

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chronos for May 1999 [9]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1707

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 24, 1999

REDO

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

GREG SCHULTE *MS*

FROM:

MIKE HURLEY *MH*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Letter to Representative Sheila
Jackson-Lee

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a response to Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee. She wrote to the President requesting a 72-hour pause in NATO's bombing of the FRY in order to pursue a diplomatic settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Concurrences by: *mt* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Representative Jackson-Lee

Tab B Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee concerning Kosovo.

Background

Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee wrote commenting on Reverend Jackson's negotiations that led to the release of the three American soldiers. She also described her recent trip to Macedonia and Albania where she saw the effects of the humanitarian crisis. In view of the release of the soldiers and her trip, she urged that you consider a 72-hour pause in NATO's bombing of the FRY so that the United States and NATO may press for a diplomatic settlement.

Your reply praises the results of Reverend Jackson's efforts. It describes the fissures that are beginning to appear in Serbia and explains that for the bombing to pause, Milosevic must clearly and demonstrably accept the international community's conditions to end the bombing.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Jackson-Lee
Tab B Incoming correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Sheila:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo. I appreciate your thoughts and am particularly gratified to learn you were able to visit with American troops on your recent congressional trip to Europe and the Balkans. The courage and fortitude of America's military men and women will continue to be essential as we respond to Mr. Milosevic's repression in Kosovo. I also appreciate your sharing with me the experiences you gained from talking with the victims of that repression.

I share your appreciation for Reverend Jackson's successful efforts in gaining the release of our three American soldiers. I met with Jesse and conveyed my heartfelt thanks for the important service he rendered to his country. I have had the opportunity to discuss the conflict in Kosovo with Jesse both before and after his trip to Belgrade and to thank him for his efforts.

I take very seriously your request that NATO implement a 72-hour pause in its bombing and I want to explain why we and our NATO allies believe we must press forward with strikes, even as we are pursuing a diplomatic resolution. Were we confronting an adversary other than Mr. Milosevic, such a pause might be appropriate. But the West has a long history of dealing with Mr. Milosevic, whose hate-filled nationalistic policies have triggered four wars in the last decade, causing unimaginable misery to hundreds of thousands. He has violated every obligation he has undertaken, and for more than a year he rejected every overture toward peace in Kosovo.

Mr. Milosevic's forces continue to murder innocent civilians in Kosovo and to expel ethnic Albanians from their homes. In view of these actions, we are determined to continue the air campaign until Mr. Milosevic clearly and demonstrably accepts NATO's conditions to end the bombing. Those conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb.

Over the last two months, the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing its objective of creating the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. In recent days, we have seen indications that NATO's air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

I want to assure you that we are pressing forward on the diplomatic front as you urge and we are actively engaging the Russians in this effort. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott has met twice with Russian Special Kosovo Envoy Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari on Kosovo. We are also working with the international community to align Russia with NATO's conditions and to prepare elements of a United Nations Security Council Resolution that would reinforce NATO's demands and endorse the establishment of an international force and provisional administration for Kosovo.

NATO's campaign and these diplomatic initiatives are having an effect, as we are seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations.

In recent days I have met with many Americans who expressed the conviction that America's moral leadership in this crisis is a defining moment as the world prepares to enter the new millenium. I appreciate your kind offer of assistance and will not hesitate to call on you. Thank you for your support and for your insights.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

SHEILA JACKSON LEE
18TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEES:

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
(RANKING OF MEMBERSHIP MEMBER)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

3673

303972

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
410 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
202-225-3816

DISTRICT OFFICE:
1919 SMITH STREET, SUITE 1180
THE GEORGE "MICKEY" LELAND FEUNAL BUILDING
HOUSTON, TX 77002
713-655-0050

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Hand Delivered

May 6, 1999

William Jefferson Clinton
President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In recent days NATO has been presented with a unique opportunity to resolve this tragedy with the NATO demands for settlement in tact. I am hopeful that in light of the work of Reverend Jesse Jackson in negotiating the release of our three service members, that we can seize on this weekend's goodwill gesture.

This past weekend I joined a Congressional delegation that traveled to Germany, Albania, Macedonia, Italy and Belgium. Mr. President, while it was somewhat disheartening to see the effects of this tragedy up close, it was comforting to see the courageous spirit that persevered among our troops and the many non-government organizations aiding in the crisis.


It is incomprehensible to imagine the scope of this tragedy until you see it in person. On the ground and among the refugees, I was able to interact and listen to the stories of this human tragedy. Putting faces behind tragic accounts, I heard about the killing of innocent men and boys, the wanton burning of homes, and the brutal rape of Kosovar women.

In addition to confronting the humanitarian crisis, I had the good fortune of interacting with our troops. I am pleased to report that our troops had high spirits and that they remain committed to the NATO operation. As is customary with U.S. Armed Forces their preparedness, attention to detail, and commitment to duty and country was very impressive.

It is clear that there can be no winners from our present conflict. There are no easy answers to a crisis of this magnitude, but I am encouraged by both the release of our three service members and from my trip to the region that a diplomatic settlement can be reached. **Therefore, Mr. President, I am respectfully requesting a 72-hour pause in the bombing so that the U.S. and NATO officials may press for a diplomatic settlement.**

Mr. President, I want to thank you in advance for your attention to this request. I look forward to hearing from you and if I can be of any assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read 'Sheila Jackson Lee'.

Sheila Jackson Lee
Member of Congress

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), concerning alleged links between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and drug trafficking;
- 2) Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), concerning the meetings of the U.S. Congressional delegation and Russian Duma in Vienna, Austria;
- 3) Rep. David Dreier (D-CA) and seventy-eight other Members of Congress, concerning export control thresholds for computers;
- 4) Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 5) Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and ten other Members of Congress, concerning the meetings of the U.S. Congressional delegation and Russian Duma in Vienna, Austria;
- 6) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting that the President appoint former Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL) as a special envoy to Sudan; and,
- 7) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting that the President appoint a special envoy to Sudan.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 10, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

SUBJECT: REQUESTS A 72-HOUR PAUSE IN THE BOMBING SO
THAT THE U.S. AND NATO OFFICIALS MAY PRESS
FOR A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/10			
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS: CC: Chuck Brain

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:F INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D TX (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4112

May 28, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

GREG SCHULTE *BS*

FROM:

SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT:

Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Senator George Voinovich.

Concurrences by:

MH Mike Hurley; *VG* Valerie Guarnieri; *MT* Mark
Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Proposed Response

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Voinovich.

Background

Senator Voinovich wrote to after his return from the Balkans, which he visited with a Congressional delegation. He urges a bombing pause. He also applauds your support for the refugees.

