

8. (e) ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH DIVIDE THE PARTS, THE MOST IMPORTANT WILL BE THE QUESTION OF KOSOVO'S RELATIONSHIP TO SERBIA. KNOWING THAT THE SERBS WILL NOT ACCEPT LOSING KOSOVO, AND KNOWING THAT THE ALBANIANS CANNOT ACCEPT TO BE FOREVER IN SERBIA, WE CAME UP WITH THE IDEA OF A SO-CALLED "INTERIM ACCORD" WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO ALLOW THE ALBANIAN NEGOTIATORS TO NEGOTIATE THE RECLAIMING OF KOSOVO'S SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS, WHILE NOT SUBJECTING THEM TO ACCUSATIONS THAT THEY SIGNED AWAY THE AGE-OLD DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENCE. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT WHILE SERBIA IS OBVIOUSLY NOT A DEMOCRACY (RAISING THE MORAL QUESTION OF FORCING THE ALBANIANS TO LIVE UNDER THE SERBIAN REGIME, A QUESTION THE NGO COMMUNITY AND ALBANIAN AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS), THE KOSOVAR THEMSELVES COULD DO WITH A LITTLE REMEDIAL EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. "MOREOVER, IN OUR VIEW, THERE ARE FEW SIGNS INDEED THAT KOSOVARS HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS OR TO BECOME A SECOND ALBANIAN STATE IN THE BALKANS, WITH ALL THE FRIGHTENING PROSPECTS THIS CONJURES UP FOR THE BROADER NEIGHBORHOOD GIVEN THE CONTINUED MELTDOWN OF STATE AUTHORITY IN ALBANIA.

9. (e) ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF KOSOVO'S STATUS HAS BEEN THE SUGGESTION THAT KOSOVO LEAVE SERBIA BUT STAY A PART OF YUGOSLAVIA. THIS SEEMS PERSUASIVE IN THEORY, BUT EVERYONE - SERBS AND ALBANIANS ALIKE - AGREES THAT THE FRY IS A CARTOON STATE WITH A VERY UNCERTAIN FUTURE. THEREFORE, THE ALBANIANS' WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A FEDERAL STATUS OUTSIDE SERBIA, OR A "THIRD REPUBLIC" STATUS FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD CANNOT BE CONSIDERED MUCH OF AN EFFORT TO MEET THE SERBS HALF WAY. IN ESSENCE, THE ALBANIANS SEE FEDERAL STATUS WITH NO RESIDUAL CONNECTIONS TO SERBIA AS AKIN TO INDEPENDENCE AND DEMAND THAT -- EVEN DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD -- THEY

BE FREE FROM ANY CONNECTION WITH SERBIA. THE SERBS REJECT THIS TOTALLY. THEY UNDERSTAND VERY WELL THAT FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS PROVIDE NO REAL LEVERS OF POWER -- WITNESS THEIR TROUBLES WITH THE MONTENEGRINS -- AND THE REMAINING SERBS IN KOSOVO WOULD GET THE MESSAGE AND PROMPTLY LEAVE. THE SERBS WILL NOT --AT LEAST FOR NOW -- SIGN ON TO A STATUS FOR KOSOVO OUTSIDE SERBIA PEACEFULLY.

10. (C) SO THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION REMAINS KOSOVO'S RELATIONSHIP TO SERBIA. OUR NEGOTIATION HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO PUT THE STATUS QUESTION OFF FOR AT LEAST THREE YEARS, IN EFFECT NOT TAKING KOSOVO OUT OF SERBIA BUT TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TAKING SERBIA OUT OF KOSOVO. BOTH THE ALBANIANS AND THE SERBS -- BUT PARTICULARLY THE ALBANIANS - INSIST THAT WE ADDRESS THE STATUS ISSUE NOW, PROVIDED, OF COURSE, WE CONFIRM THEIR PARTISAN VIEW. IN MY JUDGMENT, THIS MEANS THAT THE CONTACT GROUP, IN ENDORSING OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT, WILL HAVE TO STAND FIRM IN DENYING BOTH SIDES THEIR MOST CHERISHED ASPIRATIONS OF CONFIRMING ONCE AND FOR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SKOPJE 002543

NODIS

PLEASE PASS TO BELGRADE FOR COM MILES
TIRANA FOR AMB LINO
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
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PASS ALSO TO JCS (CASEY) AND OSD (MCCONNELL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: WHERE WE STAND

ALL THAT KOSOVO IS (FOR THE SERBS), OR IS NOT (FOR THE ALBANIANS) A PART OF SERBIA.

11. (C) IF WE CAN HOLD FIRM ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE OF PUTTING ASIDE THE STATUS QUESTION (IN EFFECT, MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO WITH REGARD TO KOSOVO'S POSITION IN SERBIA) AND WORKING ON A THREE YEAR PROGRAM OF DEVELOPING BROAD SELF-GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, I BELIEVE THE SERBS AND THE ALBANIANS WILL ACCEPT OUR PLAN, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY. (IN POINT OF FACT, BY "IMPOSING" THE PLAN WE WOULD BE PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED POLITICAL COVER TO BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO SELL THE AGREEMENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE PUBLICS.) IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONTACT GROUP SIDES WITH THE ALBANIANS AND ATTEMPTS TO TAKE KOSOVO OUT OF SERBIA UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, THE SERBS WILL REJECT THE PLAN AND DARE US TO ENTER A SCENARIO OF USING FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR COMPLIANCE.

