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Folder Title:

Chronos for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

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1707

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	07/27/1999	P3/b(3)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, July 21, 1999. [Record ID: 9905553] [partial] (1 page)	07/21/1999	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo Situation Update. [Record ID: 9905566] (5 pages)	07/23/1999	P1/b(1)
003b. email	Greg Chulte to Samuel Moyn. Subject: FW:...POTUS Comment. (1 page)	07/19/1999	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, July 13, 1999. [Record ID: 995420] [partial] (1 page)	07/19/1999	P3/b(3)
005a. memo	From Dan Rosenthal to Samuel Berger. Subject: Not Yet a Memo on Sarajevo. (4 pages)	07/15/1999	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	re: Sarajevo Stability Pact Conference--Too many loose ends for July 30. (6 pages)	07/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6307

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

July 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT:

POTUS Message to NATO Leaders on Eve of Sarajevo Summit

I attach a proposed message from POTUS to the NATO leaders following up on the discussion in yesterday's small meeting of Principals. In accordance with the discussion, the message emphasizes the need for solidarity on maintaining economic sanctions on Serbia and denying reconstruction as long as Milosevic is in power. I have also added some introductory paragraphs describing our view of the Summit's objectives and format.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab 1 Message to NATO Leaders

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: July 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 4/18/2024
208-0994-F-3

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY

INFO: SECSTATE WASH DC

SUBJECT: LETTER TO ...

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO ...AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL NOT FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR

TWO MONTHS AGO, AT NATO'S WASHINGTON SUMMIT, WE MET WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM SOUTHEAST EUROPE TO HEAR THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS DURING THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO AS WELL AS THEIR PRELIMINARY IDEAS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION. SINCE THEN, THESE COUNTRIES HAVE JOINED WITH OURS AND OTHERS IN AN AMBITIOUS STABILITY PACT AIMED AT PROMOTING PEACE, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN THE REGION. NEXT WEEK, WE WILL MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE IN SARAJEVO TO LAUNCH THE STABILITY PACT IN A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND SYMBOLIC WAY.

THE STABILITY PACT SUMMIT PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE A VISION OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE FOUNDED ON COOPERATION AND DEMOCRACY RATHER THAN NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT. WE SHOULD USE THE SUMMIT TO ENCOURAGE THE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO COOPERATE REGIONALLY AND TO DEVELOP A SHARED STRATEGY FOR STABILITY, GROWTH AND INTEGRATION WITH THE REST OF EUROPE. BEING IN SARAJEVO, I HOPE THAT WE WILL USE THE SUMMIT AS A VEHICLE TO RECOMMIT ALL PARTIES TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HEAR FROM THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS FIRST, AND ESPECIALLY TO PRESENT REGIONAL AS OPPOSED TO NATIONAL VIEWS. THEY WILL BE TEMPTED TO TALK ABOUT ASSISTANCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE, BUT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO THINK ABOUT LONG-TERM GROWTH AND

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By W NARA, Date 4/18/2024

208-094-f-3

STABILITY AND FOCUS THE DISCUSSION ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS MARKET REFORM, DEMOCRATIZATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY. WE SHOULD BE READY TO RESPOND AND TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH THE REGIONAL LEADERS, RATHER THAN JUST MAKING A SERIES OF PREPARED INTERVENTIONS. I HOPE YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT THIS CONTENT AND FORMAT WILL MAKE THE SUMMIT MUCH MORE PRODUCTIVE AND INTERESTING.

ALL THE LEADERS OF THE REGION HAVE BEEN INVITED TO SARAJEVO, EXCEPT ONE -- SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THE SUMMIT DEMONSTRATE SERBIA'S ISOLATION UNDER MILOSEVIC, WHILE HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF RAPID REINTEGRATION ONCE HE IS GONE. DURING NATO'S AIR CAMPAIGN, OUR SOLIDARITY WAS THE KEY TO OUR ULTIMATE SUCCESS. MAINTAINING OUR SOLIDARITY NOW IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO "WIN THE PEACE" BY ACHIEVING POLITICAL REFORM IN BELGRADE, AND THUS A MORE SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION.

TO DO THIS, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST PURSUE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON LINE ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE TO SERBIA. WE SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND NO ASSISTANCE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AS LONG AS MILOSEVIC IS IN POWER. ANY HINT THAT WE ARE RECONSIDERING OUR POSTURE ON THESE POINTS WILL BE USED BY MILOSEVIC TO CLAIM VICTORY AT HOME AND TO UNDERCUT THE OPPOSITION. I APPRECIATE YOUR SOLIDARITY NOW -- IT IS AS IMPORTANT NOW AS SOLIDARITY DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN, IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED VISION FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS SOUTHEAST EUROPE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT WEEK IN SARAJEVO AND THANK YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR SUPPORT. WE CAN MAKE THIS AN HISTORIC MOMENT BY UNDERSCORING OUR HOPES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE REGION, ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR DEMOCRATIC LEADERS.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5646

July 27, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sm*
SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I please find a memorandum to the President enclosing a reply to Senator Jack Reed on Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Mark Tavlarides *Sm*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Reed.

Background

Attached at Tab I is a proposed response to a note and report that Senator Jack Reed sent you upon returning from Kosovo, where he met with Wes Clark, Sergio de Mello, and Kosovar leaders. He was among the first members of Congress to visit the province after the peace. His report generally tracks with our assessment of both the current situation in Kosovo and the way ahead.

In your reply, you thank the Senator for his note and report and emphasize the importance of maintaining Congressional support for our Kosovo policy. You respond positively to his recommendations, echoing his high praise for KFOR and taking a relatively optimistic attitude toward UNMIK implementation. You also reference the upcoming Sarajevo Summit. You conclude with some thoughts underscoring the importance of American involvement in the region.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jack:

Thank you for your note and the report on your recent visit to Kosovo. Congressional support for our Kosovo policy is critical for a region that is so important to our country. I am glad you were among the first members to visit since the peace and were able to meet with General Jackson, Interim Representative de Mello and Kosovar leaders. I too have been closely monitoring ongoing developments there and I appreciated reading your first-hand report on the situation on the ground.

Like you, I take pride in KFOR's accomplishments since entering Kosovo and the participation of U.S. servicemen and women in the force. We have their professionalism and competence to thank as violent incidents become less frequent and an atmosphere of normality returns to the province.

I share your assessment that much remains to be accomplished in Kosovo, and concur in particular with your list of specific recommendations for progress. You are right that we cannot rest on our laurels and that significant hurdles have to be crossed as UNMIK establishes a government in Kosovo. The recent arrival of the Special Representative of the Secretary General Bernard Kouchner -- along with his American deputy and my former Special Assistant Jock Covey -- is an important step in the right direction. Given the immensity of the task ahead, it is critical that we move forward with our bilateral efforts as well as maintain our support of UN efforts on civil administration. United Nations planning and implementation is advancing, and despite regrettable incidents such as the recent massacre of Serbs at Gracko, we believe the situation is improving rapidly.

My attendance at Friday's Sarajevo summit shows our strong support for finding solutions to the problems of the region. The initiatives of the summit should demonstrate how choosing to create a better climate for investment, human rights and democracy can result in better lives for everyone in the region. Milosevic, of course, did not attend, and Serbia's absence from the Stability Pact and the conference initiatives will reinforce

his isolation and the failure of his obsolete vision for this region.

I believe the United States will overcome what obstacles remain, with your support and in cooperation with the United Nations and other nations and multilateral organizations, and help create a Europe that is undivided, democratic and at peace in the next century. Thank you again for your letter and your support in Congress in making this vision a reality.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jack Reed
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

JACK REED
RHODE ISLAND

COMMITTEES:
BANKING
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
AGING

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3903

July 15, 1999


The Honorable William J. Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, 20500-0005

Dear Mr. President:

From July 5 through July 8, 1999, I traveled with CODEL LEVIN to Skopje, Macedonia and Kosovo. Our delegation consisted of myself, Senators Levin, Sessions and Landrieu, together with Under Secretary of Defense Rudy DeLeon and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense John Verouneau.

I enclose my report on the trip. I hope it provides insights into the challenging problems faced by NATO and by the local communities. As always, I welcome your comments.

Sincerely,


Jack Reed
United States Senator

Enclosure

311 622
S646
PLEASE RESPOND TO:

WASHINGTON:

☐ WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3903
(202) 224-4642

RHODE ISLAND:

☐ 201 HILLSIDE ROAD
SUITE 200
GARDEN CITY
CRANSTON, RI 02920-5602
(401) 943-3100

☐ FEDERAL BUILDING
ROOM 418
PROVIDENCE, RI 02903-1773
(401) 528-5200

TDD RELAY RHODE ISLAND
1-(800) 745-5555

www.senate.gov/~reed

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5645

July 28, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *DS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on the Danube

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President enclosing a proposed response to Senator George Voinovich on the above subject.

