

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chronos for May 1999 [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1707

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 20, 1999. [Record ID: 9904037] [partial] (1 page)	05/26/1999	P3/b(3)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 17, 1999. [Record ID: 9904036] [partial] (1 page)	05/26/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [6]

2008-0994-F

vz6296

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Representative Capuano et al.

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft responses to Representative Michael Capuano et al. regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *MH* Mike Hurley; *MT* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Responses to Representative Capuano et al.

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to Representative Capuano and 23 other Members of Congress regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Representative Capuano and twenty three other Representatives wrote to you expressing support for NATO's air operations but also asking that you consult fully with Congress and seek its approval before introducing American ground troops into the Kosovo conflict.

In your replies, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces at part of the international security presence with NATO at its core. You restate your April 28 commitment to the Congressional leadership to consult fully with Congress, and to ask for its support, before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Representative Capuano et al.
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Michael:

Thank you for the letter from you and twenty three of your colleagues expressing support for the air strikes undertaken by our country and NATO in an effort to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, I can assure that I would think long and hard, and consult closely with Congress, before ever committing American soldiers to combat in Kosovo.

I thank you again for your support to the ongoing efforts of the United State and its allies to create the conditions in which the people of Kosovo can return to their homes.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Michael F. Capuano
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

303160
3334

April 29, 1999

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We have supported the air strikes undertaken by our country and NATO in an effort to end genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In good conscience, we cannot stand by while President Milosevic commits unspeakable violence against the people of Kosovo. We hope that ultimately the air campaign will result in an end to Mr. Milosevic's conduct and a return of the Kosovars to their country to live in peace.

If the time comes, however, that serious consideration is given to introducing American ground troops into that conflict, we respectfully request and expect that you will consult fully with Congress and seek our approval before such action is taken.

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signatures: Phil Meade, Ted Lieu, Bonnie R., Jeff Young, Bob Ulan, and Louie Lohr]

[Handwritten signatures: Michael E. Caputo, David D. Phelps, Phil Lane, Karl Wolf, Ed Pastor, and Tom C. Ichniowski]

Nancy Kapter

Lydia V. Pitt

Tomeray

Mark Woodell

Alex Campbell

Julia W. Ortiz

Stephanie Palko

Jan Schabowsky

[Signature]

Ch Edwards

Carol Rodriguez

Karen M. Carter

TO: PRESIDENT

Capuano

FROM: CAPUANO, MICHAEL
LUCAS, FRANK
PHELPS, DAVID

DOC DATE: 29 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 303160

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

NATO
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR GROUND TROOPS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 11 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

LACKEY
MCELDOWNEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO

BANDLER
BELL
BLINKEN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 03, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE MICHAEL CAPUANO

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT TO CONSULT FULLY WITH
CONGRESS AND SEEK APPROVAL BEFORE CONSIDERING
SENDING AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS INTO KOSOVO

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/03		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 20 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D MA (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM        *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL      *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE       *C-COMPLETED          *      CODE = A      *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET   *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC *                      *      OUTGOING      *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY  *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE        *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John F. Kerry (D-MA), concerning his recent meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia;
- 2) Rep. Michael E. Capuano (D-MA) and twenty-three other Members of Congress, concerning the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 3) Rep. John Joseph Moakley (D-MA) and thirteen other Members of Congress, recommending the closure of the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3550

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERBER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Senators Domenici, Voinovich, and Crapo regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *MS* Mike Hurley; Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Responses the Senators

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to Senators Domenici, Voinovich, and Crapo regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Senator Pete Domenici sent you a letter asking that you submit a request to Congress before committing the United States to military action beyond the current air campaign. Senators George Voinovich and Mike Crapo sent you a letter with the same request.

In your reply, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces at part of the international security presence with NATO at its core.

You also reiterate your commitment from April 28 to consult fully with congress and ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Senators Domenici, Voinovich, and Crapo
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Domenici:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo. I appreciate your support for the efforts of our men and women in uniform, and want to explain to you our policy in the region, particularly with respect to possible deployment of American ground forces.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open

fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, as I explained in a letter of April 28 to Congressional leadership, I can assure you that I would think long and hard, and seek Congressional support before ever introducing ground troops into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

I appreciate your concern about the region and your views about the possible commitment of American ground forces. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Voinovich:

Thank you for the letter from yourself and Senator Crapo on Kosovo. I wish to take this opportunity to explain our policy and objectives, and why I think we can succeed.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, as I stated in a letter of April 28 to Congressional leadership, I would consult closely with Congress, and seek its support before ever introducing U.S. ground troops into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

Thank you for your offer to work with the Administration on this important matter. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Voinovich
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Crapo:

Thank you for the letter from yourself and Senator Voinovich on Kosovo. I wish to take this opportunity to explain our policy and objectives, and why I think we can succeed.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

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I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, as I stated in a letter of April 28 to Congressional leadership, I would consult closely with Congress, and seek its support before ever introducing U.S. ground troops into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

Thank you for your offer to work with the Administration on this important matter. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Mike Crapo
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

PETE V. DOMENICI
NEW MEXICO

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3101

3550 3034 98

COMMITTEES:
BUDGET
APPROPRIATIONS
ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
INDIAN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

May 4, 1999

Dear President Clinton,

As a Senator and strong supporter of our military men and women, I feel obliged to convey my position with you regarding the U.S. involvement in hostilities in Kosovo. As you well know, several legislative packages already exist which would propose to preempt, further define, or curtail your authority and responsibilities as President. I believe that these options are neither prudent at this particular time, nor do they necessarily conform with desired consensus in an effort that involves the active engagement of our military in a hostile situation.