12. (C) WE ALSO NEED TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE OF THE "INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES" THAT THE ALBANIANS REQUIRE AND THE SERBS REJECT. NATO IS IDEALLY SUITED FOR SOME OF THE TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH POST-SETTLEMENT, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO BE TOUGH WITH THE SERBS (AND PROBABLY THE RUSSIANS) TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT SOME KIND OF NATO ROLE. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES, SUCH AS WITH THE OSCE, WILL PROBABLY BE AN EASIER SELL.

13. (C) AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST, WE WILL PROBABLY WANT TO WORK WITH THE EU TO PROVIDE SOME ECONOMIC SWEETENERS. ECONOMICALLY, KOSOVO IS NOT A LOT WORSE OFF THAN OTHER PARTS OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT ONE CAN

IMAGINE WITH ITS THIRD WORLD POPULATION GROWTHRATE AND ITS CRUMBLING INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, IT WILL NEED CONSIDERABLE HELP EVEN APART FROM WAR DAMAGE.

14. (C) FINALLY, AS WE ALL ARE AWARE, ALBANIA'S CHAOS IS LIKELY TO POSE THEREATEST CHALLENGE TO STABILITY IN KOSOVO AND THAT SITUATION WILL HAVE TO BE MANAGED IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF SUCCESS IN KOSOVO.

HILL

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, September 21, 1998 2:14 PM
To: Dowling, John N. (Nick); Hurley, C. Michael; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: MILOSEVIC BEGINNING TO GET THE MESSAGE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 211723Z SEP 98
MSGTO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9272
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 6331
TOR: 980921134812 M3474469

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 4/26/2024

2008-0994-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 006331

NODIS

OPS PLEASE PASS TO AMB LINO IN TIRANA
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
USUN FOR AMB SODERBERG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/08

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SR

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC BEGINNING TO GET THE MESSAGE

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER R. HILL.
REASON: 1.5(B) (D) .

1. (C) I HAD A DIFFICULT AND STORMY SESSION WITH MILOSEVIC THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS THE HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY SITUATION IN KOSOVO AND TO HAND OVER A COPY OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ALREADY SHOWN TO THE ALBANIANS. FRY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SAINOVIC AND MILOSEVIC'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER BUGARCIC WERE ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING. SERB PRESIDENT MILUTINOVIC JOINED US LATER.

2. (C) I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT BASED ON MY RECENT TRIPS TO WASHINGTON AND TO BRUSSELS, I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT INTERNATIONAL PATIENCE WAS AT AN ALL-TIME LOW, AND THAT INCREASINGLY THE MO7 WAS TURNING TO ANGER. I TOLD HIM THAT THE USE OF FORCE WAS BECOMING A REAL OPTION AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT AT ALL FEEL COMFORTED BY THE CAREFUL WORDING OF DRAFT UN RESOLUTIONS OR NATO COMMUNIQUE. I TOLD HIM THAT IF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINED AS IT IS, I COULD NOT PREDICT THE REACTION -- EXCEPT TO SAY THAT IN MY OPINION THERE WOULD BE A SEVERE ONE SOONER OR LATER.

3. (C) MILOSEVIC LISTENED INTENTLY, HIS FACE SLIGHTLY FLUSHED IN ANGER AS I DESCRIBED THE DESTRUCTION ON THE GROUND IN KOSOVO AND OUR CONCERN FOR THE "TENS OF THOUSANDS" OF PEOPLE LIVING OUT IN THE OPEN DUE TO HIS OFFENSIVE AGAINST REMNANTS OF THE KLA. WHEN I WAS FINISHED, MILOSEVIC LOOKED DOWN MOMENTARILY TO CALM HIMSELF, AND BEGAN HIS REBUTTAL. "YOU HAVE RAISED THREE ISSUES," HE SAID: "THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SECURITY SITUATION, AND WHAT YOU CALL THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE."

4. (C) ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT HE

WOULD LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND WOULD, PER MY REQUEST, HAVE WRITTEN COMMENTS PREPARED BY THE END OF THE WEEK. HE STRESSED THAT HE IS PREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT CANNOT AGREE TO ANYTHING THAT TAKES KOSOVO OUT OF SERBIA. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS IS WHAT THE NOTION OF AN "INTERIM ACCORD" IS SUPPOSED TO DEAL WITH. THE ALBANIANS WILL NOT BE ACCUSED OF GIVING AWAY KOSOVO BECAUSE ANYTHING THEY AGREE TO CAN BE REVIEWED IN THREE YEARS.

5. (C) ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT KOSOVO HAD HAD A LONG, HOT SUMMER, AND ADMITTED THAT FIGHTING HAD BEEN INTENSE AT TIMES AND THAT NERVES WERE VERY RAW. HE OVERRULED DPM SAINOVIC (WHO WAS DOWNPLAYING THE ISSUE) TO ADMIT THAT THERE HAD BEEN POLICE ABUSE, ESPECIALLY HOUSE BURNINGS AND LOOTING, AND SAID THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED HAD BEEN PROSECUTED. HE STRESSED THAT THE POLICE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN HUNTING DOWN REMAINING BANDS OF KLA BUT ARE NOT ATTACKING VILLAGES, AS SO OFTEN CLAIMED BY THE ALBANIANS. HE DESCRIBED THE "HARDLINE" KLA AS NUMBERING NO MORE THAN 1,000-2,000 AT ITS PEAK, AND CLAIMED THAT THE KLA'S RANKS HAD BEEN SWELLED BY INTIMIDATED VILLAGERS WHO HAVE SINCE SHED THEIR UNIFORMS AND GONE BACK TO THEIR FARMS. MILOSEVIC NOTED THAT OVER 15,000 AK-47'S HAVE BEEN CONFISCATED, ALONG WITH HUNDREDS OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AS WELL AS RECOILLESS RIFLES AND 82MM AND 60MM MORTARS. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE HAVING SUCCESS IN CREATING LOCAL POLICE, ESPECIALLY IN THE DJAKOVICA AREA, AND WOULD SOON BE TRIED OUT IN THE PRIZREN AREA.

