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Folder Title:

Chronos for May 1999 [1]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	05/10/1999	P3/b(3)
002. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Editorials in the Boston Globe and New York Times. [Record ID: 9903075] (2 pages)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Michael Hurley. Subject: PDB Item. [Record ID: 9930116] (1 page)	05/04/1999	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: PDB Item [Record ID: 9930116] (2 pages)	05/04/1999	P1/b(1)
004a. telcon	Telephone Conversation with British Prime Minister Blair. [Record ID: 9902679] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (5 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)
004b. telcon	Telephone Conversation with United Nations Secretary Kofi Annan. [Record ID: 9902679] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)
004c. telcon	Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac. [Record ID: 9902679] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (4 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)
005a. briefing paper	Phone Call with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. [Record ID: 9903328] (2 pages)	05/04/1999	P1/b(1)
005b. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. [Record ID: 9903328] (1 page)	05/04/1999	P1/b(1)
005c. draft	[Draft of 005a (9903328)] (2 pages)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)
005d. draft	[Draft of 005b (9903328)] (2 pages)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

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Chronos for May 1999 [1]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 10, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

BRUCE WRIGHT
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

DAVID ADAMS
Agency for International
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

JAMIE METZL
Department of State


JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Wednesday, May 12, 1999, from 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.


Greg Schulte

Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of Dayton Accords

Attachment

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING
May 12, 1999

- I. Civil Implementation Planning.State
- II. International Civil Police Force.State
- III. Training Local Police.State
- IV. Status of Visit and Search ConsentState
- V. Any Other Issues. All

SECRET

Chon 3075

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER *[Signature]*
THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *[Signature]*
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Editorials in Boston Globe and New York Times

In a margin comment on a recent Boston Globe John Ellis editorial, the President asked whether Ellis's proposal to take specific steps against the interests of Milosevic's cronies was a good idea. After reading a New York Times article on NATO focusing on property owned by Serb elite, the President queried whether we have good information on what these elite own.

Your response answers these two related questions and outlines steps we are taking to make Milosevic's cronies pay a price for his defiant policies.

Concurrences by: *[Signature]* Mary DeRosa, *man* Mary McCarthy

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Editorials

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: May 3, 2009

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *2/20/2024*
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Associated Press

An oil refinery burned yesterday near Belgrade after an attack by NATO jets; 500 sorties were flown in a day.

NATO Said to Focus Raids on Serb Elite's Property

By ERIC SCHMITT
and STEVEN LEE MYERS

WASHINGTON, April 18 — In listing its bombing targets in Yugoslavia, NATO has generally described them as installations that feed Slobodan Milosevic's war machine. What the alliance does not usually say is that some of the refineries and factories have also been chosen as targets because they are run by close cronies of the Yugoslav President.

The idea, according to senior NATO and Pentagon officials, is to undermine Mr. Milosevic's control by chipping away at his system of political and economic patronage.

"He doesn't care if his soldiers die in Kosovo, as long as he stays in power," one senior military officer said of Mr. Milosevic. "But if you blow up some things near and dear to

him — or to somebody close to him — then that could have an effect."

While NATO's bombing seems to have solidified popular support for Mr. Milosevic, the officials said they hope the attacks against some of the targets will turn loyal supporters against him by destroying their own sources of wealth and power.

The bombing continued this weekend, with 500 sorties flown on Saturday afternoon and overnight.

[NATO began its most active day yet of air strikes on Yugoslavia on Sunday night, bombing refineries, bridges and dozens of other targets in what it claimed were "highly successful" operations, the Associated Press reported.]

[Yugoslav media was reporting

there were several powerful detonations around Novi Sad, Serbia's second-largest city, early Monday. There were no reports of casualties, but the damage was described as "great." Tanjug, the state-run news agency, also reported attacks on the capital, Belgrade, and in the towns of Paracin, Kraljevo and Sremska Mitrovica.]

Yugoslavia's oil and gas industry has suffered enormously under NATO's strikes. While the stated aim of those attacks has been to choke off fuel to the armed forces operating in Kosovo, the strikes must also be a blow to Dragan Tomic, the director of Yugo Petrol, who as Speaker of the federal parliament in Belgrade is a close ally of Mr. Milosevic.

On April 9, a missile strike de-

256 DAYS TO GO! THE NEW YORK TIMES
Magazine Millennium Countdown sponsored today by
Aaron Basha — ADVT.

Continued on Page A8

stroyed the Zastava automotive plant in Kragujevac. Its director, Milan Beko, has served under Mr. Milosevic as Minister of Privatization.

Four days earlier, NATO struck a tobacco factory and warehouse in Nis, and damage to tobacco plants has been reported in other cities. According to American intelligence reports, a major player in Yugoslavia's tobacco distribution is Mr. Milosevic's son, Marko.

So far, economic and industrial targets have made up a small portion of NATO's targets. Of the roughly 200 targets attacked since the air war began on March 24, a dozen have been strictly industrial sites, like factories. That percentage grows when those targets are combined with fuel storage and ammunition factories.

As NATO presses on with bombing that has done little to stop the purging of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, some NATO and Pentagon military leaders have advocated striking still more economic and industrial targets, the officials said.

These commanders, including the alliance's supreme commander, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, believe that NATO has to intensify its efforts to undermine Mr. Milosevic's 11-year grip on power.

"If we continue sustaining this air campaign and intensifying it in a way that he sees he is slowly but surely starting to lose those instruments of power that keep him in power, then he's going to have to make a decision," Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen testified on Capitol Hill last week.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry H. Shelton, disclosed that NATO's political leaders had not yet approved a select group of targets for heavy attack. He said NATO warplanes could begin striking such targets "in a few days."

General Shelton declined to identify those targets, but the highly classified list includes additional industrial and economic sites, according to a senior Administration official.

Attacking those targets would carry a much higher risk of civilian casualties and would cause the kind of profound disruption of day-to-day life for ordinary Yugoslavs that NATO has so far sought to avoid, that official said. Such strikes could also undercut NATO's stated rationale for its bombing: to weaken the military and police forces involved in the



Associated Press

Fires raged near Novi Sad, Serbia, yesterday after an oil refinery was hit. Raids are said to single out the property of allies of Serbia's leader.

killings in Kosovo rather than wage war on the people of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon and NATO are looking for ways to intensify pressure on Mr. Milosevic's Government. "We're trying to make the price higher and higher," a senior military official said.

While not aiming directly for Mr. Milosevic, American and NATO officials say they are hitting what they call his four pillars of power: the political machine, the communications media, military and security forces, and the economic system.

A senior American military officer said the targets on NATO's list included strikes at "the things that keep him afloat." The idea, the officer said, is to instill fear in those whose economic standing depends on Mr. Milosevic, to make them think, "We didn't bargain for this."

"If you can achieve that mindset, then who knows what will happen?" the officer said.

Allied planes and missiles have struck half a dozen targets thought to be part of the "national command authority," several of them in and

around Belgrade. These include headquarters and bunkers believed to be used by political and military leaders, although it is not clear whether anybody was killed or injured.

In Yugoslavia's state-run economy, virtually any industrial or economic activity can be linked to Mr. Milosevic's Government. Ever since the former Yugoslavia collapsed into its rump state today, and the economy was hit by comprehensive sanctions from 1992 to 1995, Mr. Milosevic, a former banker and Communist bureaucrat, has been able to tighten his control of the little business left. Agriculture, fuel, manufacturing and exports and imports are operated by Mr. Milosevic's cronies virtually as private fiefs, American officials say.

Mr. Milosevic has used funds gained from industry and his cronies mostly to finance an effective security apparatus to maintain political control, according to experts and intelligence estimates.

But his family and associates also have benefited, living far better than most Yugoslavs, whose standard of living has fallen sharply since the country began to disintegrate in 1991.

Britain's Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, challenged Mr. Milosevic last week to admit to his people that he has bought three villas in Greece. European news reports also have spoken of funds funneled to Swiss banks through French accounts held by Mr. Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic.

The holdings of the couple's son, Marko, are believed to include a discothèque and a tobacco distribution network. Before the war, Yugoslav media reported that he had announced plans to open a Disney-style theme park, called Bambiland.

