

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chronos for June 1999 Part I [8]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1707

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo, July 2, 1999. [Record ID: 9904990] [Duplicate at vz6299_001, this case] (1 page)	06/30/1999	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For the Samuel Berger from Matthew Vaccaro. Subject: Deployment of Task Force Thunder. [Record ID: 9903755] (3 pages)	05/15/1999	P1/b(1)
002b. map	Task Force Thunder - Lost Opportunities [NATO] (1 page)	05/00/1999	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, June 24, 1999. [Record ID: 9904907] [Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	06/28/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
004a. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	06/28/1999	P3/b(3)
004b. agenda	Kosovo ExComm Meeting, June 29, 1999. (1 page)	06/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [8]

2008-0994-F

vz6305

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

3606

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
N/A
MEMORANDUM

TO: Glyn T. Davies

DATE: 5/10/99

FROM: Tim Emrich
Presidential Scheduling
184 OEOB/456-5306

ATTACHED:

☒ Please advise on
how to respond

☐ For your information

☐ For your action

☐ As you requested

☐ Please call me regarding
the attached

☐ Please prepare
response per
instructions below

☐ For your approval

☐ For Surrogate
Consideration

☐ Please prepare
Scheduling
Proposal

COMMENTS: The National Security Council staff does not recommend a meeting between the Director for Balkan Affairs and the President.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

MAY 11 14:25

CC:

34450

Institute for Balkan Affairs

P.O. Box 32099 • Washington, D.C. 20007 • Tel: (301) 424-0191 • Fax: (301) 424-0192

open

President William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C. 20500

VIA FAX

BC, SC
4/6/99

Mr. President:

As Director of the Institute for Balkan Affairs, and on behalf of all Serbian Americans, I respectfully request an immediate meeting with you and your staff to discuss the situation in Yugoslavia. We feel that the bombing campaign is against the interests of all people in the region, Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians alike.

With the situation getting worse every day the bombing continues, you must realize that it is an immoral and indefensible policy to persist in this aggression. Please take responsibility for your part in what is happening there -- you cannot blame only one person.

We would like to discuss ways to end this growing crisis, and ways Serbian-Americans can assist in reaching a peaceful solution and return of refugees.

We see that you are willing to meet with Albanian-Americans. Show us, and to the world, that you are not against the Serbian people, as you have so often stated, and grant our request for a meeting.

Respectfully yours,



Danielle Sremac
Director, Institute for Balkan Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4990

June 30, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT:

Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo -- July 2, 1999

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to the agencies forwarding the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo on July 2, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: June 30, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 4/17/2024
2008-0494-F-3

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND
Counsel for Intelligence
Policy
Department of Justice

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo - July 2,
1999

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo on July 2,
1999, from 9:30 to 11:00 a.m., in the Situation Room of the
White House. An agenda is attached at Tab A.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: June 30, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 4/17/2024
2008-0994-F-3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [8]

2008-0994-F
vz6305

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904323
RECEIVED: 07 JUN 99 13

TO: THORN, TERENCE H

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 24 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CROATIA
SCHEDULING REFERRAL

ENERGY
AP

file

PERSONS: THORN, TERENCE H
ZUZUL

SUTTON, JOSEPH
TUDJMAN, FRANJO

SUBJECT: REPLY TO THORN FM ENRON REREQUEST FOR MTG W/ TUDJMAN

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 12 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9903069 9903461

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HURLEY

SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904323

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HURLEY
002 HURLEY
003 BERGER
003 HURLEY
003 BERGER
003 HURLEY
004

Z 99060713 PREPARE MEMO DAVIES TO EMRICH
Z 99061012 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
Z 99061912 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99061914 FOR REDO
Z 99062110 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99062321 FOR REDO
X 99062514 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4323
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG D A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>JACOBSON</u>	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>CP 6/19</u>	<u>SEC NOTE/EDITS</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>6/19 ONK</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Hurley</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>A = sec note</u>

Return to Originator

A = ACTION I = INF

- needs explanation as to why earlier letters were not answered

IER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

- whom the State Department will notify Thorn? regarding the meeting

EXEC SEC OFFICE

R.

auth

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4323

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG D A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Cerv</u> JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	<u>1</u>	<u>6/23</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	_____	_____	_____
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
<u>2</u>	<u>OUR</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: SADIA SIGNATURE

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 24, 1999

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters proposing that the President meet with Croatian President Tudjman and describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia.

As you point out, Croatia has been helpful to NATO's efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Secretaries Cohen and Albright have expressed our appreciation in their meetings with Croatian Ministers Miljavac and Granic.

Our objective remains to integrate Croatia into Europe. Croatian cooperation with NATO is an important step forward in this regard, though Croatian performance in the fields of human rights, refugee returns, and implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords leaves much to be desired. A possible meeting between President Clinton and President Tudjman needs to be evaluated in this context.

We are committed to building a Europe that is undivided and at peace for the first time in history. To that end, we are working closely with the European Union on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe to forge a brighter, democratic future for the region. I appreciate your efforts to help bring Croatia into the European mainstream.

Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Greg Schulte', written over a horizontal line.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4323

June 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *h*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *mt*
SUBJECT: Letter from Enron Executive

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Government Relations, wrote the President several times to request that he invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting. It took some time to reply to this series of letters because of volume and because an interagency process was necessary to develop the proposed coordinated response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Terence Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence



246
Terence H. Thorn

*Executive Vice President, International
Government Relations & Environmental Affairs*

Enron International

P. O. Box 1188

Houston, TX 77251-1188

(713) 646-8244

Fax (713) 646-8278

tthorn@ei.enron.com

VIA COURIER

June 1, 1999

The Honorable William J. Clinton
The President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20501

Dear Mr. President:

I have written on two occasions requesting that you consider inviting President Tudjman of Croatia to the United States. I understand you will be traveling to Slovenia in three weeks. I cannot think of a better time for a brief visit to Croatia where you can personally thank President Tudjman for his strong support of our Kosovo efforts, and to invite him to the United States. Because of the war in Kosovo the Croatian economy has been negatively affected due to the loss of tourism.

Copies of my earlier letters are attached for your review and decision. I greatly appreciate your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Encl.

306290



Enron International

333 Clay, Suite 1800
Houston, TX 77002-7361
(713) 646-6100
Fax (713) 646-6565

May 20, 1999

Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Attn: Inside White House Mail

Dear Mr. President:

It was a pleasure to sit next to you at the recent luncheon in Houston. Despite the huge burden of your office in these times of international conflict I was pleased that you and I were able to discuss the importance of energy development that we plan to undertake in Croatia.

