

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

G-8 / Allied Diplomacy [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1709

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	7	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	To Jim Steinberg from Jim Pardew. Subject: Ivanov Force Proposal. (1 page)	05/06/1999	P1/b(1), b(6)
001b. note	[Map?] Jim Pardew and George Krol from Steve Sestanovich. (1 page)	05/06/1999	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Subject: Kosovo Roadmap. [Duplicate of vz6319_003b, this case] (11 pages)	05/13/1999	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Evaluating Russia's G-8 Proposals Against NATO's Conditions. (4 pages)	05/02/1999	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Diplomatic Strategy paper for PC. (1 page)	04/01/1999	P1/b(1)
005. email	Gregory Schulte to @NSA National Security Advisor. Subject: Greek-Czech Proposal on Kosovo. (1 page)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

G-8 / Allied Diplomacy [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6320

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998 and 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998,

Having considered the briefing of the Secretary General of 5 April 1999 on the humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as in the neighbouring states of Albania and FYROM, caused by the arrival of deported persons from Kosovo, Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia,

Deeply concerned about the grave humanitarian situation caused by the systematic expulsion of the Kosovo-Albanian population,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo-albanian population and other ethnic groups in Kosovo as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region,

Affirming that the unresolved situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a continuing threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately take all necessary steps to put an end to killings, expulsions and all human rights violations in Kosovo, Fed. Rep. Of Yugoslavia,
 2. Demands also that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia withdraw all Yugoslav military and special security forces as well as paramilitary and irregular units from Kosovo and cooperate in a verification of this process,
- Recognizes the need for the deployment of an international security force to provide a safe environment for all ethnic groups in Kosovo as Yugoslav forces withdraw, to allow all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety and demands that the FRY cooperate in this deployment and the immediate return of the Kosovo-Albanian population,

4. Calls on the Kosovo-Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist actions, and insists on the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army as international forces enter and assume responsibility for the security of areas,
5. Calls upon NATO-Member States to suspend all military action once the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia verifiably implemented the demands mentioned above,
6. Emphasizes the need of coordinated humanitarian relief operations and therefore demands that the Federal Rep. Of Yugoslavia cooperate with the international organisations for humanitarian aid and to allow unimpeded access,
7. Emphasizes the need for peaceful negotiations about a settlement of the Kosovo problem which should be based on the Rambouillet acquis,
8. Authorizes the member States to take all necessary measures to organize a transitional Administration of Kosovo, acting under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, to guarantee effective protection of the returning displaced and deported civilian population and all other inhabitants of Kosovo until a political settlement is agreed.
9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter

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001b. note	[Map?] Jim Pardew and George Krol from Steve Sestanovich. (1 page)	05/06/1999	P1/b(1)
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UNCLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Special Advisor
to the President and Secretary of State
for Kosovo and Dayton Implementation

OK

Department of State * Room 6219 * Washington, DC 20520

Fax Cover Sheet

DATE: May 13, 1999

TIME:

TO: Greg Schulte

FAX: 456-9150

FROM: PARDUE

PHONE: [1] (202) 647-0924

FAX: [1] (202) 647-0939

RE:

Number of pages including cover sheet: 17

Message:

Greg

This is the mark up of the UK
draft. We will FAX to Sandy V tonight
for discussions w/ Quint Tomorrow.

Pete Hinz has the
action

647-3405

UNCLASSIFIED

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Clinton Library

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Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Weiss, Andrew S.
Sent: Friday, April 23, 1999 8:14 AM
To: @KOSOVO
Cc: @PRESS - Public Affairs; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
Subject: Text of Cherno-Milosevic "peace (sic) plan" [UNCLASSIFIED]

Russia: 'Text' of Chernomyrdin-Milosevic[0] Peace Plan

LD2304104799 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1029 GMT 23 Apr 99

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 23 (Itar-Tass) -- Follows the agreed text of the press release on the talks in Belgrade between the Russian president's envoy for Yugoslavia settlement, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic [0] in Belgrade on Thursday:

"President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic[0] has met in Belgrade with the special representative of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Viktor Chernomyrdin.

"Viktor Chernomyrdin has laid out the position of Russia determined at the meeting which President Boris Yeltsin held on April 19, 1999 in order to return the solution of the problem to peaceful lines.

"The meeting (with the Yugoslav president) lasted for over eight hours.

"A very substantial exchange of opinions has been held.

"The Russian side has reaffirmed its principled position about the need for immediate cessation of the missile and bomb strikes, as well as of violence and repressions.

"The sides have considered in detail conditions:

- safe return of refugees and displaced people,
- provision of humanitarian aid,
- resumption of the work the political framework of the future autonomy of (Kosovo) province,
- feasible reduction of the presence of military and police forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo that would concur with withdrawal of NATO units concentrated at the borders of Yugoslavia.
- international assistance to restoration of the economy of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo and the region as a whole.
- as well as the international presence on agreement with Yugoslavia under the aegis of the U.N. with participation of Russia.

"The meeting was attended by President of the Republic of Serbia Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Jivadin Jovanovic, Chairman of the Serbian government Mirko Marjanovic, Russian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yuri Kotov and other Russian and Yugoslav officials." [Description of Source: ITAR-TASS -- Main government information agency.]

G8- Ad Ref

The following principles must be implemented to stop the fighting and resolve the Kosovo crisis.

1. A prompt and verifiable end to all repressive and offensive action against the people of Kosovo.
2. The withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police, and paramilitary forces of FRY/Serbia.
3. The presence of an international security force to ensure the safety of all the inhabitants of Kosovo.
4. The unconditional return of all refugees and deportees and displaced persons and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid.
5. Putting in place a political framework for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords, including substantial self-government for Kosovo, while respecting the territorial integrity of the FRY and the demilitarization of the UCK.

These principles are recommended to the G-8 Ministers meeting for the purpose of discussing Kosovo and adopting this set of principles. The ministers would discuss the introduction of these principles in a Chapter 7 UNSCR which all G-8 members of the Security Council would co-sponsor.

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages - 1

To	Greg	From	Jim Dubbins
Dept./Agency		Phone #	
Fax #	456-9150	Fax #	

10: Larry Carter

Kosovo Peace Plan

Ludwig Cimmer

1. Step 1

G 8 Ministerial meeting agrees that the list of demands to Belgrade worked up by the Dresden meeting of the G 8 Political Directors is to be turned into a Security Council Resolution of the United Nations.

The following points would be determined:

- The point in time for the start of the withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces. Establishment of the point in time by which the withdrawal must be completed. In addition the verification of the withdrawal (see point 4).
- In parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, commitment of UCK (KLA) to stop all conflict and not to change its current deployment.
- Establishment of an international peace force under Chapter VII with the principles: robust; no double key; strict rules of engagement.
- Start of work of the international aid organisations in Kosovo as soon as possible, in any case at the latest by the time the Yugoslav forces withdraw.
- Once the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces is complete, deportees and refugees return to Kosovo, and the first reconstruction and rehabilitation measures are carried out.
- Placing of Kosovo under a transitional administration authorized by the United Nations until a final political resolution is achieved.

2. Step 2: Consideration by the UN Security Council

This agreement should on the same day, or as soon as possible be turned into a Chapter VII Resolution in the UN Security Council.

