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Folder Title:

Chronos for June 1999 Part I [4]

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39	1	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, June 3, 1999. [Record ID: 9904230] [Duplicate of rs1119_001a, 2014-0549-M] (3 pages)	06/03/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
002a. form	Profile Sheet. [Record ID: 9930117] (1 page)	05/05/1999	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: [Memo to the President] [Record ID: 9930117] (1 page)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)
002c. form	Distribution Receipt. [Record ID: 9930117] (1 page)	06/03/1999	P1/b(1)
002d. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. [Record ID: 9930117] (1 page)	06/03/1999	P1/b(1)
002e. report	BTF Memo. (2 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1)
002f. pamphlet	re: [Serbia] (2 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1)
002g. briefing paper	For the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Some Thoughts about Slobodan Milosevic. [See also rs1038_001c, 2014-0547-M and vz6288_005c, this case.] (3 pages)	05/01/1999	P1/b(1)
002h. draft	[Draft of 002b (9930117)] (1 page)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)
002i. draft	[Draft of 002d (9930117)] (1 page)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)
002j. draft	[Draft of 002d (9930117)] (1 page)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [4]

2008-0994-F

vz6302

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Editorials in Boston Globe and New York Times. [Record ID: 9903075] [Duplicate of vz6192_002, this case] (2 pages)	05/10/1999	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Michael Hurley. Subject: Editorials in [the] Boston Globe and New York Times. [Record ID: 9903075] (1 page)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)
003c. draft	[Draft of 003a (9903075)] [page 2 only] (1 page)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)
003d. draft	[Draft of 003a (9903075)] [page 2 only] (1 page)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

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
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June 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on June 3, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on June 3.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: June 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VR* NARA, Date *4/17/2024*
2008-0994-F-3

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on June 3, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on June 3, 1999. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: June 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
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FOLDER TITLE:

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2008-0994-F
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
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READY TO
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ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
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☒	ACTION	FILE
☐	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
☐	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
☐	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
☐	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
☐	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CODEWORD~~

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2008-0454-E-3

~~CODEWORD~~

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002b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: [Memo to the President] [Record ID: 9930117] (1 page)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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002c. form	Distribution Receipt. [Record ID: 9930117] (1 page)	06/03/1999	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

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2008-0994-F
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ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	THE PRESIDENT		
2	FILE	6/7/99	
3			
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5			
6			

ACTION	FILE
APPROVAL	XX INFORMATION
COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

cc VICE PRESIDENT
CHIEF OF STAFF

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6-4-99

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JUN 5 1999

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. draft	[Draft of 002b (9930117)] (1 page)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6302

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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OA/Box Number: 1707

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903075
RECEIVED: 23 APR 99 08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 10 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
MILITARY POSTURE

USIA



PERSONS: ELLIS, JOHN

SUBJECT: EDITORIALS IN BOSTON GLOBE & NYT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 29 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES: -

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HURLEY

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By N NARA, Date 4/17/2024

2008-0994-F-3

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9903075

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HURLEY	Z 99042308 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 99050616 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
003 PRESIDENT	Z 99051014 FOR INFORMATION
003 EXECSEC	Z 99051014 FOR FURTHER ACTION
003 PRESIDENT	Z 99051014 FOR INFORMATION
003	X 99060814 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 990510	VICE PRESIDENT
003 990510	WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3075
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Dmk A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>DS/6</u>	<u>ed/13</u>
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>DS/6</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>4</u>	<u>DS</u>	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>5</u>	<u>TIC 5/10</u>	<u>DS</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>6</u>	<u>Dmk 6/7</u>	<u>w/12</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Editorials in Boston Globe and New York Times. [Record ID: 9903075] [Duplicate of vz6192_002, this case] (2 pages)	05/10/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

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2008-0994-F
vz6302

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An oil refinery burned yesterday near Belgrade after an attack by NATO jets; 500 sorties were flown in a day. Associated Press

NATO Said to Focus Raids on Serb Elite's Property

By ERIC SCHMITT
and STEVEN LEE MYERS

WASHINGTON, April 18 — In listing its bombing targets in Yugoslavia, NATO has generally described them as installations that feed Slobodan Milosevic's war machine. What the alliance does not usually say is that some of the refineries and factories have also been chosen as targets because they are run by close cronies of the Yugoslav President.

The idea, according to senior NATO and Pentagon officials, is to undermine Mr. Milosevic's control by chipping away at his system of political and economic patronage.

"He doesn't care if his soldiers die in Kosovo, as long as he stays in power," one senior military officer said of Mr. Milosevic. "But if you blow up some things near and dear to

him — or to somebody close to him — then that could have an effect."

While NATO's bombing seems to have solidified popular support for Mr. Milosevic, the officials said they hope the attacks against some of the targets will turn loyal supporters against him by destroying their own sources of wealth and power.

The bombing continued this weekend, with 500 sorties flown on Saturday afternoon and overnight.

[NATO began its most active day yet of air strikes on Yugoslavia on Sunday night, bombing refineries, bridges and dozens of other targets in what it claimed were "highly successful" operations, the Associated Press reported.

[Yugoslav media was reporting

there were several powerful detonations around Novi Sad, Serbia's second-largest city, early Monday. There were no reports of casualties, but the damage was described as "great." Tanjug, the state-run news agency, also reported attacks on the capital, Belgrade, and in the towns of Paracin, Kraljevo and Sremska Mitrovica.]

Yugoslavia's oil and gas industry has suffered enormously under NATO's strikes. While the stated aim of those attacks has been to choke off fuel to the armed forces operating in Kosovo, the strikes must also be a blow to Dragan Tomic, the director of Yugo Petrol, who as Speaker of the federal parliament in Belgrade is a close ally of Mr. Milosevic.

On April 9, a missile strike de-

Continued on Page A8

Continued From Page A1

stroyed the Zastava automotive plant in Kragujevac. Its director, Milan Beko, has served under Mr. Milosevic as Minister of Privatization.

Four days earlier, NATO struck a tobacco factory and warehouse in Nis, and damage to tobacco plants has been reported in other cities. According to American intelligence reports, a major player in Yugoslavia's tobacco distribution is Mr. Milosevic's son, Marko.

So far, economic and industrial targets have made up a small portion of NATO's targets. Of the roughly 200 targets attacked since the air war began on March 24, a dozen have been strictly industrial sites, like factories. That percentage grows when those targets are combined with fuel storage and ammunition factories.

As NATO presses on with bombing that has done little to stop the purging of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, some NATO and Pentagon military leaders have advocated striking still more economic and industrial targets, the officials said.


