

# FOIA MARKER

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**Folder Title:**

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

**Staff Office-Individual:**

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                               | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001a. briefing<br>paper  | Informal Working meeting with British Prime Minister Blair, April 21, 1999. [Record ID: 9902881] [Release in Part Per E.O. 12958] (2 pages) | 04/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001b. talking<br>points  | Summary Points for Meeting with Prime Minister Blair. [Record ID: 9902881] [Release in Part Per E.O. 12958] (2 pages)                       | 04/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001c. briefing<br>paper  | Proposed Concept Paper for One-on-One Meetings with NATO Leaders. [Record ID: 9902881] [Release in Part Per E.O. 12958] (2 pages)           | 04/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001d. report             | U.S. Government Report [partial, page 2 only] [Likely duplicate of rs105_001d, 2006-1189-M (1.04)] (1 page)                                 | 04/08/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001e. draft              | [Draft of 001a (9902881). Page 3 only] [Release in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page)                                                            | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001f. draft              | [Draft of 001b (9902881). Pages 2 & 3 only] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page)                                                      | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001g. draft              | [Draft of 001b (9902881). [Release in Part Per E.O. 12958] (2 pages)                                                                        | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001h. draft              | [Draft of 001b (9902881). Page 2 only.] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page)                                                          | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001i. draft              | [Draft of 001a (9902881).] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (3 pages)                                                                      | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001j. draft              | [Draft of 001a (9902881). Page 2 only] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page)                                                           | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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| 001k. draft              | [Draft of 001c (9902881).] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page)                                                                                                                        | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001l. draft              | [Draft of 001c (9902881).] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (2 pages)                                                                                                                       | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002a. briefing paper     | Meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Kosovo, April 19, 1999. [Record ID: 9902897] (4 pages)                                                                                               | 04/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002b. talking points     | Issues to be Discussed at Foreign Policy Team Meeting on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9902897] [Duplicate of ke5834_001b, this case] (2 pages)                                                        | 04/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002c. memo               | For Samuel Berger from Gregory Schulte and Stephen Flanagan. Subject: Foreign Policy Team Meeting on Kosovo [Record ID: 9902897] [with marginalia. See also ke5834_001c, this case] (1 page) | 04/18/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003a. briefing paper     | Telephone Calls to Netherlands Prime Minister Kok and Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik, April 20, 1999. [Record ID: 9902944] [See also rc2571_006a and rc2571_007a, 2018-0530-S] (2 pages)  | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003b. talking points     | Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Kok. [Record ID: 9902944] (3 pages)                                                                                         | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003c. talking points     | Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik. [Record ID: 9902944] (2 pages)                                                                          | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004a. memo               | For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte and Larry Butler. Subject: Meeting with John Sawers. [Record ID: 9902975] [With marginalia. See also rx193_002a, 2006-0217-F] (3 pages)                  | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004b. talking points     | Points to be Made for Meeting with John Sawers. [See also rx193_002b, 2006-0217-F] (2 pages)                                                                                                 | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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| 005a. memo               | For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Richard Holbrooke's Thoughts on Kosovo and Slobodan Milosevic. [Record ID: 9902988]<br>[Duplicate of rs1038_001a, 2014-0547-M] (3 pages) | 04/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005b. memo               | For the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, Secretary of State from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Kosovo: Next Steps.<br>[Duplicate of rs1038_001b, 2014-0547-M] (8 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005c. memo               | For the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Some Thoughts about Slobodan Milosevic. [Duplicate of rs1038_001c, 2014-0547-M] (2 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902881  
RECEIVED: 16 APR 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 21 APR 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

File

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY

SUBJECT: POTUS MTG W/ BLAIR 21 APR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 22 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BANDLER

BLINKEN

BOUCHARD

BUTLER

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By W NARA, Date 2/15/2024

2008-0994-F-3

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSEMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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RECORD ID: 9902881

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99042113 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
Z 99042113 FOR INFORMATION  
X 99050111 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

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4-21-99

2881

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 21, 1999

'99 APR 21 PM 2:13

 INFORMAL WORKING MEETING WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE: April 21, 1999

LOCATION: Residence

TIME: 8:00-10:00 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER I. PURPOSE

- Prepare with Blair plan for dealing with the Allies on Kosovo during the NATO Summit.
- Advance discussions on a Southeastern European Initiative.
- Have a short discussion of developments in the Northern Ireland Peace Process.

II. BACKGROUND

Blair arrives following his regular appearance at Parliamentary question hour, and will come directly from Andrews to your meeting. He leaves for Chicago at noon on Thursday. He wants to use this pre-summit meeting to work through with you the issues he raised in the paper he sent over the weekend, i.e. how to make the best use of the Summit to sustain Allied solidarity over Kosovo.

You agreed that it was worth exploring meeting individually with each of the Alliance leaders to ensure that they are solidly on board for key Summit objectives on Kosovo:

- confirm determination to sustain air strikes
- prevent compromise on NATO's basic conditions
- allow NATO to proceed with updating assessment on ground troops while avoiding divisive debate during summit

Released in Part

Per E.O. 12958, As Amended

2006-1189-M (1.01)

12/15/2008 RDS

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: 4/17/09



- step up economic and other pressure on Belgrade
- help Albania and Macedonia with refugee crisis

**Kosovo.** In keeping with your recent conversations, Blair has waged an aggressive public campaign to put the message out that NATO will persist with its air campaign to achieve its objectives, keeping all options, including the use of ground troops, under review. He told CBS Monday that in the longer term we have to ensure that Milosevic is not allowed to terrorize this region any more. British support has been particularly strong throughout the NATO operation.

**Economic Pressure.** Based on your conversations with Blair, the UK has also been active in looking for additional ways to put pressure on Milosevic. The UK instructed its embassy in Cyprus to join a demarche with ours in seeking to close down offshore accounts used by Milosevic. The UK has also been pressing the EU to tighten its implementation of the investment ban and assets freeze directed against the FRY and to adopt a travel ban on senior FRY officials and businessmen with ties to the regime. Finally, the UK has supported our proposal that NATO implement a maritime inspection regime to prevent delivery to the FRY of war material including petroleum products.

**Southeastern European Initiative.** As you discussed with Blair Saturday, we seek to use the Summit to launch an initiative aimed at transforming southeastern Europe from the continent's primary source of instability to a region with a realistic prospect of joining the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. To achieve this, we need to involve the United States, NATO, the EU, OSCE, international financial institutions and the states in the region themselves. We hope to build on existing frameworks, including especially our own Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the EU's "Royaumont" process for regional cooperation, and regularized consultations among Southeast European Defense Ministers (SEDM). The Europeans agree with us that we cannot deal effectively with Kosovo except in this wider context, and they are discussing similar or related proposals, including an eight-point plan the 1.4(b), 1.4(d) Foreign Office has put forward. The 1.4(b), 1.4(d) are also putting forward an initiative. We want to announce during the NATO Summit that the Alliance, the EU, and others are undertaking a joint initiative in this area.



NATO Summit. For the most part, they are also on board for the Summit deliverables we plan. ESDI, however, is not resolved. We and the British largely agree on the need for strengthening European capabilities in ways that are compatible with NATO but they have not pressed back as hard as we would wish against French attempts to emphasize EU autonomy and build ESDI outside the Alliance. In our efforts to revise NATO's Strategic Concept, we also need

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Northern Ireland. Blair and Ahern met with Trimble, Adams, Hume and other leaders in London on Monday after talks were broken off last week when the Hillsborough Declaration was declared beyond repair.

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary Albright  
John Podesta  
Samuel R. Berger  
James Steinberg

Prime Minister Blair  
John Sawers, Prime Minister's Diplomatic Advisor  
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff  
Ambassador Christopher Meyer (TBC)

IV. PRESS PLAN

TBD

V. SEQUENCE

See Tab C.

Attachment

Tab A Points to Make  
Tab B Proposed Points for Use in NATO Leader bilats  
Tab C Scenario  
Tab D Biography



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SUMMARY POINTS FOR  
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Kosovo

- points to be provided following Berger-Sawers meeting.

South East Europe

- Need comprehensive approach to bringing South East Europe into Euro - Atlantic mainstream - integration versus disintegration.
- The [REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d) suggestions we have seen along these lines fit very closely with our own. At the Summit we must agree on the NATO track of this broader regional approach.