I recognize that as Commander in Chief you have broad authorities and grave responsibilities in decisions of national security and foreign policy. You have chosen to take the lead in this air war. As you well know, these are decisions that directly impact the daily lives of citizens throughout this country and will have long-term implications for the security and prosperity of the American people.

If you should decide that this operation requires means beyond the current air campaign, I respectfully ask that you send us your request. Upon receiving any such request, I offer you my commitment to help bring the matter before the Senate for deliberation and a decision expeditiously.

Sincerely,



PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Pete V.
Domenici
UNITED STATES SENATOR



Fax Data Sheet

328 Hart Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510
202-224-6621
fax: 202-224-7371
www.senate.gov/~domenici

Date: 5/4/99
Time: 4:35 EST
To: President Bill Clinton
Fax No.: (202) 456-6221

From: Senator Pete V. Domenici
Phone No.: 224-7001

Number of pages including this sheet: 2

Message:

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 05, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE PETE V. DOMENICI

SUBJECT: CONVEYS HIS POSITON WITH THE PRESIDENT
REGARDING THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES
IN KOSOVO

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/05		19/5/7
NSC (GLYN T. DAVIES)	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: *E/C*

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:F INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R NM (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

S

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John Ashcroft (R-MO), concerning the possible purchase by the Government of Greece of American F-16 fighter jets;
- 2) Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) and thirty-six other Senators, concerning U.S.-Turkey relations;
- 3) Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 4) Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) and fifteen other Senators, concerning the efforts of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
- 5) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), recommending the establishment of an international tribunal for alleged crimes against humanity in Cambodia during the 1970's;
- 6) Rep. Mark Green (R-WI) and ten other Members of Congress, concerning funding for the current military actions in Kosovo;
- 7) Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), urging the President to invite the President of the Democratic Socialist

MAY 7 1999

Republic of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga, on an official visit to the United States;
and,

- 8) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting the appointment
of a special envoy for Sudan.

Enclosures

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: DOMENICI, PETE V

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 303498

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ASKS POTUS SEND REQUEST IF KOSOVO REQUIRES MEANS BEYOND AIR CAMPAIGN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 21 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BELL

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

301680
3197

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 14, 1999

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:


As the United States continues to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), we wanted to take this opportunity to express our most sincere hope that a ground campaign is not being considered by the Alliance.


For months, the human rights situation in Kosovo has been appalling. We realize that the United States is involved in this effort to both protect the Kosovar Albanians as well as significantly degrade the FRY's ability to wage war on an innocent, defenseless population. These are well-intentioned, laudable humanitarian goals. However, reports indicate that this situation in Kosovo has deteriorated since the strikes were initiated and that the international community is considering deploying ground troops to further protect the Kosovar Albanians.

We believe that before the United States commits troops to a NATO ground campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), the American people and their congressional representatives need the opportunity to fully express their will on this matter. History has demonstrated such serious commitments are difficult to sustain without this consent. Therefore, we hope the consent of Congress will be sought before committing to a military campaign on the ground in the FRY.

We look forward to working with you on this important matter in the future. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,


George V. Voinovich
United States Senator


Mike Crapo
United States Senator

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA), Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) and Sen. Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), concerning the current situation in Kosovo and the Snowe-Cleland Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999;
- 2) Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI), concerning the President's upcoming meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan and next year's G-8 summit to be hosted by Japan;
- 3) Sen. George V. Voinovich (R-OH) and Sen. Michael D. Crapo (R-ID), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 4) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), concerning the future stability of Southeastern Europe in light of the current conflict in Serbia-Montenegro;
- 5) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), recommending the sale of long-range early warning radar to Taiwan;
- 6) Rep. William F. Goodling (R-PA), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;

APR 27 1999

- 7) Rep. Joseph M. Hoeffel (D-PA) and seventeen other Members of Congress, concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 8) Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), concerning possible human rights violations at the Buenos Aires Yoga School in Argentina;
- 9) Rep. Jose E. Serrano (D-NY), concerning the American military presence on the Island of Vieques;
- 10) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), concerning the NATO summit and countries that have expressed an interest in joining the Alliance;
- 11) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and four other Members of Congress, expressing concern over the massive inflow of foreign aid into Indonesia in light of upcoming national elections; and,
- 12) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), enclosing a copy of his remarks from the floor of the House of Representatives on April 21 concerning the current situation in Kosovo.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 19, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE GEORGE VOINOVICH

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT TO CONSULT WITH
CONGRESS BEFORE COMMITTING TO A MILITARY
CAMPAIGN ON THE GROUND IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY)

ROUTE TO:		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/19		99/4/26
NSC	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: E/C

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 1 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R OH (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*		*OUTGOING	*
R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
-FOR-SIGNATURE *			*
-INTERIM REPLY *			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

B

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: *Rep.* VOINOVICH, GEORGE
CRAPO, MIKE

DOC DATE: 14 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 301680

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST CONSENT OF CONGRESS BEFORE SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BELL
BLINKEN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *h*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*

SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Representative Goodling

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative Bill Goodling regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *MH* *MT* Mike Hurley; Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Representative Goodling

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to Representatives Goodling and Hayes regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Representatives Goodling and Hayes sent you a letters asking that you not deploy ground forces in Yugoslavia. Representative Hayes had recently met with troops at Ft. Bragg and found himself unable to justify their commitment to the field.

In your reply, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces at part of the international security presence with NATO at its core.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Representative Goodling and Hayes
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Goodling:

Thank you for note expressing your deep concern about deploying ground forces into Yugoslavia. I wish to respond by explaining our policy and our objectives, and why I think we can succeed.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those

policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, I can assure that I would think long and hard, and consult closely with Congress, before ever committing American soldiers to combat in Kosovo.