Concurrence by: Mark Tavlarides *am*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on the Danube

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Voinovich.

Background

Senator George Voinovich recently wrote you upon return from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting in St. Petersburg. He stresses the importance of the Danube for the regional economy of southeastern Europe; it is currently blocked at Novi Sad where NATO planes dropped several bridges. He believes the waterway needs to be cleared and the bridges rebuilt.

In your reply, you agree with the Senator about the importance of the Danube. But you explain your position that the U.S. government cannot undertake clearance efforts and does not support bridge reconstruction. You note that your experience with Milosevic has convinced you that no reconstruction of any kind is appropriate until a regime change.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Voinovich:

Thank you for the letter you sent on your return from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting in St. Petersburg. I appreciated the measure you appended on economic reconstruction in southeastern Europe.

I believe in the principle of free navigation and share your view of the importance of the Danube as an international waterway and trade route. I do not oppose efforts of others to free the Danube of blockages, though I would hope that any such efforts avoid the intermediation of the FRY government. However, I cannot support your proposal to rebuild Serbia's bridges. Such repairs would fall into the category of reconstruction.

It is our policy, as you know, that Serbia should not receive funds for reconstruction while it is headed by Milosevic. He is responsible for the ruin of his country and the Serb people, with whom I have always said I have no quarrel, are drawing the proper conclusions about the future of his regime. Serbia is, of course, eligible under our policy for humanitarian funds, but it will not receive any other assistance from the United States until there has been a change in leadership. We have too much experience with Milosevic to allow him to abuse well-intentioned international efforts to shore up his government, pad his coffers and prepare for new wars.

I do share your concern about the recovery of southeast Europe and I hope you will support the other initiatives I announced at the Sarajevo summit designed to bring about economic and political change in this region. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George V. Voinovich
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH
OHIO

317 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 224-3353
TDD: (202) 224-6997
senator_voinovich@voinovich.senate.gov
www.senate.gov/~voinovich

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3504

311599 004
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT
RESTRUCTURING AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

SMALL BUSINESS

ETHICS

July 14, 1999

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Last week, I joined several of my congressional colleagues at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia.

As you would expect, the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict was one of the central topics addressed. I have attached for your review and information a measure that I offered that highlights the humanitarian and economic impact of infrastructure rebuilding throughout Southeastern Europe (including Serbia). The Danube River, the economic lifeline for much of the region, is largely impassable and unable to be crossed at several key points. The regional economy, linked together closely, has been impacted. To reinvigorate the regional economy, this kind of issue needs to be resolved.

The amendment was adopted with the unanimous support of the entire Assembly (including the parliamentary representatives from nations involved in the peacekeeping force in Kosovo, including Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy). I am hopeful that this incredible level of international support for the reconstruction of Southeastern Europe, with the understanding that it can only be successful with infrastructure repair in Serbia, will bring about a real change in policy for a number of nations, including the United States.

I urge you to join the hundreds of parliamentarians who attended the OSCE meeting last week and support the economic recovery of Southeastern Europe. Let us enter the 21st century free of the bitter ethnic hatred and economic struggles that plagued this century. Reaching out to the people of Southeast Europe, by rebuilding infrastructure damaged during the Kosovo conflict, would be a great first step.

It would be wonderful if, at the end of the month when you join your colleagues in Sarajevo, you could announce to the world your support for cleaning up the Danube River and rebuilding key bridges across it to allow normal commerce to begin again.

STATE OFFICES:
36 EAST 7TH STREET
ROOM 2815
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202
(513) 684-3265

1240 EAST NINTH STREET
ROOM 2955
CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114
(216) 522-7095

37 WEST BROAD STREET
ROOM 970 (CASEWORK)
COLUMBUS, OHIO 43215
(614) 469-6774


37 WEST BROAD STREET
ROOM 960
COLUMBUS, OHIO 43215
(614) 469-6697

420 MADISON AVENUE
ROOM 1210
TOLEDO, OHIO 43604
(419) 259-3895

SEP 21 1998 11:00 AM FAX
0005

I look forward to continuing working with you on issues facing Europe in the months ahead.
Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



George V. Voinovich
United States Senate

cc: The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary of State

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	07/27/1999	P3/b(3)

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National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chen

July 27, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

BRIAN CARLSON
United States Information
Agency

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

DAVID ADAMS
Agency for International
Development

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

JAMIE METZL
Department of State

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

LEN HAWLEY
Department of State

JEFFREY BIALOS
Department of State

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

NANCY LEE
Department of the Treasury

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

MAC MCATAMNEY
Department of Justice

KEITH DAYTON
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT PERITO
Department of Justice


BRUCE WRIGHT
Joint Chiefs of Staff

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting on Wednesday, July 28, 1999, will now be held from **12:00 - 1:30 p.m. in room 208** of the Old Executive Office Building. There will be no 8:30 a.m. SVTS. An agenda is attached **with one item added (in bold)**.

If your attendees are not on the standard list, please call in your attendees date of birth and social security number by NLT, 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, July 28 to Mary Quinn at 202-456-9101.



Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Attachment

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING

July 28, 1999

11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

- I. UNMIK Update.State
- II. KFOR Update. JCS
- III. Concept for Interim Judicial and Penal Systems. . . .State
- IV. Kosovo Implementation. NSC
- V. **Uniformed Civil Defense Force - KLA Participation. . State**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5476

Chen

July 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *MS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a proposed response to a note and report that Senators Carl Levin and Mary Landrieu sent you upon returning from Kosovo. They were the first members of Congress to visit the province after the peace. Their report generally tracks with our assessment of both the current situation in Kosovo and the way ahead.

In your reply, you thank the Senators for their note and report and emphasize the importance of maintaining Congressional support for our Kosovo policy. You respond positively to the Senators' recommendations, echoing their high praise for KFOR and take a relatively optimistic attitude toward UNMIK implementation. You also reference the upcoming Sarajevo Summit. You conclude with some thoughts underscoring the importance of American involvement in the region.

The letter to Levin also replies to his faxed note to you recommending a documentary on Serb atrocities. In response to this request, you tell the Senator that you have passed the concept to your staff and explain what initiatives are up and running to bring home to the Serb people the crimes of their leader.

Concurrences by: Mark Tavlarides; Steven Naplan; Matt McLean *jm*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Senators.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Letters

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Levin:

Thank you for your note and the report on your recent visit to Kosovo. Congressional support for our Kosovo policy is critical for a region that is so important to our country, and I am glad you were the first members to visit since the peace. I too have been closely monitoring ongoing developments there and I appreciated reading your first-hand report on the situation on the ground.

I share your pride in KFOR's accomplishments since entering Kosovo and the participation of U.S. servicemen and women in the force. We have their professionalism and competence to thank as violent incidents become less frequent and an atmosphere of normality returns to the province.

I take seriously your concept of a documentary on war crimes and have referred it to my staff. In the meantime, please know that the Serbian language services of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, broadcast from an expanding ring of transmitters around Serbia, continue to report on the atrocities committed in Kosovo. More remains to be done; for example, the State Department is updating the "Erasing History" report on atrocities it released in May and plans to disseminate the results to Serb audiences. But recent episodes of public dissent suggest that many Serb citizens are slowly coming to grips with the true nature of Milosevic's self-destructive policies.

You are right that we cannot rest on our laurels and that significant hurdles have to be crossed as UNMIK establishes a government in Kosovo. Kouchner's recent arrival -- along with his American deputy and my former Special Assistant Jock Covey -- is an important step in the right direction. Given the immensity of the task ahead, it is critical that we move forward with our bilateral efforts as well as maintain our support of UN efforts on civil administration. UN planning and implementation is rapidly advancing, and the speedy release of U.S. funds from

the Congress for our contribution to the UNMIK budget would help ensure that these efforts remain on track.

We are also thinking regionally as the President plans to attend the Sarajevo conference next week. This will show how choosing to create a better climate for investment, human rights and democracy can result in better lives for everyone in the region. Milosevic, of course, will not attend, and Serbia's absence from the Stability Pact and the conference initiatives will reinforce his isolation and the failure of his obsolete vision for this region.

I share your assessment of how much remains to be accomplished in Kosovo, and concur in particular with your list of specific recommendations for progress. I believe the United States will overcome what obstacles remain, with your support and in cooperation with the UN and other nations and multilateral organizations. I am especially heartened by your report on the sympathies of the Kosovars you met for our policies and our country. I believe the affection they feel for the United States and the West is a credit to our involvement and will prove decisive in realizing the President's vision of a Europe undivided, democratic, and at peace in the next century.