In your reply, you thank the Senator for his support for U.S. humanitarian efforts and explain why we and our NATO allies will not pause the bombing until Milosevic meets the NATO conditions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Voinovich
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Voinovich:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts and am particularly gratified to learn you were able to visit with American troops on your recent trip to the Balkans. The courage and fortitude of America's military men and women will continue to be essential as we respond to Mr. Milosevic's repression in Kosovo.

In my estimation, given the terrible suffering the Kosovar Albanians have endured and the enormity of the crimes Milosevic has committed against them, there can be no lasting resolution until NATO's certain basic conditions are met: to allow the refugees to return with safety and self-government. I have thought hard about your request to call for a pause in the bombing of Yugoslavia. The question, it seems to me, is whether a pause would advance NATO's objective: to allow the refugees to return with safety and self-government.

I'd like to explain why I think it is essential NATO continue its campaign without a pause, even as we push forward on the diplomatic track at the same time. We have a long history of dealing with Milosevic, whose hate-filled nationalistic policies have sparked four wars in the last decade, causing unspeakable suffering and misery to hundreds of thousands. He has violated every obligation he has undertaken, and for more than a year he rejected every overture toward peace in Kosovo.

My concern is that Milosevic would use even a three-day pause to consolidate further the gains from his campaign of ethnic cleansing, resupply and reinforce his forces in Kosovo, and move in additional weapons and systems that would pose a serious threat to NATO aircraft and crews. While you point out that should Milosevic not seize the opportunity a pause offers to withdraw his forces NATO could resume the bombing campaign, obtaining allied consensus to resume military operations after a pause could be difficult. Milosevic's pattern is clear: he

would withdraw the minimum number of troops he judged necessary to create the illusion of compliance, while these inadequate measures would actually be directed at sowing disharmony among NATO allies. Given that pattern, NATO is determined to maintain the air campaign until Milosevic clearly and demonstrably accepts NATO's conditions to end the bombing.

NATO's campaign is working, and we are beginning to see evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. As you know, he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. Given this movement, we are pressing forward on the diplomatic front as you urge. Last week, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott met with Russian Special Kosovo Envoy Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari on Kosovo and is meeting again with them this week. We hope they will contribute to the eventual resolution of this situation.

Finally, I would like to thank you for your kind words about the emphasis Hillary and I have placed on the humanitarian challenge. We are giving financial as well as moral support to the frontline states, and have provided over \$210 million to address the needs of Kosovars since the beginning of 1998. We will help the refugees return to their homes and rebuild their lives and soon as conditions permit.

In recent days I have met with many Americans who expressed the conviction that America's moral leadership in this crisis is a defining moment as the world prepares to enter the new millennium. Thank you again for your views.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Voinovich
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

1760
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH
OHIO

317 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 224-3353

TDD: (202) 224-6997

senator_voinovich@voinovich.senate.gov
www.senate.gov/~voinovich

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3504

May 19, 1999

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues its operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), I wanted to urge you to consider pausing the air campaign to create a diplomatic environment conducive to a negotiated settlement to the ongoing conflict.

I applaud the efforts your administration has taken through the G-8 Group to outline the principles that would guide a political solution to the crisis. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright especially deserves a great deal of credit for leading her colleagues in this effort. However, I have noted with interest that a number of leaders in the international community have suggested that FRY President Slobodan Milosevic is unlikely to agree to a diplomatic solution while the NATO attacks continue. I agree. With that in mind, we need to create an environment that will encourage the success of our diplomatic efforts. A bombing pause would create that environment. You may be also interested to know that I respectfully made this bombing pause suggestion when several of my colleagues and I met with General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, this past Monday at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

Once the pause is initiated, we must again make it clear to the Serb people that our quarrel is not with them. We should also highlight, through Voice of America broadcasts or leaflet drops, that the bombing intensity will only increase in the weeks and months ahead. Unfortunately, this will likely involve more tragic civilian casualties and the further destruction of the Serb infrastructure. The point must be clearly made to the Serb people that they will continue to suffer as long as Milosevic is in power and is viciously attacking ethnic minorities. We can only hope that this will weaken the strong domestic political position that Milosevic has established in the wake of the bombing. It would be a tragic mistake to miss this opportunity to negotiate a settlement that brings about an end to the violence in Kosovo, the removal of Serb forces from Kosovo, ensures the return of the refugees, puts in place a multi-national peacekeeping force and lays the groundwork for a long-term political solution to the underlying problems. The human costs are too high in this conflict for negotiations to be dismissed at this point.

As you may know, I joined several of my colleagues in a trip to the Balkans this past weekend. You should be very proud of the armed forces you have deployed throughout the region. I can assure you that they are performing beyond any reasonable expectations. Amazingly, they

305801
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT
RESTRUCTURING AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 412
**ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS**
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SMALL BUSINESS
ETHICS

STATE OFFICES:
1240 EAST NINTH STREET
ROOM 2957
CLEVELAND, OH 44114
(216) 522-7095


37 WEST BROAD STREET
ROOM 970 (CASEWORK)
COLUMBUS, OH 43215
(614) 469-6774

37 WEST BROAD STREET
ROOM 960
COLUMBUS, OH 43215
(614) 469-6697

established a mission-capable tent city nearly overnight in Albania. Further, you and the First Lady are to be commended for the efforts you both have made to stress the gravity of the humanitarian situation to the American people.

I am ready to work with you in the Senate to build support for a bombing pause. I look forward to your leadership.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "George V. Voinovich". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping "G" and a distinct "V".

George V. Voinovich
United States Senator

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: VOINOVICH, GEORGE

DOC DATE: 19 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 305801

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NATO

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PAUSE IN AIRSTRIKES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 08 JUN 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
GORDON
LACKEY

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
SCHULTE
WEISS

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 25, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE GEORGE VOINOVICH

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO CONSIDER A BOMBING
PAUSE TO CREATE A DIPLOMATIC ENVIRONMENT TO
CONDUCT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE
ONGOING CONFLICT

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/25		99/05/27
REFERRAL NOTE:					
NSC-Glynn Davies			/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /		/ /

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220 _____

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R OH _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 27, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Paul D. Coverdell (R-GA), regarding the African Trade Opportunities delegation traveling to Nigeria on May 29;
- 2) Sen. Phil Gramm (R-TX) and five other Senators, concerning "tier 3" export licensing thresholds for high performance computers;
- 3) Sen. Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), concerning the current situation in Cyprus;
- 4) Sen. George V. Voinovich (R-OH), concerning the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 5) Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) and sixty-two other Members of Congress, concerning the current situation in Kosovo.

Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3674

May 29, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *MS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative Curt Weldon and ten colleagues. They have previously met with Secretary Albright regarding their proposal.

Concurrence by: *MH* Mike Hurley; *MT* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Weldon and ten of his House colleagues.

Background

Representative Curt Weldon, along with ten of his House colleagues, wrote you to describe the meetings in Vienna that resulted in the Weldon Resolution currently before the House.