Yugoslav officials have estimated damage from the bombing as high as \$100 billion, including damage to roads, destroyed bridges and railways, which has the ripple effect of disrupting commerce.

But there are no signs that Mr. Milosevic has lost the backing of his key supporters.

One American Government official familiar with the Yugoslav economy said the prospects were slim that Mr. Milosevic's cronies, however battered, would turn on him.

"A scenario that would involve these guys acting as a group seems fairly unlikely," the official said. "They don't have anywhere to turn besides Milosevic."

Mr. Milosevic appoints the executives of each of the country's monop-



olies, many of whom also serve as Government ministers. Dejan Kovacevic, the Minister of Construction, also heads Mastrogradnje, one of the country's largest construction firms. Zivota Kotic, the Minister of Energy and Mining, also heads a natural resources concern called Duvanska Industrija Nis. Nis is southern Serbia's largest city, and has been a repeated target of NATO bombs.

Another state-run industry that has been severely disrupted is ammunition production, which is overseen by an umbrella organization headed by Maj. Gen. Jovan Cekovic.

Although the industry has a clear military function, it has also historically provided Yugoslavia with hard currency, and the destruction of the plants has crippled another source of profits for people close to Mr. Milosevic, officials say.

Pentagon and NATO officials declined to provide a list of economic or industrial targets that have been struck. But Yugoslav news agencies have reported strikes against several, including a small-plane manufacturer in Pancevo, a construction-equipment plant in Krusevac and a plastics factory in Pristina.

requires walking a fine line, the officials said.

Mr. Cohen said President Clinton, like leaders of other major NATO countries, review the target list.

NATO officials insist the bombing is taking a toll, wearing down Yugoslav supplies and resolve. But the political process has kept some targets off the list. General Clark has sought approval — so far unsuccessfully — to attack another of the pillars of Mr. Milosevic's support: the communications industry.

Arrest Order For Yugoslav

PODGORICA, Montenegro, April 18 (AP) — The Yugoslav Army issued a warrant today for the arrest of Montenegro's Deputy Prime Minister, Novak Kilibarda, the news agency Montena Fax reported. The agency said the warrant accused Mr. Kilibarda, who has been critical of President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, of "the crime of undermining national military and defense ability."

Mr. Kilibarda said he would ignore the warrant.

The move against Mr. Kilibarda adds to Belgrade's pressure on the pro-Western government of Montenegro, which together with Serbia, its larger sister republic, makes up Yugoslavia. President Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro is frequently critical of Mr. Milosevic's authoritarian rule and has opposed his treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

Since NATO air strikes began March 24, Mr. Milosevic has replaced the entire army command in Montenegro with officers loyal to him.

NATO has warned Mr. Milosevic against undermining Montenegro, which has said it is neutral in the conflict between Yugoslavia and NATO.

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PLEASE STAFF

THE BOSTON GLOBE • THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1999

Wage an attack on Serbia's 'soft assets'

JOHN ELLIS

The Washington Post has reported that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had sent his son, daughters, and grandchildren to Crete for an extended vacation. One presumes that other children and grandchildren of the Milosevic elite are likewise ensconced, far away from NATO air strikes and the possibility of personal collateral damage. Precious assets get special treatment.

To date, the United States and its NATO allies have devoted all of their resources to attacking "hard" military assets in Yugoslavia. These include missile defense systems, communications infrastructure, ammunition depots, and the like. Cruise missiles and laser guided bombs rain down on these targets with stepped-up intensity. The Clinton administration believes these attacks are "working."

Experience teaches that aerial assaults will not reverse what has already happened in Kosovo. Two weeks ago, Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo, was a bustling community of 250,000 ethnic Albanians. Today, it has 800, according to one news account. The battle for Kosovo is over. The Serbs have won. The only thing that will reverse this outcome is an allied invasion of ground forces.

The likelihood of 19 NATO countries agreeing to use ground troops in the Balkans is not great. The best the air campaign can hope to accomplish is to make Milosevic more flexible when the inevitable "peace conference" is convened. So the question arises: What should the United States and its NATO allies do to weaken Milosevic's negotiating posture?

First, the United States and its NATO allies should continue the air war on Yugoslavia without interruption. Degrading the military assets and the communications infrastructure of the Serbian army diminishes its ability to wreak further havoc in the Balkans. Milosevic's unilateral cease-fire was patently bogus and rightly rejected out of hand. The air war on hard assets should increase and intensify with each passing day.

Second, the United States should begin to mobilize a ground force for deployment in the Balkans. Troops can be introduced into Albania under the cover story that they are there to help with humanitarian and relief efforts. The United States can do this without NATO approval. Milosevic will get the point.

Third, the United States and its NATO allies should mount an aggressive campaign against the "soft assets" of the Milosevic elite. In the past, campaigns against "soft assets" have taken the form of economic sanctions and have not been particularly

successful. But just because they haven't worked against, say, Iraq, does not mean that a "soft assets" campaign won't work against Yugoslavia.

Serbian elites see themselves as cosmopolitan Europeans. They educate their children abroad. They travel frequently throughout the region. They shop in Athens, attend fashion shows in Milan, dine at the finest restaurants in Paris. They care about all that — a lot more than they care about Kosovo. The point of a "soft assets" campaign would be to take all that away.

The United States and its NATO allies should publish on the Internet a list of the names of the 3,000 to 5,000 people (and their families) who comprise the Milosevic elite. Once published, anyone who is on the list or related to someone on the list would be denied entry into every NATO country.

All existing visas would be canceled. All students would be sent home. All businessmen would be sent packing. All diplomats would be told to get out. Let the Serbian elites educate their children in Moscow. Let them shop in Belgrade. Kick them out and never let them back through customs again until Kosovo is restored.

The United States and its NATO allies should also freeze and seize all financial assets of the Milosevic elite. Serbian elites are legendarily corrupt. Over the years, they have stolen hundreds of millions of dollars

from their country. Many of these assets are tucked away in Swiss banks and offshore accounts. They use these money havens to protect themselves in the event that their countrymen someday take exception to their malfeasance.

The Genocide Convention, signed after World War II by most countries, including the United States and Yugoslavia, establishes genocide as an international crime and makes possible criminal and civil charges against specific individuals. The United States and its NATO allies should freeze and seize all financial assets of the Milosevic elite as part of a concerted legal effort to prosecute specific individuals on charges of genocide.

A "soft assets" campaign could be very effective. It might make the Milosevic elite realize that they will never be Europeans so long as they occupy Kosovo. It could steal back the money they stole. And it could serve as a kind of test case for future "soft asset" campaigns, which may become necessary if, for example, nationalist forces in Russia prevail.

Waging a "soft asset" campaign against Yugoslavia would set useful legal precedents for the future. And it just might split the Milosevic elite into warring factions.

John Ellis is a Globe columnist.

APR 21 6:18

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
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5			
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: PDB Item [Record ID: 9930116] (2 pages)	05/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6291

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

PDB Item

to be

Added

by

MONA

138 Bulkley Street
Williamstown, Mass. 01267

April 5, 1999

TO: KOSOVO/EVK
PLS. DRAFT
RESPONSE ON
BEHALF OF SA

Mr. Sandy Berger
National Security Advisor
The White House
1600 Pa. Ave N.W.
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Berger,

I am writing you as a concerned American with respect to the tragic situation in Kosovo. My urgent request is that in your capacity as a key Foreign Policy advisor you can influence the President to take the necessary steps to bring the war to a prompt conclusion and to set in motion a process to address both a short and long term political solution. While we can not act unilaterally we must take the lead within NATO to win the war and to explore all the options for peace. As we are all aware, U.S. and NATO credibility are on the line and not to win the war will only embolden tyrants from Iraq to North Korea and will further encourage the Chinese to challenge us in the Far East and beyond. Let me address the situation from three standpoints-military, humanitarian and political.

