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Folder Title:

Chrons for June 1999 Part I [1]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo, July 2, 1999. [Record ID: 9904990] (1 page)	06/30/1999	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting [partial] (1 page)	06/18/1999	P3/b(3)
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, June 4, 1999. [Record ID: 9904355] [partial] (1 page)	06/11/1999	P3/b(3)
004. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, June 15, 1999. [Record ID: 9904605] [partial] (1 page)	06/15/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6299

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904990
RECEIVED: 29 JUN 99 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 30 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
AGENDA

DC

fl

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 JUL DC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 05 JUL 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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EXECSEC
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NSC CHRON
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SCHULTE

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 4/15/2024

208-0794-F-3

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DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904990

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99063016 FOR DECISION
X 99063023 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99063023 SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990630 FUERTH, L
002 990630 KENNEY, K
002 990630 COMSTOCK, N
002 990630 CRIBBS, M
002 990630 TOWNSEND, F
002 990630 BASKETTE, A
002 990630 KYLE, R
002 990630 RICCHETTI, S
002 990630 WOLFE, T
002 990630 BRAINARD, L
002 990630 CONROY, R
002 990630 MANNING, M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

6/30

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4950
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>h</i> JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 6/30</u>	<u>see [signature] p.15</u>
SARGEANT	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>82</u>	<u>[signature]</u>	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

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1999 JUN 30 10 13 AM '99

COMMENTS:

DC on Kosovo 7/2

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4990

MEMORANDUM FOR

June 30, 1999

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND
Counsel for Intelligence
Policy
Department of Justice

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. STEVE RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo - July 2,
1999 ~~let~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo on July 2,
1999, from 9:30 to 11:00 a.m., in the Situation Room of the
White House. An agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~let~~


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: June 30, 2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 4/5/2024
2008-0094-F.3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo, July 2, 1999. [Record ID: 9904990] (1 page)	06/30/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6299

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE:

 X

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ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC West Wing Desk (202) 456-9425 WH Situation Room
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 JUL DC MTG ON KOSOVO
NSC LOG # 4990

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>Justice</u>	<u>Counsel for Intel Policy</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Staff Asst to the Rep</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>AID</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 4/15/2024

2008-0994-E-3

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 4990

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 JUL DC MTG ON KOSOVO PAGES: 3
(w/
Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

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2028-0994-F-3

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9904990
DATE 30 JUN 99

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 JUL DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX +1</u>
MR. NEAL COMSTOCK ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
COL MARIA I. CRIBBS ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW ROOM 3305, MAIN JUSTICE WASHINGTON, DC DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9904990
DATE 30 JUN 99

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 JUL DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOP OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	_____
RICCHETTI, S	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	_____
MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	_____
MS LAEL BRAINARD 2ND FLOOR WEST WING NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	_____
MS. RYAN CONROY 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE ROOM 6.08 WASHINGTON, DC 20523-6801 AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	_____
COL. MICHELLE MANNING SECRETARY JOINT STAFF ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	_____

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOP

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4990

June 30, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT:

Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo -- July 2, 1999

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to the agencies forwarding the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo on July 2, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *GS*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: June 30, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *W* NARA, Date *4/15/2024*
2008-0094-F.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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002. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting [partial] (1 page)	06/18/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
June 18, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

DAVID ADAMS
Agency for International
Development

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

JAMIE METZL
Department of State

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LEN HAWLEY
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

NANCY LEE
Department of the Treasury


BRUCE WRIGHT
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MAC MCATAMNEY
Department of Justice

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Monday, June 21, 1999, from 3:30 to 5:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.

Please call in your attendees date of birth and social security number by NLT noon, June 21 to Mary Quinn at 202-456-9101.


Matthew Vaccaro
Director for Multilateral and
Humanitarian Affairs

Attachment

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING
June 21, 1999

- I. Legal Authority of UNMIK. State Paper
- II. Police and Justice Update. State Verbal Update
- III. CIMIC Update (at KFOR HQ and US Sector). JCS
- IV. Economic Structures for Kosovo. . State/NEC Verbal Update
- V. Sanctions Next Steps. State Action List
- VI. U.S. Diplomatic Presence in Kosovo. State Paper on
Way Ahead
- VII. Protecting Minorities in Kosovo. JCS/State Paper
- VIII. Humanitarian Update. NSC Verbal Update

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3646
REDO

June 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*
SUBJECT: Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Father Raymond Helmick on Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER
SUBJECT: Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Father Raymond Helmick.

Background

You received a letter from Father Raymond Helmick, a member of Jesse Jackson's delegation to Belgrade, forwarding some correspondence he sent to Mssrs. Milosevic and Karic. He suggests that the KLA be allowed to play a constructive role in post-conflict Kosovo.

Your reply thanks Father Helmick for his useful advice during the course of the air campaign. You touch on NATO's policy regarding the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo. You explain that you do not see KLA members and that NATO envisions an important political role for them in creating a Kosovo at peace with itself.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Father Helmick:

Thank you for your letter on your return from Belgrade and the correspondence with Mr. Karic and others that you were kind enough to forward. I know you sent it to Sandy Berger as well, and we each closely examined it.

You have America's gratitude for your participation in Reverend Jackson's delegation to Belgrade and your contribution to the release of the three American servicemen held against their will. You and the others in Jesse's group rendered an inestimable service to our country.

Now we are entering a new phase in Kosovo, bringing short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. With the rapid entry of the international security force into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and under self-government is underway.

I especially appreciated your thoughtful comments on American attitudes toward the KLA. As you point out in your letter, the KLA presents a delicate problem. You are right to point out that marginalizing a group and excluding it from a peace process only delays a reckoning with their interests. For that reason, one of General Mike Jackson's first priorities after entering Kosovo has been to conclude an agreement with the KLA to make them part of the settlement.

As of this writing, that agreement has not been concluded, but I am optimistic. I am glad to see that we share the same vision for the basic contours the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo. Like you, I firmly believe that we should hold the KLA to its Rambouillet commitment to demilitarize; now that KFOR is providing security to the province and no Serb forces will remain, the KLA has every incentive to do so completely. But I also share your view that KLA members should not be treated as terrorists and that we should not rebuff their efforts to play a

role in post-conflict Kosovo. It is also likely that NATO military commanders will invite some of them to participate in local policing. On the political plane, NATO and American diplomats continue to take them seriously as negotiating partners and as important contributors of a democratic peace.

In the long term, the United States will be a driving force in the international community's effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the European Union on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. It is our hope that as part of this process the KLA will work with us towards achieving our goal of an autonomous, self-governed, and multiethnic province within the FRY.

Thank you again for your contributions to the peace and for your constructive questions and suggestions.

Sincerely,

The Reverend Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167-3802



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02467-3802

4039

May 22, 1999

President William Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton,

Christ's Peace!

After returning with the Jesse Jackson delegation from Belgrade, I wrote back to our hosts there, President Milosevic and Mr. Bogoljub Karic, thanking them for the return of the prisoners and analyzing what I had seen as miscomprehension, on their part, of the objectives behind American policy. I sent a copy of all that, by FAX, to Mr. Berger.

By yesterday I had also finished a report of our visit for the Holy See, of which I FAXed copies to Cardinal Sodano and to Fr. Kolvenbach, the General Superior of my Jesuit order. I enclose a copy of that for you, as the Holy See is another of the diplomatic parties active in this matter.

I am left with one matter left over, on which I felt I needed to write to you. That is **our American attitudes toward the KLA**. Those run a gamut from support of them as Freedom Fighters, which means recruitment, funding and armaments, to classification of them as practically terrorists. I listened carefully as Mr. Berger spoke, before we left, of U.S. policy giving no support either to Kosovo independence or to the arming of the KLA. He was quite sure, however, that if the refugees were not brought back to Kosovo, the KLA would be armed, whether we liked it or not, and would be a dangerous element for the destabilization of the region. When we saw you on our return, you saw as one of the uses of a NATO-core international force in Kosovo that it would bring the right Kosovars back and keep the really dangerous KLA elements out.

h All this needs to be thought through carefully. I think it an error to classify the KLA as "terrorist group." That becomes self-fulfilling prophecy, and we will rue it if we end up having to fight them. They will have many friends right here at home.

I brought back with me from Belgrade a lot of glossy English-language literature full of that "terrorist" language. Serbs of course understand the KLA as their enemy, as Israelis did the PLO, as the British did the IRA (and Sinn Fein), as the Turks do the PKK (and HADEP), as Rhodesians did ZANU and ZAPU, as South Africans did the ANC. Without doubt, the KLA has committed atrocities on Kosovan Serbs, and has murdered its own people who dissented from it. But these are the actions of embattled defenders of a victim people, not of oppressors. Their acts of terrorism are expressions of a people's desperation. That is an aspect that has been ignored in the other cases I refer to, always to our cost or the cost of those who defined their enemies only in this way.

President Clinton, May 22, '99 - 2

The KLA is new, despite a lineage that goes back a century and more to conspiratorial separatist groups. Up to the time, early last year, when Yugoslav authorities reacted with massive violence against a village in response to a relatively minor act of guerrilla violence, the KLA was small, of little political importance compared to Ibrahim Rugova's non-violent movement. Yugoslav action was itself responsible for the KLA's growth. In this it resembled the way the moribund IRA was brought back to life in reaction to Unionist and British actions in the early 1970s. The KLA is still not a recognizably unified force with acknowledged leadership.

But the KLA is still not a force to which the U.S. can respond with any degree of trust or cooperation, however much some of our congress and media may want to arm and assist them as "our" ground troops. Their objective is independence, which is truly incompatible with American or European interests. And in victory, they would be a mortal danger to the small (10%) Serb population of Kosovo, which it will be our responsibility to protect. Ethnic cleansing all over again.

The situation bears comparison to that of the Iraqi Kurds. Their two main parties, KDP and PUK, agreed in the late '80s that a non-separatist policy of autonomy within a democratic Iraq was best for them. Even as they have come to fight each other since 1994, they have remained faithful to this resolve. Consequently, when the U.S. and international community decided, since 1991, to provide them protection and air cover, we could leave their Pesh Merga militias in possession of the ground, reasonably confident that they would not dismember Iraq. You have seen something of my own long-term arguments with the PKK in Turkey, urging them also to renounce separatism, and my position that they have effectively been open to that, declaring it their policy since early 1993, and should be dealt with on that basis.

With the KLA, that moderation is lacking. They cannot be trusted not to produce regional havoc if they come to power. Consequently, when the Kosovars are brought back, as we all hope, we need to disarm the KLA, and simultaneously find a way to employ them that respects their dignity as defenders of their people during this crisis.