Under Secretary Pickering has stressed, in Congressional testimony, that the resolution's language is simply too ambiguous to square with current NATO policy. Your response explains NATO's policy, that the Serb pullout from Kosovo and an end to the bombing campaign must come in that order, rather than "without regard to sequence" and why. You thank the House members for their constructive efforts.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Weldon
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Weldon:

Thank you for the letter recounting your meeting with Duma members in Vienna and for the report that you were kind enough to forward to my attention. I have asked my foreign policy team to give it close attention. I want to assure you that I share your desire to find a speedy resolution to the conflict.

I share your view that Russia has an important role in that effort. We are pressing forward on the diplomatic front as you urge and we are actively engaging the Russians. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott just met again with Russian Special Kosovo Envoy Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari to consider how best to move Milosevic to meet our conditions.

Your proposal calls for an end to NATO bombing and a Serb withdrawal from Kosovo without regard to sequence. I'd like to explain why I think it is essential that NATO preserve its conditions in sequence, even as we push forward on the diplomatic track. Were we confronting an adversary other than Milosevic, a looser set of demands might be appropriate. But we have a long history of dealing with Milosevic, whose hate-filled nationalistic policies have sparked four wars in the last decade, causing unspeakable suffering and misery to hundreds of thousands. He has violated every obligation he has undertaken, and for more than a year he rejected every overture toward peace in Kosovo.

My concern is that Milosevic would use a pause in bombing not to withdraw his troops, but to consolidate further the gains from his campaign of ethnic cleansing, resupply and reinforce his forces in Kosovo, and move in additional weapons and systems that would pose a serious threat to NATO aircraft and crews. Milosevic's pattern is clear: he would withdraw the minimum number of troops he judged necessary to create the illusion of

compliance, while these inadequate measures would actually be directed at sowing disharmony among NATO allies.

Given that pattern, NATO is determined to maintain the air campaign until Milosevic clearly and demonstrably accepts NATO's conditions to end the bombing. Those conditions will be met when Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb.

There is strong evidence we are succeeding. NATO's air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. In recent days, we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic, such as his acceptance of the G-8 principles.

In recent days I have met with many Americans who expressed the conviction that America's moral leadership in this crisis is a defining moment as the world prepares to enter the new millennium. Thank you again for your thoughtful letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Curt Weldon
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

303800
3674

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

May 4, 1999

President William Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

As a world leader committed to peace and human rights, we know you share our grave concerns about the escalating crisis in Kosovo and our desire to bring this conflict to a speedy and peaceful resolution. In that spirit, we write seeking your consideration of recommendations that we believe could lead to a negotiated settlement by leaders of stakeholder nations.

Recognizing the global security and human rights implications of prolonged fighting in the Balkans, we want to ensure that no stone is left unturned in the allies' effort to bring this crisis to closure. That is why we initiated bipartisan discussions last month on options our government might pursue to accomplish that goal. Through our interparliamentary exchanges in the Duma-Congress Study Group, we learned that many Russian leaders shared our desire to bring an end to the conflict. These Duma Deputies are deeply concerned about the security implications of this crisis for Russia as well as its potential to foster the rising nationalist fervor there. Given the high stakes in this crisis for both of our nations, and our desire to prevent further deterioration in U.S. - Russian relations, we welcomed the April 8 invitation from our Duma colleagues to discuss potential settlement options that international leaders might pursue to avoid further bloodshed in Yugoslavia.

We originally planned to meet April 23-24 and to visit a refugee camp. In deference to U.S. government concerns and with hopes of fostering a sense of neutrality, we held the Duma-Congress meetings April 30 - May 1 in Vienna. We started our meeting on the premise that any recommendations issued for consideration by our respective governments and allied leaders would have to meet NATO's demands for a peaceful settlement. After more than twelve hours of discussions, we jointly issued a report recommending options that international leaders could pursue to restore order in Yugoslavia. Not only do these recommendations meet NATO's conditions for peace in Kosovo, but after consulting with a key aide to Slobodan Milosevic, we believe that they could be accepted by the Serbian government as well.

Attached is a copy of that report, outlining our recommendations in more detail. We would like to brief you in more detail on this report, and request a meeting at your earliest convenience for that purpose. As an international leader with the power and influence to help end this conflict, we respectfully ask that you review the attached recommendations and work to ensure their serious consideration.

Sincerely,

Paul Hill

Neil Abernethy

Jim Gibbons

Dennis Kucinich

Lynda Harris

Marlene Hurley

Bob Dole

Bob Dole

Rich Nunn

J. F. Saxton

Corrine Brown

Report of the Meetings of the U.S. Congress and Russian Duma
Vienna, Austria
30 April – 1 May 1999

All sessions centered on the Balkan crisis. Agreement was found on the following points:

- I. The Balkan crisis, including ethnic cleansing and terrorism, is one of the most serious challenges to international security since World War II.
- II. Both sides agree that this crisis creates serious threats to global and regional security and may undermine efforts against non-proliferation.
- III. This crisis increases the threat of further human and ecological catastrophes, as evidenced by the growing refugee problem, and creates obstacles to further development of constructive Russian-American relations.
- IV. The humanitarian crisis will not be solved by bombing. A diplomatic solution to the problem is preferable to the alternative of military escalation.


Taking the above into account, the sides consider it necessary to implement the following emergency measures as soon as possible, preferably within the next week. Implementation of these emergency measures will create the climate necessary to settle the political questions

1. We call on the interested parties to find practical measures for a parallel solution to three tasks, without regard to sequence: the stopping of NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, withdrawal of Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of the military activities of the KLA. This should be accomplished through a series of confidence building measures, which should include but should not be limited to:


- a. The release of all prisoners of war.
- b. The voluntary repatriation of all refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations. NATO would be responsible for policing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders with Albania and Macedonia to ensure that weapons do not reenter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the returning refugees or at a later time.
- c. Agreement on the composition of the armed international forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian withdraw. The composition of the group should be decided by a consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership of Kosovo.
- d. The above group would be supplemented by the monitoring activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

- e. The Russian Duma and U.S. Congress will use all possibilities at their disposal in order to successfully move ahead the process of resolving the situation in Yugoslavia on the basis of stopping the violence and atrocities.
2. We recognize the basic principles of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which include:
 - a. wide autonomy for Kosovo
 - b. a multi-ethnic population
 - c. treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with international norms
3. We support efforts to provide international assistance to rebuild destroyed homes of refugees and other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to victims in Kosovo.
4. We, as members of the Duma and Congress, commit to active participation as follows:
 - Issue a Joint U.S. Congress-Russian Duma report of our meetings in Vienna. Concrete suggestions for future action will be issued as soon as possible.
 - Delegations will agree on timelines for accomplishment of above tasks.
 - Delegations will brief their respective legislatures and governments on outcome of the Vienna meetings and agreed upon proposals.
 - Delegations will prepare a joint resolution, based on their report, to be considered simultaneously in the Congress and Duma.
 - Delegations agree to continue a working group dialogue between Congress and the Duma in agreed upon places.
 - Delegations agree that Duma deputies will visit refugee camps and Members of Congress will visit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Members of Congress




