

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1708

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Kosovo Strategy [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)
002. draft	Memo: Kosovo Strategy. [with marginalia "For 1/11/99 DC] [Near Duplicate of 001, vz6262_006b, this case and rs236_002b, 2009-0983-M (2.44)] (12 pages)	01/08/1999	P1/b(1)
003. memo	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. [See also jp405_003, 2006-0207-F] (3 pages)	12/30/1998	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For Kosovo Executive Committee from David Wippman. Subject: Sanctions. (4 pages)	12/01/1998	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For James Steinberg from Greg Schulte. Subject: Tomorrow's DC on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9821014] [See also bm415_007, 2006-0325-F and vz6250_003a, this case] (5 pages)	11/16/1998	P1/b(1)
005b. memo	To Permanent Representatives and Heads of Mission of the Three Invited Countries from Secretary General. Subject: Proposed Messages to FRY and Kosovar Albanians with Annexes I to III. [SG(98)1175] [NATO] [Duplicate at vz6250_003b, this case] (6 pages)	11/16/1998	P1/b(1)
005c. cable	Re: Kosovo Negotiations and Implementation. [Duplicate of vz5800_003, 2019-0897-F and vz6250_003c, this case] (4 pages)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)
005d. paper	International Donor Strategy for Kosovo. [Duplicate at vz6250_003d, this case] (7 pages)	11/16/1998	P1/b(1)
006a. paper	Getting Better Leverage on the KLA. (8 pages)	11/23/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. map	[Kosovo Liberation Army, July 1998] (1 page)	07/00/1998	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	Confronting the Impact on Kosvo of Northeastern Albania. (4 pages)	11/19/1998	P1/b(1)
007a. paper	Getting better Leverage on the KLA [Not a duplicate of 006a] (7 pages)	11/20/1998	P1/b(1)
007b. map	[Duplicate of 006b] (1 page)	07/00/1998	P1/b(1)
007c. paper	Confronting the Impact of Kosovo on Northern Albania [Duplicate of 006c] (4 pages)	11/19/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Kosovo Strategy [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

January 14, 1999

Kosovo Strategy

Negotiations on a political settlement in Kosovo are at an impasse and the international community has little leverage over the key parties --Belgrade/Milosevic, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Rugova's negotiators. Regardless of our efforts, we can expect a continued level of police harassment, KLA provocations and increasingly intense and destabilizing violence over the coming weeks. The essential challenge is to prevent this violence from escalating beyond a point that threatens our basic objectives, undercuts NATO credibility in advance of the summit, and destroys any chance for a political settlement. Our strategy cannot and should not rely on KVM successfully managing a series of crisis along the lines of the recent VJ prisoner situation. There is a high-risk of failure with each such undertaking, the ever-present possibility of escalation and the chance of verifiers being caught in the cross-fire.

Our fundamental strategic objectives remain unchanged:

- Promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia;
- Prevent a resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and a renewed humanitarian crisis;
- Preserve U.S. and NATO credibility.

Building confidence in the negotiating process and in the broader role of the international community in Kosovo is essential to achieving these objectives. We intend to pursue progress on three independent, but inter-connected, tracks to advance prospects for a settlement and reduce the risk of serious violence. **We need to focus energies on:**

- Revitalizing the negotiating process;
- Creating positive change on the ground to build confidence;
- Building leverage on Belgrade and on the KLA.

Implementation of the Strategy

Once approved by the USG, State will present the program to members of the Contact Group plus Norway bilaterally as soon as possible. State will seek formal Contact Group endorsement and approval for immediate

Released in Part

SECRET/NO DIS

Per E.O. 13526

2009-0983-M (2.44)

VZ 9/21/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

implementation. This will almost certainly require a Contact Group meeting, probably an expert-level meeting followed by a meeting of Political Directors.

Russian can be expected to resist any activity that is not explicit in the OSCE KVM agreement including elections, police, KVM radio, and any XFOR activity. We should outline the proposal to the Russians in advance of Secretary Albright's January visit to Moscow. This will help avoid a log jam with the Russians in the Contact Group.

To be successful, however, this effort will need to be seen as more than a Contact Group proposal. As we work for Contact Group endorsement, we should also reach out to other key European states and continue to work aggressively with OSCE, NATO and KVM contributors to identify resources and build leverage on the parties.

The international community's engagement in Kosovo currently amounts to an unfunded mandate. This cannot be an all-American effort. We will need to engage potential donors in the process early on and push the Europeans to take the lead on program implementation in many areas. Careful coordination among donors will be essential to ensure that adequate resources are available to see the programs through to successful conclusion.

Track I: Revitalize the Negotiations

Chris Hill and EU Representative Petritsch are pressing forward with efforts to strengthen the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team and bring Belgrade and Pristina closer to resolution. There will be a number of opportunities in the weeks ahead to frame the negotiations and advance prospects for a settlement.

Next Steps

- Reinforce Hill team with senior advisors on policing and elections issues (not necessarily Americans).
- Contact Group to host a meeting of all Albanian parties in Vienna within the next two weeks. Hill and Petritsch to determine the timing, venue and invitees.

-- Objective is to broaden the base of the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team and reinforce the ability of the negotiators to compromise on outstanding issues. Keeping up the pressure on the KLA to engage in the negotiating process is critical. Rugova's team will be

SECRET/NO DIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

more inclined to move forward if the participants feel less isolated and exposed.