6. (C) ON THE "HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE," MILOSEVIC THEORIZED THAT IT WAS THE INVENTION OF UNSPECIFIED "NEFARIOUS ELEMENTS" INTERESTED IN VISITING WAR ON SERBIA. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY PEOPLE HAD BEEN DISPLACED, BUT SAID THAT THE SITUATION HAS IMPROVED RAPIDLY IN RECENT WEEKS. MILOSEVIC STATED BAPLY (AS HAD HIS FOREIGN MINISTER SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE) THAT THERE ARE NO/NO IDP'S SLEEPING OUTDOORS AND THAT ALL ARE UNDER ONE ROOF OR ANOTHER, THOUGH SOME ARE IN UNCOMFORTABLE SURROUNDINGS IN OVER-CROWDED VILLAGES. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAD NOT EMPLOYED COERCION TO FORCE PEOPLE BACK TO TOWNS AND SAID THEY HAD WANTED TO GO ALL ALONG, BUT WERE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY KLA DIEHARDS. HE DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN ISTINIC, BETWEEN PEC AND DECANI, AS A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT ONE INVOLVING UPWARDS OF 15,000 IDPS PREVENTED FROM LEAVING BY THE KLA. WHEN THE KLA DEPARTED, THE PE WERE HAPPY TO LEAVE, SAID MILOSEVIC, AND THEY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 006331

NODIS

OPS PLEASE PASS TO AMB LINO IN TIRANA
USNATO FOR AMB VERSHBOW
USUN FOU AMB SODERBERG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/08

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SR

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC BEGINNING TO GET THE MESSAGE

WELCOMED THREE STAR POLICE GENERAL DJORDJEVIC ("OUR MOST SENIOR POLICEMAN") IN THEIR MIDST. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT TODAY REGULAR BUS LINES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED ALONG THE ROAD BETWEEN PEC AND DJAKOVICA.

7. (S) IN JUNIK, MILOSEVIC INSISTED, THERE IS A SIMILARLY ROSY SITUATION WHICH HE SAID I SHOULD SEE PERSONALLY. "YOU WERE THERE WHEN IT WAS UNDER KLA, THEN WHEN IT WAS EMPTY, AND NOW YOU CAN SEE IT AS A CALM, NORMAL VILLAGE," HE SAID CHEERFULLY. HE CLAIMED THAT THE HUMANITARIAN CENTERS ARE BEWHNNING TO FUNCTION, AND NOTED THAT THE ELEVEN CENTERS HAVE GROWN TO FOURTEEN. "IF THE HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS WNT TO DO SOMETHING USEFUL THEY SHOULD BRING MORE HUMANITARIAN AID," HE ADDED.

8. (S) MILOSEVIC DOWNPLAYED THE NUMBER OF HOUSES DESTROYED IN THE FIGHTING, POINTING OUT THAT BRICK BUILDINGS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE CAN BE QUICKLY REPAIRED AS SOON AS PEOPLE RETURN AND THAT THESE REPAIRS WERE ALREADY UNDERWAY. HE SAID THAT THE DESTRUCTION HAD SOMETIMES BEEN GREATER THAN NECESSARY BECAUSE THE CIVILIANS HAD LEFT AND IN ATTACKING THE KLA THE POLICE DID NOT FEEL THE NEED TO BE TOO CAREFUL IN AIMING THEIR WEAPONS. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF AN 11-MEMBER ALBANIAN FAMILY IN SENIK REVEALED THAT THE INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A MORTAR WHICH HAD OVERSHOT ITS TARGET IN KLECKA. IT WAS, HE ADDED, "AN UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT."

9. (S) I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE KLA VIRTUALLY DOES NOT EXIST ANY LONGER, NO ONE UNDERSTANDS WHY THERE CONTINUES TO BE SUCH A HEAVY POLICE PRESENCE THROUGHOUT KOSOVO. MILOSEVIC CLAIMED THAT IN FACT UNITS WOULD SOON START TO BE PULLED OUT, BUT NOT YET. HE SAID THERE ARE EXAM"LES OF REDUCED SECURITY FORCE PRESENCE, INCLUDING A DRAMATIC REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF FIXED CHECYOINTS AND REDUCED PATROLLING. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT ACTUAL WITHDRAWALS COULD NOT YET BEGIN BECAUSE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINS FLUID. I EMPHASIZED THAT A REDUCTION OF SEURITY PRESENCE IS SOMETHING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ABSOLUTELY DEMANDS AND THAT FAILURE TO REDUCE TROOP NUMBERS COULD HAVE SEVERE (UNSPECIFIED) CONSEQUENCES.

10. (S) MILOSEVIC SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY POINT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAS AN OBLIGATION UNDER THE YELTSIN/MILOSEVIC COMMUNIQUE TO WITHDRAW FORCES AS THE SECURITY SITUATION IMPROVES. HE PLEDGED THAT HE WOULD COMPLY WITH THIS PROVISION, BUT FOR NOW, HE SAID, "YOU SHOULD LOOK FOR A REDUCTION IN CHECKPOINTS AND PATROLLING." I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WOULD NOT DO THE TRICK, AND THAT WE NEEDED TO SEE REAL REDUCTIONS OF SECURITY FORCES AND AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE IMMEDIATELY.