Duma Deputies

Joe Linton
Bernard Sanders

Alva

Castillo

Corrin Brown

Jim Gibbons
Robert Kennedy
Angela Hs

Leon Shum

Dennis J. Kennedy

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 07, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CURT WELDON

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES A COPY OF A REPORT RECOMMENDING
OPTION FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN
YUGOSLAVIA & REQUEST A MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS THESE RECOMMENDATIONS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN	ORG	99/05/07		
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 9 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R PA (B) (C)

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *      OF SIGNER   *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *      CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING    *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE        *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), concerning alleged links between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and drug trafficking;
- 2) Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), concerning the meetings of the U.S. Congressional delegation and Russian Duma in Vienna, Austria;
- 3) Rep. David Dreier (D-CA) and seventy-eight other Members of Congress, concerning export control thresholds for computers;
- 4) Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 5) Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and ten other Members of Congress, concerning the meetings of the U.S. Congressional delegation and Russian Duma in Vienna, Austria;
- 6) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting that the President appoint former Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL) as a special envoy to Sudan; and,
- 7) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting that the President appoint a special envoy to Sudan.

Enclosures

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: WELDON, CURT
ABERCROMBIE, NEIL
GIBBONS, JIM

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 303800

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FWDS PAPER ON KOSOVO PEACE THROUGH RUSSIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9903672

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
WEISS

FOR INFO
BELL
HOLTZAPPLE
MCCARTHY
PASCUAL
SCHWARTZ
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK


CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

3563

Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
N/A
MEMORANDUM



TO: Glyn T. Davies

DATE: 5/10/99

FROM: Tim Emrich
Presidential Scheduling
184 OEOB/456-5306

ATTACHED:

-
- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| ☒ Please advise on
how to respond | ☐ For your information | ☐ For your action |
| ☐ As you requested | ☐ Please call me regarding
the attached | ☐ Please prepare
response per
instructions below |
| ☐ For your approval | ☐ For Surrogate
Consideration | ☐ Please prepare
Scheduling
Proposal |
-

COMMENTS: old request, not sure what/if anything
happened to original letter - ply advise on how to
handle. Jim

The National Security Council recommends that no response be sent.

Glyn T. Davies

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

CC:



Serbian Orthodox Church in the United States of America and Canada
The Episcopal Council

32377 N. Milwaukee Avenue - P. O. Box 519
Libertyville, Illinois 60048

Phone: (847) 367-0698

Fax: (847) 367-7901

No. 73
October 9, 1998

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

Please find enclosed the joint declaration of the Episcopal Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the United States of America and Canada which we direct to your attention, Mr. President, together with our urgent request for an audience with you as soon as possible. In order to prevent a human catastrophe of horrendous proportions, We believe that We can contribute significantly to help counter and dispel any misinformation that may cause you to undertake any actions which may result in needless, tragic and costly consequences of unimaginable proportions that no amount of regrets can undo.

In anticipation of your response and invitation, We express our readiness to meet with you at your earliest convenience, remaining,

Faithful to the cause of peace in the world,
Respectfully yours

PRESIDENT
THE EPISCOPAL COUNCIL

+ Christopher

METROPOLITAN
OF MIDWESTERN AMERICA



MAY 10 1999



Serbian Orthodox Church in the United States of America and Canada
The Episcopal Council

32377 N. Milwaukee Avenue - P. O. Box 519
Libertyville, Illinois 60048

Phone: (847)367-0698

Fax: (847) 367-7901

October 9, 1998

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We, the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the United States of America and Canada, gathered in extraordinary session, feel that it is our moral obligation to inform you of our great concern about the threats of NATO forces bombing Serbian Kosovo-Metohija, which is an integral part of Serbia and the United Republic of Yugoslavia.

We have no doubts that the International Community desires peace in the Balkans, as well as the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe in the Serbian region of Kosovo and Metohija. This we all desire. However, we ask ourselves whether bombing would not bring a greater humanitarian catastrophe and lead the Balkans and Europe into a hopeless situation. We, and the Serbian Orthodox Community in the United States, as American citizens, think that such an act, in violation of international law, would set a precedent by negating International law which would have dire consequences for the sovereignty of all nations, and that such an attack would bring shame upon our country and its democracy. As you surely know Mr. President, no other nation in the world, including our own United States of America, has ever been threatened or attacked in such a manner with bombing by other nations when forced to deal with lawless acts of terrorism within their own borders. Such an act would only encourage such lawlessness to continue unabated. We are convinced that a peaceful solution is possible.

Although we do not wish to delve into history, we are obligated to remind you that the Serbian people in that region have been biologically endangered with extinction and have repeatedly suffered forced exile from their homes and region from time of the fascist occupation of 1941, through- out the communist totalitarian system, and up to the most recent tragic events for both the Serbs and the Shiptars in Kosovo and Metohija.

Can it really be the aim of democratic America to destroy the last remnants of the Serbian people in that part of Serbia, which represents to them what Jerusalem is for the Jewish people?

We are deeply saddened by the one-sided and in many ways untruthful reporting by the mass media concerning the real situation in Kosovo. Such distortions have repeatedly resulted in the satanization of all Serbian people, and not only of the present regime. We believe that the restoring of political and diplomatic dialogue, with the dynamic help of the international community, is the only morally permissible and effective way of reaching a just resolution of the tragic Kosovo drama .

We pray to God to bless with wisdom and understanding all those in the world who are involved in this matter, that they seek the best and the most righteous solution for everyone concerned, and to prevent the mass slaughter of innocent people as had occurred in the previous bombings.

Respectfully,

PRESIDENT
THE EPISCOPAL COUNCIL



METROPOLITAN
OF MIDWESTERN AMERICA



UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9804625
RECEIVED: 25 JUN 98 08

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BERGER
STEIN, L

DOC DATE: 23 JUL 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CONGRESSIONAL

LEGAL ISSUES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DEVELOPING ESTIMATED TARGET DATES FOR
BOSNIA IMPLEMENTATION

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK DUE DATE: 01 JUL 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: COVEY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BANDLER
BELL
COVEY
NSC CHRON
RUDMAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9804625

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 COVEY
002 BERGER
002 STEIN, L
003 PRESIDENT
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 98062508 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 98070112 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 98072018 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 98072310 FOR SIGNATURE
X 98080417 PRESIDENT SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

7/15/98
3:20 PM

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4625 Redo

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(P) 7/15</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(P) 7/20</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>(P) 8/4</u>	<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

98 JUL 15 AM 10:27

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4625

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

h

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(P) 7/1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(P) 7/1</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

JBS bounced this for re-write - to simplify. We have recast the package and re-cleared it with Legal and

COMMENTS:

was due 6/30 the interagency

98 JUL 1 AM 11:13

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Starks, Tali T.