-- Too early to include KLA military commanders in the all-parties meeting, but political representatives -- i.e. "Demaci +1" -- should be invited.

-- U.S. and other CG member states should request the Albanian government also urge Demaci to participate in the conference.

- If the all-parties conference is successful, Hill and Petritsch should move rapidly toward face-to-face or proximity talks between Belgrade's team and a reinforced Kosovo Albanian negotiated team. Target time-frame should be early February.
- If the conference is unsuccessful or inconclusive, Hill and his team will look at options for imposing a solution -- including by circumventing the current Kosovo Albanian leadership.)?
- In parallel, KVM head Walker should begin negotiations with Belgrade authorities on side agreements that would support the police training program and elections.

Alternatively, Chris Hill rather than Walker could focus his energies on negotiating the parallel agreements with Milosevic. Some argue that negotiations for an overall political settlement demonstrably cannot succeed in the required timeframe, given the fractiousness of the Albanians and the limited leverage on both sides. Indeed, the effort to obtain a comprehensive agreement may be an active impediment to progress in specific areas because it creates discord and mistrust. Thus, the best course would be to shift our focus to getting Milosevic's agreements on sectoral areas.

Focussing Hill on negotiating more limited agreements would almost necessarily mean putting aside efforts at achieving a larger political settlement. It would also mean a reduced role for the Kosovo Albanian negotiators, as most of the work would be done on a bilateral basis with Belgrade; that would be politically controversial. **A variant** would be to proceed with efforts to convene the all-Albanian meeting, but use it to rally the Albanians behind sectoral activities and reduce the divisive pressure on them for an overall settlement.

SECRET/NOBIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Track II: Creating New Realities in Kosovo

While the negotiating process goes forward, the OSCE, through KVM, and other key parties (including USAID) will begin implementation of specific programs in Kosovo independent of the negotiating process. This will include implementing aspects of the draft settlement proposal that establish a basis for local administration in areas such as education, health care, social services, police, justice, etc.

Ideally, this will be done on the basis of agreement between the parties. Full implementation of programs related to police and justice issues in particular would almost certainly require the conclusion of formal agreements with Belgrade. Elections are another area in which Belgrade's acquiescence is essential. These are also the most critical areas for building confidence in the negotiating process among the Kosovo Albanian population and progress in these areas would demonstrate the advantages of working with the international community to achieve a political solution to the problems of Kosovo.

Even in the absence of agreement, however, we should be prepared to move forward on implementation as far as possible using Walker's personal authority and the authority of the KVM to provide the political support. While protecting the safety of its personnel, KVM should continue to take an active approach to verifying compliance, negotiating confidence-building measures, mediating disputes and using diplomatic tools to prevent and contain violence. To the degree feasible, KVM should aim to broker not only cease-fires when hostilities erupt but pull-backs by combatants from discrete areas of conflict. Verification patrols should follow up to keep these areas "demilitarized."

We should consolidate and focus our limited jump-start initiatives -- police training, civil society, and elections initiatives -- on selected communes with the full spectrum of our initiatives working in tandem. This will maximize the synergy among them and generate political momentum. It is more important to have fewer well-functioning demonstrations early on than to work towards Kosovo-wide coverage many months down the road." Proposals for action in specific program areas are outlined below.

SECRET/NO DIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

KVM Ramp-up**Goals**

- Broad and intrusive international verification of the cease-fire and Serb security force activities.
- Foster confidence on the ground and an environment conducive to a negotiated solution.
- Maintain a separate USG presence in Kosovo to support Hill, the KVM and other U.S. priorities.

Critical Milestones

- January 12 - open final two regional centers in Pristina and Gnjilane, for a total of five centers.
- January 31 - KVM verifiers should exceed 1,000.
- February 28 - KVM should reach full strength by mid to late February.

-- Note: KVM currently budgeted for a full-strength complement of 1,650 personnel. As Mission grows, we will need to re-evaluate whether this complement is adequate for the task at hand.

Police

Absent formal agreement with Belgrade on police, new "recruits" can accompany KVM police monitors, combining on-the-job training with visibility for the police program. Police monitors and trainees should also deploy to communities targeted for other jump-start initiatives.

Goals

- Establish a locally-based police force representative of the population and responsible to democratically-elected local authorities.
- Reduce abuses by Serbian police against the civilian population.
- Use the build up of local police to achieve additional withdrawal of MUP forces from Kosovo.

SECRET/NOBIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Critical Milestones

- January 27 - Begin implementation of pilot police training program
- By January 31 - All 51 U.S. police verifiers deployed to Kosovo
- February 17 - Pilot Program concludes
- February 14-20 - Identify/Screen candidates for training course
- March 3 - Begin first course for 300-400 recruits
- March 24 - First group of trainees graduates
- By May 5 - 1,000 local police trained and on the job
- By August 4 - 2,700 local police (may require additional firearm training)

Early Local Elections

Goals

- Build civilian confidence in the reality of democratic change.
- Establish local authorities (town councils, mayors) with mandate to implement reconstruction programs, oversee police, etc.
- Lay the groundwork for future elections to institutions established by the political settlement

Critical Milestones

The timetable below is longer than optimal. But a minimum six months preparation time is required for elections to be fully credible and transparent. In the absence of any progress on an agreement with Belgrade that would allow formal elections to go forward, we should proceed with accelerated local elections on an informal and ad hoc basis. Funding for assistance projects and police training programs should be targeted to support those municipalities in which early elections are held. Benchmarks for a more formal elections procedure should include:

- January 29 - establish Rules and Regulations; Identify offices for which to hold elections
- Mid-February - Begin voter registration process
- March - Complete voter registration. Begin training poll commissions

SECRET/NO DIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- March 15 - International supervisors arrive
- April 15 - Survey of polling sites begins; party/candidate application period ends
- April and May - Voter civic education; training poll commissions; media campaign
- June 30 - Election Day

Press/Public Affairs

Goals

- Establish a KVM Radio station quickly to provide a platform for supporting the cease-fire and progress on a political settlement.
- Foster the development of independent media in Kosovo.