Thanks again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Landrieu:

Thank you for your note and the report on your recent visit to Kosovo. Congressional support for our Kosovo policy is critical for a region that is so important to our country, and I am glad you were the first members to visit since the peace. I too have been closely monitoring ongoing developments there and I appreciated reading your first-hand report on the situation on the ground.

I share your pride in KFOR's accomplishments since entering Kosovo and the participation of U.S. servicemen and women in the force. We have their professionalism and competence to thank as violent incidents become less frequent and an atmosphere of normality returns to the province.

You are right that we cannot rest on our laurels and that significant hurdles have to be crossed as UNMIK establishes a government in Kosovo. Kouchner's recent arrival -- along with his American deputy and my former Special Assistant Jock Covey -- is an important step in the right direction. Given the immensity of the task ahead, it is critical that we move forward with our bilateral efforts as well as maintain our support of UN efforts on civil administration. UN planning and implementation is rapidly advancing, and the speedy release of U.S. funds from the Congress for our contribution to the UNMIK budget would help ensure that these efforts remain on track.

We are also thinking regionally as the President plans to attend the Sarajevo conference next week. This will show how choosing to create a better climate for investment, human rights and democracy can result in better lives for everyone in the region. Milosevic, of course, will not attend, and Serbia's absence from the Stability Pact and the conference initiatives will reinforce his isolation and the failure of his obsolete vision for this region.

I share your assessment of how much remains to be accomplished in Kosovo, and concur in particular with your list of specific

recommendations for progress. I believe the United States will overcome what obstacles remain, with your support and in cooperation with the UN and other nations and multilateral organizations. I am especially heartened by your report on the sympathies of the Kosovars you met for our policies and our country. I believe the affection they feel for the United States and the West is a credit to our involvement and will prove decisive in realizing the President's vision of a Europe undivided, democratic, and at peace in the next century.

Thanks again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Mary Landrieu
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

5414

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

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MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND

LES BROWNLEE, STAFF DIRECTOR
DAVID S. LYLES, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States :

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 16, 1999

TO: LEGISLATIVE
KOSOVO
PLS. DRAFT
RESP. FOR
SRB SIGNATURE
RETURN ORIGINAL TO

Mr. Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
1st Floor, West Wing
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. Berger:

We wanted to share with you our observations from our trip to Kosovo during July 6-7.

We would welcome your comments on the enclosed report.

Sincerely,


Carl Levin


Mary L. Landrieu

Enclosure

JUL 19 17:24

Scenes of Horror and Hope:
Report on July 6 - 7 Visit to Kosovo
Senators Carl Levin and Mary Landrieu

Together with Senators Reed and Sessions, we visited Kosovo on July 6 and 7, 1999, accompanied by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Rudy de Leon, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs John Veroneau, and Major General Bruce Scott, Army Chief of Legislative Liaison. This was the first Congressional delegation to visit Kosovo since the end of the conflict. These were days 26 and 27 of the deployment of the NATO Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (KFOR) into Kosovo and the launch of Operation Joint Guardian.

Throughout our two day visit, we found scenes of horror and hope: horror because of the unspeakable atrocities visited upon the ethnic Albanian residents of Kosovo under Milosevic's campaign of terror and ethnic cleansing, and hope for the future in the vibrant spirit of these same ethnic Albanians, particularly the children, who have returned to their homes in such extraordinary numbers in a short period of time to rebuild their lives and communities.

Overall Observations

The speed with which the ethnic Albanian refugees and internally-displaced persons have returned to their towns and villages in Kosovo is remarkable. One of the refugee camps north of Skopje, Macedonia, is already empty; the other will be empty shortly. The fact that the people are busily and determinedly resuming their normal lives is a testament to the resiliency of the human spirit. These factors give us hope for the future.

Milosevic's forces committed unspeakable atrocities against the ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo. Suspected mass grave sites are being uncovered on almost a daily basis. NATO must continue to exert every effort to assist the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its investigations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The international community must ensure that indicted war criminals are brought to justice.

The United Nations faces a task of unprecedented complexity and difficulty in Kosovo. Mr. de Mello has made an excellent start as the acting Special Representative of the Secretary General but he has been hindered in his efforts by a lack of international civilian police, a lack of funding for salaries of Kosovo civil servants, and the slow deployment of personnel from the United Nations (UN), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU).

The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

organization, under which major tasks are assigned to four different international organizations, will present a significant management challenge to Mr. Bernard Kouchner, who has just been appointed to the position of Special Representative of the Secretary General. This challenge is compounded by the presence of a large number of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These stovepipe organizations bring talent and resources to the effort and it is imperative that mechanisms be created to organize and synthesize the efforts of the PVOs, NGOs and UNMIK. K

Based upon a survey of 141 of Kosovo's 2,000 villages, UNHCR preliminary results show that approximately 64 percent of the housing in the villages covered suffered severe damage or complete destruction during the war. Another 20 percent sustained slight or moderate destruction. Another 20 percent sustained slight or moderate damage. This represents a twofold increase in severely damaged homes and a near tripling of those destroyed since March. The level of destruction in Kosovo is extremely varied. Some areas, such as the ones surveyed, are heavily destroyed, while others were barely touched. About 40 percent of water sources are contaminated, many by household rubbish or animal or human remains.

KFOR has performed incredibly well in the first month of its presence in Kosovo. It has been forced to perform tasks that are outside the normal functions of a military force. It is a tribute to the training, professionalism, and motivation of the U.S. and allied forces that so many relatively junior personnel could assume such responsible jobs as mayors and administrators, policemen, and arbitrators. Their accomplishments are even more extraordinary since they have been accomplished in a situation in which they have been subjected to hostile fire. ✓

Despite KFOR's best efforts, however, it will take weeks or months for major businesses in Kosovo to resume operations. Ethnic Albanian employees, who were fired from their jobs and replaced by Serbs in 1989 at the direction of Serbian President Milosevic, now seek to regain their jobs while Serbs want to remain in place. Agriculture is hampered by a lack of fuel for farm machinery. It will take great skill and judgment to resolve these competing claims and to get Kosovo's economy restarted.

NATO and Russia have worked out arrangements to place Russian troops under the tactical control of KFOR. Russian troops are presently deploying to areas in the American, German and French sectors and Russian military personnel are returning to their posts at NATO headquarters. The presence of Russian troops can reassure the Serbs remaining in Kosovo, potentially enable Serbs who have left and who played no role in atrocities against the ethnic Albanians to return, contribute to the success of KFOR's mission, and foster the restoration of good relations

between the NATO allies and Russia. It will take hard work and good judgment for these arrangements to work.

The Serbs who have remained in Kosovo are moving to enclaves where they feel more secure. General Clark estimates that there are 40 to 50 such Serb enclaves. Although the VJ and uniformed Serb special police (MUP) have withdrawn from Kosovo, MUP and paramilitary personnel have remained and, in addition to reporting to Belgrade, present a problem for KFOR and law and order in Kosovo. Their departure or detention is essential.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is filling a vacuum caused by the lack of a functioning civil government in Kosovo. It is important for UNMIK to establish rapidly an interim civil administration so as to counteract the KLA's influence and enable all qualified Kosovars to participate in the effective administration of the cities, towns and villages.

The burning of houses, which continues, must be stopped, no matter who is responsible. This is the number one need. NATO must accelerate the deployment of forces and nations must identify and provide qualified police forces as soon as possible.

The KLA will likely store weapons in caches in the mountains and maintain its military organization as long as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President Milosevic stays in power. The international community must do all that it can to support democratic elements in Serbia and Montenegro so as to hasten the return of the FRY to the community of nations and to bring Milosevic and other indicted war criminals to trial at the Hague.

The Serbs continue to view themselves as the victims of this conflict. Milosevic's control of the Serbian news media since his forces started carrying out ethnic cleansing in the Fall of 1998, has prevented the Serbs from understanding the scope of atrocities carried out in their name. The Serbs must be exposed to what really happened in Kosovo. A powerful documentary, narrated by a modern Serbian language speaker, that clearly demonstrates the atrocities against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, must be prepared for airing over Serbian television.

Finally, we are deeply appreciative of the professionalism, bravery, and sensitivity of our troops in Kosovo. We ask a lot of the men and women of our armed forces and they always respond in a manner that makes all Americans proud. We must ensure that we continue to provide them with all the resources and support that they need.

