

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Congress / Public [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1708

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	7	1	V

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806620
RECEIVED: 28 SEP 98 11

TO: LOTT, TRENT
ET AL

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY RE CRUCIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 03 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
RUDMAN
SCHULTE

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

SMO

DATE

10/6

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9806620

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 98093019 FOR SIGNATURE
X 98100619 PRESIDENT SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	981006	LOTT, TRENT	CIA
002	981006	THURMOND, STROM	STATE
002	981006	WARNER, JOHN W	DEFENSE
002	981006	LUGAR, RICHARD G	
002	981006	HELMS, JESSE A	
002	981006	HAGEL, CHUCK	
002	981006	DOMENICI, PETE V	
002	981006	STEVENS, TED	
002	981006	NICKLES, DONALD L	
002	981006	DASCHLE, THOMAS A	

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

6780 pido

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ARS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG h A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	(P) 10/6	
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger	2	(A)	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(D) 10/6	DEST via EAR
Records Mgt.	4	(D) 10/6	D
	5	END 10/6	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Letter re Kosovo

OCT 6 1996

Exec Sec Office has diskette info

National Security Council
The White House

1015
5:28 pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6780
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RBS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG W A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>R 10/5</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>—</u>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Response to Senate
Republican Concerns
re Kosovo.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:

- immediately cease offensive operations;
- withdraw security forces;
- allow full access to international monitors and relief agencies;
- negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.

Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the potential use of force. I want to provide you and others in the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.

As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when Serbian special police launched an offensive against the Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven months that have followed, Serbian military and police have steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and expulsions designed to terrorize the local population and suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since 1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making clear that this was a prerequisite

to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local affairs, including education, justice and a separate police force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity, because we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the wrong signal to those in the region calling for a "greater Albania," and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's security forces.

In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

It is important to focus on U.S. national interests that are at stake here.

- First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania and

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the threat of terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.

- Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe. Yesterday, the United Nations Secretary General's report on the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed atrocities, including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such acts.
- Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force, has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts

initiated by my Administration over the past several months to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming that reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For FY 1999, I have proposed a \$1.9 billion emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of our Bosnia deployment. To preclude serious readiness problems in FY 1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure.

In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration to work with Congress to provide adequate resources for readiness and other defense programs in FY 1999 and beyond. For the short term, I proposed that members of my Administration work with you prior to the Congressional adjournment to craft a \$1 billion supplemental package that will augment FY 1999 funding for key readiness programs. For the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council have been instructed to work with Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year plan that provides the resources necessary to preserve military readiness, support our troops, and modernize aging weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my FY 2000 defense budget request to Congress. As I wrote you last month, the men and women of our armed forces will have the resources they need to do their job.

The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would be a function of the scope and intensity of such operations. My Administration will work with the Congress to ensure timely passage of appropriate funding measures and that this does not come at the expense of our defense program.

Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO planners have reviewed a broad range of options, some of which would involve ground forces in hostile circumstances, I can assure you the United States would not support these options and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The mission under consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not military forces on the ground.

In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some form of international presence may be needed. Whether this can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and whether Americans should participate are matters we will need to consider in the context of any such agreement and with full consultation with the Congress.

Third, regarding the nature of the air campaign in Kosovo, NATO has developed a clear military plan. It entails the graduated but effective use of air power harnessed to two achievable objectives. The primary objective is by threat of force, or its use, to persuade Milosevic to comply with the demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. If initial use of air power does not result in compliance, NATO's secondary objective is to strike Belgrade's military capabilities in ways that will damage his ability to conduct repressive operations in Kosovo, the same objective you identify in your letter.

Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power to be used effectively. There will be no "pin prick" strikes. Even the initial use of air power will send a very clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY military and special police, and follow-on phases will progressively expand in their scale and scope. These operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.

Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to advance our overall objectives of promoting a political settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are combining the two to achieve our objectives. Secretary Albright recently dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus reducing the risk of wider conflict, averting a humanitarian catastrophe and lessening the chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term objective is to secure a political settlement that grants broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the Kosovars have their own bodies of government and police. Our longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration. This requires a responsible government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free and independent media in the FRY.

Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current situation including the brutal tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.

While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong and exacerbate it. I am referring in particular to the various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Ambassador Holbrooke this week delivered a firm message to these groups to cooperate in bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true autonomy. We have told them that failure to cooperate will cause us to reassess our operations against the Serbs.

Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador to Yugoslavia, once said that the war in Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will ultimately end there. His prediction was correct. Our job is to bring that war to an end, to keep it from destabilizing the region and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I appreciate your willingness to work with the Administration to protect American interests in southeastern Europe. We will continue to consult closely with you in the critical days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2403

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806620
DATE 06 OCT 98

SUBJECT: REPLY RE CRUCIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
LOTT, TRENT ROOM SR-487 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2403	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
THURMOND, STROM ROOM SR-217 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
WARNER, JOHN W ROOM SR-225 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4601	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
LUGAR, RICHARD G ROOM SH-306 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1401	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
HELMS, JESSE A ROOM SD-403 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3301	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
HAGEL, CHUCK ROOM SH-528 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2702	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806620
DATE 06 OCT 98

SUBJECT: REPLY RE CRUCIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
DOMENICI, PETE V ROOM SH-328 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC, 20510	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
STEVENS, TED ROOM SH-522 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0201	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
NICKLES, DONALD L ROOM SH-133 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3602	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
DASCHLE, THOMAS A ROOM SH-509 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4103	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Democratic Leader
United States Senate
509 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-4103

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
United States Senate
328 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-3101

The Honorable Chuck Hagel
United States Senate
346 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-2705

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
403 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
487 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-2403

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
United States Senate
306 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-1401

The Honorable Don Nickles
Majority Whip
United States Senate
133 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-3602

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
522 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
217 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-4001

The Honorable John W. Warner
United States Senate
225 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-4601

6720

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1998

'98 OCT 6 PM 3:14

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*
LARRY STEIN *LS*

SUBJECT: Response to Senate Republican Concerns on Kosovo

Purpose

To gather support from Congressional Republicans on Kosovo.