Critical Milestones

- Week of January 11: Norwegian CiO to press Milosevic on frequencies for KVM Radio, as well as for indigenous Kosovo stations.
- January 12 - Complete installation of radio broadcast tower in Montenegro able to reach 70% of Kosovo
- January 15 - Begin negotiations with radio/TV Tirana in Albania on broadcasting a weekly program about KVM's work in Kosovo.
- January 31 - KVM radio to begin broadcasting.
- If frequencies are not granted, KVM should broadcast through the Montenegrin facilities or via satellite
- February -- KVM begins producing radio and TV spots at the studios of the U.S. Information Service in Belgrade for distribution throughout Serbia, including Kosovo, by the ANEM network.

Civil Society Development

Communities selected for this initiative should also be the platforms for other jump-start programs. This initiative has progressed the furthest, enjoys quick turnaround in results, and in the near-term is best funded. Police and elections initiatives should piggy-back on this program.

SECRET/NO DIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Goals

- Engage broadest possible segments of Albanian community to participate in local governance and community improvement through the establishment of up to 120 local governance councils.
- Provide a focus for the activities of elected local officials (town councils, etc.) in project implementation.
- Develop and implement quick-impact projects -- such as health clinic repair, agricultural inputs, or school refurbishing -- with the assistance of international contractors.
- Identify adequate resources to fund 400 projects by the end of May. To date, only \$5.1 million has been allocated for a program that will require an estimated \$15 million in capitalization.

Critical Milestones

- By January 10 - Deployment of trained international staff to Kosovo;
- By end of January - estimated 20 councils established, 10-20 projects underway
- By end of February - estimated total of 45 councils established, total of 80 projects underway
- By end of March - estimated total of 60 councils established, total of 180 projects underway
- By end of April - estimated total of 90 councils established, total of 270 projects underway
- By end of May - estimated total of 120 councils established, total of 400 projects underway

Humanitarian Initiatives

Goals

- Ensure that aid agencies are able to maintain their ability to address humanitarian needs.
- Build up adequate stockpiles to prepare for a possible upsurge in violence/large number of IDPs.
- Promote IDP/refugee returns to places of origin.

SECRET/NODIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Critical Milestones

- January - Secure Presidential approval for \$25 million drawdown of Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Account to fund UN and NGO efforts.
- January - Respond to the UN Consolidated Appeal for former Yugoslavia, including UNHCR, WFP, and other International Organizations.
- Ongoing - Press Europeans and other donor countries to provide funding to UN agencies and NGOs.

Human Rights

Goals

- Significant improvement in the human rights environment in Kosovo.
- Ensure that KVM includes human rights concerns -- monitoring, reporting, verification, and intervention in all areas governed by the OSCE KVM agreement -- among its highest priorities.
- Continue to press for a general amnesty in Kosovo and the release of detainees.

Critical Milestones

- January 15 - KVM press conference to provide initial assessment of the human rights climate, "success stories," and a statement of mission goals.
- January 15 - DOS-funded senior human rights expert attached to KVM to advise Walker on organizing human rights mission and establish priority issues.
- January 18 - Demarche to COE countries pressing them to follow through on manpower and resource commitments.
- By January 31 - First tranche of USG-funded human rights officers seconded to KVM through the DynCorp contract.
- February 15 - KVM human rights element to be fully staffed (12 human rights experts per regional center).

Track III: Building Leverage

We should attempt to capitalize on the positive resolution of the latest mini-crisis in Kosovo to underscore with both sides their mutual interest in (1) taking steps to

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

avoid further such incidents, (2) cooperating with the KVM, and (3) supporting progress on Tracks I and II of our strategy.

Belgrade

On Track II, we are attempting to build off vague -- and in some cases minimal -- commitments by Milosevic to push aggressively on implementation of specific programs. Fully implementing the programs above will require the active cooperation of the Belgrade government, and the acquiescence of President Milosevic. Under current conditions, it is unlikely that such cooperation will be forthcoming. There is an urgent need to identify new sources of leverage against the Milosevic regime that can be used in support of both the negotiations and program implementation.

The first step is to re-establish and profile Belgrade's record on non-compliance. This is essential for shoring up allied unity and building a base for future punitive or leverage-building actions against the FRY.

- Publicize the Clark-Naumann agreement spelling out in detail what Belgrade agreed to and what specific violations have been observed. Efforts to build international consensus on Serb non-compliance are hampered by our inability to use the force levels established by the Clark-Naumann agreement as a public benchmark.
- Encourage Bill Walker to submit frequent OSCE/KVM reports detailing incidents and patterns of Serb non-compliance with its obligations, including specific reference to the Clark-Naumann agreement as well as UNSCRs 1199 and 1203.
- Frequent public statements -- U.S., OSCE, Contact Group, UNSC, NATO, etc -- condemning Serb patterns of non-compliance. Press Norway as OSCE CiO, as well as Solana and Annan, to issue periodic "cumulative judgments" on FRY non-compliance.
- Continue efforts to press for action in the UNSC (i.e. ICTY sanctions resolution), independent NATO action on compliance assessments, etc.

