

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1705

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, April 12, 1999. [Record ID: 9902690] [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1999	P3/b(3)
002a. talking points	Points to be Made for Call to Secretary General Javier Solana. [Record ID: 9902769] [Duplicate ke5831_001a, this case. See also bm446_004, 2006-0325-F] (2 pages)	04/14/1999	P1/b(1)
002b. talking points	Points to be Made for Call to President Chirac. [Record ID: 9902769] [Duplicate ke5831_001b, this case] (2 pages)	04/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [2]

2008-0994-F

vz6287

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 19 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
DC

SOC



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC ON 12 APR 99 ON KOSOVO

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 17 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
COSGRIFF
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 903 NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-6549-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902690

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99041308 FOR DECISION
X 99041914 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99041914 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002	990419	FUERTH, L
002	990419	KENNEY, K
002	990419	REYNES, J
002	990419	BASKETTE, A
002	990419	KYLE, R
002	990419	PODESTA, J
002	990419	WOLFE, T
002	990419	CONROY, R
002	990419	MANNING, M

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

4/14
1036

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2690

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PHS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Duk NO _____

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

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Rice	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>A-Tav I</u>
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>68 4/13</u>	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JTC 4/19</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: SOC Apr 12 DC Mtg

9 APR 13 am 7:59

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

April 19, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President


MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 12, 1999 ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on April 12. ~~(S)~~


Glyn T. Davies
for Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 12, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SDB NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0549-m

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, April 12, 1999. [Record ID: 9902690] [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6287

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: April 12, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 9:00 - 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:

Richard Saunders

Leslie Davidson

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

State:

Thomas Pickering

James Pardew

Julia Taft

Jamie Metzl

JCS:

Joseph Ralston

George Casey

USNATO:

Douglas McElhaney (via secure
voice)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kaufmann

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Alan Romberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Antony Blinken

David Leavy

James Baker

Eric Schwartz

Miles Lackey

Michael Hurley

OMB:

Sylvia Mathews

Robert Kyle

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: April 12, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0549-M(1.21)

KBH 7/31/2015

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should warn President Djukanovic of the possibility of NATO military action against FRY naval forces in Montenegro. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Humanitarian IWG should review options for third-party distribution of assistance to people internally displaced in Kosovo, including through Greek non-governmental organizations and the Kosovo Liberation Army. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- U.S. international public information (IPI) efforts should highlight views of ethnic Serbs who disagree with Milosevic's policies. U.S. IPI efforts should be publicized domestically. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(C)~~
- The USG should send a direct message to Milosevic, following the Secretary of State's meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister tomorrow, stressing NATO's determination and conditions for stopping NATO's air operations. This message could be conveyed through the FRY mission to the United Nations in New York. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG should maintain individual contacts with members of the Kosovar Albanian delegation from Rambouillet. These contacts should be used to stress:
 - our engagement and concern for their personal safety;
 - the need for them to stay together, to stay with us and to avoid the Iranians;
 - our continued efforts to find a political solution;
 - our efforts to find ways to assist the internally displaced in Kosovo. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- U.S. outreach to the Kosovar Albanians should be publicized domestically. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(C)~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 2690

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-8425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: SOC for Kosovo DC 12 Apr PAGES: 5
(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 2/15/2024
228-0994-F.3

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**PAGES: 5
(Including Cover)FROM: NSC West Wing Desk
(NAME)(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for Kosovo DC 12 AprNSC LOG # 2690

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>DoD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>State</u>	<u>Alan Rosenberg</u>		
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>AID</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: VL Date: 2/15/2024

2008-0994-F.3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9902690
DATE 19 APR 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC ON 12 APR 99 ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1+F</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RL Date: 2/15/2024
2008-0694-F.3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9902690
DATE 19 APR 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC ON 12 APR 99 ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

MS. RYAN CONROY
1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE
ROOM 6.08
WASHINGTON, DC 20523-6801
AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF
ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

April 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 12, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on April 12.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: April 12, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SP3 NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0549-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2692

April 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *AS*

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for Cabinet Briefing -- April 13, 1999

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding talking points (Tab A) to the Chief of Staff for the Cabinet briefing on April 13. At Tab B are the talking points for the President's drop by.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the talking points at Tab A and Tab B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Chief of Staff
Tab A Talking Points for John Podesta
Tab B Talking Points for the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN PODESTA

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the Cabinet Briefing --
April 13, 1999

