

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chronos for May 1999 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1707

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 11, 1999. [Record ID: 9903844] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	05/18/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 13, 1999. [Record ID: 9903845] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	05/18/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 13, 1999. [Record ID: 9903847] [partial] (1 page)	05/18/1999	P3/b(3)
004. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	05/25/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for May 1999 [4]

2008-0994-F

vz6294

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3844

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 11, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 11.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: May 18, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *12* NARA, Date *2/22/2024*
2008-004-F-3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 11, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 11, 1999. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: May 19, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~SDB~~ NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0544-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 11, 1999. [Record ID: 9903844] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	05/18/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6294

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CONFIDENTIAL

3844

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 11, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

Chief of Staff:

Steven Ricchetti

OVP:

Leslie Davidson

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

State:

Thomas Pickering

James Dobbins

James Pardew

Lawrence Rossin

JCS:

Edward Anderson

John Donovan

Treasury:

Mark Medish

Richard Newcomb

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kaufmann

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

Miles Lackey

David Leavy

Matthew Vaccaro

Donald Mitchell

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

2014-0549-M (1.44)

7/31/2019 KBH

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 18, 2009

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should consider to what extent IEEPA or other measures can be used to obstruct third-party delivery of oil to the FRY. (Action: Treasury, State) (C)
- E.O. 13526 1.4(c)
- The USG should demarche the government of Slovenia to shut down the shipment of oil to the FRY via small coastal tankers loading in Slovenia. (Action: State) (C)
- The USG should implement the recommendations contained in the paper on "Kosovar Leadership Strategy." This should include building on PM Majko's concept of a "national security council," sending pre-emptive messages to the Kosovar leadership on our diplomatic intentions, explaining our concept of an international provisional administration and sustaining support for a political outcome similar to Rambouillet and short of independence. (Action: State) (C)

May 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 13, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 13.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *JB* NARA, Date *7/30/2014*
2014-0544-M

MEMORANDUM FOR .

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 13, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 13, 1999. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: May 19, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ADB NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0546-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 13, 1999. [Record ID: 9903845] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	05/18/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [4]

2008-0994-F

vz6294

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 13, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (TS)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

AID:

Michael Mahdesian

State:

Thomas Pickering

James Dobbins

James Pardew

Robert Gelbard

James O'Brien

James Metzl

JCS:

Joseph Ralston

Bruce Wright

John Donovan

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Treasury:

Richard Newcomb

John Moran

White House:

Donald Kerrick

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

James Bodner

Alan Van Egmond

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Matthew Vaccaro

Chuck Allen

Michael Hammer

Mark Tavlarides

Scott Busby

Steven Naplan

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

Christopher Jones

~~TOP SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 19, 2009

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

2014-0549-M (1.46)

7/31/2019 KBH

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Agencies should provide comments on the UK "roadmap" for Kosovo to the Department of State. (Action: All) (C)
- Elements of a Kosovo UN Security Council Resolution should be discussed with allies in the "quint" but not yet with the Russians. (Action: State) (C)
- Deputies would recommend to Principals that the two Serb POWs in U.S. custody be released in the immediate future in order to encourage a practice of early release and because neither had given meaningful consent to an interview by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. (Action: NSC) (C)
- Since there was no sign of movement by Milosevic toward NATO's conditions, it would be premature for President Ahtisaari to go to Belgrade. (Action: State) (C)

•

E.O. 13526 1.4(c)

- The Departments of State and Treasury should send a team to Brussels to assist the EU in implementing an effective sanctions regime. (Action: State, Treasury) (C)
- Pressure should be applied to Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria to cut off oil supplies to the FRY. (Action: State) (C)
- Consideration should be given to:
 - ways of blocking traffic through the locks on the Danube;
 - destruction of oil offloading facilities on the Danube;
 - ways to discourage third countries from shipping oil on the Danube or to FRY ports on the Adriatic. (Action: State, JCS, Treasury) (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 15, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 15.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

CONFIDENTIAL WITH ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 18, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SD3 NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0549-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on May 15, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 15, 1999. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WITH ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: May 19, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 50B NARA, Date 7/30/2019
214-6549-m

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 13, 1999. [Record ID: 9903847] [partial] (1 page)	05/18/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6294

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 15, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 12:30 - 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Edward Anderson

Alan Swain

State:

Strobe Talbott

James Dobbins

James Pardew

Robert Beecroft

USNATO:Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)Defense:

James Bodner

Alan Van Egmond

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Alan Romberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:

Robert Kyle

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Deputy Secretary Talbott should proceed with his trip to Helsinki to meet with Russian Special Envoy Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari. However, he would not present

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 19, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.44)

KBH 7/31/2019

any figures for a limited number of FRY forces that might be allowed to return to Kosovo under international supervision following the withdrawal of all FRY military, police and paramilitary forces. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- Ambassador Dobbins should discuss UK "roadmap" and draft UN Security Council resolution with "quint" allies. However, the draft resolution should not be discussed with the Russians in the G-8 at this time. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Detailed planning for an international provisional administration should proceed on the basis of the concept presented to Deputies. This should include:
 - briefing the concept to "quint" allies;
 - identifying key functional tasks where the USG has a comparative advantage;
 - beginning to identify personnel for priority tasks;
 - beginning to plan for advance procedure of equipment and training for personnel;
 - preparing for advance consultations with Congress;
 - considering funding issues;
 - developing a system to augment existing planning cells to boost capacity once a decision is made on the institutions to lead an international provisional administration;
 - identifying other ways to speed deployment. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903873
RECEIVED: 19 MAY 99 13

TO: DJUKANOVIC, MILO

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 20 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MONTENEGRO

file

PERSONS: DJUKANOVIC, MILO

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES DJUKANOVIC RE KOSOVO

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 25 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HURLEY
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: GIVEN TO EUR FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903873

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99051916 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99051919 FOR SIGNATURE
X 99052013 PRESIDENT SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

002 990518
002 990518

DISPATCH FOR INFO

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
MAY 19 1999
May 19, 1999

MR. PRESIDENT:

If you approve, Ambassador Gelbard
will hand-carry this letter
tomorrow.

Sean Maloney

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5-20-99

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3873
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>DT/20</u>	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>TC 5/20</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>3</u>	<u>DMK 5/20</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: Given to Europe for dispatch

Date 5/20/99

COMMENTS:

Coordinate dispatch
Schultz's office

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3873
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ENK A/O _____

TMM

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>09/19</u>	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>05/15</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>5</u>	<u>05/19</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>S</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

Letter needs to be signed by 5/20 11:00 am

COMMENTS: POTUS reply to Montenegrin President milo Djukanovic

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1999

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter concerning the international community's efforts to resolve the crisis in Kosovo and to define a rehabilitation strategy for the Balkan region. I appreciate Montenegro's courageous support, despite threats from Belgrade, for a peaceful solution.