3. Step 3: Implementation

- The adoption of the Resolution will be communicated to the Belgrade authorities. If the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces begins there will be a 24 hour break in the air strikes. To the extent that this occurs, the break will be extended for the period required for the withdrawal of the forces. If the withdrawal of the forces has been achieved within the required time period the air strikes will be permanently suspended.
- In parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces: implementation of the requirement on the UCK (KLA) to cease fire, and not to leave existing positions until the peace keeping force arrives in Kosovo. At this point in time the disarming and demilitarisation of the UCK (KLA) begin.
- Before the international peace force has been fully deployed and parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, fast, mobile advance forces of the States contributing to the international peace force move successively into Kosovo.
- KVM again takes up its verification responsibilities under the new conditions.
- Transitional administration authorised by the UN.

4. In parallel to this: military safeguarding above Kosovo and outside Kosovo:

- NATO air forces
- NATO ground forces in FYR Macedonia/ Albania (strength to be determined)

For these parts of the force rules of engagement must be determined.

5. During implementation of the UN Resolution

As quickly as possible, in any case at the latest with the arrival of the advance forces of the international peace force in Kosovo, the international aid organisations begin their work.

6. At the same time as the achievement of the Yugoslav troop withdrawal:

Start of return of deportees and refugees

Start of the first reconstruction and rehabilitation measures.

Hurley, C. Michael

From: WHSR
Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 1999 12:52 PM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Miller, Laurel E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Uyehara, Margaret A.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: YUGOSLAVIA-GERMANY

CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: Reuters
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 990414122850

a2151

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-GERMANY 4THLD

^FOCUS-Germany tries to win Russia for Kosovo plan
(Adds U.S. reaction paras 6-8, NATO para 9)

By Douglas Busvine

BONN, April 14 (Reuters) - Germany launched a new peace plan on Wednesday aimed at bridging the gap between the West and Russia over how to get Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo and police a settlement of the Balkan crisis.

Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said Russia had "almost fully agreed" to his plan, under which NATO would suspend air strikes for 24 hours if Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic started pulling troops out of Kosovo.

But Fischer conceded Russia still had concerns over the make-up of an international peacekeeping force, which under his scheme would be backed up by a United Nations mandate.

"The most difficult problem is the composition," he said.

Fischer's deputy, Guenter Verheugen, told the European Parliament in Strasbourg there was "broad international agreement" to the idea of a temporary ceasefire.

But the United States, which has provided the main firepower for NATO's three-week-old bombardment and wants NATO to lead a peacekeeping operation, gave a guarded welcome to the plan.

White House spokesman Joe Lockhart said the plan was "in the spirit" of the conditions the Atlantic Alliance had set out for ending the conflict. But he insisted the bombing would go on until Belgrade accepted NATO's demands it pull out of Kosovo and let refugees return under international protection.

NATO spokesman Jamie Shea described the German blueprint as "useful and necessary" but said it had no official status yet.

The initiative marked a new step in Germany's return to a bigger role in global diplomacy after half a century being kept on the sidelines by strict limits on its military strength.

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has put German forces into combat for the first time since World War Two, giving Bonn a stronger voice in defining diplomatic moves, analysts said.

At the same time, he and Fischer are keen to show strongly pacifist elements among supporters of their own Social Democratic and Green coalition parties that they do want peace.

Under the German plan, NATO could make its ceasefire permanent if Milosevic pulled his troops out of the Serbian province before a set deadline.

An international peacekeeping force backed by a U.N. mandate would then be deployed in Kosovo, enabling hundreds of thousands of mainly Moslem ethnic Albanian refugees to return home.

The German plan foresaw a meeting of foreign ministers from the Group of Eight major industrial powers -- the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Canada and Russia -- to

draft a U.N. resolution formalising the arrangements.

But Fischer said a G8 meeting might not be needed and the resolution could be finalised at an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council, where Russia has a right of veto.

Germany was expected to put its proposals to an informal summit of European Union leaders in Brussels later attended by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Bonn is hoping Annan will play a key role in bringing Moscow on board. But German officials said it was too early to ask him formally to assume a mediating role.

Schroeder, addressing the European Parliament, promised the EU would reward Russia for its efforts to help bring peace.

"I'm firmly convinced that Russia will act as a stabilising factor in Europe," he said.

The Bonn plan would also require ethnic Albanian separatist fighters from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to disarm.

The U.N. would then set up an interim administration in Kosovo enabling hundreds of thousands of refugees driven out of the territory by Yugoslav forces to return home.

The pullout of Yugoslav forces would, Germany said, clear the way for a major Balkan conference which would seek to involve both the U.N. and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in cr

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Butler, Lawrence E.
Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 1999 11:33 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @KOSOVO
Subject: German Kosovo peace plan ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Importance: High

Message Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Embassy Bonn is faxing the entire text -- here are the highlights:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 001942

E.O. 12958: DECL:4/14/09

TAGS: PREL, NATO, EUN, MARR, PARM, SR, GM

SUBJECT: TFSR02: "FISCHER KOSOVO PEACE PLAN"

CLASSIFIED BY FLETCHER BURTON, CHIEF EXTERNAL UNIT, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(C)~~ GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE CONTACTS PROVIDED US APRIL 14 WITH A COPY OF THE PAPER OUTLINING FM FISCHER'S PROPOSAL FOR A "KOSOVO PEACE PLAN." WE NOTE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN WERE WIDELY LEAKED IN BONN TO MAJOR MEDIA OUTLETS AND MOST OF THE DETAILS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN APRIL 14 NEWS STORIES.

2. ~~(C)~~ BEGIN TEXT OF GERMAN MFA PAPER (ORIGINAL IN ENGLISH -- NOTE INTERNAL PARAGRAPH NUMBERING):

KOSOVO PEACE PLAN

1. STEP 1

G8 MINISTERIAL MEETING AGREES THAT THE LIST OF DEMANDS TO BELGRADE WORKED UP BY THE DRESDEN MEETING OF THE G8 POLITICAL DIRECTORS IS TO BE TURNED INTO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE FOLLOWING POINTS WOULD BE DETERMINED:

- THE POINT IN TIME FOR THE START OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL MILITARY, POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POINT IN TIME BY WHICH THE WITHDRAWAL MUST BE COMPLETED. IN ADDITION THE VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL (SEE POINT 4).

- IN PARALLEL TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE YUGOSLAV FORCES, COMMITMENT OF UCK (KLA) TO STOP ALL CONFLICT AND NOT TO CHANGE ITS CURRENT DEPLOYMENT.

- ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE UNDER CHAPTER VII WITH THE PRINCIPLES: ROBUST, NO DOUBLE KEY, STRICT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

- START OF WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANIZATIONS IN KOSOVO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN ANY CASE AT THE LATEST BY THE TIME THE YUGOSLAV FORCES WITHDRAW.

- ONCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF YUGOSLAV FORCES IS COMPLETE,

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 4/22/2024
2008-0994-F.3

DEPORTEES AND REFUGEES RETURN TO KOSOVO, AND THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION MEASURES ARE CARRIED OUT.

- PLACING OF KOSOVO UNDER A TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS UNTIL A FINAL POLITICAL RESOLUTION IS ACHIEVED.

2. STEP 2: CONSIDERATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ON THE SAME DAY, OR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BE TURNED INTO A CHAPTER VII RESOLUTION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

3. STEP 3: IMPLEMENTATION

- THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE BELGRADE AUTHORITIES. IF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE YUGOSLAV FORCES BEGINS THERE WILL BE A 24 HOUR BREAK IN THE AIR STRIKES. TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS OCCURS, THE BREAK WILL BE EXTENDED FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCES. IF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCES HAS BEEN ACHIEVED WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME PERIOD THE AIR STRIKES WILL BE PERMANENTLY SUSPENDED.

