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Folder Title:

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39	1	7	1	V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Kosovo: 10/1 NAC Authorizes ACTREQ for Air Options. [NATO] (7 pages)	10/01/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Instructions

2008-0994-F

vz6330

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Washfax Receipt

Department Of State

B

'93 OCT -2

00013367

Message No.

Classification ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

No. Pages 2

From: Peter Petrihos
(Officer Name)

S/S
(Office symbol)

647-6548
(Extension)

7224
(Room number)

Message Description: NIAC Cable to BELGRADE: Demarche on Security of U.S. Personnel

Agency	Delivery	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Glyn T. Davies	456-9461	WHSITRM
	Executive Secretariat		
	<i>BANDER Bell</i>		
	<i>Schwite Withersley</i>		

MUST GO ☒

NON-MUST GO ☐

Remarks: Please Clear by:by:

NSC POC:

S/S Officer:

KMJ

for PP
Peter Petrihos

CROSSHATCH

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: W Date: 4/24/2024

2008-0994-F.3

INITIALS	
APPR:	EAW <i>ah</i>
DRAFT:	CDA <i>ah</i>
CLR 1:	JSW <i>ah</i>
CLR 2:	LRO <i>ah</i>
CLR 3:	ERU <i>ah</i>
CLR 4:	DR <i>ah</i>
CLR 5:	RS <i>ah</i>
CLR 6:	...

copy original

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EUR/SCE:CDANIELS
10/02/98 6-7478 HOME:202-822-4667
EUR:EAWAYNE

EUR:JSWIGERT EUR/SCE:LROSSIN P:ERUBIN S/S-O:
DS:RSOULE EUR/EX:DHAYS NSC: S/S:

NIACT/IMMEDIATE BELGRADE

IMMEDIATE EURPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/08

TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PINS, PTER, SR

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL

REF: BELGRADE 6655

1. (U) OP CENTER PLEASE DISSEMINATE THIS CABLE AT 0700 AM LOCAL BELGRADE TIME ON OCTOBER 3, 1998. NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE REQUESTED ACTION RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF U.S. CITIZENS IN THE FRY.

2. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING A/S E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASON 1.5 (D).

3. ~~(c)~~ ACTION REQUEST: CHARGE IS INSTRUCTED TO REQUEST FRY OFFICIALS PROVIDE INCREASED SECURITY TO CHANCERY AND OTHER APPROPRIATE EMBASSY PREMISES IN LIGHT OF INCREASED TENSIONS. IN ADDITION, CHARGE IS INSTRUCTED TO WARN FRY OFFICIALS AGAIN THAT ANY ATTACK ON U.S. OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL WOULD CARRY THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, WHETHER OFFICIALLY ORGANIZED OR CONDUCTED IN AN OFFICIALLY-SANCTIONED HOSTILE CLIMATE.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VR NARA, Date 4/24/2024
2008-0994-1.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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4. (U) SUGGEST POST CITE RECENT THREATENING COMMENTS BY DEPUTY PM VOJISLAV SESELJ OCTOBER 1 (REFTEL), AS WELL AS BELGRADE'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

YY

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Washfax Receipt

Department Of State

B

'98 OCT -1

Message No. 00013330 Classification ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 3
From: Stephen D. Mull S/S 647-5302 7224
(Officer Name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description: Cable to USNATO: Guidance for October 1 PCG Meeting

To (Agency)	Deliver to	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Glyn T. Davies	456-9461	WHSITRM
	Executive Secretariat		
	Bawolow Bell		
	Schulte Withersky		

KMJMUST GO ☒NON-MUST GO ☐

Remarks: Please Clear by _____

NSC POC: Greg SchulteS/S Officer: Stephen D. Mull**CROSSHATCH**

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: W Date: 4/24/2024
2008-0944-F.3

APPR:	BOK
DRAFT:	TGR
CLR 1:	PD
CLR 2:	MP
CLR 3:	TW
CLR 4:	PM
CLR 5:	CS
CLR 6:	ER
CLR 7:	JB
CLR 8:	
CLR 9:	

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EUR/RPM/S:TGRYAN:TGR
10/01/98 202 647 2097
EUR/RPM:BOKIRKPATRICK