These commanders, including the alliance's supreme commander, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, believe that NATO has to intensify its efforts to undermine Mr. Milosevic's 11-year grip on power.

"If we continue sustaining this air campaign and intensifying it in a way that he sees he is slowly but surely starting to lose those instruments of power that keep him in power, then he's going to have to make a decision," Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen testified on Capitol Hill last week.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry H. Shelton, disclosed that NATO's political leaders had not yet approved a select group of targets for heavy attack. He said NATO warplanes could begin striking such targets "in a few days."

General Shelton declined to identify those targets, but the highly classified list includes additional industrial and economic sites, according to a senior Administration official.

Attacking those targets would carry a much higher risk of civilian casualties and would cause the kind of profound disruption of day-to-day life for ordinary Yugoslavs that NATO has so far sought to avoid, that official said. Such strikes could also undercut NATO's stated rationale for its bombing: to weaken the military and police forces involved in the



Associated Press

Fires raged near Novi Sad, Serbia, yesterday after an oil refinery was hit. Raids are said to single out the property of allies of Serbia's leader.

killings in Kosovo rather than wage war on the people of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon and NATO are looking for ways to intensify pressure on Mr. Milosevic's Government. "We're trying to make the price higher and higher," a senior military official said.

While not aiming directly for Mr. Milosevic, American and NATO officials say they are hitting what they call his four pillars of power: the political machine, the communications media, military and security forces, and the economic system.

A senior American military officer said the targets on NATO's list included strikes at "the things that keep him afloat." The idea, the officer said, is to instill fear in those whose economic standing depends on Mr. Milosevic, to make them think, "We didn't bargain for this."

"If you can achieve that mindset, then who knows what will happen?" the officer said.

Allied planes and missiles have struck half a dozen targets thought to be part of the "national command authority," several of them in and

around Belgrade. These include headquarters and bunkers believed to be used by political and military leaders, although it is not clear whether anybody was killed or injured.

In Yugoslavia's state-run economy, virtually any industrial or economic activity can be linked to Mr. Milosevic's Government. Ever since the former Yugoslavia collapsed into its rump state today, and the economy was hit by comprehensive sanctions from 1992 to 1995, Mr. Milosevic, a former banker and Communist bureaucrat, has been able to tighten his control of the little business left. Agriculture, fuel, manufacturing and exports and imports are operated by Mr. Milosevic's cronies virtually as private fiefs, American officials say.

Mr. Milosevic has used funds gained from industry and his cronies mostly to finance an effective security apparatus to maintain political control, according to experts and intelligence estimates.

But his family and associates also have benefited, living far better than most Yugoslavs, whose standard of living has fallen sharply since the country began to disintegrate in 1991.

Britain's Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, challenged Mr. Milosevic last week to admit to his people that he has bought three villas in Greece. European news reports also have spoken of funds funneled to Swiss banks through French accounts held by Mr. Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic.

The holdings of the couple's son, Marko, are believed to include a discothèque and a tobacco distribution network. Before the war, Yugoslav media reported that he had announced plans to open a Disney-style theme park, called Bambiland.

Yugoslav officials have estimated damage from the bombing as high as \$100 billion, including damage to roads, destroyed bridges and railways, which has the ripple effect of disrupting commerce.

But there are no signs that Mr. Milosevic has lost the backing of his key supporters.

One American Government official familiar with the Yugoslav economy said the prospects were slim that Mr. Milosevic's cronies, however battered, would turn on him.

"A scenario that would involve these guys acting as a group seems fairly unlikely," the official said. "They don't have anywhere to turn besides Milosevic."

Mr. Milosevic appoints the executives of each of the country's monop-



olies, many of whom also serve as Government ministers. Dejan Kovacevic, the Minister of Construction, also heads Mastrogradnje, one of the country's largest construction firms. Zivota Kosic, the Minister of Energy and Mining, also heads a natural resources concern called Duvanska Industrija Nis. Nis is southern Serbia's largest city, and has been a repeated target of NATO bombs.

Another state-run industry that has been severely disrupted is ammunition production, which is overseen by an umbrella organization headed by Maj. Gen. Jovan Cekovic.

Although the industry has a clear military function, it has also historically provided Yugoslavia with hard currency, and the destruction of the plants has crippled another source of profits for people close to Mr. Milosevic, officials say.

Pentagon and NATO officials declined to provide a list of economic or industrial targets that have been struck. But Yugoslav news agencies have reported strikes against several, including a small-plane manufacturer in Pancevo, a construction-equipment plant in Krusevac and a plastics factory in Pristina.

requires walking a fine line, the officials said.

Mr. Cohen said President Clinton, like leaders of other major NATO countries, review the target list.

NATO officials insist the bombing is taking a toll, wearing down Yugoslav supplies and resolve. But the political process has kept some targets off the list. General Clark has sought approval — so far unsuccessfully — to attack another of the pillars of Mr. Milosevic's support: the communications industry.

Arrest Order For Yugoslav

PODGORICA, Montenegro, April 18 (AP) — The Yugoslav Army issued a warrant today for the arrest of Montenegro's Deputy Prime Minister, Novak Kilibarda, the news agency Montena Fax reported. The agency said the warrant accused Mr. Kilibarda, who has been critical of President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, of "the crime of undermining national military and defense ability."

Mr. Kilibarda said he would ignore the warrant.

The move against Mr. Kilibarda adds to Belgrade's pressure on the pro-Western government of Montenegro, which together with Serbia, its larger sister republic, makes up Yugoslavia. President Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro is frequently critical of Mr. Milosevic's authoritarian rule and has opposed his treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

Since NATO air strikes began March 24, Mr. Milosevic has replaced the entire army command in Montenegro with officers loyal to him.

NATO has warned Mr. Milosevic against undermining Montenegro, which has said it is neutral in the conflict between Yugoslavia and NATO.

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good idea?

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4-19-99

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PLEASE STAFF

THE BOSTON GLOBE • THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1999

Wage an attack on Serbia's 'soft assets'

JOHN ELLIS

The Washington Post has reported that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had sent his son, daughters, and grandchildren to Crete for an extended vacation. One presumes that other children and grandchildren of the Milosevic elite are likewise ensconced, far away from NATO air strikes and the possibility of personal collateral damage. Precious assets get special treatment.

To date, the United States and its NATO allies have devoted all of their resources to attacking "hard" military assets in Yugoslavia. These include missile defense systems, communications infrastructure, ammunition depots, and the like. Cruise missiles and laser guided bombs rain down on these targets with stepped-up intensity. The Clinton administration believes these attacks are "working."