Attached at Tab A are your talking points for the Cabinet briefing on April 13.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

CHIEF OF STAFF'S POINTS TO BE MAKE FOR
CABINET BRIEFING

- We have assembled the Cabinet in the past to address major challenges facing the country and the administration. Today that challenge is Milosevic's brutal aggression in Kosovo.
- This is a challenge not just to the million people who have been displaced by the Serb offensive, but also to our moral values, to the stability of the region and to the credibility of NATO and American leadership.
- The people of Kosovo, and our allies in NATO, are looking to the United States to point the way toward the resolution of this tragic crisis.
- To succeed, we must be determined, we must be patient, and we must be prepared to stay the course. The President needs the help of all of you as Cabinet members, and of all of your Departments.
- Our objective is clear: to allow the refugees to return to their homes and live with security and self-government. This means that we must be ready to sustain the current air strikes for many more weeks, if Milosevic remains defiant. It means that we need to be ready to deploy rapidly a ground force to implement a settlement. And it also means that we must relieve the humanitarian suffering in the meantime.
- Success requires a common effort.
 - The Pentagon is at the forefront of the current military effort as well as humanitarian relief. You need to ensure full support to our military commanders and our military personnel.
 - State must do its part on the diplomatic front. This means keeping the allies together, trying to engage the Russians and dealing with Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians.
 - USAID is playing a key role in coordinating the humanitarian relief effort.
 - CIA must inform our decisions and help with our efforts to weaken Milosevic's grip.

- Treasury needs to look for ways to help increase the economic pressure on Milosevic.
- Perhaps most importantly, OMB needs to ensure that we get the supplemental funding necessary to sustain this operation.
- Call on:
 - Sandy Berger to describe our interests and objectives.
 - Bill Cohen to report on results of military campaign to date.
 - Strobe Talbott to report on diplomatic strategy.
 - Brian Atwood to report on humanitarian relief efforts.
- At the end of next week, Alliance leaders will gather in Washington for the NATO Summit. The performance of NATO will not be judged by the ceremony of the Summit. Rather it will be judged by the effectiveness of its actions in Kosovo.
- American leadership will also be judged on that basis. As the President said yesterday at Barksdale, and as our NATO allies confirmed yesterday in Brussels, we must do what is necessary to prevail.

THE PRESIDENT'S POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
CABINET BRIEFING

- Was at Barksdale Air Force Base yesterday talking with B-52 crews. We can be proud of what they and other members of our Armed Services are doing in Kosovo.
- Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton are to be commended for their outstanding leadership.
- There are many others who are also working hard -- our diplomats, our USAID teams and the many others involved in the humanitarian relief efforts. You should pass to them my heartfelt thanks.
- Madeleine Albright, in particular, has performed miraculous work in maintaining the unity and determination of our 18 NATO allies.
- I know that Kosovo has been a tremendous distraction from other parts of the nation's business. But succeeding in Kosovo is part of our business.
- What we are doing today in Kosovo is important not just for Kosovo, but also for the future of Europe and American leadership.
- We need all of your support as we move forward to achieve our goal of returning all refugees with security and self-government.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902700
RECEIVED: 12 APR 99 15

TO: MCWILLIAMS, GORDON

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 03 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NATO

YUGOSLAVIA
NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY OBO APNSA RE KOSOVO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 23 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HURLEY

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902700

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HURLEY
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99041215 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 99050510 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 3, 1999

Dear Mr. McWilliams:

Thank you for your recent letter on Kosovo to Samuel Berger, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who thought so much of your reasoning that he took the liberty of sharing your letter with his staff. It will be useful for us in thinking through the difficult policy choices we will face as the Kosovo situation unfolds over the next several months.

I share your hope that in the wake of the recent NATO Summit our renewed military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a path to a negotiated settlement. In the meantime, Mr. Berger and I appreciate your constructive and excellent recommendations on this issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gregory Schulte', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Gregory Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton
Accords

Mr. Gordon B. MacWilliams
138 Bulkley Street
Williamstown, Massachusetts 01267

2/100

TO: KOSOVO/EUR
PLS. DRAFT
RESPONSE ON
BEHALF OF SRB

138 Bulkley Street
Williamstown, Mass. 01267

April 5, 1999

Mr. Sandy Berger
National Security Advisor
The White House
1600 Pa. Ave N.W.
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Berger,

I am writing you as a concerned American with respect to the tragic situation in Kosovo. My urgent request is that in your capacity as a key Foreign Policy advisor you can influence the President to take the necessary steps to bring the war to a prompt conclusion and to set in motion a process to address both a short and long term political solution. While we can not act unilaterally we must take the lead within NATO to win the war and to explore all the options for peace. As we are all aware, U.S. and NATO credibility are on the line and not to win the war will only embolden tyrants from Iraq to North Korea and will further encourage the Chinese to challenge us in the Far East and beyond. Let me address the situation from three standpoints-military, humanitarian and political.

