

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chrons for May 1999 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1707

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|------|----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| 39   | 1        | 6      | 3         | V      |

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. memo                | Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 3, 1999. [Record ID: 9903335] [partial] (1 page)                            | 05/14/1999 | P3/b(3)     |
| 002. memo                | Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 4, 1999. [Record ID: 9903614] [partial] (1 page)                            | 05/14/1999 | P3/b(3)     |
| 003. memo                | For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Next Steps on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9903808] [Duplicate of 1.34, 2014-0547-M (rs1039_001j) (5 pages) | 05/17/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. memo                | For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)                                                        | 05/20/1999 | P3/b(3)     |
| 005. memo                | For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)                                                                        | 05/17/1999 | P3/b(3)     |
| 006. memo                | Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, May 14, 1999. [Record ID: 9903846] [Duplicate of 1.04, 2014-0547-M] (2 pages) | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007. memo                | Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, May 9, 1999. [Record ID: 9903843] [partial] (1 page)                            | 05/18/1999 | P3/b(3)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Shulte, Greg)  
OA/Box Number: 1707

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for May 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6293

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 14 MAY 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO  
SOC

DC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 3 MAY DC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: JACOBSON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 08 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER  
BARTLETT  
EXECSEC  
KERRICK  
NSC CHRON  
POWELL  
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By SDB NARA, Date 7/30/2019  
2014-0549-m

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

SECRET

## ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STEINBERG  
001  
002

Z 99051220 FOR DECISION  
X 99051422 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM  
X 99051422 JACOBSON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

## DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTIONDISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990514 FUERTH, L  
002 990514 KENNEY, K  
002 990514 REYNES, J  
002 990514 BASKETTE, A  
002 990514 RICCHETTI, S  
002 990514 WOLFE, T  
002 990514 CONROY, R  
002 990514 MANNING, M



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

5/11/98  
0958

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 3335  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 72 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

TMA

|                | SEQUENCE TO  | INITIAL/DATE     | DISPOSITION  |
|----------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| JACOBSON       | <u>1/3</u>   | <u>D 5/12/14</u> |              |
| POWELL         |              |                  |              |
| RICE           |              |                  |              |
| DAVIES         |              |                  |              |
| KERRICK        |              |                  |              |
| STEINBERG      | <u>2</u>     |                  |              |
| BERGER         | <del>3</del> |                  |              |
| SITUATION ROOM |              |                  |              |
| WEST WING DESK | <u>4</u>     | <u>(1) 5/14</u>  | <del>5</del> |
| RECORDS MGMT.  |              |                  |              |
|                |              |                  |              |
|                |              |                  |              |

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

99 MAY 12 10 10 AM '98  
CC:

COMMENTS: SOC, may 3 DC on Kosovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3335

May 14, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE  
Staff Assistant to the  
Representative of the U.S.  
to the United Nations

MR. STEVE RICCHETTI  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
to the President


MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International  
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC  
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 3, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies  
Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 3, 1999. (C)

  
Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify On: 5/4/09

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By SD3 NARA, Date 7/30/09  
2014-0545-m

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3335

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 3, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 9:30 - 11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting  
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:  
James Steinberg

AID:  
Harriet Babbitt  
Hugh Parmer

OVP:  
Leon Fuerth  
Leslie Davidson

JCS:  
Joseph Ralston  
George Casey  
Robert Wagner

State:  
Strobe Talbott  
James Pardew  
Julia Taft

USNATO:  
Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

Defense:  
Walter Slocombe  
Joseph Kaufmann

White House:  
Donald Kerrick

USUN:  
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:  
Greg Schulte  
James Baker  
Eric Schwartz  
Carlos Pascual  
Miles Lackey  
Matthew Vaccaro  
Donald Mitchell

Chief of Staff:  
Steven Ricchetti

CIA:  
John Gordon

(b)(3)

**DECLASSIFIED**

**PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0549-m (1.34)

KBH 7/31/019

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 11, 2009

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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should examine all options for providing shelter and humanitarian relief to the refugees leaving Kosovo. (Action: State) (U)
- The USG should ensure appropriate coordination between NATO and the ICRC on planning for commercial airdrops of humanitarian supplies to displaced persons in Kosovo. (Action: State) (C)
- The USG should only agree to a G-8 document that makes reference to an "international security presence." (Action: State) (C)
- The upcoming visit with Russian envoy Chernomyrdin should be used to move Russia toward acceptance of a UN Security Council resolution containing NATO's conditions. (Action: State, OVP) (C)
- The EXCOMM should produce a paper elaborating NATO's conditions on such issues as withdrawal, verification and the nature of an international military presence. (Action: NSC) (C)

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

X

IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

RELEASER: \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE NO: \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PAGES: 4

(Including Cover)

 FROM: NSC West Wing Desk  
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425  
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH Situation Room  
(ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR 3 MAY DC MTG ON KOSOVONSC LOG # 3335

| <u>TO (AGENCY)</u> | <u>DELIVER TO</u>             | <u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u> | <u>PHONE NUMBER</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| <u>DOS</u>         | <u>Exec Sec</u>               | _____                | _____               |
| <u>DOD</u>         | <u>Exec Sec</u>               | _____                | _____               |
| <u>USUN</u>        | <u>Staff Asst to the Rep</u>  | _____                | _____               |
| <u>CIA</u>         | <u>Exec Sec</u>               | _____                | _____               |
| <u>JCS</u>         | <u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u> | _____                | _____               |
| <u>USAID</u>       | <u>Exec Sec</u>               | _____                | _____               |
| _____              | _____                         | _____                | _____               |
| _____              | _____                         | _____                | _____               |

REMARKS:

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2008-0994-F-3

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NSC # 3335

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR  
SUBJECT: SOC FOR 3 MAY DC MTG ON KOSOVO PAGES: 4  
(w/  
Cover)

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|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <u>USUN New York</u> | <u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u> | <u>212-415-4029</u> | <u>212-415-4177</u> |

**SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS**

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

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DATE 14 MAY 99

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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| MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE<br>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT<br>ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS<br>WASHINGTON, DC 20505<br>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY                          | _____ | _____            | _____     |
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: RL Date: 2/21/2024  
2008-0994-F.3

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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DATE 14 MAY 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 3 MAY DC MTG ON KOSOVO  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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| COL. MICHELLE MANNING<br>SECRETARY<br>JOINT STAFF<br>ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON<br>WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001<br>JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF | _____ | _____                | _____     |
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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 11, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 3, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 3.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 11, 2009

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By SDB NARA, Date 7/30/2019  
2014-0549-M

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 14 MAY 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO  
SOC

DC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 4 MAY DC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: JACOBSON SGD TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 17 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER  
BARTLETT  
EXECSEC  
KERRICK  
NSC CHRON  
POWELL  
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By SDS NARA, Date 7/30/2019  
2014-0549-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903614

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG  
001  
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99051220 FOR DECISION  
X 99051422 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM  
X 99051422 JACOBSON SGD TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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002 990514 FUERTH, L  
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002 990514 REYNES, J  
002 990514 BASKETTE, A  
002 990514 KYLE, R  
002 990514 RICCHETTI, S  
002 990514 WOLFE, T  
002 990514 CONROY, R  
002 990514 MANNING, M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

5/12/91

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|                | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE       | DISPOSITION |
|----------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| JACOBSON       | <u>1/3</u>  | <u>D 5/12 5/14</u> |             |
| POWELL         |             |                    |             |
| RICE           |             |                    |             |
| DAVIES         |             |                    |             |
| KERRICK        | <u>2</u>    |                    |             |
| STEINBERG      | <u>2</u>    |                    |             |
| BERGER         | <u>2</u>    |                    |             |
| SITUATION ROOM |             |                    |             |
| WEST WING DESK | <u>4</u>    | <u>R 5/14</u>      | <u>X</u>    |
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: 199 MAY 12 12 42

COMMENTS: SOC, may 4 DC on Kosovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3614

May 14, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MR. STEVE RICCHETTI  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
to the President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MS. RYAN CONROY  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International  
Development

MS. AMBER BASKETTE  
Staff Assistant to the  
Representative of the U.S.  
to the United Nations

COL. M. MANNING, USMC  
Secretary, Joint Staff

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE  
Associate Director for  
National Security and  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 4, 1999 *let*

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies  
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Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify On: 5/5/09

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *SDB* NARA, Date *7/30/2019*  
*2014-0544-m*

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3614

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 4, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 9:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.  
3:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting  
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

OVP:

Richard Saunders  
Leslie Davidson

State:

James Pardew  
Julia Taft

Defense:

Walter Slocombe  
Joseph Kaufmann

OMB:

Robert Kyle

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

AID:

Harriet Babbitt  
Hugh Parmer

JCS:

Joseph Ralston  
George Casey

USNATO:

Douglas McElhaney (via SVTS)  
Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

White House:

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte  
Eric Schwartz  
David Leavy  
Chuck Allen  
Matthew Vaccaro  
Donald Mitchell

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2014-0549-M (1.35)  
KBH 7/31/2019

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify on: 5/5/09

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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should develop a detailed concept for moving refugees through Macedonia, taking into account proposals from the Humanitarian IWG for "land bridges" to Albania and Turkey.  
(Action: NSC) (U)
- The President's trip to Europe should be used to press the EU to provide additional funding for humanitarian relief.  
(Action: NSC, State) (U)
- The USG should determine whether the ICRC is willing to transmit the ICTY's request to interview the two Serb POWs in U.S. custody. (Action: State) (S)
- The paper on "Elaborating NATO's Conditions" should be revised taking into account the Deputies' discussion. (Action: NSC)  
(U)

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(ROOM NO.)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR 4 MAY DC MTG ON KOSOVONSC LOG # 3614

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| <u>USUN</u>        | <u>Staff Asst to the Rep</u>  | _____                | _____               |
| <u>CIA</u>         | <u>Exec Sec</u>               | _____                | _____               |
| <u>JCS</u>         | <u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u> | _____                | _____               |
| <u>USAID</u>       | <u>Exec Sec</u>               | _____                | _____               |
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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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3614

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 11, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 4, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 4.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 11, 2009

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By SPB NARA, Date 7/30/2019  
2014-0549-m (1.35)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3808  
LIMITED ACCESS

May 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *fn*  
SUBJECT: Next Steps on Kosovo

I attach the memorandum to the President that you requested last night on this subject. I would appreciate your guidance on its content and direction, and whether you would like any parts to be further developed.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President  
Tab A Two Memoranda from Richard Holbrooke

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify On: May 17, 2009

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E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By *N* NARA, Date *2/21/2024*  
*2008-0994-K-3*

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
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| 003. memo                | For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Next Steps on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9903808] [Duplicate of 1.34, 2014-0547-M (rs1039_001j) (5 pages) | 05/17/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
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### RESTRICTION CODES

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1

REVISED AND UPDATED: May 1, 1999

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State  
The National Security Advisor

SUBJECT: Some Thoughts about Slobodan Milosevic

1. Has he lost his mind? Recent Serb behavior is so extreme, erratic and stupid that it raises questions--admittedly of a highly speculative nature--about the stability of Milosevic. Until now, while often reprehensible, his behavior was coolly and cruelly calculating. It no longer is. Recent actions, especially the bizarre reversals in the refugee flow, suggest an increasingly (but not wholly) irrational pattern. Perhaps this is driven by rage and early signs of desperation--a sense that he has trapped himself.

His goals at the time of Dayton were clear: he would throw the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs over the side of his boat, and work out a deal acceptable to us on Bosnia, in order to bring Yugoslavia back into the community of civilized European nations. His personal high point was surely the ceremonies at the Elysee Palace, when he was treated with some degree of respect as an equal member of the Dayton process, and talked face to face with Presidents Clinton and Chirac, Kohl and other world leaders. Proud of his background as a banker who had negotiated with some of the leading money center bankers in the world, he foresaw international recognition for his regime, membership in the major international institutions, and substantial business opportunities.

At first he made real progress toward these goals. Most of the EU recognized Yugoslavia over our objections. The Italians and Greeks made a grotesque deal with him for a large stake in the state telecom company, netting Milosevic \$1 billion in cash, money he could use to pay the army, bribe people, and perhaps move partly off-shore for his own uses and future protection. In 1996-97 the United States and the Contact Group offered him a "road map" in which, in return for implementation of Dayton, he would get the "outer wall" sanctions lifted or suspended on a rolling basis.

This policy was well underway when it was derailed by Kosovo. His dreams for rejoining Europe as a full-fledged and accepted member are now gone forever.

As this realization sinks in, I suspect that it will significantly affect Milosevic. He will never again be the man of Dayton, the Elysee, and the road map--and he surely knows it. He is will never again eat the Packy's All-Sports Bar in Dayton, or even be able to leave his country without risking arrest. Milosevic must realize that he has crossed an invisible line and cannot get back again. Trapped by the enormity of what his forces have done, at his instructions, he is isolated for the rest of his days inside Yugoslavia.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0547-M (1.24)

2/27/2017 KRM



With this bleak prospect facing him--one I suspect he is beginning to understand--his behavior has shown far less of its previous cleverness or tactical flexibility--not, at least, until he released the three American POWs to Jesse Jackson. Although both General Anderson and I told him and his senior generals that the bombing would be "swift, severe, and sustained," it is quite possible (as Jim O'Brien suggested during our trip) that he thought it would be something along the lines of Desert Fox--short and survivable. Now that he realizes the extraordinary level of destruction his country faces, he must also begin to realize that he cannot survive long enough to re-build Yugoslavia's economy, that the international community will never give Belgrade financial assistance until he is removed, and that he will probably lose power either during or after the bombing ends.

Perhaps for this reason Milosevic has pursued a policy in Kosovo that will cause the Albanians the maximum pain in the shortest possible time frame, but surely doom him in the long term. It is one of the theses of this memorandum that he understands what he has done, and has embarked on this policy even though, at some level, he knows he cannot survive it.

Although it may not have been a conscious policy, he seems to have decided to destroy the Albanians as fast as possible; no more creeping repression from Belgrade, just real, all-out murderous ethnic cleansing. Have deeply hostile psychological factors in his make-up taken over from his rational sense? He never showed any remorse or concern for human suffering, which takes place far from his clean and isolated presidential palaces and villas. The Milosevic we negotiated with, while dangerous and cruel, was rational. The behavior of the man who launched Operation Horseshoe is not. The fact that both his parents committed suicide may be particularly relevant now. It is my guess that Milosevic will not survive these events, that one way or another he will not only fall, but die as a result. This does not, however, answer the critical questions of when and how.

2. What About His Associates? The men around him are not strong or courageous. While they all owe their current positions to Milosevic, many of them have told Chris Hill, Wes Clark, and me over the years that they held views different from those of their leader. At times each tried to suggest to us that he held "softer," more reasonable views than Milosevic.

In the end, facing the abyss, almost all of them would seek to save their own skins. Whatever their individual views on the sacredness of Serb soil in Kosovo, they are not likely to be ready to sacrifice themselves on the altar of Prince Lazar. I believe that the early signs of dissension within Serb ranks (and with Montenegro) are real, and probably reflect even greater unhappiness than we are aware of. This may be an exploitable opportunity, but must be handled with extreme care and confidentiality.

## ADDITION ON MAY 1:

In rereading this memo, which was written in great haste, I realize that I omitted a critical caveat regarding Milosevic, and thereby may have left a misleading impression of my view as to what he might do.

The fact is that it is impossible to predict what Milosevic will do. Broadly speaking, he faces two choices: first, try to survive and perhaps even retain power through a negotiation; or second, hold to his current position (with relatively minor adjustments) no matter what happens, thus assuring his ultimate destruction. The key rests inside his own head, where no one can go. We cannot discount the possibility that, if he feels he is doomed anyway, he may choose to take as many Albanians with him, while disregarding the suffering of the Serb people. (This was how Hitler reacted when he realized that the war was lost: kill as many Jews as possible and the hell with the destruction of Germany itself.)

On the other hand, if his associates, including the military, understand that they can bring the war to an end by removing Milosevic, they may be willing to act. It is therefore critical that those with the power to remove or undermine Milosevic understand that if they act, they will receive a receptive response from NATO and Washington.



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

1

April 20, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RICHARD HOLBROOKE

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: NEXT STEPS

As the bombing ends its fourth week, allow me to offer some thoughts on the choices that lie before us:

## PART ONE: His Choices, Our Choices

I. Slobo's Choices. While we control the bombing, Milosevic controls the timing and nature of the first political/diplomatic response. However, none of his options are attractive:

--First choice: he refuses to blink--and continues his current defiance of NATO;

--Second choice: he accepts our terms, in effect, surrendering--or else is replaced by a group who accept our position;

--Third choice: having emptied most of Kosovo of Albanians, Milosevic announces that he is ready to negotiate and makes a half-serious offer in an effort to split the Alliance and the Contact Group.