Background

On Friday, Trent Lott and other Senate Republican leaders wrote to you expressing concern about the Administration's policy on Kosovo. They raise four primary concerns: first, the need for a significant increase in the defense budget; second, the need to address possible ground force commitments; third, NATO's planning for the use of air power; and fourth, the need for a convincing plan that advances our interests, avoids an open-ended military commitment and helps to replace Milosevic with a democratic government. I believe that this letter deserves a rapid, lengthy and thoughtful response as part of the process of building Congressional support for possible military action. I also recommend that we send a version of the letter to Senator Daschle, in response to my recent discussions with him on Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to the Senate Republicans and to Senator Daschle.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senate Republicans and Senator Daschle
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6780

October 5, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *for*
SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Response to Senate
Republican Concerns on Kosovo

I attach a proposed letter from the President responding to Friday's letter from Senate Republicans on Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Mara Rudman *MR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed response at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

October 2, 1998

Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our concerns about your Administration's policy toward Kosovo. Since the Serbian military offensive began in Kosovo more than seven months ago, senior Administration officials have repeatedly stated that Serbian actions would not be tolerated. For example, in March 1998, Secretary of State Albright stated, "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia." The same month, your Special Representative threatened "the most dire consequences imaginable" in response to Serbian offensives. Since these statements, many of us indicated we would support military action to halt Serbian ethnic cleansing. However, it is now more difficult for us to have confidence that military action will accomplish the stated goals. U.S. credibility has suffered great damage because U.S. threats have not been carried out. Milosevic has had the luxury of time to accomplish his goals in Kosovo.

We listened carefully as your senior national security officials briefed Senators yesterday. Clearly, we recognize the stakes involved in Kosovo, including the danger the conflict will spread to neighboring countries, the importance for our credibility and for that of the NATO alliance, and the ongoing human tragedy created by months of ruthless attacks by Serbian forces. We also recognize the seriousness of the action you are contemplating. It means, as Senator Lugar stated yesterday, going to war with an attack on a sovereign country. We do not believe you have taken the necessary steps to prepare the Congress and the American people for such a weighty decision. In fact you have not even asked the Congress to authorize the use of military force.

We are troubled by a number of aspects of the plans and policies contemplated by your Administration.

First, we cannot support military operations by U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo unless and until you commit to request a significant increase in the defense budget to address the shortfalls in military readiness, personnel and modernization recently acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crisis in military readiness that has only belatedly been acknowledged by your Administration is grave. To support ongoing operations around the world, our men and women in uniform are deployed away from their homes and families for unprecedented lengths of time

during peacetime. Morale among the troops is suffering, and recruiting and retention statistics are dangerously low. Modernization of the force is seriously underfunded across the services. Training in many of the combatant commands must halt well before the end of the fiscal year due to funding and supply shortages. Nearly 12,000 military families rely on food stamps. Failing to provide additional funding for a potentially costly military operation in Kosovo, while U.S. forces are about to complete three years in Bosnia at a cost of nearly \$10 billion, will severely and perhaps irreparably exacerbate this critical readiness crisis.

Second, the issue of potential deployment of U.S. ground forces was not adequately addressed in yesterday's briefing. Press accounts report that detailed plans for nearly 50,000 ground troops in Kosovo have been developed. Yet Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that there has been no discussion of deploying U.S. ground forces in Kosovo. We believe that a ground force in Kosovo, which could be a likely follow-on to airstrikes, should be European, not American.

Third, we are concerned about the proposed use of NATO airpower. Press reports contain information about U.S. targeting plans that was not discussed in the briefing. To the extent we understand the proposed strikes, they appear to envision gradual and incremental measures. General Ralston discussed a "limited option" that may or may not achieve its stated objectives. A more "robust" option is under consideration but apparently has not yet been finalized. We believe any air attack should be sustained and overwhelming. Air attacks should be designed to decimate Milosevic's forces in Kosovo and in Serbia -- in order to permanently end his ability to perpetuate the conflict in Kosovo.

Finally and most importantly, we are concerned that U.S. policy is not based on a coherent and convincing plan and neither protects our interests nor recognizes the danger of becoming involved in another open-ended military commitment in the Balkans. Your policy seems to recognize that Milosevic is the problem but also proposes to make him part of the solution. By so doing, your policy helps to perpetuate his hold on power; your Administration has yet to formulate a policy for replacing Milosevic with a democratic government.

Yesterday, your officials stated that the credible threat of force was necessary to induce Milosevic to negotiate seriously. Yet in June, Secretary of State Albright stated, "The issue here is that we want a diplomatic solution. And I don't want to threaten strikes when what I'm trying to do is get a diplomatic solution." This is a disturbing and confusing inconsistency. A central question involves subsequent actions if any use of military force is not immediately successful in accomplishing its stated objectives. If Milosevic does not accept U.S. or NATO demands either before or after the employment of military force, what is our next step? It is not sufficient to state, as Secretary of Defense Cohen did yesterday, that you have not reached that decision point.

Your policy apparently envisions a status of limited autonomy for Kosovo, a status that both parties have shed blood to reject. Independence has been the choice of the majority of inhabitants in Kosovo. Serb assaults since February have served to increase this sentiment. Your policy currently opposes independence for Kosovo but we are concerned that you do not have an achievable program to implement your policy.