Keeping Montenegro actively engaged in the quest for a peaceful solution to the crisis has been, and remains, a high priority. I especially welcome your readiness to play a constructive role in creating a democratic Yugoslavia.

Having read your editorial with Zoran Djindjic in the New York Times, I was struck by your courage and firm commitment to bringing Yugoslavia into the European mainstream. We will study closely your idea for an economic development plan for the Balkans.

I am personally committed to a broader project in Southeast Europe that would, among other things, promote reform in the FRY and advance regional economic integration. I understand European leaders have invited your government to take part in the senior officials meeting on the EU-proposed Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. This effort can make an important contribution to our shared goal of stabilizing, transforming, and ultimately integrating Southeast Europe into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. We welcome and encourage Montenegro's involvement in this meeting and seek ways to involve your government in other forums on the Yugoslav crisis.

I share your observations regarding FRY leaders' loss of credibility and legitimacy. We are committed to working with ICTY to ensure that those guilty of war crimes are brought to justice.

Again, thank you for writing. I remain steadfastly committed to supporting Montenegro's efforts to create a democratic society that respects the human rights of its citizens and strives to offer them a better life.

Sincerely,

Bob Clinton

His Excellency
Milo Djukanovic
President of the
Republic of Montenegro
Podgorica

5-20-99
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


99 MAY 19 PM 7:19

May 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT:

Letter to President Milo Djukanovic

Purpose

Respond to Montenegrin President Djukanovic.

Background

You received a letter dated May 10 from President Milo Djukanovic of the Republic of Montenegro. The same day, he published in the New York Times an op-ed piece co-authored with Zoran Djindjic, a leading opposition figure in Serbia, which included recommendations on the transition to democracy in post-conflict Serbia. In his letter, he emphasized the importance of a long-term solution that would ensure stability in the Balkans.

Your response thanks President Djukanovic for the constructive stance he is taking with regard to Kosovo. It also promises to take under advisement his recommendation, proposed in his Times article, for an economic development plan for the region. Finally, it notes that Montenegro has been invited to participate in the EU-proposed Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and welcomes Montenegro's participation.


RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Djukanovic and NYT op-ed
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



Republic of Montenegro
President

Podgorica, May 10, 1999

Dear Mr. President,

The days ahead should, with a maximum effort of all the key players in Europe and in the world, bring peace to the citizens of Kosovo and of the whole Yugoslavia that they have craved for so strongly. It is encouraging to see an orientation that a political solution to the Kosovo problem should also include defining a rehabilitation strategy for Yugoslavia and the Balkan region on a more long-term basis.

Montenegro wholeheartedly supports such an orientation and is prepared to do its best to contribute to this end. We therefore welcome the initiative for an International Conference on Southeast Europe and we suggest that it take place in Montenegro. This would be yet another expression of a continuing support of the international community to the democratic processes in our Republic. At the same time, this would mean highlighting and stimulating Montenegro as a positive example in the Balkans, while also encouraging all the progressive forces in Yugoslavia and in the region to follow suit. We would like to recall that it was on precisely such premises that at the beginning of this year an idea was proposed - and in principle supported - to organise, under the auspices of the OSCE, an international conference on regional problems in the Balkans, which would be held in Montenegro.

I wish also to express our greatest interest that Montenegro be directly represented at the initial meeting on Southeast Europe, as well as at any other meetings in the process of dealing with the Yugoslav crisis and of seeking mechanisms on more long-term basis for inclusion of the Balkan region into the developed European integrations.

His Excellency
William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, DC

./.

You probably know that for quite some time now, due to a gross violation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Belgrade regime, Montenegro has been allowed no authentic representatives in the Federal administration, disregarding the electoral will of its citizens. In this manner the equal status of our Republic in the Yugoslav federation has been infringed upon and Montenegro prevented to have its say in the decision making by top federal authorities. If there is a genuine wish to find a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, the constitutional status of Montenegro in Yugoslavia must also be fully addressed and defined.

The current leadership of FRY, which has for the sake of holding on to power and for the sake of their personal interests exposed the country to the NATO intervention, unmindful of the lives of its citizens or of material assets, has called into question the very existence of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro. Such a leadership cannot represent the state and national interests of Montenegro at the international scene either. We see the future of Montenegro in a common state, but only provided it is democratic, economically prosperous, internationally recognised and respected, and included in European integration processes.

I would like to assure you that, in all these activities, the European Union and the international community will continue to have in the leadership of Montenegro a constructive and reliable partner. And I hope that for this proposal we may have your support and understanding. I also wish to inform you that I have sent this letter to all the leaders of the European Union member states, to Russia and USA, as well as to the Secretary General of the UN and the Chairman in Office of the OSCE.

Yours sincerely,

Milo Djukanović



After The War In Serbia Is Over

By Milo Djukanovic
and Zoran Djindjic

Despite the current conflict, we remain committed to Yugoslavia's integration into Europe, and eventually into the European Union. The road to Europe is the only route that will help our country solve its considerable problems and build a lasting peace and stability throughout the region. It is difficult to imagine that any economic or political renewal can occur in Yugoslavia without unambiguous and long-term international support.

Only a democratic and stable Yugoslavia can secure stability in the Balkans. We want to underscore that the democratic political forces in Yugoslavia are committed to that goal. The immediate concerns are ending the war, securing the return of the refugees and implementing a political settlement in Kosovo that will include the deployment of an international force.

But to establish a lasting peace, the outside world needs to do more than solve the Kosovo crisis. Military intervention in Kosovo has led to new problems, whether or not that was intended. With intervention, the West assumed part of the responsibility for finding solutions to these problems.

At the same time, intense efforts will also be necessary on the part of Yugoslavs to win the trust of the outside world and recover the moral standing lost because of Kosovo.

Even before the end of the war, the international community should state clearly and unequivocally that democratic and economic reconstruction in Yugoslavia represents its official and binding position. Such a statement would give hope to the citizens of our country and encourage the transformation of the political landscape.

5-10 200 277

The cycle of politics that over the past 10 years or more has led our country to this tragedy must be broken. If the war ends with a signature on a peace agreement and the same leadership in power, with Slobodan Milosevic at the helm, the tragedy and violence will continue.

Yugoslavia's stability is crucial because of its size and geographical position in the Balkans and its role in determining the stability or instability of neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. To date, however, international strategy on Yugoslavia has boiled down to crisis management, while ignoring the roots of crisis.

Yugoslavia will need democracy and its own Marshall Plan.

Democracy can be established in our country only with a complete political transition in Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia. This depends on free and fair elections, the strengthening of Serbia's democratic opposition, close cooperation with the democratic Government of Montenegro, the complete isolation of undemocratic forces and the establishment of an outside body to help monitor the political change.