## II. Our Choices--keyed to his three choices:

1. In the event that Belgrade continues to stand up to the air campaign: We have three courses, broadly speaking:

--end the bombing without achieving our objectives. Result: Milosevic wins.

--send ground troops to Yugoslavia in a "non-permissive environment"--that is, invade and occupy at least part of Yugoslavia. Result: Potentially open-ended conflict and hostile occupation of large portion of Yugoslavia.

--continue to bomb. This leaves the situation unresolved--in effect, taking us back to the starting point of this memo.

If the Administration wishes to avoid being pushed by events into either defeat or invasion, the bombing must intensify--and continue until the Serbs change their position, preferably by changing their leader.

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PER E.O. 13526

2014-0547-M (1,13)

2/27/2017 KBH

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EYES ONLY

2

2. In the event that Belgrade accepts our terms or loses power, then we achieve our objectives. Result: We win.

3. In the event that Milosevic makes a semi-serious offer that still falls short of our core goals, we will face some complicated decisions which could strain relations with our Contact Group and NATO colleagues:

--Should we negotiate with Milosevic at all? Dayton may have been a deal with the devil, but it ended a war on acceptable terms. Milosevic kept enough of his word, especially regarding no NATO/American casualties in Bosnia, so as to justify continued dealings with him. But at the same time he was re-legitimized and re-empowered politically, and he then strengthened his economy with big international deals.

--But after Kosovo he is not the same person he was after Dayton. Whatever the details of an agreement, his sole goals will be to retain power, retain Kosovo, and avoid punishment for his own deeds. Can we allow that after Kosovo? Can Milosevic, the most disruptive person in Europe in half a century, become the co-guarantor of Kosovo's future?

--After the war is over, the world is going to demand justice. There will be widespread public opposition to any deal, no matter how good, that leaves Milosevic in power. This time, the War Crimes Tribunal will need to be satisfied. We will not be able to let indicted war criminals run loose, as is the case with Karadzic and Mladic. And I assume that Louise Arbour will indict Milosevic.

Our real goal: Regime change. Our real goal, whether stated or not, must be a change in the leadership of Yugoslavia. While there is no hard information that suggests such an outcome, we should not preclude it. I have an instinct that Milosevic is finished, but cannot foresee how or when<sup>1</sup>.

--Nothing in wartime is more difficult than effecting a regime change. Even Churchill ignored several promising opportunities to help anti-Hitler plotters. Milosevic, however, runs a "soft dictatorship," more like Marcos than Saddam or Ceaucescu. The Serbs are not the North Vietnamese or the Iraqis; Milosevic is not popular and Serb unity, while it may exist at the moment, is not a long-term Serb thing. The men around him might look for ways to distance themselves from him; one way to do this would be to re-open lines of communication with Western officials. However, it would require the active support of the Army and some powerful business interests to remove him. There is also the danger

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<sup>1</sup> See separate memorandum, "Has Milosevic Lost His Mind?"

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While Milosevic's departure from power is the optimum outcome, policy must be based on the likelihood that he cannot be dislodged, at least not in the time frame we seek, and it may therefore become necessary to negotiate with his regime once again. Thus the current Administration position of remaining vague on the issue in public is correct.

A. Bombing must continue while the discussions take place. Milosevic is certain to try to link the opening of talks to the cessation of bombing<sup>2</sup>. The Russians and perhaps some of our NATO allies will support him, but we must be unyielding.

C. Where should talks be held? Milosevic will never leave Yugoslavia again, for fear that he will either be arrested by the War Crimes Tribunal or overthrown while he is away. So direct talks with him would have to be in Belgrade while NATO is bombing--not a good arrangement.

--It seems likely Milosevic will offer to negotiate with someone other than the United States--the Russians, Kofi Annan, Carl Bildt, the Greeks, the Ukrainians, the Chinese, etc. If he succeeds in such a ploy, we would be allowing other parties to determine what the air war was for--that is,

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what our war aims are. This strikes me as unthinkable.

E. Where? This time around, the United States is probably out. France, which had its shot and botched it badly, should not be given a second chance. Moscow will surely offer its lovely hotels and conference rooms, but that would be absurd. Geneva reeks of history's failures, and it is virtually impossible to keep the press and the international community out of the way. A remote place somewhere in Europe that can be sealed off and controlled would have to be found.

--Given these considerations, my recommendation is that any talks with the Yugoslav government be conducted not with Milosevic, but outside Yugoslavia with empowered subordinates, while we continue to look for ways to undermine him or encourage his removal.

#### PART TWO: War Aims

NATO has been criticized for lack of clarity or precision about the purposes of the bombing. But this is neither surprising nor troubling in the early stages of such a fluid situation. War aims often evolve as facts on the ground change. In this case, the original stated aims of the bombing had to change once the atrocities became apparent.

The current statements of our goals seems correct to me. We should continue to stress the three most urgent: the refugees go home; the Yugoslav security forces leave; and an international security force moves into Kosovo in a permissive environment. In turn, the KLA must agree to a cease-fire. (Disarming them, a key part of Rambouillet, will be a more difficult matter.)

Of course, Milosevic's proposals will fall far short of these goals. He will seek conditions that discourage refugee return; insist on leaving some of his security and border forces and offer to return to either the October or the Rambouillet levels; and oppose any international security force, then offer to allow one that has no NATO troops. All these ploys, and others too numerous to anticipate, should be rejected.

As for the political issues, which are more complex, we are unlikely to settle them in the first phase of negotiations, although we should try to make as much progress as possible. Rambouillet will no longer satisfy the KLA, which is now in substantial control of the Kosovar political situation. But most of the principles of Rambouillet are still valid, and should be part of the general framework agreement that accompanies the end of the bombing.

#### PART THREE: The Post-bombing Status of Kosovo and other Considerations.

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

5

The post-bombing status of Kosovo might be a Trusteeship, under Chapter VII authority from the UN Security Council. This would not formally change the international status of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, but it would remove it from the political control of Belgrade for a specified period of time. Partition of Kosovo strikes me as a bad idea, but I would not rule out completely the possibility of dividing Kosovo into different zones of temporary control, along the lines of the West Bank agreements.

Humanitarian Issues. The dimensions of this problem defy quantification at this early date, when we still do not know precisely what has happened inside Kosovo. But already we know that it will be far beyond anything Europe has seen since 1945:

--Housing and infrastructure have been destroyed. The rural population will not be able to re-establish itself before the planting season. Farm animals and wells have been destroyed. Winter is less than six months away. The costs will be staggering, higher than the highest current estimate. The international community will probably have to provide temporary housing for about one million people through the winter of 1999-2000, then provide security and a reconstruction program for years to come--an extraordinarily sad way, incidentally, to usher in the brave new millennium.

--Given this situation, we should consider immediately establishing a special high-level coordinator for humanitarian assistance in Kosovo, with authority to cut across interagency lines.

Regional Issues. The rest of the region will also need more attention, which will also be expensive. But the alternative is further instability and, ultimately, risks of further wars. Albania and Macedonia are, in different ways, close to the edge, and need immediate help far beyond what they are getting. The other near neighbors, plus Montenegro, have paid a huge price for the crisis, and also need assistance. And Bosnia must remain at the top of our agenda, since a setback there would raise questions about our entire policy.

Looking further down the road, there will also be a need to help with reconstruction within non-Kosovo Yugoslavia. It is clearly premature to think of helping the Serbs, yet in the long run building a viable, democratic Serbia is an essential goal for the European Union, Russia, and the United States.

Russia. The Russians seem to have realized that they should not let their own future be tied to the actions of a man who does not give a damn about them. The Secretary's successful Oslo talks, and the fact that the Russians have left their troops in Bosnia, are indications that Moscow is looking for ways to keep the strains within acceptable--and primarily rhetorical--limits, while dealing

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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with its domestic opponents who are exploiting the issue.

While we need to work closely with Moscow, it is a dream to think they will bail us out. In fact, giving them a central role in a negotiation would probably backfire, because they would support compromises that would be unacceptable to us. Our public rejection of these proposals could then increase the strain between us. In short, we should keep in constant and close communication with Moscow, but not let them become deeply involved in a serious negotiation--for the sake of the U.S.-Russian relationship.

#### PART FOUR: Ground Troops.

We have been outmaneuvered by our critics on this issue, primarily because of three factors: first, the widespread theory that air campaigns alone never succeed; second, the general impatience of the public and the press; and third, the ability of Administration critics, especially Senator McCain, to hammer NATO for "not even having a plan."