Experience teaches that aerial assaults will not reverse what has already happened in Kosovo. Two weeks ago, Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo, was a bustling community of 250,000 ethnic Albanians. Today, it has 800, according to one news account. The battle for Kosovo is over. The Serbs have won. The only thing that will reverse this outcome is an allied invasion of ground forces.

The likelihood of 15 NATO countries agreeing to use ground troops in the Balkans is not great. The best the air campaign can hope to accomplish is to make Milosevic more flexible when the inevitable "peace conference" is convened. So the question arises: What should the United States and its NATO allies do to weaken Milosevic's negotiating posture?

First, the United States and its NATO allies should continue the air war on Yugoslavia without interruption. Degrading the military assets and the communications infrastructure of the Serbian army diminishes its ability to wreak further havoc in the Balkans. Milosevic's unilateral cease-fire was patently bogus and rightly rejected out of hand. The air war on hard assets should increase and intensify with each passing day.

Second, the United States should begin to mobilize a ground force for deployment in the Balkans. Troops can be introduced into Albania under the cover story that they are there to help with humanitarian and relief efforts. The United States can do this without NATO approval. Milosevic will get the point.

Third, the United States and its NATO allies should mount an aggressive campaign against the "soft assets" of the Milosevic elite. In the past, campaigns against "soft assets" have taken the form of economic sanctions and have not been particularly

successful. But just because they haven't worked against, say, Iraq, does not mean that a "soft assets" campaign won't work against Yugoslavia.

Serbian elites see themselves as cosmopolitan Europeans. They educate their children abroad. They travel frequently throughout the region. They shop in Athens, attend fashion shows in Milan, dine at the finest restaurants in Paris. They care about all that — a lot more than they care about Kosovo. The point of a "soft assets" campaign would be to take all that away.

The United States and its NATO allies should publish on the Internet a list of the names of the 3,000 to 5,000 people (and their families) who comprise the Milosevic elite. Once published, anyone who is on the list or related to someone on the list would be denied entry into every NATO country.

All existing visas would be canceled. All students would be sent home. All businessmen would be sent packing. All diplomats would be told to get out. Let the Serbian elites educate their children in Moscow. Let them shop in Belgrade. Kick them out and never let them back through customs again until Kosovo is restored.

The United States and its NATO allies should also freeze and seize all financial assets of the Milosevic elite. Serbian elites are legendarily corrupt. Over the years, they have stolen hundreds of millions of dollars

from their country. Many of these assets are tucked away in Swiss banks and off shore accounts. They use these money havens to protect themselves in the event that their countrymen someday take exception to their malfeasance.

The Genocide Convention, signed after World War II by most countries, including the United States and Yugoslavia, establishes genocide as an international crime and makes possible criminal and civil charges against specific individuals. The United States and its NATO allies should freeze and seize all financial assets of the Milosevic elite as part of a concerted legal effort to prosecute specific individuals on charges of genocide.

A "soft assets" campaign could be very effective. It might make the Milosevic elite realize that they will never be Europeans so long as they occupy Kosovo. It could steal back the money they stole. And it could serve as a kind of test case for future "soft asset" campaigns, which may become necessary if, for example, nationalist forces in Russia prevail.

Waging a "soft asset" campaign against Yugoslavia would set useful legal precedents for the future. And it just might split the Milosevic elite into warring factions.

John Ellis is a Globe columnist.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Michael Hurley. Subject: Editorials in [the] Boston Globe and New York Times. [Record ID: 9903075] (1 page)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [4]

2008-0994-F

vz6302

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903075
RECEIVED: 23 APR 99 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 19 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
MILITARY POSTURE

USIA

PERSONS: ELLIS, JOHN

SUBJECT: POTUS ASKS QUESTION ON BOSTON GLOBE ARTICLE RE SERBIA SOFT ASSETS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 29 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES: -

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. draft	[Draft of 003a (9903075)] [page 2 only] (1 page)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999, Part I [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6302

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. draft	[Draft of 003a (9903075)] [page 2 only] (1 page)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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Case Number: 2006-1186-F

FOIA MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1707				
Document ID: [Summary of Conclusions for June 12 DC Meeting on Kosovo]				
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3010

June 14, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *gs*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *sm*
SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative Rick Boucher's letter on Kosovo and China's entry into the WTO.

Concurrences by: Mike Hurley; Mark Tavlarides; Daniel Shapiro; Ken Lieberthal *sm*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Representative Boucher
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo and WTO

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Representative Rick Boucher concerning Kosovo and China's entry into the WTO.

Background

Representative Rick Boucher wrote to you to express his support for your Kosovo policy, including a possible decision to deploy ground forces if deemed necessary. He also endorsed China's entry into the WTO.

In your response, you explain your policy with regard with Kosovo now that the air strikes have ended: in the short term, to provide security through participation in KFOR; in the long term, to bring democracy and stability to the region through the Southeast Europe Initiative. You also explain that China's entry into the WTO is very much in America's interest and that we hope to reach an agreement with the Chinese in the near future.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Boucher
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Rick:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo and China's entry into the WTO. I welcome the opportunity to update you on both matters.

Turning first to Kosovo, I deeply appreciated your determination that NATO not stand idly by while ethnic cleansing proceeded in the Balkans. I am glad to report to you - as I did to the American people the other night - that NATO's determined action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo compelled Belgrade to capitulate to NATO's conditions. Nineteen resolute democracies came together and stayed together through the toughest challenge since the end of the Cold War, out of the simple conviction that we could not begin the 21st century by allowing the purveyors of ethnic hatred and violence to cause unspeakable suffering and misery with impunity.

I know you share my pride in the achievements of those who brought us to this point: above all, the fine men and women of our armed services whose performance throughout has been so outstanding. International diplomatic efforts - including those of our Russian allies - were also critical in bringing an end to the conflict on NATO's terms.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

We will also be a driving force in the international community's longer-term effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the EU on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to guarantee a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.

I firmly believe that in standing up to Milosevic and his war-making machine, America's leadership will in the long term promote a safer, more secure world. We will consult with you as events warrant and would appreciate your support as we move forward to make these policies work.

Let me turn to China and the WTO now. We want China to enter the WTO this year on the basis of a strong commercial accession agreement. We are prepared to negotiate seriously with the Chinese to complete this package as soon as they are ready to do so.

A strong commercial agreement will be very much in America's interests. It will open China's market so that our bilateral trade will take place on a more level playing field. That will substantially increase American exports and American jobs. At the same time, China's entry into the WTO will achieve other goals of this Administration: promoting market-oriented reform in China and moving global trade increasingly into a rules-based framework. Both of these improve the future environment for healthy American economic growth.

Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Rick Boucher
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



3010

301458

APR 20 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

1230

RICK BOUCHER
9TH DISTRICT
VIRGINIA

April 12, 1999

Mr. President,

Many thanks for the honor of sitting at your table during the state dinner last Thursday. My friend Wendy and I greatly appreciate your hospitality.

While it was not appropriate to address these topics during the dinner conversation, I want you to know that I support your actions in the Balkans and will support the introduction of ground forces if you deem them necessary.

I also endorse the entry of China into the WTO. Congress has repeatedly opposed "Most Favored Nation" status for China, with broad support from members of our party, and I believe we can pass legislation awarding that status permanently.

You are doing excellent work in leading our nation. You have my admiration and support.

Cordially,

D. R. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Paul D. Coverdell (R-GA), concerning long term recovery efforts for Central America and the Caribbean in the wake of Hurricane Mitch;
- 2) Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA), concerning the current situation in the Kosovo and the China-WTO negotiations;
- 3) Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), concerning the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 4) Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), concerning his recent visit to Northern Albania.

APR 21 13:29

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 16, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE RICK BOUCHER

SUBJECT: SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS
AND INTRODUCTION OF GROUND FORCES AND THANK
THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SIT AT
THE HEAD TABLE AT THE STATE DINNER

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/16		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230 _____
 _____ MAIL USER CODES: (A)D VA _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****
  
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3319
REDO

June 16, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL L. BERGER

THROUGH: MICHAEL HURLEY *M*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sm*
SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Senator Cleland

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President providing a suggested response to a letter from Senator Max Cleland.

Concurrence by: Mike Hurley; Mark Tavlarides *Mr*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
 Tab A Letter to Senator Cleland
 Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Cleland regarding Kosovo.

Background

Senator Cleland sent you a heartfelt letter recommending a policy change during the course of NATO's air campaign in Kosovo. He urged a pause and a diplomatic solution. Drawing from his own experience 31 years ago at Khe Sahn, and citing Clausewitz and Tacitus, he argues against the use of helicopters or ground troops - indeed against any escalation.

You thank the Senator for his constructive advice during the course of the air campaign. You explain your policy with regard with Kosovo now that the air strikes have ended: in the short term, to provide security through participation in KFOR; in the long term, to bring democracy and stability to the region through the Southeast Europe Initiative. You conclude by asking for his support in these ventures.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Cleland
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Max:

Thank you for your heartfelt letter on Kosovo. I deeply respect your expertise and experience on matters involving our Armed Forces and the leadership role you have undertaken regarding Kosovo in the Senate. You may have heard from your colleagues that I referred to your compelling letter at the Congressional Retreat on Saturday, May 22nd.

I am glad to report to you - as I did to the American people the other night - that NATO's determined action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo compelled Belgrade to capitulate to NATO's conditions. Nineteen resolute democracies came together and stayed together through the toughest challenge since the end of the Cold War. Their perseverance is all the more remarkable because no NATO country had territorial ambitions on the FRY. Rather, the collective action resulted from the simple conviction that we could not begin the 21st century by allowing the purveyors of ethnic hatred and violence to cause unspeakable suffering and misery with impunity.

I know you share my pride in the achievements of those who brought us to this point: above all, the fine men and women of our armed services whose performance throughout has been so outstanding. International diplomatic efforts - including those of our Russian allies - were also critical in bringing an end to the conflict on NATO's terms.

Max, I considered your perspective seriously during the air campaign. I deeply appreciated, for example, your warnings about the dangers of deploying ground troops or helicopters in a non-permissive environment. I am glad that we agreed about the ends that we are now in the process of achieving: an end to the violence and the security and self-government the Kosovars so very much deserve.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this

troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

We will also be a driving force in the international community's longer-term effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the EU on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to guarantee a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.

I firmly believe that in standing up to Milosevic and his war-making machine, America's leadership will in the long term promote a safer, more secure world. We will consult with you as events warrant and would appreciate your support as we move forward to make these policies work. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Max Cleland
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-1005

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To: EXEC
KOSOVO
LEGISLATIVE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

June 4, 1999

6-4-99

GRB-

LTR

MR. PRESIDENT:

NSC has now finished its response to Max Cleland's letter on Kosovo. I gave you the incoming letter prior to the recent Democratic Senators retreat in Virginia, and I know you spoke about it there.

Recent events may give you even more to say in response to Cleland's concerns (and I'm happy to have your response redone if you'd like), but I wanted you to have it without further delay.

Sean Maloney 

*We need to read in
light of recent developments*

copied

Berger

Stein

NSC WWB

Podesta



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

99 JUN 3 08:07

June 2, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 
LARRY STEIN 
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Senator Cleland

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Senator Cleland regarding Kosovo.

Background

Senator Cleland sent you a heartfelt letter calling on us to change course in Kosovo. He insists that we must cease air strikes and pursue a diplomatic solution. Drawing from his own experience 31 years ago at Khe Sahn, and quoting Clausewitz and Tacitus, he argues against the use of helicopters or ground troops - indeed against any escalation - and in favor of a bombing halt and initiation of negotiations to achieve a political settlement.

Your response asserts that NATO's campaign is working. It explains the necessity of a full Serb pullout from Kosovo so that Kosovars can confidently return to their homes. It notes recent indications of growing Serb frustration with Milosevic's policies. Finally, it makes the case that NATO should plan for deployment of ground forces after concluding a settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Cleland
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Max:

Thank you for your heartfelt letter on the situation in Kosovo. I deeply respect your expertise and your moral and practical leadership in the Senate. You may have heard from your colleagues that I referred to your letter at the Congressional Retreat on Saturday, May 22nd. I hope you don't mind.

We began our action in Kosovo because we could not let the staggering brutality of Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo go unanswered. The perpetration of these crimes on NATO's doorstep and the potential for destabilizing the surrounding region further underscored the need to act. But it was only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted that we and our NATO allies resorted to force. Even as our military action is underway, however, we continue to explore all diplomatic opportunities in an effort to achieve a solution that meets our objective.

The objective of our strategy is, and has always been, to allow the refugees to return with safety and self-government. This is the basis for the ongoing NATO air strikes and our ongoing diplomatic efforts. This objective can only be met when Milosevic withdraws Serb forces from the province, allows all refugees to return home, and permits the stationing of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, whether ethnic Albanian or Serb.