My colleagues and I are gratified President Tudjman has personally directed that Enron develop a natural gas power facility in Croatia despite the considerable criticism of others in his government. This would be the first significant generating plant developed by an American company in the region which is significant both economically and politically.

Several of us have met personally with President Tudjman during this process. He has repeatedly expressed admiration for you and a desire to meet with you in Washington. During our conversation in Houston you told me Croatia had started down the same path as Yugoslavia, but had reversed itself to the benefit of the country and the region. It would seem both the United States and Croatia have a common goal in the region. I believe the visit would strengthen a developing political relationship.

I sent you a request by letter on April 20 but have received no response to date. Therefore, our meeting in Houston was fortuitous in allowing me to personally raise our interest in having you invite President Tudjman to the White House. A copy of my earlier letter is attached for your review and decision.

It was as always a delight to see you again. You are always welcome in Houston.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Joseph Sutton".

cc: Ambassador Zuzul
Joseph Sutton

Natural gas. Electricity. Endless possibilities.

MAY 21 1999



Enron Corp.

1775 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 828-3360

Fax (202) 828-3372

April 20, 1999

The Honorable William J. Clinton
The President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It has been several months since we spoke about energy developments. In the interim, I accompanied Secretary of Commerce Bill Daley to Korea and China. In both countries Enron has either acquired energy assets or announced significant new projects.

I have some good news about an opportunity in a strategically important nation, Croatia. Enron International through the direct involvement of President Franjo Tudjman has successfully concluded negotiations to build a 240 MW natural gas powered plant at Jertovec, Croatia. This is the first such facility negotiated by an American energy company in Croatia. These negotiations were commenced with the assistance of former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. The positive results are a lasting tribute to his service to the United States and his interest in Croatia.

Our people have come to know Croatia, its people and its President. Through our power project Croatia solidified those ties and welcomed the United States as its largest foreign investor. Croatia is also cooperating with NATO to bring peace to the Balkan region.

President Tudjman's support and perseverance in having a United States company participate in Croatia's economy deserves to be recognized. He would welcome an invitation from you to come to the White House. I respectfully request President Tudjman be invited to visit you in the White House at the earliest possible time.

I greatly appreciate your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Terence H. Thorn
Executive Vice President
International Government Relations
& Environmental Affairs
Enron International

4323

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
798
MEMORANDUM

TO: *Dlyn T. Daines*

DATE: *6/9/99*

FROM: Tim Emrich
Presidential Scheduling
184 OEOB/456-5306

ATTACHED:

☒ Please advise on
how to respond

☐ For your information

☐ For your action

☐ As you requested

☐ Please call me regarding
the attached

☐ Please prepare
response per
instructions below

☐ For your approval

☐ For Surrogate
Consideration

☐ Please prepare
Scheduling
Proposal

COMMENTS: *- Scheduling final May 20 letter to NSC on
June 4*

- OK to request? Tim

CC:

4323

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

798
MEMORANDUM

TO: Glyn T. Davies

DATE: 6/4/99

FROM: Tim Emrich
Presidential Scheduling
184 OEOB/456-5306

ATTACHED:

☒ Please advise on
how to respond

☐ For your information

☐ For your action

☐ As you requested

☐ Please call me regarding
the attached

☐ Please prepare
response per
instructions below

☐ For your approval

☐ For Surrogate
Consideration

☐ Please prepare
Scheduling
Proposal

COMMENTS:

Recommend POTUS response.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

CC:

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ID# 306746

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JUNE 07, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. TERENCE H. THORN

SUBJECT: WRITES AGAIN REQUESTING THAT THE PRESIDENT
CONSIDER INVITING PRESIDENT TUDJMAN OF
CROATIA TO THE UNITED STATES

ACTION

DISPOSITION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
TIM EMRICH		ORG	99/06/07			
	REFERRAL NOTE: OPEN					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS: ENCLOSURES

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:

MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

MI MAIL

USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *OF SIGNER        *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *CODE = A          *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *OUTGOING          *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                  *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                  *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                  *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

5

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JUNE 01, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. TERRENCE H. THORN

SUBJECT: WRITES TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT INVITE
CROATIAN PRESIDENT, TUDJMAN, TO THE WHITE
HOUSE

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
TIM EMRICH		ORG	99/06/01		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: OPEN		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE:		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE:		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE:		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE:		___/___/___		___/___/___

COMMENTS: COPY OF APRIL 20TH LETTER NOT ATTACHED

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: ___

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) ___ (B) ___ (C) ___

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED         *      CODE = A      *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED         *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING     *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE        *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                      *                      *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

(5)

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904323
RECEIVED: 07 JUN 99 13

TO: DAVIES

FROM: EMRICH, T

DOC DATE: 09 JUN 99
SOURCE REF: 306746

KEYWORDS: CROATIA
SCHEDULING REFERRAL

ENERGY
AP

PERSONS: THORN, TERRENCE H
ZUZUL

SUTTON, JOSEPH
TUDJMAN, FRANJO

SUBJECT: SECOND SCHEDULING REFERRAL RE POTUS MTG W/ TUDJMAN FM ENRON /
ENCLOSES MAY 20 & APR 20 LTR

ACTION: ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 12 JUN 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9903069 9903461

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

4323

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia. Clearly, projects such as these are important and can help bind Croatia to the West.

As you point out, Croatia has been helpful to NATO's efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Secretaries Cohen and Albright have expressed our appreciation in their meetings with Croatian Ministers Miljavac and Granic.

Unfortunately, the schedule for my trip to the G-8 Summit followed by a visit to Slovenia did not allow for a meeting in Zagreb. I have asked the State Department and my National Security Council Staff to consider whether a meeting with President Tudjman would be in keeping with our policy objectives. The State Department will be in further contact with you on that matter.

OKA . . .

I enjoyed speaking to you at the luncheon in Houston. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia. ~~Clearly, projects such as these are important and can help bind Croatia to the West.~~

As you point out, Croatia has been helpful to NATO's efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Secretaries Cohen and Albright have expressed our appreciation in their meetings with Croatian Ministers Miljavac and Granic.

Unfortunately, the schedule for my trip to the G-8 Summit followed by a visit to Slovenia did not allow for a meeting in Zagreb. I have asked the State Department and my National Security Council Staff to consider whether a meeting with President Tudjman would be in keeping with our policy objectives. The European Affairs division of the State Department will be in further contact with you on that matter.

I enjoyed speaking to you at the luncheon in Houston. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia. Clearly, projects such as these are important and can help bind Croatia to the West.

As you point out, Croatia has been helpful to NATO's efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Secretaries Cohen and Albright have expressed our appreciation in their meetings with Croatian Ministers Miljavac and Granic.