I see evidence enough that your administration understands the importance of NATO in carrying out that objective. NATO is clearly the only force to which the KLA would even consider handing over its arms. I worry that we may alienate the KLA by treating them as real or potential enemies, even terrorists. Even your own formula, of keeping the most dangerous elements from returning, is very suspect to my way of thinking. We need all of them back in Kosovo, satisfied that the NATO-core international force is making their people safe. Only on that basis can we expect to restore a working autonomy regime within the context of Serbia and Yugoslavia. We could otherwise find ourselves at war with a disillusioned KLA, to our great political damage. It is very much in our interest, and that of peace in Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia, to fine-tune our policy in this regard.


President Clinton, May 22, '99 - 3

I hope you will understand the point of my concern on this question. My own experience for several decades now has been with a great number of conflicts in which insurgent forces have set themselves up against governments. I have become very wary of the self-fulfilling prophecies by which we or others define such groups as our enemies and end up having to fight them down to some sort of finish. I have adopted it as normal expectation that the people I need to talk to are those who are at the root of whatever trouble I seek to confront, and that I need to talk to them with respect. It is this kind of thinking that brought all of us in the Jackson delegation to Belgrade and Milosevic, and led me afterwards to write to Mr. Karic and President Milosevic as I did.

When we of the Jackson delegation met you after our return, we recommended that you make a telephone call to President Milosevic. This was on the model of the phone call Ronald Reagan had made to President Asad of Syria back in 1984, when Jesse Jackson first brought an American prisoner, airman Goodman, back from captivity. It may be late for that phone call now, but it is in this spirit that we recommended it. And there are surely other ways of accomplishing the same effect.

With all best wishes,

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sm*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative Patrick Toomey regarding Kosovo.

Concurrences by: Mark Tavlarides *Sm*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Response

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to Representative Patrick Toomey on Kosovo.

Background

You received a letter from Representative Patrick Toomey during the course of the air campaign questioning the short and long-term aspects of NATO's policy. President Milosevic's acceptance of NATO conditions and the end of the air strikes have rendered his questions moot.

In the reply you explain the short and long-term goals you have adopted for the region and conclude by asking for his support in these ventures.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Toomey:

Thank you for your letter regarding our Government's strategy in the Balkans. I deeply appreciated your tough questions about the conflict. Now that the bombardment has ended, let me address the implications of NATO's success for our long-term involvement in the region.

Our goal is to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal policies of repression.

We will also be a driving force in the international community's long-term effort to promote democracy and stability in the region. We are working closely with the EU on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part, in order to guarantee a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live there.

The NATO action in Kosovo beat back the greatest remaining outpost of violent, aggressive nationalism in Europe, and opened the way to a Europe that can be, for the first time in its history, undivided, democratic and at peace. We have also reminded the world that when our values and our interests are threatened, Americans will stand up to defend them.

I look forward to your support as we work to bring a brighter future to the people of southeastern Europe.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Pat Toomey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

PATRICK J. TOOMEY 1240
15TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
SOCIAL SECURITY TASK FORCE

COMMITTEE ON BANKING
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEES:
CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES AND
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY POLICY

COMMITTEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
TAX, FINANCE, AND EXPORTS
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND OVERSIGHT



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

April 26, 1999

3330

302 713
WASHINGTON OFFICE:
511 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3815
(202) 225-6411
FAX: (202) 226-0778

DISTRICT OFFICE:
2020 HAMILTON STREET
ALLENTOWN, PA 18104
(610) 439-8861
FAX: (610) 439-1918

E-Mail: rep.toomey.pa15@mail.house.gov
Internet: http://www.house.gov/toomey/

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

APR 29 1999

Dear Mr. President:

As NATO continues its fourth week of military strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I am writing to share my concerns regarding the United States long-term strategy and policies in the Balkans and the use of U.S. Armed Forces in the region.

Mr. President, many important questions remain unanswered about Operation Allied Force and the long-term policy of the United States in the Balkan region. As I meet with constituents across my district, they continue to question the U.S. interest in the region and the strategy currently being employed.

As this operation progresses, I am concerned that fundamental questions regarding American involvement have yet to be put to rest. I am, therefore, respectfully submitting the following questions for your response.

- 1) The Rambouillet agreement called for autonomy for the Kosovars. Is the implementation of the Rambouillet agreement still the goal? Is autonomy even an option at this point?
- ✓ 2) Operation Allied Force is a combined operation. What is your strategy for keeping NATO unified behind the operation? What are the contingency plans should one or more NATO members withdraw its support for the operation?
- [3) Given the numerous conflicts involving ethnic minority populations in the Balkan states, or for that matter, around the world, what precedent does intervention in Kosovo set for United States involvement in civil conflicts generally?
- 4) How would the introduction of ground forces affect our relations with other nations, in particular, Russia?

- 5) What is the exit strategy? At what point can we declare victory and how do we extricate the troops from the Balkans?
- 6) If Milosevic weakens and the Kosovo Liberation Army becomes more powerful, as your Administration has stated it believes will happen, what is your Administration's strategy for ensuring that the KLA will disarm and accept a balance of power within the region?
- 7) Our current national security policy calls for the U.S. to be able to fight two major regional conflicts virtually simultaneously. How does intervention in Kosovo affect the ability of the United States to fight two wars?
- 8) Past history has shown that public support is essential for the successful prosecution of a military strategy, and it appears that our hopes of a quick campaign will not be realized. What is your strategy for building and maintaining public support for military operations that may last an extended period of time?

Mr. President, I am hopeful that your answers will better prepare me to allay the concerns of my constituents over Operation Allied Force. I look forward to your timely response.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Pat Toomey". The signature is stylized, with a large, sweeping "P" and a cursive "Toomey".

Patrick J. Toomey
Member of Congress

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903330
RECEIVED: 03 MAY 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM:  DOOMEY, PATRICK

DOC DATE: 26 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 302713

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS RE AMER INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 14 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
LACKEY
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4323

June 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *ks*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*
SUBJECT: Letter from Enron Executive

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Government Relations, wrote the President to request that he invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Terence Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with the President and
President Tudjman of Croatia

Purpose

Respond to letter from Mr. Terence Thorn.

Background

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Relations, wrote to request that you invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting. He also suggests you visit Croatia on your mid-June trip to Europe to thank President Tudjman for his support of our Kosovo efforts.

Your response thanks Mr. Thorn for his request and advises him that you have asked your NSC staff and the State Department to review the proposal for a meeting with Tudjman.

In fact, State continues to recommend against a Tudjman meeting with you. We agree with State's position. While Croatia has been helpful with our effort in Kosovo, Zagreb continues to meddle in Bosnian Croat politics in the Bosnian Federation and falls short in a number of Dayton implementation areas, among them, refugee returns, and democratization.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mr. Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia. Clearly, projects such as these are important and can help bind Croatia to the West.

As you point out, Croatia has been helpful to NATO's efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Secretaries Cohen and Albright have expressed our appreciation in their meetings with Croatian Ministers Miljavac and Granic.

Unfortunately, the schedule for my trip to the G-8 Summit followed by a visit to Slovenia did not allow for a meeting in Zagreb. I have asked the State Department and my National Security Council Staff to consider whether a meeting with President Tudjman would be advisable given our policy objectives. The State Department will be in further contact with you on that matter.

I enjoyed speaking to you at the luncheon in Houston. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

306290



Enron International
333 Clay, Suite 1800
Houston, TX 77002-7361
(713) 646-6100
Fax (713) 646-6565

May 20, 1999

Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Attn: Inside White House Mail

Dear Mr. President:


It was a pleasure to sit next to you at the recent luncheon in Houston. Despite the huge burden of your office in these times of international conflict I was pleased that you and I were able to discuss the importance of energy development that we plan to undertake in Croatia.

My colleagues and I are gratified President Tudjman has personally directed that Enron develop a natural gas power facility in Croatia despite the considerable criticism of others in his government. This would be the first significant generating plant developed by an American company in the region which is significant both economically and politically.

Several of us have met personally with President Tudjman during this process. He has repeatedly expressed admiration for you and a desire to meet with you in Washington. During our conversation in Houston you told me Croatia had started down the same path as Yugoslavia, but had reversed itself to the benefit of the country and the region. It would seem both the United States and Croatia have a common goal in the region. I believe the visit would strengthen a developing political relationship.

I sent you a request by letter on April 20 but have received no response to date. Therefore, our meeting in Houston was fortuitous in allowing me to personally raise our interest in having you invite President Tudjman to the White House. A copy of my earlier letter is attached for your review and decision.

It was as always a delight to see you again. You are always welcome in Houston.

Sincerely,


cc: Ambassador Zuzul
Joseph Sutton

Terrence H. Thorne

Natural gas. Electricity. Endless possibilities.

MAY 21 1999

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4323

June 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *hs*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *mt*
SUBJECT: Letter from Enron Executive

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Government Relations, wrote the President several times to request that he invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting. It took some time to reply to this series of letters because of volume and because an interagency process was necessary to develop the proposed coordinated response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Terence Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with the President and
President Tudjman of Croatia

Purpose

Respond to letter from Mr. Terence Thorn.

Background

Mr. Terence Thorn, Enron Vice President for International Relations, wrote to request that you invite Croatian President Tudjman to Washington for a meeting. He also suggests you visit Croatia on your mid-June trip to Europe to thank President Tudjman for his support of our Kosovo efforts.

Your response thanks Mr. Thorn for his request and advises him that you have asked your NSC staff and the State Department to review the proposal for a meeting with Tudjman. In fact, State continues to recommend against a Tudjman meeting with you. We agree with State's position. While Croatia has been helpful with our effort in Kosovo, Zagreb continues to meddle in Bosnian Croat politics in the Bosnian Federation and falls short in a number of Dayton implementation areas, among them, refugee returns, and democratization. We will forward your response to Colleen Hyland at State, after which she will formally decline a later meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mr. Thorn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Thorn:

Thank you for your letters describing Enron's negotiations to build a natural gas powered plant in Croatia. Clearly, projects such as these are important and can help bind Croatia to the West.

As you point out, Croatia has been helpful to NATO's efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Secretaries Cohen and Albright have expressed our appreciation in their meetings with Croatian Ministers Miljavac and Granic.

Unfortunately, the schedule for my trip to the G-8 Summit followed by a visit to Slovenia did not allow for a meeting in Zagreb. I have asked the State Department and my National Security Council Staff to consider whether a meeting with President Tudjman would be in keeping with our policy objectives. The State Department will be in further contact with you on that matter.

I enjoyed speaking to you at the luncheon in Houston. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Terence H. Thorn
Enron International
P.O. Box 1188
Houston, Texas 77251-1188

306290

Scheduling
ENRON

Enron International
333 Clay, Suite 1800
Houston, TX 77002-7361
(713) 646-6100
Fax (713) 646-6565

May 20, 1999

Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Attn: Inside White House Mail

Dear Mr. President:

It was a pleasure to sit next to you at the recent luncheon in Houston. Despite the huge burden of your office in these times of international conflict I was pleased that you and I were able to discuss the importance of energy development that we plan to undertake in Croatia.