- IN PARALLEL TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE YUGOSLAV FORCES, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REQUIREMENT ON THE UCK (KLA) TO CEASE FIRE, AND NOT TO LEAVE EXISTING POSITIONS UNTIL THE PEACE KEEPING FORCE ARRIVES IN KOSOVO. AT THIS POINT IN TIME THE DISARMING AND DEMILITARIZATION OF THE UCK (KLA) BEGIN.

- BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE HAS BEEN FULLY DEPLOYED AND PARALLEL TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE YUGOSLAV FORCES, FAST, MOBILE ADVANCE FORCES OF THE STATES CONTRIBUTING TO THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE MOVE SUCCESSIVELY INTO KOSOVO.

- KVM AGAIN TAKES UP ITS VERIFICATION RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE NEW CONDITIONS.

- TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZED BY THE UN.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 001942

E.O. 12958: DECL:4/14/09

TAGS: PREL, NATO, EUN, MARR, PARM, SR, GM

SUBJECT: TFSR02: "FISCHER KOSOVO PEACE PLAN"

4. IN PARALLEL TO THIS: MILITARY SAFEGUARDING ABOVE KOSOVO AND OUTSIDE KOSOVO:

- NATO AIR FORCES

- NATO GROUND FORCES IN FYR MACEDONIA/ALBANIA (STRENGTH TO BE DETERMINED)

FOR THESE PARTS OF THE FORCE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MUST BE DETERMINED.

5. DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTION

AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, IN ANY CASE AT THE LATEST WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE FORCES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE IN KOSOVO, THE INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANIZATIONS BEGIN THEIR WORK.

6. AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ACHIEVEMENT
OF THE YUGOSLAV TROOP WITHDRAWAL:

START OF RETURN OF DEPORTEES AND REFUGEES

START OF THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION
MEASURES.

END TEXT OF GERMAN PAPER.

3. (U) TIRANA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. KORNBLUM

(2)

Speaking Notes

- The meeting of the G8 Political Directors in Dresden has opened up a perspective which we must now use rapidly and determinedly.
- The Rambouillet Agreement provided for residual elements in Kosovo of the Yugoslav military and, for a transitional period, Serbian police. These residual elements were the basis for the proposed deployment of K-FOR in Kosovo at the strength-level and in the configuration foreseen.
- In the meantime this basis has fallen away. Our agreed declaration of 7 April, the declaration of the UN Secretary General of 9 April, and the non-paper of the G 8 Political Directors of 9 April all, in accord with each other, demand the withdrawal of all military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. Only in the case of the demand of the UN Secretary General would a withdrawal of the police not be required.
- The G 8 Foreign Ministers should meet soon and come to an agreement on a formula for a withdrawal of forces, and on the other four points of the declarations referred to, as well as on a transitional administration by the United Nations.
- The agreement should on the same day, or at the latest on the next day, be turned into a Chapter VII Resolution of the UN Security Council.
- The following points would need to be determined in this Resolution:
 - The point in time for the start of the withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces. Establishment of the point in time by which the withdrawal must be completed. In addition, the verification of the withdrawal by the peace force.
 - In parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, commitment of UCK (KLA) to stop all conflict and not to change its current deployment.
 - Establishment of an international peace keeping force under Chapter VII. This is to be a UN force, with the principles: robust, no double key, strict rules of engagement.
 - Establishment that as soon as possible, in any case at the latest by the time the Yugoslav forces withdraw, the international aid organisations will take up their work in Kosovo.

- (3)
- Establishment that once the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces is complete, deportees and refugees will start their return to Kosovo, and the first reconstruction and rehabilitation measures will be carried out.
 - Kosovo will be placed under the transitional administration of the United Nations.
 - With the adoption of the resolution a 24 hour break in the air strikes will begin. During this break the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces must begin. To the extent that the withdrawal of the forces has taken place during the required time period, the air strikes will be permanently suspended.

Explanatory note

- NATO air forces will remain over Kosovo after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces.
- NATO ground forces will remain in FYR Macedonia and Albania.

These forces will remain available for the monitoring of the permanent withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. Should the Yugoslav forces behave contrary to the Resolution, they remain available to defend against such behaviour.

(4)

Kosovo Peace Plan1. Step 1

G 8 Ministerial meeting agrees that the list of demands to Belgrade worked up by the Dresden meeting of the G 8 Political Directors is to be turned into a Security Council Resolution of the United Nations.

The following points would be determined:

- The point in time for the start of the withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces. Establishment of the point in time by which the withdrawal must be completed. In addition the verification of the withdrawal (see point 4).
- In parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, commitment of UCK (KLA) to stop all conflict and not to change its current deployment.
- Establishment of an international peace force under Chapter VII. This is to be a UN peace force, with the principles: robust; no double key; strict rules of engagement.
- Start of work of the international aid organisations in Kosovo as soon as possible, in any case at the latest by the time the Yugoslav forces withdraw.
- Once the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces is complete, deportees and refugees return to Kosovo, and the first reconstruction and rehabilitation measures are carried out.
- Placing of Kosovo under a transitional administration of the United Nations until a final political resolution is achieved.

2. Step 2: Consideration by the UN Security Council

This agreement should on the same day, or at the latest on the next day, be turned into a Chapter VII Resolution in the UN Security Council.

3. Step 3

Involvement of the UN Secretary General in immediately following the adoption of the Resolution.

4. Step 4: Implementation



- With the adoption of the Resolution there will be a 24 hour break in the air strikes. During this break the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces must begin. To the extent that this occurs, the break will be extended for the period required for the withdrawal of the forces. If the withdrawal of the forces has been achieved within the required time period the air strikes will be permanently suspended.
- In parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces: implementation of the requirement on the UCK (KLA) to cease fire, and not to leave existing positions until the peace keeping force arrives in Kosovo. At this point in time the disarming and disbanding of the UCK (KLA) begin.
- Before the international peace force has been fully deployed and parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, fast, mobile advance forces of the States contributing to the international peace force of the UN move successively into Kosovo.
- KVM again takes up its verification responsibilities under the new conditions.
- Transitional administration by the UN: basis - territorial integrity of the FRY; the political part of the Rambouillet Agreement, to the extent that it is still applicable.

Should say: KVM
returns to Kosovo
assumes charge of
civil administration.

5. In parallel to this: military safeguarding above Kosovo and outside Kosovo:
- NATO air forces
 - NATO ground forces in FYR Macedonia/ Albania (strength to be determined)
 - no fly zone for Yugoslav air force (Kosovo and security zone)
- For these parts of the force rules of engagement must be determined.