We do not believe our measured intervention in Kosovo will become a slippery slope. Rather, we believe our involvement, as I have outlined it, is justified; it is also working. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bill Goodling
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Hayes:

Thank you for your letter concerning the situation in Kosovo. I am particularly happy you shared your impressions of your meetings with soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg. The courage and fortitude of American military men and women has been essential to our campaign to end Milosevic's reign of terror in Kosovo.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

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I firmly believe that NATO's air campaign is not only justified, it is demanded, and it is working. In recent days I have met many Americans who expressed the conviction that America's moral leadership in this crisis is a defining moment as the world prepares to enter the new millennium. Thank you again for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. "Robin" Hayes
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

BILL GOODLING
19TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

CHAIRMAN:
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND
THE WORKFORCE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TOLL FREE DISTRICT NUMBER:
800-632-1811
<http://www.house.gov/goodling/>



3198

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3819

April 19, 1999

201111
ROOM 2107
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-5836
DISTRICT OFFICES:
FEDERAL BUILDING
200 SOUTH GEORGE STREET
YORK, PA 17405-9999
CHAMBER BUILDING
212 NORTH HANOVER STREET
CARLISLE, PA 17013-2423
140 BALTIMORE STREET
ROOM 301
GETTYSBURG, PA 17325-2311
2020 YALE AVENUE
CAMP HILL, PA 17011-5456
44 FREDERICK STREET
HANOVER, PA 17331-3598

President William Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500-0005

Dear Mr. President:

Please, please, please no ground troops in Yugoslavia. I know you know the history of the Balkans. We will be mired down in that mess for years to come with body bags coming back to this country, and then the necessity for a draft will make Vietnam protests look like a Sunday school picnic. I'm sure that is not what you want the legacy of your presidency to be.

Sincerely,

Bill

BILL GOODLING
Member of Congress

WFG/co

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA), Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) and Sen. Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), concerning the current situation in Kosovo and the Snowe-Cleland Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999;
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APR 27 1999

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- 9) Rep. Jose E. Serrano (D-NY), concerning the American military presence on the Island of Vieques;
- 10) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), concerning the NATO summit and countries that have expressed an interest in joining the Alliance;
- 11) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and four other Members of Congress, expressing concern over the massive inflow of foreign aid into Indonesia in light of upcoming national elections; and,
- 12) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), enclosing a copy of his remarks from the floor of the House of Representatives on April 21 concerning the current situation in Kosovo.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 21, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE BILL GOODLING

SUBJECT: OPPOSES THE DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND TROOPS IN
YUGOSLAVIA

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/21		99/4/26
NSC	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS:

E/c

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R PA (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *      CODE = A      *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING     *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

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LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

S

TO: PRESIDENT

WFG
FROM: GOODLING, WILLIAM F

DOC DATE: 19 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 301911

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AGAINST GROUND TROOPS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BELL

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

ROBIN HAYES

8TH DISTRICT, NORTH CAROLINA

130 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-3715
FAX: (202) 225-4036

COMMITTEES:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-3308

April 12, 1999

DISTRICT OFFICES

137 UNION STREET, SOUTH
CONCORD, NC 28025
(704) 786-1612
FAX (704) 782-1004

230 EAST FRANKLIN STREET
ROCKINGHAM, NC 28379
(910) 997-2070
FAX (910) 997-7987

TOLL FREE IN NC
(888) 207-1311

The Honorable William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

Over the Easter work session, I had the good fortune of spending time with military personnel posted at Ft. Bragg in the 8th District of North Carolina. On the eve of possible American ground force involvement in Kosovo, I reflect on a discussion I had with eight young paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division around the lunch table. I left lunch with a peace of mind that the security of my family and every American alike rested on the shoulders of those capable soldiers. Looking across the table into the eyes of those young Americans, I realized that not a one of them had reservations about deploying to the Balkans. I also realized that, had I been asked, I couldn't have given a response as to why this nation may place them in harm's way.

Mr. President, my position is unchanged. I cannot and will not support a resolution to deploy ground forces in Kosovo at this time. Clearly, there are substantial reports and evidence of horrific crimes committed against innocents. These accounts are heart-wrenching, and I am very sensitive to the plight of the Kosovars. I cannot in good conscious, however, ask the sons and daughters of my neighbors and our nation to leave their last breath on a Yugoslavian battlefield for reasons that remain ill-defined.

In this moment of continued civil unrest in Yugoslavia, I ask that you lead our nation into a public discourse about the objectives of the United States in Kosovo by engaging this Congress in a national debate.

I have long held that before we ask our military to deploy abroad, we must be satisfied that we have answers to the following questions: What we intend to accomplish; How we intend to implement our mission plan; And how we intend to bring our forces home. The American people and, most importantly, our fighting forces deserve to know what we hope to accomplish in Yugoslavia, that we will give our troops everything they need, and that we will not tie their hands with political strings. Only then can we have one American voice echoing support for our mission. And only then can I tell those fine soldiers from the 82nd Airborne why their country is asking of them a patriot's greatest sacrifice.

Sincerely,

Robin Hayes
Member of Congress

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and eight other Members of Congress, concerning their recent trip to Europe with Secretary Cohen to meet with NATO allies;
- 2) Sen. Robert J. Torricelli (D-NJ), concerning an "open skies" agreement between the U.S. and Argentina;
- 3) Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC), concerning the current events in Kosovo;
- 4) Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), concerning the current events in Kosovo; and,
- 5) Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), concerning the current events in Kosovo.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 15, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ROBIN HAYES

SUBJECT: INFORMS THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WILL NOT
SUPPORT A RESOLUTION TO DEPLOY GROUND FORCES
IN KOSOVO

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/15		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 _____

___ MAIL USER CODES: (A) R NC _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *                OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *      CODE = A      *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *                OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                        *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE        *                        *                        *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                        *                        *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
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LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

5

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HAYES, ROBIN

DOC DATE: 12 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 301238

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DOES NOT SUPPORT RESOLUTION TO DEPLOY GROUND TROOPS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 30 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BELL
BOUCHARD
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3010

May 22, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative Rick Boucher's letter on Kosovo and China's entry into the WTO.