Mr. President, we believe in bipartisanship in foreign policy. We will not support any plan that requires American military personnel alone to bear the burden of the sacrifice and risk involved. To the contrary, we expect other member of NATO and their military personnel to share the sacrifice and risk. We stand ready to work with you and your officials to protect American interests in southeastern Europe.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond

Clark HAGEL

Pete Domenici

Zip Stevens

Don Nickles

Frank Laut

John Warner

Richard H. Lugar

Jesse Helms

*Staff Secretary
Chiefs*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senate Republican Concerns on Kosovo

Purpose

To gather support from Congressional Republicans on Kosovo.

Background

On Friday, Trent Lott and other Senate Republican leaders wrote to you expressing concern about the Administration's policy on Kosovo. They raise four primary concerns: first, the need for a significant increase in the defense budget; second, the need to address possible ground force commitments; third, NATO's planning for the use of air power; and fourth, the need for a convincing plan that advances our interests, avoids an open-ended military commitment and helps to replace Milosevic with a democratic government. I believe that this letter deserves a rapid, lengthy and thoughtful response as part of the process of building Congressional support for possible military action. I also recommend that we send a version of the letter to Senator Daschle, in response to my recent discussions with him on Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to the Senate Republicans and to Senator Daschle.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senate Republicans
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local affairs, including education, justice and a separate police force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity, because we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the wrong signal to those in the region calling for a "greater Albania," and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's security forces.

In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

It is important to focus on U.S. interests that are at stake here.

- First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania and

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the threat of terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.

- Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe. Today, the United Nations Secretary General's report on the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed atrocities, including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such acts.
- Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary of ~~Defense~~ Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several

months to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming ~~which~~ reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For ~~fiscal~~ 1999, I have proposed a \$1.9 billion emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of our Bosnia deployment. To preclude serious readiness problems in ~~fiscal~~ 1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure.

In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration to work with Congress to provide adequate resources for readiness and other defense programs in ~~fiscal~~ 1999 and beyond. For the short term, I proposed that members of my Administration work with you prior to the Congressional adjournment to craft a \$1 billion supplemental package that will augment ~~fiscal~~ 1999 funding for key readiness programs. For the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council have been instructed to work with Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year plan that provides the resources necessary to preserve military readiness, support our troops, and modernize aging weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my ~~fiscal~~ 2000 defense budget request to Congress. As I wrote you last month, the men and women of our armed forces will have the resources they need to do their job.

The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would be a function of the scope and intensity of such operations. My Administration will work with the Congress to ensure timely passage of appropriate funding measures and that this does not come at the expense of our defense program.

Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO planners have reviewed a broad range of options, some of which would involve ground forces in hostile circumstances, I can assure you the United States would not support these options and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The mission under consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not military forces on the ground.

In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some form of international presence may be needed. Whether this can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and whether Americans should participate are matters we will need to consider in the context of any such agreement and with full consultation with the Congress.

to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local affairs, including education, justice and a separate police force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity because we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the wrong signal to those in the region calling for a "greater Albania," and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's security forces.

In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

It is important to focus on U.S. ^{NATIONAL} interests that are at stake here. ✓

- First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania and

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the threat of terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.

- Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe. ~~Today,~~ ^{YESTERDAY,} the United Nations Secretary General's report on the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed atrocities, including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such acts.
- Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force, has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary of Defense Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: ~~Proposed Presidential~~ Response to Senate
Republican Concerns on Kosovo

Purpose

To gather support from Congressional Republicans on Kosovo.

Background

On Friday, Trent Lott and other Senate Republican leaders wrote to you expressing concern about the Administration's policy on Kosovo. They raise four primary concerns: first, the need for a significant increase in the defense budget; second, the need to address possible ground force commitments; third, NATO's planning for the use of air power; and fourth, the need for a convincing plan that advances our interests, avoids an open-ended military commitment and helps to replace Milosevic with a democratic government. I believe that this letter deserves a rapid, lengthy and thoughtful response as part of the process of building Congressional support for possible military action.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to the Senate Republicans.

Attachments

Tab A ~~Proposed~~ Response to Senate Republicans
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

Our goal is a peaceful settlement. Neither our allies nor I relish the thought of military intervention. However, it is clear that we have important national interests at stake.

- First, Kosovo is indeed a tinderbox that could ignite a wider conflagration. The Balkan nations are obsessed with their history, a history that is dominated by ethnic conflicts and often used for political manipulation. The violence directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has already exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo could trigger further refugee flows into Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) with destabilizing consequences. Wider instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, likely exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The radicalization of ethnic Albanians would also support Iran's efforts to establish a fundamentalist toehold in southeastern Europe.

refugee

- Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe. *The security forces in Kosovo* Today we are expecting the United Nations Secretary General's report on the crisis, but he has already expressed his outrage at the atrocities perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed horrific acts, including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such bestiality in the middle of Europe.

- Third, we must consider the credibility of NATO. The Alliance has gained much respect through its operations in Bosnia, implementing the peace accords negotiated at Dayton. But we risk squandering that respect if Milosevic continues to defy international demands and the Alliance does not act in Kosovo. The implications for NATO operations in Bosnia could be profound. The United States has a strong national interest in preserving the

✓

Alliance as a credible, effective institution that can promote stability and manage future crises in Europe or on its periphery.

Because of the threat to these national interests, I am prepared to commit American armed forces. However, as you rightly state, we must have a credible plan for the use of force. That plan must share the risks and burdens with our allies, and it must be part of a broader political strategy aimed at attaining an end-state that is both desirable and achievable.

I believe that NATO has developed a military plan that is credible. It entails the graduated but effective use of air power with two objectives. The primary objective is to use the threat of force, or if necessary initial use, to compel Milosevic to comply with the demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. ~~These include~~ stopping repressive operations and withdrawing forces, allowing full access by international observers, facilitating the return of displaced persons, and initiating a serious dialogue, with international involvement, toward a political settlement. *o; o; o; fine ✓*

The secondary objective is to progressively reduce Belgrade's military capabilities and its ability to conduct repressive operations in Kosovo. In this regard, let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power to be used effectively. There will be no "pin prick" strikes against broken-down tanks. The initial use of air power will send a very clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY military and special police, and follow-on phases will progressively expand in their scale and scope.