I agree with you that the refugees will only return to their homes if their security is assured. After so much death and suffering, the Kosovar Albanians believe only NATO can protect them from further repression. For that very reason we cannot accept any Serb proposal that falls short of NATO's fundamental conditions, including the requirement that the international security force have NATO at its core. That means a force under NATO command and control that operates under rules of engagement

set by the Alliance. We envision the force would also include Russian and other non-NATO participants.

I have thought hard about your proposal to call for a cease-fire and convene an international conference to resolve the conflict. My concern, however, is that Milosevic would use such a cease-fire and conference to consolidate further the gains from his campaign of ethnic cleansing and reconstitute his military capabilities in Kosovo and elsewhere. This is exactly what he did after agreeing to last October's cease-fire -- but then immediately began to violate its terms. Were Milosevic to continue his intransigence, it would be difficult to gain allied consensus to resume military operations. Without the prospect of continued air operations and international isolation, Milosevic would have little or no incentive to create the conditions in which the refugees could return or the underlying reasons for the conflict would be resolved.

There is strong evidence we are succeeding. The air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic as General Shelton and others have noted. Each day NATO airstrikes cause further damage to Serb forces deployed in the field.

In recent days, we have seen growing indications that NATO's air campaign and Milosevic's self-destructive policies have created rising dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations have occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting the government's silence about the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their town to end the mistreatment of their families by police. The recent indictment of Milosevic by the ICTY should help to widen these fissures.

We are also seeing evidence that Milosevic miscalculated NATO's resolve. His recent sham announcement of troop withdrawals was clearly intended to divide the alliance and influence international opinion. His public acceptance of G-8 principles for negotiating an end to the conflict (though coupled with a demand that the details be negotiated with the United Nations), indicates he is searching for a way out.

Max, I take seriously your warnings. On the use of Apache helicopters, for instance, I have not yet approved their employment, and would only do so on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- and only at a time and place, and in a manner, best designed to take advantage of their capabilities.

With respect to the possible deployment of ground troops, I believe we must prepare for success. This means planning for the introduction following an agreement of an effective international security force. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and this week approved updates to that plan. KFOR, of course, would only enter in a permissive environment, as IFOR did in Bosnia.

SACEUR is moving ahead to raise the necessary forces. Given the new circumstances, including the enormous humanitarian crisis caused by Milosevic, KFOR will need to be larger than originally foreseen. We still expect our European allies will provide the vast bulk of the force. For the U.S. contribution, we had previously identified just under 4,000 troops for KFOR, including a Marine Expeditionary Unit and a brigade combat team. This amounted to roughly fifteen percent of a 28,000-soldier force. We are assuming that this percentage will stay roughly constant for a larger KFOR.

NATO is also updating its assessment of deploying a ground force into Kosovo without Belgrade's consent. While I have not ruled out any option, I continue to believe that we will achieve our objectives on our current course. Should my view of what is needed change, I will consult closely with you and your colleagues before any change.

Thank you again for your thoughtful letter. I ask that you continue to provide me your views.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Max Cleland
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1005

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1005

April 22, 1999

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

**DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING Per E.O. 13526**

Sec. 3.2(C) Initials: VZ Date: 4/17/2024
2008-0997-1-3

Dear Mr. President:

I am greatly disturbed by the war in Kosovo. I fear it has turned in a direction against our vital national interests. I fear an open-ended conflict which has no realistic policy objective, no clear-cut military objective other than to "degrade" the enemy's military capability, and no exit strategy. Politically, I fear we have set ourselves up for a test of wills between an increasingly frail political will of NATO allies and the hard-headed will of Milosevic and the Serbs. If this war becomes a test of wills, we may lose. Milosevic can and will hunker down. He has no where else to go. He can survive our air attacks for months and still accomplish his objectives.

I certainly believe that the intentions which you and NATO have expressed for our policy in Kosovo are honorable, and indeed commendable: "a peaceful, multiethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis." However, the best of intentions and good wishes are not enough in developing an effective policy. By these standards, virtually all of the Balkans now fall far short of what we seek for Kosovo, and in any case, it is an outcome which neither side -- understandably including the Kosovar Albanians -- currently support. Thus, in my opinion, it cannot serve as the basis for a realistic policy.

When one turns to the particular political objectives which we have set as a result of the just-stated underlying goal, I similarly see significant practical problems. In your November 18, 1998 letter responding to my letter of October 5, you listed as our "overriding objectives...to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans...to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe, and ... to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government." Similarly, at the outset of the current military confrontation we set as our political goals: 1) the prevention or hampering of Milosevic's reprehensible "ethnic cleansing" campaign against the Kosovar Albanians; and 2) the unconditional agreement by Milosevic to the Rambouillet "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo." To carry out these political objectives, NATO, with the support of the United States Senate -- and my affirmative vote -- determined to employ air and missile strikes with the specific military objective of reducing the capacity of the Serbian military and security forces to conduct offensive operations.

By any conceivable measure our air strikes have completely failed to achieve the originally stated political objectives. To say the least, the "ethnic cleansing" effort was not stopped and the Rambouillet agreement is now a dead letter. Now, employing the same military instrument -- air

strikes -- with the same military objective -- reducing Serbian military capacity, NATO has put forward the following political objectives: a verifiable stop to all Serbian military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo; withdrawal of all Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces in Kosovo; Serbian agreement to the stationing of an international military presence in Kosovo; Serbian agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo; and Serbian provision of credible assurance of a willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework based on the Rambouillet accords.

It is my opinion that our current military forces and military objectives cannot expeditiously and simultaneously achieve all of these political objectives, especially the safe return of all refugees -- given that many of these refugees will not want to return unless and until their security is not in any way dependent on the Serbian government and their homes and communities can be rebuilt --, and the acceptance of a settlement based on Rambouillet -- given my view that neither side currently accepts that as a basis for a lasting agreement. Furthermore, even in their somewhat more ambiguous current formulations, the NATO demands for a total Serbian military and police withdrawal from Kosovo and for the acceptance of an armed international presence -- including NATO forces -- continue to represent conditions which will be unlikely for any Serbian leader to accept, barring the kind of military defeat that can only come about via a massive ground invasion. Therefore, I have concluded that our current political purposes are unattainable both because of the mismatch with the military means we are employing, and also because of the realities of the situation on the ground in the Balkans.

As Clausewitz observed, "Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political purpose, the value of this purpose must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political purpose, the purpose must be renounced and peace must follow." In anticipation of the arguments you are no doubt receiving which urge you to end the current mismatch by expanding the military effort in order to enable it to attain the current political objectives, I again offer Clausewitz' commentary: "Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction. Such an interaction could lead to a maximum effort if a maximum effort could be defined. But in that case all proportion between action and political demands would be lost: means would cease to be commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise."