Military-It is important from a number of standpoints to "win" as promptly as possible. This means using any and all means short of nuclear to achieve that objective. To date, the air campaign has been anything but robust and by itself it can not accomplish the job. In the final analysis wars are won on the ground with great help from the air and naval forces. General Clark must be given all the men and material he needs without having to fight for it. A NATO force of no more than 200,000 people can, I feel, see this through to a successful conclusion. Let us get on with it. Humanitarian-The massive steps that are now underway will hopefully be adequate to handle this immense tragedy. Again, the U.S. must take the lead.

Political-It is long past the time when we should be talking loudly and carrying a small stick. First, the President must articulate to the American people the absolute necessity to change strategy. He must explain why, in order to win, we must launch a ground campaign combined with the more vigorous use of air power and we must do it soon. The Prime Minister can be helpful in selling this change to others in NATO. If some wish to sit on the sidelines, so be it-let them be silent.

Second, when Milosevic has finished his brutal ethnic cleansing and

APR 9 1999

signals he wants to reach a political settlement, he basically should be ignored. Through his actions in Bosnia and now Kosovo, he has forfeited his right to lead Yugoslavia. He should be indicted as a war criminal, apprehended, tried and sentenced. We should indicate we will only work out a peace agreement with moderate Yugoslav politicians. Third, Once cleared of Yugoslavian troops and police Kosovo will, for some time, need to have the status of a NATO protectorate. Once this is done, it is essential that all of Kosovo's refugees be returned to their land. Next, a number of longer term options need to be explored such as partition. However, the status of Kosovo should be examined within a larger Balkan geopolitical context. Very difficult ethnic, religious, and political considerations remain. They might best be addressed at a United Nations study and conference and ultimate treaty of Southern Europe. In closing, I deeply hope that the President will show the necessary wisdom and internal fortitude. It is a matter of will. He can lead NATO to a speedy and successful conclusion to the war. If he does not, no one will and we will have lost the war and the peace.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. B. McWilliam". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the "Sincerely yours," text.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 3, 1999

Dear Mr. McWilliams:

Thank you for your recent letter on Kosovo to Samuel Berger, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who thought so much of your reasoning that he took the liberty of sharing your letter with his staff. It will be useful for us in thinking through the difficult policy choices we will face as the Kosovo situation unfolds over the next several months.

I share your hope that in the wake of the recent NATO Summit our renewed military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a path to a negotiated settlement. In the meantime, Mr. Berger and I appreciate your constructive and excellent recommendations on this issue.

Sincerely,



Gregory Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton
Accords

Mr. Gordon B. MacWilliams
138 Bulkley Street
Williamstown, Massachusetts 01267

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903450
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 99 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO & YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WEISS

FOR CONCURRENCE
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BERGER
DAVIES
KERRICK
PASCUAL
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: STAFFING PER DAPSNA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By W NARA, Date 2/20/2024
2008-0944-F.3

DISPATCHED BY WB

DATE 5/6

BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT

Russian Federation

May 2, 1999
No. Pr-560

Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,

In spite of Russia's insistent appeals, NATO continues its aggression against a sovereign state in the center of Europe, which brings immense destruction and countless human casualties.

As a result of the NATO's military operations against Yugoslavia the situation on the Balkans is severely deteriorating. The crisis has already encircled the whole region. This tragedy, unless immediately ceased, can result in irreparable consequences for international stability. You and I have already said that we cannot allow this to happen.

MAY 4 1999
The Russian Federation has undertaken and is undertaking great efforts in order to achieve a political settlement in Yugoslavia, as well as in the Balkans as a whole. As a result of the negotiations we have held, including with the President of SRYu S. Milosevic, there is beginning to appear the following possible scheme of actions:

- At an agreed upon day, Belgrade announces the start of a withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo. Simultaneously, NATO announces its suspension of missile-bomb strikes and gives guarantees on the non-deployment of ground operations;

HIS EXCELLENCY
MISTER WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington

- The Secretary General of the UN promptly flies to Belgrade for the purpose of working out a text of a UN Security Council Resolution on the settling of the situation surrounding Yugoslavia. Negotiations are held with the participation of the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Yugoslav settlement;
- The UN Security Council adopts the resolution. After this, NATO's military operation is finally ceased and in Kosovo an international presence under UN auspices is deployed.

As you understand, it was not easy for us to achieve this. There is now a chance that no one should miss. Naturally, we will continue working with S. Milosevic as well.

With this message, I am sending my special representative Victor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin who will lay out in detail all of the particulars of our plan. We must act quickly and decisively.

I am depending upon your understanding and rapid positive response.

With respect,

B. Yeltsin

LOG NO. _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

HoS DISTRIBUTION REVIEW
(Suggested Distribution Attached)



APPROVE w/CHANGES DISAPPROVE

RICE	<u>16R</u>	☐	☒	☐
COSGRIFF	_____	☐	☐	☐
DAVIES	_____	☐	☐	☐
KERRICK	_____	☐	☐	☐
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	☐	☐	☐
BERGER	_____	☐	☐	☐
RECORDS	<u>3</u>			

- Log into system to find Action

Comments: *Jim - Attached is the Yeltsin letter
Chernomyrdin delivered. Do you approve the
recommended distribution?*
EA

RETURN TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT FOR DISTRIBUTION

STATE E.O. S, D
Fuerth

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT STAFFING DOCUMENT

Document Description:

TO: PRESIDENT DOCUMENT DATE: 5/2/99

FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO KOSOVO
CRISIS

Document Distribution:

ACTION	CONCURRENCE	INFO
<u>LESS</u>	STATE	<u>BERGER</u>
	<u>SCHULTE</u>	<u>STEINBERG</u>
	BANDER	<u>PASQUAL</u>
		<u>DAVIER</u>
		<u>KERRICK</u>
		<u>FUERST</u>
		<u>STATE (EYES ONLY) SEC/DERSC</u>

ACTION REQUIRED: PREPARE MEMO BERGERDUE DATE: 15 MAY 99

COMMENTS: _____

MAY 4 17:20

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: W Date: 2/70/2024

2008-0494-F.3

LOGGED BY

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903455
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 99 13

TO: DAVIES

FROM: KENNEY, K

DOC DATE: 05 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 9906206

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS
NATO



PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: STATE FWDS 14 APR LTR FM YELTSIN RE KOSOVO

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCELDOWNEY
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SCHULTE
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903455

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 99050613 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9906206
Date May 5, 1999

FOR: Mr. Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Clinton
From: President Yeltsin
Date: 4/14/99
Subj: Letter from President Yeltsin on Kosovo

WH Referral dated: _____
NSCS ID# (if any): _____

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A draft reply is attached.
_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
_____ A translation is attached.
_____ An information copy of a direct reply is
attached.
_____ X We believe no response is necessary for the
reason cited below.
_____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: President Clinton and President Yeltsin talked on April
19 and again on May 2 and discussed Kosovo.

Alan Davis
Director
Secretariat Staff

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

9906206

(Translation Division)

LS No.0390479

JS/LAP
Russian

Dear Bill:

[handwritten sentence: In connection with your letter of March 22, I would like to set forth my basic assessments and views regarding the settlement of the Kosovo crisis.] I agree with you that the situation in and around Kosovo is very alarming. It is no secret to anyone that if a conflagration begins in Kosovo, it will spread immediately through the entire region. That must be prevented.

I am deeply convinced that there is only one solution: to reach, as soon as possible, political agreements that could not only ensure broad autonomy for Kosovo while preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, but also create conditions for bringing about lasting peace in the region.

It is a pity, of course, that in Rambouillet and Paris we were unable, despite all our efforts, to come up with an agreed document on a political settlement. However, we are not inclined to consider this a total failure. As you know, Bill, this sort of document is difficult to hammer out.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Through our joint efforts we have done a great deal of work, which cannot be simply ignored. We must continue combined efforts within the framework of the Contact Group, whose unity is the main guarantee of success. It is now vital that the political process not be allowed to come to a halt. It was precisely for this reason we endorsed the idea of sending a "trio" of negotiators to Belgrade to continue working with the Yugoslav leadership.