6. During implementation of the UN Resolution
- As quickly as possible, in any case at the latest with the arrival of the advance forces of the international UN peace force in Kosovo, the international aid organisations begin their work. *endorsed*

7. At the same time as the achievement of the Yugoslav troop withdrawal:
- Start of return of deportees and refugees
 - Start of the first reconstruction and rehabilitation measures.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**

S/S #

8

'99 OCT 12 00

MESSAGE NO. 018129 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 3FROM: Pardew
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION German/G 8 PlanTO: (Agency) NSC DELIVER TO: Schulte Extension 456-9151 Room No. 1FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: vr Date: 4/22/2024
2008-0914-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

①

4/11/99

TO: STATE OPS FOR JIM PARDEN (PLS PASS ASAP)
AND WASHFAX TO NSC-GREG SCHULTE
(3 PAGES TOTAL)

FROM: LARRY ROSSIN (WITH SECSTATE PARTY USNATO)

SUBJECT: LATEST VERSION OF G-8 "KOSOVO
PEACE PLAN"

JIM - THIS IS THE LATEST VERSION OF THE
"G-8 PLAN" PAPER, FIRST VERSION OF
WHICH WAS PUT OUT TO QUINT BY
GERMANS AT OOB TODAY HERE.
CHANGE REFLECT QUINT POLDIERS
LUNCH DISCUSSION TODAY, AS JIM
AND I INTERPRETED THEM:

- ITALICIZED BRACKETS ARE GERMAN TEXT
WE DON'T LIKE, OR AT LEAST RESERVED ON

- BOLD IS OUR SUGGESTED TEXT

- CHANGES NEITHER BOLD NOR ITALICIZED
REPRESENT IDEAS, IF NOT PRECISE LANGUAGE,
WE BELIEVE WERE AGREED AT QUINT LUNCH.
WE EXPECT NOW GERMAN VERSION TO BE CIRCULATED
TO QUINT SOON, PROBABLY TOMORROW.
PLS GET TO AMB, PICKERING, OTHERS
APPROPRIATE. *Larry*

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By *VR* NARA, Date *4/22/2024*

2008-0994-F.3

Kosovo Peace Plan

(2)

1. Step 1

G-8 Ministerial meeting agrees that the list of demands to Belgrade worked up by the Dresden meeting of the G-8 Political Directors is to be turned into a Security Council Resolution of the United Nations.

The following points would be determined:

- The point in time for the start of the withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces. Establishment of the point in time by which the withdrawal must be completed. In addition the verification of the withdrawal (see point 4).
- In parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, commitment of UCK (KLA) to stop all conflict [and not to change its current deployment].
- *Pandor* → Deployment to Kosovo
- [Establishment] of an international [peace] security force under Chapter VII with the principles: robust, no double key, strict rules of engagement.
- Start of work of the international aid organizations in Kosovo as soon as possible, in any case at the latest by the time the Yugoslav forces withdraw.
- Once the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces is complete, deportees and refugees return to Kosovo, and the first reconstruction and rehabilitation measures are carried out.
- Placing of Kosovo under a transitional administration authorized by the United Nations until [a final] an agreed political resolution is achieved. [need to say something about process, noting involvement of both sides as was with Rambouillet]

2. Step 2: Consideration by the UN Security Council

This agreement should on the same day, or as soon as possible thereafter, be turned into a Chapter VII Resolution in the Security Council.

13. Step 3

Involvement of the UN Secretary General in immediately following the adoption of the Resolution.]

4. Step 4: Implementation

③

ITALIANS,
GERMANS &
FRENCH LESS SO.UK STANDING
ON THIS

- *[With the adoption of the Resolution there will be a 24 hour break in the air strike. During this break the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces must begin. (continue below)*
or
- *Upon receipt of a positive indication of acceptance of its terms from the FRY following adoption of the Resolution, there will be a 24 hour break in the air strikes. During this break the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces must begin. If this occurs, the break will be extended for X days (note: X being our judgment of how many days full withdrawal should require). If the withdrawal of the forces has been achieved within the required time period the air strikes will be [permanently] indefinitely suspended.]*
- In parallel to the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces: implementation of the requirement on the UCK (KLA) to cease fire *[and not to leave existing positions until the peacekeeping force arrives in Kosovo]*. At this point in time the disarming and demilitarization of the UCK (KLA) begin.
- Before the international *[peace]* security force has been fully deployed and parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces, fast, mobile advance forces of the States contributing to the international peace force move successively into Kosovo.
- KVM *[again]* takes up its *[verification]* civilian implementation responsibilities under the new conditions, as defined in the Rambouillet Accords.
- Transitional administration authorized by the United Nations.

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5. In parallel to this: military safeguarding above Kosovo and outside Kosovo:

- NATO air forces
- NATO ground forces in FYR Macedonia/Albania (strength to be determined)
- *[No-fly zone for Yugoslav air force (Kosovo and security zone)]*

For these parts of the force rules of engagement must be determined.

Pardew
NATO
T454

6. During implementation of the UN Resolution

As quickly as possible, in any case at the latest with the arrival of the advance forces of the international peace force in Kosovo, the international aid organizations begin their work.

7. At the same time as the achievement of the Yugoslav troop withdrawal:

Start of return of deportees and refugees

Start of the first reconstruction and rehabilitation measures.

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, May 17, 1999 10:50 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: ITALY/KOSOVO: PM D'ALEMA'S MAY 16 PROPOSAL (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR THOMAS FOGLIETTA. REASONS

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 171353Z MAY 99
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1849
ORIG: AMEMBASSY ROME
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 3314
TOR: 990517100733 M3860010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROME 003314

E.O. 12958: DECL:05/17/09
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, IT, NATO, SR, AL
SUBJECT: ITALY/KOSOVO: PM D'ALEMA'S MAY 16 PROPOSAL

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR THOMAS FOGLIETTA. REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY AND COMMENT: ITALIAN PM D'ALEMA IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ITALIAN PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION OF THE NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO AND GROWING RESERVATIONS WITHIN HIS GOVERNING COALITION. ON MAY 16, HE PROPOSED A HALT TO NATO AIRSTRIKES IF RUSSIA AND CHINA AGREED TO SUPPORT A UNSC RESOLUTION CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SERBIAN FORCES AND RETURN OF REFUGEES GUARANTEED BY AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, BUT ADDED THAT SERBIAN REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD THEN TRIGGER USE OF GROUND FORCES TO SECURE COMPLIANCE. ITALY, HE SAID, WOULD DO ITS PART IN A GROUND OPERATION. D'ALEMA IS TRYING TO RESPECT ITALY'S COMMITMENTS TO ITS ALLIES WHILE MANAGING THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CHALLENGE. HE GOES BEFORE PARLIAMENT ON WEDNESDAY (MAY 19), AND SOME CONCESSIONS AT THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC ARE LIKELY AS D'ALEMA SEEKS TO MAINTAIN THE UNITY OF HIS COALITION. THE FIRST LADY AND THE AMBASSADOR, OVER DINNER WITH D'ALEMA MAY 14, STRESSED THE NEED FOR ITALY'S CONTINUED SOLIDARITY WITH ITS ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) IN A MAY 16 INTERVIEW IN LEADING DAILY "LA REPUBBLICA," ITALIAN PM D'ALEMA SAID THAT, IF RUSSIA AND CHINA AGREE TO A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VL NARA, Date 4/22/2024
2008-0494-F.3

WOULD CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILOSEVIC'S TROOPS FROM KOSOVO AND RETURN OF REFUGEES GUARANTEED BY AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HALT NATO AIRSTRIKES BEFORE SERBIAN FORCES ACTUALLY BEGAN TO WITHDRAW. (INDEED, A WELL-BACKGROUNDED EDITORIAL BY THE PAPER'S FOUNDER, EUGENIO SCALFARI, SPECIFIES THAT THE HALT, IN D'ALEMA'S EYES, WOULD OCCUR BEFORE THE UNSC ACTUALLY PASSED THE RESOLUTION AND UNSYD ANNAN PRESENTED IT TO MILOSEVIC.) D'ALEMA ALSO ARGUED THAT, IF MILOSEVIC DID NOT ABIDE BY SUCH A UNSC RESOLUTION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO USE GROUND FORCES, AND THAT ITALY WOULD DO ITS PART. D'ALEMA REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED HIS VIEWS IN ADVANCE WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND NATO SYD SOLANA: NATO SPOKESMAN SHEA IS PORTRAYED IN THE PRESS AS HAVING "CORRECTED" AN EARLY MAY 16 CRITICISM OF D'ALEMA (PICKED UP BY WIRE SERVICES) WITH A STATEMENT AT NATO'S REGULAR AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE THAT DAY, WELCOMING INITIATIVES LIKE THOSE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