Because of the unique military capabilities that we possess, the United States will play a significant role in any military operation. This is particularly in the opening phases which are highly reliant on systems that only our armed forces possess. However, I can assure you that allied forces will participate throughout any operation. Indeed, a half dozen allies, including Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom have already stated publicly their willingness to contribute forces, and others are currently preparing to make such announcements. *true*

Of course, any use of air power is not without risk. The tactics and weapons that we would use have been selected to minimize this risk to our airmen and women. Moreover, we have taken prudent precautionary measures in the FRY, issuing a travel advisory to American citizens and readying plans for their evacuation. We are carrying out these precautionary measures in close consultation with our allies and with the various international and non-governmental organizations operating in that country.

Thus far, I have written about the use of air power. I know that you are concerned that the commitment of our air forces could lead to a subsequent commitment of ground forces, with the potential for greater risk and the certainty of greater cost. As one would expect, NATO has examined a variety of contingencies. These include everything from the imposition of no-fly zones, to the preventive deployment of forces in neighboring countries, to a massive infusion of ground forces into the FRY to halt the hostilities and impose a settlement. More recently, NATO military planners have been looking at "lighter" options to verify a cease-fire or oversee a settlement.

NATO has not ruled out any of these options. At the same time, the North Atlantic Council has not directed detailed planning for the introduction of ground forces into a non-permissive environment. Furthermore, it has made no decisions to begin generating forces for any of the ground options. Our focus now is on the use of air power to attain our immediate objectives. I do not wish to rule out the possibility of a US role in helping to implement a settlement in a permissive environment. But I can assure you that the Administration will need to conduct some serious analysis, and then consult with ^{the Congress} ~~you~~, before committing to any ground force deployments into Kosovo.

Let me also assure you that NATO air power will not be used punitively, but rather strategically, as part of a broader political strategy to advance our overall objectives of averting a humanitarian catastrophe and promoting a political settlement. We are not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are combining the two to achieve our objectives. Yesterday, Secretary Albright dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to

recently
not by the same POTUS signs.

execute air strikes, we will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to Serbian operations in Kosovo.

Contrary to assertions in your letter, our military leaders reported to me and testified before the Congress that the armed forces do not now face a military readiness "crisis." Rather, they outlined a set of concerns that must be addressed if we are to maintain the high readiness levels of our forward-deployed and first-to-fight forces and restore the readiness of lower priority units to acceptable levels. As noted in my recent letters to Congress and Secretary of Defense Cohen, I have moved quickly and appropriately to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several months to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming which reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For fiscal 1999, I have proposed a \$1.9 billion emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of ^{our} Bosnia ^{legislation}. To preclude serious readiness problems in fiscal 1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure. SECRET

In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration to work with Congress to provide adequate resources for readiness programs in fiscal 1999 and beyond. For the short term, I proposed that members of my Administration work with you prior to the Congressional adjournment to craft a \$1 billion supplemental package that will augment fiscal 1999 funding for key readiness programs. For the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council have been instructed to work with Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year plan that provides the necessary resources to preserve military readiness, support our troops, and modernize aging weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my fiscal 2000 defense budget request to Congress.

Funding potential military operations in Kosovo would be determined as the scope and intensity of these operations developed and in the context of continued consultations with you and other members of Congress. Should Kosovo operations require resources in addition to amounts provided by the Congress for the Defense Department, my

Administration will work with Congress to ensure timely passage of appropriate funding measures.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo can be clearly defined, though I would divide it into three parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe and reducing the risk of further atrocities. Our mid-term objective is to secure a political settlement that, in the words of Secretary Albright, keeps Kosovo in Serbia but gets the Serbs out of Kosovo. Our longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration. This requires a responsible government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

responsibility This brings me to your question about Slobodan Milosevic himself. The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary responsible for the current situation including the brutal tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.

While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong it. I am speaking in particular of the various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. We call on these groups to cooperate in bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true autonomy.

The role of Russia is an issue that you did not raise in your letter but that deserves our consideration. ~~As~~ As a member of the Contact Group with a long history of involvement in the Balkans, Russia is capable of playing a unique diplomatic role. My summit discussions on Kosovo ✓

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Rudman, Mara E.
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 1999 3:48 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; Schulte, Gregory L.; Hurley, C. Michael; Blinken, Antony J.
Cc: @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: Kosovo call assignments per deputies [UNCLASSIFIED]

Greg--

Attached is the call list that was assigned at the deputies. If your counterparts ask, it gives each agency their authorizing committee chairs and rankings, as well as their appropriating subcommittee chairs and rankings. On full approps chair/ranking, gave State the Rankings (Byrd and Obey) because they do not have defense-related subc while gave DoD the chairs (Stevens and Young) because they chr the defense subcommittees as well.

We have alerted our legislative counterparts that these calls are being made this afternoon. But we also have told them that talking points (such as they may be) are being generated by the policy people who were in the meeting. (I guess that means you, but I'm also assuming those in the meeting are prepared to go out and make calls without having points in front of them?)