EUR/SCE:LROSSIN P:ERUBIN D:JBASS
OSD:TWHELAN JCS/J-5:GCASEY
NSC: S/S: S/S-O:

EUR

IMMEDIATE USNATO

SECDEF WASHDC, JOINT STAFF WASHDC, ANATO,
WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST+

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/08

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAC, SR, AL

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR OCTOBER 1 PCG MEETING

REF: USNATO 2589, DTG 011735Z OCT 98

CLASSIFIED BY BARBRO O. KIRKPATRICK, DIRECTOR EUR/RPM FOR
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(C)~~ IN RESPONSE TO REFTTEL, WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT THE PCG SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON OCTOBER 2 AND SEND TO THE NAC SPECIFIC DEADLINES FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE PROPOSED TASKS. THESE DEADLINES SHOULD FACILITATE ACTION ON ACTORD AS EARLY AS THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK. THE NAC SHOULD APPROVE THE PCG PAPER NLT SATURDAY, OCTOBER 3.

2. ~~(C)~~ WITH REGARD TO THE TEXT OF THE PCG TASKING CONTAINED AT PARAGRAPH 11 OF REFTTEL, MISSION SHOULD REFER TO THE FOLLOWING:

-- IN PARAGRAPH 3) ADD A NEW FINAL SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS:

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By v2 NARA, Date 4/24/2024

2001-0994-F.3

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HOWEVER, NATO'S OWN ASSESSMENT WILL BE THE PRIMARY DETERMINANT OF ANY NAC DECISION ON MILITARY ACTION.

-- CONCERNING PARAGRAPH 4), MISSION SHOULD STATE THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NAC SHOULD ENGAGE IN DEBATE ON THE MANDATE ISSUE. IT IS WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT ALLIES MUST DECIDE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THEIR OWN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTION. MILOSEVIC'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE THREAT POSED BY MILOSEVIC TO REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY MILOSEVIC HAS UNLEASHED ON KOSOVO DEMAND ACTION BY NATO. THE NAC SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE ANOTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

-- WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 11), I., C., MISSION SHOULD DRAW SEPTTEL CONCERNING TRAVEL ADVISORY ISSUED BY DEPARTMENT. IN ADDITION, IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES, MISSION SHOULD DRAW ON CONTENT OF SEPTTEL TO BE TRANSMITTED OCTOBER 2, WHICH WILL DISCUSS SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S. CITIZENS, U.S. MISSIONS, AND PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FRY.

-- WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 11), II., D. AND E., WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT ACTORD FOR THE LIMITED RESPONSE AIR OPTION AND THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN SHOULD BE APPROVED SIMULTANEOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE U.S.-ONLY NATURE OF THE ATTACK ASSETS IN THE LIMITED AIR OPTION. WASHINGTON BELIEVES THIS IS IMPERATIVE. WE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR "AUTOMATIC" PROGRESSION, BUT RATHER, WE PROPOSE TO PROCEED CONSISTENT WITH THE PROGRESSION BETWEEN THE PHASES OF OPLAN 10601. SPECIFICALLY, "THE DECISION TO ESCALATE TO THE NEXT PHASE OF THE GRADUATED AIR OPERATION RESTS WITH THE NAC, BUT THIS PROCESS WOULD NEED TO BE ACHIEVED WITHIN A TIMESCALE WHICH WOULD NOT RISK LOSING THE OPERATIONAL MOMENTUM AND COULD, THEREFORE, BE EXTREMELY SHORT." ADDITIONALLY, AS NOTED IN MCM-129-98 "BEFORE THE OPERATION (LIMITED RESPONSE AIR OPTION) IS TO BE EXECUTED, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE NAC TO THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS, SUCH AS THOSE OUTLINED IN EXISTING PLANS."