3. (C) DURING DINNER WITH THE FIRST LADY AND THE AMBASSADOR 5/14, D'ALEMA HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER GROWING RESERVATIONS WITHIN HIS GOVERNING COALITION, FROM OTHER POLITICAL FORCES, AND AMONG THE GENERAL PUBLIC REGARDING NATO AIRSTRIKES. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO BE SEEN AS AN ACTIVE AND CREATIVE ADVOCATE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN KOSOVO. THE FIRST LADY AND THE AMBASSADOR UNDERLINED FORCEFULLY, HOWEVER, THE NEED FOR MILOSEVIC TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP, BY STOPPING THE MASSACRES, WITHDRAWING HIS FORCES, ALLOWING THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND ACCEPTING ALL THE OTHER CONDITIONS SET BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THEY ALSO STRESSED THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY AMONG THE NATO ALLIES IN STAYING THE COURSE.

4. (C) ALSO ON MAY 14, THE AMBASSADOR HAD A TOUGH DISCUSSION WITH FRANCO MARINI, HEAD OF THE CATHOLIC CENTRIST PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPI), ONE OF THE PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION. IN A TELEVISION APPEARANCE MAY 13, MARINI HAD ARGUED FOR A NATO BOMBING HALT AS A MEANS OF FACILITATING THE PEACE PROCESS. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT WE CANNOT HALT UNTIL MILOSEVIC STOPS THE KILLING AND MEETS ALL THE OTHER CONDITIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. TO SECURE THE PEACE, HE ADDED, THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE TO REMAIN FIRM AND UNITED.

5. (C) EMBASSY INTERVIEWED MAY 14 WITH THE

INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE DEMOCRATS OF THE LEFT (DS), THE LEADING PARTY OF THE GOVERNING COALITION. DS FLOOR LEADER IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FABIO MUSSI HAD MADE A DECLARATION THAT WAS BEING PLAYED AS HAVING ECHOED MARINI'S CALL FOR A BOMBING HALT. DS PARTY HEADQUARTERS, WE WERE TOLD, ALREADY HAD CONTACTED MUSSI FOR A CLARIFICATION.

(HE SAID H

E IN

FACT HAD ARGUED FOR A UN RESOLUTION INCORPORATING THE G-8 CONDITIONS, A

FTER WHICH A HALT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.) THE DS INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT MANAGING RESERVATIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNING COALITION WOULD BE A CHALLENGE AND MIGHT REQUIRE STATEMENTS RE-FOCUSING ATTENTION ON EFFORTS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. DS LEADER WALTER VELTRONI, FOR EXAMPLE, CALLED ON THE GOI "TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE WITH ITS NATO ALLIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER A SUSPENSION OF THE BOMBING MIGHT NOT CHANGE THE TERMS OF THE NEGOTIATION."

6. (C) D'ALEMA WILL GO BEFORE PARLIAMENT ON WEDNESDAY (MAY 19) TO DISCUSS GOI POLICY ON KOSOVO, AND THE SESSION IS LIKELY TO BE STORMY. HOWEVER, EVEN THE STAUNCHEST OPPONENTS OF THE INTERVENTION WITHIN THE GOVERNING COALITION -- THE COMMUNISTS -- HAVE DENIED ANY INTENTION TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. D'ALEMA ALSO HAS THE FIRM SUPPORT OF THE OPPOSITION. AS HE DID IN HIS "LA REPUBBLICA" INTERVIEW, HE IS LIKELY TO UNDERLINE THAT THE MAIN TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO IS NOT THE RESULT OF SOME ERRORS BY NATO, BUT THE WAR MILOSEVIC IS CONDUCTING AGAINST THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT NATO CANNOT SIMPLY HALT ITS EFFORTS AS THINGS STAND NOW, WITHOUT HANDING MILOSEVIC A VICTORY. HOWEVER, IN ADVANCE OF WEDNESDAY'S SESSION IN PARLIAMENT, THE PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION WILL BE WORKING ON A JOINT STATEMENT, WHICH -- IN ITS RHETORIC -- IS LIKELY TO INCLUDE SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE PARTIES WITH RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE KOSOVO INTERVENTION.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
FOGLIETTA



*Embassy of Greece
Washington, D.C.*

The Ambassador

May 3, 1999

Mr. Anthony Blinken
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for European Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Blinken,

Following our telephone conversation, I am sending you this memorandum containing the topics raised during recent discussions in Moscow, April 28-29, 1999 on the Kosovo issue, which the Foreign Minister has asked me to transmit to the National Security Adviser Mr. Samuel Berger.

I would be most grateful to hear any comments and ideas that Mr. Berger, you, and other members of the National Security Council may have on this subject.

With all my thanks, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

Alexander Philon

P.S. Have a good trip.

SUMMARY OF TOPICS RAISED DURING DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW
(28-29, APRIL, 1999)

CONDITIONS	SUGGESTIONS that came up during discussions	COMMENTS-QUESTIONS/SUBJECTS FOR CLARIFICATION
STOP MILITARY ACTION & WITHDRAWAL OF YUGOSLAV MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES FROM KOSOVO	GRADUAL REDUCTION OF BOMBARDMENTS AND WITHDRAWAL OF YUGOSLAV FORCES. REDUCTION OF YUGOSLAV PRESENCE, TOTAL OR TO THE LEVELS AGREED UPON IN OCTOBER 1998.	• WHO WILL START FIRST? SYNCHRONIZED TIME TABLE • NATO NEEDS VERIFICATION • YUGOSLAVS WANT TO BE REASSURED THAT THEY WILL NOT BE BOMBARDED AS THEIR TROOPS PULL BACK. REDUCTION OF BOMBARDMENTS COULD STEP UP SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND HALT OF U.C.K. ACTIVITIES. • A HUMANITARIAN TRUCE FURTHER ENHANCE THE PROCEDURE. • YUGOSLAV MILITARY PRESENCE IN KOSOVO SEEMS NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN KOSOVO	"INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE", THAT IS INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE, UNDER U.N. AUSPICES	• THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM • NATO CORE/ NATO COUNTRIES WHICH DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE BOMBARDMENTS (I.E. GREECE) PLUS OTHERS (RUSSIA, ETC.) • UNCLEAR - TO BE DECIDED: CONSTITUTION OF THE FORCE, ITS MANDATE, RESPONSIBILITY, VARIED COMPOSITION IN DIFFERENT REGIONS, ITS COOPERATION WITH LOCAL FORCES: WHO WILL GUARD THE BORDERS, INTERNATIONAL FORCE, LOCAL FORCE OR A FORCE OF MIXED COMPOSITION? COULD WE ENVISAGE SOME FORM OF YUGOSLAV PARTICIPATION IN BORDER GUARD? • POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES MAY NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FORCE. THESE TASKS MAY BE UNDERTAKEN BY LOCAL POLICE FORCES, EITHER SERB OR ALBANIAN, DEPENDING ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE AREA. • AN AGREEMENT ON CURTAILING BOMBARDMENTS, WITHDRAWING FORCES AND MILITARY PRESENCE, CAN SERVE AS A BASIS FOR U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR KOSOVO	RUSSIANS CLAIM THAT CHAPTERS 2,5 AND 7 OF RAMBOUILLET ARE "DEAD". THE REST (ESPECIALLY ON CONSTITUTION ETC.) CAN BE RETAINED. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF F.R.Y. MUST BE STRESSED. KOSOVO INTERIM ADMINISTRATION BY O.S.C.E.	• INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF KOSOVO TO BE AGREED BETWEEN MILOSEVIC AND THE WEST. • WHO WILL REPRESENT THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS IN THE TALKS AND COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT? NEED KOSOVAR LEADERSHIP BE LEGITIMATE IN THE EYES OF KOSOVAR ALBANIANS. • YUGOSLAV SIDE HAS NEVER TALKED ABOUT PARTITION OF KOSOVO OR CANTONAL KOSOVO. • LOOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELGRADE-KOSOVO?