Second, we should look for opportunities to exploit those factors which motivate Milosevic. The FRY President

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

cares primarily about maintaining his grip on power and enhancing his personal prestige--particularly with the US. Milosevic is sensitive to the level of interaction with him, and he reads virtually all international press reports related to him and his regime. We should aggressively promote democratic alternatives to Milosevic in the FRY. In private, we should intimate to Milosevic that the United States will shift its position on independence for Kosovo if Belgrade does not improve cooperation with the KVM.

In addition to building new realities in Kosovo, we need to continue efforts to open up the political system and support movement toward our longer-term goal of a democratic FRY. We should also consider whether it will be possible to employ positive incentives with Belgrade as well as negative leverage. Milosevic is more likely to respond constructively to pressure when he sees a way forward. Some have suggested using the prospect of FRY participation in OSCE, conditioned on both progress on Kosovo and on acceptance and implementation of OSCE standards, as a vehicle to secure an OSCE mission in FRY to drive democratization.

Broader engagement within the OSCE framework could help promote conditions that would encourage the Kosovar Albanians to accept an interim status within a more democratic FRY, and encourage stronger European support for the negotiations. While Milosevic would certainly like to get into the OSCE, however, experience demonstrates that he is not likely to pay much for the privilege. We would also need to be careful that FRY membership in the OSCE neither damages the Outer Wall of sanctions, which includes membership in international organizations nor allows the FRY to use the organization's consensus rule to take other OSCE priorities hostage.

In the longer run, we will need to sustain in Milosevic's mind the potential for NATO action -- including air strikes -- if we are to contain the violence in Kosovo and move Belgrade on key issues. NATO and our allies must frequently reiterate that we are still demanding full and sustained compliance with UNSCR 1199 and the Clark-Naumann agreement and that we are keeping FRY compliance under continuous review. The U.S. should ask NATO to consider enhancing its regional exercise program, both air and ground, to emphasize NATO's continued interest in FRY compliance and in the security of KVM verifiers.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The KLA

Recent developments highlight the urgent need to develop leverage over this organization and may help us deal with the political downsides of sanctioning the KLA. The goals would be to induce KLA compliance on the ground and collaboration in the entire process and to isolate the more extremist elements within the KLA from the rest of the KLA and its popular support base.

Positive incentives for the KLA are at least as important as negative leverage. We have offered them the possibility to engage in the political process conditioned on restraint on the ground, and have assured them that our goal is to "get Serbia out of Kosovo." They express interest. Our conversations, however, lead to the conclusion that the KLA will not be motivated by the prospect of elections or Community Improvement Councils. It wants Serbia out visibly and progressively -- i.e., MUP/VJ . withdrawals -- and it wants Albanian prisoners released. Those require leverage on Belgrade. Establishing meaningful positive incentives for the KLA is therefore a function of building effective leverage over Milosevic. If we cannot show we are getting "Serbia out of Kosovo," all indications are that they will keep preparing to fight for it themselves.

While we seek to build leverage on Belgrade that can increase our positive leverage with the KLA, which will take time, the U.S. -- in coordination with allies -- should take immediate steps to interfere with KLA fund-raising activities,

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

We should also work with the Albanian American community to establish a diaspora donors fund supporting civil society development projects in Kosovo. This would ensure legitimate funding could still flow through clean channels and help develop the broadest possible base of support for the CICs and associated program activity among the general population of Kosovo.

Other avenues for building leverage on the KLA that we should take action on include:

- Offering inclusion in the political process
- Pressing for Serbian pullouts
- Pushing Belgrade on Albanian prisoners
- Warning of the potential for a pullout of KDOM/KVM
- Threatening the KLA with ICTY action

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Other options, including interfering with KLA arms flows, should be kept in reserve.

Actions If Hostilities Resume

A complete breakdown of the cease-fire in Kosovo would likely unfold in a series of stages rather than in an immediate collapse. At each stage, the international community will intervene to reduce tensions, negotiate local or Kosovo-wide cease fire arrangements, and limit the impact of the violence on the civilian population. As always, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and we should continue efforts to minimize the risk of a breakdown in the cease-fire. VJ/MUP cross border operations in Albania are a particular concern and could widen the Kosovo conflict.

If the cease-fire breaks down:

- KVM will continue to negotiate local cease-fire arrangements;
- The OSCE CiO and the PC will be asked to respond rapidly and forcefully to cease-fire violations and recommend actions to end local conflicts and ease tensions;
- OSCE and NATO issue assessments on compliance and begin to build a case for the use of force. U.S. to press for early engagement of the NAC and UNSC;
- OSCE must be prepared to threaten both sides that it will withdraw from Kosovo if the security situation deteriorates beyond the level of acceptable risk or if FRY non-cooperation makes it impossible for the KVM to do its job. The KVM should pull out before casualties or hostages are taken and use the withdrawal as "shock therapy" for the parties;
- U.S. should move on an urgent basis to build consensus in the Alliance for possible NATO intervention as OSCE considers withdrawal.