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ZAGREB
SARAJEVO
BELGRADE
LJUBLJANA
SKOPJE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RUGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFNBNA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. cable	re: Kosovo: 10/1 NAC Authorizes ACTREQ for Air Options. [NATO] (7 pages)	10/01/1998	P1/b(1)
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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Kosovo - Instructions

2008-0994-F
vz6330

RESTRICTION CODES

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Washfax Receipt

Department Of State

B

'98 SEP 28 07:40

00013216

Message No. _____

Classification SECRETNo. Pages 29From: Peter Petrihos
(Officer Name)S/S
(Office symbol)647-6548
(Extension)7224
(Room number)Message Description: Cable to USNATO: Achieving our Objectives in Kosovo

To: (Agency)	Deliver to	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Glyn T. Davies	456-9461	WHSITRM
	Executive Secretariat		
	Schulte		
	Aureley		

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Remarks: Please Clear by: _____

NSC POC: Greg Schulte

S/S Officer: _____


Peter Petrihos**CROSSHATCH**UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 4/24/2024

208-0794-F-3

APPR:	STA	...
DRAFT:	MGR	...
CLR 1:	CH	...
CLR 2:	SS	...
CLR 3:	BMC	...
CLR 4:	GCA	...
CLR 5:		...
CLR 6:		...
CLR 7:		...

~~SECRET~~

EUR/RPM:TGRYAN
09/28/98 79626
DEPUTY SECRETARY:STALBOTT

EUR:MGROSSMAN EUR/RPM:BOKIRKPATRICK EUR/SCE:MPALMER
P:ERUBIN D:JBASS EUR/RUS:MYOVANOVITCH IO/UNP:CSTOCKBRIDGE
OSD:TWHELAN JCS:DBLAIR S/S: S/S-O: NSC:

EUR

IMMEDIATE USNATO, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE,
LONDON IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE, BONN IMMEDIATE+
IMMEDIATE JOINT STAFF WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ANATO IMMEDIATE, BELGRADE IMMEDIATE
NODIS NOT FOR ADS

E.O. 12958: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAC, SR

SUBJECT: ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN KOSOVO

REF: A) SKOPJE 2543; B) USNATO 2522; C) USNATO 2517;
D) VERSHBOW 9/27/98 FAX

CLASSIFIED BY A/S GROSSMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

FOR AMBASSADORS/CHARGES

1. ~~18~~ AS A RESULT OF SUSTAINED AMERICAN EFFORT AND LEADERSHIP, THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT STEPS DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 21 TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON FRY PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE NEED TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS ON THE THREE TRACKS OF OUR KOSOVO STRATEGY: HUMANITARIAN, NEGOTIATIONS AND CREATING THE CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. THE ADOPTION SEPTEMBER 23 OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199 IS A CONCRETE STEP TOWARD ENDING THE VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO. ONCE THE UNSCR PASSED, WE AGREED TO A CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 23 WHICH WAS PRODUCTIVE. NATO REINFORCED THE MESSAGE TO

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0830-m (1.06)

8/3/2015 KBH

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MILOSEVIC ON SEPTEMBER 24 BY AUTHORIZING SACEUR TO ISSUE AN ACTIVATION WARNING (ACTWARN) THAT BEGAN THE FORCE GENERATION PROCESS TO CARRY OUT A LIMITED AIR OPTION AND A PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN. NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN PORTUGAL HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.

2. ~~(S)~~ WE HAVE AT LEAST NINE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES TO MEET IN THE COMING DAYS IF WE ARE TO RALLY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC TO END THE VIOLENCE, ALLOW ACCESS TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM HIS CAMPAIGN OF BRUTALITY, MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. WE WILL NEED TO:

-- MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM WE ACHIEVED IN THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 21.

-- READY NATO BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY TO CONDUCT AIR STRIKES WITHOUT A FURTHER UNSCR

-- ENSURE THAT THE UNSC IS WELL BRIEFED AND THAT THE SYG'S REPORT ON UNSCR 1199 IS ACCURATE, TIMELY AND UNAMBIGUOUS

-- CONSULT CLOSELY WITH RUSSIA BILATERALLY, AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE NATO PJC

-- ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PRESENTED BY HILL AND "IMPOSED" BY THE CONTACT GROUP

-- PREPARE OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

-- LOOK FOR OTHER WAYS TO LEVERAGE MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING THROUGH DRIVING WEDGES BETWEEN HIM AND HIS PUBLIC AND SECURITY FORCES

-- FURTHER DEVELOP HUMANITARIAN RELIEF STRATEGIES FOR BOTH BEST-CASE AND WORST-CASE OUTCOMES

-- BUILD SUPPORT IN CONGRESS AND WITH THE PUBLIC

3. ~~(S)~~ WE WANT TO USE THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BRING THE VARIOUS STRANDS OF OUR POLICY TOGETHER (INCLUDING WORKING WITH THE RUSSIANS) SO THAT NATO IS READY (SHOULD POLITICAL AUTHORITIES DECIDE) TO AUTHORIZE MILITARY ACTION "AT A TIME