NATO SUMMIT

- Close on ESDI, want to get it done here, rather than leave it for EU meetings later this spring. [REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)  
[REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)  
(b)(1) Congress feels very strongly and could get in way of your achievement.
- Encourage the development of European capabilities, emphasis should be on ESDI within the Alliance. EU autonomous defense role should be for cases when Alliance as a whole not engaged.
- We have to keep the Summit from bogging down in legalistic arguments about mandates, especially in light of Kosovo --  
[REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Northern Ireland

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] 1.4(d)
- [REDACTED]

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 12/5/08

Released in Part

Per E.O. 12958, As Amended

2006-1189-M (1.02)

12/15/2008 RDS

1.4(d)

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1.4(d)

- I am prepared to tell him that if you agree after meeting him on Monday.

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PROPOSED CONCEPT PAPER FOR  
One-on-One Meetings with NATO Leaders

Objectives

- confirm determination to sustain air strikes
- prevent compromise on NATO's basic conditions
- allow NATO to proceed with updating assessment on ground troops while avoiding divisive debate during summit
- step up economic and other pressure on Belgrade
- help Albania and Macedonia with refugee crisis

Detailed Points

- Summit must signal NATO's determination to sustain air strikes until our objectives are achieved.
  - Meet SACEUR's requests for additional forces.
  - 1.4(d)
  - Be ready to persist for months if necessary.
  - NATO must prevail. Anything less than our conditions will undercut long-term regional stability.
- NATO cannot waiver on basic conditions: Serb forces out; international security presence in; refugees back.
  - International force need not bear NATO label, but must be organized by NATO and have NATO at its core.
  - Belgrade must commit to these principles and begin to withdraw its forces in accordance with a precise and rapid timetable before any suspension in NATO's air strikes.
- Defer detailed discussion of ground options until we have an updated assessment from NATO's military authorities.
  - Prudent to consider all contingencies. Need to understand likely requirements and risks before making any decisions on detailed planning and force generation.
  - However, we should make no commitments at this time and avoid any suggestion of losing confidence in air campaign.
  - Not an issue for the Summit.
- Support military operations by stepping up economic and other pressure on Belgrade.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 4/20/09

Released in Part

Per E.O. 12958, As Amended

2006-1189-M (1.03)

12/15/2008 RDS

1.4(d)

- 
- 
- Establish NATO maritime inspection regime to stop shipment of war material (including petroleum) to the FRY.
- Increase support for the International Criminal Tribunal.
- Counter Belgrade's propaganda through transmitters in front-line states.
- Help Albania and Macedonia to cope with influx of over 550,000 refugees.
  - Increase economic assistance and humanitarian assistance in cooperation with UNHCR.
  - Commit to accepting refugees, or implement existing national commitments.<sup>1</sup>
- Several partners in Southeast Europe have had to deal with brunt of spillover effects of Kosovo conflict. They have provided critical support to NATO's military operations and we are asking them to do more.
  - Seeking a Summit outcome that will reassure them of NATO's concerns about their security, active engagement with humanitarian relief efforts and commitment to their longer-term stability and integration.
  - At a minimum, NAC should approve measures in Southeast European Initiative advanced by U.S., France and Italy.
- Would also like to reinforce Alliance warnings to Milosevic that we would view with grave concern any effort to widen the war. NATO leaders should say that the Alliance will respond to Serb retaliation against them resulting from their support to NATO activities.
  - Also build support for SEE "vision" - Europe and North American working together with relevant institutions and IFIs to develop a longer term-strategy to stabilize and develop the entire region.

---

<sup>1</sup> Of the NATO allies, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Turkey have already agreed to take refugees; of these, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Norway and Turkey are already bringing them in. Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom have not offered temporary asylum.

**TAB C**  
**SCENARIO**

**TO BE PROVIDED**



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                               | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001d. report             | U.S. Government Report [partial, page 2 only] [Likely duplicate of rs105_001d, 2006-1189-M (1.04)] (1 page) | 04/08/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

2881

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN

FROM: LAWRENCE E. BUTLER

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Blair

Your memo for the President is attached. We will need to insert appropriate points on Kosovo and the Summit following your 1:00 p.m. lunch meeting with John Sawers.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte, Don Bandler, Joe Bouchard

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Presidential Briefing Memorandum  
Tab A Points to Make  
Tab B Proposed points for NATO leaders  
Tab C Scenario  
Tab D Biography

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (d)  
Declassify On: 4/20/09

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2006-1189-M  
12/15/2008 RDS

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                    | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001e. draft              | [Draft of 001a (9902881). Page 3 only] [Release in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

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the NATO Summit that the Alliance, the EU, and others are undertaking a joint initiative in this area.

NATO Summit. For the most part, they are also on board for the Summit deliverables we plan. ESDI, however, is not resolved. We and the British largely agree on the need for strengthening European capabilities in ways that are compatible with NATO but they have not pressed back as hard as we would wish against French attempts to emphasize EU autonomy and build ESDI outside the Alliance. In our efforts to revise NATO's Strategic Concept, we also need

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Northern Ireland. Blair and Ahern met with Trimble, Adams, Hume and other leaders in London on Monday after talks were broken off last week when the Hillsborough Declaration was declared beyond repair.

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

1.4(b), 1.4(d)



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                         | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001f. draft              | [Draft of 001b (9902881). Pages 2 & 3 only] [Released in Part Per E.O.12958] (1 page) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

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- We have to keep the Summit from bogging down in legalistic arguments about mandates -- [REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

#### Northern Ireland

- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
- 1.4(d)

- I am prepared to tell him that if you agree after meeting him on Monday.

#### Defense Trade - ASTOR

- The Pentagon has offered its state-of-art radar technology insertion program (RTIP) technology to all three U.S. companies competing for your ASTOR contract. We are integrating into our own JSTARS surveillance aircraft.
- Integrating RTIP technology into ASTOR will make it more effective system and enhance commonality and interoperability with JSTARS. NATO air operations against ground forces in Kosovo illustrate the value of such compatibility.

Released in Part  
Per E.O. 12958, As Amended  
2006-1189-M (1.07)  
12/15/2008 RDS



- As you know, ASTOR itself is a contender in the NATO Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) program. Thus, if ASTOR is selected by NATO, both the UK and NATO systems would be compatible with the U.S. JSTARS system.

#### Hushkitted Jet Engines/Open Skies

- Poor time for an issue like this given Kosovo and fact we've finally put bananas behind us. Headed for unnecessary nightmarish collision. Need your urgent intervention to defer this while we tackle noise issues multilaterally.
- Industry and Congress reacted very badly to EU unilateral action that undermines international standards and multilateral process in ICAO that has worked for 50 years.
- We have a compromise that makes a lot of sense to me. We would agree to work with EU within the ICAO to adopt a new noise reduction standard by a date certain. In return, EU would agree not to adopt or to immediately suspend application of the hushkit regulation while we pursue an ICAO solution.
- Finally, while on Aviation, hope we can push a U.S.-UK Open Skies agreement to conclusion by end of year.

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| 001g. draft              | [Draft of 001b (9902881). [Release in Part Per E.O. 12958] (2 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

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SUMMARY POINTS FOR  
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Kosovo

- points to be provided following Berger-Sawers meeting.

South East Europe

- Need comprehensive approach to bringing South East Europe into Euro - Atlantic mainstream - integration versus disintegration.
- The [redacted] 1.4(d) suggestions we have seen along these lines fit very closely with our own. At the Summit we must agree on the NATO track of this broader regional approach.
- ~~Want to meet with Schroeder/EU and Bondevik/OSCE so we can signal that this issue is of concern to the broader Euro/Atlantic community. Engage the IFIs as well as the IMF. The Bank's spring meeting April 27-28 will be critical.~~

*want to get it done here, rather than leave it for EU meeting.*

NATO SUMMIT

- Close on ESDI, [redacted] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)  
[redacted] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
- ~~Bad for Congress~~ *late by 50%* and could get in way of your achievement. *feels very strongly*
- Encourage the development of European capabilities, emphasis should be on ESDI within the Alliance. EU autonomous defense role should be for cases when Alliance as a whole not engaged.
- We have to keep the Summit from bogging down in legalistic arguments about mandates. *esp. in light of Kosovo*

[redacted] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)  
[redacted] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)  
[redacted] 1.4(d)

*especially in light of Kosovo*

Northern Ireland

- [redacted]
- [redacted] 1.4(d)

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 12/5/08



- Time to take a risk before hot summer? Delay helps extremists -- more killings could unravel support in Ireland and here.