Unfortunately, the schedule for my trip to the G-8 Summit followed by a visit to Slovenia did not allow for a meeting in Zagreb. I have asked the State Department and my National Security Council Staff to consider whether a meeting with President Tudjman would be ^{in keeping with our} ~~advisable given our~~ policy objectives. The State Department will be ~~be~~ in further contact with you on that matter.

I enjoyed speaking to you at the luncheon in Houston. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia.

The P. asked me to reply for him.

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Unfortunately, the schedule for ^{the P's} my trip to the G-8 Summit followed by a visit to Slovenia did not allow for a meeting in Zagreb. ~~I have~~ *He has* asked the State Department and my ^{his} National Security Council Staff to consider whether a meeting with President Tudjman would be in keeping with our policy objectives. The European Affairs division of the State Department will be in further contact with you on that matter.

~~I enjoyed speaking to you at the luncheon in Houston.~~ Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
~~LARRY STEIN~~

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with the President and
President Tudjman of Croatia

Answer a letter

Purpose

Respond to letter from Mr. Terence Thorn.

Background

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Relations, wrote to request that you invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting. He also suggested you visit Croatia on your mid-June trip to Europe to thank President Tudjman for his support of our Kosovo efforts.

Your response thanks Mr. Thorn for his request and advises him that you have asked your NSC staff and the State Department to review the proposal for a meeting with Tudjman. In fact, State continues to recommend against a Tudjman meeting with you. We agree with State's position. While Croatia has been helpful with our effort in Kosovo, Zagreb continues to meddle in Bosnian Croat politics in the Bosnian Federation and falls short in a number of Dayton implementation areas, among them, refugee returns, and democratization. We will forward your response to Colleen Hyland at State, after which she will formally decline a later meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mr. Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4323

June 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *fs*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*
SUBJECT: Letter from Enron Executive

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Government Relations, wrote the President to request that he invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Terence Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with the President and
President Tudjman of Croatia

Purpose

Respond to letter from Mr. Terence Thorn.

Background

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Relations, wrote to request that you invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting. He also suggested you visit Croatia on your mid-June trip to Europe to thank President Tudjman for his support of our Kosovo efforts. >

Your response thanks Mr. Thorn for his request and advises him that you have asked your NSC staff and the State Department to review the proposal for a meeting with Tudjman. In fact, State continues to recommend against a Tudjman meeting with you. We agree with State's position. While Croatia has been helpful with our effort in Kosovo, Zagreb continues to meddle in Bosnian Croat politics in the Bosnian Federation and falls short in a number of Dayton implementation areas, among them, refugee returns, and democratization. We will forward your response to Colleen Hyland at State, after which she will formally decline a later meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mr. Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 24, 1999

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia. ~~The President has asked me to reply for him.~~

As you point out, Croatia has been helpful to NATO's efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Secretaries Cohen and Albright have expressed our appreciation in their meetings with Croatian Ministers Miljavac and Granic.

~~Unfortunately, the schedule for the President's trip to the G-8 Summit followed by a visit to Slovenia did not allow for a meeting in Zagreb.~~

Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

Handwritten notes:
Our objective remains to ~~refugee Croatia help Croatia~~ integrate Croatia into Europe. Croatia cooperation with NATO is an important step forward in this regard, though Croatia performance in the fields of human rights, ~~and~~ refugee returns, and implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords leaves much to be desired. A possible meeting between President Clinton and President Tudjman needs to be ~~evolved~~ evolved in this context.

Handwritten notes:
Presiding that the President meet with Croatia - President Tudjman

Handwritten notes:
I appreciate your wish to help bring Croatia into the European mainstream. (SEE 1-30-99)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903755
RECEIVED: 15 MAY 99 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: VACCARO
SCHULTE
SCHWARTZ

DOC DATE: 15 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY POSTURE

CROATIA



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEPLOYMENT OF TASK FORCE THUNDER

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 19 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VACCARO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC CHRON
SARGEANT
SCHULTE
SCHWARTZ
VACCARO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By RL NARA, Date 4/17/2024

2008-0999-F-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9903755

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99051714 FOR INFORMATION
X 99062814 NOTED BY BERGER

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3755
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TIC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	1		
POWELL			
RICE			
DAVIES			
KERRICK	copy ✓		
STEINBERG	2		
BERGER	3	Ⓚ	
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	4	TIC 6/28	N
RECORDS MGMT.	5	DMC 6/28	N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Deployment of Task Force Thunder

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For the Samuel Berger from Matthew Vaccaro. Subject: Deployment of Task Force Thunder. [Record ID: 9903755] (3 pages)	05/15/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [8]

2008-0994-F
vz6305

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. map	Task Force Thunder - Lost Opportunities [NATO] (1 page)	05/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [8]

2008-0994-F
vz6305

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902590
RECEIVED: 07 APR 99 19

TO: HUNTER, ROBERT E

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 25 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NSA CORRESPONDENCE

NATO SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY TO HUNTER RE LTR ON KOSOVO & NATO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 19 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902590

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HURLEY
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99040719 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
X 99062910 SCHULTE SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990625 HUNTER, ROBERT E

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 25, 1999

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter on Kosovo and NATO and for your ideas on how to move forward. Sandy shared it with the NSC staff when it arrived and asked that I reply now that the air strikes have ended.

I hope you are pleased about the NATO's Summit's role in confirming the unity of the Alliance behind the policy in Kosovo. The common purpose and firm resolve forged at the summit were critical to our success. We also agreed with your suggestion to use the Kosovo crisis to dramatize a new Balkan and Southeast Europe Initiative. As you know, this project has gone forward, led by the European Union. All of our long-term efforts are directed towards the stabilization and democratization of the region. You will also be glad to know that the President is planning to attend a Balkans Conference in Europe in the near future.

Thank you again for your incisive suggestions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G. Schulte', written over a light blue grid background.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

The Honorable Robert E. Hunter
Senior Advisor
RAND Corporation
1333 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-4707

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2590

May 26, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*
SUBJECT: Reply to Robert Hunter

Robert Hunter wrote with some ~~good~~ suggestions for broadening our Kosovo communications and outreach strategy, beyond the usual influentials. He also offers ^{ed} some ~~good~~ recommendations for advancing NATO's agenda and the transatlantic link over the next 18 months. In reply, 'you' thank him for his recommendations and ^{also} especially, his strong public support for the ~~Administration's policies both in the lead-up to the Summit and on Kosovo.~~ *Also*

Concurrence by: Philip Gordon

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed response at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Response to Robert Hunter
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

tell him what NATO has done in some of the areas he mentioned and

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

First letter

Dear Robert:

I appreciated your thoughtful letter on NATO's Kosovo policies and your suggestions as to how to increase support for them. As we enter the third month of the bombing campaign, your recommendations are particularly apt and on the mark.