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I sent you a request by letter on April 20 but have received no response to date. Therefore, our meeting in Houston was fortuitous in allowing me to personally raise our interest in having you invite President Tudjman to the White House. A copy of my earlier letter is attached for your review and decision.

It was as always a delight to see you again. You are always welcome in Houston.

Sincerely,



cc: Ambassador Zuzul
Joseph Sutton

Natural gas. Electricity. Endless possibilities.

MAY 21 1999

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904323
RECEIVED: 07 JUN 99 13

TO: DAVIES

FROM: EMRICH, T

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 99
SOURCE REF: 798

KEYWORDS: CROATIA
SCHEDULING REFERRAL

ENERGY
AP

PERSONS: THORN, TERRENCE H
ZUZUL

SUTTON, JOSEPH
TUDJMAN, FRANJO

SUBJECT: SCHEDULING REFERRAL RE POTUS MTG W/ TUDJMAN FM ENRON

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR DAVIES

DUE DATE: 12 JUN 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9903069 9903461

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
CARAVELLI
SANDALOW
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BERGER
BLINKEN
ELKIND
HILLIARD
SAMORE
SCHWARTZ
WEISS
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3035
REDO

June 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *fs*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*
SUBJECT: Reply to Chet Crocker

Chet Crocker and Dick Solomon wrote during the air campaign on Crocker's Georgetown letterhead forwarding the conclusions of a U.S. Institute for Peace study group on Kosovo policy options. Among those participating in the study were Mort Abramowitz, Zbig Breziznski, Max Kampelman, Brent Scowcroft, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Stephen Solarz. The study concluded that nothing short of a ground troop deployment could achieve U.S. goals. In reply, you thank Ambassador Crocker for writing and praise NATO's success. You conclude by inviting the Ambassador's comment on further developments in the region.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Ambassador Crocker at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Reply to Ambassador Crocker
Tab II Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chet:

Thank you very much for your letter forwarding the U.S. Institute for Peace paper on Kosovo options, which I took the liberty of sharing with my staff. It proved useful as we thought through the difficult policy choices we faced as the Kosovo situation unfolded.

As you know, NATO chose to persist in the strategy of combining diplomacy with force in a fashion that eventually produced movement in Belgrade in line with every NATO condition. Though a major success, achieved without the ground invasion you thought necessary, there remains much more to accomplish to achieve our ultimate goal of returning the expelled to their homes and building a secure, multiethnic, and democratic Kosovo.

I entirely agree with you regarding the need for a sustained military and civilian presence in the province. At this writing, Serb pullout is almost complete and KFOR under General Jackson is continuing to deploy. The President has set no time limit on how long KFOR - including the 7,000 American members - will need to stay, precisely for the reasons you cite. The first step is to secure the area to end the humanitarian disaster and to begin a period of stabilization that can take root. The United Nations has begun planning and implementing a civilian administration for the province which will remain in place until no longer needed.

I know you will follow these initiatives closely as we move forward to make them work and I would appreciate any further advice you and your group would want to offer. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Chester A. Crocker
Research Professor of Diplomacy
Intercultural Center Room 113
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20057-0099



GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Chester A. Crocker
Research Professor of Diplomacy
Intercultural Center Room 813
School of Foreign Service
Washington DC 20057-0999

April 20, 1999

RETURN TO
APNCA

The Honorable Samuel Berger
National Security Advisor to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Sandy:

The U.S. Institute of Peace, for the past several years, has convened diverse experts and practitioners to consider critical issues within our mandate associated with Bosnia and the larger Balkans region in order to contribute to policy deliberations.

As a result of our deep concern about the current situation in Kosovo and its implications for the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy and alliance relationships in the region, we recently invited a small group of our colleagues with high level experience in national security management to the Institute to consider some of the options now available to us and how we might be helpful to the President at this time.

The attached paper represents a consensus of this particular group, that we strongly urge for your consideration and that we would very much like the President to see. The paper represents the view of the participants and others who have seen it speaking in their individual capacities (as the Institute of Peace itself does not take specific positions on matters of policy).

The members of the group and others who wish to associate themselves with the attached paper include, in addition to ourselves: Mort Abramowitz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Max Kampelman, Brent Scowcroft, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Stephen Solarz. We put this consensus forward in the most constructive and supportive way possible. We would be happy to meet with the President to discuss this further or to convene a larger group of our peers whom we believe also concur with the ideas presented in the paper.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Chet".

Chester Crocker

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dick".

Richard Solomon

gumet
Email: crockerc@gumet.georgetown.edu
Phone 202-687-5074 or 5763 Fax 202-687-2315

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2915

June 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sm*
SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Representative Rod Blagojevich wrote during the air strikes to suggest a revision of policy, including a partition of Kosovo to allow a diplomatic solution.

In your reply, you thank the Representative for his constructive advice during the course of the air campaign. You explain why partition is neither practically feasible nor theoretically consistent with your goal of healing differences in the region. You also mention the new policy with regard with Kosovo now that the air strikes have ended: in the short term, to provide security through participation in KFOR; in the long term, to bring democracy and stability to the region through the Southeast Europe Initiative. You conclude by asking for his support in these ventures.

Concurrence by: Mark Tavlarides *MT*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Letter
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Blagojevich:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo. I considered it seriously as the air campaign continued. Now that the bombardment has ended and we turn to building peace in the region, I am writing to explain why we continue to insist on the territorial integrity of Kosovo rather than the partition that you suggest.

Simply put, we do not believe a partition is practically feasible. I want to assure you that the President had the regional experts on his national security staff study this option closely months ago. The Serb cathedral and historic places you mention are not localized enough to permit the partition you recommend. Nor do demographic realities on the ground permit such a solution: the populations are too intermixed, and Albanian presence in the north too strong, to permit any exercise in line-drawing to work.

But a partition is not only practically impossible; it is also morally undesirable. We should reject the recent polarization of these ethnic groups, rather than confirm it by placing a national border between them. For this reason, we are insistent - as we were in Bosnia - that these peoples learn to live together in safety and prosperity. It is not an unthinkable outcome. As the President stated most recently in his remarks at Fort McNair, it is a mistake to oversimplify the history of the region. So-called "ancient ethnic hatreds" have not been endemic to the region; and the intense "cleansing" we have seen recently is in fact radically new. These peoples are not fated to eternal opposition; they can learn to live together because they have done so for centuries.

I want to assure you that we have given a great deal of thought to the interests of the ethnic Serbs in the province. Both Rambouillet and our current policy call for the preservation of the FRY's territorial integrity; during an interim period, on which the President has set no time limit, KFOR will protect all Kosovars, both Albanian and Serb, as well as their respective cultural monuments and treasures. General Jackson has recently made a point of repeating that KFOR is there to protect Kosovars

no matter what their ethnicity or faith. At some point, some Serb personnel will be allowed to return to the province, in part to patrol those sites so central to Serbian national identity.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. We will also be a driving force in the international community's longer-term effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the EU on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to guarantee a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.

Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Rod Blagojevich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH
5TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
AND OVERSIGHT

2915

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-1305

331 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1305
(202) 225-4061
FAX: (202) 225-5603

4064 NORTH LINCOLN AVENUE
CHICAGO, IL 60618
(773) 868-3240
FAX: (773) 868-0036

11 CONTI PARKWAY
ELMWOOD PARK, IL 60707
(708) 583-1948

April 12, 1999

Honorable Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Berger:

I appreciate all of the leadership you have shown as National Security Advisor, and I write this knowing that the decisions that you confront in Kosovo are very difficult.

Current U.S. policy in Kosovo clearly stems from the best intentions, but I believe after nearly three weeks of bombing we must reevaluate our policy in the region. I believe the time has come to seriously consider non-military options, including a plan for partition, to achieve our immediate and long-term policy objectives in the Balkans.

As you know all too well, the Balkans are a complicated, dangerous area. For six centuries, three vastly different cultures have clashed violently in Kosovo. These battles are not over something so simple as land or even as valuable as mineral rights, but rather ones in which each party believes they are guided by a higher authority in a fight for the survival of their people.

As we have seen in recent weeks, these 14th century hatreds are a formidable match for 21st century military technology. Placing U.S. troops on the ground in the midst of this conflict will only make matters worse. Unlike our policy in Bosnia, which I have consistently supported, this conflict would inevitably be far more difficult and dangerous to American forces. Therefore, instead of embarking upon a dangerous and costly military escalation in the region, I believe we should broker a diplomatic agreement centered on the partition of Kosovo.

A workable plan for stabilizing Kosovo must take the following factors into account: First, it must keep in Serbia as many of Kosovo's sacred Orthodox cathedrals and historic places as possible. These shrines are central to the Serbian people and have deep emotional and spiritual meaning. Second, the partition should seek to place as many Albanian homes as possible within an area of self-rule contiguous to Albania. Third, we must make the Russians a major party to any partition agreement. Russian resentment over the NATO air strikes is strengthening the hands of that country's ultra-nationalists, and this clearly is not in our national interest. Fourth, the partition boundary should be drawn as much as practicable along naturally defensible lines that will provide real security for both Albanians and Serbs. Lastly, any lasting settlement in the Balkans rests on the foundation of a secure and stable Albania and its contiguous, autonomous

TO: LEGISLATIVE
KOSOVO
P.S. DRAFT
RESPONSE FOR
GRB SIGNATURE

region. To that end, the U.S. and our allies should fund a new "Marshall Plan" for Albania, providing resources for refugee resettlement both in Albania and Albanian Kosovo. Such a plan should include debt relief for Albania and transitional aid to a functioning market economy.

Although hard-line elements of both parties to the current conflict would find a partition settlement objectionable, I believe such a resolution is the best and most viable option in the region. Under a carefully crafted partition, many Albanians would be free to return home under the prospect of self-rule. The Serbian people, who have suffered under Milosevic's regime, would be spared more bombing and a protracted ground war with NATO forces. Similarly, the U.S. would be spared a long and costly war that would result in the loss of American lives. Perhaps most importantly, Europe's most explosive region would have new cause for peace and stability in the 21st century.


While some may argue that a partition plan would represent a victory for President Milosevic, I believe this viewpoint is far too simplistic. A partition like the one outlined above would return many Kosovars to the province while safeguarding the religious and historic sites that have allowed Milosevic to rally nationalist support for his brutal policies. Moreover, once the fighting stops we can begin to do what we should have done long ago: mobilize democratic opposition to Milosevic's regime, much the same as we did when Solidarity emerged as the opposition in Communist Poland.