In sum, the challenges to UNMIK and KFOR are substantial:

- qualified international civilian police must be deployed to maintain law and order and to train a local police force;

- civil government structures must be restored;
- an impartial judicial system in which all Kosovars have confidence must be created;
- Russian troops must be successfully integrated into KFOR;
- homes must be repaired prior to the onset of winter in October;
- MUP and paramilitary personnel remaining in Kosovo must be taken into custody;
- the Serbs must be informed of the atrocities against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo that were carried out in their name;
- KFOR and UNMIK must assist the ICTY in the gathering and preservation of evidence of war crimes, and
- Milosevic must be brought to trial for war crimes at the Hague.

Summary of Places and People Visited

After flying overnight from Andrews Air Force Base to Skopje, Macedonia, we immediately were flown by American Blackhawk helicopters to Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo which is located in the British sector. We met with Commander KFOR, British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson; Mr. Sergio Viera de Mello, acting Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations; Mr. Hashim Thaci, leader of the KLA; Colonel Agim Ceku, Military Commander of the KLA; and we drove and walked around Pristina. Upon our return to Skopje to spend the night, we met with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, American General Wesley Clark and had a working dinner with U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia Chris Hill.

From our initial helicopter vantage point over the capital city to our final drive and walk through Pristina's streets, we were surprised by the lack of destruction to its infrastructure, houses and shops and by the number of people going about their lives in a purposeful and vibrant manner. While we did not have the time to tour the entire city, it was clear that the people were determined to resume their normal lives and that NATO's air campaign avoided unintended damage to an extraordinary degree.

General Jackson and Mr. de Mello both emphasized the fact that 600,000 of the 850,000 ethnic Albanian refugees had returned to Kosovo within three weeks and that 90,000 of the remaining refugees were in temporary refuge outside the Balkans. The

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), who had less distance to travel, had returned even earlier to their homes. They also noted that there was far less damage to Kosovo's infrastructure than they had expected.

They also told us that KFOR personnel, in the absence of the presence of UN administrators or international civilian police, were necessarily acting as civil administrators, facilitating the carrying out of public services, and detaining both alleged war criminals and common law breakers. They both urgently called for the international community to quickly field approximately 3,000 qualified armed civilian police to perform law enforcement functions and to train a local police force and to provide approximately \$15 million to pay the salaries of 50,000 public employees for a period of three months.

Mr. de Mello outlined the organization and assignment of responsibility of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as follows: (a) Interim civil administration - the UN; (b) Humanitarian affairs - the UNHCR; (c) Institution building - the OSCE; and (d) Reconstruction - the EU. UNMIK will be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, whom Secretary General Kofi Annan announced on July 2 would be Bernard Kouchner from France. The Special Representative will be assisted by four Deputy Special Representatives, each of whom will be responsible for one of the above four major components of the mission.

Mr. de Mello advised that on July 2 he had called together leaders of the Albanian and Serbian communities to discuss security for all people in Kosovo. The leaders issued a joint statement calling for restraint and respect for human life, which was broadcast on radio and television by UNMIK.

Mr. Thaci advised us that the KLA was a democratic organization and both he and Colonel Ceku assured us that they want to see a multiethnic Kosovo and have publicly called for the remaining Serbs to stay and for those who had left to return provided they had not committed atrocities. They estimated that about 10,000 ethnic Albanians, of whom 9,000 were civilians and 1,000 soldiers, had been killed by the Serbs.

Pursuant to the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the KLA, entered into on June 20, 1999, the KLA has 90 days to place all designated weapons within registered storage sites under the control of KFOR. Thus far, a number of weapons have been turned in but no baseline exists as to the number and types of weapons previously held by the KLA. Both Mr. Thaci and Colonel Ceku called to our attention paragraphs 25 a. and b. of the KLA's Undertaking. Those paragraphs, which are not binding on the United Nations, are an expression of the KLA's desires that the international community should give due

consideration to (a) the participation of individual current members of the KLA in the administration and police forces of Kosovo in view of the expertise they have developed and (b) the formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the U.S. National Guard.

General Clark reviewed with us the successful completion of NATO-Russian consultations in Moscow for the implementation of the earlier Helsinki Agreed Points. He noted that, as opposed to Bosnia, there is no peace agreement for Kosovo. He advised that there are presently 40 to 50 Serb enclaves in Kosovo. Finally, he noted that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President Milosevic controls the military, police and economy of the FRY and that as long as he remains in power, the KLA will be unlikely to totally demilitarize.

On our second day in the area, we had a working breakfast with U.S. Major General Dave Grange, Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division. General Grange then accompanied us throughout the remainder of the day. We flew to the U.S. sector at Camp Bondsteel near Urosevac. The U.S. sector, which is located in southeastern Kosovo, is the least damaged of the five NATO sectors. Greek and Polish troops are also deployed in the U.S. sector. We were briefed by U.S. Brigadier General John Craddock, Commander Task Force Falcon, and his staff. From June 24 to July 1, 1999, U.S. soldiers and marines had been involved in 10 incidents in which they received hostile fire. The aggressors suffered 3 killed and 4 wounded in action. There have been no U.S. casualties. U.S. forces had not received hostile fire since July 1, but it has since been reported that gunmen fired on American troops three times on Saturday, July 10. The aggressors suffered one killed and one wounded. There were no U.S. casualties.

U.S. forces have detained 169 persons for criminal activity, mainly arson or looting. Of that number, 160 have been released on their own cognizance after magistrate hearings conducted by U.S. Army judge advocates. A team of ethnic Albanian and Serb judges assembled by Mr. de Mello has visited the Camp and approved the U.S. hearing process, including the continued detention of the 9 alleged criminals.

We toured Camp Bondsteel and visited the Canadian Forensic Laboratory there, which is investigating suspected war crimes sites. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel at the lab showed us the packaged remains of ten ethnic Albanians whose beaten and bullet-riddled bodies had been burned and buried under bulldozed earth.

We then drove to Urosevac. Just outside Camp Bondsteel, we stopped at a site of 6 heavily damaged houses that we learned belonged to three ethnic Albanian brothers and their extended

families. We talked to two of the brothers who described for us how the wife and daughter of one of the brothers was brutally slain by Serbian paramilitary forces while they were sitting on the front stoop of their house. His account was so heart-rendering that the U.S. interpreter who was translating for us had to interrupt his translation and walk a distance away to recompose himself.

During our drive through Urosevac and our stop in the town square, we and the U.S. soldiers accompanying us were welcomed by enthusiastic crowds of children and adults who chanted "NATO" and "USA." This warm welcome was repeated everywhere we traveled in Kosovo. Even during our U.S. Blackhawk helicopter flights over the countryside, people working in the fields paused to wave to us. As we saw earlier in Pristina and later in Prizren, the people were moving purposely through the streets of Urosevac, cafes were crowded and stores were either open for business or work was underway to prepare them for opening.

We then flew to Camp Monteith near Gnjilane. The Camp is located on the site of the barracks of the Yugoslav Army's Pristina Corps that was struck by NATO during the air campaign. We ate lunch with Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scurlock Jr., Commander Task Force 1-26 Infantry, and with soldiers of the 26th Infantry Division and with U.S. Navy Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion THREE.

We then flew to the German headquarters camp near Prizren and were briefed by the Deputy Commander and his staff. The German sector, which is located in southwestern Kosovo, is second only to the Italian's northeastern sector in terms of damage. Dutch and Turkish troops are also deployed in the German sector. We drove through Prizren where we received friendly and enthusiastic waves and shouts from the city's residents.

In our flight over and drive through Prizren, we could see 5 houses ablaze in the hills in the northern part of the city that is a mostly Serb area. The UNHCR reported on July 9, that 21 Serb houses had been burned in Prizren in the past 48 hours. In the course of our briefing by the German headquarters staff, we were informed that there are a number of motivations behind these burnings: (a) Serbs are burning their own homes as they depart for Serbian majority villages or for Serbia; (b) Serbian paramilitary who stayed behind in civilian clothes are burning Serb houses to destabilize the situation and to demonstrate that NATO cannot protect the Serbs; (c) ethnic Albanians are burning Serb houses in retribution; and (d) young ethnic Albanians are burning Serb houses for excitement.

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

ETROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA
 CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
 JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
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 JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND

LES SNOWHILL, STAFF DIRECTOR
 DAVID S. LYLES, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

July 19, 1999

Mr. Samuel R. Berger
 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 1st Floor, West Wing
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Sandy:

It has become increasingly clear to me that we must prepare to inform the Serbian people of the atrocities committed against the ethnic Albanians in their name.

Because of Milosevic's control of Serbian television, most Serbs believe that they are the wronged party. Yugoslav Army reserves are demonstrating, for the most part, for back pay. Even the opposition's demonstrations to oust Milosevic have reprimanded him for failing to hold on to Kosovo and for causing the damage resulting from NATO's air campaign.