CONDITIONS	SUGGESTIONS that came up during discussions	COMMENTS-QUESTIONS/SUBJECTS FOR CLARIFICATION
	(OR/AND U.N.) UNTIL ELECTIONS. CIVILIAN ASPECT: - HUMANITARIAN (UNHCR) - POLITICAL (OSCE/EU) - ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (EU) - POLICE	
RETURN OF REFUGEES	REASSURANCE OF THEIR SAFE RETURN, THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS, CONDITIONS TO CARRY OUT FAIR ELECTIONS, BUILDING POWER STRUCTURES. HUMANITARIAN: IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT BY EXPERT GROUP LED BY GREECE - DEVELOPMENT OF THREE COUNTRY COOPERATION (GREECE - RUSSIA- SWITZERLAND) IN PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN AID AT THIS STAGE.	- IDENTIFICATION PAPERS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY. U.N. COULD REGISTER THE REFUGEES IN THE CAMPS AND PROVIDE THEM WITH SPECIAL U.N. DOCUMENTS ("NANSEN PASSPORTS") - UNCLEAR THE STATUS OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE LEFT KOSOVO EARLIER - PREPARE FOR LOOMING HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE OVER YUGOSLAVIA (AS STATED BY U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL)

IF MILOSEVIC ACCEPTS, EVEN TACITLY, THE ABOVE, THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT COULD SERVE AS THE BASIS OF A U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, SUPPORTED ALSO BY RUSSIA.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	Evaluating Russia's G-8 Proposals Against NATO's Conditions. (4 pages)	05/02/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

G-8 / Allied Diplomacy [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6320

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



**Botschaft
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Washington
Embassy
of the Federal Republic of Germany**

Washington, May 1, 1999

Department of State
Operations Center
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Sirs:

Please find enclosed the Russian draft for the final document of the meeting of G 8 Political Directors. Please forward the document to your Political Director immediately.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D. Grimm".

Grimm

Counselor (on duty)

2

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
Translating Division**

**LS No.
BL
Russian**

Russian Draft

**Basic Elements of Stage-by-Stage Measures
for the Settlement of the Situation in Yugoslavia**

1. Immediate and verifiable cessation of all military operations and repression in Kosovo:
 - On "Day X", Belgrade declares the beginning of the withdrawal of the Yugoslav and Serb military and police forces from Kosovo; at the same time, NATO announces the suspension of the missile and bombing strikes on the territory of Yugoslavia and gives guarantees that it will not deploy ground troops;
 - Both sides agree that the observation of the withdrawal of forces will be carried out by special groups from the humanitarian relief organizations operating in the area (the overall direction of the observers will be carried out by the U.N.).
 - 2. The withdrawal from Kosovo by the Yugoslav army and police forces, as well as paramilitary formations, and the complete disarmament of all paramilitary forces in the territory of Kosovo, including the KLA:

First stage (three weeks from "Day X"):

- The numbers of Yugoslav and Serb forces allowed to remain in Kosovo are reduced to the level of October 1998,
- The G-8 countries agree on a UN Security Council draft resolution,
- The UN proceeds – if Belgrade agrees – to prepare for the deployment of a civilian mission with an armed component (the mission's task will

be to ensure the conditions for the implementation of extensive autonomy in Kosovo, including the holding of elections for local self-government bodies on all levels),

- This stage concludes with the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution; at this point, the definite cessation of NATO military operations against the FRY is declared.

Second stage (three weeks – four months from "Day X"):

- The withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serb armed forces and police continues to the agreed minimum level,
- The units remaining in Kosovo are deployed in garrisons and border checkpoints,
- The advance structures of the civilian UN mission with an armed component enter the territory of Kosovo,
- The disarmament of the KLA in the regions coming under the control of these advance structures begins.

Third stage (four months – 12 months from "Day X"):

- The full civilian UN mission with an armed component is deployed and formed in accordance with the content of the UN Security Council resolution.
3. The international civilian mission with an armed component under the aegis of the UN (its basic aspects must be laid down in the Security Council resolution):
- The overall direction of the mission will be carried out by a special representative of the UN Secretary General, under whom a council made up of the leaders of the individual aspects of the mission will be constituted;
 - The composition of the civilian mission by its task areas:
Return of the refugees – UNHCR,
Political matters, including democratization, establishment of temporary local government authorities, and preparation of general elections – CSCE,

Law enforcement, including the establishment of a local police force – UN,

Economic matters, including the reconstruction of destroyed installations – EC,

- The armed component (whose mandate, structure, and tasks must be defined in the UN Security Council resolution).

The armed component will be considered to have fulfilled its task and will be subject to withdrawal after general elections have been held in Kosovo.

4. The establishment of a temporary administration in Kosovo to ensure the conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all Kosovo inhabitants:

- Composition: the special representative of the UN Secretary General (the head of the civilian UN mission), a representative of the Serbian authorities, and a representative of the Kosovo Albanians;
- Until the holding of general elections, the function of chief temporary coordinator in Kosovo is carried out by the special representative of the UN Secretary General;
- As soon as possible, local government authorities are established, if necessary by way of direct appointment, and appropriate administrative authority are conferred upon them;
- Elections must be held no later than one year from "Day X", in the manner envisioned in the draft constitution for Kosovo that was agreed upon in Rambouillet.

5. The unconditional and safe return of the refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to Kosovo for humanitarian aid organizations:

- Belgrade declares its readiness to allow through simplified procedures all refugees wishing to return to the places of their permanent residence in Kosovo to return to the territory of Kosovo;

- The UNHCR studies and approves the most rational method for the identification and certification of the identity of the refugees for their return to Kosovo;
 - Starting with the beginning of the civilian UN operations, monitoring of the crossing of the borders by the refugees is carried out jointly by members of the mission and FRY borderguards;
 - The responsibility for the distribution and settling of the refugees returning to the places of their permanent residence is undertaken by the EC in support of the UNHCR.
6. The beginning of the political process aimed at the adoption of a framework agreement on large-scale autonomy for Kosovo, taking into consideration the proposals and texts of Rambouillet and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia:
- It is necessary to determine the most representative composition of the Kosovar delegation;
 - It is necessary to agree with Belgrade on the place and conditions for conducting direct negotiations with the Kosovar delegation (at the initiative of the UN);
 - The texts produced in Rambouillet can be used as a basis, in particular the constitution mentioned above as orientation for the holding of general elections;
 - If an agreement on the status of Kosovo is concluded between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Rugova, its provisions must also be taken into account.