11. (S) COMMENT: MUCH OF WHAT MILOSEVIC IS SAYING IS OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO HEAD OFF DRASTIC ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. (DURING THE MEETING, SERB PRESIDENT MILUTINOVIC BRANDISHED A COPY OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH THE WORLD'S INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE SERB POSITION.) IT IS ALSO CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE SERBS ARE GETTING THE MESSAGE AND ARE TRYING TO RESPOND. I PLAN TO GO TO KOSOVO TOMORROW AND TRY TO VERIFY SOME OF WHAT I HEARD FROM MILOSEVIC TODAY. IN THE MEANTIME, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE LOOK FOR WAYS TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE.

12. (S) IN THIS REGARD, BASED ON MY MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC TODAY, IT APPEARS HE MAY BE READY TO MAKE SOME SUBSTANTIAL GESTURES IN THE REALM OF REDUCING

SECURITY SERVICE PRESENCE IN KOSOVO. HE SEEMS, THOUGH, TO REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL PUSH. IT COULD BE VERY USEFUL AT THIS JUNCTURE TO HAVE AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT, PERHAPS WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK. WHILE WE STILL DO NOT HAVE A FINALIZED DRAFT AGREEMENT IN HAND, WE NEED MILOSEVIC TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE ALBANIANS. A MEETING WITH HOLBROOKE, COULD BE A VERY POSITIVE STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.
END COMMENT

ZETKULIC

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. form	Fax Cover Sheet. [partial] (1 page)	09/18/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Situation/Assessments [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Friday, August 21, 1998 12:21 PM
To: Dowling, John N. (Nick); Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: KOSOVO POLICY: INDEPENDENCE, NOT YET AN

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SUBJECT: KOSOVO POLICY: INDEPENDENCE, NOT YET AN
OPTION, MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY NICHOLAS HILL, POLITICAL
OFFICER, REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (X) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS SUBMITTED BY POLOFF
NICHOLAS HILL AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT NORMAN.
POST'S FRONT OFFICE HAS CONCURRED IN FORWARDING THE
MESSAGE TO THE DEPARTMENT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
DISCUSSION/DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON KOSOVO. AT
THE OUTSET, THE AUTHORS WISH TO STATE THAT THEY
RECOGNIZE THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE KOSOVO HAS TO SERBS.
OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS TEY HAVE WORKED HARD TO FIND
A SOLUTION FOR KOSOVO WITHIN EXISTING U.S. POLICY.
THEY TAKE SPECIAL PRIDE IN THE FACT THAT THEIR
REPORTING WAS CRUCIAL IN PROMPTING THEN A/S KORNBLUM
TO STATE PUBLICLY IN APRIL 1997 IN KOSOVO THAT THE
U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE.
NEVERTHELESS, THEY BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC
MAY HAVE SQUANDERED ANY OPPORTUNITY TO PRESERVE
SERBIA'S TRADITIONAL BORDERS AND, UNDER CURRENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, A LONG AND BLOODY CONFLICT IS BECOMING
INEVITABLE. AS SUCH, THE U.S. SHOULD PREPARE FOR THE
EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT KOSOVO. AT A MINIMUM,
ADMITTING INDEPENDENCE AS AN OPTION--EVEN PRIVATELY--
MIGHT GIVE IMPETUS TO EFFORTS TO BROKER A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE FRY/SERBIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE
ALBANIAN KOSOVAR COMMUNITY.

3. (X) CHIEF OF MISSION COMMENT: THE COM IS SOMEWHAT
UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE ROLE OF DEFENDING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
BUT BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT, IN THIS CASE, THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM IS RIGHT. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BLUFF ON THIS
ISSUE. ONE IS EITHER FOR INDEPENDENCE NOW OR OPPOSED TO
IT. COM BELIEVES THAT, AT THIS TIME, AN INDEPENDENT
KOSOV COULD ONLY BE ESTABLISHED BY FORCE -- AND FORCE ON
A LEVEL WHICH WOULD MAKE THE PRESENT DEATH TOLL IN KOSOVO
PALE IN COMPARISON. HE ALSO BELIEVES THIS INCREASED
VIOLENCE WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO KOSOVO AND SERBIA BUT
WOULD SPILL OVER INTO MONTENEGRO AND ALBANIA, PROBABLY
BOSNIA, MACEDONIA AND PERHAPS BEYOND THE REGION. IN
SHORT, INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO NOW IS NOT SOMETHING THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD BE PLAYING WITH. NONETHELESS, THE

DISSENT MESSAGE WHICH FOLLOWS IS WELL WRITTEN AND WELL REASONED AND SHOULD STIMULATE WASHINGTON THINKING ON THE ISSUE. END CHIEF OF MISSION COMMENT.

SUMMARY

4. (X) MILOSEVIC'S POSITION IN KOSOVO HAS NOT LOOKED SO STRONG SINCE FIGHTING FIRST STARTED IN THE PROVINCE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR. BELGRADE'S RECENT VICTORIES ON THE BATTLEFIELD MEAN THAT ITS POSITION ON THE PROVINCE'S POLITICAL STATUS WILL LIKELY HARDEN. SHORT OF NATO AIR STRIKES, WHICH WOULD HARDEN ALBANIAN RESOLVE TO OBTAIN INDEPENDENCE, THERE IS LITTLE PRESURE UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WILL COMPEL MILOSEVIC TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KOSOVO. INDEED, AS A FALSE CALM SETTLES IN THE COUNTRY, MILOSEVIC CAN BE EXPECTED TO ARGUE THAT THE INVESTMENT FREEZE SHOULD BE LIFTED SO THAT THE ECONOMY CAN GROW AND MEET THE NEEDS OF CITIZENS, INCLUDING IDPS.