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AND PLACE OF NATO'S CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COME INTO COMPLIANCE WITH UN, CONTACT GROUP, AND NATO REQUIREMENTS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE NEED ANOTHER UNSCR, NOR SHOULD WE ASSUME THIS IS ATTAINABLE GIVEN THE LIKELY OPPOSITION OF RUSSIA. WE DO NOT WANT TO TIE NATO'S DECISION TOO CLOSELY TO THE UNSYG'S CONCLUSIONS. INSTEAD, WE WANT TO ESTABLISH NATO'S OWN ABILITY TO ASSESS WHETHER MILOSEVIC HAS OR HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH LONG-STANDING INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. SINCE WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY, WE WISH TO AVOID ISSUING A FORMAL ULTIMATUM DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT TO ISSUE A LATE ULTIMATUM WHICH GIVES MILOSEVIC ANOTHER EXTENDED PERIOD FOR COMPLIANCE AND REQUIRES A FURTHER DECISION BY EITHER THE NAC OR THE UNSC BEFORE MILITARY ACTION. NATO SHOULD BE FULLY READY TO ACT, IF NECESSARY, THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 WITH AS FEW ADDITIONAL DECISIONS REQUIRED AS POSSIBLE.

4. ~~(S)~~ ACTIONS REQUESTED:

-- FOR USNATO: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM TOWARD MILITARY ACTION, WHICH NATO DEMONSTRATED BY MOVING TO ACTWARN, IS VITAL. AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD USE THE COMING WEEK TO GIVE ALL 16 ALLIES A SENSE OF CO-OWNERSHIP OF OUR POLITICAL/MILITARY STRATEGY. HE SHOULD HAVE THE ALLIANCE MOVE TO ACTREQ FOR THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AND THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN AT THE NAC MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. NAC AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ ON SEPTEMBER 30, WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NAC TO CONSIDER A DECISION TO GO TO ACTORD DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5.

WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT NATO'S PRESS LINE AFTER AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ SHOULD BE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT FORCES ARE BEING COMMITTED TO POSSIBLE ACTION. SYG SOLANA SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE DECISION TO GO TO ACTREQ WAS BASED ON THE ALLIANCE'S ASSESSMENT OF MILOSEVIC'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LONG-ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. WHILE PREVIOUS NATO PRESS GUIDANCE EMPHASIZED THAT ACTWARN WAS THE LAST STEP IN THE PLANNING PROCESS AND NOT THE FIRST STEP IN USE OF FORCE, NATO SHOULD NOW EMPHASIZE THAT ~~THIS~~ IS A SERIOUS STEP TOWARDS A POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE. SYG SOLANA SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE NAC PLANS TO AGAIN REVIEW WHETHER MILOSEVIC HAS COMPLIED WITH THESE DEMANDS WHEN IT

ACTREQ *LS*

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MEETS NEXT WEEK. MISSION SHOULD DRAW FROM THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE PRESS LINE WITH ALLIES:

- NATO FORCES ARE NOW BEING COMMITTED TO ACTREQ
- MILOSEVIC'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND UN DEMANDS IS FORCING NATO TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE
- MILOSEVIC HAS PAID NO HEED TO REPEATED CALLS TO CEASE HIS ACTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE CONTACT GROUP, NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AS WELL AS THE DEMANDS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT CEASED HIS OFFENSIVE
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ALLEVIATED THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT RESTRAINED THE BRUTALITY OF HIS SECURITY FORCES
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT PERMITTED FULL ACCESS FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS
- WE HOLD MILOSEVIC RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO
- THE NAC WILL REVIEW COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT ITS NEXT MEETING.

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW MAY ALSO USE THE PERMREPS LUNCH ON SEPTEMBER 29 AND THE NAC MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 30 TO GIVE ALLIES A SENSE OF OUR THINKING AS OUTLINED IN PARAS 1-3. AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD ALSO HAVE NATO CONSULT WITH RUSSIA THROUGH THE PJC. WE BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD SHARE SANITIZED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO WITH THE RUSSIANS IN BRUSSELS. (FYI: AMBASSADOR MALLOY REVIEWED OVERHEAD ON DESTRUCTION IN KOSOVO WITH AMBASSADOR CHIZHOV IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24).