From: Millison, Cathy L.
Sent: Thursday, July 23, 1998 11:40 AM
To: @WWD - West Wing Desk; Covey, James P.; Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Cc: @CROSS - Cross Hatches; Quinn, Mary E.
Subject: RPT TO CONGRESS - DEVELOPING ESTIMATED TARGET DATES FOR BOSNIA - #4625
[UNCLASSIFIED]

This package is currently with the President. Sandy Berger had written that we should provide a copy to Levin so a letter to Levin was prepared. Clerk's Office has informed me that this will be sent as a Message to Congress and will not go via letters. Clerk's Office will provide NSC with a copy of the signed message but it will be the NSC's responsibility to transmit a copy to Senator Levin.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 23, 1998

President sgd per WH
Executive Clerk (13) 7/20ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEINSUBJECT: Report to Congress on Developing Estimated Target
Dates for Bosnia ImplementationPurpose

To forward a mandatory report to Congress on the development of estimated target dates for Bosnia implementation.

Background

The Levin Amendment to P.L. 105-74, the fiscal 1997 Bosnia Supplemental, urged you to seek agreement with NATO Allies on benchmarks for a sustainable peace process, estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks, and on a process to review progress towards achieving the benchmarks. The bill required you to report on efforts to gain agreement on these arrangements no later than June 30.

In your certification to Congress of March 3, 1998, you outlined ten conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. These conditions -- or benchmarks -- have been made a part of NATO's Oplan approved by NATO Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg May 28. The Oplan stipulates that SFOR will, in consultation with key international organizations (including the Office of the High Representative) and SHAPE, develop clear criteria based on the conditions outlined in Annex Z. These criteria will later be endorsed by the NATO Military Committee and ultimately approved by the NAC and become part of the regular six-month review process.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

On instruction, USNATO proposed to Allies on May 28 that SFOR, as part of developing specific criteria keyed to the President's benchmarks, develop estimated target dates for achieving these criteria. Allies agreed to our proposal June 11.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Speaker of the House (Tab A), the President of the Senate (Tab B) and Senator Levin.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to the Speaker of the House
Tab B	Letter to the President of the Senate
Tab C	Letter to Senator Levin

Tab A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Section 7 of the general provisions of Chapter I of P.L. 105-174, I am providing this report to inform Congress of ongoing efforts to meet the goals set forth therein.

With my certification to the Congress, dated March 3, 1998, I outlined ten conditions -- or benchmarks -- under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. Section 7 of P.L. 105-174 urges that we seek concurrence among NATO allies on: 1) the benchmarks set forth with the March 3 certification, 2) estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks, and 3) a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving those benchmarks. NATO has agreed to move ahead in all these areas.

First, NATO agreed to benchmarks parallel to ours on May 28 as part of its approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military plan (OPLAN 10407). Furthermore, the OPLAN requires SFOR to develop detailed criteria for each of these benchmarks, to be approved by the North Atlantic Council, which will provide a more specific basis to evaluate progress. SFOR will develop the benchmark criteria in coordination with appropriate international civilian agencies.

Second, with regard to timelines, the United States proposed that NATO military authorities provide an estimate of the time likely to be required for implementation of the military and civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement based on the benchmark criteria. Allies agreed to this approach on June 10. As SACEUR General Wes Clark testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee June 4, the development and approval of the criteria and estimated target dates should take two to three months.

Third, with regard to a review process, NATO will continue the six-month review process that began with the deployment of the

Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995, incorporating the benchmarks and detailed criteria. The reviews will include an assessment of the security situation, an assessment of compliance by the parties with the Dayton Agreement, an assessment of progress against the benchmark criteria being developed by SFOR, recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian agencies and recommendations on any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force.

While not required under P.L.105-174, we have sought to further utilize this framework of benchmarks and criteria for Dayton implementation among civilian implementation agencies. The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) adopted the same framework in its Luxembourg declaration of June 9, 1998. The declaration, which serves as the civilian implementation agenda for the next six months, now includes language that corresponds to the benchmarks in the March 3 certification to the Congress and in the SFOR Oplan. In addition, the PIC Steering Board called on the High Representative to submit a report on the progress made in meeting these goals by mid-September, which will be considered in the NATO six-month review process.

The benchmark framework, now approved by military and civilian implementers, is clearly a better approach than setting a fixed, arbitrary end date to the mission. This process will produce a clear picture of where intensive efforts will be required to achieve our goal: a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina for which a major international military force will no longer be necessary. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines can prove impossible to meet and tend to encourage those who would wait us out or undermine our credibility. Realistic target dates, combined with concerted use of incentives, leverage and pressure with all the parties, should maintain the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an enduring peace. While the benchmark process will be useful as a tool both to promote and review the pace of Dayton implementation, the estimated target dates established will be notional, and their attainment dependent upon a complex set of interdependent factors.

We will provide a supplemental report once NATO has agreed upon detailed criteria and estimated target dates. The continuing six-month reviews of the status of implementation will provide a useful opportunity to continue to consult with Congress. These reviews, and any updates to the estimated timelines for implementation, will be provided in subsequent reports submitted

pursuant to P.L. 105-174. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Tab B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to Section 7 of the general provisions of Chapter I of P.L. 105-174, I am providing this report to inform Congress of ongoing efforts to meet the goals set forth therein.

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We will provide a supplemental report once NATO has agreed upon detailed criteria and estimated target dates. The continuing six-month reviews of the status of implementation will provide a useful opportunity to continue to consult with Congress. These reviews, and any updates to the estimated timelines for implementation, will be provided in subsequent reports submitted

pursuant to P.L. 105-174. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Tab C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Levin:

Pursuant to Section 7 of the general provisions of Chapter I of P.L. 105-174, I am providing this report to inform Congress of ongoing efforts to meet the goals set forth therein.

With my certification to the Congress, dated March 3, 1998, I outlined ten conditions -- or benchmarks -- under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. Section 7 of P.L. 105-174 urges that we seek concurrence among NATO allies on: 1) the benchmarks set forth with the March 3 certification, 2) estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks, and 3) a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving those benchmarks. NATO has agreed to move ahead in all these areas.

First, NATO agreed to benchmarks parallel to ours on May 28 as part of its approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military plan (OPLAN 10407). Furthermore, the OPLAN requires SFOR to develop detailed criteria for each of these benchmarks, to be approved by the North Atlantic Council, which will provide a more specific basis to evaluate progress. SFOR will develop the benchmark criteria in coordination with appropriate international civilian agencies.