I sincerely and urgently believe that it is time for a new strategy. It is time to regain the strategic initiative. In my view, it is time for the United States and NATO to initiate a call for a verifiable cease-fire -- including a bombing halt, an exchange of prisoners of war, a continuing reduction in Serbian military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo and the convening of an international conference to produce a durable and humane resolution to the current crisis in the Balkans. To me, such an approach would bring our political objectives and military means more in line with each other, and would free us up to concentrate on our real problem -- the refugees. Kosovo is now a wasteland. It is where citizens of Kosovo used to be. The people that I voted to protect with air strikes and missile attacks are no longer there. They are in the countries surrounding Kosovo or are on the roads of Kosovo, looking for safety and shelter.

Mr. President, I supported you, NATO and General Clark with your requests for authority from Congress for air strikes and missile attacks. Like you, I believed the worst we could have done in the face of the atrocities in Kosovo would have been to do nothing.

But military air and missile strikes are not a military strategy. They are punishment. They are not capable of achieving what real military action is designed to accomplish — an outright defeat of the enemy and enemy forces. As you consider future steps, do not get drawn into a wider military conflict in Yugoslavia. Do not slip into a ground war there.

In my opinion, however, this is where you, NATO and General Clark are headed. The buildup of helicopter air assault battalions in Albania along the border facing off against a corresponding buildup of Serbian troops, tanks and armored personnel carriers on the other side of the border in Kosovo has committed us to a ground war. I must reiterate that I cannot support that effort. I vehemently oppose it.

If there is anything I know about from my experience of a year of war in Vietnam thirty-one years ago, it is helicopter air assault warfare. I was wounded thirty-one years ago on the largest helicopter air assault of the Vietnam War — the relief of the siege at Khe Sahn in 1968. Five thousand Marines were under siege just below the DMZ. North Vietnamese unexpectedly attacked across the border and isolated a large contingent of U.S. ground forces, necessitating a huge relief effort on the part of the U.S. military. As NATO builds up a force of five thousand troops just inside the Albanian border from Kosovo to insert Apache helicopter attack capability, the lives of thousands of Americans are needlessly being endangered in an effort which, in my view, cannot achieve our objectives.

Additionally, Apache helicopters — like my helicopter outfit — are designed to operate in conjunction with ground forces. Why? Because they are extremely vulnerable to ground fire. We lost two helicopters in Somalia by ground fire. We lost ten thousand helicopters in Vietnam. What do we expect in Kosovo up against Serbian tanks and troops dug in with hand-held heat-seeking missiles protected by terrain that is more severe than Afghanistan? The Russians lost a lot of helicopters in Afghanistan to hand-held heat-seeking missiles which were provided by us to the guerillas. The Apache helicopter creates a strong heat imprint against the sky when it fires one of its missiles. Incidentally, the way the missile firing is supposed to take place is that a spotter on the ground banks a laser beam off the target and it is picked up by the chopper. The chopper then fires the missile without seeing the target. However, with no spotter on the ground the chopper has to expose itself to the target in order to fire. Additionally, with night vision goggles on, the pilot cannot see wires strung across mountain passes. The only way in and out of targets in Kosovo is through those mountain passes. The helicopters are especially vulnerable on the way back from the target because they have already been discovered.

Mr. President, I urge you and NATO not to authorize the use of Apache attack helicopters against dug in troops and tanks and mountainous terrain with no ground troops to assist. It would be folly and an unnecessary risk of numerous American lives. The cost is not worth the candle. In my opinion, it will backfire.

Mr. President, it is time to exit from the circumstances and location that started this century on its course to war, "some damn thing in the Balkans." We now have a situation from which we must extricate ourselves. This country and the Congress will not stand behind a wider war there once the inevitable American casualties ensue. It is time to initiate our exit strategy, stop the bombing, exchange prisoners of war, move immediately to an international conference to negotiate the political settlement and focus on the refugees. Milosevic may well end up in control of some portion of Kosovo, but he has made a wasteland. As the Roman historian Tacitus wrote almost two thousand years ago, "Where they make a desert, they call it peace." He has made a desert out of Kosovo. The people of Kosovo are now elsewhere. They are the people I supported the missile strikes to protect. That's the Kosovo worth our efforts. Let's end the military effort and concentrate on a political settlement and the relief effort for the refugees. Otherwise, we get deeper and deeper with more lives at risk, especially American, and we still end up with a situation where Albanians and Serbs do not live together in a secure, democratic environment. That is unacceptable to me.

You have an awesome responsibility here, and I know that there are no easy answers or simple solutions, but because of the depth of my feeling on the subject I wanted to share my views with you. I am proud to be your friend.

Most respectfully,



Max Cleland
United States Senator

MC:aek

O.S. I'm proud of you, Mr. President!

June 10, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN

SUBJECT: IEEPA/NEA Report on the FRY to Congress

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he submit the attached combined report to Congress required under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act. The report concerns the national emergencies with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that he recently renewed pursuant to the relevant section of the National Emergencies Act, including information on the total expenditures incurred by the U.S. government directly attributable to the exercise of the powers and authorities conferred by the declared emergency.

Concurrences by: Joseph Bouchard, Miles Lackey, Mary B.
DeRosa and Mike Hurley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Report to Congress
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and transmit to the Congress the enclosed letter and report.

Attachments

Tab A	Report to Congress
Tab B	Incoming Correspondence

Report to Congress on the National Emergencies
with Respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia & Montenegro) and Kosovo

On May 30, 1992, by Executive Order 12808, President Bush declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro, blocking all property and interests in property of those Governments. President Bush took additional measures to prohibit trade and other transactions with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (the "FRY (S&M)"), by Executive Orders 12810 and 12831, issued on June 5, 1992, and January 15, 1993, respectively.

On April 25, 1993, I issued Executive Order 12846, blocking the property and interests in property of all commercial, industrial, or public utility undertakings or entities organized or located in FRY (S&M), and prohibiting trade-related transactions by U.S. persons involving those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the Bosnian

Serb forces and the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia. On October 25, 1994, because of the actions and policies of the Bosnian Serbs, I expanded the scope of the national emergency by issuance of Executive Order 12934. On November 22, 1995, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution ("UNSCR") 1022, immediately and indefinitely suspending U.N. economic sanctions against the FRY (S&M). On October 1, 1996, the United Nations passed UNSCR 1074, terminating U.N. sanctions against the FRY (S&M) and the Bosnian Serbs in light of the elections that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina on September 14, 1996. Both UNSCR 1022 and UNSCR 1074, however, provided that funds and assets previously blocked pursuant to sanctions against the FRY (S&M) that are subject to claims and encumbrances, or that are the property of persons deemed insolvent, shall remain blocked until "released in accordance with applicable law." This provision was implemented in the United States on December 27, 1995, by Presidential Determination No. 96-7, which directed the Secretary of the Treasury to suspend the application of sanctions on the FRY (S&M) and to continue to block property previously blocked.