Concurrences by: *only* Mike Hurley; Mark Tavlartides; Ken Lieberthal

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Rep. Boucher

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo and WTO

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Representative Rick Boucher concerning Kosovo and China's entry into the WTO.

Background

Representative Rick Boucher wrote to you to express his support for your Kosovo policy, including a possible decision to deploy ground forces if deemed necessary. He also endorsed China's entry into the WTO.

Your reply summarizes Administration Kosovo policy and updates him on air campaign progress and indications of dissent in Serbia. It also summarizes your policy with respect to the deployment of ground forces. Finally, it explains that China's entry into the WTO is very much in America's interest and that we expect this to occur before the end of the year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Rep. Collins
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Rick:

Thank you for your letter concerning Kosovo and China's entry into the WTO. I appreciate the opportunity to explain our position on both matters.

Turning to Kosovo first, the staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing there, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century, we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months, the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Mr. Milosevic. In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time, he publicly accepted the G-8's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded that the details be negotiated directly with

the United Nations. But we have made clear that the details are non-negotiable.

I appreciate your support on deploying ground forces to Kosovo. Clearly, Mr. Milosevic's security forces must be replaced with an effective international security force deployed there with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, I can assure that I would think long and hard, and consult closely with Congress, before ever committing American soldiers to combat in Kosovo.

As to China's entry in the WTO, we want China to enter the WTO this year on the basis of a strong commercial accession agreement. We are close to reaching such an agreement, with only a few significant items yet to resolve. We are prepared to negotiate seriously with the Chinese to complete this package as soon as they are ready to do so.

A strong commercial agreement will be very much in America's interests. It will open China's market so that our bilateral trade will take place on a more level playing field. That will substantially increase American exports and American jobs. At the same time, China's entry into the WTO will achieve other goals of this Administration: promoting market-oriented reform in China and moving global trade increasingly into a rules-based framework. Both of these improve the future environment for healthy American economic growth.

Thank you again for your letter and I deeply appreciate your support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Rick Boucher
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



3010

301458

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

1230

RICK BOUCHER
9TH DISTRICT
VIRGINIA

April 12, 1999

Mr. President,

Many thanks for the honor of sitting at your table during the state dinner last Thursday. My friend Wendy and I greatly appreciate your hospitality.

While it was not appropriate to address these topics during the dinner conversation, I want you to know that I support your actions in the Balkans and will support the introduction of ground forces if you deem them necessary.

I also endorse the entry of China into the WTO. Congress has repeatedly approved "Most Favored Nation" status for China, with broad support from members of our party, and I believe we can pass legislation awarding that status permanently.

You are doing excellent work in leading our nation. You have my admiration and support.

Cordially,

Rub

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Paul D. Coverdell (R-GA), concerning long term recovery efforts for Central America and the Caribbean in the wake of Hurricane Mitch;
- 2) Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA), concerning the current situation in the Kosovo and the China-WTO negotiations;
- 3) Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), concerning the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 4) Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), concerning his recent visit to Northern Albania.

APR 21 13:29

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 16, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE RICK BOUCHER

SUBJECT: SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS
AND INTRODUCTION OF GROUND FORCES AND THANK
THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SIT AT
THE HEAD TABLE AT THE STATE DINNER

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/16			
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230
MAIL USER CODES: (A) D VA (B) (C)

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED            *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL    *      OF SIGNER   *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED           *      CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED           *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING    *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

5

May 26, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 20, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 20.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *SPB* NARA, Date *7/30/2014*
2008
2014-0544-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 26, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 20, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 20, 1999. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: May 26, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SDB NARA, Date 7/30/2019
204-0544-n

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 20, 1999. [Record ID: 9904037] [partial] (1 page)	05/26/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [6]

2008-0994-F
vz6296

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 20, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Raltston
John Donovan

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
Randy Beers

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Treasury:
Timothy Geithner
Magthre Lundsager

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

NSC:
Greg Schulte
James Baker
Miles Lackey
David Leavy
Matthew Vaccaro

USUN:
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Michael Daniel

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0544-M (1,51)

KBH 7/31/2019

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: May 26, 2009

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- An analysis should be conducted of the environmental consequences of striking barges loaded with oil on the Danube. (Action: DOD) (~~8~~)
- The USG should consider the feasibility and utility of arranging for any ship that calls at a FRY port, or that belongs to a company that has shipping calling at FRY ports, to be banned from entry into NATO/EU ports. (Action: State) (~~e~~)
- The USG should begin to implement the action plan presented for an international police force for Kosovo. This should include presenting the concept to "quint" allies to gain their support and to UN and OSCE planners to encourage parallel planning in the two organizations. (Action: State) (~~e~~)
- The USG should press to implement the NATO maritime "visit and search" regime by encouraging Germany to exclude its ships from participation at the outset and encouraging the UK to accept this outcome. (Action: State) (~~e~~)

May 26, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *fn*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 17, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 17.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SD3 NARA, Date 7/30/2019
7014-0549-m

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 26, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 17, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 17, 1999. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(a) (d)

Declassify On: May 26, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SPB NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0544-11

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 17, 1999. [Record ID: 9904036] [partial] (1 page)	05/26/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [6]

2008-0994-F
vz6296

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 17, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

AID:

Donald Pressley

State:

Strobe Talbott

James Dobbins

James Pardew

Julia Taft

JCS:

Joseph Raltston

John Donovan

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Alan Van Egmond

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

USUN:

Alan Romberg

White House:

Donald Kerrick

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

Cameron Leuthy

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

Miles Lackey

Eric Schwartz

David Leavy

Matthew Vaccaro

Chief of Staff:

Steven Ricchetti

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 26, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0549-m (1.50)

KBM 7/31/2019

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should continue to pursue the "hammer and anvil" strategy with Russian envoy Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari as proposed by Deputy Secretary Talbott. It should keep this initiative in the diplomatic forefront in order to forestall unhelpful freelancing by others. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- Deputies should review options for restricting the supply of POL on the Danube. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG should publicize the fact that Belgrade was purposely trying to increase the number of ethnic Albanian casualties associated with NATO air strikes. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG should publicize our expectation that the UN assessment mission to the FRY should concentrate its assessment in Kosovo and have full access to any potential atrocity site. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- Deputies should review the strategic campaign plan for the next thirty days. (Action: NSC) ~~(C)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2912

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE
FROM: SAMUEL MOYN 
SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Hoyer

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative Steny Hoyer.

Concurrences by: Mike Hurley; Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Steny Hoyer

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Hoyer.

Background

Representative Steny Hoyer wrote regarding Kosovo. Citing his work with the Helsinki Commission, he argues that Milosevic's aggression must not stand and that he should, if possible, be brought to justice as a war criminal. He also suggests greater support for the OSCE.

In your response, you explain current NATO policy, emphasizing the strong support your Administration is giving to ICTY and the role it plans for OSCE in bringing peace to the Balkans. It thanks him for his understanding of the purpose and necessity of our current involvement in the region.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Hoyer
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Steny:

Thank you for your letter on the situation in Kosovo. Your comments were thought provoking and I deeply appreciate your candor. Because of your work with the Helsinki Commission, I particularly value your insight into the ongoing, Belgrade-caused humanitarian crisis.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it is taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. In recent days we have seen indications that NATO's air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the

conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations.

With respect to the possible deployment of ground troops, it is clear that we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning. I have not ruled out other options, since - as you point out -- it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain.

I agree with your suggestion concerning the importance of supporting the work of the ICTY and the OSCE in Kosovo. The United States strongly supports the Tribunal's work and we are the principal contributor to it of information on alleged war crimes in Kosovo. We support an active role for the OSCE in implementing the civilian aspects of a peace settlement and do not envision lifting the FRY's suspension from the organization. Finally, we will work closely with allies to advance the democratization of Serbia.

I firmly believe that NATO's air campaign is not only justified, it is demanded, and it is working. In recent days I have met with many Americans who expressed the conviction that America's moral leadership in this crisis is a defining moment as the world prepares to enter the new millenium. Thank you for your support and for your insights.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Steny Hoyer
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HOYER, STENY H

DOC DATE: 09 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 301242

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE
OSCE

HUMAN RIGHTS
WAR CRIMES
CO

PERSONS: MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

SUBJECT: SUPPORTS POTUS RE KOSOVO & SUGGEST USE OF GROUND TROOPS & USE OF
OSCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 30 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY
WIPPMAN

FOR INFO
BAKER
BELL
BOBBITT
BOUCHARD
BROWN, K
BUSBY
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and eight other Members of Congress, concerning their recent trip to Europe with Secretary Cohen to meet with NATO allies;
- 2) Sen. Robert J. Torricelli (D-NJ), concerning an "open skies" agreement between the U.S. and Argentina;
- 3) Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC), concerning the current events in Kosovo;
- 4) Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), concerning the current events in Kosovo; and,
- 5) Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), concerning the current events in Kosovo.

Enclosures

STENY H. HOYER
5TH DISTRICT, MARYLAND

CO-CHAIR
DEMOCRATIC STEERING COMMITTEE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2005

April 9, 1999

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

TREASURY, POSTAL SERVICE,
AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT

LABOR,
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
AND EDUCATION

LEGISLATIVE

COMMITTEE ON
HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

301242

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for your strong leadership in attempting to resolve the crisis in Kosovo. I want you to know that I support your efforts wholeheartedly and agree with you that we must see this action through until our objectives are attained. I stand ready to assist you in these efforts in any way I can.

As the former Chairman and now Ranking Member of the Helsinki Commission, I have followed with great distress the tragic events associated with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. It is abundantly clear, as you have stated, that the situation in Kosovo is a continuation of the conflict instigated by Slobodan Milosevic in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. In his pursuit of political power, he has created the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. In my view, what he and his thugs are undertaking is genocide. He is a war criminal.

Therefore, I write to you, Mr. President, to urge you to continue to hold firm and take the decisive steps necessary to ensure that Milosevic does not succeed in manipulating the West into acquiescing to his apparent idea of an ethnically-cleansed Kosovo. Negotiating a settlement now with Milosevic should be rejected. It would be tragic if the United States were to agree to compromises it will later regret while Milosevic remains in power. This particularly applies to what might be Milosevic's aim – the partition of Kosovo.

I believe we must maintain the course of intervention, and prepare now for the deployment of ground troops in Kosovo. Milosevic likely believes that ground troops would be deployed only if a settlement is reached; dissuading him of this could encourage him to rethink his responses. Deployment will, admittedly, be difficult. In planning for deployment, we must take into account various actions Milosevic might take. His forces in Kosovo have spread out and dug in, and may be preparing for a guerilla war. Ethnic Albanians remaining in Kosovo (and more than half the Albanian population is still in Kosovo) are vulnerable to further atrocities or use as human shields.