1.4(d)

Defense Trade - ASTOR

- The Pentagon offering radar technology insertion program (RTIP) technology to U.S. companies competing for your ASTOR contract. We are integrating into our own JSTARS surveillance aircraft.
- As you know, ASTOR itself is a contender in the NATO Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) program. Thus, if ASTOR is selected by NATO, both the UK and NATO systems would be compatible with the U.S. JSTARS system -- good for interoperability.

Hushkitted Jet Engines/Open Skies

- Poor time for an issue like this given Kosovo and fact we've finally put bananas behind us. Headed for unnecessary nightmarish collision. Need your urgent intervention to defer this while we tackle noise issues multilaterally.
- While on Aviation, hope we can push a U.S.-UK Open Skies agreement to conclusion.

*Pts in hush  
pts from long version (29ress)  
- last 3*

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
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| 001h. draft              | [Draft of 001b (9902881). Page 2 only.] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

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- We have to keep the Summit from bogging down in legalistic arguments about mandates -- [REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Northern Ireland

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

[REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

to  
summary

[REDACTED] 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Defense Trade - ASTOR

- The Pentagon has offered its state-of-art radar technology insertion program (RTIP) technology to all three U.S. companies competing for your ASTOR contract. We are integrating into our own JSTARS surveillance aircraft.
- Integrating RTIP technology into ASTOR will make it more effective system and enhance commonality and interoperability with JSTARS. NATO air operations against ground forces in Kosovo illustrate the value of such compatibility.

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Per E.O. 12958, As Amended  
2006-1189-M (1.13)  
12/15/2008 RDS



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| 001i. draft              | [Draft of 001a (9902881).] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (3 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMAL WORKING MEETING WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE: April 21, 1999

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Prepare with Blair plan for dealing with the Allies on Kosovo during the NATO Summit.
- Advance discussions on a Southeastern European Initiative.
- Have a short discussion of developments in the Northern Ireland Peace Process.
- Time permitting, discuss bilateral defense sales and an EU trade issue involving aircraft engines.

II. BACKGROUND

*likely his regular appearance at*  
Blair arrives ~~late in the evening, having been delayed by~~ following his regular appearance at  
Parliamentary question hour, and will come directly from Andrews to your meeting. He leaves for Chicago at noon on Thursday. He wants to use this pre-summit meeting to work through with you the issues he raised in the paper he sent over the weekend, i.e. how to make the best use of the Summit to sustain Allied solidarity over Kosovo.

*key*  
You agreed that it was worth exploring meeting individually with each of the Alliance leaders to ensure that they are solidly on board for our Summit objectives on Kosovo:

(i) a clear re-affirmation of NATO's conditions -- Serbian forces out, an international force in, and refugees back home; (ii) a signal that military, economic and political pressure against Belgrade will intensify until those goals are met; and (iii) a commitment to do for southeastern

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: 4/17/09

Released in Part

Per E.O. 12958, As Amended

2006-1189-M (1.16)

12/15/2008 RDS

*take from  
"objectives"  
section of  
paper  
at  
Tab B*



Europe what we helped do for western Europe after World War II and for central Europe after the Cold War -- supporting the democratic and economic development of the region, and providing confidence in its long-term security. A proposed set of talking points for these meetings is at Tab B.

**British domestic context.** Blair is enjoying strong domestic support for his actions on Kosovo, and he appreciated the boost that resolution of the Kashmir question gave to his growing lead in the Scottish elections May 6. Only Northern Ireland continues to challenge his political leadership at home. This summer Blair is expected to make some changes in his cabinet; he would like to bring Mo Mowlam back from Belfast to take the Labor party chair or another key position commensurate with her abilities.

**Kosovo.** In keeping with your recent conversations, Blair has waged an aggressive public campaign to put the message out that NATO will persist with its air campaign to achieve its objectives, keeping all options, including the use of ground troops, under review. He told CBS Monday that in the longer term we have to ensure that Milosevic is not allowed to terrorize this region any more. British support has been particularly strong throughout the NATO operation. This reflects both Blair's own outstanding public diplomacy efforts and his team's good work in making the case to the British people.

**Economic Pressure.** Based on your conversations with Blair, the UK has also been active in looking for additional ways to put pressure on Milosevic. The UK instructed its embassy in Cyprus to join a demarche with ours in seeking to close down offshore accounts used by Milosevic. The UK has also been pressing the EU to tighten its implementation of the investment ban and assets freeze directed against the FRY and to adopt a travel ban on senior FRY officials and businessmen with ties to the regime. Finally, the UK has supported our proposal that NATO implement a maritime inspection regime to prevent delivery to the FRY of war material including petroleum products.

**Southeastern European Initiative.** As you discussed with Blair Saturday, we seek to use the Summit to launch an initiative aimed at transforming southeastern Europe from the continent's primary source of instability to a region with a realistic prospect of joining the Euro-Atlantic



mainstream. To achieve this, we need to involve the United States, NATO, the EU, OSCE, international financial institutions and the states in the region themselves. We hope to build on existing frameworks, including especially our own Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the EU's "Royaumont" process for regional cooperation, and regularized consultations among Southeast European Defense Ministers (SEDM). The Europeans agree with us that we cannot deal effectively with Kosovo except in this wider context, and they are discussing similar or related proposals, including an eight-point plan the British Foreign Office has put forward. The Germans are also putting forward an initiative. We want to announce during the NATO Summit that the Alliance, the EU, and others are undertaking a joint initiative in this area. ~~The trick is to show that we have a long term, comprehensive plan to fix this problem instead of fighting it over and over again, and that we are coordinating with, not competing against, our allies and the major international institutions.~~

ESDI, however  
is not resolved.  
we and the British  
largely agree on  
the need for  
strengthening  
European capabilities  
in ways that  
are compatible  
with NATO, but  
they have

NATO Summit. ~~The British support us strongly on making the Summit a success and using it to chart the way ahead on Kosovo. They agree that it should be a working Summit focused on the serious business at hand. For the most part, they are also on board for the Summit deliverables we plan. There are still open questions between us and the British, and among them, the French and other continental Allies. These center on a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the "UN mandates" issue - whether NATO needs specific UN Security Council authorization before it can do crisis response (non-Article V) operations. The~~

1.4(d)

~~ESDI, however~~  
ESDI, however  
is not resolved;  
we and the  
British largely  
agree on  
the need for  
strengthening  
European capabilities  
in ways that  
are compatible  
with NATO, but  
they have

*mission* missions

Northern Ireland. Blair and Ahern met with Trimble, Adams, Hume and other leaders in London on Monday after talks were broken off last week when the Hillsborough Declaration was declared beyond repair.

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

1.4(b), 1.4(d)



1.4(b), 1.4(d)

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

encourage a different approach rather than leaving the process fallow over the summer. Adams' apparent backtracking from what was near-agreement on April 1 has been aided by the aftermath of the Rosemary Nelson murder and the subsequent non-stop flow of negative information about the RUC's actions and lack of action. In the absence of movement on the political track, human rights groups and Republican supporters on both sides of the Atlantic are in full cry over policing reform.

**Defense Trade.** DoD has offered its radar technology insertion program (RTIP) technology to the three U.S. companies competing for Britain's "ASTOR" contract. This is state-of-the-art radar technology we are integrating into our own JSTARS surveillance aircraft. You should raise this important competition because integrating RTIP technology into ASTOR will make it a more effective system and enhance commonality and interoperability; NATO air operations against ground forces in Kosovo illustrate the value of such compatibility. ASTOR is a contender in the NATO Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) program. If it is selected, both the UK and NATO systems would be compatible with the U.S. JSTARS system.

**Hushkits.** The EU is on the verge of implementing a discriminatory law that would restrict the acquisition of airplanes outfitted with "hushkits". These are high tech, U.S.-made jet engine mufflers that bring airplanes manufactured to old noise standards into compliance with current standards. We support a multilateral process with the EU to resolve the issue in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which has set international standards for more than 50 years. We would pledge to work with the Europeans toward a new noise reduction standard by a date certain. In exchange, we will ask the EU to forego adopting or applying the proposed hushkit regulation while we pursue the ICAO track.