On June 9, 1998, by Executive Order 13088, I declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary

threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the Republic of Serbia with respect to Kosovo. Executive Order 13088, with certain exceptions, blocked all property and interests in property of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro within the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons, and prohibited all new investment in the territory of the Republic of Serbia by U.S. persons, and the approval or other facilitation by U.S. persons of other persons' new investment in the territory of the Republic of Serbia.

On April 30, 1999, I took additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13088 by issuing Executive Order 13121 (64 FR 24021, May 5, 1999). Executive Order 13121 blocks all property and interests in property of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro within the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons. The Order also revoked section 2 of Executive Order 13088, which had permitted U.S. persons to engage in certain financial transactions within

the territory of the FRY (S&M). Executive Order 13121 added a new section 2 to Executive Order 13088, which prohibits trade transactions involving the FRY (S&M). These orders now prohibit (1) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a U.S. person, wherever located, to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M), the Government of the Republic of Serbia, or the Government of the Republic of Montenegro, of any goods (including petroleum and petroleum products), software, technology (including technical data), or services; (2) the importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, software, technology (including technical data), or services from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M) or owned or controlled by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M), the Government of the Republic of Serbia, or the Government of the Republic of Montenegro; and (3) any transaction or dealing by a U.S. person, wherever located, in goods, software, technology (including technical data), or services, regardless of country of origin, for exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to, or exportation from or by, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M) or the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M), the Government of the

Republic of Serbia, or the Government of the Republic of Montenegro. This prohibition includes, without limitation, purchase, sale, transport, swap, or brokerage transactions in such items, and approving, financing, insuring, facilitating, or guaranteeing any such transactions. Any transaction by a U.S. person that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions of the Order, and any conspiracy formed to violate the prohibitions of the Order, are prohibited.

Executive Order 13121 directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, in implementation of the Order, to (1) give special consideration to the circumstances of the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and persons located in and organized under the laws of the Republic of Montenegro; (2) give special consideration to the humanitarian needs of refugees from Kosovo and other civilians within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M); and (3) authorize commercial sales of agricultural commodities and products, medicine, and medical equipment for civilian end use in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M) under appropriate safeguards to prevent diversion to military, paramilitary, or political use by the Government of Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M), the Government of the Republic of Serbia, or the Government of the Republic of Montenegro. The Order became effective at 12:01 a.m., EDT, May 1, 1999.

The present report is submitted pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) and 1703(c) and, with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12808, covers the period from November 30, 1998 through May 29, 1999, and with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13088, covers the period from December 9, 1998 through June 8, 1999. It discusses Administration actions and expenses directly related to the exercise of powers and authorities conferred by the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 12808 as modified by Executive Order 12810, Executive Order 12831, Executive Order 12846, and Executive Order 12934, and the declaration of national emergency in Executive Order 13088, as amended by Executive Order 13121.

1. The declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 12808 on May 30, 1992, and the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 13088 on June 9, 1998, were made pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code. The additional sanctions set forth in related Executive orders were imposed pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the statutes cited above, section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. App. 1514), and section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287c).

2. The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury, implemented the sanctions imposed under the foregoing statutes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M) and Bosnian Serb-Controlled Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 585 (the "Regulations") and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Kosovo Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 586 (the "Kosovo Sanctions Regulations") (63 Fed. Reg. 54575, October 13, 1998).

On May 5, 1999, OFAC issued a Notice revoking provisions of the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations that were inconsistent with the additional sanctions imposed in Executive Order 13121. By the Notice of May 5, 1999, OFAC also issued General License No. 2

authorizing trade transactions involving the Republic of Montenegro that would otherwise be prohibited by Executive Order 13121. These include (1) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a U.S. person, wherever located, destined for end-use in the Republic of Montenegro (except by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S&M) or the Government of the Republic of Serbia) or the Government of the Republic of Montenegro, of any goods (including petroleum and petroleum products), software, technology (including technical data), or services; (2) the importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, software, technology (including technical data), or services originating in the Republic of Montenegro or owned or controlled by the Government of the Republic of Montenegro; and (3) any transaction or dealing by a U.S. person, wherever located, in goods, software, technology (including technical data), or services, regardless of country of origin, for exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to, or exportation from or by, the Republic of Montenegro or the Government of the Republic of Montenegro. A copy of the Notice is attached to this report.

On May 20, 1999, OFAC issued General License No. 3, authorizing all transactions ordinarily incident to the

exportation of goods (including petroleum and petroleum products), software, or technology (including technical data) from the United States or reexportation of U.S.-origin goods, software, or technology from a foreign country to any person in the FRY (S&M), to the Government of the FRY (S&M), to the Government of the Republic of Serbia, provided that the following terms and conditions are met: (1) the exportation or reexportation is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce under the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) and IEEPA; (2) the exportation or reexportation is financed by a financial institution in a third country that is neither a U.S. person nor a person whose property is blocked pursuant to the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations, or by cash payment in advance, or by open account financing not to exceed 90 days net. General License No. 3 also provides that financial institutions that are U.S. persons, prior to confirming or advising, or accepting or paying drafts draft under, or reimbursing themselves for payment made under, any letter of credit, or making any other payment or transfer of credit in connection with any exportation or reexportation licensed pursuant to this general license, or engaging in any other transactions authorized in this general license shall satisfy themselves that: (1) each such transaction is incident to a bona fide exportation or

reexportation and is customary in the normal course of business, and that the value of such exportation or reexportation reasonably corresponds to the sums of money involved in financing such transaction; and (2) the exportation or reexportation and any financing therefor are made pursuant to all the terms and conditions of this general license.