The theory (almost universally held by the chattering classes and the Sunday pundits) that the air campaign has failed is not proven. While there are definitely limits to what air power alone can accomplish, it is too early to conclude that this campaign will not achieve its objectives, especially given the campaign's slow start. Comparisons are useful but can be misleading: in Vietnam most of the bombs fell in rural areas, and the economy was far less vulnerable to targeted bombing. In fact, there are already signs that the bombing is beginning to affect the thinking of business and leadership elements. Premature obituaries for the bombing will only drive the policy into a rush to a ground troop invasion--a step of historic import.

As for ground troops, our critics scored an easy point without having to support an invasion by hammering the lack of a plan. This has left the impression that we are opposed to rational and prudent planning. Yet a plan does not commit anyone; it is simply planning.

In fact, planning might highlight the costs and dangers of sending troops into Kosovo in a "non-permissive environment." Few advocates of sending ground troops into Kosovo have examined the potential costs and consequences of such a decision, which would be the most fateful any American President has taken since June-July 1965, when, after a week of intense secret debate, Lyndon Johnson told the American public that he would send 75,000 combat ground troops to Vietnam. Throughout the spring of 1965, Johnson had refused to discuss honestly with the Congress and the American public the situation, although the air war against North Vietnam had started in February. Before June, he literally tried to sneak military units into Vietnam under the fiction that they were not going into combat but merely protecting the air bases. All in all,

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it was probably the most devious act of any President in our time, with the most adverse consequences (including the beginning of an inflationary spiral at home.)

This is not, of course, an argument against the NATO-led peace-keeping force: one way or another, there will almost certainly be NATO ground troops in Kosovo later this year. And once there, they will stay a long time. But everything depends on whether they enter by invitation, along the lines of Dayton, with the formal agreement of the national authority in Belgrade--or whether they enter as an invasion force which will then become an occupation force. Talk about something in between a "permissive" and "non-permissive" force is wishful thinking; in the real world the troops are either invited in--which means low or no casualties--or they have to fight their way in. If they invade, they will not be able to stop in Kosovo; given the realities of the situation, they will have to pursue Serb forces deep into the rest of Serbia and Montenegro, perhaps as far as Belgrade itself. Under the permissive scenario, they should be able to restrict themselves to Kosovo (as well as Macedonia, Albania and perhaps Montenegro), and take low casualties as in Bosnia.

An invasion can, of course, succeed, but only at substantial cost. NATO is far too powerful, and the Serbs far too weak, to repel an invasion. If we undertake such a policy, we will surely prevail. But it could mean serious casualties, and at the end of the process NATO will "own" Yugoslavia, Albania, and Macedonia just as surely as the World War II victors owned Germany and Japan. They will have to occupy the land and defend themselves against possible attacks, including Somalia and Beirut-style terrorism. To be sure, even without an invasion NATO will be in the region for the indefinite future. But how they enter makes a huge difference. To put it somewhat melodramatically, will it be Dayton or D-Day?

#### PART FIVE: Summation

To summarize:

- Our most important goal should be to encourage a regime change.
- If that is not achieved before Milosevic makes a credible negotiating offer, then we should negotiate with someone other than him, in a site outside Yugoslavia.
- If Belgrade does not make a credible negotiating offer, we should intensify the bombing until it does.
- Bombing should continue during the negotiations.
- We should not compromise on our three core goals, but defer most political issues for a later date if necessary.
- We should make plans for a ground troop invasion of Kosovo, but recognize that it is a step from which there may be no exit.
- The planning effort should be made known to the public so as

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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to allow its effect to be felt in Belgrade--and its costs and risks understood publicly.

--We should do more to deal with the worst humanitarian crisis Europe has seen since 1945, recognizing that it will get even worse once we gain access to Kosovo itself.

--We should start planning for trusteeship or protectorate status for Kosovo, and obtain full Contact Group endorsement for this general concept, without getting bogged down in the details.

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To mention a few other important issues not covered in this memo:

--More economic pressure on Yugoslavia--as quickly as possible;

--More public information to reach the Serbs about what their troops are really doing in Kosovo: this is the area of greatest current urgency;

--Set up a separate operation for KLA handling; it is currently in danger of becoming an orphan of our policy, yet it will be critical.

--Finally, there is the question of justice. For some, especially the Kosovar Albanians, this will also be a search for revenge. We should not underestimate the anger that will exist after the war. Not only should we re-double our efforts on behalf of the War Crimes Tribunal now, but we must anticipate even greater demands for justice later. There will be fierce criticism of any negotiation with Milosevic, no matter what the deal. The world will demand justice for Milosevic after the war, if he is still alive.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *ms*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *cmh*

SUBJECT: POTUS Response to Letter from Montenegrin  
President Milo Djukanovic

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a proposed response to President Djukanovic. Bob Gelbard will hand-deliver the letter to President Djukanovic Friday; it needs to be given to Andy Bair from Gelbard's office before his departure for Brussels tomorrow in order that he can deliver it to Bob in time.

Concurrence by: Susan Braden *SB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President  
Tab A Proposed Response to President Milo Djukanovic  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to President Milo Djukanovic

Purpose

Respond to Montenegrin President Djukanovic.

Background

You received a letter May 10 from President Milo Djukanovic of the Republic of Montenegro. The same day, he published in the New York Times an op-ed piece co-authored with Zoran Djindjic, a leading opposition figure in Serbia, which included recommendations on the transition to democracy in post-conflict Serbia. In his letter he emphasizes the importance of a long-term solution that would ensure stability in the Balkans.

Your response thanks President Djukanovic for the constructive stance he is taking with regard to Kosovo. It also promises to take under advisement his recommendation, proposed in his Times article, for an economic development plan for the region. Finally, it notes that Montenegro has been invited to participate in the EU-proposed Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and welcomes Montenegro's participation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Djukanovic.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Djukanovic  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of May 10 concerning the international community's efforts to resolve the crisis in Kosovo and set Yugoslavia on the path of reform. We appreciate Montenegro's courageous support, despite threats from Belgrade, for a peaceful solution.

Keeping Montenegro actively engaged in the quest for a peaceful solution to these problems has been and remains a high priority. We especially welcome Montenegro's readiness to play a constructive role in creating a democratic Yugoslavia.

Having read your editorial with Zoran Djindjic in the May 10 New York Times, I was struck by your courage and firm commitment to bringing Yugoslavia into the European mainstream. Your idea for an economic development plan for the Balkans deserves further consideration.

I am personally committed to a broader project in Southeast Europe that would, among other things, promote reform in the FRY and advance regional economic integration. I understand European leaders have invited your government to take part in the May 27 senior officials meeting on the EU-proposed Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. This effort can make an important contribution to our shared goal of stabilizing, transforming, and ultimately integrating Southeast Europe into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. We welcome and encourage your government's involvement in this meeting and seek ways to involve your government in other forums on the Yugoslav crisis.

We share your observations regarding FRY leaders' loss of credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, we are committed to working with ICTY to ensure that those guilty of war crimes are brought to justice.

As always, we remain steadfastly committed to supporting Montenegro's efforts to create a democratic society that respects the human rights of its citizens and strives to offer them a better life.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Milo Djukanovic  
President  
Republic of Montenegro  
Podgorica, Montenegro

**DRAFT**

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of May 10 concerning the international community's efforts to resolve the crisis in Kosovo and set Yugoslavia on the path of reform. We appreciate Montenegro's courageous support, despite threats from Belgrade, for a peaceful solution.

Keeping Montenegro actively engaged in the quest for a peaceful solution to these problems has been and remains a high priority. We especially welcome Montenegro's readiness to play a constructive role in creating a democratic Yugoslavia.

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We share your observations regarding FRY leaders' loss of credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, we are committed to working with ICTY to ensure that those guilty of war crimes are brought to justice.

As always, we remain steadfastly committed to supporting Montenegro's efforts to create a democratic society that respects the human rights of its citizens and strives to offer them a better life.

Sincerely,

**DRAFT**

William J. Clinton

His Excellency,  
Milo Djukanovic,  
President,  
Republic of Montenegro,  
Podgorica, Montenegro.





*Republic of Montenegro*  
*President*

Podgorica, May 10, 1999

Dear Mr. President,

The days ahead should, with a maximum effort of all the key players in Europe and in the world, bring peace to the citizens of Kosovo and of the whole Yugoslavia that they have craved for so strongly. It is encouraging to see an orientation that a political solution to the Kosovo problem should also include defining a rehabilitation strategy for Yugoslavia and the Balkan region on a more long-term basis.