It is important, certainly, that the Kosovo Albanian delegation agreed to sign the proposed document. Nonetheless, immediately after signing, the Albanians issued a statement wherein they virtually disavowed their signature, reaffirming their intention to seek the independence of Kosovo and its secession from the FRY by means of a referendum. To be frank, I was astonished that the U.S. delegation at the talks overlooked this glaring fact, which was a direct challenge to the Contact Group.

During all this time Russia was working actively with the other members of the Contact Group to find a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. As you recall, I managed to persuade President Milosevic to consent to the deployment of the OSCE verification mission in Kosovo. I regret that the decision was made to withdraw it. The presence of the mission had a restraining effect on extremists of every stripe. We can see that its withdrawal has led to a new upsurge of armed conflict in the region.

We shall of course keep working actively with Belgrade, urging it to show restraint and sign a political agreement as quickly as possible. That is our firm policy, from which we shall not retreat.

As regards international assistance in the practical implementation of political agreements, we deem it necessary to consider this matter carefully, taking into account all factors, especially the opinion of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state.

I have taken note of your warnings concerning NATO's readiness to employ force. Let me be frank: we have categorically opposed this and will continue doing so. On what grounds does NATO take it upon itself to decide the fate of peoples in sovereign countries? Who gave it the right to act as a guardian of order?

Quite obviously, this action by NATO would not only break off the negotiating process but would complicate the situation even more and bring the Balkans to the brink of a great war. Who will take responsibility for that?

I ask you once more to weigh all the consequences before making this decision, which, I will tell you frankly, could be fatal. It is not military scenarios, but continuation of the political process that is the only way out of the impasse.

I hope that we shall continue our close cooperation in resolving the Kosovo problem in the interest of peace and stability not only in that region but in Europe as a whole.

Sincerely,
B. Yeltsin

В связи с твоим посланием от 22 марта с.г. хотел бы изложить свои принципиальные оценки и видеть ситуацию вокруг косовского урегулирования.

Дорогой Билл,

Согласен с тобой, что ситуация в Косово и вокруг него складывается очень тревожная. Ни для кого не секрет, что, если в Косово разгорится пожар, то он незамедлительно перекинется на весь регион. Этого допустить нельзя.

Выход, по моему глубокому убеждению, один - скорейшее достижение политических договоренностей, способных не только обеспечить широкую автономию для Косово при сохранении суверенитета и территориальной целостности СРЮ, но и создать условия для установления прочного мира в регионе.

Конечно жаль, что в Рамбуйе и Париже, несмотря на все предпринятые нами усилия, не удалось выйти на согласованный документ по политическому урегулированию. Вместе с тем, мы не склонны рассматривать это как окончательный провал. Ты же знаешь. Билл, что такого рода документы легко не даются.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Совместными усилиями мы проделали огромную работу, которую нельзя просто так сбрасывать со счетов. Необходимо продолжать коллективные усилия в рамках Контактной группы, единство которой - главный залог успеха. Сейчас исключительно важно не допустить остановки политического процесса. Именно поэтому мы поддержали идею направления "тройки" переговорщиков в Белград для продолжения работы с югославским руководством.

Конечно, важно, что делегация косовских албанцев согласилась подписать предложенный документ. Вместе с тем, сразу после подписания албанцы выступили с заявлением, которым они фактически дезавуировали свою подпись, подтвердив намерение добиваться независимости Косово и его отделения от СРЮ путем проведения референдума. Откровенно скажу: меня удивило, что американская делегация на переговорах прошла мимо этого вопиющего факта, который явился прямым вызовом Контактной группе.

Все это время Россия вместе с другими членами Контактной группы активно работала над нахождением политического решения косовского кризиса. Как ты помнишь, мне удалось убедить Президента СРЮ С.Милошевича дать согласие на развертывание Миссии ОБСЕ по проверке в Косово. Сожалею, что принято решение о ее выводе. Присутствие Миссии оказывало сдерживающее воздействие на экстремистов всех мастей. Мы видим, что с ее уходом в крае с новой силой вспыхнули вооруженные столкновения.

Разумеется, мы будем продолжать активно работать с Белградом, призывая его к сдержанности и скорейшему подписанию политического соглашения. Это - наша твердая линия, от которой мы не отступим.

Что касается международного содействия в практической реализации политических договоренностей, то считаем необходимым тщательное рассмотрение данного вопроса с учетом всех факторов, и прежде всего мнения Югославии как суверенного государства.

Я обратил внимание на твои предупреждения относительно готовности НАТО задействовать силу. Скажу прямо: мы были и будем категорически против этого. На каком основании НАТО берется решать судьбы народов в суверенных государствах? Кто наделил его правом выступать в роли блюстителя порядка?

Совершенно очевидно, что подобная акция НАТО не только сорвала бы переговорный процесс, но и еще больше осложнила ситуацию, подвела Балканы на грань большой войны. Кто возьмет на себя ответственность за это?

Прошу тебя еще раз взвесить все последствия перед тем, как принимать такое решение, которое, прямо скажу, может стать роковым. Не военные сценарии, а продолжение политического процесса - вот единственный выход из тупика.

Надеюсь, что мы и впредь будем продолжать тесно с тобой взаимодействовать в разрешении косовской проблемы в интересах мира и стабильности не только в регионе, но и в Европе в целом.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

TO: BERGER

FROM: BUTLER
BLINKEN
BROWN, K

DOC DATE: 12 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
FRANCE

UN
TELCON

He

PERSONS: CHILUBA, FREDERICK

BLAIR, TONY

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHIRAC / BLAIR / ANNAN

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 15 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BROWN, K

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN
BROWN, K
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By *VE* NARA, Date *2/20/2017*

2008-0994-F.7

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902679

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99041913 FOR DECISION
X 99050313 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2679

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PR3 NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DMK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>PR 4/19</u>	<u>copy to [signature]</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>PR 4/19</u>	
Steinberg	<u>copy</u>		
Berger	<u>can</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>PR 4/20</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>


A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: Telcons w/ Blair,
Annex, China

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

April 12, 1999


ACTIONMEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN/GREG SCHULTE FROM: KEIRN C. BROWN 

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Telephone Conversations with British Prime Minister Blair, UN Secretary General Annan and French President Chirac

Attached at Tabs A through C are the Memoranda of Telephone Conversations with Prime Minister Blair, Secretary General Annan and President Chirac that took place on April 10-11, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations be filed for the record.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Telcon with PM Blair
Tab B Telcon with Secretary General Annan
Tab C Telcon with President Chirac

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On: 4/12/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By  NARA, Date 2/25/2024
208-0994-4.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. telcon	Telephone Conversation with British Prime Minister Blair. [Record ID:9902679] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (5 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6291

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with British Prime Minister Blair (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Blair

Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Matthew Sibley, Robert Ford, Robin Rickard, Lawrence Butler and K. C. Brown

DATE, TIME: April 10, 1999, 1:31 - 1:50 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Residence

The President: Tony? (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Hi Bill. (U)

The President: Are you still in Scotland? (U)

Prime Minister Blair: No, I am back in Chequers now. I am here with Jose Maria Aznar. (U)

The President: Good. He is coming to see me in a couple of days. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: He was telling me to send you his best wishes. (U)

The President: Are they happy in Scotland? (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Yes, a lot happier in Scotland and you will be getting any amount of cashmere that you want. (U)

The President: What I want, is that when I am done here to be made an honorary UK citizen and give me a seat from Scotland next door to a good golf course. The daily papers today are filled with China being pissed off and Russia threatening war.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)

Declassify On: 4/12/09

Released in Part

Per E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP 2013-090, document 53

10/14/2015 Interagency Classification Appeals Panel

If you want, you can give me citizenship and make me a Brit.
(U)

Prime Minister Blair: You are one very popular man there. (U)

The President: I hope that it helps in the elections. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: It has helped. Thanks for seeing Donald Leu as well. What it has done is to emphasize to the people that sometimes it is useful to be part of something bigger. (C)