There follows our interpretation of "the Fischer plan":

NATO should offer to halt the bombing, on the condition that there is:

- A verified halt to the killing
- A verified withdrawal of all Serb police and military forces from all Kosovo
- A verified withdrawal of all paramilitary units
- A return of all refugees, and
- Deployment of a NATO-led international force to provide for the security of Kosovo
- A resumption of negotiations on the basis of Rambouillet

The international force would deploy as Serb forces withdrew. As a condition of its deployment, the KLA would agree to disarm. Disarmament would occur as international forces entered and assumed responsibility for the security of areas.

OPTIONAL FORM 98 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages = 1

To <i>C-129</i>	From <i>Jim D</i>
Dept./Agency	Phone #
Fax #	

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'99 APR -1 P7:28

B

S/S #

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MESSAGE NO. 017797 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 1
FROM: GREGORIAN EUR/TMS 74781 5220
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY PAPER FOR AC

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>JIM STEINBERG / SCHULTE</u>		
<u>JCS/J-5</u>	<u>BG CASEY / COL DONOVAN</u>		
<u>OSD</u>	<u>W/S SLOCOMBE / COL KAUFFMAN</u>		
<u>VCJCS</u>	<u>GEN RALSTON</u>		
<u>CIA/BTF</u>			
<u>DVP</u>	<u>LEON FEURTH</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PASSED AS PER AMB. DOBBINS' REQUEST

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	Diplomatic Strategy paper for PC. (1 page)	04/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

G-8 / Allied Diplomacy [3]

2008-0994-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Gregory Schulte to @NSA National Security Advisor. Subject: Greek-Czech Proposal on Kosovo. (1 page)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

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
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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**U.S.MISSION TO NATO
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
TEL: 32-2-726-4580**



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To:	Name Greg Schulte	ORGANIZATION: NSC		UNCLASSIFIED FAX NUMBER 001-202-456-9150		
From:	NAME: Office of Mr. McElhaney	OFFICE/EXTENSION USMission NATO		USNATO UNCLASS FAX NUMBER 32-2-724-3422		
Precedence: Routine Priority Immediate ⇒				Receive Deadline	Date:	Time:
Date: May 25, 1999		Total Number of Pages (Including Cover):	X 7	Approval:	XO:	ODAXO:
SPECIAL NOTES AND INSTRUCTIONS						

ATTENTION: GREG SCHULTE



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Permanent Delegation
of the Czech Republic to the NAC

Permanent Delegation
of Greece to the NAC

Brussels, May 25, 1999

Dear Secretary General,



On 23 May 1999, Foreign Ministers Jan Kavan of the Czech Republic and George Papandreu of Greece signed in Peking a Joint Czech-Greek Proposal for the Peace Process in South-East Europe.

Under instructions, we are enclosing the text of this document for your consideration. The Proposal has been developed over several weeks in consultations with a number of countries - members of NATO, the G8, the UNSC and others. It is intended as a collection of ideas that further elaborate NATO's Five Conditions of its Washington summit and the G8 conditions of 6 May 1999 - but is in no way intended as a parallel, let alone competitive platform. On the contrary, the Proposal should amount to a practical contribution that would facilitate the G8 efforts to draft a UNSC resolution for resolving the Kosovo crisis.

Both for the Czechs as a recent NATO nation and for the Greeks as a traditional NATO member, preserving NATO's unity is of crucial importance. The present Proposal is in turn informed by their deep historical ties with the peoples of the Balkans, including those of the FRY.

We are copying this letter and the Proposal to our colleagues on the Council and the Chairman of the Military Committee.

Yours sincerely,



Encl.: 1/5

H.E. Mr. Javier Solana M.
Secretary General
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Brussels

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JOINT CZECH-GREEK PROPOSAL FOR THE PEACE PROCESS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

I. INTRODUCTION

Democracy, Human Rights, Peaceful coexistence of peoples and peaceful resolution of disputes, are part of our two countries history. We therefore not only support these values but we also invest our efforts to make these values a reality in our respective regions.

The Kosovo crisis has been the major challenge the Alliance has faced since the end of the cold war. Its implications go well beyond the regional framework.

The crisis has an immense impact on people, the environment and the economy of our countries but also of the broader area. Our concern is that the problems created during the crisis may take on in a very short period of time a more permanent character.

There is a serious risk to create a long term destabilising potential in the area while blind forces of polarization and violence undermine the prospects of peace, democracy, reconciliation as well as the reconstruction process.

Both the Czech Republic, as a new member of the Alliance and the Hellenic Republic, as a traditional member of the Alliance, both have a special interest in strengthening NATO's role in the Euro-Atlantic security space, while maintaining a strong transatlantic link. They are equally interested in the success of the Alliance in promoting peace and stability through its new missions beyond the scope of Article 5 as foreseen by the Alliance's new strategic concept.

The Czech Republic and Greece, like all the other NATO allies, have endorsed the actions taken by the Alliance regarding the situation in Kosovo. We both consider that keeping NATO's unity in this respect is essential. At the same time, the strong historical ties between the peoples of the region, including Yugoslavia, the Czechs and the Greeks enable Prague and Athens to play a positive role and to contribute to the search for a peaceful settlement.

Prague and Athens emphasize the position that NATO does not wage a war against the people of Yugoslavia. This principle, accepted by all the Alliance members, must also be fully reflected in our actions.

Today a month and a half after the launching of the air campaign we think, that the time is opportune to present a peace proposal corresponding to the framework of the EU and NATO policy and objectives. This peace will give the opportunity to the parties directly involved to return to the negotiating table and assure a political solution. This solution must safeguard the rights of the Kosovo Albanians provide for a broad autonomy of the province within the FRY, and secure the rights of all other ethnic communities to live peacefully in a multi-ethnic, multicultural Kosovo.

We support every effort aimed at promoting a peaceful solution. This very moment a series of constructive initiatives have developed for the solution of the crisis. We value UN Secretary General's endeavors, while we consider a UN SC resolution necessary for the establishment of the framework and the implementation of a lasting peace plan in Kosovo. We commend G-8 for their recent work and statement on Yugoslavia as well as the constructive dialogue which has emerged between Russia, the USA and the EU, on the specifics of a solution in Kosovo. We also support that German Presidency's efforts in this direction and their initiatives concerning the regional Stability Pact. We also express our full support to the Finnish President

- 2 -

M. Ahtisaari, recently appointed to mediate in the Kosovo crisis. We believe that there is a necessity for a systematic and effective continuity of the diplomatic efforts. We therefore hope that his nomination will ensure such continuity and effectiveness of the current diplomatic efforts of the International Community. We note that the Yugoslav leadership has given positive indications of accepting the G-8 Resolution. We call upon them to contribute further to the diplomatic efforts and help all find the political solution to the crisis which would immediately lead to the cessation of violence and therefore contribute to a peaceful solution in Kosovo.

1/ Although NATO unity in its actions has helped us to progress to the point where positive movement exists towards a solution, the suffering of the Kosovo population has worsened while unfortunately, the number of civilian victims on the Serbian side, has increased.

2/ Belgrade has used the operation Allied Force to intensify ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. There are reports of mass killings, summary executions, burning of houses, other gross violations of human rights of the Kosovo population, while a widespread concern persists regarding the fate of unconfirmed number of Kosovo Albanian men who are unaccounted for.