NOTE: I think as you pointed out we should place calls to Engel directly. I would add Jim Moran for the same reason. I also believe that you or Mark Grossman should make those calls. Attached are the home #s I have for them:

Engel

NY home (718) 320-3039 (try first)
Md home (301) 299-8743

Moran

(703) 683-1020



kosovocalls.doc

(202) 225-4376

0555

KOSOVO list - Calls assigned at 1/16/99 deputies meeting

NSC (Mara handling at staff level, per SRB)

- ☐ Lott
- ☐ Daschle
- ☐ Hastert
- ☐ Gephardt
- ☐ Bonior

(Greg or Mark Grossman should call the two below;)

- ☐ Engel
- ☐ Moran

CIA

- ☐ Goss
- ☐ Dixon
- ☐ Kerrey
- ☐ Shelby

State

- ☐ Gilman
- ☐ Helms
- ☐ Biden
- ☐ Gejdenson
- ☐ Callahan
- ☐ Pelosi
- ☐ Obey
- ☐ McConnell
- ☐ Leahy
- ☐ Byrd

DoD

- ☐ Warner
- ☐ Levin
- ☐ Spence
- ☐ Skelton
- ☐ Murtha
- ☐ Lewis
- ☐ Young
- ☐ Stevens
- ☐ Inouye

Points for Congressional Calls

- This morning in Kosovo, the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission discovered a brutal massacre of Kosovo Albanians in the village of Racak. Bill Walker, the U.S. diplomat heading KVM, visited the site and described it as an atrocity that was clearly carried out by Serb security forces.
- The President has issued a statement condemning this incident in the strongest possible terms and calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice.
- We have been in touch with Louise Arbour, the Prosecutor for the UN war crimes tribunal. We are pressing for the Serb authorities to identify those responsible for the atrocity and to cooperate with the KVM and the UN tribunal in investigating it. We are also insisting that the Serbs withdraw their security forces and comply with the other commitments they have made to NATO.
- We are in close contact with NATO Secretary General Solana who has also condemned this incident and is calling for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council tomorrow. We hope to use the meeting to achieve NATO's agreement to send General Clark to Belgrade to explain to Milosevic exactly what we expect.
- You will recall that the NATO "Activation Order" for air operations remains on the table, and we expect NATO to remind Milosevic of this fact.
- We are very concerned that these murders could trigger a spiral of reprisals. Thus, KVM is in close contact with the Kosovo Liberation Army to urge restraint.
- We will continue to consult closely with Congress as we seek to sustain the fragile cease-fire in Kosovo and push for a political settlement.

If asked what happens if the Serbs fail to comply:

- The Activation Order for NATO air operations will once again be valid if we and our allies agree that Milosevic is failing to comply with his commitments.
- We don't want to go back to a situation like last October when we were on the verge of air strikes. On the other hand,
- We cannot allow Milosevic to think that his forces can commit atrocities and violate commitments without any consequence.

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 16, 1998

Statement by the President

I condemn in the strongest possible terms the massacre of civilians by Serb security forces that took place last night in the village of Racak in Kosovo. This was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo. It is a clear violation of the commitments Serbian authorities have made to NATO. There can be no justification for it.

The perpetrators must be brought to justice. The Serb authorities must act immediately to identify those responsible. They must cooperate with the Kosovo Verification mission and the International War Crimes Tribunal. They must withdraw security forces, carry out all the commitments they have made to NATO and cease their repression.

We are in close contact with Secretary-General Solana and our NATO allies. Together, we will work to stop the repression and prevent an escalation of fighting.

It is urgent that these murders not trigger a spiral of reprisals. Both sides have a responsibility to work towards a peaceful resolution of this crisis, and for a settlement that allows the people of Kosovo the self-government they so clearly deserve.

##



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Office of European Security and Political Affairs

DATE: January 4, 1999

No. PAGES: cover + 7

FROM:

Name	Office	Phone	Room
Peter Hinz	EUR/RPM	202/647-3405	6513

TO:

Agency	Name	Fax
OSD/BTF	J. Moore	(703) 697-2734
JCS/J-5	A. Swain	(703) 697-0180
NSC	M. Hurley	(202) 456-9150

SUBJECT:

12/4/98 Master Media Messages on NATO Operations in and Around Kosovo

FOR:

Clearance ☒	Information ☐	Per request ☐	Comment ☒
---	--------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	---

REMARKS:

If there are any immediate problems with this document that should be raised in tomorrow's Policy Committee meeting, please let me know by COB today, Monday, January 4. Otherwise, for "happy to glad" or lower-level policy issues, silence on this document has been extended to OOB on Thursday, January 7. Please provide clearance/comments by NOON on Wednesday, January 6. Thanks.



**U.S. MISSION TO NATO
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
TEL: 32-2-724-3103**



UNCLASSIFIED FAX		OPERATORS USE		Date Sent:	Time sent	Initials
To:	NAME: Peter Hinz	ORGANIZATION: EUR/RPM	UNCLASSIFIED FAX NUMBER 202-647-0985			
From:	NAME: Bill Krug	OFFICE/EXTENSION POL 3103	USNATO UNCLASS FAX NUMBER 32-2-724-3403			
Precedence: ☐ Routine ☐ Priority ☒ Immediate ⇒			Receive Deadline	Date: 01/04/99	Time:	
Date: January 4, 1999	Total Number of Pages (Including Cover):	7	Approval:	XO:	OPAXO:	
SPECIAL NOTES AND INSTRUCTIONS						

Hi Peter, re: Kosovo

Here is POLADS(INV)(98)125(Revised) of 21 Dec. 1998 on the Master Media Messages on NATO Operations in and around Kosovo. D/POLAD and PC Rep Andrew Goodman told me that we had not sent this version to Washington before. This version does contain the changes that we wanted in the earlier version, but also has changes proposed by allies. Andrew will extend silence, but we will need Washdc concurrence to approve this version. Will draft an Unless Otherwise Directed Guidance cable.

UNCLASSIFIED TEXT ONLY

ATTACH UNCLASSIFIED ONLY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
21 December 1998

POLADS(INV)(98)125(Revised)

Silence procedure ends:
c.o.b. 4 January 1999

To : Members of the Political Committee and the Three Invited Countries
From : Acting Chairman

MASTER MEDIA MESSAGES ON NATO OPERATIONS IN
AND AROUND KOSOVO

Please find attached a revised text of the Master Media Messages on NATO operations in and around Kosovo. The new version takes into account comments received by delegations in writing and our discussion in the Political Committee on Tuesday, 15 December 1998. The text includes additional material and broad themes that can be used selectively by spokesmen to supplement the recent NATO Foreign Ministers statement on Kosovo.