Montenegro wholeheartedly supports such an orientation and is prepared to do its best to contribute to this end. We therefore welcome the initiative for an International Conference on Southeast Europe and we suggest that it take place in Montenegro. This would be yet another expression of a continuing support of the international community to the democratic processes in our Republic. At the same time, this would mean highlighting and stimulating Montenegro as a positive example in the Balkans, while also encouraging all the progressive forces in Yugoslavia and in the region to follow suit. We would like to recall that it was on precisely such premises that at the beginning of this year an idea was proposed - and in principle supported - to organise, under the auspices of the OSCE, an international conference on regional problems in the Balkans, which would be held in Montenegro.

I wish also to express our greatest interest that Montenegro be directly represented at the initial meeting on Southeast Europe, as well as at any other meetings in the process of dealing with the Yugoslav crisis and of seeking mechanisms on more long-term basis for inclusion of the Balkan region into the developed European integrations.

His Excellency  
William Jefferson Clinton  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, DC

You probably know that for quite some time now, due to a gross violation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Belgrade regime, Montenegro has been allowed no authentic representatives in the Federal administration, disregarding the electoral will of its citizens. In this manner the equal status of our Republic in the Yugoslav federation has been infringed upon and Montenegro prevented to have its say in the decision making by top federal authorities. If there is a genuine wish to find a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, the constitutional status of Montenegro in Yugoslavia must also be fully addressed and defined.

The current leadership of FRY, which has for the sake of holding on to power and for the sake of their personal interests exposed the country to the NATO intervention, unmindful of the lives of its citizens or of material assets, has called into question the very existence of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro. Such a leadership cannot represent the state and national interests of Montenegro at the international scene either. We see the future of Montenegro in a common state, but only provided it is democratic, economically prosperous, internationally recognised and respected, and included in European integration processes.

I would like to assure you that, in all these activities, the European Union and the international community will continue to have in the leadership of Montenegro a constructive and reliable partner. And I hope that for this proposal we may have your support and understanding. I also wish to inform you that I have sent this letter to all the leaders of the European Union member states, to Russia and USA, as well as to the Secretary General of the UN and the Chairman in Office of the OSCE.

Yours sincerely,

Milo Djukanović





# After The War In Serbia Is Over

By Milo Djukanovic  
and Zoran Djindjic

**D**espite the current conflict, we remain committed to Yugoslavia's integration into Europe, and eventually into the European Union. The road to Europe is the only route that will help our country solve its considerable problems and build a lasting peace and stability throughout the region. It is difficult to imagine that any economic or political renewal can occur in Yugoslavia without unambiguous and long-term international support.

Only a democratic and stable Yugoslavia can secure stability in the Balkans. We want to underscore that the democratic political forces in Yugoslavia are committed to that goal. The immediate concerns are ending the war, securing the return of the refugees and implementing a political settlement in Kosovo that will include the deployment of an international force.

But to establish a lasting peace, the outside world needs to do more than solve the Kosovo crisis. Military intervention in Kosovo has led to new problems, whether or not that was intended. With intervention, the West assumed part of the responsibility for finding solutions to these problems.

At the same time, intense efforts will also be necessary on the part of Yugoslavs to win the trust of the outside world and recover the moral standing lost because of Kosovo.

Even before the end of the war, the international community should state clearly and unequivocally that democratic and economic reconstruction in Yugoslavia represents its official and binding position. Such a statement would give hope to the citizens of our country and encourage the transformation of the political landscape.

5-10-99 291

The cycle of politics that over the past 10 years or more has led our country to this tragedy must be broken. If the war ends with a signature on a peace agreement and the same leadership in power, with Slobodan Milosevic at the helm, the tragedy and violence will continue.

Yugoslavia's stability is crucial because of its size and geographical position in the Balkans and its role in determining the stability or instability of neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. To date, however, international strategy on Yugoslavia has boiled down to crisis management, while ignoring the roots of crisis.

## Yugoslavia will need democracy and its own Marshall Plan.

Democracy can be established in our country only with a complete political transition in Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia. This depends on free and fair elections, the strengthening of Serbia's democratic opposition, close cooperation with the democratic Government of Montenegro, the complete isolation of undemocratic forces and the establishment of an outside body to help monitor the political change.

Respected European politicians with previous experience in the Balkans, like former Prime Minister Felipe González of Spain, former Chancellor Franz Vranitzky of Austria and Hans Koschnick, a veteran German Social Democrat, could work in such a commission under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Accelerated economic reconstruction in the Balkans will be possible only with some variant of the Marshall Plan. The promise of outside aid would help the cause of democracy in Yugoslavia by tempering lingering anger. It will be difficult for the democratic opposition to function after this NATO campaign because people are likely to see us as part of that Europe — part of that West — that bombed us, destroyed bridges, roads and factories, and killed civilians. People will protest in both Serbia and Montenegro.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2909

May 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL L. BERGER

THROUGH:

GREG SCHULTE *MS*

FROM:

SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Letters to McCain et al. re Kosovo

Senator McCain and others wrote the President about their trip to Europe. He warns, however, that the American public is unprepared for the long haul, particular if casualties begin to rise. Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding draft responses.

Concurrences by:

*ms: MT TB*  
Mike Hurley, Mark Tavlarides, Joseph  
Bouchard

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Senator McCain

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER  
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letters to Senator McCain et al. re Kosovo

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Senator McCain and others.

Background

Senator McCain and a number of colleagues wrote you after their trip to Europe. While concurring on NATO policy, they stressed that American public support for the venture would need to be strengthened for the policy to be tenable over the long haul; they warned, in particular, that the possibility of casualties would need to be emphasized.

Your response thanks them for their support for the policy and outlines some of the steps taken to explain it to the American people. It also notes that despite the month that has elapsed casualties remain minimal.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator McCain et al.  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter recounting the results of the meetings you and Secretary Cohen's delegation had in Brussels with General Clark, Secretary General Solana and NATO ambassadors. I also appreciate that you were able to meet with our troops at Aviano and Ramstein. I am particularly happy you were able to confer with General Clark, who is directing NATO's ongoing campaign with great skill.

As the events of intervening weeks demonstrate, I entirely agree with your insistence that NATO stay the course in the effort to reverse Milosevic's brutal policies in Kosovo. NATO will continue the air campaign against the FRY until Milosevic ends the violence, withdraws all his military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, allows all refugees to return to their homes and permits the stationing of an international security force to protect the peace.

I completely agree with your recommendation concerning the importance of keeping the American public informed on all aspects of the conflict. I have spoken frequently about why we needed to take action in Kosovo, and will continue to do so. Moreover, senior U.S. officials continue to make the case daily. Our allies, particularly Prime Minister Blair, share our resolve. That unity is essential to conveying to Milosevic that NATO will succeed.

In speaking to the American people, I have sought to warn them about the possibility of American casualties. I am relieved to be able to say more than fifty days into the campaign that NATO has not lost a single airman to hostile action. This astonishing figure is a testament to the competence of our pilots and their commanders. That said, I agree that we cannot let this successful record lead to public complacency.

Finally, I appreciate your comments on planning for ground forces. As you know, the forcible entry of NATO into Kosovo



would carry great risks and be opposed by most of our allies. As a result, NATO's planning has been restricted to the deployment of forces in a permissive environment. At America's request, the Alliance is currently updating this planning to take into account the new circumstances, including the massive exodus of refugees caused by Milosevic's forces.

Thank you again for your letter. I share your unshakeable conviction that NATO must succeed. All our efforts are clearly directed toward that end. I appreciate your support as we seek to bring peace to Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John McCain  
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and  
Forestry  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

2909

300762

**Congress of the United States**  
Washington, DC 20515

April 9, 1999

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We want to share a few thoughts with you following our return from Europe where we accompanied Secretary Cohen to meetings in Brussels with General Clark, Secretary General Solana and the Permanent Representatives from our NATO allies, as well as visits to Aviano and Ramstein Air Force Bases to see our troops.

We were generally encouraged by the strong statements of support by all our NATO allies for pursuing NATO's policy objectives and their deep understanding of the strategic interests and values of freedom those objectives reflect. We were also most pleased by Secretary Cohen's comments and actions in support of these objectives as well as his strong insistence to our allies that they bear an appropriate and significant share of the burden and risks of NATO's mission in Kosovo.

Even assuming the success of the air campaign to significantly degrade Milosevic's military capability, there is less certainty that NATO's broader objectives in Kosovo (removal of Milosevic's troops and return of refugees with international protection) will be achieved.

As a result, we believe a number of steps would be appropriate.