5. (X) WE RECOMMEND A TWO TRACK APPROACH ON KOSOVO: PUBLICLY, WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD REITERATE THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO A MULTI-ETHNIC AND DEMOCRATIC YUGOSLAVIA WITH KOSOVO INSIDE IT--BUT THAT MILOSEVIC'S POLICIES ARE DESTROYING THE CONDITIONS THAT MAKE THIS POSSIBLE. PRIVATELY, WE SHOULD TELL MILOSEVIC THAT HIS RECENT ACTIONS SERVE TO UNDERMINE HIS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER KOSOVO AND, IF HE DOES NOT SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN TALKS AND URGENTLY BEGIN TO BUILD A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL STABILITY, WE WILL BE FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT INDEPENDENCE HAS EMERGED AS THE ONLY VIABLE OPTION. KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE NO PANACEA. IF ALLOWED TO OCCUR WITHOUT CAREFUL MANAGEMENT, IT COULD PROMPT FURTHER DISINTEGRATION OF MILOSEVIC'S YUGOSLAVIA, INCLUDING MONTENEGRO'S DEPARTURE FROM THE FEDERATION AND EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN SERBIA BETWEEN "PARTIZANS AND CETNIKS." END SUMMARY

PUBLIC MESSAGE

6. (X) THE MILOSEVIC REGIME'S RECENT POLICE AND MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN KOSOVO HAS EXPOSED THE LIE TO HIS WHOLE STAND ON THE PROVINCE. DESPITE HIS PROTESTATIONS THAT KOSOVO IS HIS INTERNAL PROBLEM AND THAT ETHNIC ALBANIANS ARE WELCOME TO TAKE PART IN SERBIAN INSTITUTIONS, THE REGIME TREATS KOSOVO LIKE AN OCCUPIED TERRITORY. THE SPECTACLE, SOME SEEN FIRST HAND BY U.S. OBSERVERS, OF RAMPAGING SERBIAN POLICE TORCHING HOMES, LOOTING STORES, AND EXTORTING MONEY

FROM INTERNAL REFUGEES TRYING TO FLEE RECALLS WHAT AN ETHNIC ALBANIAN ONCE SAID OF THE SECURITY FORCES: THEY KNOW THEY HAVE LOST KOSOVO AND TREAT IT LIKE A FOREIGN LAND. THEY KNOW THE LOCALS CANNOT BE PERSUADED THAT THE PROVINCE IS A PART OF SERBIA. THEIR VISCERAL HATRED FOR ETHNIC ALBANIANS IS REFLECTED IN THEIR HARSH TACTICS AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

POLICE STATE

7. (X) MILOSEVIC'S UNFLINCHING DEDICATION OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS TO INSTRUMENTS OF REPRESSION AS THE ONLY MEANS OF CONTROL OVER KOSOVO IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND DOOMED TO FAILURE. WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE DEVOTED MUCH ENERGY TO CRITICIZING THIS POLICY FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS STANDPOINT. THEY HAVE DEVOTED TOO

LITTLE ENERGY TO CRITICIZING THE POLICY FROM A POLITICAL STANDPOINT. DURING HIS MISRULE, MILOSEVIC HAS ACCELERATED THE PROCESS UNDER WHICH, EVENTUALLY, KOSOVO WILL BECOME INDEPENDENT. IRONICALLY, WESTERN HUMANITARIAN AID FUNNELED THROUGH NON-STATE INSTITUTIONS HAS PERMITTED INDEPENDENCE-MINDED ALBANIAN KOSOVARS TO PROMOTE THE MYTH OF WESTERN SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE.

8. (e) WE SHOULD CONFRONT THIS PROBLEM HEAD-ON. WESTERN LEADERS SHOULD STRESS A COMMON MESSAGE: THAT WE ARE DEVOTED TO A MULTI-ETHNIC YUGOSLAVIA WITH KOSOVO INSIDE IT, BUT THAT THIS REQUIRES A STATE COMMITTED TO EARNING THE SUPPORT AND ALLEGIANCE OF ITS CITIZENRY. IF THE STATE GENUINELY DEMONSTRATED A COMMITMENT TO ITS CITIZENS, ASSISTANCE NOW LARGELY DENIED STATE INSTITUTIONS DUE TO THEIR CORRUPT AND REPRESSIVE NATURE, WOULD HAVE GONE TO THESE INSTITUTIONS RATHER THAN TO PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS THAT THE POSLATION ASSOCIATES WITH THE "REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO." REGRETTABLY, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC'S POLICIES HAVE ALREADY DESTROYED THE FABRIC OF A MULTI-ETHNIC STATE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND HE CONTINUES DOWN THE SAME MISGUIDED PATH IN KOSOVO PERPETUATING A SITUATION IN WHICH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SUPPORT STATE INSTITUTIONS.