Your thoughts regarding possible pitfalls of the moment and how much hangs in the balance were encouraging to me as they coincide so much with what I have been saying over the past several weeks. First of all, it is not sufficient that NATO not be seen as failing in this endeavor; I share your view that it is essential that NATO win. Secondly, the center of gravity has now shifted to Milosevic, particularly after his recent indictment by the ICTY. NATO and the international community cannot permit him to survive politically in the wake of the humanitarian outrages he has permitted in Kosovo. Finally, we are of one view in the necessity to commit ground troops to a international security force with NATO at its core, in order to insure the safe return and security of the Kosovar refugees who have so brutally been driven from their homes and livelihoods. I am convinced that only a NATO-led force, augmented by Russian and other third country participation, will ensure adherence to the demands we have set forth.

I also am grateful for your suggestions regarding the strengthening of the Alliance and the transatlantic relationship. I have taken the liberty of sharing these with my staff and the interagency. They are proving useful for us in thinking through the difficult policy choices we face in capitalizing on the success of this Summit, particularly as we confront the prospect of finding a successor to the worthy Javier Solana.

I share your hope that in the wake of the Summit our renewed military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a path to a negotiated settlement.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Robert E. Hunter
Senior Advisor
RAND Corporation
1333 H Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20005-4707

*Phil's letter
& then
connections*

Dear Bob:

I appreciated receiving your thoughtful letter on Kosovo and NATO and for your ideas on how to move forward. I took the liberty of sharing your suggestions with my staff and the interagency and we have been working hard to achieve many of the goals that you mentioned.

As you know, the NATO summit took an important step in the direction of developing NATO-EU ties. The summit laid the basis for possible NATO support for EU-led military operations, agreed on the importance of full NATO-EU consultation and transparency, and put in place a process to develop those ties over the coming months and years.

1/12 have been working with our NATO allies, the EU and the International Financial Institution
~~NATO and the EU have also been cooperating very closely in the development of a comprehensive, long-term stability plan for~~ *to enhance stability and prosperity*
~~Southeastern Europe, of the sort you suggest.~~ *to* We are fully conscious not only that we must achieve all our objectives in the Kosovo campaign, but also that after the conflict is over we must pursue a sustained strategy to integrate this region into the prosperous, democratic European mainstream. *→ We are also implementing the summit initiative to enhance security assistance to PFP partners in Southeast Europe*

along the lines
Your suggestion that I bring together another group of NATO experts, this time to discuss Kosovo, was also a good one, and I will look forward to hearing more from you when the group convenes in the near future. I value the support of influential Allied members of the strategic community and welcome the opportunity to present our strategy to you and to receive your ideas.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Robert E. Hunter
Senior Advisor
RAND Corporation
1333 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-4707

May 26, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Reply to Robert Hunter

Robert Hunter wrote with some suggestions for broadening our Kosovo communications and outreach strategy, beyond the usual influentials. He also offered some recommendations for advancing NATO's agenda and the transatlantic link over the next 18 months. In reply, you tell him what NATO has done in some of the areas he mentioned and thank him for his recommendations and ideas.

Concurrences by: Stephen Flanagan, Philip Gordon, Matt Gobush

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed response at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Response to Robert Hunter

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

RAND

2590

TO: KOSOVO
GOBUSH
(RETURN TO AFNSA)

Robert E. Hunter

Senior Advisor

April 1, 1999

Memorandum for Sandy Berger

From: Robert Hunter *RF*

Subject: Kosovo, NATO Summit

The meeting you had in the Roosevelt Room on March 4 was excellent for bringing our group up to date on Summit planning.

I suggest that you now do the same with regard to Kosovo, in two parts:

o that you brief a somewhat larger group of NATO observers/supporters on the broad outlines of the political and military strategy, the conduct of the campaign, and the dilemmas you face -- and ask for advice and support. Don Bandler may have told you of the dinner with the U.S. Committee on NATO Monday night, where there were sharp divisions among the "friendly" NATO crowd -- in part reflecting, I believe, a sense of not being engaged or having a clear line to support.

o that the President brief a wide range of former national security officials (Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Advisors, Chairmen of the JCS, ambassadors to NATO) for the same purpose. If the value of his gaining support and being seen to reach out is overbalanced by the risk that some of these people will then grandstand afterward, he could do this selectively and perhaps by phone with individuals.

Briefings would also help those of us who have been out there supporting the Administration publicly.

Looking to the NATO Summit, the key issue now is to reduce the risks that Kosovo will be disruptive within the Alliance and thus play badly in the media, on Capitol Hill, and in the Nation. Needless to say, debates, disagreements, and side chatter that take place in Brussels or European capitals will be magnified many times here, with a media corps looking for as much disagreement as possible and

1333 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20005-4707
TEL: 202.296.5000
FAX: 202.296.7960

1700 Main Street, PO Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
TEL: 310.393.0411
FAX: 310.393.4818

with easy access to hundreds of Europeans. Also, few of the visiting Europeans will have experience with the drumbeat of media coverage here and the cacophony of U.S. public debate, and many will draw the wrong conclusions about U.S. resolve and purpose.

This point cannot be overemphasized: the Summit will either build support for the administration's policy or seriously undercut it -- there's no middle ground.

If the conflict is not essentially over by April 23, it is critical to have precision and clarity on both diplomatic and military objectives, broadly agreed in the Alliance, to the extent that that can be achieved. This should now be the consuming focus of Summit preparations at NATO headquarters. Just as the impending Summit helped force the pace of responding to Milosevic's brutal campaign, so the Summit forces the pace of solidifying support behind a "bumper sticker" set of goals and means. Of course, with the complexity of events, this is a tall order -- and Milosevic still controls a major part of the unfolding action -- but getting as much clarity as possible is now imperative. (This reinforces the value of reaching out, now, as outlined above, and of course systematically to Congress).

On other Summit matters, the regular agenda for building the future of NATO and Transatlantic relations should go forward. Some added suggestions:

- o use the Kosovo crisis to dramatize a new Balkan and Southeast Europe initiative, separate from the enlargement debate and separate from regular Partnership for Peace work. Some of the elements are there, mostly on a U.S. basis: DOD's cooperative programs, State's SECI program. The Alliance as a whole needs to have an overall strategy and basic commitment to helping resolve the challenges of the region, with resources, process, and political clout (this also must not neglect Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, although it is more difficult to present that point at a Summit including Greece and Turkey). This should be made a headline initiative, showing that Kosovo (and Bosnia, etc.) are not isolated events but part of a larger, sustained, coherent, purposeful strategy to stabilize the region and help its peoples join the mainstream of Central European political and economic development.