As long as NATO military action continues, there is no hope for democracy in Serbia. Contrary to conventional wisdom, air strikes do not weaken Milosevic, they only strengthen his hold on power. Our current policies are strengthening Milosevic and driving his opposition underground. Even worse, as with the assassination of leading Serbian opposition journalist Slavko Curuvija on Sunday night, Milosevic is using NATO action as cover for permanently silencing democratic opposition.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with you in greater detail. In the meantime, however, I hope you will give my proposal very serious deliberation.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Rod R. Blagojevich". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

Rod R. Blagojevich
Member of Congress

TO: BERGER

FROM: BLAGOJEVICH, ROD

DOC DATE: 12 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
DEFENSE POLICY
LEGAL ISSUES

NATO
NCO

PERSONS: MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

SUBJECT: SUGGESTS CONSIDERATION OF NON-MILITARY OPTIONS IN KOSOVO & PLAN FOR
PARTITION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 30 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BAKER
BROWN, K
LACKEY
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 11 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
DC

SOC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO JUN 4

ACTION: POWELL SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 14 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
POWELL
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 4/15/2024

2008-0994-F-3

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSTTS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904355

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99060921 FOR DECISION
X 99061110 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99061110 POWELL SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990611 FUERTH, L
002 990611 KENNEY, K
002 990611 REYNES, J
002 990611 BASKETTE, A
002 990611 KYLE, R
002 990611 RICCHETTI, S
002 990611 WOLFE, T
002 990611 CONROY, R
002 990611 MANNING, M

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4355

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 1 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>CL</u> JACOBSON			
POWELL	<u>1/4</u>	<u>8 6/4</u>	<u>el/8</u>
RICE			<u>1/3</u>
DAVIES			
KERRICK	<u>2</u>		
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>		
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>5</u>	<u>RC/du</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>6</u>		

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

99 JUN 30 6:44

SOC DC Mtg on
Kosovo 6/4
Yes

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4355

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 11, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. STEVEN RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President


MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on June 4, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on June 4, 1999. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: June 8, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By N NARA, Date 4/15/2024
2008-0944-F-3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, June 4, 1999. [Record ID: 9904355] [partial] (1 page)	06/11/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6299

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4355

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: June 4, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~LC~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

Michael Mahdesian

State:

Thomas Pickering

James Pardew

Julia Taft

JCS:

Joseph Raltson

George Casey

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kaufmann

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

White House:

Donald Kerrick

OMB:

Robert Kyle

Cameron Leuthy

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

Eric Schwartz

Michael Hammer

Miles Lackey

Matthew Vaccaro

Chief of Staff:

Steven Ricchetti

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: June 8, 2009

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PER E.O. 13526
2014-0544-M (1.63)
7/31/2014 KBT


Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should avoid an outcome in Kosovo that would result in a partial withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo.
(Action: All) ~~(C)~~
- The USG will urge the French to complete work on the OPLAN for KFOR, assuring them of our intention to seek a UN Security Council resolution on KFOR and recalling that the OPLAN will not be implemented unless NATO authorizes an Activation Order (ACTORD). (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG will seek to modify the UN Security Council resolution drafted by G-7 political directors to:
 - make reference to the military-technical agreement being concluded between COMARRC and FRY authorities;
 - provide an exemption from UN Security Resolution 1160 for arms and related equipment to be provided to the new local Kosovo police;
 - make no reference to duration of the international civil and security presences or, as a fallback, link their termination to a final political settlement or an affirmative decision by the Security Council. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG will work with UNHCR to initiate an information campaign designed to discourage precipitous returns of refugees to Kosovo so as to facilitate KFOR deployment and ensure that refugees can return safely. (Action: State, USAID) ~~(C)~~
- The USG will promote the coordination of planning between NATO military authorities and UNHCR with respect to refugee returns. (Action: State, DOD) ~~(C)~~
- The USG will produce an assessment of how many refugees can safely return and be sheltered in Kosovo by this winter.
(Action: State, USAID) ~~(C)~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE:



IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____

CLASSIFICATION:

SECRET

PAGES: 9
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Sol's for DC mtgs on Kosovo June 1st, 4th + 5th

NSC LOG #

9904381-9904355-9904356

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Asst. to. USUN Rep</u>	_____	_____
<u>CEA</u>	<u>Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>AID</u>	<u>Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Col. Manning</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 4/15/2024

2008-0694-F-7

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

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FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DATE/TIME: _____
MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 9904381-9904355+9904356

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>SOC's for DC mtgs on Kosovo</u>		PAGES: <u>9</u>
<u>June 1st, 4th + 5th</u>		(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Initials: RL Date: 4/10/2024
2008-041-F-3

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LOG 9904355
DATE 11 JUN 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO JUN 4
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX+1</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOb OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
RICCHETTI, S 1ST FLOOR / WEST WING DEPUTY COS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VR Date: 4/15/2024
2008-0444-F.3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOb

PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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LOG 9904355
DATE 11 JUN 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO JUN 4
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

MS. RYAN CONROY
1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE
ROOM 6.08
WASHINGTON, DC 20523-6801
AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF
ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

June 8, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG


FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on June 4, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on June 4.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: June 8, 2009

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 4/15/2024
2008-0494-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4605

June 15, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *CMH*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo on June 15, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on June 15.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: June 15, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VR* NARA, Date *4/15/2024*
2008-0444-f-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4605

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on June 15, 1999 ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on June 15, 1999. ~~(S)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: June 15, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 4/15/2020
208-0994-F-3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, June 15, 1999. [Record ID: 9904605] [partial] (1 page)	06/15/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for June 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6299

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: June 15, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:15 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

(b)(3)

OVP:

Richard Saunders

Leslie Davidson

NEC:

Lael Brainard

Sonal Shah

State:

Strobe Talbott

James Pardew

James Dobbins

Jeffrey Bialos

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

Donald Pressley

Treasury:

Ted Truman

Mark Medish

JCS:

Joseph Ralston (via STU III)

George Casey

Keith Dayton

Defense:

Walter Slocombe (via STU III)

James Bodner

Joseph Kaufmann

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Carlos Pascual

James Baker

Miles Lackey

Mara Rudman

Michael Hurley

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: June 15, 2009

DECLASSIFIED**PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0549-M (1.72)

3/20/2024 KBH

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG will encourage SACEUR/COMKFOR to accept a significant role for Russia at the Slatina airport under the overall authority of COMKFOR. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(S)~~
- OMB will identify ways that the Kosovo supplemental funding can be used to assist with the return of refugees to Kosovo. (Action: OMB) (U)
- OSD will assess its flexibility in using DOD humanitarian assistance funding for emergency assistance in Kosovo. (Action: OSD) (U)
- The USG will pursue a three-stage process for a Kosovo donors' conference: a High Level Steering Group to meet within the next three weeks; an initial donor's conference for humanitarian assistance and refugee repatriation in mid July; and donors' conferences for longer-term Kosovo needs and Southeast Europe in the fall. (Action: State, Treasury) (U)
- The USG will work with the UN and EU to ensure that they interpret broadly the authority of the international civil presence to regulate economic affairs in Kosovo. (Action: OSD) (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 14, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I please find a memorandum to the President including a proposed response to a letter from Representative Brad Sherman on Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Mike Hurley; Mark Tavlarides *Mh.*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Outgoing Correspondence
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Brad Sherman

Background

Representative Brad Sherman wrote you to suggest a measure of realism in resolving the Kosovo crisis. His major proposal, as described in an attached memorandum, was to divide Kosovo into northern and southern regions to be patrolled by Serb and NATO security forces, respectively.

In your reply, you thank Representative Sherman for his constructive advice during the course of the air campaign. You note the symbolic role given to Serb forces at certain ceremonial sites as part of the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement. But you stress the importance of NATO patrol of all of Kosovo as a precondition for the refugees' return to their homes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Representative Sherman at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Brad:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo. I deeply appreciated your insights on how best to resolve the conflict. I considered your perspective seriously during the air campaign. While we differed on means, we shared the same objective: to end the violence and provide all Kosovars the security and self-government they so very much deserve.

I am glad to report to you - as I did to the American people the other night - that NATO's determined action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo compelled Belgrade to capitulate to NATO's conditions. Nineteen resolute democracies came together and stayed together through the toughest challenge since the end of the Cold War. Their perseverance is all the more remarkable because no NATO country had territorial ambitions on the FRY. Rather, the collective action resulted from the simple conviction that we could not begin the 21st century by allowing the purveyors of ethnic hatred and violence to cause unspeakable suffering and misery with impunity.

I know you share my pride in the achievements of those who brought us to this point: above all, the fine men and women of our armed services whose performance throughout has been so outstanding. International diplomatic efforts - including those of our Russian allies - were also critical in bringing an end to the conflict on NATO's terms.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that has been organized by NATO to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian

supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

With respect to your proposal that the FRY military be given a sector to patrol in Kosovo, the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement which served as the basis for the peace did call for a Serb presence in post-conflict Kosovo. While this presence is not as extensive as you proposed in your letter, we have agreed to allow an appropriate number of Serb forces to be present at the ceremonial sites you mention. We and our allies firmly believe a unified command for KFOR is essential for peace, because without it ethnic Albanians will not have the confidence to return home. But, as I have said all along and as KFOR Commander General Mike Jackson has stressed in recent days, KFOR's mission is to protect all Kosovars, whether ethnic Albanian or Serb.

We will also be a driving force in the international community's longer-term effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the EU on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to guarantee a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.

I firmly believe that in standing up to Milosevic and his war-making machine, America's leadership will in the long term promote a safer, more secure world. I will consult with you as events warrant and would appreciate your support as we move forward in carrying out our Kosovo policy. Thank you again for your thoughtful letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Brad Sherman
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

CONGRESSMAN BRAD SHERMAN

24TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

SERVING THE SAN FERNANDO AND CONEJO VALLEYS,
LAS VIRGENES AND MALIBU

COMMITTEE ON BANKING
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



April 27, 1999

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
The President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to take this opportunity to express my views on the ongoing conflict in the Balkans. As you know, I strongly support efforts to prevent mass murder, ethnic cleansing and other atrocities, through military action if necessary.

I am concerned, however, that in the process of pursuing this war, we may have adopted positions regarding the hostilities which make it impossible to resolve this conflict without heavy US and allied casualties or a protracted, months-long air campaign.

I have outlined a possible solution to this crisis. Attached please find two separate statements which describe a resolution which would provide for the return of the Kosovar Albanians to an autonomous Kosovo, under Yugoslav sovereignty, while giving the Yugoslav side assurances that their key interests will be secured.

I hope you can give this serious consideration.

Sincerely,

BRAD SHERMAN
Member of Congress

*Copied
Bergen
NSC WW
Desk
Podolska*

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CONGRESSMAN BRAD SHERMAN

24TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

SERVING THE SAN FERNANDO AND CONEJO VALLEYS,
LAS VIRGENES AND MALIBU

COMMITTEE ON BANKING
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



Non-Partition: Two Peacekeeping Forces, Two Peacekeeping Areas, One Autonomous Kosovo

We should not rule out an agreement under which a NATO-led peacekeeping force controls most of Kosovo, and another peacekeeping force, more acceptable to the Serbs, occupies a smaller area containing the main sites of importance to the Serbian nation, all without prejudice as to the final status of Kosovo. Indeed we can and should reaffirm, as part of any agreement, ultimate Serbian sovereignty over all Kosovo, a position with which we firmly agree.