9. (e) THE POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN PLACE SINCE SPECIAL ENVOY HOLBROOKE'S ARRIVAL IN BELGRADE IN MAY IMPROVES PROSPECTS THAT SUCH A PUBLIC MESSAGE WILL HAVE RESONANCE. THE U.S. HAS WORKED VERY HARD WITH BELGRADE INTERLOCUTORS TO REASSURE THEM THAT WASHINGTON OPPOSES INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO AND IS EAGER TO FIND A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO BELGRADE. WASHINGTON'S PUBLIC MESSAGE NOW, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE THAT THE RECENT BEHAVIOR OF REGIME FORCES IN KOSOVO SUGGESTS THAT BELGRADE IS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT REINTEGRATING ETHNIC ALBANIANS INTO THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE. BY SOME ESTIMATES OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE CASUALTIES IN KOSOVO OVER THE LAST FIVE MONTHS HAVE BEEN CIVILIAN, HARDLY THE WORK OF A FORCE TRYING TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS AGAINST "TERRORISTS."

THE POLICY IS STUCK

10. (e) NATO SHOULD NOT BE ENGAGED ANYWHERE TO DELIVER TO SEPARATISTS THEIR INDEPENDENCE, AND CERTAINLY NOT IN KOSOVO. THERE ARE FEW CONVERSATIONS SO TIRESOME AS THOSE SPENT WITH KOSOVO ALBANIANS DELVING INTO THEIR HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC VERSION OF HISTORY AND CONCLUDING THAT INDEPENDENCE IS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THEIR CURRENT PROBLEMS. THANKS IN LARGE PART TO MILOSEVIC'S INCOMPETENT POLICIES IN KOSOVO, HOWEVER, THIS REFLIVE AND ETHNO-CENTRIC WAY OF THINKING GAINS CURRENCY WITH TIME. KOSOVO IS MOVING INEXTRICABLY TOWARD INDEPENDENCE--EVEN IF IT COMES AFTER A LONG, BLOODY WAR, INVOLVING THOUSANDS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. OBJECTIVELY, CONCERN OVER KOSOVO BECOMING INDEPENDENT AND ABOUT THE PRECEDENT INVOLVED IF IT DOES SO WITHOUT BELGRADE'S FULL BLESSING MAY BE FUTILE.

DEVIL'S ADVOCATE

11. (e) ARGUMENTS CAN BE ADVANCED AS TO WHY KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE WOULD SERVE TO STABILIZE THE BALKANS RATHER THAN DESTABILIZE IT--ESPECIALLY IF ETHNIC ALBANIAN GRIEVANCES ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION ARE

ENERGETICALLY ADDRESSED SO AS TO PRE-EMPT A "GREATER ALBANIA." SUCCESS ON THIS FRONT WOULD REQUIRE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BUILDING UP--AND PROVIDING DEFENSES FOR--MODERATE VOICES. THIS WOULD INVOLVE FOCUSING NOT ONLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT BY ALSO MORE ENERGETICALLY ADDRESSING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF

CITIZENSHIP. POLCOUNS VIVIDLY RECALLS A CONVERSATION HE HAD IN THE SPRING OF 1994 IN SKOPJE WITH AN ETHNIC ALBANIAN POLITICIAN WHO SAID THAT UNTIL THE WEST IDENTIFIES LIMITS ON MINORITY DEMANDS, NO ACCOMMODATION REACHED WITH THE MACEDONIANS WOULD EVER BE ENOUGH. HE SAID, "NEW VOICES WILL ALWAYS EMERGE TO CHARGE THAT OUR POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE SOLD US OUT."

12. (C) TO PLAY THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE, INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO COULD IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN SERBIA. AS LONG AS KOSOVO REMAINS INSIDE SERBIA, THERE WILL LIKELY BE DISCONTENT AND FIGHTING IN THE PROVINCE. FAR MORE DEADLY FORMS OF TERRORISM COULD BECOME AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE STRUGGLE--AND WITH A LARGE DIASPORA IN WESTERN COUNTRIES IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE LIMITED TO KOSOVO OR EVEN YUGOSLAVIA. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEMOCRATIZING SERBIA WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT. ALSO, MILOSEVIC, WITH THE HELP OF HIS MEDIA MACHINE, HAS USED KOSOVO FOR MORE THAN A DECADE TO CONSOLIDATE HIS AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN BELGRADE. LARGELY BECAUSE OF MILOSEVIC'S LEGACY, NO DEMOCRAT WHO ASSUMED POWER IN SERBIA COULD DO SO WITHOUT EITHER LOSING KOSOVO OR ENGAGING IN REPRESSIVE, FUNDAMENTALLY ANTI-DEMOCRATIC POLICIES TO KEEP IT UNDER BELGRADE'S YOKE. TODAY IN SERBIA, INTELLIGENT VOICES WHO RECOGNIZE REALITY AND FEAR A LONG-TERM BLOODLETTING IN KOSOVO ARE NONETHELESS COWED INTO SILENCE--NOT WANTING TO BE IDENTIFIED AS APOLOGISTS FOR "TERRORISTS."

ANOTHER AUTHORITARIAN MINI-STATE?