This should, in fact, be the headline Presidential initiative at the Summit.

- o double the U.S. contribution (to \$200 million a year) to Partnership for Peace countries, under the "Warsaw Initiative" formula. Put this on a "challenge grant" basis, with an equal added contribution being put up by the Europeans. Providing resources to PFP countries is one of the most important NATO needs at this point.

o create a new "reverse PFP" that will bring people from the PFP countries -- not just the militaries but also from civilian ministries and even key economic sectors -- to Western countries, for internships/training/practical experience with counterparts. Again, there are elements of this scattered about -- including devices like the Marshall Center; but this can be a major reaching out, in effect a PFP-Phase Two. This can even become a challenge to the private sector to put up resources and create opportunities, including training of "middle management" in a wide range of critical areas. Russia, of course, should be included.

o set a clear goal of creating better consultations, ties, and practical relations between NATO and the EU. You know of my idea for this Summit -- that it should have been supplemented by an EU Summit, leading to an overall declaration of political, economic, and security concerns, initiatives, and proposals. I attach a piece I wrote for the *Financial Times* on this. This idea should now be adopted for the next NATO Summit; while also pressing for rapid implementation of a new set of NATO-EU relations in Brussels. (As a small gesture, the U.S. should create formal liaison between its two missions in Brussels).

o get a NATO subvention to the Atlantic Treaty Association, in part for work with counterpart Atlantic Councils in the PFP states. \$1 million a year put toward this by the allies collectively could make a huge difference in what is probably the most important long-term NATO task: to build and sustain popular support for the Alliance.

Summit of summits

The EU should use Nato's 50th anniversary summit in Washington next month to co-ordinate the two institutions' policies


The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's summit in Washington on April 23-25 promises to be a grand celebration of the alliance's first 50 years - provided that efforts to stop the Kosovo conflict are successful. But it is unlikely that the "largest collection of foreign leaders ever to assemble in Washington" will do much new to chart the course of transatlantic relations for the 21st century.

On current plans, the Nato summit will not invite any more central European countries to join the alliance, nor even decide when next to do so. Instead, it will issue a "vision statement" and revise its "strategic concept" (the basic set of principles on which the alliance rests). These changes are both more about codifying what has already been done than providing ideas for the future. None of it is especially ambitious or eye-catching for a meeting billed as ushering in Nato's next half-century.

With this prospect, the allies need to supplement the military dimensions of transatlantic relations. Most pertinent are economic ties across the Atlantic and extending deep into central Europe and Russia. But economic issues are never included on a Nato agenda, even at the summit; they are fenced off from the military alliance and jealously guarded by the European Union and a phalanx of transatlantic institutions.

There is a direct and simple answer: to augment the Nato summit with an economic meeting of heads of state and government - precisely, a full EU summit convened in Washington on April 26, the day after the Nato talks conclude. The US and other non-EU Nato allies would be invited to take part, and there would be a separate session to draw in the 27 other members of Nato's Partnership for Peace.

The merits are obvious. An EU summit in Washington, hard upon the Nato meeting, would bring together all the transatlantic countries to consider every



key dimension of the long-term relationship - political, military, and economic. (Only Ireland will not be in Washington anyway, since other EU states belong either to Nato or its Partnership for Peace.) This would permit discussion of the full range of matters on the 21st century agenda and show how they relate to one another - exploring connections, for example, between the expansion of the EU and that of Nato, or between Nato's military requirements and defence industry

bargain - generates some media and popular interest which is lacking in the current plans for the Nato summit.

The twin summits would also start breaking down the artificial barrier between Nato and the EU. Remarkably, these two institutions, both based in Brussels, still behave as though they live on different planets. They have no formal contacts, no exchanging of ideas. Even individual governments on both sides of the Atlantic tend to divide their bureau-

Nato has a history of pulling the two sides of the Atlantic together and can help reduce stress in economic relations as the EU deepens its integration

co-operation among EU members. The EU and Nato could review and reinforce their complementary efforts to include central European states, to reach out to Russia, and to take full advantage of high technology and the information revolution.

Nato and the EU would then agree on a joint Declaration of Washington that truly covers the waterfront, integrates all the key issues, sets transatlantic goals for the years ahead, and - in the

point was further underscored by last December's Anglo-French agreement, which foresaw the EU's direct role in defence matters.

Holding twin summits in Washington would send a clear signal that Nato and the EU must henceforth start working together in practice. This would also help both sides of the Atlantic reduce the risk of corrosive economic competition across the Atlantic. Nato has a history of pulling the two sides of the Atlantic together and can help reduce stress in economic relations as the EU deepens its integration.

There will be objections to marrying Nato and EU summits, but these centre on outdated institutional prerogatives, mostly on the Europeans' part. Some resist any encroachment on the EU by Nato, with its inherent American leadership, while Europe tries to build its own integrity. They prefer to keep apart the Nato summit and the semi-annual meetings of the US and European Council presidents - but that has the effect of robbing them of any relationship in the public eye.

Such objections are not very important, however, measured against the EU's rising confidence in its own institutional success, the opportunity provided by this proposal, and the compelling need for these two institutions to address similar issues together. In fact, this joining of summits should become a standard feature of Nato-EU co-operation and also be reflected in new working relations between them in Brussels. And the US should take the lead by tying its Brussels missions to Nato and the EU closer together.

The Atlantic summit for the millennium: to make it happen will require imagination and leadership, on both sides of the Atlantic, to match the shared tasks ahead.

The author is a senior adviser at the Rand Corporation and a former US ambassador to Nato

Hurley, C. Michael

From: Quinn, Mary E.
Sent: Friday, May 28, 1999 11:35 AM
To: Hurley, C. Michael
Subject: FW: Hunter letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 1999 6:40 PM
To: Quinn, Mary E.
Subject: FW: Hunter letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

looks fine

-----Original Message-----

From: Gordon, Philip H.
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 1999 2:53 PM
To: Quinn, Mary E.
Cc: @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @CEE - Central/Eastern Europe
Subject: Hunter letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mary:

I suggest substituting this letter for the one currently in the pkg. 2590 you asked me to concur on. I have also made some changes on the hard copy of the cover note.

Greg will need to re-clear, and Steve Flanagan should review the SEE paragraph.

thanks .



Hunter Revised
2590.doc

TO: BERGER

FROM: HUNTER, ROBERT

DOC DATE: 01 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NSA CORRESPONDENCE

NATO SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RAND SUGGESTIONS FOR KOSOVO BRIEFINGS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 19 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

BROWN, K

MCELDOWNEY

~~SCHWARTZ~~

FOR INFO

BANDLER

BELL

BLINKEN

SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

RAND

2570

To: KOSOVO
GOBUSH
(RETURN TO APNS)

Robert E. Hunter
Senior Advisor

April 1, 1999

Memorandum for Sandy Berger

From: Robert Hunter *RF*

Subject: Kosovo, NATO Summit

The meeting you had in the Roosevelt Room on March 4 was excellent for bringing our group up to date on Summit planning.