The largest difference in the stated positions of NATO and the stated positions of Serbia relate to the make-up of the peacekeeping force. Last week Serbia, through Russian mediation, suggested non-NATO peacekeepers under a UN mandate. NATO originally insisted on an all-NATO peacekeeping force, and now insists on a "NATO-led" force.

We should consider agreeing to two separate and distinct peacekeeping forces for two different geographical segments of Kosovo. "Region A" would be patrolled exclusively by Russian or other forces more favorably disposed to Serbia. Region A would consist of two or three areas, each geographically connected to Serbia or Montenegro. These areas would include the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, the Gracanica monastery, Pec (the original site of the Serbian Orthodox Church), and certain other monastery lands. Depending on negotiations, Region A might also include most of the lignite mines located in northern Kosovo.

"Region B" would be patrolled by a NATO-led peacekeeping force. It would consist of roughly 80% of Kosovo. All Serbian military and police forces would be required to immediately evacuate from Region B. Kosovar refugees would feel quite comfortable returning to Region B. (As a practical unacknowledged matter, refugees would probably not choose to return to Region A, but this need not be precluded by an agreement. Indeed the Serbian conditions of April 22 explicitly allow for the complete return of all refugees to their original home towns.) U.S. and European aid and trade concessions would be focused on Region B. This would more than make up for any farm lands or mines allocated to Region A.

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I would expect both sides to claim victory. Milosevic, faced with an alliance of 19 powerful nations including the world's only superpower, will claim victory because only friendly forces will occupy historically and religiously significant sites. He will have little difficulty arguing to his people that it is these sites which are the major reason why Serbia demanded to retain Kosovo. As long as the three or four most significant sites are in Region A, Milosevic will have little difficulty arguing that *all* the important sites are in Region A, and those left in Region B are unimportant. Furthermore, as a legal matter, all of Kosovo would remain part of Serbia -- though Region B would have an extremely high level of autonomy.

NATO would rightly claim a major victory. **All Albanian Kosovar refugees would be returned to the territory of Kosovo. All will be protected by a NATO-led peacekeeping force.** Due to trade and aid from the NATO allies, the Kosovars will be more prosperous than they were before the conflict began.

NATO will also claim victory on the issues of international law and legal status so important to its diplomats. Kosovo would remain legally a single entity entitled to a high level of autonomy, and part of Serbia -- the exact legal formula demanded by NATO. Of course this NATO victory would not include the immediate overthrow of Milosevic, just as Desert Storm did not remove Saddam Hussein.

It would probably be best if NATO required that all KLA weapons be turned over to NATO forces. (We should not be surprised if some KLA forces and weapons remain in Albania.) NATO forces should be deployed to prevent the fighters from crossing from Kosovo (Region B) into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Any peace agreement should be brokered with the involvement of Russia. This will give the Serbs the assurances they need to make peace, and provide an important measure of pride and prestige to the Russians, with whom our relationship remains perhaps the most important in the world.

CONGRESSMAN BRAD SHERMAN

24TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA



SERVING THE SAN FERNANDO AND CONEJO VALLEYS,
LAS VIRGENES AND MALIBU

COMMITTEE ON BANKING
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Kosovo: Additional Options Deserve Consideration

by Congressman Brad Sherman, member Committee on International Relations

Our actions in Kosovo are motivated by the highest level of idealism. We are willing to spend our treasure, and more importantly risk the lives of our men and women, to prevent atrocities and to assure Albanian Kosovars will be able to live in peace and autonomy.

Yet even in such a great idealistic undertaking, we must establish a realistic strategy. We must make sure our idealistic motivations do not cloud our judgement.

Realism vs. Idealism

In a more ideal world, Kosovo would be the only place of tragedy and atrocity. But realistically we should note that the government of Sudan has killed 2 million of its African citizens, and that killing continues; that 800,000 Tutsis were killed in Rwanda; and the continuing death toll is enormous in the Congo, East Timor, Myanmar and elsewhere.

In an ideal world we would easily restore Kosovo as a multi-ethnic and semi-autonomous region. Realistically it is unlikely that Albanians and Serbs will live in harmony in the absence of outside force; and it is unlikely that the Kosovars will renounce their goal of independence.

A blind idealist might see the world as pure good verses pure evil. Yet the Serbs were, just a few years ago, the victims of ethnic cleansing in Croatia, where 180,000 Serbs were expelled from lands they had lived in for centuries, while America said nothing and did nothing. And the Kosovar Albanians, the victims of today's mass-murders, are represented by the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), an organization that we describe as terrorists -- an organization that may have alliances with Iran, Osama Bin Laden and even drug dealers.

- more -

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Blind Idealism would cause us to state the maximum possible objective, and believe that we could achieve it with the minimum force. Yet realism requires us to adopt realistic objectives consistent with the future safety of the Albanian Kosovars, and to marshal the substantial force which may be necessary to achieve those objectives.

Proposed Actions

We should take three steps.

First, we should involve Russia in diplomatic efforts to the maximum possible degree.

Russia may be able to pull the Serbs to a negotiation position more realistic than the one they would be willing to adopt themselves.

Russian involvement in both the diplomacy and the peace keeping offers a face-saving method for Milosevic to make major concessions. And though there are a lot of those that think we should "dispose of Milosevic instead of negotiating with him," I would point out that we are still waiting for someone to dispose of Saddam Hussein.

Involving Russia is important beyond the events at hand. Ten years from now Kosovo may be almost forgotten, but Russia will continue to be a critical nuclear-armed state -- and treating Russia with respect now will be important to our relationship in the future. (Eighty-five years ago Russia mobilized its army in support of Serbia, and the result was World War I.)

Secretary Albright recently met with Igor Ivanov, the Foreign Minister of Russia, in Oslo. Hopefully this is the first step towards the maximum involvement of Russia in bringing peace to Kosovo.

Second, we should signal now that we are willing to reach peace on the basis that the Rambouillet agreement would apply to 80% of the Kosovo territory, rather than all of Kosovo.

No one denies that the Serbs have rights in Kosovo. They represent over 10% of the population. Kosovo has been part of Serbia for hundreds of years, and Kosovo is the religious and cultural birthplace of the Serbian nation. In fact, the Rambouillet agreement seeks to recognize Serb rights by saying that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia.

By leaving the Serbs in control of historically and religiously significant sites -- including the original seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church; the most important of the monastery lands; and the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, on which the Serbs fought the Turks in the 14th Century -- we can make an offer that the Serbs *can* accept.

Or rather, Russia can make an offer that all sides can accept. No Serb government, even without Milosevic, even after 20 days of bombing, could accept the current Rambouillet agreement which the Serbs, and many other observers, believe would end all Serbian rights in all of Kosovo.

The first step along these lines is to propose two separate peace keeping forces. The Russians could act as peace keepers in roughly 20% of Kosovo, particularly near the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, the monastery to Gracanica, the former seat of the Serbian Orthodox church in Per, other important monastery lands, and areas with large Serb populations. The second peace keeping force would occupy the remaining roughly 80% of Kosovo territory, would operate under an authorization by NATO (or even the United Nations) and would include American troops.

This offers a reasonable intermediate solution, meeting both the needs of Kosovars for a place to live and the need of the Serbs to avoid NATO occupation of the most important, historic and religious sites.

Certainly the Kosovar Albanians (who represented roughly 85% of Kosovo's population) could live far better in 80% of the Kosovo territory, protected by NATO troops, as compared to asking those same people to live in refugee camps.

Third, we should be training an army of Kosovar Albanians. This army should be independent of the KLA, and U.S. troops should control custody of the weapons while the training proceeds.

Milosevic may not believe that bombing can compel his departure from Kosovo, and he may not believe that NATO troops are willing to risk casualties on the ground. But if there is an Albanian army being trained, then he knows that a ground force willing to absorb casualties could be deployed in a matter of months. This may impel him to negotiate now.

The Administration asserts that bombing alone will bring Milosevic to his knees. If this is true, we can cease the training program and we will still have custody of the weapons (subject to a few guns being purloined.)

Deploying NATO Ground Troops

There are those who insist on the maximum objective -- Rambouillet for all of Kosovo -- with minimum involvement of the Kosovars themselves. They advise deploying NATO troops while not training the Kosovars.

This approach is not only dangerous for our servicemen and women, it is dangerous for our foreign policy. If we deploy NATO ground troops into hostilities and if the casualties rise to the point where the American public, or the German public, or the French public or the British public demand the withdraw of their soldiers -- then the NATO alliance may be broken, and Milosevic may prevail.

If that occurs, then every tyrant and mass-murderer in the world will feel that he can act with impunity. The Vietnam Syndrome, and the Somalia Syndrome, will return. We need another option -- the option of deploying a well-trained, well-armed force of Albanians, who are willing to take casualties because they are fighting for their homes.

Hopefully, by negotiating from strength, we can achieve an agreement that will eliminate the need to actually deploy combatant ground troops, NATO or Kosovar.

Conclusion

The American people have shown a willingness to commit their treasure, and more importantly the lives of their sons and daughters, to preventing atrocities and ameliorating tragedies. If we realistically define our objectives, and if we prepare to use all the tools at our disposal, we will secure a reasonable life for the Kosovars and we will inspire the American people to support limited, realistic efforts to stop atrocities in Sudan, Myanmar, the Congo, East Timor and elsewhere.

If instead we devote inadequate resources to an effort to achieve an absolute idealistic objective, we may fail -- and that would be a tragedy for those servicemen and women who die in the effort, for the Kosovars, and for the victims of atrocities around the world.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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June 14, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *bs*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sm*
SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a response to Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee. She wrote to the President requesting a 72-hour pause in NATO's bombing of the FRY in order to pursue a diplomatic settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Concurrences by: Mark Tavlarides; Mike Hurley *Am*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Representative Jackson-Lee
Tab B Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee concerning Kosovo.

Background

Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee wrote to you to comment favorably on Reverend Jackson's successful negotiations that led to the release of the three American soldiers and to urge that you consider a 72-hour pause in NATO's bombing of the FRY so that the United States and NATO may press for a diplomatic settlement. She also briefly described her recent trip to Macedonia and Albania where she saw the effects of the humanitarian crisis.