I strongly recommend that the United States produce a documentary, narrated by a modern Serb language speaker, that powerfully records the atrocities against the ethnic Albanian people. It is important that this effort be launched very quickly, while the evidence of mass graves and other atrocities are being unearthed in Kosovo.

I am convinced that when the Serbian people view such a documentary, which could happen in a number of ways, the ground will be better prepared for acceptance of responsibility and a determination to find ways to atone for the atrocities. This, in turn, will make it possible to reconcile with the Kosovars and rejoin Europe.

Sincerely, .



Carl Levin
 Ranking Minority Member

Thanks Sandy, I give consideration

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5476

July 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *on orig*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *on orig*
SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a proposed response to a note and report that Senators Carl Levin and Mary Landrieu sent you upon returning from Kosovo. They were the first members of Congress to visit the province after the peace. Their report generally tracks with our assessment of both the current situation in Kosovo and the way ahead.

In your reply, you thank the Senators for their note and report and emphasize the importance of maintaining Congressional support for our Kosovo policy. You respond positively to the Senators' recommendations, echoing their high praise for KFOR and take a relatively optimistic attitude toward UNMIK implementation. You also reference the upcoming Sarajevo Summit. You conclude with some thoughts underscoring the importance of American involvement in the region.

The letter to Levin also replies to his faxed note to you recommending a documentary on Serb atrocities. In response to this request, you tell the Senator that you have passed the concept to your staff and explain what initiatives are up and running to bring home to the Serb people the crimes of their leader.

Concurrences by: Mark Tavlarides; Steven Naplan; Matt McLean - *orig*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Senators.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Letters

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mary:

Thank you for your report on your recent visit to Kosovo. Congressional support for our Kosovo policy is critical for a region that is so important to our country, and I am glad you were among the first members to visit since the peace. I too have been closely monitoring developments there, and I appreciated reading your firsthand report on the situation on the ground.

You are right, we cannot rest on our laurels. Significant hurdles have to be crossed as UNMIK establishes a government in Kosovo. Kouchner's recent arrival -- along with his American deputy and my former Special Assistant Jock Covey -- is an important step in the right direction. Given the immensity of the task ahead, it is critical that we move forward with our bilateral efforts as well as maintain our support of UN efforts on civil administration. UN planning and implementation is rapidly advancing, and the speedy release of U.S. funds from the Congress for our contribution to the UNMIK budget would help ensure that these efforts remain on track.

Your assessment of how much remains to be accomplished in Kosovo is correct, and I particularly agree with your list of specific recommendations for progress. With your support and the cooperation of the UN and other nations and multilateral organizations, I believe the United States will overcome what obstacles remain. I am especially heartened by your report on the sympathies of the Kosovars you met for our policies and our country. I believe the affection they feel for the United States and the West is a credit to our involvement and will prove decisive in realizing the President's vision of a Europe undivided, democratic, and at peace in the next century.

Thanks again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Mary Landrieu
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Carl:

Thank you for your note and the report on your recent visit to Kosovo. Congressional support for our Kosovo policy is critical for a region that is so important to our country, and I am glad you were among the first members to visit since the peace. I too have been closely monitoring developments there, and I appreciated reading your firsthand report on the situation on the ground.

I take seriously your concept of a documentary on war crimes and have referred it to my staff. In the meantime, please know that the Serbian language services of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, broadcast from an expanding ring of transmitters around Serbia, continue to report on the atrocities committed in Kosovo. More remains to be done; for example, the State Department is updating the "Erasing History" report on atrocities it released in May and plans to disseminate the results to Serb audiences. Recent episodes of public dissent suggest that many Serb citizens are slowly coming to grips with the true nature of Milosevic's self-destructive policies.

You are right, we cannot rest on our laurels. Significant hurdles have to be crossed as UNMIK establishes a government in Kosovo. Kouchner's recent arrival -- along with his American deputy and my former Special Assistant Jock Covey -- is an important step in the right direction. Given the immensity of the task ahead, it is critical that we move forward with our bilateral efforts as well as maintain our support of UN efforts on civil administration. UN planning and implementation is rapidly advancing, and the speedy release of U.S. funds from the Congress for our contribution to the UNMIK budget would help ensure that these efforts remain on track.

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cooperation of the UN and other nations and multilateral organizations, I believe the United States will overcome what obstacles remain. I am especially heartened by your report on the sympathies of the Kosovars you met for our policies and our country. I believe the affection they feel for the United States and the West is a credit to our involvement and will prove decisive in realizing the President's vision of a Europe undivided, democratic, and at peace in the next century.

Thanks again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

July 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo and the Stability Pact on
July 21, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on July 21.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: July 21, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VL* NARA, Date *4/14/2024*
2008-0994-F-3

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo and the Stability Pact on
July 21, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo and the Stability Pact on
July 21. ~~(C)~~

Tracey A. Jacobson
Acting, Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Tracey A. Jacobson
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: July 21, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By h NARA, Date 4/14/2024
208-0994-E-3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, July 21, 1999. [Record ID: 9905553] [partial] (1 page)	07/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6307

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: July 21, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 7:00 - 8:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo and the Stability Pact ~~(C)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

CIA:

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

NEC:

Gene Sperling

Lael Brainard

State:

Madeleine Albright

James Dobbins

Anthony Wayne

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

Treasury:

Lawrence Summers

Stuart Eizenstate

JCS:

Hugh Shelton

Edward Anderson

Defense:

William Cohen

Walter Slocombe

White House:

James Steinberg

USUN:

Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Eric Schwartz

Stephen Flanagan

OMB:

Jack Lew

Chief of Staff:

John Podesta

Steven Ricchetti

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Tracey A. Jacobson

Reason for: 1.5 (a) (d)

Declassify on: July 21, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0970-M (1.28)

9/9/2019 KBH

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should work closely with the Kosovo Liberation Army to promote full compliance with its undertakings on demilitarization. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG should work with the UN to expedite the recruitment and deployment of personnel for the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). (Action: State, USUN) (U)
- The USG should redouble its efforts to secure Congressional agreement to release funding for the U.S. contribution to UNMIK's budget and international police force. (Action: All) (U)
- The USG should use its planned contribution to the July 28 Immediate Needs Conference to leverage contributions from other donors, while avoiding a contribution that exceeds a "fair share" of identified requirements. (Action: State, NSC) (U)
- The USG should consider contributing to the UN Trust Fund for Kosovo in order to support the costs of local public administration. (Action: State, OMB) (U)
- The USG should quickly complete work on a southeast Europe (SEE) investment climate initiative and trade initiative for the July 30 Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo. Secretary Albright should contact her counterparts to urge that the summit produce concrete results in these areas. (Action: NEC, Treasury, State) (U)
- The USG should independently develop an estimate of funding requirements for the US contribution to SEE development so that these requirements can be reflected in an early fall amendment to the FY00 request together with revised defense requirements associated with KFOR. (Action: State, USAID, Treasury, OMB) (U)
- Consideration should be given to bringing the Russian Federation into the High-Level Steering Group responsible for guiding the donor coordination process for Kosovo and SEE;

while Russian participation could begin in September, no commitments should be made at this time. (Action: State, Treasury) ~~(C)~~

- The USG should support a narrow definition of "humanitarian assistance" for Serbia. Any additional assistance to local communities controlled by opposition leaders should be carefully targeted, coordinated with the Europeans and conditioned on the local leaders committing to greater unity within the democratic opposition. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~

July 23, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *MS*
FROM: SAMEUL MOYN *Smr*
SUBJECT: Kosovo Situation Update

Per your e-mail request, attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President on the above subject.

Concurrences by: Matt Mclean, Valerie Guarnieri, Jack Segal *Smr*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab II E-Mail

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by: d
Reason: 1.5(c,d)
Declassify On: July 23, 2009

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *N* NARA, Date *4/18/2024*
2008-0494-F-3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo Situation Update. [Record ID: 9905566] (5 pages)	07/23/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6307

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. email	Greg Chulte to Samuel Moyn. Subject: FW:...POTUS Comment. (1 page)	07/19/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6307

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chen
5514

July 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT: POTUS Message to NATO Leaders on Eve of Sarajevo Summit

I attach a proposed message from POTUS to the NATO leaders following up on the discussion in yesterday's small meeting of Principals. In accordance with the discussion, the message emphasizes the need for solidarity on maintaining economic sanctions on Serbia and denying reconstruction as long as Milosevic is in power. I have also added some introductory paragraphs describing our view of the Summit's objectives and format.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab 1 Message to NATO Leaders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: July 20, 2009

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VR* NARA, Date *4/18/2024*
2008-0494-F-3

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY

INFO: SECSTATE WASH DC

SUBJECT: LETTER TO ...