- It is important for the Administration to reinforce the point to the American public that NATO's efforts could require many more weeks or months to succeed. (That would also have the possible salutary effect of driving home the point to Milosevic that the damage his military has sustained in the first three weeks is just the beginning of what he should expect.)


The President  
Page 2  
April 9, 1999


- The American public also needs to be better prepared for the likelihood of Alliance casualties. The success to date of avoiding casualties has been extraordinary but there is little likelihood that the required military operations can be sustained without casualties, and the public needs to accept that eventuality.
- While our focus is on accomplishing the current mission of significantly degrading Milosevic's military capability through an intense air campaign, we believe it prudent for the U.S. to urge NATO to plan for additional military missions, including the use of ground forces, in the event that proves necessary to carry out such missions to achieve NATO's broader objective -- reversing Milosevic's genocidal actions in Kosovo.


We support the position you have taken that NATO's success is in our vital national interests and critical to basic values that Americans hold dear. We are firmly resolved that NATO succeed.



Sincerely,


1220/KZ  
  
John McCain  
1230  


1040  
  
Steve Boyers

  
Chuck Hagel

  
Jim Turner

1970  
  
Carol Levin  
  
Joseph Lieberman

  
  
Ellen



TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MCCAIN, JOHN  
LEVIN, CARL M  
BUYER, STEVE

DOC DATE: 09 APR 99  
SOURCE REF: 300762

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO  
DEFENSE POLICY

NATO  
CO

PERSONS: MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

SUBJECT: SUPPORT RE MISSION IN KOSOVO & SUGGESTIONS FOR NATO POLICY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 30 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE  
BROWN, K  
LACKEY  
SCHULTE

FOR INFO  
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE  
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

RECEIVED: APRIL 12, 1999

OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JOHN MCCAIN

SUBJECT: SHARES A FEW THOUGHTS WITH THE PRESIDENT  
FOLLOWING THEIR RETURN FROM EUROPE WHERE THEY  
ACCOMPANIED SECRETARY COHEN TO MEETINGS WITH  
NATO ALLIES

|               |                | ACTION |          | DISPOSITION |             |
|---------------|----------------|--------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| ROUTE TO:     |                | ACT    | DATE     | TYPE        | C COMPLETED |
| OFFICE/AGENCY | (STAFF NAME)   | CODE   | YY/MM/DD | RESP        | D YY/MM/DD  |
| LARRY STEIN   |                | ORG    | 99/04/13 |             |             |
|               | REFERRAL NOTE: |        |          |             |             |
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COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220 1210 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) R AZ (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:      *DISPOSITION      *OUTGOING      *
*                  *                  *CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED      *TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*C-COMMENT/RECOM      *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *      OF SIGNER
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED      *      CODE = A
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED      *COMPLETED = DATE OF
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*      OUTGOING
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES  
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA  
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and eight other Members of Congress, concerning their recent trip to Europe with Secretary Cohen to meet with NATO allies;
- 2) Sen. Robert J. Torricelli (D-NJ), concerning an "open skies" agreement between the U.S. and Argentina;
- 3) Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC), concerning the current events in Kosovo;
- 4) Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), concerning the current events in Kosovo; and,
- 5) Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), concerning the current events in Kosovo.

Enclosures



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: Response to Letters from Rep. Kucinich

Representative Kucinich sent two letters to the President in April to urge an cease-fire to the ongoing bombing campaign in Yugoslavia in order to work towards a diplomatic solution. The response and your memorandum to the President are attached.

Concurrence by: *mi* Mike Hurley; *SG* Scott Busby; *mm* Miles Lackey

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Letter to Representative Kucinich  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER  
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letters from Representative Kucinich

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Representative Kucinich.

Background

Representative Kucinich wrote twice during the month of April to urge a cease-fire during the ongoing bombing of Yugoslavia and a search for a diplomatic solution. Your response explains that purely diplomatic solutions were exhausted before the commencement of bombing and that Milosevic abused the diplomatic process in order to prepare his Kosovo program. The basic conditions for an end to bombing are repeated.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Kucinich  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dennis:

Thank you for your two letters regarding ongoing events in the Balkans. I deeply respect your familiarity with the customs of the region and I found the Yugoslav plea for an end to the bombing you forwarded both moving and tragic.

The current bombing campaign has never been our preferred solution to the region's problems. In fact, we resorted to use of force reluctantly and only after investigating and exhausting every diplomatic avenue. Even as military action is underway, we continue to explore all diplomatic opportunities in an effort to achieve a just peace for the region and a secure return of the Kosovar Albanians to their homes.

Mr. Milosevic has cynically abused every concession made to him and rejected every opportunity for peace to further his destructive policies in Kosovo. After long efforts to work with him, NATO has now given him a basic set of conditions which are not open to revision. Milosevic must withdraw all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, allow all refugees to return to their homes and permit the stationing of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb.

The e-mail you forwarded provides precious evidence of pro-democracy forces in Yugoslavia of exactly the kind our policy hopes to nourish. As I stated most recently last Thursday at Fort McNair, our quarrel is not with the Serbian people and we have never identified them with their leader. For that reason, we have taken every possible precaution to avoid collateral damage during the bombing campaign. It is our hope that the humanitarianism espoused in the message can prevail eventually for all peoples in the region. That is the motivation behind our policy.



Thank you again for your letters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20510

DENNIS J. KUCINICH

10TH DISTRICT, OHIO

1730 LONGWORTH OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-5871

14400 DETROIT AVENUE  
LAKEWOOD, OHIO 44107  
(216) 228-8850



Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
April 8, 1999

2735

5004  
Committees:  
Government Oversight  
Education  
and the  
Workforce

William J. Clinton  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500-0005

Dear President Clinton:

I am deeply concerned about the current Allied NATO strike taking place in Yugoslavia and its effect on the civilian population in Yugoslavia. I support your Administration's efforts to halt the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. My thoughts and prayers are with the innocent Kosovar Albanian refugees and families still in Kosovo. But I also feel that we must be attuned to the sensitivities of the innocent civilians living in Yugoslavia who will be celebrating their Easter holiday.

As you know, the Eastern Orthodox Easter holiday is set to begin only hours from now. It is in the spirit of compassion and faith that I request that you reconsider accepting President Slobodan Milosovic's offer for a cease-fire during the Orthodox holidays. Orthodox Christians worldwide would view it as insensitive to shower a country with bombs as innocent Orthodox families celebrate one of their most important religious holidays. The United States has already demonstrated its sensitivity to the Muslim world when the Administration postponed a missile attack on Iraq which had been set for the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Let us show the same compassion to the innocent civilians of Yugoslavia.

The Orthodox holiday will begin tomorrow and end on Tuesday, April 13. A cease-fire at this time could provide the needed time for relocating the thousands of refugees who are missing or separated from their families. It may also provide a new venue for reopening peace talks and to fulfill your goal of ensuring a meaningful and lasting peace in the war-torn region of Kosovo.

As someone who is very familiar with the political and religious traditions of the region, I am offering to be of assistance to you in any way you might think appropriate. I thank you in advance for your thoughtful consideration.

Sincerely,

Dennis J. Kucinich  
Member of Congress

DJK:sa

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903011  
RECEIVED: 21 APR 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: KUCINICH, DENNIS

DOC DATE: 15 APR 99  
SOURCE REF: 301471

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO  
REFUGEES

NATO  
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: KUCINICH FWDS PRO DEMOCRACY FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA MSG RE END OF NATO  
CAMPAIGN IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 03 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE  
BROWN, K  
SCHULTE  
SCHWARTZ

FOR INFO  
BUSBY  
GUARNIERI  
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE  
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



DENNIS J. KUCINICH  
10TH DISTRICT, OHIO

1730 LONGWORTH OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-5871

14400 DETROIT AVENUE  
LAKESWOOD, OHIO 44107  
(216) 228-8830



Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

3011 301471

Committees:  
Government Oversight  
Education  
and the  
Workforce

April 15, 1999

William J. Clinton  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500-0005

Dear President Clinton:

Pro-democracy forces inside Yugoslavia have forwarded a copy of the enclosed message to me by e-mail. They wish to communicate to the world their appeal for an immediate end to NATO's bombing campaign, followed by vigorous diplomatic efforts to accomplish humanitarian goals in Kosovo. In light of the death of 100 Kosovar refugees by NATO bombs yesterday, I hope that you will consider this appeal for peace. If I can be of further assistance, it would be my privilege.