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
April 6, 1999
Page Two

I also believe we must work to ensure that Milosevic is indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide by getting any and all available information to the Hague. As you know, last year the Congress passed by an overwhelming majority S. Con. Res. 105 which called for the indictment of Milosevic by the War Crimes Tribunal. Once indicted, U.S. policy can no longer include meeting with Milosevic or signing any agreement with him.

Finally, I would suggest that, in 1999, you make the fullest use of the OSCE as the "conscience of Europe," supporting strongly the eventual redeployment of an OSCE mission to Kosovo that, along with a peacekeeping presence, will resuscitate a now threatened civil society. Even after the Kosovo conflict is over, the OSCE will need to prevent a spillover effect in neighboring Macedonia and Albania. I would hope that you will continue to actively oppose lifting Yugoslavia's suspension for the foreseeable future, and use the OSCE to promote the needed building of democracy in Serbia.

Again, Mr. President, I thank you for your leadership and will work with you to ensure that we prevail.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



STENY H. HOYER

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 14, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE STENY HOYER

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO REJECT NEGOTIATING A
SETTLEMENT WITH SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND TO
ENSURE THAT MILOSEVIC DOES NOT SUCCEED IN
MANIPULATING THE WEST INTO HIS IDEA OF AN

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/15		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: ETHNICALLY-CLEANSED KOSOVO

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D MD (B) (C)

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED              *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL      *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED              *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED              *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE        *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

S

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3193

May 22, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN

SUBJECT: Response to Letters from Rep. Hoeffel

Representative Hoeffel and 17 other representatives wrote the President requesting he not rule out the use of ground forces if the NATO air campaign does not achieve its aims. They also request that the U.S. military begin preparing for such a contingency. The response and your memorandum to the President are attached.

Concurrence by: ^{Int} Mike Hurley; ^{MT} Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Representative Hoeffel

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to Representative Hoeffel regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Representative Joseph Hoeffel and seventeen other Representatives wrote you to request that you not preclude the use of U.S. ground troops if air strikes do not achieve NATO's objectives. They believe ground forces may be the only way to stop Milosevic's ethnic cleansing. They also urge the U.S. military to begin making preparations for such a contingency.

Your reply explains current NATO policy, including policy with respect to the use of ground forces. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the international security force with NATO at its core that would deploy to Kosovo following agreement with Belgrade. You point out that planning for KFOR is underway.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Rep. Hoeffel
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Joseph:

Thank you for the letter from you and your seventeen colleagues concerning Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts and share your determination that the refugees will return. I welcome this opportunity to explain our policy in the Balkans, in particular our stance on the use of ground forces.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and its potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century, we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time, he publicly accepted the G-8's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded that the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. But we have made clear that the details are non-negotiable.

I appreciate your support for deploying ground forces to Kosovo. Clearly, we want Mr. Milosevic's security forces replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and it has recently updated that plan on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, I can assure that I would want to consult closely with Congress, before ever committing American soldiers to combat in Kosovo.

I firmly believe that NATO's air campaign is not only justified, it is demanded, and it is working. In recent days, I have met many Americans who expressed the conviction that America's moral leadership in this crisis is a defining moment as the world prepares to enter the new millennium. Thank you again for your letter and for your support.

Sincerely,

Representative Joseph M. Hoeffel
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3813

TO: PRESIDENT,

FROM:  HOFFEL, JOSEPH
ENGEL, ELIOT L
KING, PETER T

DOC DATE: 16 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 302121

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE
CO

NATO
HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS: MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

SUBJECT: REQUEST PREPARATION TO SEND GROUND TROOPS TO KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BAKER
BELL
BLINKEN
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

392121
3193

April 16, 1999

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the crisis in Kosova mounts and the number of refugees and victims of Slobodan Milosevic's campaign of brutal aggression grows, we urge you to leave all military options open to accomplish our national goals. Specifically, we ask that you not preclude the use of United States ground troops as part of the NATO mission if the airstrikes prove to be inadequate to meet our aims. It may be that only NATO ground forces will be able to create a secure environment for the return of the refugees and to stop Milosevic's brutal abuse and murder of innocent civilians.

We further ask that you take all appropriate operational measures to fully prepare the United States armed services for the contingency of sending American ground troops to the region as part of the NATO force. As we have seen with the introduction of the Apache helicopters into this mission, it takes time to put all of the necessary components in place to wage an effective war against Milosevic. Acting swiftly at this critical juncture to develop an operational plan will make any future effort more productive and limit the risk of further ethnic cleansing in Kosova.

Mr. President, we appreciate your consideration and resolve, and join you in expressing our gratitude for all of the brave men and women taking part in this crucial mission.

Sincerely,

Joseph M. Hoegge

1200-100
Peter T. King

Ernest L. Engel

Joseph Crowley

Shelley Berkley

Don Miller

Edith R.

Ray Arken

Stacy

John W. Oliver

Walt Meek

Gerold Nadler

John Lewis

Major J. Owens

Paul E. Brown

Norm Licks

Charlie Stenholm

Ellen Tausscher

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA), Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) and Sen. Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), concerning the current situation in Kosovo and the Snowe-Cleland Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999;
- 2) Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI), concerning the President's upcoming meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan and next year's G-8 summit to be hosted by Japan;
- 3) Sen. George V. Voinovich (R-OH) and Sen. Michael D. Crapo (R-ID), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 4) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), concerning the future stability of Southeastern Europe in light of the current conflict in Serbia-Montenegro;
- 5) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), recommending the sale of long-range early warning radar to Taiwan;
- 6) Rep. William F. Goodling (R-PA), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;