Please bear in mind that the text is intended to provide themes for spokesmen to draw on with the media; it is not a text which is publicly released. Delegations should therefore look at the text for substance rather than fine-tuning the language. If I do not hear otherwise by **c.o.b. 4 January 1999**, I will consider the Master Media Messages approved by the Political Committee. If silence is broken, we will take up the text at our Political Committee meeting on 5 January.

(Signed) Donald J. McCONNELL

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

-1-

ANNEX to
POLADS(INV)(98)125(Revised)

MASTER MEDIA MESSAGES ON NATO OPERATIONS IN
AND AROUND KOSOVO

UPDATE (17 December 1998)

General

- NATO's aim has been to contribute to international efforts to stop the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, and the violence there and bring about a lasting political settlement. The Alliance condemns all acts of violence or terrorism from whatever source. NATO does not support the independence of Kosovo but calls for an enhanced status for Kosovo, and meaningful self-administration, which preserves the territorial integrity of the FRY, and safeguards the human and civil rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo regardless of their ethnic origin.
- NATO has repeatedly stated that both sides in the conflict, the Serb forces and armed Kosovar groups must heed the international community's demands, cease all acts of violence, and enter into an unconditional political process of dialogue.
- NATO operations currently being implemented – such as the Kosovo Air Verification Mission « Eagle Eye » and Operation « Joint Guarantor » to assist in a possible emergency extraction of OSCE verifiers – are in support of the above goals. These operations are carried out on the basis of the agreements between NATO/OSCE and the FRY and UNSCR 1203.
- NATO believes that stability in Kosovo is linked to the democratization of the FRY and supports those who are genuinely engaged in that process. In this regard, we condemn actions taken by President Milosevic to suppress the independent media and political pluralism in Serbia. We welcome the steps the government of Montenegro has taken to protect the independent media, promote democratic reforms and ensure respect for the rights of all its citizens.
- Since the beginning of November 1998, violent incidents provoked in some cases by Serbian security forces and in others by armed Kosovar elements show that the parties have failed to comply fully with the requirements set out in UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203. We call upon the armed Kosovar elements to cease and desist from provocative actions and we call upon the FRY and the Serbian authorities to reduce the number and visibility of MUP special police in Kosovo and abstain from intimidating behavior.
- NATO urges all parties to move rapidly in the spirit of compromise to find a political solution to the crisis and to take advantage of this window of opportunity. An interim solution for Kosovo, endorsed by the international

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

ANNEX to
POLADS(INV)(98)125(Revised)

-2-

community, would allow the Kosovar Albanian community and other ethnic groups in Kosovo to develop democratic and self-governing institutions. Failure to reach a political agreement could prompt the international community to disengage.

On ACTORDs

- The credible threat of use of force was a determining factor that helped avert a humanitarian catastrophe, led to the withdrawal of Serb FRY forces, restarted the political negotiation process, and allowed for the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions. The Alliance's enhanced state of military readiness for the conduct of limited air strikes and phased air operations continues in order to assure full compliance with UNSC Resolutions 1199 and 1203. Any military action is subject to a separate decision by the North Atlantic Council.
- The NAC authorized to sending of the ACTORDs to secure compliance with the relevant UNSC Resolutions and to avert an imminent humanitarian catastrophe.
- NATO appreciates the willingness of Partner countries in the region to allow NATO access to their airspace, and, if necessary, to provide other forms of support. The international community would view with the utmost seriousness an attack by the FRY on a non-Allied country providing assistance.

On Air Verification Mission, Operation Eagle Eye

- The NATO-FRY agreement of October 15, 1998 called for the establishment of a NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo. The NATO Air Verification Mission - operation « Eagle Eye » is assessing compliance with UNSCR 1199 and is complementing the work of the OSCE Verification Mission on the ground in Kosovo. Flights are carried out on a daily basis.
- NATO welcomes the association of Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine in Operation « Eagle Eye ».

NATO/OSCE cooperation

- Both the NATO Air Verification and the OSCE ground verification missions were subsequently endorsed by UNSC Resolution 1203. NATO and the OSCE are coordinating their activities closely and exchanging information. Both organizations provide the UN Secretary General with information for his regular reports to the UNSC in accordance with para 16 of UNSCR 1203.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

-3-

ANNEX to
POLADS(INV)(98)125(Revised)

- The security and safety of the OSCE verifiers is of utmost importance to us. The FRY government must meet its responsibilities in this regard, as set out in UNSCR's 1199 and 1203 and the OSCE-FRY agreement of 16th October.
- NATO expects the FRY and Serbian authorities, as well as the Kosovar communities, to cooperate fully with the OSCE KVM, in particular by respecting its freedom of movement and right of access and by ensuring that its personnel are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind. NATO also expects the FRY and Serbian authorities to cooperate fully with the ICTY in The Hague, and to allow unimpeded access to international humanitarian organizations, including by issuing the necessary visas.

On Extraction Force – Operation Joint Guarantor

- According to the FRY-OSCE agreement of October 16, the FRY has assumed the primary responsibility for the safety and security of the OSCE Mission and its personnel. However, UNSC Resolution 1203 stipulates that the OSCE may call on the support of, and make arrangements with other organisations to guarantee the safety and security of the OSCE verifiers in Kosovo in the event that the FRY is unable or unwilling to fulfil its obligations.
- NATO has requested and received formal approval from the government of FYROM¹ to station the Extraction Force on its territory. The North Atlantic Council authorized the sending of an ACTORD for the Extraction Force on December 4, 1998. Work is now [almost] complete in mounting and deploying the force which could, if required, be augmented to brigade-size strength. The force will intervene only in an emergency to extract OSCE and other designated personnel on request by the OSCE Verification Mission.
- The Force is primarily composed of European NATO Allies with France as the lead nation. As with any NATO operation in Europe, the Extraction Force falls under the overall command of SACEUR.