Respected European politicians with previous experience in the Balkans, like former Prime Minister Felipe González of Spain, former Chancellor Franz Vranitzky of Austria and Hans Koschnick, a veteran German Social Democrat, could work in such a commission under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Accelerated economic reconstruction in the Balkans will be possible only with some variant of the Marshall Plan. The promise of outside aid would help the cause of democracy in Yugoslavia by tempering lingering anger. It will be difficult for the democratic opposition to function after this NATO campaign because people are likely to see us as part of that Europe — part of that West — that bombed us, destroyed bridges, roads and factories, and killed civilians. People will protest in both Serbia and Montenegro.

DRAFT

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of May 10 concerning the international community's efforts to resolve the crisis in Kosovo and set Yugoslavia on the path of reform. We appreciate Montenegro's courageous support, despite threats from Belgrade, for a peaceful solution.

Keeping Montenegro actively engaged in the quest for a peaceful solution to these problems has been and remains a high priority. We especially welcome Montenegro's readiness to play a constructive role in creating a democratic Yugoslavia.

Having read your editorial with Zoran Djindjic in the May 10 New York Times, I was struck by your courage and firm commitment to bringing Yugoslavia into the European mainstream. Your idea for an economic development plan for the Balkans deserves further consideration.

I am personally committed to a broader project in Southeast Europe that would, among other things, promote reform in the FRY and advance regional economic integration. I understand European leaders have invited your government to take part in the May 27 senior officials meeting on the EU-proposed Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. This effort can make an important contribution to our shared goal of stabilizing, transforming, and ultimately integrating Southeast Europe into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. We welcome and encourage your government's involvement in this meeting and seek ways to involve your government in other forums on the Yugoslav crisis.

We share your observations regarding FRY leaders' loss of credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, we are committed to working with ICTY to ensure that those guilty of war crimes are brought to justice.

As always, we remain steadfastly committed to supporting Montenegro's efforts to create a democratic society that respects the human rights of its citizens and strives to offer them a better life.

Sincerely,

DRAFT

William J. Clinton

His Excellency,
Milo Djukanovic,
President,
Republic of Montenegro,
Podgorica, Montenegro.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *LP*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *CMH*
SUBJECT: POTUS Response to Letter from Montenegrin
President Milo Djukanovic

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a proposed response to President Djukanovic. Bob Gelbard will hand-deliver the letter to President Djukanovic Friday; it needs to be given to Andy Bair from Gelbard's office before his departure for Brussels tomorrow in order that he can deliver it to Bob in time.

Concurrence by: Susan Braden *S/B*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response to President Milo Djukanovic
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to President Milo Djukanovic

Purpose

Respond to Montenegrin President Djukanovic.

Background

dated
You received a letter May 10 from President Milo Djukanovic of the Republic of Montenegro. The same day, he published in the New York Times an op-ed piece co-authored with Zoran Djindjic, a leading opposition figure in Serbia, which included recommendations on the transition to democracy in post-conflict Serbia. In his letter, he emphasizes the importance of a long-term solution that would ensure stability in the Balkans.

Your response thanks President Djukanovic for the constructive stance he is taking with regard to Kosovo. It also promises to take under advisement his recommendation, proposed in his Times article, for an economic development plan for the region. Finally, it notes that Montenegro has been invited to participate in the EU-proposed Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and welcomes Montenegro's participation.

RECOMMENDATION

at Tab A
That you sign the letter to ~~President Djukanovic~~.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Djukanovic *and NYT op-ed*
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

3573

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of ~~May 10~~ concerning the international community's efforts to resolve the crisis in Kosovo and ~~set Yugoslavia on the path of reform.~~ ~~We~~ appreciate Montenegro's courageous support, despite threats from Belgrade, for a peaceful solution.

Keeping Montenegro actively engaged in the quest for a peaceful solution to ~~these problems~~ ^{~~The Crisis~~} has been, and remains, a high priority.

~~I~~ ^{~~Your~~} We especially welcome ~~Montenegro's~~ readiness to play a constructive role in creating a democratic Yugoslavia.

Having read your editorial with Zoran Djindjic in the ~~May 10~~ New York Times, I was struck by your courage and firm commitment to bringing Yugoslavia into the European mainstream. ~~Your idea for an economic development plan for the Balkans deserves further consideration.~~

I am personally committed to a broader project in Southeast Europe that would, among other things, promote reform in the FRY and advance regional economic integration. I understand European leaders have invited your government to take part in the ~~May 27~~ senior officials meeting on the EU-proposed Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. This effort can make an important contribution to our shared goal of stabilizing, transforming, and ultimately integrating Southeast Europe into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. We welcome and encourage ~~your government's~~ ^{Montenegro's} involvement in this meeting and seek ways to involve your government in other forums on the Yugoslav crisis.

~~I~~ We share your observations regarding FRY leaders' loss of credibility and legitimacy. ~~Moreover,~~ we are committed to working with ICTY to ensure that those guilty of war crimes are brought to justice.

to define a rehabilitation strategy for the Balkan region.

take out?

how many has he written in the past month

We will study closely

Again, thank you for writing.

As always, we remain steadfastly committed to supporting Montenegro's efforts to create a democratic society that respects the human rights of its citizens and strives to offer them a better life.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Milo Djukanovic
President of the
→ Republic of Montenegro
Podgorica, Montenegro

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	05/25/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6294

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 25, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

BRUCE WRIGHT
Joint Chiefs of Staff

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

DAVID ADAMS
Agency for International
Development


LEN HAWLEY
Department of State

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Tuesday, May 25, 1999, from 5:00 to 7:00 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.

Please call in your attendees date of birth and social security number by NLT 3:30 p.m., May 25.


Greg Schulte

Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of Dayton Accords

Attachment

2481
SA

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

TO: *Glyn T. Davies*

DATE: 4/1/99

FROM: Tim Emrich
Presidential Scheduling
184 OEOB/456-5306

ATTACHED:

☒ Please advise on how to respond	☐ For your information	☐ For your action
☐ As you requested	☐ Please call me regarding the attached	☐ Please prepare response per instructions below
☐ For your approval	☐ For Surrogate Consideration	☐ Please prepare Scheduling Proposal

COMMENTS:

The NSC staff sees no compelling foreign policy benefit to be gained by scheduling this meeting.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

CC:

Open

Sched

BLSC
4/1/99

30 March 1999,

To President of USA

REQUEST FOR EXTREMELY URGENT APPOINTMENT

Dear Clifton,

I was just granted a US patent for discovering new insulin for diabetic people. This particular insulin will be given only once per a week to the patients with *Diabetes Mellitus*. I represented US at 14 Th. International Diabetes Federation Conference, Kobe, Japan in 1994. Currently, I am at Yale Medical School working on the vaccine to prevent Diabetes in humans. According to American medical experts I already gave a contribution to medicine and humanity.