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO ...AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL NOT FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR

TWO MONTHS AGO, AT NATO'S WASHINGTON SUMMIT, WE MET WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM SOUTHEAST EUROPE TO HEAR THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS DURING THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO AS WELL AS THEIR PRELIMINARY IDEAS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION. SINCE THEN, THESE COUNTRIES HAVE JOINED WITH OURS AND OTHERS IN AN AMBITIOUS STABILITY PACT AIMED AT PROMOTING PEACE, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN THE REGION. NEXT WEEK, WE WILL MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE IN SARAJEVO TO LAUNCH THE STABILITY PACT IN A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND SYMBOLIC WAY.

THE STABILITY PACT SUMMIT PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE A VISION OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE FOUNDED ON COOPERATION AND DEMOCRACY RATHER THAN NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT. WE SHOULD USE THE SUMMIT TO ENCOURAGE THE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO COOPERATE REGIONALLY AND TO DEVELOP A SHARED STRATEGY FOR STABILITY, GROWTH AND INTEGRATION WITH THE REST OF EUROPE. BEING IN SARAJEVO, I HOPE THAT WE WILL USE THE SUMMIT AS A VEHICLE TO RECOMMIT ALL PARTIES TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HEAR FROM THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS FIRST, AND ESPECIALLY TO PRESENT REGIONAL AS OPPOSED TO NATIONAL VIEWS. THEY WILL BE TEMPTED TO TALK ABOUT ASSISTANCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE, BUT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO THINK ABOUT LONG-TERM GROWTH AND

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 4/14/2024
2008-944-F-3

STABILITY AND FOCUS THE DISCUSSION ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS MARKET REFORM, DEMOCRATIZATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY. WE SHOULD BE READY TO RESPOND AND TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH THE REGIONAL LEADERS, RATHER THAN JUST MAKING A SERIES OF PREPARED INTERVENTIONS. I HOPE YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT THIS CONTENT AND FORMAT WILL MAKE THE SUMMIT MUCH MORE PRODUCTIVE AND INTERESTING.

ALL THE LEADERS OF THE REGION HAVE BEEN INVITED TO SARAJEVO, EXCEPT ONE -- SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THE SUMMIT DEMONSTRATE SERBIA'S ISOLATION UNDER MILOSEVIC, WHILE HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF RAPID REINTEGRATION ONCE HE IS GONE. DURING NATO'S AIR CAMPAIGN, OUR SOLIDARITY WAS THE KEY TO OUR ULTIMATE SUCCESS. MAINTAINING OUR SOLIDARITY NOW IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO "WIN THE PEACE" BY ACHIEVING POLITICAL REFORM IN BELGRADE, AND THUS A MORE SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION.

TO DO THIS, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST PURSUE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON LINE ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE TO SERBIA. WE SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND NO ASSISTANCE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AS LONG AS MILOSEVIC IS IN POWER. ANY HINT THAT WE ARE RECONSIDERING OUR POSTURE ON THESE POINTS WILL BE USED BY MILOSEVIC TO CLAIM VICTORY AT HOME AND TO UNDERCUT THE OPPOSITION. I APPRECIATE YOUR SOLIDARITY NOW -- IT IS AS IMPORTANT NOW AS SOLIDARITY DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN, IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED VISION FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS SOUTHEAST EUROPE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT WEEK IN SARAJEVO AND THANK YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR SUPPORT. WE CAN MAKE THIS AN HISTORIC MOMENT BY UNDERSCORING OUR HOPES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE REGION, ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR DEMOCRATIC LEADERS.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 19 JUL 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

DC

ALB

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR KOSOVO DC 13 JUL

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 21 JUL 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
POWELL
SARGEANT
SCHULTE

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By LR NARA, Date 4/18/2024

7008-294-L-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9905420

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99071618 FOR DECISION
X 99071916 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 99071916 SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990719 FUERTH, L
002 990719 KENNEY, K
002 990719 CRIBBS, M
002 990719 TOWNSEND, F
002 990719 SYPTAK, S
002 990719 KYLE, R
002 990719 RICCHETTI
002 990719 WOLFE, T
002 990719 BRAINARD, L
002 990719 CONROY, R
002 990719 WHITE, D

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # **5420**

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SYSTEM **RS INT ARS**

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON			
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>S 7/16</u>	
SARGEANT	<u>3</u>	<u>S 7/18</u>	
DAVIES			
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>Q</u>	
STEINBERG	<u>2072</u>		
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>TC 7/19</u>	<u>X</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>Q</u>		<u>Q</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: **SOC-DC-Kosovo-13 July**

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE **CF**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5420

July 19, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. STEVEN RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND
Counsel for Intelligence
Policy
Department of Justice

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development


MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on July 13, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on July 13, 1999. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: July 16, 2009

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 4/18/2024
208-0944-F.3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, July 13. 1999. [Record ID: 995420] [partial] (1 page)	07/19/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6307

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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5420

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 13, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(C)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

(b)(3)

OVP:

Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

NEC:

Lael Brainard
Sonal Shah

State:

James Pardew
James Dobbins
David Appleton
Richard Holbrooke

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

JCS:

Edward Anderson
Martin Dempsey

Justice:

Gary Grindler

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Martin Minton (via SVTS)

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Eric Schwartz
David Leavy
Mark Taviarides
Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

Chief of Staff

Steven Ricchetti

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: July 16, 2009

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2014-0544-M (1.7x)
7/31/2019 KSH

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should actively assist KFOR in helping to ensure demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Consideration should be given to establishing a cooperative process for inspecting suspected cache of unauthorized weapons. (Action: State, DOD, CIA) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should warn the KLA not to attack Russian units in KFOR. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should ensure that UNMIK and KFOR resist attempts by Belgrade to reassert sovereignty in Kosovo at the expense of our objectives. (Action: State, DOD) ~~(S)~~
- Planning for the U.S. contribution at the July 28 Immediate Needs Conference should proceed on the basis of the funding identified by the Humanitarian IWG, with further consideration required concerning the commitment of DOD humanitarian funding from the FY99 supplemental appropriation. (Action: NSC) (U)
- Without setting a precedent for previous or future military operations, DOD will commit funding to the disposal of unexploded ordnance to be carried out under the auspices of the UN. (Action: OSD) (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9905420
DATE 19 JUL 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR KOSOVO DC 13 JUL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____
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MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____
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2028-0494-f-3

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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DATE 19 JUL 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR KOSOVO DC 13 JUL
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
RICCHETTI	_____	_____	_____
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MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____
MS LAEL BRAINARD 2ND FLOOR WEST WING NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>1</u> _____
MS. RYAN CONROY 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE ROOM 6.08 WASHINGTON, DC 20523-6801 AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____
COL. DAVID C. WHITE SECRETARY JOINT STAFF ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC #

5420

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: SOC For Kosovo DC 13 Jul PAGES: 4
(w/
Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Stephanie Syptak</u>	<u>212-415-4407</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Stephanie Syptak for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: h Date: 4/18/2004

2008-0994-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____ IMMEDIATE _____ RELEASER: _____
 _____ PRIORITY _____
 _____ ROUTINE _____ DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES: 4
 (Including Cover)
 FROM: NSC West Wing Desk (202) 456-9425 WH Situation Room
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for Kosovo DC 13 Jul
 NSC LOG # 5420

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>Justice</u>	<u>Counsel for Intel Policy Townsend</u>		
<u>State</u>	<u>USUN Rep</u>		
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>AID</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: VE Date: 9/18/74

2008-0914-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5420

July 15, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG *(D) R*

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *H*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on July 13, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on July 13.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve *(C)* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: July 16, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By *VR* NARA, Date *4/18/2024*

208-0494-23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9905172
RECEIVED: 08 JUL 99 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: GIRE
DAVIES
SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 05 JUL 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
TELCALL

GERMANY

PERSONS: STEINER, M

File

SUBJECT: SRB TELCALL W/ STEINER 5 JULY

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 14 JUL 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DAVIES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DAVIES
GIRE
NSC CHRON
SARGEANT
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VR* NARA, Date *4/18/2024*
2008-0994-1-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9905172

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99070812 FOR INFORMATION
X 99070812 NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

5172

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5172
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	1/8	g 7/5	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	2 copy	_____	w/ edit done
BERGER	4	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	5	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	A/6	ENC 6 7/5	But Em
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	DMLC 7/8	N
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: Davies ✓

COMMENTS:

your Phone Call with
Michael Steiner July 5

EC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

NO

exec sec/KG/call to Steiner

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 5, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: GLYN DAVIES *G*
FROM: CINDY GIRE *CG* / GREG SCHULTE *JS*
SUBJECT: Your phone call with Michael Steiner on 5 July

sep 2

The attached cable from our Embassy in Sarajevo (Tab D) reports on the visit by Steiner, Rosenthal and a Finnish representative to evaluate the feasibility of convening a SEE Stability Summit in Sarajevo on July 30. It notes (and Dan agrees) that the Bosnian authorities are enthusiastic, but lack the necessary resources and experience. To be successful, the Europeans need to get on the ground **this week** with ownership and resources.