General License No. 3 does not authorize: (1) the financing of any transaction from a blocked account; (2) any transaction by a financial institution in the United States or by any U.S. person, wherever located, under, or with respect to an exportation or reexportation financed by, a letter of credit issued by a person whose property is blocked pursuant to the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations; (3) any transaction by a U.S. person related to the reexportation of non-U.S.-origin goods, software, or technology from a foreign country to any person in the FRY (S&M) or to the Government of the FRY (S&M) or to the Government of the Republic of Serbia; or (4) any transaction by a U.S. person related to the sale or supply within the same foreign country of goods, software, or technology to the Government of the FRY (S&M) or to the Government of the Republic of Serbia, except as incidental to an exportation or reexportation authorized pursuant to paragraph (a) of this general license; or (5) the opening or operation by any U.S.

person of a correspondent account for a financial institution whose property is blocked pursuant to the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations.

For the purposes of General License No. 3, the terms "foreign country" and "third country" include the Republic of Montenegro. A copy of General License No. 3 is attached to this report.

3. Over the past two and a half years, the Departments of State and the Treasury have worked closely with European Union member states and other U.N. member nations to implement the provisions of UNSCR 1022 and UNSCR 1074. In the United States, retention of blocking authority pursuant to the extension of a national emergency provides a framework for administration of an orderly claims settlement. This accords with past policy and practice with respect to the suspension of sanctions regimes.

4. During this reporting period, OFAC issued five specific licenses pursuant to the Regulations authorizing transactions pertaining to the FRY (S&M) or property in which it has an interest. In addition, OFAC issued a total of 65 specific licenses pursuant to the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations. Specific licenses were issued (1) to unblock wire transfers

involving generally small amounts of individuals' purely personal funds; (2) to authorize receipt of payment for legal services; (3) to authorize certain transactions relating to air safety policy; and (4) to authorize certain administrative transactions by other U.S. government agencies.

During the past six months, OFAC has continued to oversee the maintenance of FRY (S&M) accounts blocked pursuant to 31 CFR Part 585, and records with respect to: (1) liquidated tangible assets and personalty of the fifteen blocked U.S. subsidiaries of entities organized in the FRY (S&M); (2) the blocked personalty, files, and records of the two Serbian banking institutions in New York previously placed in secure storage; and (3) remaining blocked FRY (S&M) tangible property, including real estate. Pursuant to the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 586, OFAC blocked 341 transactions totaling nearly \$5 million during this reporting period. Most of the blockings were of funds transfers originating from, or destined for, Serbian banks.

D.C. Precision, Inc. v. United States, et al., 97 Civ. 9123 CRLC, was filed in the Southern District of New York on

December 10, 1997, alleging that the Government had improperly blocked D.C. Precision's funds held at one of the closed Serbian banking agencies in New York. This case is still pending.

5. OFAC has continued to work closely with the U.S. Customs Service and other cooperating agencies to investigate alleged violations of the sanctions imposed pursuant to Executive Order 12808, as modified, and Executive Order 13088, as amended. On April 15, 1999, a U.S. citizen was sentenced in the Southern District of Florida to six months in prison and ordered to pay a \$6,000 criminal fine as the result of a guilty plea entered on October 23, 1998. The Miami, Florida, businessman entered a guilty plea for himself and his corporation to one count of violating IEEPA for the export of aircraft parts to Serbia. The U.S. citizen, his corporation, and two nationals of the FRY (S&M) were named in a 13-count indictment on February 13, 1997, charging them with conspiracy to purchase three Cessna propeller aircraft, a Cessna jet aircraft, and various aircraft parts in the United States and export them to the FRY (S&M) in violation of U.S. sanctions and the Regulations. Timely interdiction action prevented the export of the aircraft from the United States. The two foreign nationals are fugitives residing outside the United States.

Since my last report, OFAC has collected three civil monetary penalties totaling more than \$54,000 for violations of the sanctions. These violations involved prohibited exports of goods and services, contract dealings, and payments to the Government of the FRY (S&M), persons in the FRY (S&M), or to blocked entities owned or controlled by the Government of the FRY (S&M). The violators included one U.S. financial institution, one company, and one individual. Additional 14 cases are undergoing penalty action for violation of the Regulations, and additional 24 cases are undergoing penalty action for violation of the Kosovo Sanctions Regulations.

6. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the six-month period from November 30, 1998, through May 29, 1999, and the six-month period from December 9, 1998, through June 8, 1999, that are directly attributable to the declaration of the national emergencies in Executive Orders 12808 and 13088 are estimated at approximately \$470,000, most of which represents wage and salary costs for Federal personnel. Personnel costs were largely centered in the Department of the Treasury (particularly in OFAC and its Chief Counsel's Office, and the U.S. Customs Service), the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Department of Commerce.

7. The resolution of the crisis and conflict in the former Yugoslavia that has resulted from the actions and policies of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and of the Bosnian Serb forces and the authorities in the territory that they controlled, will not be complete until such time as the Peace Agreement is implemented and the terms of UNSCR 1022 have been met. Therefore, on May 27, 1999, I continued for another year the national emergency declared on May 30, 1992, as expanded in scope on October 25, 1994, and will continue to enforce the measures adopted pursuant thereto.

The declaration of the national emergency with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Serbia contained in Executive Order No. 13088 was made in reaction to the unacceptable actions and policies of the Belgrade authorities in Kosovo, and continues to apply. The current situation in Kosovo is fragile and, as yet, unresolved. It is of particular importance that developments in Kosovo should not disrupt progress in implementing the Dayton peace agreement. This threat to the peace of the region constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States.

With this in mind and in support of UNSCR 1099 and UNSCR 1203, on May 27, 1999, I continued for another year the national emergency declared on June 9, 1998, and will continue to enforce the measures adopted pursuant thereto. Therefore, I shall continue to exercise the powers at my disposal with respect to the measures against the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Government of the Republic of Serbia, and the Government of the Republic of Montenegro, as well as against the Bosnian Serb forces, civil authorities, and entities, as long as these measures are appropriate, and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).

THE WHITE HOUSE



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

June 8, 1999

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, you are required every six months to submit a report to the Congress concerning the Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12808 on May 30, 1992, and concerning the Kosovo emergency declared in Executive Order No. 13088 on June 9, 1998.

In addition, under the National Emergencies Act, you are required, during each six-month interval of a declared national emergency, to report to the Congress the total expenditures incurred by the United States Government. These expenditures must be directly attributable to the exercise of the powers and authorities conferred by the declared emergency.

Enclosed is a proposed combined report covering events under the Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Kosovo emergency declarations for the latest six-month periods. The proposed report indicates that it is a combined report submitted pursuant to each of the foregoing statutes. Copies of the prior reports on the Yugoslavia and Kosovo emergencies are enclosed for reference.

I recommend that you sign and transmit the proposed report to the Congress. The report has been reviewed and approved by the Department of State.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Robert E. Rubin".

Robert E. Rubin

Enclosures