13. (C) IN KOSOVO ITSELF INDEPENDENCE WOULD NOT INEVITABLY MEAN THE VICTORY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OVER MILOSEVIC'S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME. INDEED, SOMETIMES LOST ON FOREIGNERS WHO TREK TO PRISTINA TO PAY HOMAGE TO SHOW PRESIDENT RUGOVA IS THAT HE IS AT BEST A FRIENDLY HOLOGRAM AT THE CENTER OF A POLITICAL STRUCTURE WITH A CAPACITY FOR VENALITY THAT ARGUABLY RIVALS MILOSEVIC'S. AT WORST, RUGOVA PRESIDES OVER A PARTY THAT IS RUTHLESSLY EFFICIENT ONLY IN SUFFOCATING MODERATE VOICES THAT CONSIDER OPTIONS LESS THAN INDEPENDENCE. RUGOVA'S DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE OF KOSOVO (LDK) HAS ESTABLISHED A PARALLEL STRUCTURE IN THE PROVINCE THAT IS INEFFICIENT AND CORRUPT. THE LDK PARTY CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY AND PARALLEL ELECTIONS IN MARCH--CONSTANTLY REVILED BY RUGOVA'S CRITICS AND THE SOURCE OF MUCH DISUNITY IN PRISTINA'S POLITICAL CLASS --WERE INDEED FLAWED. RUGOVA, WHOSE STATURE HAS AT TIMES BEEN BOOSTED COUNTER-PRODUCTIVELY BY THE WEST, STEADFASTLY REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENSHIP, EVEN BY PARTICIPATING IN ELECTIONS THAT MIGHT HAVE REMOVED--OR AT LEAST SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED--MILOSEVIC. RUGOVA HAS HARVESTED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FROM A "WOSE-IS-BETTER" POLICY THAT LINKED HIM AND MILOSEVIC IN AN ALMOST SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP.

14. (C) RUGOVA'S POLICY APPEARS--AT GREAT COST--TO BE PAYING OFF. THE POSSIBILITY OF KOSOVO EMERGING FROM THE CURRENT CRISIS INDEPENDENT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY LIKELY AND MAY PROVE UNAVOIDABLE. IF IT

OCCURS, IT WOULD AT LEAST ALLOW THE WEST TO PUT THE ONUS ON THE ALBANIANS THEMSELVES TO REFORM THEIR POLITICAL STRUCTURE OR RISK BEING OSTRACIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. NO DOUBT THEY WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO WELL CALIBRATED PRESSURE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED QUICKLY AND TO SUSCEPTIBLE LEADERS. ALREADY, SOME POLITICALLY PLUGGED-IN ETHNIC ALBANIANS, INCLUDING SOME IN THE UCK, VIEW RELATIVE WESTERN SILENCE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE RECENT POLICE AND MILITARY CRACKDOWN IN KOSOVO AS OUR TACIT APPROVAL OF THE OPERATION. IF WE BECOME MORE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE REGIME'S POSTURE CONCERNING INDEPENDENCE WE STAND TO LOSE INFLUENCE IN KOSOVO LATER.

15. (e) THERE ARE OTHER PRACTICAL BENEFITS TO HAVING AN INDEPENDENT KOSOVO. FOR EXAMPLE, WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD RETURN REFUGEES WITH MUCH GREATER EASE, NEGOTIATING BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH PRISTINA RATHER THAN BELGRADE. BEFORE FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN THE PROVINCE, WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE VEXED REGULARLY DURING TALKS WITH BELGRADE OVER RETURNING ETHNIC ALBANIANS WHICH THE FRY GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT BACK IN THE COUNTRY. THE KOSOVO ALBANIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE IN GERMANY WITH OVER 120,000 AND IN SWITZERLAND AND OTHER SMALLER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. MOREOVER, GIVEN THE DISPROPORTIONATE INVOLVEMENT OF ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND OTHER ORGANIZED CRIME, AN INDEPENDENT KOSOVO WOULD LIKELY BECOME A MORE PLIANT PARTNER FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN LAW

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES LOOKING TO ESTABLISH COOPERATIVE RELATIONS.

HAND WRINGING OVER PRECEDENTS

16. (e) WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING OF COURSE THE U.S., FREQUENTLY CITE HELSINKI PRINCIPLES AS A REASON TO OPPOSE KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE. OPPOSITION IS BASED ON DEFENDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE PRINCIPLE THAT EXTERNAL BORDERS SHOULD NOT CHANGE WITHOUT THE MUTUAL CONSENT OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED. OTHER CONCERNS CENTER ON REGIONAL STABILITY, INCLUDING THE VIABILITY OF MACEDONIA AS A STATE IF ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO WERE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE. WOULD SUCH AN OUTCOME LEAVE ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN THIS MINI-STATE OF TWO MILLION AGITATING FOR THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE OR POSSIBLY FOR UNIFICATION IN SOME(SORT OF "GREATER" ALBANIA? THE HAND-WRINGERS NOTE THAT, WERE MACEDONIA TO BE DESTABILIZED, OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION--INCLUDING TURKEY AND GREECE--COULD BE DRAWN INTO A CONFLICT. THEN THERE IS DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION: WOULD REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE INSTABILITY, TRY TO BREAK OUT OF BOSNIA AND JOIN SERBIA? AND THEN WHAT OF THE FEDERATION?

17. (e) APART FROM THE POTENTIAL FOR TROUBLE IN MACEDONIA WERE KOSOVO TO GO INDEPENDENT, MOST OF THESE PROBLEMS ARE TOO HYPOTHETICAL WHEN JUXTAPOSED AGAINST THE VERY REAL HUMANITARIAN DISASTER THAT IS UNFOLDING IN KOSOVO AND THE FACT THAT INDEPENDENCE MAY--AS A REST OF THE EVENTS SINCE FEBRUARY AND MILOSEVIC'S VIOLENT CRACKDOWN--BE UNAVOIDABLE. THE CONCERN FREQUENTLY RAISED ABOUT MAINTAINING HELSINKI PRINCIPLES IS PARTICULARLY DUBIOUS. YUGOSLAVIA NO LONGER EXISTS. THE OLD STATE'S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES CAN BE PRESERVED--AND SHOULD BE TO PRECLUDE "GREATER ALBANIA," BUT THE INTERNAL BORDERS SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM THE EMERGENCE OF THE OTHER SUCCESSOR

STATES.