Commerce Under Secretary David Aaron led a team to Europe during the week of April 19 to discuss how to pursue this multilateral approach to address U.S. concerns. The

Commission's preliminary response has been negative. The  
1.4(b) also voiced displeasure, but  
none were unwilling to speak with U.S. officials. You

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

us. You should also ask Blair for his support to reach an  
"Open Skies" aviation agreement before year's end.

### III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary Albright  
John Podesta  
Samuel R. Berger  
James Steinberg

Prime Minister Blair  
John Sawers, Prime Minister's Diplomatic Advisor  
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff  
Ambassador Christopher Meyer (TBC)

### IV. PRESS PLAN

TBD

### V. SEQUENCE

See Tab C.

### Attachment

Tab A Points to Make  
Tab B Proposed Points for Use in NATO Leader bilats  
Tab C Scenario  
Tab D Biography



insert A

The attraction of the Day of Reconciliation idea was that it offered confidence that IRA would in fact decommission, without requiring it to happen in advance of setting up the shadow executive. Sinn Fein's position--go forward with the Executive, and then will see what's possible -- is not sustainable for Blair, much less for Trimble. But it is equally true that Sinn Fein won't respond to a public pressure campaign (an idea the British and Irish are considering). The trick remains for Sinn Fein to give adequate assurances on future decommissioning (to de Chastelain, to the governments, or possibly to you) that would make it possible for the process to move ahead. One idea is to have the British go first with their "act of Reconciliation" and setting in motion the process of setting up the executive --to which the IRA could then respond with their own "act of reconciliation". This could only work if Blair felt confident that the IRA would keep its commitment, and act quickly following the British move.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001j. draft              | [Draft of 001a (9902881). Page 2 only] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- step up economic and other pressure on Belgrade
- help Albania and Macedonia with refugee crisis

**Kosovo.** In keeping with your recent conversations, Blair has waged an aggressive public campaign to put the message out that NATO will persist with its air campaign to achieve its objectives, keeping all options, including the use of ground troops, under review. He told CBS Monday that in the longer term we have to ensure that Milosevic is not allowed to terrorize this region any more. British support has been particularly strong throughout the NATO operation. ~~This reflects both Blair's own outstanding public diplomacy efforts and his team's good work in making the case to the British people.~~

**Economic Pressure.** Based on your conversations with Blair, the UK has also been active in looking for additional ways to put pressure on Milosevic. The UK instructed its embassy in Cyprus to join a demarche with ours in seeking to close down offshore accounts used by Milosevic. The UK has also been pressing the EU to tighten its implementation of the investment ban and assets freeze directed against the FRY and to adopt a travel ban on senior FRY officials and businessmen with ties to the regime. Finally, the UK has supported our proposal that NATO implement a maritime inspection regime to prevent delivery to the FRY of war material including petroleum products.

**Southeastern European Initiative.** As you discussed with Blair Saturday, we seek to use the Summit to launch an initiative aimed at transforming southeastern Europe from the continent's primary source of instability to a region with a realistic prospect of joining the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. To achieve this, we need to involve the United States, NATO, the EU, OSCE, international financial institutions and the states in the region themselves. We hope to build on existing frameworks, including especially our own Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the EU's "Royaumont" process for regional cooperation, and regularized consultations among Southeast European Defense Ministers (SEDM). The Europeans agree with us that we cannot deal effectively with Kosovo except in this wider context, and they are discussing similar or related proposals, including an eight-point plan the 1.4(b), 1.4(d) Foreign Office has put forward. The 1.4(b), 1.4(d) are also putting forward an initiative. We want to announce during

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                         | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001k. draft              | [Draft of 001c (9902881).] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (1 page) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



SECRET

PROPOSED CONCEPT PAPER FOR  
One-on-One Meetings with NATO Leaders


email  
final b  
@nsa  
@Schulte

Objectives

- confirm determination to sustain air strikes
- prevent compromise on NATO's basic conditions
- ~~initiate planning for ground forces without commitment~~
- step up economic and other pressure on Belgrade
- help Albania and Macedonia with refugee crisis

allow ...  
to provide with  
update assessment  
on situation  
with confidence  
within all day  
Summit

Detailed Points

- Summit must signal NATO's determination to sustain air strikes until our objectives are achieved.
- Meet SACEUR's requests for additional forces.
-  1.4(d)
- Be ready to persist for weeks ~~in not~~ months. *if necessary*
- NATO must prevail. Anything less than a Serbian "defeat" will undercut long-term regional stability. *our conditions*
- NATO cannot waiver on basic conditions: Serb forces out; international security presence in; refugees back.
- International force need not bear NATO label, but must be organized by NATO and have NATO at its core.
- Belgrade must commit to these principles and begin to withdraw its forces in accordance with a precise and rapid timetable before any suspension in NATO's air strikes.
- ~~Be ready to consider planning for ground options, once we have an updated assessment from NATO's military authorities.~~ *Defer detailed discussion of until*
- Prudent to consider all contingencies. Need to understand likely requirements and risks before making any decisions on detailed planning and force generation.
- However, we should make no commitments at this time and avoid any suggestion of losing confidence in air campaign.
- Not an issue for the Summit.

allow NATO to proceed with updating assessment on ground troops while avoiding debate during Summit if necessary

Released in Part  
Per E.O. 12958, As Amended  
2006-1189-M (1.20)  
12/15/2008 RDS

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 4/20/09

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 0011. draft              | [Draft of 001c (9902881).] [Released in Part Per E.O. 12958] (2 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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PROPOSED CONCEPT PAPER FOR  
One-on-One Meetings with NATO Leaders

Objectives

- confirm determination to sustain air strikes
- prevent compromise on NATO's basic conditions
- allow NATO to proceed with updating assessment on ground troops while avoiding divisive debate during summit
- step up economic and other pressure on Belgrade
- help Albania and Macedonia with refugee crisis

Detailed Points

- Summit must signal NATO's determination to sustain air strikes until our objectives are achieved.
  - Meet SACEUR's requests for additional forces.
  - 1.4(d)
  - Be ready to persist for months if necessary.
  - NATO must prevail. Anything less than our conditions will undercut long-term regional stability.
- NATO cannot waiver on basic conditions: Serb forces out; international security presence in; refugees back.
  - International force need not bear NATO label, but must be organized by NATO and have NATO at its core.
  - Belgrade must commit to these principles and begin to withdraw its forces in accordance with a precise and rapid timetable before any suspension in NATO's air strikes.
- Defer detailed discussion of ground options until we have an updated assessment from NATO's military authorities.
  - Prudent to consider all contingencies. Need to understand likely requirements and risks before making any decisions on detailed planning and force generation.
  - However, we should make no commitments at this time and avoid any suggestion of losing confidence in air campaign.
  - Not an issue for the Summit.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 4/20/09

Released in Part

Per E.O. 12958, As Amended

2006-1189-M (1.21)

12/15/2008 RDS

- Support military operations by stepping up economic and other pressure on Belgrade.
- 1.4(d)
- Establish NATO maritime inspection regime to stop shipment of war material (including petroleum) to the FRY.
- Increase support for the International Criminal Tribunal.
- Counter Belgrade's propaganda through transmitters in front-line states.
- Help Albania and Macedonia to cope with influx of over 550,000 refugees.
  - Increase economic assistance and humanitarian assistance in cooperation with UNHCR.
  - Commit to accepting refugees, or implement existing national commitments.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Of the NATO allies, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Turkey have already agreed to take refugees; of these, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Norway and Turkey are already bringing them in. Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom have not offered temporary asylum.