The OSCE should continue to operate in Kosovo until the security environment or FRY non-cooperation have deteriorated to a point where the risk to verification personnel is unacceptable and the mission can no longer be effective.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. draft	Memo: Kosovo Strategy. [with marginalia "For 1/11/99 DC] [Near Duplicate of 001, vz6262_006b, this case and rs236_002b, 2009-0983-M (2.44)] (12 pages)	01/08/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. [See also jp405_003, 2006-0207-F] (3 pages)	12/30/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

DRAFT

**PUBLIC-DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING SERBIAN GOVERNMENT'S
RESTRICTIONS ON THE MEDIA**

Issue: Serbian government control of the media and the prohibition on domestic retransmission of foreign broadcasts make it difficult for the USG to communicate its message within Serbia, including Kosovo. Given the sensitivity of Kosovo to all parties and the active role played by the USG, we need the capacity to present our point of view and to counter rumors, conspiracy theories, misrepresentations, etc. KVM needs a way to communicate regularly with Serbian and Albanian audiences to reassure them, demonstrate that KVM is on the job, and provide information on the substance of verification. KVM will have to determine to what extent it can be part of the USG effort outlined in this memo without raising sensitivities within OSCE about the prominence of the U.S.

Situation: There is no silver bullet. To thwart GOS media controls effectively, we must use a variety of approaches simultaneously, including internal and external broadcasting, local publications, USG-produced printed materials, Internet and e-mail, and personal contacts. Currently local radio and television broadcasters will not carry externally produced programs such as VOA-TV's Serbian-language program "Open Studio" or VOA programs intended for its affiliate radio stations in Serbia, because to do so would violate the media law. Therefore on the broadcasting front we need to broadcast directly to home receivers or work with local broadcasters to air material that does not violate the media law. As far as the print press is concerned, some weekly and daily publications carry hard news from abroad and we need to provide them relevant material in the most user-friendly format. Independent wire services, Beta and Fonet, have apparently slipped through a loop hole in the media law and are also a natural recipient for our materials. Web sites, listservs, and push e-mails will reach only a small percentage of the population but some of them will be influential and further distribute and amplify our message.

Action Plan Assets: In pursuing an action plan to circumvent Serbian media controls, our assets include:

- excellent daily contact with key media;
- high media interest in Kosovo and U.S. policy toward Serbia;
- existing delivery vehicles with established credibility (such as the electronically transmitted Washington File, containing key U.S. foreign policy documents);
- modest production capability in-country (USIS Belgrade does video and audio tapes as well as modest printing);
- Information Resource Centers (electronically sophisticated, they link key audiences with information via CD-ROMs, Internet sites, proprietary data bases, written reference materials);
- prior and current support of independent media (for instance the B-92 radio network expanded greatly with the support of \$600,000 in funding split among Soros, the EU, and

- SEED funds administered by USIA; The B92 TV network is supported by USAID); audiences attentive to foreign broadcasts (examples include the popularity of Tirana television in Kosovo, the popularity of “Open Studio” in Serbia, including Kosovo).

Elements of the action plan follow:

- do **telepress conferences in Belgrade and Pristina**, linking local journalists and Washington news-makers via phone. TPCs could also link in-country newsmakers like Amb. Walker with journalists in Pristina, Belgrade, or Podgorica for example;
- give **interviews at local radio stations in Serbia**. Embassy Belgrade officers traveling outside Belgrade would make this a component of their travel. Local radio stations controlled by the Opposition can air these interviews and not violate the media law.
- work closely with **non-USG external broadcasters**, whose programs are followed by viewers in Serbia, to provide broadcast content. This would include **Tirana and also Podgorica**, if Montenegro successfully launches its planned satellite television service directed toward Serbia. Even if not picked up by local TV stations, these broadcasts will reach viewers who have satellite dishes at home, a particularly significant number in Kosovo.
- produce low-tech **radio and TV spots** at USIS Belgrade for distribution to independent radio and TV broadcasters. We believe B-92 and others would help with distribution. Participants would include prepared VIPs and local newsmakers, such as Ambs. Hill, Miles, and Walker.
- conduct **brief radio interviews with Washington newsmakers**, using USIS staff. Provide tapes to radio stations with dub-over into local language (or let stations do dubbing). Objective is to provide short segments for incorporation into local news programs.
- **translate a highly selective compilation of policy relevant material each week and circulate to media outlets for their use**. Recipients would include papers, magazines, radio, television, wire services. Material would be distributed with the Washington File both personally and by mail. The objective is to establish a reputation for quality and relevance in a format that can be used quickly by media without in-house translation capability. Emphasis would be on material not bound to twenty-four hour news cycle.
- **continue distribution of the Washington File to media recipients;**
- **continue to maintain English-language web site** (USIA’s “I” Bureau) of material on Kosovo.
- continue to maintain **web site of material translated into Albanian and Serbian**

(Regional Program Office, Vienna).