APR 27 1999

- 7) Rep. Joseph M. Hoeffel (D-PA) and seventeen other Members of Congress, concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 8) Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), concerning possible human rights violations at the Buenos Aires Yoga School in Argentina;
- 9) Rep. Jose E. Serrano (D-NY), concerning the American military presence on the Island of Vieques;
- 10) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), concerning the NATO summit and countries that have expressed an interest in joining the Alliance;
- 11) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and four other Members of Congress, expressing concern over the massive inflow of foreign aid into Indonesia in light of upcoming national elections; and,
- 12) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), enclosing a copy of his remarks from the floor of the House of Representatives on April 21 concerning the current situation in Kosovo.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 22, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE ALL
APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO FULLY PREPARE THE
U.S. ARMED SERVICES FOR THE CONTINGENCY OF
SENDING AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS TO THE KOSOVA

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/22		99/4/22
NSC	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: AS PART OF THE NATO FORCE

E/c

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 16 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D PA (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
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LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2518

May 26, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *DS*

SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence -- Reply to James
Forman

Attached at Tab I is your memo to the President conveying a reply to James Forman, who wrote recommending introduction of a UN peacekeeping force in Kosovo to hasten a negotiated settlement given Milosevic's aversion to NATO. The reply at Tab A thanks him for the recommendation and repeats our rationale for having an international security force with NATO at its core.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Reply to James Forman
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT: Reply to James Forman

Purpose

Respond to a letter from James Forman.

Background

James Forman wrote to suggest that given Milosevic's adamant refusal to accept NATO troops as part of a Kosovo settlement, that we accept UN troops for this purpose instead. In reply, you thank him for the recommendation and reiterate our preference for an international security force with NATO at its core.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to James Forman at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Reply to James Forman
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for your recent note on Kosovo and your insightful point about Milosevic's reluctance to return to the negotiating table. You are absolutely correct that he would prefer a UN regime, similar to UNPROFOR provided in Bosnia from 1992-1995.

For the same reasons, we are insisting on an international security force with NATO at its core, in order to insure the safe return and security of the Kosovar refugees who have so brutally been driven from their homes and livelihoods. I am convinced that only a NATO dominant force, together with Russian and other third country participation, will ensure adherence to the demands we have set forth. From events of the past couple of weeks, I believe we are coming closer to achieving our objective.

I share your hope that in the wake of the recent NATO Summit our renewed military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a path to a negotiated settlement. In the meantime I appreciate your constructive recommendations on this issue.

Sincerely,

Mr. James Forman
President
The Unemployment and Poverty Action Committee
P.O. Box 21097
Washington, D.C. 20009

2518

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

N/A
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Wyn T. Davies

DATE:

3/31/99

FROM:

Tim Emrich
Presidential Scheduling
184 OEOB/456-5306

ATTACHED:

☒ Please advise on
how to respond

☐ For your information

☒ For your action

☐ As you requested

☐ Please call me regarding
the attached

☐ Please prepare
response per
instructions below

☐ For your approval

☐ For Surrogate
Consideration

☐ Please prepare
Scheduling
Proposal

COMMENTS:

CC:



The Unemployment and Poverty Action Committee

P.O. Box 21097 ■ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009 ■ (202) 737-2133 ■ FAX (202) 234-8422

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President

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March 30, 1999

BC-SC
3/31/99

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for all of your responses to my communiqués to the White House. They have been very inspiring.

From various reports it seems the main reason Slobodan Milosevic is refusing to agree to the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo is the NATO proposal to leave some personnel in Kosovo in order to guarantee peace in that area of the world. I suggest, therefore, that NATO propose the placing of U.N. troops in that area to guarantee peace.

In making this suggestion I am aware that the U.N. Security Council has already voted not to halt the current efforts of NATO to protect the people of Kosovo from any forms of ethnic cleansing. I am further aware that all the member states of NATO are members of the U.N. and that the U.N., since its inception, has worked hard to promote peace in the world, self-determination of nations and protection of minorities in nation states.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of this letter.

Sincerely,

James Forman
President, The Unemployment
& Poverty Action Committee

*The UPAC FUND, INC.—The Unemployed and Poverty Action Council Legal Defense, Education and Research Fund, Inc.

*A 501(c)(3) TAX DEDUCTIBLE ORGANIZATION

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APR 5 1999

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4038

May 25, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *ly*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 19, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 19.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBH* NARA, Date *9/9/2019*
2014-0920-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: May 26, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 19, 1999 (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 19. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: May 19, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~KBA~~ NARA, Date 9/9/2014
7014-0970-m

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4038

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: May 19, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 7:00 - 8:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Madeleine Albright
James Dobbins

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

USUN:
Peter Burleigh

OMB:
Jack Lew

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta
Steven Ricchetti

CIA:
George Tenet
John Gordon

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
Edward Anderson

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0920-m (1.24)
KBM 9/9/7019

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should press NATO to move ahead quickly to update planning and preparations for the deployment of KFOR in a

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: May 26, 2009

permissive environment assuming Milosevic accepts NATO's conditions. (Action: State, DOD) ~~(S)~~

- DOD should examine to what extent planning and preparations for KFOR in a permissive environment will reduce the time required to plan and prepare for a forced entry option. (Action: DOD) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should allow some "creative ambiguity" about the purpose of KFOR preparations so as to increase the pressure on Milosevic. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should begin planning and preparations to assist refugees through the winter, including through the winterization of their camps. (Action: State, DOD) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should send a sharper message on "regime change" through public and private contacts with Serb officials, economic elite, opposition and public, but without making it one of our conditions for suspending NATO's air operations. (Action: State, DOD) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3457

May 26, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence -- Reply to Bob Dole

Attached at Tab I is your memo to the President conveying a reply to Bob Dole, who wrote urging you to adopt conditions for a NATO victory, defined as a defeated and deposed Milosevic, the withdrawal or destruction of all Serb forces in Kosovo, and the return of the Kosovar Albanians under the protection of a NATO force. The reply at Tab A reiterated the President's commitment to a NATO victory, to hold Milosevic accountable for the crimes against humanity in Kosovo, and a settlement upholding the introduction of an international security force with NATO at its core.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Reply to Bob Dole
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Reply to Bob Dole

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Bob Dole.