Second, with regard to timelines, the United States proposed that NATO military authorities provide an estimate of the time likely to be required for implementation of the military and civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement based on the benchmark criteria. Allies agreed to this approach on June 10. As SACEUR General Wes Clark testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee June 4, the development and approval of the criteria and estimated target dates should take two to three months.

Third, with regard to a review process, NATO will continue the six-month review process that began with the deployment of the

Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995, incorporating the benchmarks and detailed criteria. The reviews will include an assessment of the security situation, an assessment of compliance by the parties with the Dayton Agreement, an assessment of progress against the benchmark criteria being developed by SFOR, recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian agencies and recommendations on any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force.

While not required under P.L.105-174, we have sought to further utilize this framework of benchmarks and criteria for Dayton implementation among civilian implementation agencies. The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) adopted the same framework in its Luxembourg declaration of June 9, 1998. The declaration, which serves as the civilian implementation agenda for the next six months, now includes language that corresponds to the benchmarks in the March 3 certification to the Congress and in the SFOR Oplan. In addition, the PIC Steering Board called on the High Representative to submit a report on the progress made in meeting these goals by mid-September, which will be considered in the NATO six-month review process.

The benchmark framework, now approved by military and civilian implementers, is clearly a better approach than setting a fixed, arbitrary end date to the mission. This process will produce a clear picture of where intensive efforts will be required to achieve our goal: a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina for which a major international military force will no longer be necessary. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines can prove impossible to meet and tend to encourage those who would wait us out or undermine our credibility. Realistic target dates, combined with concerted use of incentives, leverage and pressure with all the parties, should maintain the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an enduring peace. While the benchmark process will be useful as a tool both to promote and review the pace of Dayton implementation, the estimated target dates established will be notional, and their attainment dependent upon a complex set of interdependent factors.

We will provide a supplemental report once NATO has agreed upon detailed criteria and estimated target dates. The continuing six-month reviews of the status of implementation will provide a useful opportunity to continue to consult with Congress. These reviews, and any updates to the estimated timelines for implementation, will be provided in subsequent reports submitted

pursuant to P.L. 105-174. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2202

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4625

June 26, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD BANDLER *DB*

FROM: JOCK COVEY *JC*

SUBJECT: Report to Congress: Developing Estimated Target
Dates for Bosnia Implementation

*should send
copy to Senate
from*

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a report to Congress regarding estimated target dates for Bosnia implementation. At Tab A is a letter to the Speaker of the House forwarding the Report to Congress. At Tab B is a similar letter for the President of the Senate.

The report was developed in and vetted through the interagency.

Concurrences by: *RB* Robert Bell, *JB* Jamie Baker, *MR* Mara Rudman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to the Speaker of the House

Tab B Letter to the President of the Senate

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Developing Estimated Target
Dates for Bosnia Implementation

Purpose

To forward a mandatory report to Congress on the development of estimated target dates for Bosnia implementation.

Background

The Levin Amendment to P.L. 105-74, the fiscal 1997 Bosnia Supplemental, urged you to seek agreement with NATO Allies on benchmarks for a sustainable peace process, estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks, and on a process to review progress towards achieving the benchmarks. The bill required you to report on efforts to gain agreement on these arrangements no later than June 30.

In your certification to Congress of March 3, 1998, you outlined ten conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. These conditions -- or benchmarks -- have been made a part of the NATO's Oplan approved by NATO Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg May 28. The Oplan stipulates that SFOR will, in consultation with key international organizations (including the Office of the High Representative) and SHAPE, develop clear criteria based on the conditions outlined in Annex Z. These criteria will later be endorsed by the NATO Military Committee and ultimately approved by the NAC and become part of the regular six-month review process. ✓

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

On instruction, USNATO proposed to Allies on May 28 that SFOR, as part of developing specific criteria keyed to the President's benchmarks, develop estimated target dates for achieving these criteria. Allies agreed to our proposal June 11.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Speaker of the House (Tab A) and the President of the Senate (Tab B).

Attachments

Tab A Letter to the Speaker of the House
Tab B Letter to the President of the Senate

working together, NATO, SFOR and civilian implementation ^{agencies} will be able to develop specific implementation criteria along with estimates of the time likely required for implementation of these criteria. This will produce a clear picture of where intensive efforts will be required to achieve our goal: a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When that goal is achieved, a major NATO-led military force will no longer be necessary.

When we developed and approved the post-June SFOR follow-on force, NATO allies agreed that instead of establishing a fixed, arbitrary end date for the mission, NATO's interests would be better served by focusing instead on the desired end state of the mission. In addition, our policy should be driven by progress toward achieving the goals of Dayton and the security situation, not by an arbitrary deadline. All eventualities in implementation cannot be foreseen when a deadline is set. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines tend to encourage those who would wait us out or undermine our credibility. Consequently, adopting deadlines for achieving such benchmarks could run counter to U.S. interests in pursuing a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Realistic target dates, combined with concerted use of leverage and pressure with all the parties, should maintain the sense of urgency necessary to achieve an enduring, irreversible peace process.

We intend to provide a supplemental report as soon as civilian implementation agencies and NATO have agreed upon coordinated target dates. The continuing six-month reviews of the status of implementation will provide a useful opportunity to continue to consult with Congress. These reviews, as well as any resulting adjustments to the estimated timelines for implementation, will be provided in subsequent reports submitted pursuant to Section 7 of the General Provisions of Chapter 1 of P.L. 105-174. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

3

agencies

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chion
4625

June 26, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD BANDLER *DB*
FROM: JOCK COVEY *JC*
SUBJECT: Report to Congress: Developing Estimated Target
Dates for Bosnia Implementation

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The report was developed in and vetted through the interagency.

Concurrences by: *RB* Robert Bell, Jamie Baker, *MR* Mara Rudman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

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Tab A Letter to the Speaker of the House
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

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THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Developing Estimated Target
Dates for Bosnia Implementation

Purpose

To forward a mandatory report to Congress on the development of estimated target dates for Bosnia implementation.

Background

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In your certification to Congress of March 3, 1998, you outlined ten conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. These conditions -- or benchmarks -- have been made a part of the NATO's Oplan approved by NATO Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg May 28. The Oplan stipulates that SFOR will, in consultation with key international organizations (including The Office of the High Representative) and SHAPE, develop clear criteria based on the conditions outlined in Annex Z. These criteria will later be endorsed by the NATO Military Committee and ultimately approved by the NAC and become part of the regular six-month review process.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

On instruction, USNATO proposed to Allies on May 28 that SFOR, as part of developing specific criteria keyed to the President's benchmarks, develop estimated target dates for achieving these criteria. Allies agreed to our proposal June 11.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Speaker of the House (Tab A) and the President of the Senate (Tab B).