The President: Yes, I believe that. We don't have time to talk about this today, but when you are here -- I want you to think about something between now and then -- we have to figure out how to resolve this stupid banana thing. But the real thing is that the Caribbean is in bad shape economically. I would like to get a bill through that would treat them like Mexico in exports. It would help them a lot if the United States, and if not the entire EU, then the French, Dutch, and British and everybody that had some presence there could think about setting up a joint effort for the long-term development strategy. We all have limited money, but if we coordinate it we could leverage it. Think about what we could do to help them diversify their economies. We could try to improve their economies, increase tourism and personal income, and reduce their vulnerabilities to the narco-traffickers. Get them to where they are not completely dependent on bananas. Anyway, there has never been anything like this in this part of the world where all the countries with ownership or colonization of these islands coordinated together. I think that this is a third way deal, and I bet we could get some other Europeans interested. I don't know if the French would help. The Dutch might be interested. Some of the Europeans might be interested. We might think about doing something like that. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: That's right. The EU is wrong on the trade issue but right on the general concern for the Caribbean. The EU is in the right on the larger economic well being, on the longer-term interests of the Caribbean. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: In Central America they are all concerned, I was just down there and talked to all these guys. They are sensitive because of the hurricane. What few bananas they have, they want to sell. I told them we will help them get through this, but that we would have to diversify their economies too. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: The Central Americans and the Caribbeans sound like a boys school argument. They ought to be thinking about making common cause and not pissing down each others' leg to see who has the biggest bananas. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: OK, on Kosovo, just want to check in and reconnoiter where we are. We had greater military impact with the air actions. I think if we could do a couple more weeks I think that we could really have it. The G-8 statement is good. Have you received the report on the G-8 ministers? We are hoping to get a statement here involving the Russians. (S)

Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: That was good. Madeleine is going to see Ivanov on Tuesday or Wednesday. I also think that Kofi gave a good statement. (S)

Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: He is a little miffed, though maybe that's too strong a word, disappointed maybe or concerned that neither of us have put out a statement on it. I told him that you were in Scotland and that I was preoccupied with the Chinese. I think that we ought to put one out now because he is out in Europe now. There are two things we need to think about. One is whether any economic pressures could be put on Milosevic that don't hurt the Macedonians and the Montenegrins too badly. I have a list of things, maybe cutting down on their money laundering in Cyprus and putting the squeeze on their London accounts. I don't want to cause the Montenegrins any trouble. I will get that list to you today and let you guys look at it

and respond to it. Any time that I try to get our banks to do something the Treasury Department gets squirrely on me. It is always a fight with those guys. I would like to send you this list and let you evaluate it. (S)

We have to decide whether we want to have a more aggressive diplomatic initiative and if so, how to intensify the military action to enhance the likelihood that diplomatic efforts will succeed, assuming we can achieve all our objectives that Kofi signed off on and bring Russia into it. E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d) It may turn out to be a bigger problem for me than you. It assumes that we can achieve our political objectives because Milosevic doesn't want to get the hell bombed out of him and have Apaches on top of his tanks. If you assume -- the one downside is that we are facing a lot of hurdles -- if you assume that all of our stated objectives are achievable if we intensify our bombing campaign without actually toppling Milosevic. Then it seems to me that there will be some kind of diplomatic agreement for an international force that will include Russian participation. They will push Milosevic back when he says who can and cannot be part of it. I think that it will be difficult to have NATO as NATO participate. The problem this creates for us is Somalia. (S)

I don't want to take too much time going over this now but this is a big problem for us. We went through this in Somalia when the UN took over command and control. We had a messy deal during the first part of the Administration. We stayed on in Somalia when the UN took it over and it was a messy deal. I lost some American boys over there and one of them was dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu. We made some mistakes there in what we did and did not do. We basically had serious command and control problems where the Americans were supposed to do two things -- the same things we'd have to do if it were a non-NATO force in Kosovo -- in Somalia we were supposed to be there doing humanitarian relief and act as a multinational peace force. One of the factional leaders who since has died, killed a bunch of Pakistani peacekeepers -- something like 15-20. We were the only presence there that had the capabilities to figure out who did it and to go and get him. So the UN wanted us and tasked us to go and get him, Aided. The UN tasked us to do that while doing humanitarian relief. They tasked our guys to go into a hotel and get him. Our guys landed on the top of a hotel in the middle of the day -- he got away and then all of a

sudden more than 300 Somalis started shooting at them. It is the sort of thing that if NATO had been doing it, it would have been totally different: there would have been different command and control arrangements, armor and artillery. So there is still a lingering bad taste. I have a lot of support in Congress right now. There is even more than before the Gulf War. More and more in Congress are saying that they are in favor of ground troops if we had to put them in there. And I am telling you this in advance, if you could help me on this because it is your guys' necks, too. If they say NATO can participate, but not as NATO, instead as the UN, we have this awful memory of Somalia. We would also need the serious command and control issues to be worked out. We did not have these problems in Bosnia. It worked like a charm once NATO went in and the Russians came in with us. We only had to make an amendment to the NATO issue. Does that make sense? (C)

Prime Minister Blair:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: This was the lowest point of my presidency. It was a goddamned nightmare. I felt personally responsible for that kid's body being dragged through the streets. So I see this as a practical measure about keeping people alive. We were prepared to take risks. We had all these glitches because of the command and control problems. The Russians are allergic to NATO and Milosevic is allergic to NATO. Keep in mind Tony, I know you know this, if we go in, we can't go in with one foot. If we get a multi-national force we have to go in at least with the commitment to protect the Serbs in Kosovo at a minimum as well as the Kosovar Albanians. There is enormous grass roots support right now for the freedom fighters. This will be a big force protection issue -- command and control will be critical with huge political implications. We may have all kinds of problems where we have both sides pissed at us. They will be politically important as well in any country. (S)

Prime Minister Blair:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(b)(1)

I will send you the list of economic sanctions. We will look like assholes at the garden party if we don't make

sure that everybody understands that NATO means keeping our people alive. (S)

Prime Minister Blair: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: It is horrible. (S)

Prime Minister Blair: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: We need to talk on a secure line or talk when you get here. There are arguments both for it and arguments against it. We will need to look at in the context of where it is going to be five years from now. We need to keep our crowd together and keep at him and get a diplomatic solution with a mechanism that includes the UN and Russia. I will follow up on this. I am in the country all next week and will get that economic list out to you. Tell Jose Maria I said hello. Did you show him Napoleon's pistol and Charles' sword? (S)

Prime Minister Blair: I took him to Rothschild House today to see the most amazing works of art. (U)

The President: I want to get there. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: You must come back. (U)

The President: I will come back to the Scottish golf course. You were the best first-timer that I ever saw play. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Joking apart, thanks for cashmere. Let's keep in touch. (U)

The President: Thank you, find me a safe seat in a golf cart. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Right, good-bye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. telcon	Telephone Conversation with United Nations Secretary Kofi Annan. [Record ID:9902679] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6291

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary General Annan

Notetaker: Bonnie Glick, Matthew Sibley,
Robin Rickard and Robert Ford

DATE, TIME April 10, 1999, 1:01 - 1:08 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello Kofi, how are you? (U)

Secretary General Annan: How are you Bill? I am fine, but
these are difficult times for us. (U)

The President: Yes, I thought your statement was very good. Notwithstanding the big headline from Russia, I think we have a real chance over next week. I think it was great. Even though the headlines in the New York Times this morning are disturbing, I think we have a chance for a diplomatic united front. What the Russians need is to get back into the ballgame. If they are part of an international force, which I always thought they had to do, like in Bosnia. If the Russians are happy, then the Chinese will stop what they are saying, and then we can get the whole thing sanctioned by the UN. Madeleine is seeing Ivanov next week and we are working through the Europeans and I know you are. If we could get them to take a common diplomatic position, where it is obvious they would be part of any international force, there may be a way to work through this. It's important to get a negotiated settlement. If we keep this up for another month or two, we'll be able to move in there uncontested. Then the thing that concerns me is having Europe with us and being there forever and a day. Look how long we had to stay in Bosnia, with the Russians. It is almost a license for Kosovar military elements to reconstitute themselves and start going the other way. I think we have a chance in the next