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902897  
RECEIVED: 18 APR 99 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 18 APR 99  
SOURCE REF:

*fl*

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY TEAM MEETING ON KOSOVO 19 APR

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 23 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NSGLS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
FLANAGAN  
NSC CHRON  
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By 17 NARA, Date 2/15/2024  
2008-0994-F.3

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMKJ

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902897

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER  
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99042818 FOR INFORMATION  
X 99042818 NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

~~SECRET~~



National Security Council  
The White House

4/19/23  
10

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2897

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BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG K A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE    | DISPOSITION |
|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Cosgriff       |             |                 |             |
| Rice           | <u>1</u>    | <u>R 4/18</u>   |             |
| Davies         |             |                 |             |
| Kerrick        | <u>copy</u> |                 |             |
| Steinberg      | <u>2</u>    |                 | <u>OPED</u> |
| Berger         |             |                 |             |
| Situation Room |             |                 |             |
| West Wing Desk | <u>3</u>    | <u>B 4/26</u>   | <u>N</u>    |
| Records Mgt.   | <u>4</u>    | <u>DMK 4/28</u> | <u>N</u>    |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Foreign Policy Team

4/19

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002a. briefing<br>paper  | Meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Kosovo, April 19, 1999.<br>[Record ID: 9902897] (4 pages) | 04/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                            | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002b. talking<br>points  | Issues to be Discussed at Foreign Policy Team Meeting on Kosovo.<br>[Record ID: 9902897] [Duplicate of ke5834_001b, this case] (2 pages) | 04/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary Madeleine Albright  
Secretary William Cohen  
John Podesta  
Samuel Berger  
Steve Ricchetti  
Strobe Talbott  
George Tenet  
Walter Slocombe  
Hugh Shelton  
James Dobbins  
Donald Kerrick  
James Steinberg  
Leon Fuerth  
Greg Schulte/Steve Flanagan (Schulte attending first half/  
Flanagan attending second half)

The following individuals have been invited to join the meeting  
for the 1:30 - 2:00 p.m. portion on financial support for  
Southeastern Europe:

Secretary Robert Rubin  
Jacob Lew  
Gene Sperling  
Lawrence Summers  
Lael Brainard

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                                                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002c. memo               | For Samuel Berger from Gregory Schulte and Stephen Flanagan.<br>Subject: Foreign Policy Team Meeting on Kosovo [Record ID:<br>9902897] [with marginalia. See also ke5834_001c, this case] (1 page) | 04/18/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

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SECRET  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902944  
RECEIVED: 20 APR 99 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: BROWN, K

DOC DATE: 20 APR 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NETHERLANDS  
TELCALL

NORWAY

*fl*

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALLS TO PM KOK & BONDEVIK

ACTION: NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED

DUE DATE: 26 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BROWN, K

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN  
BROWN, K  
NSC CHRON  
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By 12 NARA, Date 2/15/2024  
2008-0944-E.3

COMMENTS: CALLS PLACED BEFORE PKG. COULD GET TO EXSEC

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902944

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001

Z 99042014 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
X 99042014 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council  
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                        | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE    | DISPOSITION |
|------------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| <u>588</u><br>Cosgriff |             |                 |             |
| Rice                   | <u>1</u>    | <u>/</u>        |             |
| Davies                 |             |                 |             |
| Kerrick                |             |                 |             |
| Steinberg              |             |                 |             |
| Berger                 |             |                 |             |
| Situation Room         |             |                 |             |
| West Wing Desk         | <u>2</u>    | <u>TTC 4/20</u> | <u>N</u>    |
| Records Mgt.           | <u>3</u>    | <u>84/21</u>    | <u>NFA</u>  |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

*File for the record -  
Pres. made both  
phone calls -*

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes 4-20-99 R to bf

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2944  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG TTC A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                      | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE | DISPOSITION |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| <u>2</u><br>Cosgriff |             |              |             |
| Rice                 |             |              |             |
| Davies               |             |              |             |
| Kerrick              |             |              |             |
| Steinberg            |             |              |             |
| Berger               |             |              |             |
| Situation Room       |             |              |             |
| West Wing Desk       |             |              |             |
| Records Mgt.         |             |              |             |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

99 APR 20 PM 2:22

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has yes

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2944

April 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

ANTONY BLINKEN *B In AS*

FROM:

K. C. BROWN *KCB*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Telephone Calls to Prime Ministers Kok  
and Bondevik

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum the President conveying  
background and talking points for his telephone calls to  
Netherlands Prime Minister Kok and Norwegian Prime Minister  
Bondevik.

Concurrence by:

Greg Schulte *GS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Points to be Made to Prime Minister Kok

Tab B Points to be Made to Prime Minister Bondevik

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By V2 NARA, Date 2/15/2024  
2008-0994-F.3



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                                              | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003a. briefing<br>paper  | Telephone Calls to Ntherlands Prime Minister Kok and Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik, April 20, 1999. [Record ID: 9902944] [See also rc2571_006a and rc2571_007a, 2018-0530-S] (2 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003b. talking<br>points  | Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister<br>Kok. [Record ID: 9902944] (3 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003c. talking<br>points  | Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Norwegian Prime<br>Minister Bondevik. [Record ID: 9902944] (2 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902964  
RECEIVED: 20 APR 99 14

TO: MATAXIS, THEODORE

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 28 APR 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO UN  
NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: LAKE, ANTHONY

SUBJECT: REPLY OBO APNSA RE KOSOVO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR DUE DATE: 01 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
HURLEY

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902964

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HURLEY  
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99042014 APPROPRIATE ACTION  
X 99050510 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


April 28, 1999

Dear General Mataxis:

Thank you for your recent letter on Kosovo to Samuel Berger, the President's National Security Adviser, to which he has asked me to reply. Your concept of using the Treaty of Lausanne or the Partition of the Indian sub-continent as a point of departure for the Balkans is an intriguing one.

In the wake of this weekend's NATO Summit, we are optimistic that our renewed military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a path to a negotiated settlement. In the meantime, I appreciate your constructive and supportive thoughts on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Greg Schulte', with a stylized, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Greg Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Implementation of the Dayton  
Accords

BG Theodore C. Mataxis, USA (ret)  
P.O. Box 1643  
Southern Pines, NC 28387-1643



2964

To: Kosovo/EA

**AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY**

PO Box 1643  
Southern Pines, NC 28387  
(910) 692 - 4168  
(910) 692- 1732 Fax  
azed@pinchurst.net

RESPONSE  
ON BEHALF OF  
SARB.

5 April '99

Samuel Berger  
Ast. to the President for National Security Affairs  
National Security Council  
The White House  
1600 Penn.Ave.NW  
Washington ,DC 20500

Dear Mr. Berger :

I am heart sick , the current events in Kosovo remind me of a WW I scenario with out of control mobilizations on a collision course which will result in our US ground forces becoming involved in a guerrilla war in the Balkans. Yes, we can win, if the public is willing to take the casualties and cost. But the deep commitment isn't there and I'm afraid we'll see another "bug out" reminiscent of Beirut or Somalia. This would be a disaster for both us and NATO!

However there is another way out . Rather than committing ground forces or declaring victory having "Damaged his military" or what ever the victory mantra of the day will be, there is another option. The third Option is to call for a conference on the entire Balkans which take a look at history and attempt to realign the boundaries of the region in a manner which will take into account the powerful influence of the ethnic ties in that region.

In 1994 I sent an OPED I had written about the tragedy in Bosnia to Tony Lake recommending that he take a look at history. I highlighted the example of how the League of Nations used the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 to end the Greco/Turk War. They exchanged two million Greeks and Turks -the Greeks to Greece and the Turks to Turkey. As you will note in Tab A he thanked me for the idea and later used it in a Conference in Europe on Bosnia. Unfortunately it was turned down by the Moslems.

I recommend that you follow this example today. Call on the UN Secretary General to use his "Good Offices" to broker an International Conference which will study long term solutions to the Balkans by reviewing and redrawing boundaries which will reflect the existence of hundred of years of mutual hatred between the different ethnic groups . Tab B. Perhaps then we would have the peace in Europe that that the President spoke of so eloquently for our grand children.

I commanded combat infantry troops in WW II, Korea and Vietnam and have a feel for the pain that body bags bring the families. And I fought against guerrillas for four years in Vietnam and supported the Reagan Doctrine's assistance to the Afghan Freedom fighters during the 1980's making seven trips of one to three months to the Afghan War. ( Tab C) So I also have an understanding of the difficulties of combating a people who are willing to die for their cause. We don't need the "tar baby" of another Vietnam hanging around our neck for the next generation!

Respectfully,

*Theo. C. Mataxis*  
Theo. C. Mataxis  
Brig. Gen.(ret) USA



# Speaker tells of impact of Afghan, Cambodian wars

The guest speaker for the weekly meeting of the Sandhills Golden K Kiwanis Club at the Brownson Memorial Presbyterian Church was Brig. Gen. Ten Mataxis of the Speakers Bureau Of The American Security Council. He gave a first hand report of his recent three month tour of Pakistan and Thailand where he visited the refugee camps and spoke with freedom fighters struggling to free their countries from the Soviet and Vietnamese armies, who now occupy Afghanistan and Cambodia.