I did not go to work since last Friday.

I am a Serb. My parents and two brothers are just below the bombs.

I would like to make an appointment to see and talk to President in the name Serb Scientists. I will not talk about human disasters, or who is wrong in this very moment. I think I can offer a solution for consideration that might be agreeable to people in charge for this action. To me it is crucial to suggest this plan. **I feel intellectual, human and medical duty to take this step.**

Could you put a rush for my appointment as quick as possible.

Thank you .

Sincerely yours,

Jelena Mandic

Dr. Jelena Mandic

Edward S. Harness Hall
Yale Medical University
367 Cedar St Box # 517
New Haven CT 06510
E-mail jmandic@hotmail.com
Fax::203-737-4130

APR 5 12:23

2440

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 24, 1999

Dear Mr. Raymar:


Thank you for your letter in support of our policy in Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts as we and our NATO allies seek to end Serbia's repression of ethnic Albanians.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the destabilizing effect it was having on the surrounding region demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st Century we could not let so massive an onslaught on a people go unchallenged. Even as military action is underway, we continue to explore all diplomatic opportunities in an effort to achieve a just peace for the region.

Mr. Milosevic knows what he must do for NATO to end the bombing: end the violence; withdraw all Serb security forces from the province; allow all refugees to return to their homes; and accept the stationing of an international security force to protect all Kosovars. The refugees will only return to their homes if these conditions are met.

In standing up to those committing such unspeakable crimes the United States and NATO allies are following the right course of action. I agree with you that history will look favorably on how we responded. Again thank you for your insights.

Sincerely,



Gregory L. Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for Implementation of Dayton Accords

Mr. Bob Raymar
Hellring, Lindeman, Goldstein
and Siegal LLP
1 Gateway Center
Newark, New Jersey 07102

MEMORANDUM

To: Nancy Hernreich, Deputy Dated: March 31, 1999
Assistant to the President
Tel: 202-456-6610
Fax: 202-456-6703

From: Bob Raymar
Tel: 973-621-9020
Fax: 973-621-7406

Re: Kosovo

Would you please deliver the attached to the President.

Thank you.

RSR/cb

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4-2-99

To: President Bill Clinton

Dated: March 31, 1999

From: Bob Raymar

Re: Kosovo

KSC/cc BL
Lindsey

Copied
Berger
wudesk
Lindsey
Podesta

It may be appropriate for you to give a Passover-Easter speech appealing to America's morality and humanitarian instincts. Early in your Administration, Paul Joffe and I sent you a memorandum advocating action and passion based on America's view of itself as a beacon for the world, as a country with a higher view of itself, its purpose, its morality than other countries possess. How can Christians and Jews proclaim "Never Again!" without acting in the way you have courageously acted. The Serbs have proved the futility of condemnation, negotiations, and inaction.

No matter how vocal is the criticism of the current strategy, or of its limited success to date, you — the American people — are in the right. Genocide and refugees were inevitable in Kosovo. No matter what today's television images, the same genocide and refugees would have occurred within six months without NATO's involvement, but more silently, invisibly. At the very, very least, your strategy will "destroy the rail lines", degrade Serb forces and allow thousands of Kosovars to escape a Holocaust, and therefore you will be vindicated by History.

The decision to do something does not mean we have to do everything. We should support the Kosovars from the air, supply them, and feed them, but we should insert ground forces (helicopter gun ships are not ground forces) only as part of a broader

peacekeeping force. Since the main difference between Bosnia and Kosovo is the lack of an effective defensive ground force, we should arm the Kosovars as rapidly as possible. Even without training or sophisticated weapons, a Kosovar with an M-16 is far better able to defend his territory and family than a Kosovar without one.

And when dreadful Somalia-style tragedies occur - as they must - you should stay the course until a Bosnian or Haitian-style peace is achieved. America respects perseverance when we are right. America disrespects quitting in the face of adversity and failing to achieve honorable objectives.

Good luck! No matter what the commentators or protestors say, you are doing the right thing, are doing it prudently, and are doing it as timely as America has ever risen to mitigate world tragedy.

RSR/cb

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: RAYMAR, BOB

DOC DATE: 31 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS RE KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 14 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

BROWN, K
GUARNIERI
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO

BELL
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: SEE POTUS NOTE

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 22, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Senator Voinovich

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Senators George Voinovich and Mike Crapo regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *JS* Mike Hurley; *SM* Mike Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Responses to Senators Voinovich and Crapo

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senators Voinovich and Crapo

Purpose

Respond to Senators Voinovich and Crapo regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Senators George Voinovich and Mike Crapo wrote to you asking that you seek the consent of Congress before committing to a military campaign on the ground in the FRY.

In your reply, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces at part of the international security presence with NATO at its core. You restate your April 28 commitment to the Congressional leadership to consult fully with Congress, and to ask for its support, before introducing U.S. ground forces in a non-permissive environment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Senators Voinovich and Crapo
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Voinovich:

Thank you for the letter from yourself and Senator Capro on Kosovo. I wish to take this opportunity to explain our policy and objectives, and why I think we can succeed.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those

policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, as I stated in a letter of April 28 to Congressional leadership, I would consult closely with Congress, and seek its support before ever introducing U.S. ground troops into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

Thank you for your offer to work with the Administration on this important matter. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Voinovich
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Crapo:

Thank you for the letter from yourself and Senator Voinovich on Kosovo. I wish to take this opportunity to explain our policy and objectives, and why I think we can succeed.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those

policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, as I stated in a letter of April 28 to Congressional leadership, I would consult closely with Congress, and seek its support before ever introducing U.S. ground troops into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

Thank you for your offer to work with the Administration on this important matter. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Mike Crapo
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: *Rep.* VOINOVICH, GEORGE
CRAPO, MIKE

DOC DATE: 14 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 301680

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST CONSENT OF CONGRESS BEFORE SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BELL
BLINKEN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

301680
3197

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 14, 1999

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the United States continues to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), we wanted to take this opportunity to express our most sincere hope that a ground campaign is not being considered by the Alliance.

For months, the human rights situation in Kosovo has been appalling. We realize that the United States is involved in this effort to both protect the Kosovar Albanians as well as significantly degrade the FRY's ability to wage war on an innocent, defenseless population. These are well-intentioned, laudable humanitarian goals. However, reports indicate that this situation in Kosovo has deteriorated since the strikes were initiated and that the international community is considering deploying ground troops to further protect the Kosovar Albanians.


We believe that before the United States commits troops to a NATO ground campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), the American people and their congressional representatives need the opportunity to fully express their will on this matter. History has demonstrated such serious commitments are difficult to sustain without this consent. Therefore, we hope the consent of Congress will be sought before committing to a military campaign on the ground in the FRY.