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to the Speaker of the House
Tab B	Letter to the President of the Senate

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Section 7 of the general provisions of Chapter I of P.L. 105-174, I am providing this report to inform Congress of ongoing efforts to comply with the goals set forth therein.

With my certification to the Congress, dated March 3, 1998, I outlined ten conditions -- or benchmarks -- under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. Section 7 of P.L. 105-174 urges that we seek concurrence among NATO allies on the benchmarks set forth with the March 3 certification, estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks and a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving those benchmarks.

Operations Plan (Oplan) 10407 for the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which went into effect June 20, 1998, and which was adopted by allied foreign ministers on May 28, incorporates all the benchmarks identified with the March 3 certification. Oplan 10407 states that SFOR will develop detailed criteria in close coordination with key international organizations participating in civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement, including the Office of the High Representative and with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The North Atlantic Council will approve these detailed criteria following endorsement by the NATO Military Committee.

The benchmark covering the military aspects of Dayton is addressed in SFOR's primary mission. The benchmarks pertaining to civilian implementation are incorporated in the guidelines that should form the basis for SFOR's coordination with the Office of the High Representative and other international organizations responsible for civilian implementation in order to develop the detailed criteria for assessing progress in civilian implementation.

In response to the Congressional desire to have allies reach agreement on estimated target dates for achieving the benchmarks with the March 3 certification, the United States proposed that

allies agreed to task NATO National Military Authorities (NMAs) to provide an estimate of the time likely to be required for implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. Likewise, as part of developing the detailed criteria described above and in consultation with the civilian organizations responsible for implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement, NMAs have been tasked to provide estimates of the time likely to be required for implementation of these detailed criteria. Allies agreed to this approach on June 10 and directed that these detailed criteria and the accompanying estimates of the time likely to be required for their implementation be provided to the North Atlantic Council for review and approval. As SACEUR General Wesley Clark noted in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee June 4, this process could ultimately take two to three months.

Through the Office of the High Representative and in conjunction with the United Nations International Police Task Force and other international organizations involved in civilian implementation of Dayton, NATO can only estimate timelines for implementation of civilian tasks. To that end, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) adopted the same framework of benchmarks and criteria in its Luxembourg declaration of June 9, 1998. The declaration, which serves as the civilian implementation agenda for the next six months, now includes language that corresponds to the benchmarks with the March 3 certification to the Congress and in the SFOR Oplan. In addition, the PIC Steering Board called on the High Representative to submit a report on the progress made in meeting these goals by mid-September, which will be considered in the NATO six-month review process.

The six-month review process that began with the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995 will continue. Formal reviews by NATO allies will occur at intervals of not more than six months. The reviews will include an assessment of the security situation, an assessment of compliance by the parties with the provisions of the Dayton Agreement, an assessment of progress against the identified criteria being developed by SFOR, recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian implementation agencies and recommendations on any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force.

The development of estimated target dates to accompany the benchmarks set forth with the March 3 certification will be a useful opportunity to focus allied attention on the status of tasks related to implementation of the Dayton Agreement. By

working together, NATO, SFOR and civilian implementation will be able to develop specific implementation criteria along with estimates of the time likely required for implementation of these criteria. This will produce a clear picture of where intensive efforts will be required to achieve our goal: a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When that goal is achieved, a major NATO-led military force will no longer be necessary.

When we developed and approved the post-June SFOR follow-on force, NATO allies agreed that instead of establishing a fixed, arbitrary end date for the mission, NATO's interests would be better served by focusing instead on the desired end state of the mission. In addition, our policy should be driven by progress toward achieving the goals of Dayton and the security situation, not by an arbitrary deadline. All eventualities in implementation cannot be foreseen when a deadline is set. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines tend to encourage those who would wait us out or undermine our credibility. Consequently, adopting deadlines for achieving such benchmarks could run counter to U.S. interests in pursuing a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Realistic target dates, combined with concerted use of leverage and pressure with all the parties, should maintain the sense of urgency necessary to achieve an enduring, irreversible peace process.

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Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904147
RECEIVED: 28 MAY 99 16

TO: DORGAN, BYRON L

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 15 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
CO

WAR CRIMES

PERSONS: MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE RE MILOSEVIC INDICTMENT IN KOSOVO

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 09 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LACKEY

MOYN

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 6 OF 6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904147

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HURLEY	Z 99052816 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 99060214 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 99060317 KERRICK SGD MEMO
002 STEIN, L	Z 99060317 FOR SIGNATURE
003	X 99060717 KERRICK SGD MEMO
003 PRESIDENT	Z 99060717 FOR SIGNATURE
003 SCHULTE	Z 99060815 FOR REDO
004 BERGER	Z 99061122 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
004 STEIN, L	Z 99061122 FOR SIGNATURE
005 PRESIDENT	Z 99061611 FOR SIGNATURE
006	X 99061808 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
006 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 99061808 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 990607	VICE PRESIDENT
003 990607	WH CHIEF OF STAFF
006 990615 DORGAN, BYRON L	
006 990615 WH STRIPPING DESK	

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4147

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

JACOBSON

POWELL

SARGEANT

DAVIES

KERRICK

STEINBERG

BERGER

SITUATION ROOM

WEST WING DESK

RECORDS MGMT.

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

DATE 15 JUNE 99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>1</u>	<u>HC 6/14</u>	<u>J. Maloney</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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LOG #

4147800

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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PRS

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DOCLOG

2

A/O

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

JACOBSON

POWELL

RICE

DAVIES

KERRICK

STEINBERG

BERGER

SITUATION ROOM

WEST WING DESK

RECORDS MGMT.

1

09/11

2/10/00
JB

2

06/11

3

06/11

2/10/00
JB

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

420

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4147

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Back to NSC —
update in light
of current events
DAVIES

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISK.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4147
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SMK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>8 6/2</u>	
RICE	<u>2</u>	<u>8 6/3</u>	
DAVIES			
KERRICK	<u>23</u>	<u>6 6/3</u>	
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u>		
BERGER	<u>copy</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>Enk 6/3</u>	<u>Dispel</u>
RECORDS MGMT.			

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

Document received on 22 MAY

CC:

COMMENTS: Orig. Correspondence on
ICTY/Losovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1999

Dear Byron:

Thank you for your letter concerning Mr. Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This effort to displace systematically an entire people from their land because of their ethnicity has been an affront to all peace-loving nations, and that is why NATO intervened. The end of the air strikes and the entrance of KFOR into Kosovo to secure a safe environment do not diminish Mr. Milosevic's accountability for his acts.

I know you were as heartened as I was by Justice Arbour's announcement of the indictment of Milosevic and his associates for crimes against humanity and other war crimes. The indictment sends the clear message that those who order such brutal crimes will not do so with impunity.