You thank Representative Lee for her constructive advice during the course of the air campaign. You explain your policy with regard with Kosovo now that the air strikes have ended: in the short term, to provide security through participation in KFOR; in the long term, to bring democracy and stability to the region through the Southeast Europe Initiative. You conclude by asking for her support in these ventures.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Jackson-Lee
Tab B Incoming correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Sheila:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo. I deeply appreciated your insights on how best to resolve the conflict. I considered your perspective seriously during the air campaign. While we differed on means, we shared the same objective: to end the violence and provide all Kosovars the security and self-government they so very much deserve.

I am glad to report to you - as I did to the American people the other night - that NATO's determined action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo compelled Belgrade to capitulate to NATO's conditions. Nineteen resolute democracies came together and stayed together through the toughest challenge since the end of the Cold War. Their perseverance is all the more remarkable because no NATO country had territorial ambitions on the FRY. Rather, the collective action resulted from the simple conviction that we could not begin the 21st century by allowing the purveyors of ethnic hatred and violence to cause unspeakable suffering and misery with impunity.

I know you share my pride in the achievements of those who brought us to this point: above all, the fine men and women of our armed services whose performance throughout has been so outstanding. International diplomatic efforts - including those of our Russian allies - were also critical in bringing an end to the conflict on NATO's terms. I also share your appreciation for Reverend Jesse Jackson's successful efforts in gaining the release of our three American soldiers during the course of the conflict. I had the opportunity to discuss the conflict in Kosovo with Jesse both before and after his trip to Belgrade and to thank him for his efforts.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo,

under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

We will also be a driving force in the international community's longer-term effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the EU on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to guarantee a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.

I firmly believe that in standing up to Milosevic and his war-making machine, America's leadership will in the long term promote a safer, more secure world. We will consult with you as events warrant and would appreciate your support as we move forward to make these policies work. Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

SHEILA JACKSON LEE
18TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEES:

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

MAY 10 1999
Hand Delivered

May 6, 1999

William Jefferson Clinton
President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In recent days NATO has been presented with a unique opportunity to resolve this tragedy with the NATO demands for settlement in tact. I am hopeful that in light of the work of Reverend Jesse Jackson in negotiating the release of our three service members, that we can seize on this weekend's goodwill gesture.

This past weekend I joined a Congressional delegation that traveled to Germany, Albania, Macedonia, Italy and Belgium. Mr. President, while it was somewhat disheartening to see the effects of this tragedy up close, it was comforting to see the courageous spirit that persevered among our troops and the many non-government organizations aiding in the crisis.


It is incomprehensible to imagine the scope of this tragedy until you see it in person. On the ground and among the refugees, I was able to interact and listen to the stories of this human tragedy. Putting faces behind tragic accounts, I heard about the killing of innocent men and boys, the wanton burning of homes, and the brutal rape of Kosovar women.

In addition to confronting the humanitarian crisis, I had the good fortune of interacting with our troops. I am pleased to report that our troops had high spirits and that they remain committed to the NATO operation. As is customary with U.S. Armed Forces their preparedness, attention to detail, and commitment to duty and country was very impressive.

It is clear that there can be no winners from our present conflict. There are no easy answers to a crisis of this magnitude, but I am encouraged by both the release of our three service members and from my trip to the region that a diplomatic settlement can be reached. **Therefore, Mr. President, I am respectfully requesting a 72-hour pause in the bombing so that the U.S. and NATO officials may press for a diplomatic settlement.**

Mr. President, I want to thank you in advance for your attention to this request. I look forward to hearing from you and if I can be of any assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sheila Jackson Lee', with a large, stylized initial 'S'.

Sheila Jackson Lee
Member of Congress

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), concerning alleged links between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and drug trafficking;
- 2) Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), concerning the meetings of the U.S. Congressional delegation and Russian Duma in Vienna, Austria;
- 3) Rep. David Dreier (D-CA) and seventy-eight other Members of Congress, concerning export control thresholds for computers;
- 4) Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 5) Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and ten other Members of Congress, concerning the meetings of the U.S. Congressional delegation and Russian Duma in Vienna, Austria; .
- 6) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting that the President appoint former Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL) as a special envoy to Sudan; and,
- 7) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting that the President appoint a special envoy to Sudan.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 10, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

SUBJECT: REQUESTS A 72-HOUR PAUSE IN THE BOMBING SO
THAT THE U.S. AND NATO OFFICIALS MAY PRESS
FOR A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/10		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: CC: Chuck Brink

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:F INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230
MAIL USER CODES: (A) D TX (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: JACKSON-LEE, SHEILA

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 303972

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUESTS 24 HR BOMBING PAUSE FOR DIPLOMACY IN RE KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
GORDON
LACKEY
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BANDLER
BLINKEN
WEISS
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3646

June 14, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *js*
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*
SUBJECT: Correspondence on Kosovo

Father Raymond Helmick wrote you shortly after participating in Jesse Jackson's delegation to Belgrade forwarding some letters he sent to Mssrs. Milosevic and Karic. Subsequently, he sent the same package to the President along with suggestions that the KLA be allowed to play a constructive role in post-conflict Kosovo. Your reply is also intended to answer this letter.

In the reply, you thank Father Helmick for his contribution to freeing the American servicemen. You thank him for his constructive advice during the course of the air campaign. You explain your policy with regard with Kosovo now that the air strikes have ended: in the short term, to provide security through participation in KFOR. Finally, you touch on NATO's policy regarding the KLA's role in post-conflict Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Mike Hurley *MH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Response
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Father Helmick:

Thank you for your letter on your return from Belgrade and the correspondence with Mr. Karic and others that you were kind enough to forward.

I very much appreciated meeting you at the briefing session before your trip. You have the country's gratitude for your contribution to the release of the three American servicemen held against their will. You and the others in the Jackson delegation rendered an inestimable service to our country; it will not soon be forgotten.

I am glad to report to you now - as I did to the American people the other night - that NATO's determined action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo compelled Belgrade to capitulate to NATO's conditions. Nineteen resolute democracies came together and stayed together through the toughest challenge since the end of the Cold War. Their perseverance is all the more remarkable because no NATO country had territorial ambitions on the FRY. Rather, the collective action resulted from the simple conviction that we could not begin the 21st century by allowing the purveyors of ethnic hatred and violence to cause unspeakable suffering and misery with impunity.

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that NATO has organized to restore peace to Kosovo. With KFOR's rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade's brutal repression.

I know you have also written the President regarding the KLA. While he is unable to reply, allow me to share some thoughts. The KLA presents a delicate problem. Like you, I firmly believe that we should hold the KLA to its Rambouillet commitment to demilitarize; now that KFOR is providing security to the province, the KLA has every incentive to do so completely. But I also share your view that KLA members should not be treated as terrorists and that we should not rebuff their efforts to play a role in post-conflict Kosovo. In fact, it is likely that Gen. Jackson will invite some of them to participate in local policing.

Thank you again for your contributions to the peace and for the constructive suggestions.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903646
RECEIVED: 12 MAY 99 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: HELMICK, RAYMOND G

DOC DATE: 11 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
KOSOVO

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: KARIC, BOGOLJUB

STEELE, DAVID

SUBJECT: FWDS FAX TO KARIC RE KOSOVO CRISIS

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
HURLEY
SCHWARTZ
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 11, 1999

Mr. Sandy Berger
National Security Adviser
The White House

FAX (202) 456-9300

Dear Mr.

Dear Mr. Berger,

Christ's Peace!


Having traveled to Belgrade last week with the Jackson delegation, I had extensive conversations with Bogoljub Karić, his wife and a number of his assistants, working in those with Landrum Bolling and David Steele.

I came back with the conviction that they and other officials we had met there had little comprehension of the perceptions and objectives behind American policy and actions. I had drawn heavily on the briefing you yourself gave our delegation before we left in trying to explain these things, and promised that I would write a catalogue of then points on which I felt they misunderstood what the U.S. aimed at. I was ready with that by Sunday last, the 9th, but had great trouble getting through to them by FAX. The many FAX and phone numbers I had were all in the Karić building, which has been evacuated now because of danger from the bombing. Not until today was I sure I had gotten the FAX through, to a number I had from Aleksandar Vidojević this morning. And then I found that I had succeeded Sunday, when I sent it to Mrs. Karić's London number, in the hope that someone there would be able to send it further.

You should be informed, I know, of any such thing that I send. The whole transmission is here, including the covering sheets to Mrs. Karić in London and to Aleksandar Vidojević, as well as the attached copies of what I had written to Catholic authorities in Rome and Croatia in 1995 and 1997. I waited to send you a copy until I knew it had been received there. I've also just now sent a copy to David Steele at CSIS, so that he and Landrum Bolling would know of it before their State Department meeting today.

With all best wishes,

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 9, 1999

Madame Milanka Karić
London

FAX: 011 44 181 367-9487

Dear Madame Karić,

Christ's Peace!

You helped us so much when we were in Belgrade last week, the Jackson delegation seeking the release of the three American prisoners. We were seeking more, of course, an opening to diplomacy through this generous gesture. Landrum Bolling, David Steele and I were particularly concerned to foster that in our conversations with your husband. As I watch the new developments of these last few days, I wonder if we may not have had some degree of success at that.

It is in that context that I have written the attached letters, to your husband and to President Milosević. I tried twice today to send these by FAX, to each of the two numbers listed on the letter to your husband. I did not get through, but had only continued ringing of a phone each time.

Perhaps I need only to call tomorrow at a time when people are in the office and can set the machine for FAX reception. But I was not certain whether his building is still undamaged or whether the lines were in order. But I thought it well to send this to the FAX number you gave me for your office in London. I hope there will be someone there who knows how to get it all to you in Belgrade as quickly as possible.

I pray for you as you go through this ordeal of the bombing. Best wishes,

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

THE JESUIT COMMUNITY
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802

Fax: 617-552-~~8077~~ ²³⁸⁰

COVER SHEET

FAX #: 011 381 11 3617591

011 381 11 3617747

011 381 11 605353 *Ref. Kennedy*

TO: *Mr. Bogoljub Karic'*

FROM: *Raymond G. Helwick, S.J.*

ADDRESS: Jesuit Community at Boston College
St. Mary's Hall
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167
TEL: 617-552-~~8200~~ *8215*

or 617-325-1300

DATE: *May 10, '99*

RE:

MESSAGE: *Aleksandar - Thank you for giving me
this FAX number. I have been two days trying all the
FAX numbers I had, without success, except that I sent
this Sunday evening to Mr. Karic's number in England.*

Number of pages sent 15 (Number includes cover sheet.)

Please notify us (617-552-8200) if any pages of this document
were not transmitted or if you have received this message in error.
Thank you.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 9, 1999

Mr. Bogoljub Karić
Nemanjina 11
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

FAX: 011 381 11 3617591 (or 3617747)

Dear Mr. Karić,

Christ's Peace!