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: April 12, 2009

Released in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M (3.02)
8/6/2015 KBH

couple of weeks to break the iceberg and get the Russians back in the hunt. They're not just coming to Europe and the United States now, but they're working through a whole range of things. If we can get them there sometime over the next couple of weeks, then I think we have a chance to put this together. (S)

Secretary General Annan:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: I think as a practical matter, what would matter there is the level of assurance and detail we have about acceptance, and a timetable for withdrawal and when the international force will get in. What Blair, Schroeder, and I are worried about is having him accept it, having a cessation of bombing, and then a reason why he can't get it across, and the trouble then is having the allies resume bombing. The problem will be in the details. (S)

Secretary General Annan:

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Yep. I agree with that. (U)

Secretary General Annan: I will work with you and all the governments concerned to find a way out of this and I think we may get to a point where he will crack, but Milosevic is such an incredibly unpredictable character. (S)

The President: Even though there is a most frightening headline about Yeltsin's bombast, as near as we can tell, this is an effort by Russia to get back into the diplomatic hunt. (S)

Secretary General Annan: It had quite an impact here in Europe, but some of the clarifications from Moscow seem to have clarified things a bit. (S)

The President: Let's stay in close touch next week to see what we can do to put this thing together. I think you have really done a good thing here. We have got a chance to get this done. (C)

Secretary General Annan: Would you say something about my initiative, then? (C)

The President: Absolutely. I thought I put something out yesterday. (C)

Secretary General Annan: I am in Europe. (U)

The President: I was thrilled by what you said. I will double-check. If we haven't put out a statement, I will. (C)

Secretary General Annan: Thank you very much. In fact, one of the European leaders said to me that France, Germany, etc. have said something, but the United States and UK have not. (S)

The President: Tony Blair is supposed to call in the next hour. When he calls, I will ask him to say something also. (C)

Secretary General Annan: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d) I
find in these situations that when the whole world comes together, we always make progress. (S)

The President: Okay, I got it. (U)

Secretary General Annan: Thank you Bill and give my best to the family. (U)

The President: I will, thank you so much. (U)

Secretary General Annan: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. telcon	Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac. [Record ID:9902679] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (4 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6291

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with French President
Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Miles Murphy,
Doug Bayley

DATE, TIME April 11, 1999, 1:00 - 1:13 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine, how are you? (U)

President Chirac: It is very good to hear from you. (U)

The President: Thank you. I just wanted to check in with you to see where we are on Kosovo. I think Kofi Annan made a very good statement on Friday, the way he stated our conditions. The only difference, of course, is that he asked NATO to suspend airstrikes once Milosevic commits to the conditions. But I think we need some sign of implementation first. I am very encouraged that the G-8 political directors' statement has Russia involved. If we can lock that in at the highest levels, I think we can get back on the diplomatic track. (C)

President Chirac: I absolutely share these feelings. I also think that Kofi Annan's statement is perfect. E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)

Declassify On: 4/12/09

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

2013-0472-M (3.03)

8/6/2015 KBH

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Well, I think we are agreed on that. I just wanted to mention one or two other things. First, Hubert, Robin Cook and Madeleine will meet with their NATO counterparts in Brussels on Monday. This is an important signal of our determination, and makes sure the smaller Allies not in the Contact Group don't feel left out. I am going to call some of them, especially those contributing forces. Any that you feel particularly close to, if you have the occasion, you could say something useful to them. It would be helpful to spend a little time shoring them up. (C)

President Chirac: I am in absolute agreement, and I shall make my contributions to this effort. I also intend to ask Schroeder, as President of the European Union, to do so. I would also like to add that we have a European Union Council on Wednesday. There will be 15 heads of European states and governments present. At this time we shall consider Kosovo in the spirit just indicated, which will allow heads of smaller governments to express their points of view. It is even possible Kofi Annan might come, and this is something that would greatly please the German president. (C)

The President: That is very good. Let me mention a couple other things. I really appreciate what you have done with the refugees. The situation is beginning to get in better shape, but we need to be sensitive to what is happening to the front line states. We need to ask our people what we are going to do after this is over to help the resettlement of Kosovo and the larger recovery efforts. There may be a way after this is over to get all these countries involved in a common economic endeavor that will reduce ethnic strife. We need to start to think about this now. We need the best people in all these countries thinking about what it will look like five years from now, assuming we get a diplomatic solution here. (C)

President Chirac: This is also my feeling. Also, what we wish to do with the European Union. Also, the specific problem of the refugees, but more precisely the displaced persons, who are still in Kosovo and cannot get out. And we know neither where they are, nor what state they are in. It will be necessary to consider help by the military, particularly how to get more

information about the situation and, if need be, to parachute in the necessary help. (S)

The President: Yes, that is very good. One last thing. I got a couple letters from Yeltsin last week that I thought were pretty encouraging, notwithstanding the rather inflammatory public comments he made. In the next week or so, once we get this G-8 statement nailed down, we ought to make an effort to get the Russians back in the game, and that might serve Yeltsin at home where he is fending off attacks in the Duma. (S)

President Chirac: Yes, I have heard of a resumption of dialogue between Russia and America, and I know Madeleine is meeting with Ivanov on Tuesday. E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Yes, well, I think that if we can just keep the pressure up, I think we may get a break in the next couple of weeks, Jacques. If we can keep the pressure up. We just have to stay after it. (S)

President Chirac: This is quite possible. The unity of NATO countries is perfect. E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Chirac: E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Yes, it is very, very unstable. I am very worried about it. But we are trying to get them to take a higher profile in an attempt to promote stability, because on one hand it brings Russia closer to Europe, and on the other, Yeltsin can say to the nationalists he is trying to stop the bombing. (S)

President Chirac: Yes, I completely agree, and we can make use of the NATO-Russia partnership. (~~S~~)

The President: Yes, okay, I will see you here pretty soon, but if we need to talk this week, I will be around all week. I may need to call you again. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Okay, everything is absolutely clear. As long as we stay on the Kofi Annan process, I think we can achieve success. [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

The President: Yes, I agree with that. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: Okay, Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Please give my regards to Hillary, and I will see you soon. (U)

The President: All right, good bye. (U)

President Chirac: Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902517
RECEIVED: 06 APR 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 16 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CONGRESSIONAL

MEDIA

file

PERSONS: HELMS, JESSE A

SUBJECT: SEN HELMS 25 MAR WP OP ED RE KOSOVO

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 12 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VACCARO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902517

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCHULTE
001
001 VACCARO
002 BERGER
003 PRESIDENT
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99040715 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 99040715 ACTION TRANSFERRED
Z 99040715 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 99040921 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99041615 FOR INFORMATION
X 99050313 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

003 990416
003 990416

DISPATCH FOR INFO

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902517
RECEIVED: 06 APR 99 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: PRESIDENT

✓
DOC DATE: 29 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CONGRESSIONAL

MEDIA

PERSONS: HELMS, JESSE A

SUBJECT: POTUS REQUESTS NSC RECOMS RE SEN HELMS 25 MAR WP OP ED RE KOSOVO

ACTION: DUE DATE: 12 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

M
M.H.
FOR ACTION
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE
BAKER
CROWLEY
LACKEY

FOR INFO
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



National Security Council
The White House

~~4/11~~ 4/12
1200

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DUF A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>Q</i> Cossgriff JACOBSON Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>D 4/9</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>1</u>		<u></u>
Berger	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u> 4/10</u>	<u></u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

33072 9:00 2-4-81

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

4-19-99

THE WHITE HOUSE

'99 APR 16 PM3:27

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT: Senator Helms' Serbian Democracy Act

Madeleine and I agree that we ought to work with Senator Helms to modify his Serbian Democracy Act so that we can endorse the legislation and ask for its swift passage. The bill is designed to help bring about the replacement of Mr. Milosevic by a democratic government. It would authorize \$100 million to support democracy programs and the development of civil society in Yugoslavia, impose or strengthen a number of economic, financial, or trade sanctions, and prohibit military-to-military cooperation between the U.S. and the FRY, among other initiatives.