We look forward to working with you on this important matter in the future. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



George V. Voinovich
United States Senator



Mike Crapo
United States Senator

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA), Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) and Sen. Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), concerning the current situation in Kosovo and the Snowe-Cleland Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999;
- 2) Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI), concerning the President's upcoming meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan and next year's G-8 summit to be hosted by Japan;
- 3) Sen. George V. Voinovich (R-OH) and Sen. Michael D. Crapo (R-ID), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 4) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), concerning the future stability of Southeastern Europe in light of the current conflict in Serbia-Montenegro;
- 5) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), recommending the sale of long-range early warning radar to Taiwan;
- 6) Rep. William F. Goodling (R-PA), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;

APR 27 1999

- 7) Rep. Joseph M. Hoeffel (D-PA) and seventeen other Members of Congress, concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 8) Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), concerning possible human rights violations at the Buenos Aires Yoga School in Argentina;
- 9) Rep. Jose E. Serrano (D-NY), concerning the American military presence on the Island of Vieques;
- 10) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), concerning the NATO summit and countries that have expressed an interest in joining the Alliance;
- 11) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and four other Members of Congress, expressing concern over the massive inflow of foreign aid into Indonesia in light of upcoming national elections; and,
- 12) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), enclosing a copy of his remarks from the floor of the House of Representatives on April 21 concerning the current situation in Kosovo.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 19, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE GEORGE VOINOVICH

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT TO CONSULT WITH
CONGRESS BEFORE COMMITTING TO A MILITARY
CAMPAIGN ON THE GROUND IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY)

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/19		99/4/26
NSC	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: E/C

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 1 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R OH (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*		*OUTGOING	*
2-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
'-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

B

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 22, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*
SUBJECT: POTUS Letter to Representative Kasich

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative John Kasich regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *Sm* Samuel Moyn; *MT* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Representative Kasich
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Kasich

Purpose

Respond to Representative Kasich regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Representative Kasich sent you a letter regarding Kosovo policy. He asks for Congressional consultation before commitment of ground forces in the region. He also suggests negotiating a peace with Russian help.

In your reply, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces at part of the international security presence with NATO at its core. You also explain that Deputy Secretary Talbott is pursuing negotiations with Special Envoy Chernomyrdin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Kasich
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Kasich:

Thank you for your letter calling for increased diplomatic effort, backed by NATO's ongoing air campaign, to achieve a long-term solution for Kosovo and the wider Balkan region.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. In line with your advice, we have engaged both Russia and the G-8 in our diplomatic efforts. Earlier this month, G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted a set of principles for ending the crisis that align the G-8 with NATO's conditions. Deputy Secretary Talbott is now actively working with Viktor Chernomyrdin to press Milosevic to meet these requirements for ending the crisis. We are looking for ways to involve Russia in an international security force, while explaining to Moscow the importance of having "NATO at the core". Neither the U.S. nor Russia would want to participate in a force that is less than effective and that cannot assure the safety of all people of Kosovo.

We are confident that our air campaign will lead Milosevic to accept our conditions because it is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I deeply appreciate your offer to work together to fashion a better future for all in Kosovo. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John Kasich
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3512

April 21, 1999

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It appears that the crisis in Kosovo is nearing a decision point. You may now be contemplating the commitment of U.S. ground forces to secure Kosovo. But before you place more American servicemen and women in harm's way, I urge you to make another effort at securing a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the crisis, including maintaining an open attitude towards third-party mediation. Negotiation does not represent failure. Rather, sophisticated diplomacy is the only means to achieve a long-term solution for Kosovo and the wider Balkan region.

Were NATO to introduce ground forces, complete victory is not likely without the risk of significant American casualties. In any case, we would eventually have to return to the negotiating table. For a durable peace to be realized, neither Serbian nor Albanian nationalism can "win." If a peaceful and lasting outcome to this conflict is to be achieved, we cannot ignore the suffering of any of the Balkan peoples and the economic conditions that have only exacerbated the political and ethnic problems.

Accordingly, I urge you to use the occasion of NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit to call for a special meeting of the G-8 to begin a formal effort to achieve a peaceful settlement. This G-8 meeting should help initiate a framework for a diplomatic solution of the crisis and begin to put into place the foundation for economic assistance to the region. Delegations from Ukraine and other affected regional countries should also be invited to participate in the G-8 session.

We must face the fact that Russia is a critical factor in the successful resolution of this conflict. So far, they have shown restraint, in spite of some significant internal political pressure. But more important, we have many strategic objectives that can only be achieved through U.S.-Russian cooperation. We should

APR 21 1999




consult with the Russian government in a joint effort to reach a peaceful settlement in the Balkans. Russian willingness to participate in an international implementation force should be welcomed, and the differences over the nature of such a force can be resolved through negotiation. Not all of our NATO allies or the European Union are unequivocally committed to a NATO-only or NATO-led force. The U.S. position should recognize that any prospective international force is the means to an end: the return of the Kosovo Albanians to their homeland.

In the interim, NATO should be prepared to apply credible military pressure through the ongoing air campaign to induce Milosevic to enter into meaningful negotiations. And we must work with the UN and countries in the region to find ways to mitigate the suffering of the 800,000 internally displaced Kosovars, who are at the greatest risk during this conflict.

Rather than attempting to solve the region's ethnic problems in isolation, we must find ways to address the conflicts that affect all former republics of Yugoslavia and the neighboring countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Romania. That this is a long-term process should be no obstacle to our trying to achieve it.

America must be courageous in taking opportunities for peace. Together with our NATO allies, Russia, and other regional parties, we must try to set the Balkans on the path to a meaningful peace with a comprehensive, negotiated, and enforceable settlement.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'John R. Kasich', with a large, stylized flourish extending from the bottom.

John R. Kasich
Representative to Congress

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM:  KASICH, JOHN R

DOC DATE: 21 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
RUSSIA

NATO SUMMIT
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: URGES POTUS TO USE NATO SUMMIT TO CALL G 8 MTG RE KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 04 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
LACKEY

FOR INFO
BANDLER
BELL
HOLTZAPPLE
MCELDOWNEY
PASCUAL
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2911

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *MS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Representative Robin Hayes
Regarding Decisions in Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Representative Collins regarding policy in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *MT* Mike Hurley; *MT* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Representative Hayes

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Hayes

Purpose

Respond to Representative Hayes regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Representative Robin Hayes sent you a letter regarding Kosovo policy. He wrote after meeting with soldiers at Ft. Bragg to say that he cannot support the use of ground troops at this time.

In your reply, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces as part of the international security presence with NATO at its core.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Hayaes
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Hayes:

Thank you for your letter concerning the situation in Kosovo. I am particularly happy you shared your impressions of your meetings with soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg. The courage and fortitude of American military men and women has been essential to our campaign to end Milosevic's reign of terror in Kosovo.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, I can assure that I would think long and hard, and consult closely with Congress, before ever committing American soldiers to combat in Kosovo.