How can I thank you and Mrs. Karić enough for the extraordinary help you gave us of the Jackson delegation in our difficult task last week? I have known you and your good will from last year, and I treasure the friendship of Aleksandar Vidojević. I was glad that I came this time in the company of Landrum Bolling and David Steele. Their long and sympathetic study of your country, their efforts for the healing of wounds and for building relations of civility and respect within and between our countries exceed mine, but I share with them their hopes for your good.

Your help was indispensable to our entire delegation when we faced that crisis over our admission to the prisoners as a religious delegation, and far more so when it came to presenting our case for the release of these three young men to your President Milosević. In addition, it was of great value to the three of us, Landrum Bolling, David Steele and myself, to have that good conversation on Saturday afternoon.

I enclose, with this letter, one for your President Slobodan Milosević. In it I promise him that I will write to you an analysis of what I saw as incomprehension of American thinking from the many conversations I had with you and others. Mrs. Albright told us, on our return, that the Yugoslav government knows exactly what the U.S. and NATO demand, that there could be no misunderstanding. I thought that an example of incomprehension on her part, and said so. What I experienced was that your government receives demands, reads them as ultimatums, darkly suspects their motives and rejects them. Our government receives your proposals, finds them trivial and inadequate and rejects them. Neither seems to comprehend the perceptions behind the other's statements, or the true objectives of the other's policy.

My observations to my own government on this are made directly to them. But I will tell you that we, as a delegation, called strong attention to the Serbian experience of ethnic cleansing in 1995, when the Krajina and West Slavonian Serbs were expelled from Croatia by assaults as cruel as anything that is happening now in Kosovo. To give you some insight into my own attitude and activity on that matter, I will attach to this letter copies of what I wrote at that time. It was not condemnation after the fact, but efforts to

Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 2

prevent the evil as it happened, as I wrote to the Vatican Secretary of State requesting papal intervention on behalf of the people of Krajina. I wrote again, this time directly to the Pope, before the return of East Slavonia to Croatian administration in January of 1998. This received a positive response from the *assessore* of the Papal Secretariat of State, though I am not aware of any such active church appeal for the safety of Serbs in the area as I sought.

But I should come to what I have called areas of incomprehension.

American Intentions as to the Status of Kosovo.

I kept hearing, from you and others, the belief that the United States intended to set up an independent Kosovo, and that under KLA control. I'm sure this is not true, and that your believing it is an obstacle to understanding that can and should be eliminated.

I have heard high American officials, Sandy Berger and, on our return, President Clinton himself deny it. I know what gravely unacceptable results, for American and NATO interests, would follow either from the independence of Kosovo or from the empowerment of the KLA. And I observe that the U.S. officials, whom I hear denying that this is their policy, understand very well how any such developments would jeopardize their real interests.

Sandy Berger made these points very absolutely before we departed for your country, and wanted to be sure that none of us misunderstood them. An independent Kosovo, he recognized, would launch a "Greater Albania" movement, drastically destabilizing to a fragile Albania itself, and to Macedonia and Montenegro. It would likely engender a war that could quickly involve Greece and Turkey, canceling out the whole Southern reach of NATO, and perhaps spread even wider. American and NATO policy does not accept that and will not permit it. Any expectation on your part that such things are American and NATO objectives are wholly mistaken.

Retention of Kosovo as Part of Serbia.

The irony of this is that, as Mr. Berger put it, there appears to be no other way that Kosovo can be retained as territory of Serbia than that it be put under the protection of an adequate international force. Alienation in Kosovo has reached such a pitch that every young man capable of carrying arms will be back from exile with a gun. The U.S., Mr. Berger told us, will not arm them, for the reasons already given, that we too would see them as danger. But they will certainly be armed, and will mount such a long-term insurrection as Yugoslavia will not be able to contain. The province will become unsafe for its Serb population and ungovernable by Serbian force.

Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 3

We were told both by Mr. Berger, before our visit to you, and by President Clinton after it, that the U.S. feels itself equally responsible to protect the Serbs in Kosovo, whether from the KLA or from acts of vengeance by non-KLA Albanian residents, as it is for the Albanian Kosovars themselves. President Clinton made it clear that the KLA would have to be disarmed and even that the international force of which he spoke would have to provide that the most dangerous KLA elements were kept outside. Fundamental to this view, as expressed both by Berger and the President, is a recognition that the KLA would not surrender its weapons to any other force than an American-led NATO. That is a basic reason for the American insistence on a NATO core in an international force.

The Nature of the Conflict in Kosovo.

American thinking, at an earlier stage of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, was content to believe that people in your part of the world had their ancient quarrels that could never be settled. This gave outside countries a rationalization to believe there was nothing that could be done about war in your countries, that people had always been killing each other and always would.

Our planners have become more sophisticated now. They recognize that people in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated their capacity to live together in peace over many years, and that it took deliberate actions of provocation to create a war. Only so could the ancient hatreds be revisited.

In American opinion, the Kosovo crisis dates only to 1987, when Mr. Milosević made his speech there. In fact all the rest of the Balkan crisis rests on that deliberate and artificial resuscitation of an ethnic nationalism which had to rely on an appeal to religious identity to make it so divisive.

The withdrawal of Kosovo's already established autonomy status is seen as the key decision that has made this division violent. Even so, that followed a period of several years in which Mr. Ibrahim Rugova's non-violent resistance movement provided an opportunity to address the problem in peace. That opportunity was squandered as Mr. Rugova's party was ignored for all that time, until he was discredited by the outbreak of widespread violence March of 1998. Now, because Rugova remained so long in government custody, apparently under duress, American planners fear that he may have become too compromised to retain his standing with his own people.

As for the KLA, our planners do not accept that the war arose from long plotted conspiracy by these militants and their predecessor organizations. The KLA remained a minor element in the situation, not seriously dangerous, until the time last year when the Yugoslav forces over-reacted to provocations and brought about its sudden growth.

Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 4

Character of the International Force.

When we spoke last week, I interrupted you when I heard you speak of American demand for a purely NATO occupation of Kosovo. I said that I felt you had not heard the significant change in the language used by the American government. Some weeks ago, the U.S. was indeed speaking only of a NATO force. The language has changed, and now calls for "an international force." The U.S. and NATO now actively pursue Russian, Ukrainian and Swedish participation in that force, as well as other neutral nations.

The remaining insistence on U.S. and NATO participation in this force is not based on any desire to dominate Yugoslavia, or even Kosovo itself. It is instead because the exiled Kosovars will not trust any force that does not include them, armed and in adequate numbers, nor will the KLA otherwise agree to be disarmed. A purely UN-led force could simply not accomplish either of those goals.

What I heard frequently from Yugoslav officials, particularly from your Foreign Minister Jovanović, was that only Yugoslav forces would be allowed in Kosovo, and that they alone would protect the Kosovars, who were invited to return. American officials dismiss this as impractical, even evasive. They are convinced that the Kosovar Albanians have been so much traumatized by Yugoslav Army and Police actions of the last year, and especially by the actions of the paramilitary militias, that there is no hope whatever of their returning while those forces are still present in the province.

Convictions About the Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo.

When American officials hear the denials by the Yugoslav government that ethnic cleansing happens at all in Kosovo, denials of the specific charges of burning villages, forcing people from their homes, widespread murder of men of military age, or organized mass rape of Kosovar women, they do not believe you at all. The stories told by the refugees are consistent and backed by credible evidence.

They do not doubt that some accounts have been exaggerated or invented. But the total impact of the accounts convinces them. They have aerial photographs to support the tales of military columns burning out villages and driving civilians before them, pictures of new mass graves, medical tests of distraught young women who have been raped. In the case of those still inside Kosovo, they have further aerial photographs of them living out in the open in the forests, deprived of all supplies. All of this is totally consistent with what they have seen of Serbian practice in Bosnia. Denial impresses them simply as evidence of bad faith.

They hear the Yugoslav invitations to the exiles to return, but notice the condition required that they be able to prove their citizenship. So many refugees have told of

Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 5

having their passports, identity papers, even the license plates of their cars taken from them and destroyed before they crossed the borders, that this invitation too impresses American and NATO observers as merely pretense.

Consequently these officials firmly believe that your government has driven these exiles from their homes and intends to keep them out of Kosovo despite all claims to the contrary. Just as the U.S. officials reject the proposal of an independent Kosovo because of the dangers of regional destabilization it would pose, they understand that leaving these exiles outside of Kosovo presents exactly the same dangers. The influx of all these ethnic Albanians into Macedonia and Montenegro, the presence of all these angry and dispossessed people in Albania itself, pose the risk of a regional war as much as if there were an independent Kosovo state attempting to construct a Greater Albania. The one can no more be tolerated by the U.S. and NATO than the other.

All of this means that the U.S. and NATO find themselves obligated to win this war. Such episodes as the bombing, surely by accident rather than design, of hospitals, busses, residential neighborhoods, and now the Chinese Embassy embarrasses them gravely. You might expect that these embarrassments would weaken their resolve. But they cannot afford to lose, as it would mean the destruction of their alliance.

Their air war has not done what they expected. Yugoslavia was not brought quickly to its knees as they had thought. The bombing has not stopped or even slowed the process of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and may even have accelerated it. But that does not mean that Yugoslavia has won or will win. Instead, the NATO forces are trapped into a continuing air war which they can no longer halt. Because they are so much stronger militarily than Yugoslavia, this will mean eventually the wholesale destruction of your country and its power.

No one, certainly not the American and NATO officials who make the decisions about the war, really wants that. Winning that way will be no real victory, nor will it do any real good for the exiled Kosovo population. But the effective decisions, defective though they are, have already been made irreversibly.

I paint indeed a dreadful picture. As I see it myself, the true American and NATO objectives are in fact honorable. They intend to save the Kosovo population from what has become a genuinely criminal assault. They have no intention of removing Kosovo from the territory of Yugoslavia, but instead have a firm resolve to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia with an autonomous province of Kosovo, as it was before. I have heard your Foreign Minister Jovanović describe the NATO plans for Yugoslavia as "limited sovereignty," like that which first the Nazis and then the Soviets sought to impose. I don't believe that is the case. Rather, I believe the NATO powers are striving to prevent Yugoslavia's total loss of sovereignty over Kosovo, a prospective loss incurred by the massive over-reaction by Yugoslav forces to the unrest in Kosovo last year.

Mr. Bogoljub Karić, May 9, 1999 -- 6

I see no probability that these disasters can be averted without agreement on the basic demands made by the U.S. and NATO. The refugees must be enabled to return. That cannot happen while the forces that have driven them out remain in place. Another force must necessarily take their place. Otherwise the KLA will fill the vacuum, driving out or murdering the remaining Serb population, and exposing the entire region to the dangers posed by the Greater Albania idea. Allowing the refugees to remain outside of Kosovo threatens exactly the same regional dangers.