While we share most of the objectives of the bill, some of the specific provisions are problematic, particularly those which unnecessarily restrict Presidential flexibility. Most important, the legislation codifies various economic sanctions and directs certain diplomatic and foreign policy measures. It would require us to oppose FRY participation in a number of international organizations, to block official FRY assets in the United States, and to refuse visas to members of the FRY leadership or their immediate families. While many of the provisions reflect current U.S. policy, the legislation does not provide waiver authority to permit us to license specific transactions and to take appropriate diplomatic positions if they are in the national interest. Constitutional questions are raised by bill provisions that prohibit issuance of visas to certain governmental leaders, that require you to undertake specific diplomatic positions, and that prohibit direct or indirect military cooperation.

In addition, some European allies will oppose an explicit policy of seeking the replacement of Milosevic, and this could thus weaken NATO cohesion.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

However, given Mr. Milosevic's recent behavior, it would be undesirable simply to oppose this bill. Our strategy, therefore, is to work with Senator Helms to modify the bill into something we can support. Madeleine has already spoken with the Senator in this regard. When Congress returns next week, State will begin a dialogue with Senator Helms on the provisions of the legislation that would require modification.

Attachment

Tab A Op Ed by Senator Helms

Sandy
Why don't we work
this and fix it right
and speedy passage?
PC

3-29-99

TO: EXEC
RE: E-MAIL
TASKING

Copied
Berger
Podesta

WHY DON'T WE ENDORSE
THIS AND ASK FOR
ITS SWIFT AND SPEEDY
PASSAGE?

→ GREG
We owe POTUS
an answer

Ⓟ

Jesse Helms

Our Exit Strategy

For the past year, Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic has waged a brutal campaign of genocide against the Albanian population of Kosovo. More than 600,000 have been displaced from their homes, and more than 2,000 men, women and children have been murdered by his armed forces and interior ministry—many forced to kneel together on the ground before being sprayed with bullets and then piled into mass graves.

All this is merely the latest in Milosevic's reign of terror in the Balkans. In his proxy war against Bosnia-Herzegovina, he killed hundreds of thousands, opened the first concentration camps in Europe since the Holocaust and almost single-handedly restored "genocide" to the European vocabulary.

American troops already have been sent into harm's way to enforce peace in Bosnia. Now, as a result of his latest repression in Kosovo, the United States is being called on again to deploy its armed forces in an even more difficult and perilous Balkan quagmire.

This must stop. And the only way it will stop—ever—is if we address the underlying cause of the problem in the Balkans: Slobodan Milosevic's continued rule. The time has come for the United States to stop coddling Milosevic and pretending that he can be part of any acceptable solution and start working toward his removal and the democratic transformation of Serbia.

Time and again the Clinton administration has sent senior envoys, such as Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill, to wine and dine Milosevic in the hope of convincing him to behave. Time and again, he has clinked glasses, and then returned to his genocidal ways.

Now, after threatening NATO airstrikes 20 times without following through, the president has backed himself into a corner. So the administration is crossing its fingers and hoping airstrikes will show Milosevic the error of his ways—with no idea what to do next if they don't.

Our Yugoslav policy has failed. If we are to prevent further genocide and preclude American forces from being dragged further into the Balkans, our objective must change from appeasing Milosevic to sponsoring democratic change in Serbia and Milosevic's removal from power.

Democratic countries don't commit genocide and launch wars of aggression. But Milosevic's Serbia is not a democratic country. His ruthless power is maintained through fear and repression. He orchestrates attacks on academics, restricts freedom of assembly, maintains ironclad con-

trol on the judiciary and harasses the media.

The Clinton people must stop trying to entice Milosevic and his cronies to dinners at French castles and instead treat him as the pariah that he is, while actively helping those in Serbia who oppose Milosevic's fascist regime and who understand that building a free, pluralistic society is the key to bringing down this bloody tyrant.

To this end, I am introducing legislation with Sens. Richard Lugar, Gordon Smith, Joseph Lieberman, Frank Lautenberg and others to make Milosevic's removal and Serbia's democratic transformation U.S. policy.

The bipartisan "Serbia Democratization Act" will, among other things:

- Authorize \$100 million in U.S. funds to help support democracy and the development of a civil society inside Yugoslavia.
- Authorize increased Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcasting.
- Authorize assistance to victims of Milosevic's repression.
- Codify the "outer wall" of our sanctions on the Milosevic regime.
- Block all Yugoslav assets in the United States.
- Deny visas to senior Serbian and Yugoslav government officials.
- Require certification that Yugoslavia has a freely elected government before restoring most-favored-nation trading status to Yugoslavia.
- Prohibit strategic exports and U.S. loans to Yugoslavia.

The goal of the legislation is to isolate Milosevic, while at the same time engaging the Serb people and giving them resources with which to build democratic institutions and a pluralistic civil society.

The United States must work with democratic forces in Serbia to get out the message that it is Milosevic's autocratic rule and brutal repression in Kosovo that endangers Serbian territorial integrity. We must further make clear to the Serb people that a Yugoslavia whose government is based on democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for human rights will be welcomed with open arms into the community of nations.

Milosevic's removal is our exit strategy, and it is the only policy that can bring lasting peace to the Balkans. The alternative is more indefinite, and increasingly dangerous, U.S. military deployments in the Balkans.

The writer, a Republican from North Carolina, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Jesse Helms

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2517

April 9, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL ~~BURGER~~ **BERGER**

THROUGH:

GREG SCHULTE

ERIC SCHWARTZ

FROM:

MATTHEW VACCARO

SUBJECT:

POTUS Question on Senator Helms' Serbian
Democracy Act

The attached memo to the President responds to a question he
penned on a Senator Helms' Op Ed.

Concurrence by: Miles Lackey, Jamie Baker, Carlos Pascual

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo attached at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Op Ed

by email

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

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While ~~appealing on its face~~, the ~~legislation has numerous~~ problematic aspects. Most important, the legislation codifies various economic sanctions and directs certain diplomatic and foreign policy measures. It would require us to oppose FRY participation in a number of international organizations, to block official FRY assets in the United States, and to refuse visas to members of the FRY leadership or their immediate families. While many of the provisions reflect current U.S. policy, the legislation does not provide waiver authority to permit us to license specific transactions and to take certain diplomatic positions if they are in the national interest. *partly the* Constitutional questions are raised by bill provisions that *which usually restrict flexibility* prohibit issuance of visas to certain governmental leaders, that *particularly those which unnecessarily restrict flexibility* require you to undertake specific diplomatic positions, and that prohibit direct or indirect military cooperation. *Some of the specific provisions are*

will oppose will oppose
In addition, some European allies ~~may be uncomfortable with an~~ legislated policy to seek the replacement of Milosevic, and this could thus weaken NATO cohesion ~~on Kosovo policy~~. It also sets a bad precedent for the Russian Duma, which might vote to find

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

explicit policy of seeking

~~some of Russia's New Independent States (NIS) neighbors
"undemocratic" as a pretext to oust leaders like Shevardnadze.~~

However, given Mr. Milosevic's recent behavior, it would be difficult to oppose this bill outright. Our strategy, therefore, is to work with Senator Helms to modify the bill into something we can support. Madeleine has already spoken with the Senator in this regard. When Congress returns next week, State will begin a dialogue with Senator Helms on the provisions of the legislation that would require modification.

Attachment

Tab A Op Ed by Senator Helms

undecide 5/7/97

Undesireable simply

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

New Independent² States

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Attachment

Tab A Op Ed by Senator Helms

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902893
RECEIVED: 17 APR 99 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: BUTLER
BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 17 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY

TELCALL

file

PERSONS: SCHROEDER, GERHARD

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR TELCALL W/ CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 23 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN

BUTLER

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 2/20/2024

2008-0994-F-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902893

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99050313 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
X 99050313 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2893

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 6 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>4/17</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>4/20/99</u>	<u>4/20/99</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>		<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = I

urther Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Points only went
to POTUS 20 Apr. 1999
file for the record.

6

4-20-99

Exec Sec Office h:

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR CALL TO
CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

- Congratulations on your election as SPD party chairman. Know there was difficult debate on Kosovo. '99 APR 20 AM 11:39
- Good luck Monday with inaugural Bundestag session in Berlin.