I firmly believe that NATO's air campaign is not only justified, it is demanded, and it is working. In recent days I have met many Americans who expressed the conviction that America's moral leadership in this crisis is a defining moment as the world prepares to enter the new millennium. Thank you again for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. "Robin" Hayes
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HAYES, ROBIN

DOC DATE: 12 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 301238

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DOES NOT SUPPORT RESOLUTION TO DEPLOY GROUND TROOPS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 30 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

BROWN, K
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO

BELL
BOUCHARD
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

ROBIN HAYES

8TH DISTRICT, NORTH CAROLINA

130 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-3715
FAX: (202) 225-4036

COMMITTEES:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-3308

April 12, 1999

301250
DISTRICT OFFICES:

137 UNION STREET, SOUTH
CONCORD, NC 28025
(704) 786-1612
FAX (704) 782-1004

230 EAST FRANKLIN STREET
ROCKINGHAM, NC 28379
(910) 997-2070
FAX (910) 997-7987

TOLL FREE IN NC
(888) 207-1311

The Honorable William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

Over the Easter work session, I had the good fortune of spending time with military personnel posted at Ft. Bragg in the 8th District of North Carolina. On the eve of possible American ground force involvement in Kosovo, I reflect on a discussion I had with eight young paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division around the lunch table. I left lunch with a peace of mind that the security of my family and every American alike rested on the shoulders of those capable soldiers. Looking across the table into the eyes of those young Americans, I realized that not a one of them had reservations about deploying to the Balkans. I also realized that, had I been asked, I couldn't have given a response as to why this nation may place them in harm's way.

Mr. President, my position is unchanged. I cannot and will not support a resolution to deploy ground forces in Kosovo at this time. Clearly, there are substantial reports and evidence of horrific crimes committed against innocents. These accounts are heart-wrenching, and I am very sensitive to the plight of the Kosovars. I cannot in good conscious, however, ask the sons and daughters of my neighbors and our nation to leave their last breath on a Yugoslavian battlefield for reasons that remain ill-defined.

In this moment of continued civil unrest in Yugoslavia, I ask that you lead our nation into a public discourse about the objectives of the United States in Kosovo by engaging this Congress in a national debate.

I have long held that before we ask our military to deploy abroad, we must be satisfied that we have answers to the following questions: What we intend to accomplish; How we intend to implement our mission plan; And how we intend to bring our forces home. The American people and, most importantly, our fighting forces deserve to know what we hope to accomplish in Yugoslavia, that we will give our troops everything they need, and that we will not tie their hands with political strings. Only then can we have one American voice echoing support for our mission. And only then can I tell those fine soldiers from the 82nd Airborne why their country is asking of them a patriot's greatest sacrifice.

Sincerely,

Robin Hayes
Member of Congress

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and eight other Members of Congress, concerning their recent trip to Europe with Secretary Cohen to meet with NATO allies;
- 2) Sen. Robert J. Torricelli (D-NJ), concerning an "open skies" agreement between the U.S. and Argentina;
- 3) Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC), concerning the current events in Kosovo;
- 4) Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), concerning the current events in Kosovo; and,
- 5) Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), concerning the current events in Kosovo.

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 15, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ROBIN HAYES

SUBJECT: INFORMS THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WILL NOT
SUPPORT A RESOLUTION TO DEPLOY GROUND FORCES
IN KOSOVO

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/04/15		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R NC (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:      *DISPOSITION      *OUTGOING      *
*                  *                  *              *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED      *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM     *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE    *C-COMPLETED    *           OF SIGNER *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED    *           CODE = A   *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *          *          OUTGOING  *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE      *          *          *
*X-INTERIM REPLY      *          *          *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: POTUS Replies to Senator Arlen Specter et al.
Regarding Support to the ICTY

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding draft responses to Senator Arlen Specter and fifteen other Senators requesting that the United States step up its support to the ICTY. These responses are also intended to answer a separate letter from Senator Specter on the same subject.

Concurrences by: *DN* David Wippman, *MW* Mike Hurley; *MT* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Responses to Sen. Specter et al.

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter from Arlen Specter and Other Senators on
ICTY

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Arlen Specter and colleagues.

Background

Sen. Arlen Specter and fifteen other Senators wrote you after meeting with Justice Arbour of the ICTY. They suggested that U.S./SFOR be ordered to arrest Radovan Karadzic in order to lend credibility to our commitment to bringing war criminals to justice. They also asked for a funding increase and an interagency center to facilitate ICTY's work.

In your reply, you explain commanders are able to apprehend these accused in the field, they must exercise their discretion in carrying out these duties. You note the large funding increase for ICTY in the recent Supplemental Funding Package and explain that current procedures for sharing information with ICTY are working well.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Responses to Sen. Specter et al.
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Specter:

Thank you for your letter urging an increase in our support for the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Although the United States provides more support to the Tribunal than any other country, I share your view that we must find ways to increase that support. As we look at ways to do so, we will keep your suggestions very much in mind.

I agree with you that the arrest of Radovan Karadzic and others named by the court in open or sealed indictments would send a signal to those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo that they will be held accountable for their actions. U.S. and SFOR troops do have the authority to arrest indictees, and have done so when feasible, sometimes under difficult circumstances. At the same time, it is important to note that individual commanders must exercise discretion in carrying out such arrests. In particular, they must consider the possible dangers to their troops and to civilians. Nonetheless, we will continue to look for opportunities to make such arrests.

I also agree with your view that the Tribunal needs additional funding to handle adequately the investigation and prosecution of crimes that have been committed in Kosovo. I believe that the \$18 million in additional funding included in the recent Kosovo Supplemental will satisfy the Tribunal's current needs, but we remain ready to consider additional funding should it prove necessary.

Finally, I want to assure you that we already have in place an effective interagency process for collecting and providing to the Tribunal as much information, both classified and unclassified, as feasible. Nonetheless, we are constantly looking at ways to enhance our support for the Tribunal. In this context, we will consider carefully your suggestion for an interagency War Crimes Center.

Thank you again for writing and for sharing your concerns with me on this important matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SPECTER, ARLEN
LAUTENBERG, FRANK R
LUGAR, RICHARD G

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 303658

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
WAR CRIMES
CO

KOSOVO
INTEL

PERSONS: KARADZIC, RADOVAN

MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

SUBJECT: URGE POTUS TO SUPPORT PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 21 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
WIPPMAN

FOR INFO
BANDLER
BLINKEN
BUSBY

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 6, 1999

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge you to take a stronger hand in supporting the efforts of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In addition to the ongoing military and diplomatic efforts being carried out by the United States and NATO, three specific steps can and should be taken now to deter more war crimes in Kosovo and to support the rule of law in the international arena.