Even if this happens, Dan is skeptical about execution. We will need creative planning and significant support from SFOR to manage the logistical aspects. One idea from Sarajevo is to have the countries from the region arrive the day before, both to reduce the load on the airport and to prepare for the meeting. Another idea suggested was that heads of delegation "share rides" into Sarajevo, but this will be tough to organize and enforce.

The EU is scheduled to meet early this week to make a final "go/no-go" recommendation. Once a decision is made on all sides we will begin to coordinate with the Europeans on the substantive part of the program. Our objectives are to:

- Keep the meeting focused on a few key themes (economic reform, integration and recovery, democratization/human rights, and security);
- Limit the number of interventions; encourage countries of the region to present *their* views of how to cooperate together and with Europe;
- Use the meeting to advance Dayton objectives. Attached is a draft concept paper that we are working interagency with the intent of sharing it with the Europeans.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 07/04/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By *12* NARA, Date *4/18/2024*
2028-0994-1-3

I have spoken with Dan since he returned from Sarajevo and will single out just one quote from his attached draft (Tab C):

"I am very skeptical that the necessary and decisive steps will be taken by the Europeans in a timely enough manner to make a July 30 summit feasible. I therefore strongly urge that we hold off on any 'go/no-go' decision until we have a clear indication and evidence of such decisive planning. To do otherwise will box us in to a potentially embarrassing situation. If the logistics are sufficiently bad they will overshadow the positive policy proposals and achievements."

Your conversation with Steiner will once again help remind the Europeans that they must decide what role they want to play if we want this to happen successfully in **less than** one month.

Dan would like to speak with you for a few minutes before you call Steiner. You could call Dan directly or ask Cindy to set up a conference call with Cindy, Greg, Dan and you.

RECOMMENDATION

That you speak briefly with Dan Rosenthal (perhaps with Cindy and Greg on as well) and then call Steiner to lay down a marker that the EU needs to step up its ownership and efforts.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Draft Interagency Concept Paper
- Tab C Rosenthal Draft Trip Report
- Tab D Sarajevo 006257

Steiner called
1) EU will pay
2) Finland in charge
3) team there this week under Polsi
4) Clarke will cooperate (LFAK)
5) Germany will do transport if OK w/ France.
(P)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS
WEEK

• Whose going to pay

5172
6000

• whose going to own? • team on the ground

POINTS TO MAKE WITH STEINER

• SFOR

• prepared to contribute

- I understand that your visit to Sarajevo with Dan Rosenthal and the Finnish Rep was productive, but many logistical challenges remain.

~~media person~~

- Dan and our Embassy stressed that the Bosnians have neither the resources nor the experience to do this on their own. We think this can only succeed if the EU gets a team with adequate resources and authority on the ground this week to organize the conference.

person
in
charge

- Also, I understand that it will be challenging to facilitate arrivals for all of the delegations and that the concept of "plane sharing" was suggested. This will be difficult to manage. Do you have any suggestions on who could take the lead in overseeing this?

- To move ahead, we will also need to develop the substance of the meeting itself. Greg Schulte and his colleagues at the State Department will be talking to your colleagues and the Finns in a video conference on Tuesday.

- They will want to explore ways to:

- keep the meeting focused on a few key themes;
- encourage countries of the region to present their views of how to cooperate together and with Europe; and
- use the meeting to advance Dayton objectives.

appeal? declaration?

→ from Sarajevo

- The themes we currently envision are:

- economic reform, integration and recovery;
- democratization/human rights (including a conference bringing together the democratic opposition in Serbia);
- security.

call Athissari

SRB

was Clarke

- We would see these included in a brief "Sarajevo Declaration" that would also emphasize the historic import of having the meeting in Sarajevo.

③ plane sharing
→ Germany
willing to
do

① must be a team on ground

→ Pusi - Fin. in charge

w/ a team
other Europeans

→ eu will carry cost -
tomorrow

8 people
US +
2 Germans

② SFOR - Solano +
Clarke - will do it

stay
until
July 30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 7/3/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 4/14/2024
2008-0944-f.3

Notional Goals for Heads of State and Government
Stability Pact Conference on South East Europe

I. Overall Objectives

- Brief "Sarajevo Declaration," signed by Heads, endorsing the Stability Pact, committing to implementation of its goals, and welcoming the efforts of SEE countries to work together more closely.
- Would affirm joint determination to overcome tragedy of this decade – and of this century – by new joint commitment to work together to stabilize, transform and integrate region into European and transatlantic mainstream. Would underscore regional cooperation, reform, integration and self-help as essential underpinnings.
- Would call for or welcome implementation of specific actions, including recommendations from Southeast European participants.
- Would set priorities for Stability Pact working tables in economics, security and democratization/human rights. Promised or prospective actions by other institutions – OSCE, NATO, EU, SEDM, SEEC – might be "welcomed."
- Separate statement by leaders of South East European Cooperation Process to develop a code of conduct among them on how they will treat each other and their citizens; and to establish an implementation review mechanism of their commitments under this code of conduct as well as the Stability Pact, inviting assistance from OSCE (ODIHR) and Stability Pact participants. This would make clear that they are taking responsibility for developing regional planning and cooperation.
- Solicit specific commitments from Bosnian Presidency in implementing Dayton.

II. Guidance on Priority Areas for Further Work

Economics

- Coming just two days after the donors' conference, the Leaders' statement should underscore that in the end, it will be trade and investment, not aid, that will be essential to self-sustaining growth in the region. The Stability Pact Working Table should be tasked to focus on this as its highest priority, based on principles of transparency, open competition and anti-corruption. In this regard an "Investment Climate Initiative" could be launched, under which the SEEs would pledge to make the requisite reforms and the West would provide targeted technical assistance to help them make their investment climate more attractive (~~Tab 1~~). This initiative should also bring in the business communities from the region together with TABD leaders and others.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By 12 NARA, Date 4/18/2004

7008-0999-F.3

Democratization/Human Rights

- Recalling the Stability Pact provision that lasting peace and stability will only become possible when democratic principles and values have taken root throughout the region, including in the FRY, endorse an initiative for a regional conference on democracy. SEE leaders could announce a one-off conference, at a site to be determined (Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary seem the most likely candidates) to discuss democracy building. This conference, which could be sponsored by a private foundation/NGO, would in fact be a cover for our main purpose, which would be to bring together a broad array of Serbian democratic opposition around a common set of principles and an agreed set of activities to promote their effectiveness as an alternative to Milosevic. (Tab 2)

Crime and Corruption

- Call for a new regional "Good Governance" Initiative to reduce corruption and increase public sector accountability. Call for new national and multilateral efforts to address the problems of crime and pledge to improve law enforcement and customs coordination. Note and welcome the SECI agreement for cooperation on combating cross-border crime, the plans for the Bucharest Anti-Crime Center, and the SECI project to improve the operations of the customs services.

Security

- Encourage greater security cooperation in the region and urge renewed efforts to enhance regional stability through confidence-building and arms control. Could welcome SEDM proposals to develop a regional crisis information network and engineering capability; encourage EAPC/PfP to develop greater opportunities for consultation and cooperation with and among the countries of the region and develop regional training centers; and urge NATO to sharpen regional focus of PfP activities and exercises.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	From Dan Rosenthal to Samuel Berger. Subject: Not Yet a Memo on Sarajevo. (4 pages)	07/15/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6307

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 5, 1999

5172
5089

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: GLYN DAVIES
FROM: CINDY GIBB GREG SCHULTE
SUBJECT: Your phone call with Michael Steiner on 5 July

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- Keep the meeting focused on a few key themes (economic reform, and recovery, democratization/human rights, ~~crime and corruption~~, and security);
- Limit the number of interventions; encourage countries of the region to present *their* views of how to cooperate together and with Europe;
- Use the meeting to advance Dayton objectives. Attached is a draft concept paper that we are working interagency with the intent of sharing it with the Europeans.

integration
integrate

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 07/04/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 4/18/2024