- provide material selectively via **e-mail and listservs** from Washington, Vienna, and from the Belgrade and Pristina Information Resource Centers. **Internet access in Serbia is limited. Nevertheless the sum total of all these electronic efforts can have a modest impact.**
- **provide USG policy makers to appear on USG-supported media.** In the case of VOA, VOA-TV, and "Washington Window," we would be dealing with programs on the news side of the fire wall. There the emphasis would be on providing individuals for interviews. We would not be in a position to schedule or order specific programs. The appeal of these TV programs to viewers with satellite dishes and the initiation of VOA medium wave broadcasting from Durres makes both these options worth pursuing.
- organize meetings with editors and correspondents, particularly of independent media, when newsmakers are in town.
- make material available to KVM, as appropriate
- if Kosovo agreement is reached, publish in local language versions (RPO Vienna)
- **cooperate with KVM Radio** (provide material, help set up interviews, etc.) to the extent desired by OSCE. If there is sensitivity about the USG role, we could propose that **every** OSCE member state be encouraged to cooperate with the radio to make it relevant and successful.

For this plan to work, we must support external as well as local media, since the FRY could close down independent media. This means **Washington policy makers would have to make time available, often on short notice.**



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 7, 1998

MEMORANDUM

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Kosovo Executive Committee

FROM: Leslie Gerson - Human Rights and Democracy SWG

SUBJECT: Kosovo Elections Update

OSCE Assessment Mission

At strong U.S. urging, an initial OSCE elections assessment team visited Kosovo and Belgrade from November 22-26. This team, organized by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, made a series of recommendations on the supervision of elections. These include:

- The OSCE must be the agency responsible for development of a voters list that all sides can agree upon. The OSCE should adjudicate all voter identification questions;
- The OSCE KVM should establish a joint working group, with participation of all sides, to deal with the voter registration process;
- The framework for the elections should be defined as part of any settlement. The settlement should establish a Kosovo Electoral Commission, determine if Kosovars outside the province can vote; establish an amnesty law to encourage returns, and address media access and fairness issues to safeguard a free elections process;
- A census would be time consuming and would considerably slow down the electoral process; and
- The OSCE KVM should immediately conduct tests in selected villages and towns to determine the state of voter lists and elections infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the OSCE/ODIHR has begun direct contacts with Ambassador Hill and has begun drafting an elections annex to the settlement agreement.

German Deputy for Democratic Development

The OSCE named German Diplomat Bern Borchardt as Director of the OSCE KVM's Human Dimension/Democratic Development Office. Borchardt, according to the ODIHR assessment team, has no prior elections experience, and the ODIHR has confidentially stated that it will be important for technical experts to advise Borchardt and keep technical preparations running smoothly.

IFES Follow-Up to Electoral Assessment

Following the ODIHR assessment mission, elections planning has been carried forward by USAID-funded consultants from the Washington-based NGO International Foundation for Election System (IFES) at the request of ODIHR. IFES will provide a full timeline and budget for the Kosovo election, setting forth minimum floors in terms of time and resources, on or about December 14. Initial findings from the team, currently on the ground and working out of KVM offices, include:

- Voter registration will be complicated and time consuming, given Serb and Albanian differences. IFES has prepared a draft voter registration timeline and budget that calls for 125 days from agreement on elections rules to election day and a \$3.9 million price tag;
- There are likely to be differing political approaches within the KVM on the extent of OSCE intrusiveness in the elections process;
- The OSCE should configure elections that conform to human rights standards and ethical principles;
- Issues such as determining the details of elections supervision and rules and regulations will have to be deferred until the conclusion of settlement negotiations; and
- The OSCE has been recommending personnel for medium and low level positions in the KVM's elections unit. Twenty-seven resumes have been submitted by OSCE's Vienna headquarters, but only three of these demonstrate any elections experience at all, with the remainder being former military personnel. IFES should second five senior level elections experts immediately.


Recommendations

- It is essential that, in the absence of a settlement, we "frontload" as much as we can in the elections process. USAID should provide funding for the immediate deployment of IFES elections experts, and provide support for IFES efforts to convene a two-week meeting of all parties involved to draft elections rules immediately after a settlement is announced.
- We should ensure that Central and East European elections experts are brought into the process -- the Association of Central and East European Electoral Officials could provide assessments of elections preparation at critical points. This would provide a crucial element of "peer review."
- The findings of the OSCE electoral assessment team should be communicated to the negotiating team. The settlement should incorporate the OSCE's elections recommendations as soon as possible. We must make sure that elections are called for in a time frame that is technically feasible -- not elections for elections sake.
- The OSCE must ensure that all parties are represented in the elections process, including on all electoral committees from the beginning; failure to do so in Bosnia gave a significant advantage to the three most nationalistic parties -- an advantage they are still benefitting from today.
- The Human Rights and Democracy SWG should closely monitor the OSCE/ODIHR's work on drafting an elections annex to the settlement.
- There are wide discrepancies within the OSCE about the degree of intrusiveness of the OSCE's elections work and degree of deference to the Serbian government -- there should be none. Any settlement document should define exactly what we mean by "supervising" Kosovo elections.
- Special attention must be devoted to media issues; either the IPI or Democracy and Human Rights working group should develop a configuration for a Media Commission that could address media issues before, during and after election day. Without increased freedom of the press, propaganda and intimidation could be the biggest election factors -- with devastating results.
- OSCE/ODIHR must ensure a strong role for the OSCE (preferably the KVM director) in the Kosovo Elections Commission. This authority should be written into Annex 4. The OSCE (KVM Director) should have the power to break deadlocks if established deadlines are not met or, at the very least, have the explicit power to make international assistance contingent upon meeting these deadlines.