First, it is imperative that the arrest warrant for Radovan Karadzic be executed. Karadzic has been an indicted war criminal since 1995, and the continuing failure to bring him to justice undermines the rule of law. Justice Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, has indicated that SFOR knows the locations of Karadzic and "a handful" of other individuals under sealed indictment for war crimes. Clearly, U.S. and SFOR units in Bosnia are capable of apprehending these individuals if given that mission. The arrest of Karadzic would send a clear and unmistakable message to Slobodan Milosevic and other senior Serbian officials that they will be held accountable for their role in war crimes being committed in Kosovo. This action will also send the message that NATO forces have the will and means to enforce the law.

Second, we urge you to support additional funding for the Tribunal so that it may begin preparations for a full scale investigation of the war crimes that have been committed in Kosovo. There is strong and credible evidence of mass murder, widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence, and the wholesale destruction of entire villages in Kosovo. The current staff of 70 investigators for war crimes throughout the former Yugoslavia is inadequate to the task of investigating and prosecuting the Kosovo war crimes. Although you have requested an additional \$5 million, more recent estimates place the figure closer to \$20 million to conduct the kind of inquiry that will be necessary to ensure that justice is done.

Third, we encourage you to establish an interagency War Crimes Center in the United States under the auspices of the State Department, to be manned by personnel from State, Justice, the FBI and the Intelligence Community. Participation in the Center by dedicated personnel from the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the National Imaging and Mapping Agency is vital to ensure that all-source information, classified and unclassified, on war crimes is collected, evaluated and rapidly and continuously disseminated to the Tribunal. The information available from such a War Crimes Center will be critical to ensuring that the ICTY can successfully prosecute those who are responsible for the ongoing atrocities in Kosovo.

12/2/98
Sincerely,

12/10

<u>Alfred</u>	<u>Frank R. Lautenberg</u>
<u>Alvin Leger</u>	<u>Patrick Leahy</u>
<u>W. J. Moynihan</u>	<u>John F. Kerry</u>
<u>W. J. Ford</u>	<u>Tom Harkin</u>
<u>Harry Reid</u>	<u>Chris Hatch</u>
<u>Frank W. Lautner</u>	<u>Herb Kohl</u>
<u>Mert Loh</u>	<u>Robert C. Nicholas</u>

Byron L. Eorgan George V. Vornouch

This image shows a blank sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are approximately 20 lines visible on each side of the central binding area. The lines are thin and black, typical of standard notebook paper. The paper appears slightly aged or off-white.

Senators on May 6, 1999 letter to President Clinton

Arlen Specter	Frank Lautenberg
Dick Lugar	Patrick Leahy
Daniel Moynihan	John Kerry
Mary Landrieu	Tom Harkin
Harry Reid	Orrin Hatch
Frank Murkowski	Herb Kohl
Trent Lott	Barbara Mikulski
Byron Dorgan	George Voinovich

FAX TRANSMISSION

OFFICE OF U.S. SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER

711 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
TELEPHONE: (202) 224-4254
FAX: (202) 228-1229

Recipient: President Clinton

Date: May 6, 1999

Time: 10:45 a.m.

Fax Number: (202) 456-6468

Sender Senator Arlen Specter

No. of pages
(including header): 5

Sender's Phone: ()

Subject: _____

Comments: Please convey to President Clinton as soon as possible.

Hard copy to follow in the mail.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 06, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ARLEN SPECTER

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE A STRONGER HAND
IN SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
WAR CRIMES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY)

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/06			99/5/7
NSC (GLYN T. DAVIES)	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /

COMMENTS:

*Cc: Mandy Myers, Tracey Thawford
E/c*

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 15 MEDIA:F INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220 1210
MAIL USER CODES: (A) R PA (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * * * *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * OF SIGNER *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED * CODE = A *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * OUTGOING *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John Ashcroft (R-MO), concerning the possible purchase by the Government of Greece of American F-16 fighter jets;
- 2) Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) and thirty-six other Senators, concerning U.S.-Turkey relations;
- 3) Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 4) Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) and fifteen other Senators, concerning the efforts of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
- 5) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), recommending the establishment of an international tribunal for alleged crimes against humanity in Cambodia during the 1970's;
- 6) Rep. Mark Green (R-WI) and ten other Members of Congress, concerning funding for the current military actions in Kosovo;
- 7) Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), urging the President to invite the President of the Democratic Socialist

MAY 7 1999

Republic of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga, on an official visit to the United States;
and,

- 8) Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting the appointment
of a special envoy for Sudan.

Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*
SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Senator Domenici

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Senator Domenici regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *Sm* Samuel Moyn; *MT* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Domenici
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Domenici

Purpose

Respond to Senator Domenici regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Senator Pete Domenici sent you a letter asking that you submit a request to Congress before committing the United States to military action beyond the current air campaign.

In your reply, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces at part of the international security presence with NATO at its core.

You also reiterate your commitment from April 28 to consult fully with congress and ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Domenici
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Domenici:

Thank you for your letter on Kosovo. I appreciate your support for the efforts of our men and women in uniform, and want to explain to you our policy in the region, particularly with respect to possible deployment of American ground forces.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open

fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, as I explained in a letter of April 28 to Congressional leadership, I can assure you that I would think long and hard, and seek Congressional support before ever introducing ground troops into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

I appreciate your concern about the region and your views about the possible commitment of American ground forces. Again, thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: DOMENICI, PETE V

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 303498

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ASKS POTUS SEND REQUEST IF KOSOVO REQUIRES MEANS BEYOND AIR CAMPAIGN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 21 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
LACKEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BELL

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

PETE V. DOMENICI
NEW MEXICO

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3101

3550 303496
COMMITTEES:
BUDGET
APPROPRIATIONS
ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
INDIAN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

May 4, 1999

Dear President Clinton,

As a Senator and strong supporter of our military men and women, I feel obliged to convey my position with you regarding the U.S. involvement in hostilities in Kosovo. As you well know, several legislative packages already exist which would propose to preempt, further define, or curtail your authority and responsibilities as President. I believe that these options are neither prudent at this particular time, nor do they necessarily conform with desired consensus in an effort that involves the active engagement of our military in a hostile situation.

I recognize that as Commander in Chief you have broad authorities and grave responsibilities in decisions of national security and foreign policy. You have chosen to take the lead in this air war. As you well know, these are decisions that directly impact the daily lives of citizens throughout this country and will have long-term implications for the security and prosperity of the American people.

If you should decide that this operation requires means beyond the current air campaign, I respectfully ask that you send us your request. Upon receiving any such request, I offer you my commitment to help bring the matter before the Senate for deliberation and a decision expeditiously.