He noted that while the battlefields of the Hind Kush mountains of Afghanistan and the jungles of Cambodia were separated by thousands of miles, there was a remarkable similarity between the two conflicts. Both resulted from a

change of Soviet strategy explained the DOD booklet "Soviet Military Power - 1987." As stated in this DOD publication, "A stronger more adventurous Soviet Union had begun to view the conflicts in the third world as an avenue for furthering Soviet interests." That view heralded an era of Soviet activism around the world including extensive support of Afghanistan a year later, in Dec. 1979.

Mataxis said the invasions of Afghanistan and Cambodia both resulted in the displacement of masses of refugees. Four million Afghans, and three million in Pakistan and one million in Iran, and a quarter of a million Cambodians fled into Thailand. Fortunately in both cases the host countries and international and private



Brig. General Ted Mataxis with a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun and Pakistani freedom fighters.

humanitarian organizations banded together to assist these unfortunate victims fleeing from the "killing field." Fortunately, this new Soviet strategy was strongly challenged by

President Reagan's commitment to "support anti communist insurgencies around the globe." A meeting last summer sponsored by the conservative American Security Council Foundation to bring together key anti communist guerrilla leaders in Washington, D.C. At this meeting Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger further expressed this administration's commitment to the freedom fighters, saying, "Our message must remain what it has always been - we shall not abandon

you." He noted that these statements of support at the policy level have been followed up in Washington by the development of a strategy tailored to meet this new danger of Low Intensity Conflicts supported by the Soviets. In addition to back this up strategy steps have been taken by the military to increase the number and capability of our Special Operation Forces and to provide a new Special Operations Command headed by General Lindsay, former commander of the XVIII Abn. Corps at Fort Bragg.

Following this overview of the background of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia Mataxis reported his observations on the current status of the conflicts in these two regions. He explained that he has made several trips to Pakistan since 1983 for the Committee for a Free Afghanistan, an educational and humanitarian organization, officially recognized by the Pakistan government. The CFA supports several humanitarian projects within their limited budget such as providing medical care in the US for wounded Afghans who cannot be treated in Pakistan and assisting in establishing medical clinics in Afghanistan.

In addition CFA has provided seeds for Freedom Fighters based inside Afghanistan plus many other crash projects such as providing

food for unregistered refugees. In addition the CFA, which has offices in the Heritage Foundation building in Washington, provides speakers and material on the Afghan War. As he said a major responsibility is to keep the story of the resistance of the Afghan people against the Soviets invasion alive in the media. He noted that the committee had recently sponsored a group of international lawyers who traveled to the Pakistan refugee camps to obtain depositions of the Soviet violations of Human Rights and evidence of War Crimes. Their report has been presented to a House committee and is scheduled for presentation before a full Congressional Committee in the fall. He said that since he had briefed the club in detail on the background of the Soviet invasion and occupation last spring, he would only briefly cover the key changes. He noted that the war continued into its eighth year with the Soviets unable to defeat the Mujahideen. The Soviets continue to hold the major cities and lines of communications while the Mujahideen held 80-90% of the country side. In place of the large sweeps and search and destroy missions of past years the Soviets are now concentrating on trying to cut the Mujahideen supply routes from Pakistan and isolate the guerrillas (See WARS, page 148)

"Assisting Freedom Fighters" through Public Diplomacy

An example of "exposure to Guerrilla war!"

(\* 7 trips)

CFA became the primary AFGHAN support group in DC "Worked" Congress, helped them set up Congressional Task Force. Became primary contact with STATE, DOD with Guerrilla Leaders in Afghanistan. Became Point of Contact for Medical Groups, Newsman etc going to Afghanistan. Brought leaders to DC to meet President, Congress & DOD officials. Assisted Cambodian guerrillas to organize in DC - attended World Anti Communist meeting, in SF & San Diego coordinated anti Soviet



# Wars

from popular support by driving the people from areas outside their control into Pakistan and Iran as refugees.

On the plus side of the ledger was the effect of the Stinger Missiles on the war. According to reports the Mujahideen were shooting down an average of 20 Soviet planes and helicopters a month. And he said that in meeting he had with guerilla commanders they explained that the major benefit from these missiles was not only the planes they shot down, but the fact that the enemy pilots were now so cautious and launched their attacks from such a height that they were inaccurate. Further that reports coming out of Afghanistan from their agents have reported that many of Kabul's pilots have complained that the Soviets give them the most dangerous missions while they fly; only the easy missions where there are few anti-aircraft weapons.

He reported that the Soviets have also increased their bombing raids on the Afghan refugee camps along the border and terrorist bomb attacks in the key cities to put pressure on the Pakistan government. This is why the Pakistan government need to obtain an effective radar system from the US to warn them of enemy attacks. In response to these raids the Mujahideen mounted a raid into Soviet Russia. The Soviet reaction was violent, they poured troops across the border devastating the area along the Oxus River. He explained he interviewed an Afghan who had witnessed the raid and fled south to escape the fighting. Their refugee said that the Mujahideen raid had been supported by Soviet Tajik citizens, who also supplied the mujahideen with food and horses to escape the Soviet swess.

In addition to this raid the Mujahideen are carrying out a series of small forays to distribute their holy book, the Koran and cassette recording of sermons and speeches banned by the Soviets. According to diplomatic reports from Moscow the Soviets are particularly sensitive to these Mujahideen initiatives since they feel they will further exacerbate the strained relations between the Soviets and their Soviet Muslim republics. They say the Soviets fear a resurgence of resistance from the grandsons of the Bashmachi guerrillas, who fought on for years until finally crushed in 1928.

Faced with more effective anti-aircraft weapons, increased morale among the Mujahideen and the possibility of increased unrest in the Muslim republic the Soviets have admitted that Afghanistan is a "bleeding wound." However they have yet to present a firm withdrawal agenda for their troop withdrawal. As the war continues and the cost, and unrest in Central Asia increases the Soviets are faced with continuing the war at its present level, withdrawing and abandoning the Kabul Communist government or seeking a military solution by pouring in more troops to attempt to finally crush the Mujahideen.

Turning to the war in Cambodia Maxis said that his involvement with the Cambodians went back to 1971 when he was assigned from Vietnam to Phnom Penh on a one day's notice in January 1971 to supervise the military assistance funds voted by Congress to support the government of Lon Nol which had seized power in a coup from Prince Sihanouk and had cut off the flow of communist weapons and supplies through the part of Kompong Som to the Vietnamese Base areas along the South Vietnamese border. After his retirement in 1972 and move to Singapore as a consultant to their Ministry of Defense he continued to keep in contact with his friends for several years — until last summer one of them attended the conference held by the American Society Council in Washington, D.C. While in Washington, D.C. MG Pok Sam an talked to the Afghan Leaders at the meeting and visited the offices of the CFA to see how it was organized. A couple of months later Gen. Sak Sutsakhan returned and asked the CFA's help to organize a similar support group for the Cambodian resistance fighters. After they organized the Committee for a Free Cambodia, with several local chapters throughout the country they asked Maxis to visit their refugee camps and base areas in Thailand to obtain an overview of the current situation which would hopefully allow him to help them to increase their media coverage in the US.

On arrival in Bangkok he was met by General Sak Sutsakhan Commander of the KPNLF, one of the three resistance groups fighting the 170,000 man Vietnamese occupation force in Cambodia. He was taken to Site 2, a refugee camp of 150,000 refugees on the Cambodia border and was given an update on the local situation.

Using a map a Cambodia Maxis explained that the Vietnamese invasion in Dec. 1978 drove the Khmer Rouge, who had seized the country in the spring of 1975, when Vietnam fell, into base areas along in the jungles of Cambodia's western borders. At this time two non-communist groups, the KPNLF,

under Son San, which consisted of remnants of the Lon Nol government and Prince Sihanouk's followers also organized bases in the border areas for their supporters.

In the fall of 1981, three years after the Vietnamese invasion the three resistance groups met at the urging of this supporters and agreed to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Prince Sihanouk became President Son San the Prime Minister and Khieu Samhan of the Khmer Rouge the Vice President for foreign affairs. This coalition formed under the pressure from the Chinese and

Asean governments soon proved its value in the UN where 116 nations have joined to call for the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia.