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WASHINGTON IS DEFINING ITS GUIDANCE ON GROUND OPTIONS AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PRIOR TO THE NAC.

SACEUR SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO BRIEF THE NAC DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 ON THE MILITARY, SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE SITUATION IN KOSOVO.

SACEUR'S BRIEFING SHOULD ASSESS COMPLIANCE IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

-- CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE POLICE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS BY FRY AND/OR SERBIAN FORCES

-- WITHDRAWAL FROM KOSOVO OF VJ AND MUP UNITS NOT NORMALLY BASED IN KOSOVO

-- RETURN OF VJ AND MUP UNITS BASED IN KOSOVO TO THEIR LOCAL GARRISONS

-- LIFTING OF EMBARGOES ON SHIPMENTS OF FOOD, FUEL AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID ITEMS TO KOSOVO

-- FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, AGENCIES AND NGOS ACCREDITED TO THE FRY

-- RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES

-- STATUS OF MILITARY PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS SHOULD THE LIMITED AIR OPTIONS NOT RESULT IN MILOSEVIC'S COMPLIANCE

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW'S VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO INVOLVE PARTNER COUNTRIES THROUGH THE EAPC.

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD INFORMALLY QUERY SYG SOLANA ABOUT HIS FEELINGS ABOUT HAVING SACEUR MAKE CONTACT WITH GENERAL PERISIC THIS WEEK TO DELIVER A STRONG MESSAGE OF NATO RESOLVE. WASHINGTON WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SACEUR MAKE CONTACT IN HIS NATO CAPACITY, HOWEVER, IF SYG IS UNWILLING, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO HAVE HIM MAKE CONTACT IN HIS CAPACITY AS CINCEUR.

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FINALLY, IN KEEPING WITH OUR STRATEGY OF WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THEM ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON SEPTEMBER 29. VERSHBOW SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE SEPTEMBER 30 NAC WILL CONSIDER THE NEXT STEP IN FORCE GENERATION, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ALLIES WILL APPROVE ADDITIONAL STEPS. THE PJC FOLLOWING THE NAC WILL PROVIDE A FORUM FOR FURTHER FRANK DISCUSSION ON NATO PLANNING. WHILE REMAINING GENERAL, VERSHBOW SHOULD CONVEY TO KISLYAK OUR COMMITMENT TO PUSH AHEAD AT NATO IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

MISSION SHOULD DISCUSS WITH ALLIES MEASURES NATO MAY TAKE TO ENSURE THAT HUMANITARIAN AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE NOTIFIED THAT NATO HAS AUTHORIZED ACTREQ FOR THE AIR OPTIONS AND INFORMED OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTREQ AUTHORIZATION. IN ADDITION, WHILE NATO WOULD WISH TO EXTEND A WARNING TO EVACUATE PERSONNEL ONLY PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF A NATO MILITARY STRIKE, THESE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD PRUDENTLY CONSIDER THE CURRENT SITUATION.

WASHINGTON DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NAC SHOULD ENGAGE IN DEBATE ON THE MANDATE ISSUE. IT IS WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT ALLIES MUST DECIDE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THEIR OWN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTION. IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES MISSION MAY OBSERVE THAT MILOSEVIC'S VIOLATION OF TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE THREAT POSED BY MILOSEVIC TO REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY MILOSEVIC HAS UNLEASHED ON KOSOVO DEMAND ACTION BY NATO.

-- FOR USUN: WE NEED THE UNSYG'S REPORT TO CLEAR THE PATH FOR POSSIBLE ACTION. WE SHOULD PROCEED ON ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY AMBASSADOR SODERBERG TO THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 26, INCLUDING TRAVEL BY DEPARTMENT OFFICERS TO BRIEF ON THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, RENEWED FOCUS ON WAR CRIMES, AND HUMANITARIAN BRIEFINGS. WE WILL RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY THAT SHE BE IN CONTACT WITH THE SYG ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FOLLOW-UP WITH THE NON-PERMANENT UNSC MEMBERS (WHO SEEMED AT THEIR MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY ON SEPTEMBER 24 TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC) WOULD BE USEFUL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS FROM USUN ON WAYS TO

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INFLUENCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE SECRETARIAT AND THE SC.