Sincerely,

*Dennis J. Kucinich*

Dennis J. Kucinich  
Member of Congress

cc: John Podesta  
Sandy Berger  
Madeleine Albright

DJK:jb

>>  
>>----- Forwarded Message Follows -----  
>>  
>>BELGRADE 17-NGO APPEAL  
>>( <http://www.nodc50.org/noalaqueria/> )  
>>  
>>  
>>Deeply shocked by NATO strikes devastation of our  
> country and the  
> plight of  
>>Kosovo Albanians, we, the representatives of  
> non-governmental  
> organizations  
>>and the Nezavisnost Trade Union Confederation,  
> energetically demand  
> from  
>>those who have created this tragedy to immediately  
> take all necessary  
> steps to  
>>create conditions for the resumption of peace  
> process.  
>>For two weeks now the most powerful military,  
> political and economic  
> countries  
>>in the world have been killing people and  
> destroying military and  
> civilian  
>>facilities, bridges, railway lines, factories,  
> heating plants, storage  
>>facilities and fuel tanks. This has produced an  
> exodus of unprecedented  
> proportions.  
>>Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs, primarily  
> ethnic Albanians, are  
> forced to  
>>leave their devastated homes to escape the bombing  
> and military actions  
> of the  
>>regime and KLA, in the hope that they will find  
> salvation in the tragic  
>>status of  
>>refugee.  
>>It is obvious that all this leads to a catastrophe  
> and that a  
> negotiated and  
>>peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem, which we  
> have urged for years,  
> is now  
>>farther than ever.  
>>Our effort to develop democracy and a civic society  
> in Yugoslavia and  
> help it  
>>restore its membership of all international  
> institutions have taken

- > place
- > >under
- > >constant pressure by the Serbian regime.
- > >We, the representatives of civil groups and
- > organizations, have
- > courageously
- > >and consistently fought against every war-mongering
- > and nationalistic
- > policy.
- > >and for the respect of human rights, and
- > particularly against the
- > >repression of
- > >Kosovo Albanians. We have always insisted on the
- > respect of their human
- > rights and freedoms and on the restoration of
- > autonomy for Kosovo.
- > >Throughout this period, Serb and Albanian civil
- > society groups were the
- > only
- > >ones to retain contacts and cooperation.
- > >The NATO intervention has destroyed everything that
- > has been achieved
- > so far
- > >and the very survival of the civic society in
- > Serbia.
- > >Faced with the current tragic situation, we put up
- > the following
- > demands in
- > >the
- > >name of humanity and values and ideas that have
- > been guiding us in our
- > >activities:
- > >
- > >• We demand an immediate cessation of bombing and
- > all armed operations;
- > >• We demand the resumption of peace process with
- > international
- > mediation at
- > >the regional (Balkan) and European level, as well
- > as in
- > >the United Nations;
- > >• We demand from the European Union and Russia to
- > take their charge of
- > >responsibility for finding a peaceful solution to
- > the crisis;
- > >• We demand an end to the practice of ethnic
- > cleansing and repatriation
- > of all
- > >refugees;
- > >• We demand support for peace, stability and
- > democratization of
- > Montenegro and
- > >every possible action aimed at helping this
- > republic alleviate the
- > disastrous
- > >consequences of the refugee crisis;
- > >• We demand from Serbian and international media to
- > report
- > professionally and
- > >impartially about current developments, to refrain
- > from participation
- > in
- > >the media war and from fanning inter-ethnic hatred,
- > hysteria and
- > glorification of
- > >force as the only reasonable way out of the crisis.



> >  
> >We are unable to achieve this on our own.  
> >We expect from you to support our demands and help  
> us realise them  
> through  
> >your actions and initiatives.  
> >  
> >  
> >- Association of Citizens for Democracy, Social  
> Justice and Support for  
> Trade  
> >Unions  
> >- Belgrade Circle  
> >- Center for Cultural Decontamination  
> >- Center for Democracy and Free Elections  
> >- Center for Transition to Democracy  
> >- Civic Initiatives  
> >- EKO Center  
> >- European Movement in Serbia  
> >- Forum for Ethnic Relations and Foundation for  
> Peace and Crisis  
> Management  
> >- Group 484  
> >- Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia  
> >- Students Union of Serbia  
> >- Union for Truth About Anti-Fascist Resistance  
> >- VIN: Weekly Video News  
> >- Women in Black  
> >- Yugoslavian Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,  
> and  
> >- NEZAVISNOST Trade Union Confederation.  
> >  
> >  
> >  
> >  
> >eGroup home:  
> [http://www.eGroups.com/list/direct\\_action](http://www.eGroups.com/list/direct_action)  
> >Free Web-based e-mail groups by eGroups.com  
> >  
> >  
> see if kucinich is interested.  
> >  
> >

DENNIS J. KUCINICH  
10TH DISTRICT, OHIO

1730 LONGWORTH OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-5871

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LAKEWOOD, OHIO 44107  
(216) 228-8850

14.10 225 5745

CONG KUCINICH



Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

001/005

Committees:  
Government Oversight  
Education  
and the  
Workforce

# FAX MEMORANDUM

Date: 4/14

TO: PRESIDENT CLINTON

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_  
FAX: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: ☒ Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich  
\_\_\_\_\_ Souheila Al-Jadda  
\_\_\_\_\_ Jaron Bourke  
\_\_\_\_\_ John Edgell  
\_\_\_\_\_ Jill Johnson  
\_\_\_\_\_ Daniel Marschall  
\_\_\_\_\_ Joe Montoni  
\_\_\_\_\_ Seth Weaver  
\_\_\_\_\_ Michael Yarbrough  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_  
FAX: (202) 225-5745

MESSAGE:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

4 pages to follow

The contents of this facsimile are personal and confidential. Please forward to the addressee immediately. If there any problems with this transmission, please notify (202) 225-5871.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES  
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA  
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Paul D. Coverdell (R-GA), concerning long term recovery efforts for Central America and the Caribbean in the wake of Hurricane Mitch;
- 2) Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA), concerning the current situation in the Kosovo and the China-WTO negotiations;
- 3) Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), concerning the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 4) Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), concerning his recent visit to Northern Albania.

APR 21 13:28

Enclosures



THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 16, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DENNIS J. KUCINICH

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES A COPY OF MESSAGE FROM PRO-DEMOCRACY  
FORCES INSIDE YUGOSLAVIA APPEALING FOR AN  
IMMEDIATE END TO NATO'S BOMBING CAMPAIGN

| ROUTE TO:<br>OFFICE/AGENCY | (STAFF NAME) | ACTION      |                  | DISPOSITION  |                           |
|----------------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|---------------------------|
|                            |              | ACT<br>CODE | DATE<br>YY/MM/DD | TYPE<br>RESP | C COMPLETED<br>D YY/MM/DD |
| LARRY STEIN                |              | ORG         | 99/04/16         |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:

MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D OH

(B) (C)

\*\*\*\*\*

|                         |                      |                      |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| *ACTION CODES:          | *DISPOSITION         | *OUTGOING            |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION   | *A-ANSWERED          | *CORRESPONDENCE:     |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM        | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE       | *C-COMPLETED         | *OF SIGNER           |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET   | *S-SUSPENDED         | *CODE = A            |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC |                      | *COMPLETED = DATE OF |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY  |                      | *OUTGOING            |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE        |                      |                      |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY        |                      |                      |

\*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                              | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004. memo                | For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page) | 05/20/1999 | P3/b(3)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Shulte, Greg)  
OA/Box Number: 1707

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6293

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 17, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW  
Department of State

BRUCE WRIGHT  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT  
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY  
Office of Management and  
Budget

ALAN ROMBERG  
Department of State

(b)(3)  
Central Intelligence Agency

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD  
Department of State

(b)(3)  
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON  
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY  
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUZE  
Department of State

DAVID ADAMS  
Agency for International  
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN  
Office of the Secretary of  
Defense

JAMIE METZL  
Department of State


JAMES SCHEAR  
Office of the Secretary of  
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON  
Office of the Vice President

GEORGE CASEY  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Wednesday, May 19, 1999, from 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. in room 248 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.

  
Greg Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President for  
the Implementation of Dayton Accords

Attachment



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                 | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005. memo                | For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial]<br>(1 page) | 05/17/1999 | P3/b(3)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Shulte, Greg)  
OA/Box Number: 1707

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6293

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 20, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW  
Department of State

BRUCE WRIGHT  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT  
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY  
Office of Management and  
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD  
Department of State

(b)(3)  
Central Intelligence Agency

ALAN ROMBERG  
Department of State

(b)(3)  
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON  
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY  
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUZE  
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON  
Agency for International  
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN  
Office of the Secretary of  
Defense

JAMIE METZL  
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR  
Office of the Secretary of  
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON  
Office of the Vice President

GEORGE CASEY  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting scheduled for Friday, May 21, 1999 has been cancelled. There will a SVTS at 8:30 a.m.