Diplomatic Strategy

- Madeleine agreed with Ivanov on whole range of principles for a political settlement, except nature of international presence. We cannot allow either Belgrade or Moscow to water down this requirement.
- Force need not have a big NATO label, but must be organized by NATO and be NATO at the core. Without effective force, Serb paramilitaries will remain and the refugees will keep out.

NATO Targeting

- We've known our strategy will take time to succeed. Milosevic might be limiting time available by creating prospect of starvation among 700,000 displaced in Kosovo.
- Need to step up NATO air campaign. We've committed 80 additional aircraft, preparing another 300. We're deploying helicopter gunships and rocket launchers in Albania and are looking at additional areas to deploy rocket launchers.
- Added capability wasted if SACEUR not allowed to strike full range of targets. Time to move to full range of targeting foreseen in Phase III, including national-level targets and Belgrade's propaganda machine.
- It would probably be difficult to get a formal NATO decision on Phase III. That's Chirac's view. Rather, give Javier and Clark full authority to strike a wider range, without day-to-day micromanagement.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0777-M (1.84)
KBH 11/22/2019

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 4/14/09

Economic Pressure

- Need your help on tightening economic pressure. We're taking additional steps here: banning Yugo ships from U.S. ports and tightening restrictions export or re-export of U.S. goods.
- Important to tighten implementation of EU sanctions: seek a *complete* ban on trade financing of both government and private projects, and the freezing of *all* funds and assets of the FRY leadership. You can help as EU president.
- We are also proposing that NATO naval forces begin to search ships bound for Yugoslavia to ensure that they are not carrying arms or other war supplies such as fuel. Hope that you will support us, and that we could announce at the Summit.

NATO Summit

- At Summit we'll want to demonstrate unity and determination, as our Foreign Ministers did earlier this week, also show that we're stepping up pressure on Milosevic.
- Understand Chirac concerned about being away for three days. Would be helpful if you talked to Jacques, persuade him critical he stay for duration. We reworked agenda so that every day has a heavy Kosovo focus -- his presence is vital to discussions. We've eliminated virtually all of the celebratory aspects. An early departure might be seen as allied disunity.
- We could also aim to announce the NATO maritime inspection regime at the Summit. Understand that concept is being questioned by France and Italy in NATO; hope that you can help with French.
- Finally, it would be good if our statement indicated the intention of all allies to tighten economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. Our Foreign Ministers' meeting with front-line states can be used for the same purpose.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR CALL TO
CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

99 APR 18 PM 2:58

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0777-M (1.90)
KBH 11/22/2015

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 4/14/09

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2893

April 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

ANTONY BLINKEN

FROM:

LAWRENCE E. BUTLER

SUBJECT:

Contingency Memo for Schroeder Phone Call

Your memo to the President is at Tab I.

Concurrence by:

Greg Schulte

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President for a Schroeder Phone Call

Tab A Points to Make

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: 4/17/09

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 2/20/2024

2008-0994-F.3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL TO GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

DATE: TBD

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

Discuss shoring up Allies on widening the range of targets and the NATO Summit.

Ask for help to buck up Chirac for the NATO Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Schroeder is preparing for Monday's historic inaugural sitting of the Bundestag in the renovated Reichstag building, signaling the start of months of migration to Berlin. He would be appreciative if you mentioned this in your call.

Schroeder is convinced that a key to maintaining public backing is to constantly take the initiative -- if the public senses stagnation or believes there is no end in sight to (ineffective) air strikes, their support could wane. Hence Foreign Minister Fischer's Kosovo plan, his call for the U.N. to be more involved, his public efforts to woo the Russians on board, and his proposal that the EU administer any peace settlement. Fischer, in an interview Saturday, rejected any suggestion that NATO should send in ground troops before a peace had been achieved. Opinion polls show a majority of the German public support the air attack on Yugoslavia and the participation of the German air force, the first combat action Germans have taken part in since World War Two. But public opinion is solidly against sending ground troops into action and against German soldiers taking part.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (b)

Declassify On: 4/17/09

DECLASSIFIED**PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0777-M (1.91)

KBH 11/22/2019

The Germans took their UAV drones temporarily out of action late in the week having lost three of them. Saturday, they returned them to action having ruled out a pervasive technical problem.

You might want to let Schroeder know that Chirac is planning to leave on Saturday afternoon, and the danger that this might be seen as allied disunity.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made for Chancellor Schroeder

The Germans took their UAV drones temporarily out of action late in the week having lost three of them. Saturday, they returned them to action having ruled out a pervasive technical problem.

You might want to let Schroeder know that Chirac ~~instructed his NATO rep to inform Allies he will leave Washington Friday night, apparently piqued that his proposal to shorten the Summit and focus it entirely on Kosovo was rejected. Chirac says he is concerned about being away from Paris for four days during this "critical time."~~ Schroeder could help persuade Chirac to stay for the duration to be present for critical Kosovo discussions and to avoid sending a terrible signal to the Russians and Milosevic of Allied disunity; you should tell Schroeder that we have eliminated or toned down the celebratory aspects of the summit to focus on the task at hand.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made for Chancellor Schroeder

11 p.m. to leave on Sat afternoon, and the
 danger that this might be seen as allied disunity;
~~just upst ~~to~~~~
~~the~~

is planning to leave on Saturday afternoon, and the
 danger that this might be seen as allied disunity.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0777-M (1,92)

KBH 11/22/2019

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR CALL TO
CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

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Diplomatic Strategy

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SECRET

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 4/14/09

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0777-M (1.93)

KBH 11/21/2019

- Important to tighten implementation of EU sanctions: seek a complete ban on trade financing of both government and private projects, and the freezing of all funds and assets of the FRY leadership. You can help as EU president.
- We are also proposing that NATO naval forces begin to search ships bound for Yugoslavia to ensure that they are not carrying arms or other war supplies such as fuel. Hope that you will support us, and that we could announce at the Summit.

NATO Summit

- At Summit we'll want to demonstrate unity and determination, as our Foreign Ministers did earlier this week, also show that we're stepping up pressure on Milosevic.
- Understand Chirac concerned about being away for three days. Would be helpful if you talked to Jacques, persuade him critical he stay for duration. We reworked agenda so that every day has a heavy Kosovo focus -- his presence is vital to discussions. We've eliminated virtually all of the celebratory aspects. An early departure ~~would send terrible message of~~ allied disunity. *but he soon might be seen as*
- We could also aim to announce the NATO maritime inspection regime at the Summit. Understand that concept is being questioned by France and Italy in NATO; hope that you can help with French.
- Finally, it would be good if our statement indicated the intention of all allies to tighten economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. Our Foreign Ministers' meeting with front-line states can be used for the same purpose.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UN

file

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO UN SEC GEN ANNAN 4 MAY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 08 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STROMSETH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SCHULTE
SCHWARTZ
STROMSETH

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 2/21/2024
2008-0914-F.3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9903328

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99051020 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99051020 FOR INFORMATION
X 99051020 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

5/4
0840

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3328
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: X DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

<u>TMA</u>	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Jacobs Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>JS/3</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>JS/NT</u>	<u>edit</u>
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>5/4 DMK</u>	<u>Scarl</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>5/10 DMK</u>	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: POTUS telcall to ~~man~~ 4 may

199 MAY 3 10:00 AM

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Maddeline will
stay in touch
w/ you.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

What is there role?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

can't stop bombing
and then
negotiate. Need
to know basic
conditions are
met first.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. briefing paper	Phone Call with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. [Record ID: 9903328] (2 pages)	05/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6291

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. [Record ID: 9903328] (1 page)	05/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6291

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3328

May 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ERIC P. SCHWARTZ

FROM: JANE E. STROMSETH

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan

> via e-mail

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his telephone call to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte; Carlos Pascual *> via e-mail*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Jane Stromseth
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/3/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 2/24/2024
2008-0444-F.3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. draft	[Draft of 005a (9903328)] (2 pages)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6291

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. draft	[Draft of 005b (9903328)] (2 pages)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6291

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005e. draft	[Draft of 005b (9903328)] (2 pages)	05/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1707

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for May 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6291

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