TAKING

-- FOR SKOPJE: WE APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR HILL'S AGREEMENT TO TRAVEL TO LONDON ON OCTOBER 2 TO MEET WITH CONTACT GROUP EXPERTS TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATION IN LONDON. AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD PRESS FOR SERB COMMENTS ON HIS DRAFT AND CONTINUE HIS OUTSTANDING EFFORT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, ~~THE~~ FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASED PRESSURE NOW BEING PLACED ON MILOSEVIC. AT THE SAME TIME, AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE CONTINUING NEED FOR MILOSEVIC TO PULL BACK SECURITY FORCES FROM KOSOVO AND MAKE GOOD ON ALL HIS PREVIOUS PROMISES, E.G. ON HUMANITARIAN AND INTERNATIONAL ACCESS. WITH THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE GROUND FOR ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING A CEASE-FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN END TO THE SERB OFFENSIVE AND BEGINNING OF TALKS ON STATUS. A CONCERTED EFFORT IN THIS REGARD OVER THE NEXT WEEK MUST BE PRESSED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NATO'S EFFORTS. PRINCIPALS HAVE APPROVED THE ASSIGNMENT OF A SENIOR ~~MILITARY ASSISTANT~~ ^{OFFICER} TO AMBASSADOR HILL TO SERVE AS A MILITARY ADVISOR. JOINT STAFF WILL COORDINATE HIS MAKING INITIAL CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR HILL.

-- FOR MOSCOW: WE WANT TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON ADDITIONAL, SPECIFIC STEPS WE CAN TAKE BEYOND CONSULTATION (AT THE PJC, FOR EXAMPLE) AND INFORMATION SHARING. WE MUST MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE SEPTEMBER 30 PJC TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH COMMONALITY AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR POSITION AND RUSSIA'S. THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED (1) A "COORDINATING MECHANISM" ON THE GROUND IN BELGRADE (THEY HAVE SUGGESTED CHRIS HILL LEAD THIS GROUP OF LOCAL AMBASSADORS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY), (2) POSSIBLE TROIKA (RUSSIAN/EU/US) MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL TRAVEL TO BELGRADE, AND (3) THE NEED FOR A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TWO WEEKS FROM SEPTEMBER 23. WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH THE RUSSIANS AND SHOULD EMPHASIZE WHEREVER POSSIBLE THAT WE ARE ACTING ON THEIR IDEAS (E.G. AMBASSADOR HILL AND CG AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC THIS WEEK), BUT WITHOUT GIVING THEM A VETO ON NATO ACTION THROUGH THE UNSC OR OTHER MECHANISMS. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY CG MEETING ON THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 SHOULD FOCUS ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

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ISSUES, NOT ON JUDGING MILOSEVIC'S COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199.

-- FOR LONDON, PARIS AND BONN: AT QUAD MEETINGS IN NEW YORK THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF A POLDIR LEVEL QUAD MEETING IN EUROPE ON OCTOBER 8 TO REVIEW A FORMAL ULTIMATUM. EVENTS ARE RUNNING AHEAD OF THAT PLAN. GROSSMAN WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES ON SEPTEMBER 28 TO REVIEW OUR THINKING. HE WILL REPORT TO AMBASSADORS/DCMS ON THESE CONTACTS. WE ASK THAT YOU NOT/NOT APPROACH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT IN CAPITALS UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM GROSSMAN. BUT AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD/SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COUNTERPARTS IN BRUSSELS TO CONVEY OUR THINKING.

-- FOR CONTACT GROUP CAPITALS: WHILE WE HAVE NOT RULED OUT ATTENDING A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN TWO WEEKS AS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS (AND SUPPORTED BY MANY OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES), OUR INTENTION IS TO PROCEED AS WE DID IN ADVANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 24 IN NEW YORK: THAT IS, WE WILL WANT TO CHOSE SEVERAL SPECIFIC THINGS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE/BEFORE WE WOULD ATTEND A CONTACT GROUP MEETING. IDEALLY ANY MEETING WOULD FOCUS ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ISSUES NOT THE STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1199. IF/IF YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT OUR THINKING ON A CONTACT GROUP, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE SECRETARY FOUND THE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 23 TO BE HELPFUL, THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO AMBASSADOR HILL'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP ON OCTOBER 2, THAT WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION ABOUT ATTENDING ANOTHER CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT ANY LEVEL, BUT THAT SUCH A DECISION WOULD NO DOUBT BE INFLUENCED BY THE AMOUNT OF PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC AND CREATING A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.