18. (e) AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, GOVERNMENTS WHICH DEAL WITH THEIR SEPARATIST PROBLEMS RESOLUTELY BUT FAIRLY SHOULD ENJOY THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. GOVERNMENTS WHICH IMPLEMENT POLICIES THAT PROMOTE SEPARATISM SHOULD KNOW THAT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IS NOT AUTOMATIC. MOREOVER, OTHER PRINCIPLES, SUCH AS RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UPON WHICH MILOSEVIC HAS RELENTLESSLY TRAMPLED, ARE ALSO IMPORTANT. IT IS DANGEROUS TO ALLOW AN AUTHORITARIAN LEADER TO LIE SHAMELESSLY TO SERIOUS WESTERN INTERLOCUTORS AND THUMB HIS NOSE AT NATO-- PARTICULARLY AS HIS NATION'S SECURITY FORCES, IN ACTS UNRELATED TO CLASHES AGAINST SEPARATIST FIGHTERS, TORCH HOMES AND LOOT SHOPS AND BURY THEIR VICTIMS IN GARBAGE DUMPS.

INDEPENDENCE AS BY-PRODUCT

11. (e) AGAIN, WE ARE NOT RECOMMENDING NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO. IF FOR VARIOUS REASONS INTERVENTION IS EVENTUALLY JUDGED TO BE NECESSARY, HOWEVER, BRUSSELS NEED NOT BE OVERLY BURDENED BY THE FEAR OF PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF SEPARATISTS, PARTICULARLY AFTER THEIR RECENT SETBACKS. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT U.S. PRIORITIES NEED TO BE REORDERED, AND THE PROSPECT OF INDEPENDENCE NEEDS TO DROP OFF THE RADAR SCREEN AS SOMETHING WE FEAR. THIS REORDERING WILL MAKE THE NATO THREAT--DISCREDITED IN PART NOW BY NATO'S DESIRE TO KEEP THE CURRENT YUGOSLAVIA IN ONE PIECE--FAR MORE BELIEVABLE FOR MILOSEVIC. THE FRY PRESIDENT MUST ALREADY UNDERSTAND THAT KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE THE BEST RESULT FOR NATO PLANNERS WHO WANT TO AVOID HAVING TO ESTABLISH A PROTRACTED AND LARGE-SCALE PROTECTORATE TO SEPARATE THE WARRING SIDES. SIGNIFICANTLY, MILOSEVIC NO DOUBT FEARS THAT KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE WOULD LIKELY SPELL THE END OF HIS RULE.

20. (e) WE NEED TO KEEP MILOSEVIC OFF BALANCE AND PROMOTE FISSURES INSIDE THE REGIME IF WE HOPE TO PROMOTE THE FLEXIBILITY THAT COULD LEAD TO A SOLUTION WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA. MILOSEVIC WILL NOT COMPROMISE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. IN ADDITION TO STARTING A RELENTLESS PUBLIC CAMPAIGN STRESSING WHAT IS STILL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S GENUINE COMMITMENT TO A MULTI-ETHNIC YUGOSLAVIA, WE ALSO SHOULD LABEL MILOSEVIC AS AN UNWITTING INSTRUMENT OF ETHNIC ALBANIAN SEPARATISTS, INCLUDING THOSE HARD-LINERS IN THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY--A FORCE THAT HAS NOT BEEN DESTROYED, ONLY PUSHED INTO HIDING. INVIDIOUS CRITICISM WORKS TOO; PART OF THIS STRATEGY WOULD

IDEALLY INCLUDE STOPS BY HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION IN PODGORICA TO HAIL MONTENEGRIN PRESIDENT MILO DJUKANOVIC'S MULTI-ETHNIC GOVERNMENT, WHILE PRESSING HIM HARD TO DELIVER ON HIS REFORMIST RHETORIC. WE SHOULD STRESS HOW THE RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO PROBLEM WOULD USHER IN A NEW ERA. YUGOSLAVIA MUCH BE INTEGRATED INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IS A NATURAL CANDIDATE FOR PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.

CONCLUSION

21. (e) ULTIMATELY, KOSOVO POLICY NEEDS TO BE LESS DEPENDENT ON THE GOOD WILL OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC--AN AUTHORITARIAN LEADER WHO SHOULD BE MADE LESS SECURE

ABOUT THE WEST'S POSTURE WITH RESPECT TO KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE. MILOSEVIC KNOWS THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ARE LOATH TO INTERVENE MILITARILY FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, MANY WITH NOTHING TO DO WITH THE BALKANS. MILOSEVIC KNOWS THAT HE CAN TOY WITH HIS WESTERN INTERLOCUTORS, PREVARICATE, OFFER CONCESSIONS WHEN THEY ARE ANGRY AND POUNCE WHEN THEY ARE RELAXED. THIS IS A REGIME WHICH PLAYED A GUIDING ROLE IN COMMITTING ACTS OF UNSPEAKABLE EVIL DURING THE WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. THIS IS A REGIME WHOSE TOP COP IN KOSOVO, GENERAL SRETAN LUKIC, IS A COUSIN OF AND MENTOR TO ONE OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA, MILAN LUKIC. TRAGICALLY, IF THE PAST IS ANY INDICATION, THIS IS A REGIME THAT WILL LIKELY FEIGN NEGOTIATION WHILE THE BLOODLETTING CONTINUES AND THE DEATH TOLL RISES.

MILES

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006. memo	Memorandum for Samuel Berger from Jock Covey. Subject: Bosnia Elections [Record ID: 9805883] [Duplicate of vz6229_002, this case] (2 pages)	08/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Situation/Assessments [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6335

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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