3/ The crisis brings about negative effects in a wider number of countries and international organizations (economy, environment, commerce and related problems) while the influx of refugees in Albania and FYROM has created a critical internal situation.

4/ The political settlement of the Kosovo crisis is complemented by the comprehensive approach to the South East European region, embodied in the concept of a Stability Pact offered by the European Union.

II. PROPOSAL

In this context the Czech Republic and the Hellenic Republic suggest for consideration the following possibilities of a fresh approach based namely upon the general principles of the G-8 Ministerial Meeting in Petersberg, Germany, May 6th, 1999:

The framework of the Czech-Greek perception of re-starting of the political process is as follows:

1. a/ In order to help the diplomatic processes the International Community should as a good will step, declare a short (2-3 day) pause of air strikes, once there are sure signs of adoption of the basis tenets for a UNSC Resolution and its acceptance by the Yugoslav government seems to be within reach.
- b/ Halt of all military, police and paramilitary activities by Serbian and Kosovar side.
- c/ Belgrade promptly disbands all paramilitary units and begins a massive verifiable (through low level flights - slightly modified NATO Eagle Eye Operation) withdrawal of its army and police units from Kosovo. The border control units of the Yugoslav army, reduced to the minimum necessary levels, should duly cooperate with the robust UN International Civil and Security Presences.
- d/ The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) undertakes to fully observe the ceasefire and thus will not engage the withdrawing Yugoslav troops. KLA will commit itself unequivocally the principle of its disarmament.

- 3 -

- e/ An ethnically mixed police force will be established in Kosovo, with the Serbian police units, accompanied by a robust presence of the UN International Civil and Security Units in the areas, where there is a majority of Serbian population.
- f/ The ethnic cleansing of Kosovar population stops and preparation for the return of all the refugees begins.
- g/ The FRY government undertakes to fulfill the remainder of the conditions stipulated by G-8 and NATO:
- h/ During the peace process, the overall presence of the KLA should be put under strict and immediate control.
2. After all these steps are implemented, including the adoption of the UNSC Resolution, the pause of air strikes becomes a temporary cease-fire.
 3. OSCE decides on the return of an OSCE monitoring body (modified KVM? in close cooperation with UNHCR) to supervise, in close coordination with the UN International Civil and Security Presences the return of all the refugees.
 4. A transitional administration of the province will be provided by the competent international organizations (OSCE, EU, UN, others) until the end of the negotiations on the status of Kosovo. These negotiations will take - as appropriate - into account the Rambouillet accords. The principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and the other countries of the region must be respected. The above international organizations will set the rules and will verify their implementation, so as to ensure that all democratic and elected institutions in the area, can function properly. Negotiations will start immediately, between the parties directly involved aiming at achieving a binding, viable solution on the future Kosovo status within FRY with the agreement of all parties involved. These negotiations should be concluded through direct contact of the parties and their governments, should be guaranteed under international supervision. The substantial participation of genuine representatives of all Kosovo Albanians during the negotiations should be secured guaranteeing thus the viability of the settlement agreed within Yugoslavia.
 5. In the framework of this proposal, a possible UNSC Resolution based on the Bonn G-8 results, could:
 - welcome these positive developments
 - set an obligatory time-table for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and Serbian police from Kosovo;
 - call upon parties involved to agree within a fixed time limit on UN International Civil and Security Presences in Kosovo, with a precise mandate, the composition of which should reflect the military efficiency needed to offer security feeling to returning refugees; (among other things) it will take care of the security of the Serbian population in Kosovo, while, based on the SFOR positive experience including the efficient role of NATO, it should be able to prevent acts of revenge, ethnic hatred and inter-ethnic hostilities. Within

- 4 -

the UN International Civil and Security Presences mandate would be the enforcement, of disarmament of paramilitary groups, including the KLA;

- invite UNHCR and ICRC to immediately renew their activities in Kosovo;
- call for the thorough implementation of its resolution 1160/98 on arms embargo to both Yugoslav and Kosovo Albanian sides including prevention of infiltration of armed Albanians from neighbouring countries to Kosovo;
- invite all UN Member States and relevant international institutions to provide humanitarian assistance to all victims of the crisis, including the population of the FRY;
- request investigation of all cases of violation of humanitarian law in Kosovo;
- call upon the relevant international institutions to assist in the initial phase of economic reconstruction of Kosovo in order to speed up the return of all the refugees, paying special attention to the people with no IDs;
- begin FRY's integration in the UN;
- invite other international organisations to do the same.

6. A phased lifting of sanctions and restrictive measures strictly in relation to Belgrade's meeting the conditions of the international community.

III. POST-CONFLICT PERIOD

In order to stabilize and assure development of the Balkans a coherent and unified strategy of the international community is needed.

It is for this reasons that the Czech Republic and the Hellenic Republic strongly welcome the concept of a Stability Pact as approved by the EU.

This concept is based on dealing with the issues such as security, economic reconstruction and reform, democratization and human rights.

This Pact should contribute to the consolidation of peace in Kosovo and aim at humanitarian assistance, the reconciliation and the rebuilding of the whole area, as well as the stability of South Eastern Europe. It should provide for a bolder vision of the region as one which has its future within the EU.

It should be taken into account that the societies and economies of the region as a whole have suffered minor or major losses. These losses have to be compensated through the international action and commitment.

The more international players commit themselves to peace in the region, the more chances exist to succeed in finding a solution with peaceful perspectives, not only for Kosovo and FRY but also for the area as a whole.

As countries directly or indirectly neighbouring to Yugoslavia we would like to express our anxiety for the human plight of refugees but also for the destruction of this country. This destruction as well as the waves of refugees have a great impact in the wider area which will be felt during many years to come. In this respect Greece will host an International Conference to address this issue, as a follow-up of other initiatives.

The concept of a Stability Pact aims at the stabilization and the development of the area and pursues the following main goals:

1. Economic development of the Balkans region through a coordinated package of measures and initiatives for the region.

- 5 -

2. Democratization of the region with measures to build up and consolidate democratic institutions, promote the concept of a civil society, protect human and minority rights. In this respect, the valuable, successful experience of the Czech Republic regarding the transition to a democratic society could be used (as well as Greece's experience in institution-building in the region).

3. Establishment of a mechanism for the resolution of conflicts, which will guarantee the inviolability of frontiers, leading to a regional non-aggression pact.

4. Promotion, intensification and formalization of the interregional cooperation with the participation of all countries of the region as a step towards full incorporation of the region into the European framework and institutional system.

5. Recognition of the eligibility of all countries to join the EU as far as they fulfill the required political and economic conditions.

All Balkan countries are welcome to participate in the project provided they will all apply international standards regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms including national minorities, rule of law and democratic principles of functioning civil society.

Very clear signal should be sent to the FRY that the international community cares about Serbian and all other non-Albania refugees from Kosovo.

Every woman and every man must be respected, regardless of their culture, religion, nationality, and any attempt to base the existence of states on ethnic purity should be refused.

Diversity and pluralism must be seen as dynamic and creative elements in building a peaceful and multicultural South Eastern Europe.

in Beijing, May 23rd, 1999

Jan KAVAN
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Czech Republic

Jorgos PAPANDREU
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Greece

Problems

- VJ left on border; MUP left in Serb areas
- UN force without NATO core
- force is negotiated after bombing suspended
- pause with no guarantee of UNSCIR or acceptance of NATO's conditions