5. ~~TS~~ WE WILL ALSO BE WORKING DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BUILD SUPPORT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, FOR EXAMPLE, ASKING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE UNSYG ON THE NEED FOR A CLEAR, TIMELY REPORT TO THE UNSC. WE WILL ALSO BE EXPLORING FURTHER MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING ASKING THE NATO SYG TO HAVE SENIOR NATO OFFICIALS ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE SENIOR VJ OFFICIALS. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO FASHION A CLEAR MESSAGE TO

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THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS ABOUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE
WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGES.

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ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE
SKOPJE IMMEDIATE
MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
WARSAW IMMEDIATE
PRAGUE IMMEDIATE
BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RUGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFNBNA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

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Washfax Receipt

Department Of State

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09:27 08-35-00
10 SEP 98 22:30

Message No. 00013294 Classification ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 4

From: Peter Petrihos S/S 647-6548 7224
 (Officer Name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description: Cable to USNATO - Guidance on Accelerating ACTREQ, Planning
for Ground Force Option

To (Agency)	Deliver To	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Glyn T. Davies	456-9461	WHSITRM
	Executive Secretariat		
<i>Bandler</i>	<i>Bell</i>	<i>Flanagan</i>	
<i>Schulte</i>	<i>Wilkowsky</i>	<i>Braden</i>	
<i>McElwain</i>			

MUST GO ☒NON-MUST GO ☐Remarks: Please Clear by: SEPT. 30 MUST GO!URGENT Guidance on ActREQ Decision 10/1NSC POC: Greg Schulte 456-9102S/S Officer: *Peter M. Petrihos*

Peter Petrihos

CROSSHATCHUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: VR Date: 4/24/2024

7208-0974-F.3

ORIGINAL

9/30

APPR:	BOK
DRAFT:	TGR
CLR 1:	PD
CLR 2:	MP
CLR 3:	TW
CLR 4:	PM
CLR 5:	CS
CLR 6:	ER
CLR 7:	JB
CLR 8:	...
CLR 9:	...

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By 12 NARA, Date 4/24/2024
2008-0994-F-3EUR/RPM/S:TGRYAN:TGR
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EUR/RPM:BOKIRKPATRICKEUR/SCE:MPLAMER P:ERUBIN D:JBASS O/UNP:WIMBRIE
OSD:TWHELAN JCS/J-5:GCASEY
NSC: S/S: S/S-O:

EUR

IMMEDIATE USNATO, ANATO IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE SECDEF WASHDC, JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE,
WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, USUN+

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/08

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAC, SR, AL

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON ACCELERATING ACTREQ, PLANNING FOR
GROUND FORCE OPTIONREF: A) USNATO 2575, DTG 301921Z SEP
B) SG(98)0914CLASSIFIED BY B. O. KIRKPATRICK, EUR/RPM FOR REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST FOR USNATO AND ALL NATO
POSTS - SEE PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 AND 8.2. ~~let~~ ON SEPTEMBER 30, THE NAC PLACED THE DECISION ON
ACTREQ UNDER SILENCE ENDING COB, OCTOBER 2. MISSION SHOULD
PRESS FOR A CHANGE IN THE SILENCE PERIOD SO THAT SILENCE
ENDS AT COB ON OCTOBER 1. WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT GREATER
URGENCY IS NEEDED BECAUSE OF THE DETERIORATING HUMANITARIAN
SITUATION IN KOSOVO, AND IN PARTICULAR, IN THE LIGHT OF THE
ATROCITIES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN GORNJE OBRINJE.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3. (C) WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT AFTER THE SILENCE PERIOD ENDS, SYG SOLANA OR DSYG BALANZINO SHOULD MAKE A PRESS STATEMENT INDICATING THAT NATO HAS ACTED IN RESPONSE TO THE THE LATEST OUTRAGE IN KOSOVO, THE COLD-BLOODED MURDER OF DEFENSELESS CIVILIANS IN GORNJE OBRINJE. THE SYG OR DSYG SHOULD STATE THAT THIS ATROCITY HAS IMPELLED NATO TO ACCELERATE AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ.