2008-0994-F.3

POINTS TO MAKE WITH STEINER

- I understand that your visit to Sarajevo with Dan Rosenthal and the Finnish Rep was productive, but many logistical challenges remain.
- Dan and our Embassy stressed that the Bosnians have neither the resources nor the experience to do this on their own. We think this can only succeed if the EU gets a team with adequate resources and authority on the ground *this week* to organize the conference.
- Also, I understand that it will be challenging to facilitate arrivals for all of the delegations and that the concept of "plane sharing" was suggested. This will be difficult to manage. Do you have any suggestions on who could take the lead in overseeing this?
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- They will want to explore ways to:
 - keep the meeting focused on a few key themes;
 - encourage countries of the region to present *their* views of how to cooperate together and with Europe; and
 - use the meeting to advance Dayton objectives.
- The themes we currently envision are:
 - economic reform and recovery;
 - democratization/human rights (including a conference bringing together the democratic opposition in Serbia);
 - ~~crime and corruption~~ *integration*
 - security.
- We would see these included in a brief "Sarajevo Declaration" that would also emphasize the historic import of having the meeting in Sarajevo.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 7/3/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By R NARA, Date 4/14/2024

208-0994-F.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	re: Sarajevo Stability Pact Conference--Too many loose ends for July 30. (6 pages)	07/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July 1999 [Part I] [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6307

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9905030
RECEIVED: 30 JUN 99 17

TO: RODZIANKO, OLEG

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 02 JUL 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY TO RODZIANKO RE KOSOVO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 12 JUL 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9905030

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HURLEY
002

Z 99063017 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
X 99070613 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 2, 1999

Dear Professor Rodzianko:

Thank you for your letter on NATO's Kosovo policy. The President asked me to examine your fact sheet on Kosovo and reply in his stead.

We continue to stand by NATO's determined action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Nineteen resolute democracies came together and stayed together through the toughest challenge since the end of the Cold War. This collective action resulted from the simple conviction that we could not begin the 21st century by allowing the purveyors of ethnic hatred and violence to cause unspeakable suffering and misery with impunity.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. The President has committed 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

We believe that in standing up to Milosevic and his war-making machine, America's leadership will in the long term promote a safer, more secure world. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,



Greg Schulte

Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Professor Oleg M. Rodzianko
Bronx Community College of CUNY
252 Rockland Lake Road
Valley Cottage, New York 10989

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9905030
RECEIVED: 30 JUN 99 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: RODZIANKO, OLEG

DOC DATE: 26 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SENDS FACT SHEET ON KOSOVO

(2 months!)
Mike/S...
I think I can
respond to
this one

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 12 JUL 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
GORDON
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
STROMSETH

COMMENTS:

*Sam
Just a short one,
how we behind
on objectives. You can
see letter.*

*Greg
Sure, but do
you really think
it's necessary?
See wanted
sections.
Let me know*

Signed out by Greg Schulte

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

5030

Oleg M. Rodzianko, Professor Emeritus
Bronx Community College of CUNY
252 Rockland Lake Road
Valley Cottage, N.Y. 10989
Tel. (914) 268-3782
Fax (914) 268-6339

Open letter to Mr. Bill Clinton, the President of the United States

April 26, 1999

Having heard your speeches and comments regarding Kosovo which I heard on TV. It is obvious to me that you do not know many facts about Kosovo and Metohia. Being familiar with prewar Yugoslavia firsthand I am taking the liberty to supply you with a brief fact sheet.

Sincerely,

Oleg M. Rodzianko

Oleg M. Rodzianko, P.E. (ret.)

FACT SHEET ON KOSOVO

I would like to present a few facts about the situation in Kosovo. I am not a Serb, nor was I ever a citizen of Yugoslavia. I was born in Yugoslavia, lived there till age twenty-one, and left Serbia in the fall of 1944. My parents were stateless Russian emigres who escaped from Communist terror in Russia in 1920.

Fact #1. In the years of my youth in Yugoslavia I witnessed true observance of human rights. In Novi Bechey and Zemun, where I lived, there lived - side by side - Serbs, Croats, Germans, Russian emigres, Gypsies, and other nationalities. All enjoyed equal rights, including my family, in spite of the fact that we were not citizens. Our neighbor Croat (Desovic) was a colonel in the active service of Yugoslav army.

Fact #2. Before World War II, Kosovo and Metohia had an undisputable majority of Serbian population. There was a large minority of Albanians (locally called Shiptars or Arnauts) and other nationalities such as Rumanians, Turks, Gypsies, Slavic moslems. No one tried to conduct any "ethnic cleansing" against any other national minority. Even the notion was non

*Records - ACTION FOR
Pass to @*

V. K. S. M. D.

2

existent. Desecration of mosques, synagogues or protestant churches never occurred.

Fact #3. In 1934, a Croat extremist killed King Alexander of Yugoslavia in France.

Extremists do exist in all lands and nationalities, Croats being no exception. However, when the body of King Alexander was taken by train to Belgrade for funeral, as it passed through Slovenia and Croatia, the crowd of local population of Slovenians and Croats along the entire length of the railroad tracks was so thick that the train, creeping along, was almost a day and a half late to arrive in Belgrade. The King was a Serb, yet the crowd along the railroad track was mostly Slovenians and Croats.

Fact #4. In 1941, the Germans occupied Yugoslavia. With the help of Slovenian extremists they first separated and then annexed Slovenia to the "Gross Deutschland" (Great Germany). They also created an "independent" State of Croatia. Croatia included Bosnia and Herzegovina which was then populated by Serbs, Moslems and Croats.

That is where and when the extremists went to work. The Croat extremists, the Ustashas or the Croatian Nazi, with the help of Moslems started a genocide against the Serbs. 700,000 Serbs perished plus 50,000 of other nationalities (Jews, Gypsies, Russian emigrees, and others). Many thousands of Serbs fled from Croatia to Serbia.

Fact #5. Kosovo and Metohia remained legally part of Serbia, but actually the German SS Division of "Scanderbeg" (named after a 15th century Albanian hero) and staffed with Albanian volunteers, was the occupying force. These Albanians started the FIRST "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo and Metohia by expelling Serbs to the north of Serbia. That is also when the ratio of Serbs vs. Albanians shifted and a mutual hatred was created. The main Serbian Church in Prishtina was turned into a chicken coop.

Note: the problem was started by Nazis.

Fact #6. In 1944-5 the Communist dictatorship took over. The Serbs tried to return home to Kosovo and Metohia, but were barred from doing so on Tito's orders. Tito had a vision of a Yugoslavian Union of Socialists Republics that would include an Albanian Republic. Tito confiscated monastery and church lands, which in Metohia made up close to 80% of the total, and settled it with the Albanians who were fleeing from a harsher Communist regime in Albania.

Note: the problem started by Nazis was continued by the communist dictatorship of Tito.

Fact #7. Today, what the Nazis started, and the Communists continued - the USA with the

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help of NATO is trying hard to bring to an unjust conclusion. The Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their nation where the Serbian Orthodoxy was born, nourished, and, in turn, created the Serbian nation. Much cherished historical past of Kosovo and Metohia did not prompt the Serbs to violate human rights of Albanians. Serbs only wanted to consolidate politically the province of Kosovo with Serbia. The backlash of that was the creation of an illegal KLA armed by NATO. Only when KLA started terrorist acts against Serbian population of Kosovo did the Serbian army start counter acts. The result was NATO air raids.

Fact #8. When in Krayina (part of Bosnia and Herzegovina) the Serbs, constituting 90% of population, wanted an autonomy, the Serbs where bombed into submission. The result was hundreds of thousands of Serbian refugees. NATO did not care. When Albanians used force to gain autonomy in Kosovo, Serbs are bombed to allow Albanian independence.

Note: from these contradicting actions it is obvious that it is not the human rights that NATO is defending. It is the creation of multinational environment in each independent State. Then it will be easy to ignite political disturbance whenever it is needed and, as the Roman rule says: "Divido et empera" (Divide and rule).

Conclusion: Looking back into history, we can see not only the example of the Roman Empire, which fell apart, but many more attempts to rule the world. Napoleon ended up on the island of St. Helen and was poisoned by arsenic in prison. Soviet union fell apart from within. Hitler killed himself and was burned. All of them used shear force to achieve what they thought was good cause. By using bombs, NATO follows in their footsteps and in the long run will end up in some similar tragic way. One should never forget what Jesus Christ said: "for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Mathew 26:52, KJV). Using terrorist force is never right. The only sensible way out of this conflict is to STOP BOMBING and find a just diplomatic solution acceptable to both sides and honoring the reasoning of both sides.

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: Hurley LOG NUMBER: 5030

DUE DATE: 7.12.99

DATE STAFFED: 6.30.99

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: OLEG PODZIANKO

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9905030
RECEIVED: 30 JUN 99 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: RODZIANKO, OLEG

DOC DATE: 26 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SENDS FACT SHEET ON KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 12 JUL 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
GORDON
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
STROMSETH

COMMENTS:

~~NFAR; OBE and just objective~~

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