OSCE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION
Office of the Deputy Head of Mission – Democratic Development

Organizational Chart – Phase I



- Annex
- KUM Director
- Media Component / Commission
- Rules & Regs

- Paper
 - How quickly can we prepare post-elect
 - " " " " " " pre-elect
 - Pol. 1

8 Dec 98
ExCom

USAID's OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES (OTI)

Date: November 30, 1998

Contact: David Costello 202-712-5231

**Updated Talking Points For Expanded Independent Media
Support In Serbia and Montenegro ...**

SERBIA & MONTENEGRO

Regardless of how Mr. Milosevic complies on Kososvo, he (and his YUL and Radical allies) are making it increasingly more difficult for independent media organizations to operate in the FRY. Principally, Serbia's restrictive new Media Law, which allows low-level magistrates to issue extraordinary penalties within 24 hours, must be overturned.

Initiatives Already Underway:

* Diplomatic and other efforts aimed at increasing the "space" (legal and otherwise) and resources available to independent media in Serbia and Montenegro must be expanded.

* USAID and other donor supported activities:

- A campaign to overturn Serbia's new media law.

- Petition Drives - 1) An ongoing effort to collect 15,000 signatures in order to place changes in the new media law before Serbia's parliament. 2) A planned (we're strongly encouraging) effort to collect 100,000 signatures in order to place a referendum on the issue before the people of Serbia.

- Billboards and PSAs calling attention to the recent crackdown and its implications.

- Place large screen televisions in Belgrade Cika Lubina (American Center) street level windows to broadcast banned foreign news and domestic documentaries.

- Fund town criers to read news in the main square (Trg Republic).

- Banned Journalist Tours - Supporting Serbian journalists from the sanctioned newspapers and radio stations to tour the country giving interviews to Serbia's various independent outlets about their plight.

- Legal Appeals - ANEM, The Media Center and the Association of Independent Print Journalists have all filed suit (separately) in Serbia's constitutional court to over turn the new media law.

- Establish a "contingency fund" to allow ANEM to respond to

Support
for

members needs for legal defense needs and protest program production.

- Publishing in Montenegro - Efforts are underway yet they are being thwarted by Serbian security and judicial authorities. Publishing in the RS would likely run into greater difficulties.

Assistance Options Worth Exploring:

* Fund opposition municipalities' Press Officers Associations to counter YUL and Radical Party assaults in the provinces.

overija
* Assist in the creation of an "Anti-Fascism Bloc" (in conjunction with Serbia's Anti-War campaign) to produce PSAs, web pages, jingles, video clips, and other products.

* Beaming in more news and information from abroad (and/or from overhead):

- Satellite TV and Radio (if analogue) broadcasts. Approximately 10% of all Serbian households have access to satellite transmissions (70%+ in Kosovo).

- Television and Radio Broadcasts - Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia (the RS), Croatia (Eastern Slavonia), Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, etc... We could possibly up the transmission power (and "foot prints") of USAID/OTI supported radio and television stations in the Eastern RS and Eastern Slavonia to penetrate further into the FRY. We could also possibly "tweak" the programming of these stations with respect to the provision of desired information. USAID/OTI currently supports radio stations in Vukovar, Mirkoci, Bijeljina, Zvornick, Bratunac, Skelani, Rudo and Trebinje. Much of this of course would depend upon the degree to which these stations had appropriate licenses and were free of intimidation.

* Augment VOA, RFE RL and other medium wave broadcasts from neighboring countries.

* Expand Internet connections, satellite up-links, and cell phone transmission with Serbian based journalists and independent radio stations. It's possible, yet fear would likely preclude much of this.

* Establish more secure media broadcast footholds in Kosovo, the RS, Eastern Slavonia, Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

* Utilize pirate transmitters located within Serbia and Montenegro. Many of these could be small mobile "back pack" transmitters. The implications and dangers are obvious.

* PSYOPS and other "special" assets. Unknown, yet indigenous assets are likely to be more effective.

KOSOVO

Media and information in Kosovo is both limited and biased. The arbitrary denial of broadcast licenses and frequencies has prevented indigenous electronic broadcast outlets from operating and Serbia's new media has restrained Kosovo's independent print press. If the situation is to improve markedly, greater diplomatic pressure will have to be exercised.

Background:

Electronic -

- * RTS and RTV Tirana predominate. Kosovo Serbs rely almost exclusively on RTS for their news and information, and Kosovo Albanians get most of their news and information from RTV Tirana. RTV Tirana reaches an estimated 90% of Kosovo's Albanian population via both satellite (18:35 - 20:35 each day) and direct microwave transmission (which reaches up to 30 % of Kosovo's entire population, mostly in the southwest). RTV Tirana radio transmission reaches up to 60% of all Kosovars.

- * VOA, RFE, Deutsche Welle, and BBC Albanian (and Serbian) language broadcasts are all regularly followed and respected (by Kosovars) in Kosovo. Albania-related news, however, often dominates. Deutsche Welle, because of its Kosovo-based correspondents appears to be the most popular and the BBC is said to be the most objective. VOA's 11:00 and 11:30 PM Serbian and Bosnian language television programs are also reportedly popular; with the Bosnian broadcast considered more favorably. Medium wave programs do not appear to have a large following.

- * There are currently no direct, indigenous, independent broadcasters in Kosovo (only Radio 21 via the Internet). Radio 21 and RTV Koha are planning daily 15 minute broadcasts via satellite, once they've completed a BBC sponsored training course.

Note: An estimated 70% of Kosovo's Albanian population have access to satellite broadcasts.