Sincerely,



Pete V.
Domenici
UNITED STATES SENATOR



Fax Data Sheet

328 Hart Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510
202-224-6621
fax: 202-224-7371
www.senate.gov/~domenici

Date: 5/4/99
Time: 4:35 EST
To: President Bill Clinton
Fax No.: (202) 456-6221

From: Senator Pete V. Domenici
Phone No.: 224-7061

Number of pages including this sheet: 2

Message:

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 05, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE PETE V. DOMENICI

SUBJECT: CONVEYS HIS POSITON WITH THE PRESIDENT
REGARDING THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES
IN KOSOVO

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/05		19/5/7
NSC (GLYN T. DAVIES)	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: *E/C*

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: F INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220 _____
 _____ MAIL USER CODES: (A) R NM (B) _____ (C) _____

 *ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
 * * * * *
 *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
 *C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
 *D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
 *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
 I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
 *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
 *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
 *X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
 (ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
 KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
 LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
 MANAGEMENT.

S

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

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- 3) Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 4) Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) and fifteen other Senators, concerning the efforts of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
- 5) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), recommending the establishment of an international tribunal for alleged crimes against humanity in Cambodia during the 1970's;
- 6) Rep. Mark Green (R-WI) and ten other Members of Congress, concerning funding for the current military actions in Kosovo;
- 7) Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ), urging the President to invite the President of the Democratic Socialist

MAY 7 1999

Republic of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga, on an official visit to the United States;
and,

- 8) Rep. ~~Frank~~ Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), requesting the appointment
of a special envoy for Sudan.

Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Representative Capuano et al.

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft responses to Representative Michael Capuano et al. regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Concurrences by: *MH* Mike Hurley; *MT* Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Responses to Representative Capuano et al.

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Responses to Representative Capuano et al.

Purpose

Respond to Representative Capuano and 23 other Members of Congress regarding decisions in Kosovo.

Background

Representative Capuano and twenty three other Representatives wrote to you expressing support for NATO's air operations but also asking that you consult fully with Congress and seek its approval before introducing American ground troops into the Kosovo conflict. .

In your replies, you explain NATO policy with regard to ground troops. You explain that while you have not taken any option off the table, the focus at present is on the deployment of American ground forces at part of the international security presence with NATO at its core. You restate your April 28 commitment to the Congressional leadership to consult fully with Congress, and to ask for its support, before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo in a non-permissive environment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Representative Capuano et al.
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Michael:

Thank you for the letter from you and twenty three of your colleagues expressing support for the air strikes undertaken by our country and NATO in an effort to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

The staggering brutality of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the fact that it was taking place on NATO's doorstep, and the potential to destabilize the surrounding region all demanded a response. Only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted did we and our NATO allies reluctantly resort to force. Ethnic hatred has caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st century we could not let so massive an onslaught go unchallenged.

The objective of our ongoing engagement is and remains straightforward: to create the conditions whereby the refugees can return to their homes with security and self-government. These conditions will be met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows the refugees to return unconditionally, and permits the deployment of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. Our military operations, and our diplomatic initiatives, are all aimed at achieving this end.

Over the last two months the Alliance has remained united and resolute in pursuing this objective. Its air campaign is exacting an ever higher price from Milosevic. We have badly damaged the infrastructure that supports his war-making machine. We have functionally degraded Serbia's petroleum and oil refining capability and interrupted its electrical power supply throughout the country. And each day NATO air strikes cause further damage to his forces deployed in the field.

In recent days we have seen indications that the air campaign and Mr. Milosevic's self-destructive policies have begun to open

fissures of dissent in the FRY. Demonstrations against those policies occurred in several cities. Serb police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse a crowd protesting against the government's deception concerning the human cost of the conflict. More than 1,000 VJ reservists deserted their units in Kosovo to return to their towns in response to the mistreatment of their families by police.

We are also seeing evidence of movement by Mr. Milosevic. Recently, for the first time he publicly accepted the international community's principles for ending the conflict, though he demanded the details be negotiated directly with the United Nations. He and his advisors clearly miscalculated NATO's resolve, and may be finally coming to the realization that they cannot outlast the Alliance.

I understand your concerns about deploying ground forces in Yugoslavia. However, we cannot succeed if Milosevic's security forces are not replaced with an effective international security force deployed in Kosovo with his consent. This means a military force with NATO at its core, with NATO command and control and rules of engagement. This also means a force with U.S. participation. NATO had planned for such a Kosovo Force (KFOR) prior to the air strikes, and is now in the process of updating that planning, on the assumption of a "permissive" environment. I have not ruled out other options, since it is useful to keep Mr. Milosevic uncertain. However, I can assure that I would think long and hard, and consult closely with Congress, before ever committing American soldiers to combat in Kosovo.

I thank you again for your support to the ongoing efforts of the United State and its allies to create the conditions in which the people of Kosovo can return to their homes..

Sincerely,

The Honorable Michael F. Capuano
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

303160
3334

April 29, 1999

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We have supported the air strikes undertaken by our country and NATO in an effort to end genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In good conscience, we cannot stand by while President Milosevic commits unspeakable violence against the people of Kosovo. We hope that ultimately the air campaign will result in an end to Mr. Milosevic's conduct and a return of the Kosovars to their country to live in peace.

If the time comes, however, that serious consideration is given to introducing American ground troops into that conflict, we respectfully request and expect that you will consult fully with Congress and seek our approval before such action is taken.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Caputo

303160
3334
VANO

David J. Phelps

John R. ...

Karl Holt

Ed Pastor

John C. ...

John ...

Bonnie ...

John ...

Tom ...

John ...

Tracy Kapture

Lydia V. J.

Tommy Wood

Al Lopez

Talysa Ortiz

Stephanie Palko

Jan Schenk


[Signature]

Ch Edwards

Carol Rodriguez

Karen McArthur

TO: PRESIDENT



FROM: CAPUANO, MICHAEL
LUCAS, FRANK
PHELPS, DAVID

DOC DATE: 29 APR 99
SOURCE REF: 303160

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

NATO
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR GROUND TROOPS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 11 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

LACKEY
MCELDOWNEY
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO

BANDLER
BELL
BLINKEN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 03, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE MICHAEL CAPUANO

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT TO CONSULT FULLY WITH
CONGRESS AND SEEK APPROVAL BEFORE CONSIDERING
SENDING AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS INTO KOSOVO

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LARRY STEIN		ORG	99/05/03		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		___/___/___		___/___/___

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 20 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230 _____

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D MA _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL    *      OF SIGNER   *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *      CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING    *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John F. Kerry (D-MA), concerning his recent meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia;
- 2) Rep. Michael E. Capuano (D-MA) and twenty-three other Members of Congress, concerning the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 3) Rep. John Joseph Moakley (D-MA) and thirteen other Members of Congress, recommending the closure of the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

Enclosures