I suggest that you now do the same with regard to Kosovo, in two parts:

o that you brief a somewhat larger group of NATO observers/supporters on the broad outlines of the political and military strategy, the conduct of the campaign, and the dilemmas you face -- and ask for advice and support. Don Bandler may have told you of the dinner with the U.S. Committee on NATO Monday night, where there were sharp divisions among the "friendly" NATO crowd -- in part reflecting, I believe, a sense of not being engaged or having a clear line to support.

o that the President brief a wide range of former national security officials (Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Advisors, Chairmen of the JCS, ambassadors to NATO) for the same purpose. If the value of his gaining support and being seen to reach out is overbalanced by the risk that some of these people will then grandstand afterward, he could do this selectively and perhaps by phone with individuals.

Briefings would also help those of us who have been out there supporting the Administration publicly.

Looking to the NATO Summit, the key issue now is to reduce the risks that Kosovo will be disruptive within the Alliance and thus play badly in the media, on Capitol Hill, and in the Nation. Needless to say, debates, disagreements, and side chatter that take place in Brussels or European capitals will be magnified many times here, with a media corps looking for as much disagreement as possible and

1333 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20005-4707
TEL: 202 296 5000
FAX: 202 296 7960

1700 Main Street, PO Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
TEL: 310.393.0411
FAX: 310.393.4818

with easy access to hundreds of Europeans. Also, few of the visiting Europeans will have experience with the drumbeat of media coverage here and the cacophony of U.S. public debate, and many will draw the wrong conclusions about U.S. resolve and purpose.

This point cannot be overemphasized: the Summit will either build support for the administration's policy or seriously undercut it -- there's no middle ground.

If the conflict is not essentially over by April 23, it is critical to have precision and clarity on both diplomatic and military objectives, broadly agreed in the Alliance, to the extent that that can be achieved. This should now be the consuming focus of Summit preparations at NATO headquarters. Just as the impending Summit helped force the pace of responding to Milosevic's brutal campaign, so the Summit forces the pace of solidifying support behind a "bumper sticker" set of goals and means. Of course, with the complexity of events, this is a tall order -- and Milosevic still controls a major part of the unfolding action -- but getting as much clarity as possible is now imperative. (This reinforces the value of reaching out, now, as outlined above, and of course systematically to Congress).

On other Summit matters, the regular agenda for building the future of NATO and Transatlantic relations should go forward. Some added suggestions:

- o use the Kosovo crisis to dramatize a new Balkan and Southeast Europe initiative, separate from the enlargement debate and separate from regular Partnership for Peace work. Some of the elements are there, mostly on a U.S. basis: DOD's cooperative programs, State's SECI program. The Alliance as a whole needs to have an overall strategy and basic commitment to helping resolve the challenges of the region, with resources, process, and political clout (this also must not neglect Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, although it is more difficult to present that point at a Summit including Greece and Turkey). This should be made a headline initiative, showing that Kosovo (and Bosnia, etc.) are not isolated events but part of a larger, sustained, coherent, purposeful strategy to stabilize the region and help its peoples join the mainstream of Central European political and economic development.

This should, in fact, be the headline Presidential initiative at the Summit.

- o double the U.S. contribution (to \$200 million a year) to Partnership for Peace countries, under the "Warsaw Initiative" formula. Put this on a "challenge grant" basis, with an equal added contribution being put up by the Europeans. Providing resources to PFP countries is one of the most important NATO needs at this point.

o create a new "reverse PFP" that will bring people from the PFP countries -- not just the militaries but also from civilian ministries and even key economic sectors -- to Western countries, for internships/training/practical experience with counterparts. Again, there are elements of this scattered about -- including devices like the Marshall Center; but this can be a major reaching out, in effect a PFP-Phase Two. This can even become a challenge to the private sector to put up resources and create opportunities, including training of "middle management" in a wide range of critical areas. Russia, of course, should be included.

o set a clear goal of creating better consultations, ties, and practical relations between NATO and the EU. You know of my idea for this Summit -- that it should have been supplemented by an EU Summit, leading to an overall declaration of political, economic, and security concerns, initiatives, and proposals. I attach a piece I wrote for the *Financial Times* on this. This idea should now be adopted for the next NATO Summit; while also pressing for rapid implementation of a new set of NATO-EU relations in Brussels. (As a small gesture, the U.S. should create formal liaison between its two missions in Brussels).

o get a NATO subvention to the Atlantic Treaty Association, in part for work with counterpart Atlantic Councils in the PFP states. \$1 million a year put toward this by the allies collectively could make a huge difference in what is probably the most important long-term NATO task: to build and sustain popular support for the Alliance.

Summit of summits

The EU should use Nato's 50th anniversary summit in Washington next month to co-ordinate the two institutions' policies


The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's summit in Washington on April 23-25 promises to be a grand celebration of the alliance's first 50 years - provided that efforts to stop the Kosovo conflict are successful. But it is unlikely that the "largest collection of foreign leaders ever to assemble in Washington" will do much new to chart the course of transatlantic relations for the 21st century.

On current plans, the Nato summit will not invite any more central European countries to join the alliance, nor even decide when next to do so. Instead, it will issue a "vision statement" and revise its "strategic concept" (the basic set of principles on which the alliance rests). These changes are both more about codifying what has already been done than providing ideas for the future. None of it is especially ambitious or eye-catching for a meeting billed as ushering in Nato's next half-century.

With this prospect, the allies need to supplement the military dimensions of transatlantic relations. Most pertinent are economic ties across the Atlantic and extending deep into central Europe and Russia. But economic issues are never included on a Nato agenda, even at the summit; they are fenced off from the military alliance and jealously guarded by the European Union and a phalanx of transatlantic institutions.

There is a direct and simple answer: to augment the Nato summit with an economic meeting of heads of state and government - precisely, a full EU summit convened in Washington on April 26, the day after the Nato talks conclude. The US and other non-EU Nato allies would be invited to take part, and there would be a separate session to draw in the 27 other members of Nato's Partnership for Peace.

The merits are obvious. An EU summit in Washington, hard upon the Nato meeting, would bring together all the transatlantic countries to consider every



key dimension of the long-term relationship - political, military, and economic. (Only Ireland will not be in Washington anyway, since other EU states belong either to Nato or its Partnership for Peace.) This would permit discussion of the full range of matters on the 21st century agenda and show how they relate to one another - exploring connections, for example, between the expansion of the EU and that of Nato, or between Nato's military requirements and defence industry

bargain - generates some media and popular interest which is lacking in the current plans for the Nato summit.