X

On NATO support for, and stability in neighbouring countries

- One of NATO's primary aims have been to avoid a spillover of the conflict and to enhance the security and stability of neighbouring countries, notably FYROM and Albania. NATO continues to have a direct interest in the security of these and other Partner countries. The Alliance's actions are meant to contribute to the restoration of stability and security in the region.

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

ANNEX to
POLADS(INV)(98)125(Revised)

-4-

- NATO has been keeping neighbouring countries regularly abreast of Alliance thinking and planning with regard to the crisis in Kosovo. We will continue to consult closely with neighbouring countries and other Partner states on the Alliance's actions.
- As a demonstration of the state of NATO's military readiness, an air exercise ("Determined Falcon") was held in June 1998 in Albania and FYROM.²

Albania

- NATO has since 1997 provided assistance to Albania under a special Individual Partnership Programme that, among other areas, focuses on the rebuilding of Albania's armed forces, addresses crisis management, border control and humanitarian issues.
- The first special consultations under Article 8 of the PfP Framework Document were held with Albania in March 1998.
- An air exercise was held in Albania in June 1998 and a large-scale PfP exercise (« Cooperative Assembly ») was held in August 1998 with wide-spread participation by Allies and Partner states.
- In June 1998, NATO established a NATO/PfP cell in Tirana, which plays a direct role in the implementation of Albania's Individual Partnership Programme.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia³

- NATO is grateful for the cooperation and support of the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for providing facilities for the basing of NATO forces. By allowing elements of the NATO Air Verification Mission, the KVCC and the standing element of the Extraction Force to be based on its territory, the FYROM is contributing to the international community's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Kosovo.
- NATO has concluded an agreement with the FYROM regulating the status of both the KVCC and the Extraction Force. The Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre, located near Skopje is a key component of the Kosovo verification process. The Centre was inaugurated in late November. The KVCC will conduct the following tasks: liaison, verification, planning coordination and information exchange with the OSCE mission in Pristina.

² And ³ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY

-5-

ANNEX to
POLADS(INV)(98)125(Revised)

- NATO rejects recent attempts by the FRY to discourage FYROM from cooperating with NATO in the deployment of the Extraction Force. NATO continues to count on the active support of its Partner countries in carrying out tasks which are enshrined in UNSC Resolution and that aim to promote peace, stability and political understanding in the region.
- NATO is considering the possible use of PfP training centres in FYROM for PfP training to enhance regional cooperation and to support more complex exercises under the enhanced PfP programme.
- In September 1998, the PfP exercise « Cooperative Best Effort » was held in FYROM, with wide-spread participation by Allies and Partners.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
CZECH REPUBLIC/HUNGARY/POLAND ONLY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNCLASSIFIED
FAX TRANSMISSION

BUREAU of EUROPEAN and CANADIAN
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF POLICY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
EUR/PPA Room 5227

Fax Number: 202-647-5116

Telephone: 202-647-6925

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 12/23/98

TO: Greg Schultz / Mike Hanley 456-9150

FROM: Michael J. Kelly

Number of pages including cover sheet: _____

SUBJECT: Press Statement on Kosovo

MESSAGE:

Fax Logo
51

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN**

For Immediate Release

December 23, 1998

**STATEMENT BY JAMES P. RUBIN, SPOKESMAN
SITUATION IN KOSOVO**

Although the cease-fire in Kosovo is generally holding, a number of violent incidents over the last week have increased tensions and threaten to re-ignite hostilities. The United States reiterates its call on the Serbian security forces in Kosovo and on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to exercise restraint, even in the face of provocation.

We have seen indications that some of the security personnel withdrawn from Kosovo in October have returned, and military and police units that should be in garrison are deployed in the field. This constitutes a dangerous provocation. While the United States has strongly condemned violent actions linked to the KLA -- including the murder of the deputy mayor of Kosovo Polje, the cafe shooting in Pec, and the killing of an off-duty Serbian police official in Podujevo -- we are also concerned at the disproportionate and heavy-handed response of the security services.

A large-scale crackdown against the civilian population of Kosovo would do nothing to improve the security situation and could spark a cycle of violence that would seriously undermine the cease-fire agreement. FRY President Milosevic should take immediate steps to ensure that all of his security forces in Kosovo are in compliance with the terms of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and agreements reached with the OSCE and NATO.

Belgrade authorities should know that we are monitoring developments in Kosovo very carefully and will not tolerate actions by either the KLA or the security forces that endanger the cease-fire.

In addition to the actions of the security forces affecting the civilian population, the United States is deeply concerned by Belgrade's continuing refusal to cooperate with the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and independent Finnish forensics experts to conduct investigations in Kosovo.

We also note with alarm the ultimatum issued by the Serbian Ministry of Information threatening to close down key Albanian-language newspapers and magazines for failing to comply with the draconian media law that Belgrade has already employed with devastating effect against the Serbian independent media. By imposing drastic restrictions on freedom of speech in Kosovo, the Belgrade government will only further deepen the FRY's isolation from the international community.

Drafted:

Eur/sce:mpalmer

Cleared:

Eur:emalloy

Eur/sce:choh

Eur/tms:msmith

Eur/ppa:debner

P:erubin

S/p:jo'brien

Drl:ecarr

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 27, 1998

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT REGIONAL APPOINTMENTS EVENT

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

4:34 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much and welcome. I know you have had a lot of briefings. I've been briefed on some of the briefings. (Laughter.) I got a colorful briefing on Mr. Begala's exuberance when he was here. (Laughter.)

I would like to, before I begin my remarks to you, it's my last opportunity to see the press today, and I'd like to say a few words about Kosovo and the recent developments there.