On the military side after the invasion the Vietnamese launched a series of attacks against the resistance forces; finally over running the camps and forcing the guerrillas to flee across the border into Thailand. Vietnam was quick to announce their victory over the resistance, however instead of giving up the three resistance groups reformed and changed their strategy. They switched to guerrilla war and moved

groups into the interior of Cambodia to continue the war, forcing the Vietnamese army to withdraw forces from the border to protect key areas across the country.

Maxis said that the Vietnamese, under pressure at the UN have agreed to withdraw in 1990. In preparation for this anticipated withdrawal the non communist groups of Son San and Prince Sihanouk have formed a Joint Military Planning staff and are cooperating with each other and coordinating their operations with the Khmer Rouge. He said is the felling of the resistance forces that the best chance to keeping the Vietnamese thus increasing the cost to their Soviet backers, who have now spent an estimated \$9 billion in military aid and 8 billion in economic aid.

Maxis ended his presentation saying that in his view the best chance for the Afghans and Cambodians to free their country is to continue to resist, raising the cost so high for the Soviets and Vietnamese that they will be encouraged to negotiate for a withdrawal at the conference table.



## TODAY'S QUESTION

It's scary to think about where this Balkan mission could take us. So today the Q section examines whether the United States and NATO should expand their efforts to stop the forces of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo.

## Tough question for Triangle

BY VAN DENTON  
AND BURGETTA EPLIN WHEELER  
STAFF WRITERS

**R**ETIRED Brig. Army Gen. Theo Mataxis, who fought in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, never would have gone to war over Kosovo in the first place.

But now that the United States is enmeshed in the conflict, Mataxis says he hopes that diplomats can end it before ground troops have to be brought in.

"We can either call on the United Nations and get diplomacy in the Balkans to settle the boundaries and then utilize people to make sure the boundaries are stable," Mataxis says.

"Or we mass troops, 100,000 troops, and take lumps. What else? You could pull out, but that would be bad for NATO and America."



Gen. Theo Mataxis says no one has clean hands.

## Gen. Theo Mataxis

Mataxis, who lives in retirement in Southern Pines, looks to history for a solution to the problem in the Balkans.

But first, he warns that none of the groups involved in the fighting has clean hands. He highlights a passage from the 1997 book, "The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia" that tells of Bosnian Muslims joining Nazi SS troops during World War II to fight the Serbs. He reminds a visitor of Jasenovac, where Croatian soldiers held Serbs in a concentration camp during the same war.

"What we have down there is unending ethnic hatred going on and on and on," Mataxis says. "When the Ottoman Turks were there for 500 years, they held that area by terror. They impaled people. They flayed them alive."

Since the Balkans conflict heated up in Bosnia earlier in the 90s, Mataxis has seen only one solution, and he takes it from another lesson in history. In 1923, Mataxis says, the League of Nations brokered peace between Greece and Turkey by redrawing their boundaries and then resettling the warring ethnic populations.

"They moved two million Greeks and Turks," he says.

"Greeks from Turkey into Greece. Turks from Greece into Turkey. They separated them. And why did they separate them? Because Greece and Turkey had agreed that when you have ethnic hatred that has run on over hundreds of years there is no way to settle it. ... The only solution is pulling them part."

So today, Mataxis, a soldier who has advised guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan, thinks that it is up to the diplomats to solve the war in Yugoslavia, not the soldiers.

"What I would suggest is that we call on the United Nations to call their diplomats together, sit down with the Balkans, and have all the countries discuss the redrawing of boundaries," Mataxis says. "If the League of Nations could do it in '23, then why in the hell can't we do it today?"

## International developments

■ Russian leaders tried to rally support Saturday for an international meeting on ending the NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia, while furiously condemning the overnight attacks that struck the heart of Belgrade. Italy and France on Saturday expressed support for a conference of the world's major powers.



tions Peace Keeping Operations. For example the current UN mission in Kashmir, was established in 1948 and the UN mission in CYPRUS was established in 1965. Problems that have existed for 1600 years cannot be resolved in a couple of years, it may take decades or even generations. The objective should be to have the UN available for humanitarian assistance when needed--and Cease Fire Peace keeping forces available when both sides finally decide they've had enough and are seriously searching for a peaceful solution.

To answer the Editor's plea "there must be away"--There is a way--population exchange! In fact it is the only way in view of the refusal by both the Americans and Europe to accept heavy casualties which would result if they decided to go to war in the Balkans. We must also realize that this is not the first time America has faced a similar dilemma. In the mid 1950s President Eisenhower asked General Ridgeway what it would take to assist the French in Indo China. Ridgeway stated it would take 500,000 troops. Faced with such a cost Eisenhower refused to become involved. Unfortunately later Presidents ignored this advice and we became deeply involved in Vietnam!

Two years ago the Senate Armed Forces Committee held a hearing with the Joint Staff which discussed in great detail what it would take militarily to resolve the crisis in Bosnia. The estimate given by the Joint Staff on what was needed to resolve the crisis militarily in Bosnia was 400,000 troops. We didn't heed the "caution light" in Vietnam with results which still echo through out our country. Will we ignore military advice again in the Balkans and have a rerun of the Vietnam War which could not only require a restitution of the draft to replace the thousands of casualties which would be suffered but also add billions to our already staggering debt!

Or will we accept that there are some things that we cannot change, particularly if the cost in casualties and treasure are too great! We must face the fact there are some things which we can not change, particularly if we are unwilling to pay the costs in casualties and treasure. We must wake up and realize that there is no "tooth fairy"--and wishing won't make it so!"

However there is a way--one which has worked successfully in the past, that is to use the Treaty of Lausanne population exchange formula before it is too late and the dogs of war spread beyond the Balkans!

*Mataxis is a retired Army brigadier general. He is on the board of the Federalist Research Institute at Raleigh and also serves on the faculty of the American Military University.*

Thursday, February 2, 1995

# THE PILOT

"In taking over The Pilot no changes are contemplated. We will try to keep this a good paper. We will try to make a little money for all concerned. Wherever there seems to be an occasion to use our influence for the public good we will try to do it. And we will treat everybody alike."--James Boyd, May 23, 1941.

## Public Speaking

### Mataxis Thanked

To the Editor:

General Theo C. Mataxis of Southern Pines has received the following letter:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning my appearance on "Meet the Press." I share your hope that the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreement in Bosnia will facilitate renewed peace negotiations. We are working very hard with our Contact Group partners to make that happen.

I also appreciate receiving a copy of your article "Bosnia-Look to History" which I have taken the choice of sharing with my staff. It will be useful for us in thinking through the difficult policy choices we will face as the Bosnia situation unfolds over the next several weeks.

Again, thank you for writing.

Anthony Lake

Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

The White House  
Washington, D.C.

→ And he did utilize the idea. But it was turned down by the Muslims!

Among Challenges: Getting Muslims to Consider New Territorial Division

Aug. '95 By Ann Devroy  
Washington Post Staff Writer

National security adviser Anthony Lake yesterday gave President Clinton an upbeat assessment of European reaction to new U.S. peace initiatives in Bosnia but warned that getting the Bosnian Muslims to consider a new division of land is only one of several major problems that could doom a settlement.

On the diplomatic side, Lake carried "ideas" for a Bosnian land settlement giving Muslims and ethnic Croats 51 percent of the territory and the Bosnian Serbs the rest. But it would more clearly recognize Serb military gains in Bosnia and offers the idea of trading control over Gorazde, the only Muslim eastern enclave, for more territory around Sarajevo as "the easiest and most logical" route to a new land settlement that the Serbs would accept.

But officials said they cannot force the Bosnian Muslims to accept a land settlement they oppose and that there are "other routes" being explored.

### NOTE:

1. I have selected the classic "Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare" for two reasons. First to complement O'Neil by highlighting case studies stressing geography and demography in several regions of the world. Second to stress the overthrow of governments by coups as well as revolutions from the early 1930's through the 1960's.

2. This article is to supplement week 10, Objective c. - Former Yugoslavia. The media stress ethnic cleansing with horror as if it was something new. Here you have an example of the League of Nations pragmatically using it as the basis for a Treaty to end a war between the Greeks and the Turks. It in my view it's like using an amputation of an arm to save a patient's life. And should be used in a final settlement in conjunction with a conference to reestablish new boundaries in the region!



**PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE**  
**IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED**

ACTION OFFICER:

Harley

LOG NUMBER:

2964

DUE DATE:

5.1

DATE STAFFED:

4.20

**CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:**

☐

PRESIDENT

☒

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM:

T Mataxis

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2972

April 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *BS*  
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *mh*  
SUBJECT: Would Partitioning Kosovo Work?