The twin summits would also start breaking down the artificial barrier between Nato and the EU. Remarkably, these two institutions, both based in Brussels, still behave as though they live on different planets. They have no formal contacts, no exchanging of ideas. Even individual governments on both sides of the Atlantic tend to divide their bureau-

Nato has a history of pulling the two sides of the Atlantic together and can help reduce stress in economic relations as the EU deepens its integration

co-operation among EU members. The EU and Nato could review and reinforce their complementary efforts to include central European states, to reach out to Russia, and to take full advantage of high technology and the information revolution.

Nato and the EU would then agree on a joint Declaration of Washington that truly covers the waterfront, integrates all the key issues, sets transatlantic goals for the years ahead, and - in the

point was further underscored by last December's Anglo-French agreement, which foresaw the EU's direct role in defence matters.

Holding twin summits in Washington would send a clear signal that Nato and the EU must henceforth start working together in practice. This would also help both sides of the Atlantic reduce the risk of corrosive economic competition across the Atlantic. Nato has a history of pulling the two sides of the Atlantic together and can help reduce stress in economic relations as the EU deepens its integration.

There will be objections to marrying Nato and EU summits, but these centre on outdated institutional prerogatives, mostly on the Europeans' part. Some resist any encroachment on the EU by Nato, with its inherent American leadership, while Europe tries to build its own integrity. They prefer to keep apart the Nato summit and the semi-annual meetings of the US and European Council presidents - but that has the effect of robbing them of any relationship in the public eye.

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The Atlantic summit for the millennium: to make it happen will require imagination and leadership, on both sides of the Atlantic, to match the shared tasks ahead.

The author is a senior adviser at the Rand Corporation and a former US ambassador to Nato

TO: BERGER

FROM: HUNTER, ROBERT

DOC DATE: 01 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NSA CORRESPONDENCE

NATO SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RAND SUGGESTIONS FOR KOSOVO BRIEFINGS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 19 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

BROWN, K
MCELDOWNEY
SCHULTE

FOR INFO

BANDLER
BELL
BLINKEN
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

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DOC 1 OF 1

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: HURLEY

LOG NUMBER: 2590

DUE DATE: 4.19.99

DATE STAFFED: 4.7.99

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:

☐

PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: HUNTER, R.

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4907

June 28, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *DS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on June 24, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on June 24.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: June 15, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By *12* NARA, Date *4/17/2024*

208-0994-F-3

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND
Counsel for Intelligence
Policy
Department of Justice

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. Steven Ricchetti
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on June 24, 1999 (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on June 24, 1999. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: June 28, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 4/17/2024
2008-0994-1.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, June 24, 1999. [Record ID: 9904907] [Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	06/28/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [8]

2008-0994-F
vz6305

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4907

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: June 24, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

(b)(3)

OVP:

Michael Orfini
Leslie Davidson

NEC:

Lael Brainard
Sonal Shah

State:

James Dobbins
Anthony Wayne
Marguerite Houze

AID:

Donald Pressley
David Adams

Treasury:

Ted Truman
John Moran

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
Martin Dempsey

Defense:

James Bodner
Joseph Kaufmann

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

Justice:

Gary Grindler
Robert Perito

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Martin Minton (via SVTS)

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Stephen Flanagan
Eric Schwartz
Matthew Vaccaro
Mark Tavlarides
Michael Hammer

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: June 28, 2009

Released in Part

Per E.O. 13526

2014-0549-M (1.74)

7/31/2019 KBH

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Deputies should be provided a paper setting out the timeframe for deploying UN civil police. (Action: NSC) (U)
- The Leaders' Conference on Southeast Europe should be used to give a political impulse to regional cooperation and other efforts that promote integration with Europe, in accordance with the broad objectives of the Stability Pact. Specific attention should be given to political and security issues, and to launching initiatives that could be brought to conclusion at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul. A decision on timing and venue of the leaders' conference should be taken following a site survey in Sarajevo. (Action: NSC, State) (C)
- To the extent possible, discussions on Kosovo's future economic framework should be held within the G-7, rather than the G-8, since Russia (1) is likely to object to the degree of economic autonomy that we desire and (2) is unlikely to contribute significant resources to economic reconstruction. (Action: State, Treasury) (C)
- The USG should encourage the World Bank to dispatch an assessment team to Kosovo, despite the "outer wall" of sanctions on the FRY. (Action: Treasury) (U)
- The initial donors' conference for Kosovo in July should focus on short-term needs, including both humanitarian and initial reconstruction requirements. The USG should encourage the EU and the World Bank to proceed to convene this conference, drawing upon the expertise of the UNHCR and World Bank. (Action: NSC, State, Treasury) (U)
- The USG should limit assistance to Serbia, beyond Kosovo and Montenegro, to humanitarian relief. Any reconstruction assistance should be focused on preventing humanitarian suffering and will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. EU countries should be encouraged to follow the same policy. (Action: State, USAID) (U)

E.O. 13526 1.4(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4908

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *DS*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Finnish President Ahtisaari.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be file for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: June 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 4/17/2024
2008-0594-F-3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Finnish President Ahtisaari

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Ahtisaari

Interpreter: None
Notetakers: Douglas Bayley, Robin Rickard,
Donald Cheraimie

DATE, TIME: June 26, 1999, 1553-1556 p.m., EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Mr. President, how are you? Thank you for taking my call. I know that a lot of people are talking to you about taking the UN job in Kosovo. I wanted to encourage you to do so, if it is at all possible. There is literally no one else in Europe who could do it as well as you. If there is anyway you can do it, I hope you will. (C)

President Ahtissari: I spoke yesterday with Kofi Annan, who was in London, I promised to give it serious thought and see how I can comply. My problem is my term runs through the end of February next year and that, of course, requires my presence here. The question is how I could divide my time here. I have to discuss it with my EU colleagues when we meet the day after tomorrow in Rio. I am heading tomorrow morning to Rio for an EU-Latin American summit. (C)

The President: I understand. If you can do it, I hope you will. That is all we can ask for. Lord knows it is important. If we can make this work, we will have done something profoundly important. (C)

President Ahtisaari: I could not agree more. If any of us wanted to delay my answer to next year, my answer would have been yes without hesitation but it is a bit complicated at the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: June 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 4/17/2024
2008-0994-F.3

moment. I spoke with the Prime Minister today and I promised to come back and discuss with him about what we can do. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

President Ahtisaari: I appreciate your call. It is a pleasure to work with your people. I think there is lot of work here to be done. (U)

The President: Yes we can do it you know. (U)

President Ahtisaari: Yes. I have no doubt. NATO is more than prepared. The civilian side is always lagging behind. That is our experience from other operations as well. I will give it serious thought. Kofi Annan is coming to Europe to Geneva on the 4th. I said if I can come to the conclusion I can do this, I would go and see him and discuss the details. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. Thank you very much. Have a good time in Brazil. If you see President Cardoso, say hello. He is a good man. ~~(C)~~

President Ahtisaari: I hope to have a bilateral with him. Thank you very much. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

President Ahtisaari: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 25, 1999


Dear Bob:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter on Kosovo and NATO and for your ideas on how to move forward. Sandy shared it with the NSC staff when it arrived and asked that I reply now that the air strikes have ended.