The force that could retain Kosovo within Serbia can only be one that convinces the Albanian Kosovars that they can safely return to their homes. That is clearly not the Yugoslav Army and Special Police, who are responsible for the ethnic cleansing in the first place. Your forces have no way of producing that confidence among the critically essential Albanian population. Nor can a force led only by the UN accomplish it. The objective can only be reached if there is the NATO core to the international force that has been demanded. It has become a choice between that and chaotic regional destruction.

For President Milosević, recognition of these realities and acceptance of this way of retaining Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo, which is otherwise likely to be forfeit, is an honorable course. The U.S. placed its reliance on him in 1995 to restore safety and civility to the region. We in our religious delegation last week came to him looking, with your invaluable help, for an action of decency and diplomacy. He fulfilled our hopes. He is the President of Yugoslavia, and has the responsibility to provide in this way for the safety of its citizens.

I hope this letter is helpful to you, for its purpose of elucidating, as I truly understand them, the real perceptions that lie behind American actions and demands. It is my conviction that you yourself and your government have understood them mistakenly. I have argued to my own government that they too misunderstand the motives behind Yugoslav actions. What is most necessary to bring about agreement, as I see it, is a kind of communication between your government and ours that is simply not taking place at present. Our delegation's objective was to open this up, and we argued for it here too.

I am grateful for what you, your wife and your President did, in response to our appeal, last week. I wish you, your fellow citizens, and among them the tortured people of Kosovo, only good. That you yourself wish only good for your neighbors and fellow citizens in Kosovo I accept. We have experienced such good will from you in our own mission that I have good hope for your coming to a resolution of these tragic differences. God love you all,

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

May 9, 1999

President Slobodan Milosević,
Care of Mr. Bogoljub Karić

Dear President Milosević,

Christ's Peace!

You have my deepest gratitude for the magnanimity with which you allowed us, the American delegation who came with the Reverend Jesse Jackson, to enter your country last week in a time of such violence. Your release of the three captured Americans showed generosity and compassion on your part. I thank you sincerely.

I send this letter in the care of Mr. Bogoljub Karić, who so much helped us and you to reach that humane conclusion to our effort. I will include, in writing to him, other observations which I trust he will share with you.

Our delegation sought to give a witness of religious faith as we appealed to that generosity and compassion in you. It differed from the official diplomacy of our country, to which we are loyal. An action of such decency and honor on your part, we felt, would call for a response of diplomacy rather than war. We hoped this would provide an opportunity to reopen the path of diplomacy.

We could never be unmindful of the desperate condition of the refugees fleeing the action of Serbian forces in Kosovo, nor advocate anything that would mean abandoning them to exile. And yet, at the very moment of the release of these prisoners, a Serbian woman journalist rose to challenge us. She asked about those Serbian citizens, victims in the bombing of the bus near Pristina the previous day, who could not sit at a desk and call their mothers on a cellular phone. We knew she had asked the right question. It was difficult to answer.

I return to the United States with a strong impression that neither side really comprehends the perceptions that govern the other's policies. I do my talking to the American officials to their face. Along with the rest of the Jackson delegation I recommended strongly to President Clinton, Mr. Berger and Mrs. Albright that they needed communication, communication, communication with you and your colleagues. When we heard it said that "we don't trust them and they don't trust us," our response was that precisely that distrust should be overcome by communication.

I found statements from your officials about what they believed were the objectives of American and NATO policy to be wildly inaccurate. In discussing these at


President Slobodan Milosević, May 9, 1999 -- 2

length with Mr. Karić, and with our own Mr. Landrum Bolling and David Steele, I felt I should catalogue, for your benefit, the points on which I believe your government has not really understood why the Americans said and demanded what they did.

This is what I will write to your good friend and mine, Mr. Karić. I hope he will not only show it to you but will discuss it as well.

My thanks and deep respect for the generous way you acted with regard to the prisoners. My acknowledgment that, in so acting, you have shown your own openness to breaking the cycle of violence that encompasses us.

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

August 11. 1995

His Eminence
Angelo Cardinal Sodano
Secretary of State
Palazzo Apostolico Vaticano
FAX 69.88.52.55 -- first of 3 pages

Dear Cardinal Sodano,
Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!

Please excuse my presumption in writing to you so directly. My long experience of dealing with Cardinal Laghi, while he represented the Holy See in the United States and I was mediating very directly in Middle Eastern and Northern Irish conflict situations, emboldens me to do so.

As the Croatian military forces regain control of the Krajina area, it seems to me that a critical moment occurs in the whole conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and one that creates an opportunity for the Catholic community, both the Catholics of Croatia and their fellows in other parts of the world, to make a significant contribution to the peace.

This war has been characterized by the expulsion of civilian populations from their ancestral homelands, with much brutality and frequent outright massacres. Bosnians, especially Muslims but also Catholics of Croatian ethnicity, have been the principal victims, but in the Krajina, previously a mixed area where roughly equal numbers of Croatian Catholics and Serbian Orthodox lived side by side for centuries, practically the whole Croatian population suffered this fate

Cardinal Sodano, August 11, '95 -- 2

in 1991. Now they are returning, and the Serbian population native to the area is in terrified flight.

What can break the cycle of violence and retribution? If at this point the Croatians were to act with great generosity toward the Serbs who have, for centuries, been their neighbors, inviting and welcoming this civilian population back to their homes and, by carefully planned policy, making it practically feasible for them to return, the entire character of this war could be changed decisively. To do this would be strikingly in keeping with their profession of Catholic faith, a response in the loving forgiveness of Christ to the terrible suffering even of those who have most offended them.

I know how much this asks of the Croatian Catholic people. It would call for great resolve and resources of faith. The gravity of the times requires greatness in faith from these afflicted people. I address this to you because I think the Croatians could be helped definitively to see this as their right course, and to follow it, by exhortation from the Holy See, and by such clear leadership from their own hierarchy and clergy, with the support of Catholics elsewhere in the world, as could best be organized from the Holy See.

Would this, at a practical level, be tilting at windmills? I think not, despite the many difficulties that would stand in the way of persuading Croatian leadership to adopt such a policy, or the Serbs to respond to it.

The Serbs of Croatia have been severely shocked by the bombing and shelling of their cities, and the harrassment of refugee columns as they fled the land. The immediate fear of their military joining with the Bosnian Serbs in the ravaging of Muslims and Catholics in that area seems to have passed, as the refugees have moved on into Serbia, their military mostly disarmed.

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
But these people now face relocation in Kosovo: settlement in another situation of disputing the land with, this time, an Albanian population, thereby spreading the conflict still more widely and themselves living with further tragedy. They are already disillusioned with the actions of Serbian government, even though for the bad reason that they wanted Serbian military help to defeat the Croatian advance. They can be expected to understand the new dangers they face.

It would take great effort by the Croatian people and government to convince them that they could safely return to their ancestral homes, to live in peace with their old Croatian neighbors. But this is the one development that would really transform the situation, not only for themselves but for the other peoples of the former Yugoslavia, and make their eventual reconciliation a credible possibility.

This is the Catholic moment of this terrible war. I believe that, with a response worthy of Catholic faith, it could be made a moment of healing and hope, and of great spiritual growth for all these peoples, Catholic, Orthodox Christian and Muslim alike.

I write this with much deference, and prayerful good wishes,

in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

Cc: His Eminence, Pio Cardinal Laghi
Very Rev. Fr. General Peter Hans Kolvenbach, S.J.
His Eminence, Bernard Cardinal Law



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

December 19, 1997

His Holiness
Pope John Paul II
Città del Vaticano
Rome, ITALY

Most Holy Father,

Christ's Peace!

As we celebrate this year the birth of Christ, the Prince of Peace, the war in what was once Yugoslavia, only partially quieted, approaches a new defining moment. On January 15th, Eastern Slavonia returns from Serbian control to that of Croatia.

Throughout the years of tragedy for Croats and Bosnians, Serbian forces pursued the policy of "ethnic cleansing." Many of us hoped, from the time the tide of war changed in 1995, that Catholic Croatia would not simply repeat that cruel behavior, turning it now against the Serbian population of Western Slavonia and the Krajina. But that is what was done: the Serbs whose ancestors had long lived in those areas were driven out just as their forces had earlier done to Croats. An opportunity for a response of lived Christian faith by the Catholics of Croatia, making it safe for their ethnic Serbian neighbors to live with them in peace, was lost.

Now, as the date for the return of Eastern Slavonia comes near, Serbs, both those whose ancestors have lived for many generations in this part of Croatia, and those who were planted there as colonists after 1991, flee for their lives from Croatian vengeance. It would still change the entire climate of this conflict, making peace among all three major population groups, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, far more possible, if Croatia's Catholics now turned, in the spirit of Christ, to forgiveness, reconciliation, and became protectors of their Serbian neighbors. The Orthodox Christians of Serbia and the Muslims of Bosnia might well respond in kind.

I reverently beg Your Holiness to make this your appeal at Christmas. I will write in like manner to Cardinal Kuharic, as I did in August 1995 to Cardinal Sodano. Every blessing of Christmas be with Your Holiness and all the Church committed to your care.

In Christ,

Handwritten signature of Raymond G. Helmick, S.J. in cursive script.
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

December 19, 1997

His Eminence
Franjo Cardinal Kuharic
Archbishop of Zagreb
Nadbiskupski Duhovni Stol
Kaptol 31, p.p. 553
10000 Zagreb, CROATIA

Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!


As we celebrate this year the birth of Christ, the Prince of Peace, the war, only partially quieted, approaches a new defining moment as, on January 15th, Eastern Slavonia returns from Serbian control to that of Croatia.

I know how terribly your people suffered as, throughout the years of tragedy for Croats and Bosnians, Serbian forces pursued the policy of "ethnic cleansing." Many of us hoped, from the time the tide of war changed in 1995, that Catholic Croatia would not simply repeat that cruel behavior, turning it now against the Serbian population of Western Slavonia and the Krajina. But that is what was done: the Serbs whose ancestors had long lived in those areas were driven out just as their forces had earlier done to Croats. An opportunity for the Catholics of Croatia to make it safe for their ethnic Serbian neighbors to live with them in peace was lost.

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I fervently beg Your Eminence, and your colleagues of the Catholic hierarchy and clergy of Croatia, to make this your appeal at Christmas. I have written in like manner to His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, as I did in August 1995 to Cardinal Sodano. Every blessing of Christmas be with Your Eminence and all your much-persecuted people.

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



SECRETARIAT OF STATE

FIRST SECTION - GENERAL AFFAIRS

From the Vatican, January 5, 1998

Dear Father Helmick,

The Holy Father has received your letter concerning the situation in Eastern Slavonia and he has asked me to send you this acknowledgment. He appreciates the concerns which prompted you to write to him.

His Holiness will remember you in his prayers. He cordially imparts his Apostolic Blessing as a pledge of joy and peace in the Lord.

Sincerely yours in Christ,

Monsignor J.M. Harvey
Assessor

The Reverend Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167-3802