4. (C) WASHINGTON SUPPORTS FURTHER PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE GROUND OPTION FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT IMPLEMENTATION. MISSION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS FURTHER PLANNING IS, LIKE PRIOR WORK ON THE SUBJECT, ENTIRELY WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FUTURE DECISIONS ON SETTING UP OR PARTICIPATING IN SUCH A FORCE. CONCERNING THE TEXT OF SG (98)0914 OF 30 SEPTEMBER, ANNEX B, WASHINGTON BELIEVES IT IS UNWISE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF INVOLVING PARTNERS IN PHASE 0 OF A PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN AT THIS TIME. WITH REGARD TO THE TASKING TO THE PCG, MISSION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE PCG WILL ACT TO EXPEDITE NATO PREPARATIONS SO THAT THE NAC COULD BE IN A POSITION TO AUTHORIZE AN ACTORD, AFTER CONSIDERING SACUER'S ASSESSMENT OF MILOSEVIC'S COMPLIANCE BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK.

5. WE ALSO BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE AN EAPC MEETING ON OCTOBER 2 SO THAT NATO CAN EXPLAIN ITS ACTIONS RELATING TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KOSOVO. WASHINGTON BELIEVES AN ADDITIONAL PJC MEETING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR EARLY NEXT WEEK. MISSION SHOULD ALERT THE SYG AND OTHER MISSIONS AS APPROPRIATE. MORE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE EXACT TIMING OF THE PJC WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTTEL.

6. (C) WASHINGTON IS IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH ALL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO STRESS THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION AND TO PRESS FOR ACCELERATION OF THE ACTREQ PROCESS. WE EXPECT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 1 TO ADOPT A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE LATEST ATROCITY.

7. (C) ACTION FOR ALL NATO POSTS: ALL NATO POSTS SHOULD DEMARCHE HOST GOVERNMENTS AT OOB ON OCTOBER 1, TO SEEK THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE ACCELERATED TIMETABLE REFERENCED IN PARAGRAPH 1.

8. (C) IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES, MISSION AND NATO POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

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- MILOSEVIC HAS PAID NO HEED TO REPEATED CALLS TO CEASE HIS ACTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE CONTACT GROUP, NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AS WELL AS THE DEMANDS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199
- DESPITE HIS PROMISES AND RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS, MILOSEVIC HAS NOT STOPPED HIS CAMPAIGN OF TERROR IN KOSOVO
- GANGS OF SERB MILITARY AND POLICE CONTINUE TO ROAM THE COUNTRYSIDE, LOOTING AND BURNING HOMES, DESTROYING CROPS AND LIVESTOCK AND KILLING INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN
- THE LATEST OUTRAGE IN GORNJE OBRINJE, THE COLD-BLOODED MURDER OF DEFENSELESS CIVILIANS, IS YET FURTHER EVIDENCE OF MILOSEVIC'S CRIMINAL CAMPAIGN
- NATO CANNOT STAND IDLE WHILE THESE HORRORS TAKE PLACE
- WE MUST ACT NOW, TODAY, TO SIGNAL OUR RESOLVE
- MILOSEVIC'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND UN DEMANDS IS FORCING NATO TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ALLEVIATED THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT RESTRAINED THE BRUTALITY OF HIS SECURITY FORCES
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT PERMITTED FULL ACCESS FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS
- WE HOLD MILOSEVIC RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO
- BY ACCELERATING NATO'S AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ, WE MAKE A CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENT OF OUR RESOLVE AND LET MILOSEVIC KNOW THAT NATO IS SERIOUS.

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DUBLIN
STOCKHOLM
HELSINKI
BERN
BRATISLAVA
BUCHAREST
CHISINAU
KIEV
MINSK
SOFIA
TALLIN
VILNIUS
RIGA
ZAGREB
SARAJEVO
BELGRADE IMMEDIATE
LJUBLJANA
SKOPJE
MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFNBNA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

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