Background

Bob Dole wrote a thoughtful letter urging you to accept nothing less than conditions for a NATO victory, which he defines as a defeated and deposed Milosevic; the withdrawal or destruction of all Serb forces in Kosovo, and the return of the Kosovar Albanians under the protection of a NATO force. In reply, you thank him for his insights, and reiterate your commitment to perservering for a NATO victory; to hold Milosevic accountable for the crimes against humanity in Kosovo, and to a settlement stipulating the introduction of an international security force with NATO at its core.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Bob Dole at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Reply to Bob Dole
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

I appreciate your thoughtful letter on NATO's Kosovo policy and your views of the approach United States policy should take. As we enter the third month of the bombing campaign, your concerns are timely and cogent.

Your thoughts regarding possible pitfalls of the moment and how much hangs in the balance were encouraging to me as they coincide so much with what I have been saying over the past several weeks. First of all, it is not sufficient that NATO not be seen as failing in this endeavor; I share your view that it is essential that NATO win. Secondly, the center of gravity has now shifted to Milosevic, particularly following his indictment by the ICTY. NATO and the international community cannot permit him to survive politically in the wake of the humanitarian outrages he has permitted in Kosovo. Finally, we are of one view in the necessity to commit ground troops to a international security force with NATO at its core, in order to insure the safe return and security of the Kosovar refugees who have so brutally been driven from their homes and livelihoods. I am convinced that only a NATO-led force, augmented by Russian and other third country participation, will ensure adherence to the demands we have set forth.

I share your hope that in the wake of the last month's NATO Summit our renewed military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a path to a negotiated settlement. In the meantime, I appreciate your constructive recommendations on this issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Dole
901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 401
Washington, D.C. 20005

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: DOLE, BOB

DOC DATE: 03 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
RUSSIA
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

NATO
HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS: MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

SUBJECT: URGES DECISIONS NECESSARY TO BRING NATO TO VICTORY INCLUDING
DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND TROOPS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: BROWN, K

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

BROWN, K

FOR CONCURRENCE

HURLEY

LEAVY

FOR INFO

BERGER

BOUCHARD

PASCUAL

SCHULTE

STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

3457

OFFICE OF SENATOR BOB DOLE
FACSIMILE COVER SHEETTO: SRB/JS
KOSOVO
PRESS

DATE: _____

TO: President Clinton
% SAMUEL BERGER, NSC

FAX NUMBER: _____

FROM: Sen. DoleCOMMENTS: Letter attached.
Thank you.NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 3

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SENATOR BOB DOLE

901 15TH STREET, N.W.

SUITE 410

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

May 3, 1999

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

Six weeks ago, you and our NATO allies made the decision to wage war against the morally bankrupt Belgrade regime of Slobodan Milosevic. I firmly believe this was the right decision at the time, but will only remain the right decision in the eyes of history if NATO achieves an unequivocal victory over Milosevic, and frees Kosova and all of Serbia from his murderous rule.

As we have seen in recent weeks, the pressure is building among certain segments of Capitol Hill and in some NATO capitals to bring this conflict to an end -- even though the goals that we and our allies have said are non-negotiable have not been attained. There may even be those in your administration who share this view.

These pressures will likely grow in the aftermath of Jesse Jackson's mission to Belgrade and the release of US soldiers who were apprehended by Serbian forces. While, like all Americans, I welcome the overdue release of these captured soldiers, everyone knows that this was just a ploy by Milosevic to "rehabilitate" himself in the eyes of the world. After all, as our soldiers were being released, thousands of Kosovars were being brutally pushed out of their homes to join the million already forcibly exiled in scenes reminiscent of the Second World War.

I am writing to you to express my firm belief that ending this conflict without a NATO victory -- which means a defeated and deposed Milosevic, the withdrawal or destruction of all Serbian forces in Kosova, and a settlement providing for the safe return of all Kosovar Albanians to their former homes under the protection of a NATO force -- is fraught with danger for America's interests. We must seek a just peace, a stable peace, and a permanent peace. Milosevic's reign of terror must end.

Today you will be meeting with the Russian envoy to discuss possible "diplomatic solutions." It is essential that we recognize that the Russians are not motivated by humanitarianism and democratic principles, but by their affinity for this destructive Belgrade regime and a desperate desire to return to the center of global politics. Any compromise deal that Milosevic is willing to sign and the Russians are willing to support cannot possibly be in the long-term interests of the United States and NATO. Furthermore, any proposal for you to meet


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directly with the war-criminal Milosevic is designed to bring dishonor upon the Office of the Presidency and to diminish the position of the United States as leader of NATO and the free world.

Mr. President, nothing could be worse than surrendering our principles, values, and credibility because we lack the will to do what it takes to win. I believe that you must clearly articulate to the American people what is at stake in this conflict -- namely, the stability of the region, the future of the most successful alliance in history, and the principles of human dignity and freedom upon which this country is founded. If you do this, I am confident that they will support you as you make the decisions necessary to bring NATO to victory, including the deployment of US ground troops.

History will record that, at the end of the twentieth century, the United States and its NATO allies had the means to defeat a brutal, belligerent, but second-rate dictator in Europe. The only question not yet answered is whether history will record that there was the will to do so.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bob Dole", with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

BOB DOLE