I hope you are pleased about the NATO's Summit's role in confirming the unity of the Alliance behind the policy in Kosovo. The common purpose and firm resolve forged at the summit were critical to our success. We also agreed with your suggestion to use the Kosovo crisis to dramatize a new Balkan and Southeast Europe Initiative. As you know, this project has gone forward, led by the European Union. All of our long-term efforts are directed towards the stabilization and democratization of the region. You will also be glad to know that the President is planning to attend a Balkans Conference in Europe in the near future.

Thank you again for your incisive suggestions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G. Schulte', written over a horizontal line.

Greg Schulte

Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

The Honorable Robert E. Hunter
Senior Advisor
RAND Corporation
1333 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-4707

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	06/28/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for June 1999, Part I [8]

2008-0994-F
vz6305

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 28, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

JEFFREY BIALOS
Department of State

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

BRUCE WRIGHT
Joint Chiefs of Staff

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

BRIAN CARLSON
United States Information
Agency

DAVID ADAMS
Agency for International
Development

JAMIE METZL
Department of State

LEN HAWLEY
Department of State

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

NANCY LEE
Department of the Treasury

MAC MCATAMNEY
Department of Justice

ROBERT PERITO
Department of Justice

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Tuesday, June 29, 1999, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. There will be no 8:30 a.m. SVTS. An agenda is attached.

Please call in your attendees date of birth and social security number by NLT 9:30 a.m., June 29 to Mary Quinn at 202-456-9101.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'G. Schulte', is written over the typed name.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. agenda	Kosovo ExComm Meeting, June 29, 1999. (1 page)	06/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [8]

2008-0994-F
vz6305

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904817
RECEIVED: 24 JUN 99 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 24 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

TELCON



PERSONS: THACI, HASHIM

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW POTUS & KOSOVO LEADER THACI 20 JUN

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 30 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By W NARA, Date 4/17/2024
2008-0994-f-3

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904817

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99062420 FOR DECISION
X 99062809 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	<u>1</u>	<u>6/25</u> <u>ENK</u>	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>6/25</u> <u>ENK</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>cop</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>cop</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>ENK 6/25</u>	_____
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

*Telcon with Kosovan
Leader Shaci*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4817

June 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Telcon with Kosovar Leader Hashim Thaci

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation between the President and Hashim Thaci on June 20, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

The President: Your statement about respecting human rights and minority rights is very important. After the suffering of the people of Kosovo, for you to take the lead on these issues means to prove to everyone that our plight is just. Milosevic is not like the others. We will have a good future. I look forward to meeting you and I admire your leadership.

Kosovar Leader Thaci: Thank you Mr. President. The new battle awaiting us now is the return of refugees, reconstruction, the establishment of a civil society and holding free and pluralistic elections. And we will do this through our mechanisms but also with your help and support. I wish you good health and success in both your life and work.

The President: Thank you. Good bye.

-- End of Conversation --

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PER E.O. 13526
2012-0515-M (1.11)
7/26/2012 RDS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1999

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Kosovar Leader Hashim Thaci

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Kosovar Leader Hashim Thaci

Interpreter: Lindita Imami
Notetaker: Lindita Imami

DATE, TIME June 20, 1999, 6:30 - 6:40 p.m.
PLACE: Hyatt Hotel, Cologne, Germany

The President: Congratulations on the signing of the agreement for the demilitarization and transformation of the KLA. I am very pleased it happened on the same day that the Serb forces completed their withdrawal from Kosovo.

Kosovar Leader Thaci: Thank you. It is an honor that you are congratulating us on KLA's demilitarization and transformation. This is also your success. For us it has been a compromise for the sake of working towards peace and stability in Kosovo and the region.

The President: I know. And I am grateful for this. I can assure you that we will fully cooperate to bring security, a local police force and true self-government for the people of Kosovo. This is a very important day for Kosovo. I am very pleased that we have managed to change the course of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Kosovar Leader Thaci: This process is also due to your efforts. We have in the past been committed and will continue to be committed to the peace process. We can guarantee that we will respect human rights, and minority rights in Kosovo. We are committed to bringing freedom, peace and democracy to all ethnic groups in Kosovo. We will also work for a free and open economy. Our conversation today will also be an incentive towards these goals.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-0515-M (1.01)
7/24/2012 RDS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Kosovar Leader Hashim Thaci

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Kosovar Leader Hashim Thaci

Interpreter: Lindita Imami
Notetaker: Lindita Imami

DATE, TIME June 20, 1999, 6:30 - 6:40 p.m.
PLACE: Hyatt Hotel, Cologne, Germany

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Kosovar Leader Thaci: Thank you. It is an honor that you are congratulating us on KLA's demilitarization and transformation. This is also your success. For us it has been a compromise for the sake of working towards peace and stability in Kosovo and the region.

The President: I know. And I am grateful for this. I can assure you that we will fully cooperate to bring security, a local police force and true self-government for the people of Kosovo. This is a very important day for Kosovo. I am very pleased that we have managed to change the course of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Kosovar Leader Thaci: This process is also due to your efforts. We have in the past been committed and will continue to be committed to the peace process. We can guarantee that we will respect human rights, and minority rights in Kosovo. We are committed to bringing freedom, peace and democracy to all ethnic groups in Kosovo. We will also work for a free and open economy. Our conversation today will also be an incentive towards these goals.

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2012-0515-AM (1,61)
7/26/2012 RDS

The President: Your statement ^{about} ~~with reference to~~ respecting human rights and minority rights is very important. After the suffering of the people of Kosovo, for you to take the lead on these issues means to prove to everyone that our plight is just. Milosevic is not like the others. We will have a good future. I look forward to meeting you and I admire your leadership.

Kosovar Leader Thaci: Thank you Mr. President. # The new battle awaiting us now is the return of refugees, reconstruction, the establishment of a civil society and holding free and pluralistic elections. And we will do this through our mechanisms but also with your help and support. I wish you good health and success in both your life and work.

The President: Thank you. good bye. ✓

-- End of Conversation --