I'm very encouraged that NATO's persistence and resolve have compelled President Milosevic to pull back his forces and comply very substantially with the demands of the international community. Hopefully now the climate of fear and intimidation can be lifted and Kosovar Albanians can return to their villages, and more importantly over the long run, that negotiations toward a durable and peaceful resolution can move forward.

From the outset we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo. First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans. Second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe by stopping the repression of Kosovar Albanians. And third, to put Kosovo back into the hands of its people by giving them self-government again.

We've achieved real progress toward each of these objectives. The fighting has stopped; displaced people are beginning to return to their homes; humanitarian aid is flowing;

and Mr. Milosevic has agreed to negotiate self-government for Kosovo with a timetable to achieve it.

It is not enough, however, for Mr. Milosevic to come into compliance; he must also stay in compliance. To verify that, the international community will continue to deploy an unprecedented international presence in Kosovo, on the ground and in the air -- something which Mr. Milosevic had resisted before for a decade.

As a result of the improving security climate, up to 40,000 displaced people already have been returned to their homes from the mountains, escaping the mortal jeopardy of a winter without shelter. As the cease-fire holds, more humanitarian relief workers and international verifiers move into Kosovo. Serb forces stay out. And roadblocks and checkpoints stay down. The confidence level of the remaining displaced people should now increase. And they, too, will be able to come in from the cold.

Over the long run, stability in Kosovo depends upon a durable political settlement -- ultimately, on the establishment of democracy and civil society, including a free press throughout the Former Yugoslavia. Now Mr. Milosevic has agreed to internationally-supervised democratic elections in Kosovo, substantial self-government and a local police. In short, rights the Kosovars have been demanding since Mr. Milosevic stripped their autonomy a decade ago.

NATO's willingness to act, combined with determined diplomacy created this chance to end the suffering and repression in Kosovo and to put its people on the path to peace. But this is a chance, not a guarantee. That is why NATO today agreed to retain the authority, the forces, and the readiness to act if Mr. Milosevic backslides on his commitments.

We are at a hopeful moment, but we should be under no illusion; there is still a lot of hard road to walk before hope can triumph over hatred in the Balkans. I feel much better today about this, but we've still got to stay on the case if we want to see hope, freedom, and peace prevail.

Again, I'd like to thank Mr. Solana, Secretary General of NATO; General Clark, our Commanding General; and Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Hill and others who have worked so hard on this.

I'd also like to thank the people who helped to put together this day for you: Goody Marshall, Kris Balderston,

Elizabeth Steele, Eric Dodd. I'm grateful that at least once a year you get to come here, and we get to tell you what we're doing, and you get to tell us what you're doing -- more important, that we get to thank you for the essential role you play in making this administration work for the American people.

Here in Washington, we often come up with great sounding policies. You have to make them work in the real world. It's the GSA's Jay Pearson making our computers in school initiative work by donating hundreds of good computers to schools throughout the Pacific northwest; or Elaine Guiney, creating the nation's first one-stop capital shop in Boston to speed up small business loans; or John Pouland bringing together diverse groups to work to make the Rio Grande and economically vibrant and environmentally healthy American heritage river.

All of you, in different ways, are the eyes and ears of this administration. You are the helping hands of our administration. And we are very, very appreciative of what you do.

And look at what, together, we have done with the American people. Nearly 17 million new jobs, the lowest unemployment in 28 years, the smallest percentage of people on welfare in 29 years, more small businesses created in the past five years than in the previous 12 years combined, the highest home ownership in history, and last month, just a couple of days ago we announced we reached a goal of two-thirds of the American people in their own homes -- a goal we had set for the year 2000, almost two years ahead of time.

Now, these goals, plus the lowest crime rate in 25 years, the cleanest environment in a generation, and, of course, the first balanced budget in 29 years, have been very, very encouraging to me. Just a couple of weeks ago, we reached agreement with the Republican majority on a fiscally responsible balanced budget that seizes this moment of prosperity to invest more in our future. We fought for and won vital new investments for children -- 100,000 new teachers; child literacy; continued funding for our goal to connect every classroom and library to the Internet by the year 2000; college mentoring programs so that we can go into middle schools and tell children that, number one, they can get the help they need now and, number two, we can tell them now exactly what kind of financial help they can get to go to college if they stay in school, learn their lessons and look to the future.

We fought for and won full funding for the International Monetary Fund to help protect our own economy and to help to stabilize the financial turmoil around the world. We fought for and won emergency relief for hard-pressed farmers and ranchers. We fought for and won substantial increases for our Clean Water Initiative, to head off the threat of global climate change, to protect more precious lands, to invest in science and medical research.

We can be particularly proud of the fact that we fought for and won the right to reserve every penny of the surplus until we save Social Security first. Despite efforts of some in the congressional majority to squander the surplus on election year tax plans, we now are well positioned to save Social Security for the 21st century.

Although we should take pride in all this, and especially in the eight days of progress that we had at the end of a long, long congressional session, eight days of progress cannot make up for eight months of partisanship. That killed our plan to build and modernize 5,000 more schools. One hundred thousand teachers will enable us to take class size down to an average of 18 in the early grades, but we can't do it if the teachers don't have classrooms in which to meet the children.

It killed an increase in the minimum wage. It killed campaign finance reform. It killed the reform legislation to protect our children from the dangers of tobacco. It killed our chance to pass a real patients' bill of rights.

So I am proud of the 100,000 teachers, saving the surplus for Social Security, protecting the environment, keeping our economy going strong. But we have so much more to do. I hope that every American will go out and vote in the election a week from today. I hope they will vote for Social Security first, for a patients' bill of rights, for building and modernizing those 5,000 schools. I hope they will vote for progress over partisanship, for people over politics. You do that every day. And I thank you for it very much.

Thank you.

END

4:50 P.M. EST