The United States supports the work of the Hague Tribunal more than any other nation. For six years, this support has been unstinting. While the Tribunal is an independent body, we have urged it to pursue its investigation of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. We will continue to provide as much relevant information as we can to the Tribunal as it solidifies the case against Milosevic.

I am gratified by congressional cooperation on this issue, especially the approval of supplemental funding for the Tribunal. This funding will help greatly in our efforts to deepen and intensify our support.

I very much share your sense of the importance of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's work and look forward to your continued support as we work to bring peace and justice to this war torn region.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Dorgan". The signature is stylized with a large, looped initial "B" and a cursive "Dorgan".

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1999

'99 JUN 16 AM 11:10

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER (K) R
LARRY STEIN JS*signed*

6-17-99

SUBJECT:

Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to Senator Dorgan regarding the Milosevic indictment.

Background

Senator Byron Dorgan wrote condemning Slobodan Milosevic's unconscionable brutality in Kosovo and urged your support of ICTY in its efforts to indict, apprehend and punish war criminals. He urged you to make this a priority among our aims in the Kosovo conflict.

In your reply, you note that you are heartened by Justice Arbour's recent announcement of Milosevic's indictment. You further explain, as you did in Florida, your Administration's strong support for ICTY's work, which includes information sharing and funding. You note that NATO will not rule out future contacts with Milosevic should he meet the non-negotiable conditions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Outgoing Letter

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4147
REDO

June 11, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on ICTY/Kosovo

Senator Dorgan wrote the President to denounce Milosevic and urge our cooperation with ICTY. The response and your memorandum to the President are attached.

Concurrence by:  Mike Hurley; David Wippman; Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Senator Dorgan
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

BYRON L. DORGAN
NORTH DAKOTA
713 HART BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3405
202-224-2551
202-224-9378 TOD

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION
ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES
INDIAN AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN, DEMOCRAT POLICY COMMITTEE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3405

May 20, 1999

306040 4147
STATE OFFICES

312 FEDERAL BUILDING
THIRD AND ROSSER AVENUE
P.O. BOX 2579
BISMARCK, ND 58502
701-250-4618
1-800-666-4482 TOLL-FREE

112 ROBERTS STREET, ROOM 110
P.O. BOX 2250
FARGO, ND 58107
701-239-5389

102 NORTH 4TH STREET, ROOM 108
GRAND FORKS, ND 58201
701-746-8972

100 1ST STREET, S.W., ROOM 105
MINOT, ND 58701
701-852-0703

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have supported the air strikes that the United States and NATO have launched against Mr. Milosevic and his troops, who have been conducting ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other unspeakable horrors against the Albanians in Kosovo.

As the air strikes have continued and negotiations with the Russians serving as intermediaries have begun, I have become concerned that this conflict may be resolved without holding Mr. Milosevic accountable for his despicable actions.

In short, any negotiated settlement to this conflict that allows Mr. Milosevic to remain in power is a tragic mistake that would undermine the basis for NATO engagement in the Balkans.

For this reason, I have been insisting that the United States and NATO countries use their influence to have Mr. Milosevic indicted and tried before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to answer for his crimes. I do not understand the reluctance of the United States or the NATO countries to aggressively pursue that as a primary objective.

Mr. President, I will only continue support for these air strikes if our policy is to bring Mr. Milosevic to justice and hold him accountable before the ICTY for the unspeakable war crimes he and his troops have committed against the Albanian Kosovars. In my judgement, negotiating a settlement with Mr. Milosevic that leaves him in power and fails to prosecute him as a war criminal would be an abysmal failure of the efforts of the United States and NATO to end the suffering and repression of the Albanian Kosovars.

I am introducing legislation in the U.S. Senate today calling on your administration to aggressively support the prosecution of Mr. Milosevic as a war criminal. I hope the Congress will pass that resolution soon. Regardless of the outcome, however, I will not support continued air strikes if the United States and NATO don't demand that Mr. Milosevic be held accountable. He must be held up as an example to the world that we are tireless in our pursuit of justice.

Sincerely,



Byron L. Dorgan
U.S. Senator

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

(K) R

SUBJECT:

Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

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Background

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In your reply, you note that you are heartened by Justice Arbour's recent announcement of Milosevic's indictment. You further explain, as you did in Florida, your Administration's strong support for ICTY's work, which includes information sharing and funding. You note that NATO will not rule out future contacts with Milosevic should he meet the non-negotiable conditions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Outgoing Letter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

med-size
Azure
2 pages
(4147)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Byron:

Thank you for your letter concerning Mr. Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This effort to systematically ~~displace~~ ^{displace} an entire people from their land because of their ethnicity has been an affront to all peace-loving nations, and that is why NATO intervened. The end of the air strikes and the entrance of KFOR into Kosovo to secure a safe environment do not diminish Mr. Milosevic's accountability for his acts. ^{next line}

I know you were as heartened as I was by Justice Arbour's announcement of the indictment of Milosevic and his associates for crimes against humanity and other war crimes. The indictment sends the clear message that those who order such brutal crimes will not do so with impunity.

The United States supports the work of the Hague Tribunal more than any other nation. For six years, this support has been unstinting. While the Tribunal is an independent body, we have urged it to pursue its investigation of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. We will continue to provide as much relevant information as we can to the Tribunal as it solidifies the case against Milosevic.

I am gratified by Congressional cooperation on this issue, especially the approval of supplemental funding for the Tribunal. This funding will help greatly in our efforts to deepen and intensify our support.

I very much share your sense of the importance of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's work and look forward to your continued support as we work to bring peace and justice to this war torn region.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4147

June 1, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER *WR*

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *fl*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sm*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on ICTY/Kosovo

Senator Dorgan wrote the President to denounce Milosevic and urge our cooperation with ICTY. The response and your memorandum to the President are attached.

Concurrence by: *W* Mike Hurley; *W* David Wippman; *W* Mark Tavlarides

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Tab A Letter to Senator Dorgan
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER (K) Fu
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Outgoing Letter

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: HURLEY

LOG NUMBER: 4147
~~4147~~

DUE DATE: 9 Jun

DATE STAFFED: 28 MAY

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: REP. DORGAN

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 27, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE BYRON DORGAN

SUBJECT: WRITES SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. AND NATO
COUNTRIES USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO HAVE
MILOSEVIC INDICTED AND TRIED BEFORE THE ICTY
TO ANSWER FOR HIS CRIMES

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/27		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 _____

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D ND _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *      CODE = A      *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING     *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 28, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-ND), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 2) Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-MN), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 3) Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) and sixty-two other Members of Congress, concerning the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 4) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), concerning the President's potential visit to Bangladesh.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1999

414

Re

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER (K) Fu
LARRY STEIN JS

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Outgoing Letter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice Presiden
Chief of Staf

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Byron:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510