In his New York Times April 6 editorial, Thomas Friedman suggested that the Serbs could be satisfied with a deal that gave them a ten percent sliver in northwest Kosovo that contains their holy sites. The President noted on the article that if this were true it would be worth pursuing.

The memorandum attached at Tab I explains that Friedman oversimplifies the problem, as the holy sites -- and Serb inhabitants -- are scattered throughout Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President  
Tab A New York Times Article  
Tab B Map of Kosovo Cultural Sites and Population

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify On: April 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By VZ NARA, Date 4/4/2024  
2008-0994-F-3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Would Partitioning Kosovo Work?

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By VZ NARA, Date 4/4/2024  
2008-0994-F-3

In his New York Times April 6 editorial (Tab A), Thomas Friedman suggested that the Serbs might be satisfied with a deal that gave them the ten percent sliver of territory in northwest Kosovo that, according to Friedman, contains their Orthodox monasteries and holy sites.

Friedman's contention that a simple line in northwest Kosovo could encompass all the Serb holy places is incorrect. The revered battlefield of Kosovo Polje lies far to the east near Pristina; other significant sites are scattered throughout the province. As you can see from the map at Tab B, enclosing all or even most of these sites would require more than ten percent of Kosovo territory.

The map also illustrates that any partition plan would be further complicated by the fact that there is no simple division between areas of ethnic Serb and Albanian settlement. Moreover, important economic sites, which Serbs would be reluctant to give up, are located throughout Kosovo.

Finally, ethnic Albanians would oppose partition, as both moderate leaders and the Kosovo Liberation Army insist on independence for all of Kosovo. Partition would violate the international proscription on changing borders in Europe by force, as enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

Attachments

Tab A New York Times Article

Tab B Map of Kosovo Cultural Sites and Population

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 20, 2009

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff



TO: SCHULTE

IS IT TRUE THAT WE  
COULD TAKE CARE OF  
VAST MAJORITY OF MONASTERIES  
+ CULTURAL SITES W/ 10%  
OF LAND? IF SO, WORTH  
PURSUING.

E PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
4-6-99

copied  
Berack  
w/ wing desk  
Dad e stc

GREG JAMES  
True?

## More Sticks

The question we are wrestling with in Kosovo today is this: How should America react when bad things happen in unimportant places?

You need only watch the footage of refugees streaming out of Kosovo, and believe just half of their chilling tales of Serbian atrocities, to know that something really bad is happening there to which America should not be turning a blind eye.

But you need only ask your Congressman to find Kosovo on a map — and watch the blank stare that comes back at you — to appreciate how unimportant Kosovo is to any vital American interests.

Faced with this dilemma, the Clinton strategy has been to use NATO air power to try to reverse the bad things happening in Kosovo. But the Administration's unwillingness to commit ground troops to actually expel the Serbs from Kosovo is an admission that its liberation is not worth the loss of many, if any, U.S. lives. To put it another way, the cruise missile is the Clinton team's weapon of choice for combating evil in unimportant places.

It is too early to say this strategy will not achieve an acceptable outcome in Kosovo, and that troops will have to be sent in. What one can say now, though, is that for this strategy to work will require much tougher sticks and much fatter carrots.

Regarding the sticks, I wouldn't underestimate the impact on a modern European state of sustained NATO air bombardments, which should be intensified once the weather clears. People tend to change their minds and adjust their goals as they see the price they are paying mount. Twelve days of surgical bombing was never going to turn Serbia around. Let's see what 12 weeks of

percent, with an international peace-keeping force separating them.

NATO needs to combine unreasonable bombing with a reasonable peace offer. For now, this strategy is preferable to a ground war, for two reasons. First, once NATO invades Kosovo, it owns Kosovo. Anyone who cares about the future of NATO does not want to see the alliance managing the daily relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. It would be an endless, debilitating task.

Second, if we have to fight a ground war, let's at least fight it in optimal political circumstances. As Michael Mandelbaum, a foreign policy expert at Johns Hopkins, points out: "George Bush's great achievement in the gulf war was the broad backing he earned from the American public and the allies, and the basic neutrality he earned from the Russians, by making it clear that he had gone the extra mile to get an acceptable diplomatic deal before launching the ground war."

All the foreign policy experts say that now that the war in Kosovo has started, "We have to win." O.K., but

## And fatter carrots in Kosovo.

win what? When you are trying to stop bad things in unimportant places your task is to minimize the bad without making the unimportant into a sucking chest wound that weakens NATO and diminishes America's overall position in the world. I don't want NATO to win

next car

eNew York Times

TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 1999



Is it for  
we could take  
of vast majority  
Serbs at 10% of land? If so  
with primary


Give war a chance.

As for the carrots, while NATO steps up the air war, it also needs to step up its diplomacy. Remember, you can bomb, curse, condemn and kill the Serbs, but there is just one thing you can't do and that's make peace in the Balkans without them. There are too many of them. Let's dangle two options before the Serbs right now — either a modified Rambouillet deal that would give the Kosovars internationally protected autonomy in a Kosovo still under Serb sovereignty, or a partition of Kosovo. The Serbs would get the northwest sliver, which contains their Orthodox monasteries and holy sites, and the Kosovo Albanians would get the remaining 90

NATO to stop what was done and get out. I want NATO to win Serbian agreement either for the Kosovo Albanians to return to their homes — with an international observer-peacekeeping force, including Russians, managing relations between Albanians and Serbs — or for a partition of Kosovo, with a peacekeeping force separating the factions.

We need to see if sustained, unreasonable bombing, combined with sustained, reasonable diplomacy, can achieve such goals. Sure, it will take time, but considering the years NATO will have to spend in Kosovo if this strategy doesn't work, I suggest we find the time. ☐

## Selected Kosovo Cultural Sites, Economic Activities, and Serb Population Distribution



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902975  
RECEIVED: 20 APR 99 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE  
BUTLER

DOC DATE: 20 APR 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

ANSA



PERSONS: SAWERS, JOHN

SUBJECT: POTUS ONE ON ONE MTGS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 26 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN

BUTLER

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By vr NARA, Date 2/15/2024  
2008-0994-F.3

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902975

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER  
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99042019 FOR INFORMATION  
X 99042617 NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 2975

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG TR A/O \_\_\_\_\_

TMA

|                          | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE | DISPOSITION |
|--------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| Cosgriff                 |             |              |             |
| <del>Rice</del> Jacobson | 1           | J 4/20       |             |
| Davies                   |             |              |             |
| Kerrick                  |             |              |             |
| Steinberg                | 2           |              |             |
| Berger                   | 3           | (A)          |             |
| Situation Room           |             |              |             |
| West Wing Desk           | 4           | (D) 4/26     | N           |
| Records Mgt.             | 5           | 4/26 DMK     | N           |
|                          |             |              |             |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

1993 APR 26 AM 6:43

COMMENTS:

mtg w/ John Sawer,  
21 April

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                                     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004a. memo               | For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte and Larry Butler. Subject:<br>Meeting with John Sawers. [Record ID: 9902975] [With marginalia.<br>See also rx193_002a, 2006-0217-F] (3 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                   | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004b. talking<br>points  | Points to be Made for Meeting with John Sawers. [See also<br>rx193_002b, 2006-0217-F] (2 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2988  
LIMITED ACCESS

April 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT: Richard Holbrooke's Thoughts on Kosovo and  
Slobodan Milosevic

At your request, I attach a short analysis of the two memoranda from Dick Holbrooke, written in the form of a covering memorandum to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Memorandum -- Kosovo: Next Steps

Tab B Memorandum -- Some Thoughts about Slobodan  
Milosevic

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 21, 2009

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By *VR* NARA, Date *2/15/2024*  
*2008-0944-F.3*

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005a. memo               | For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Richard Holbrooke's Thoughts on Kosovo and Slobodan Milosevic. [Record ID: 9902988]<br>[Duplicate of rs1038_001a, 2014-0547-M] (3 pages) | 04/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005b. memo               | For the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, Secretary of State from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Kosovo: Next Steps.<br>[Duplicate of rs1038_001b, 2014-0547-M] (8 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005c. memo               | For the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Some Thoughts about Slobodan Milosevic. [Duplicate of rs1038_001c, 2014-0547-M] (2 pages) | 04/20/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1705

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6288

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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