Greg Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President  
for the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING  
May 19, 1999

- I. Next Steps on Visit and Search. . . . . OSD/State
- II. Restricting POL on the Danube. . . . . State/JCS
- III. Next Steps on KFOR Planning. . . . . JCS
- IV. International Police Force. . . . . State



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2641

May 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM: SAMUEL MOYN *SM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Senator Brownback

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Senator Brownback

Concurrences by: Mark Tavlarides; Mike Hurley; Valerie Guarnieri *MS MH VG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Letter to Senator Brownback

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER  
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Senator Brownback Asks for Consultation before  
Commitment of Ground Troops

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Brownback.

Background

Senator Sam Brownback wrote you in early April after meeting with servicemen at McConnell Air Force Base. He asks for a statement of your policy and requests Congressional consultation before the commitment of ground troops in Kosovo.

Your response explains current NATO policy, including the position on the use of ground forces.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to the Senator Brownback  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Brownback:

Thank you so much for your letter regarding ongoing events in the Balkans. I am particularly glad to hear that you recently had a chance to meet with American service members and their families. They continue to spearhead our efforts to bring a needed end to Mr. Milosevic's brutal policies. The fact that his brand of ethnic violence has persisted so late in our war-torn century is also an invitation for us to make sure that the next century begins free of it.

The nature of Mr. Milosevic's actions in the region demanded a response, which took military form only after every diplomatic option had been explored and exhausted. The aim of our current policy is, and has always been, to achieve a just peace in the region which allows a safe return for Kosovar Albanians to their homes. The initial objective of ongoing NATO air strikes is therefore very clear. It will have been met when Mr. Milosevic withdraws all Serb forces -- including paramilitary and police forces -- from the province, allows all refugees to return to their homes, and permits the stationing of an international security force to protect all Kosovars, both ethnic Albanian and Serb. The air campaign, far from aggravating the situation, is in our view thus the first step towards a return to normalcy in the region and life without fear for Kosovo's victims.

I agree with you that Congress's role in shaping foreign policy is critically important and I understand the concern you express about the possible role of ground forces in ending the conflict. I have stated many times during recent weeks that the United States will not commit ground forces to achieving the initial objective of forcing Serb withdrawal from the region. I have also, however, emphasized that the United States will contribute troops as part of the NATO core security presence that can provide for the refugees' safe return to their homes.

I deeply share your insistence that we achieve a balance between our outrage at continuing ethnic persecution and our interest in



the safety of American service members. I believe the present policy, as I have outlined it, strikes that balance.

Thank you again for your letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Brownback  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-1604

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1604

April 1, 1999

271127  
COMMITTEES:  
COMMERCE, SCIENCE,  
AND TRANSPORTATION  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

20041

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to express my grave concern regarding the situation in Kosovo. NATO air strikes have not proven to be a deterrent to President Milosevic and the Serbian forces. Instead the violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has escalated and tens of thousands are being forced from their homes on a daily basis. Serbian forces have now taken the situation one step further and are eliminating the identities of the ethnic Albanians through the systematic destruction of archives and personal records. These atrocities against the ethnic Albanian people are the very sort of thing the NATO mission was intended to prevent.

The risks to United States military personnel participating in the NATO mission in Kosovo are substantial. The recent capture of three United States soldiers is a reminder of the human dimension of any military action and the potential for loss of American lives.

Yesterday, I met with Air Force personnel and their families stationed at McConnell Air Force Base in Wichita, Kansas. Our conversation was almost exclusively about Kosovo and the role of the United States in this region. They asked a number of key questions regarding the mission and strategy of the NATO effort and the continued involvement of United States troops. The questions were ones I have been asking myself in recent days.

The following four questions capture the major issues the personnel at McConnell Air Force Base raised and are important in explaining the mission and strategy of the military action in Kosovo. I request your immediate response to them.

- 1) What is the *current* objective of the NATO military action in Kosovo and involvement of United States?
- 2) What will be the basis for determining whether or not the objective has been attained and what is the exit strategy?
- 3) Is NATO exacerbating the political and humanitarian situation in Kosovo through the bombing and threats of United States ground troops under NATO command?
- 4) Will you seek and abide by a vote in Congress before committing United States ground forces to any military effort in Kosovo?

While all of us are deeply concerned for the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and those who have fled to neighboring countries, any military effort to assist them must be part of a well deliberated, long-term plan. That plan must also keep in mind the interests and abilities of the United States.

The troops and the American people deserve to have a clear understanding of the role of the United States in the NATO mission in Kosovo, as they are the ones who are putting their lives, or the lives of their loved ones, at risk. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sam Brownback". The signature is stylized, with a large, sweeping "S" and "B".

Sam Brownback  
United States Senator



TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BROWNBAC, SAM

DOC DATE: 01 APR 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

NATO  
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: VISIT TO MCCONNELL AIR FORCE BASE & QUESTIONS RE KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 20 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE  
BROWN, K  
GUARNIERI  
LACKEY  
MCELDOWNEY  
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO  
BANDLER  
BLINKEN  
SCHULTE  
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE  
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MILES LACKEY'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

Mindy -

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## FACSIMILE

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Office of U.S. Senator Arlen Specter  
711 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510  
(202)224-4254

TO: Eli Quintero

FROM: Arlen Specter

DATE: 4/8 TIME: 9:07

NUMBER OF PAGES (including header): 2

PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_

CONTACT: \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE: Timely

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 8, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES  
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA  
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS), expressing concern over the current situation in Kosovo; and,
- 2) Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA), concerning the President's meeting with Premier Zhu Rongji of the People's Republic of China.

Enclosures



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *FS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 14, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 14.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: May 19, 2009

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By *VR* NARA, Date *2/21/2024*  
*2008-0994-F.3*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR .

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE  
Staff Assistant to the  
Representative of the U.S.  
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE  
Associate Director for  
National Security and  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA  
Chief of Staff to the  
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International  
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC  
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 14, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the  
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 14. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify On: May 19, 2009

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By VT NARA, Date 2/21/2024  
2008-0994 .f. 3

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 006. memo                | Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, May 14, 1999. [Record ID: 9903846] [Duplicate of 1.04, 2014-0547-M] (2 pages) | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Shulte, Greg)  
OA/Box Number: 1707

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6293

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3843

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 9, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on May 9.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By SDB NARA, Date 7/30/2015  
2014-0549-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 18, 2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3843

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE  
Staff Assistant to the  
Representative of the U.S.  
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE  
Associate Director for  
National Security and  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA  
Chief of Staff to the  
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC  
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee  
Meeting on Kosovo on May 9, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies  
Committee meeting on Kosovo on May 9, 1999. (C)

Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify On: May 18, 2009

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By SDB NARA, Date 7/30/2019  
7014 -0549- M

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                             | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 007. memo                | Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies<br>Committee, May 9, 1999. [Record ID: 9903843] [partial] (1 page) | 05/18/1999 | P3/b(3)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Shulte, Greg)  
OA/Box Number: 1707

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6293

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3843

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 9, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 3:00 - 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting  
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Joseph Ralston

George Casey

State:

Thomas Pickering

James Dobbins

James Pardew

White House:

Donald Kerrick

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kaufmann

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Eric Schwartz

Chuck Allen

Matthew Vaccaro

Mark Tavlarides

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Following the accidental air strikes on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, State will consider whether to recommend that all foreign diplomats depart the FRY. (Action: State) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: May 18, 2009

**DECLASSIFIED**

**PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0545-m (1.43)

1434 7/31/2019

- A detailed timeline on implementation of NATO's maritime visit and search regime should be developed. (Action: OSD) (~~C~~)
- Deputies should review implementation of the economic and "contact matrix" components of the strategic campaign plan. (Action: NSC, State) (~~C~~)
- KFOR Planning Guidance, as amended in discussion, should be presented to Principals for their approval prior to transmitting it to NATO as a contribution toward updating KFOR planning. (Action: NSC) (~~C~~)
- Deputies should review planning for civil implementation by the end of the week. (Action: NSC, State) (~~C~~)
- The USG should not discuss elements of a Kosovo UN Security Council resolution with allies until we have evaluated the results of Deputy Secretary Talbott's trip to Moscow. (Action: State) (~~C~~)