Print

- * Koha Ditore - Koha Ditore (Daily Times) is a privately-owned, Pristina-based daily that is the most read and established of Kosovo's Albanian language newspaper. Moreover, it is independent, at times balanced and biased, and politically astute. Its publisher is Veton Surroi (the sometime negotiator and ambitious pol). The hit on Surroi (aside from his considerable ambition) are his ties to the old Yugoslav elite. KD has an estimated circulation of just under 40,000.

- * Bujku - Bujku (Farmer) is affiliated with the LDK. Its Kosovo's oldest and least independent daily newspaper. Its

principal function seems to be that of articulating and explaining the LDK's (Rugova's) slant and position on most relevant stories and issues. Although its circulation is modest (approximately 7,000), its influence is considerably greater given that it is widely read by the LDK's principal community operatives.

* Kosova Sot - Kosova Sot (Kosovo Today) is Kosovo's newest (less than 2 months old) privately owned, Pristina based daily newspaper and relies almost exclusively upon the wire services for its news stories (i.e., BETA, Reuters, the Internet, etc.). Estimated circulation: 18,000.

* Zeri - Zeri (Voice) is a privately owned, Pristina-based weekly newspaper. It is modeled after Podgorica's Monitor and Belgrade's Vreme, and it is said to be Kosovo's most balanced and professional independent journal. Estimated circulation: less than 5,000.

Note: Belgrade based newspapers are widely available in Pristina and some (the more balanced independents) are even described as believable.

Options:

* American and other diplomatic efforts aimed at increasing the "space" (legal and otherwise) and resources available to independent media in Kosovo must be expanded. More diplomatic pressure should be applied, under OSCE/KVM's elections mandate, to recover Kosovo's internationally registered frequencies (under International Telecommunications Union agreements that have been violated by Belgrade since Kosovo's autonomy was revoked in 1989) for use by independent broadcast media in Kosovo.

* USAID and other donors have already proposed setting-up indigenous transmission and relay facilities for RTV Koha, RTV 21, and Radio Kontakt. All are Pristina-based, all have existing broadcast production capability, and all are likely to be reasonably balanced and independent. Radio Kontakt, a previously banned Serbian language broadcaster, has agreed to begin broadcasting as soon as its new equipment arrives. RTV 21 has expressed some willingness to press forward, yet is likely to await a greater international presence. And, Koha has said that they will wait for permission from the Serbian authorities.

* Support the rapid expansion, development and distribution of indigenous independent print media in Kosovo. Local, community based newspapers should be a priority.

* Back the expanded presence of independent Serbian media in Kosovo (i.e., ANEM and independent newspapers).

* Assist the OSCE KVM mission in setting up radio and television broadcast systems in Kosovo (preferably via its access to

existing authority controlled facilities). Due to expected delaying tactics on the part of the Serbian authorities, indigenous media support and OSCE media support efforts should proceed concurrently.

- * Expand ongoing USAID and other donor media training programs in Kosovo.

- * Support the development of more programming for Kosovo's existing cable systems and targeted satellite broadcasts (e.g., VOA, Albanian Language CNN, etc.).

- * The OSCE KVM should be encouraged to do all that it can to support the development and expansion of independent media in Kosovo (i.e., from the periodic stationing of KVM staff members at indigenous radio and television locations to the monitoring of relevant media broadcasts and publications).

- * Determine feasibility of establishing a satellite up-link facility in Kosovo for use by the OSCE and Kosovo's indigenous independent media.

- * Expedite the placement of a 5KW radio transmitter in north eastern Montenegro (and Albania and Macedonia). Work, which would allow full FM coverage of Kosovo and other portions of southern Serbia, is already underway. The challenge will be to ensure that a majority of the broadcasts are done in Albanian.

- * Support the creation of a network of independent radio stations in Kosovo.

- * Backing for expanded Internet access in Kosovo.

- * Provide the legal framework for a non-restrictive media law for Kosovo. Language already available through analysis done by DC law firm Covington & Burling.

70%
coverage

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	For Kosovo Executive Committee from David Wippman. Subject: Sanctions. (4 pages)	12/01/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	For James Steinberg from Greg Schulte. Subject: Tomorrow's DC on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9821014] [See also bm415_007, 2006-0325-F and vz6250_003a, this case] (5 pages)	11/16/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	To Permanent Representatives and Heads of Mission of the Three Invited Countries from Secretary General. Subject: Proposed Messages to FRY and Kosovar Albanians with Annexes I to III. [SG(98)1175] [NATO] [Duplicate at vz6250_003b, this case] (6 pages)	11/16/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. cable	Re: Kosovo Negotiations and Implementation. [Duplicate of vz5800_003, 2019-0897-F and vz6250_003c, this case] (4 pages)	11/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. paper	International Donor Strategy for Kosovo. [Duplicate at vz6250_003d, this case] (7 pages)	11/16/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. paper	Getting Better Leverage on the KLA. (8 pages)	11/23/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. map	[Kosovo Liberation Army, July 1998] (1 page)	07/00/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. paper	Confronting the Impact on Kosvo of Northeastern Albania. (4 pages)	11/19/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. paper	Getting better Leverage on the KLA [Not a duplicate of 006a] (7 pages)	11/20/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. map	[Duplicate of 006b] (1 page)	07/00/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. paper	Confronting the Impact of Kosovo on Northern Albania [Duplicate of 006c] (4 pages)	11/19/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]