Military-It is important from a number of standpoints to "win" as promptly as possible. This means using any and all means short of nuclear to achieve that objective. To date, the air campaign has been anything but robust and by itself it can not accomplish the job. In the final analysis wars are won on the ground with great help from the air and naval forces. General Clark must be given all the men and material he needs without having to fight for it. A NATO force of no more than 200,000 people can, I feel, see this through to a successful conclusion. Let us get on with it. Humanitarian-The massive steps that are now underway will hopefully be adequate to handle this immense tragedy. Again, the U.S. must take the lead.

Political-It is long past the time when we should be talking loudly and carrying a small stick. First, the President must articulate to the American people the absolute necessity to change strategy. He must explain why, in order to win, we must launch a ground campaign combined with the more vigorous use of air power and we must do it soon. The Prime Minister can be helpful in selling this change to others in NATO. If some wish to sit on the sidelines, so be it-let them be silent.

Second, when Milosevic has finished his brutal ethnic cleansing and

APR 9 17:00

signals he wants to reach a political settlement, he basically should be ignored. Through his actions in Bosnia and now Kosovo, he has forfeited his right to lead Yugoslavia. He should be indicted as a war criminal, apprehended, tried and sentenced. We should indicate we will only work out a peace agreement with moderate Yugoslav politicians. Third, Once cleared of Yugoslavian troops and police Kosovo will, for some time, need to have the status of a NATO protectorate. Once this is done, it is essential that all of Kosovo's refugees be returned to their land. Next, a number of longer term options need to be explored such as partition. However, the status of Kosovo should be examined within a larger Balkan geopolitical context. Very difficult ethnic, religious, and political considerations remain. They might best be addressed at a United Nations study and conference and ultimate treaty of Southern Europe. In closing, I deeply hope that the President will show the necessary wisdom and internal fortitude. It is a matter of will. He can lead NATO to a speedy and successful conclusion to the war. If he does not, no one will and we will have lost the war and the peace.

Sincerely yours,

Jerome B. McWilliam

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE
IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: Hurley LOG NUMBER: 2700
DUE DATE: APR 23
DATE STAFFED: APR 12

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:

☐

PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: Gordon McWilliams

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902707
RECEIVED: 12 APR 99 15

TO: STREETT, S

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 13 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
SP

TELCALL



PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: SP FOR TELCALL TO PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 17 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SCHULTE
WEISS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 2/15/2024

2008-0994-E.3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902707

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002

Z 99041311 FOR SIGNATURE
X 99041915 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990413 STREETT, S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2707

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG JK NO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>K</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>4/15</u>	_____
Davies	<u>2</u>	<u>4/13</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>4/14</u>	<u>JD</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>4/21</u>	<u>JD</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SPB, JS, DLK, COTO, EAR, B.H., ME, ASW, CEP,
FUEP, CUS

COMMENTS:

SP- Don Skel 4/15
 '99 APR 13 AM 11:17
 Exec Sec Office has disket
 We need to pick up
 for the -- Skel says
 no time tomorrow
 w/ for pol mtg.
 not *g*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2707

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

date 4 / 13 / 98

 ACCEPT

 REGRET

 PENDING

TO: Stephanie Streett

FROM: Samuel Berger *gfo*

REQUEST: Phone call to Russian President Yeltsin

PURPOSE: To discuss Kosovo, U.S.-Russian relations.

BACKGROUND: Yeltsin has been active on Kosovo over the past two weeks and remains concerned about the impact on U.S.-Russian relations. A call from the President would reaffirm the importance of not allowing Milosevic to drive lasting wedges between us. The call would build on Secretary Albright's meeting with Foreign Minister Ivanov on April 13 to encourage the Russians to engage constructively on the diplomatic track.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: N/A

DATE AND TIME: As soon as possible.

BRIEFING TIME: 10 minutes

DURATION: 20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, APNSA Berger, Strobe Talbott, Leon Fuerth, others TBD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/12/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By *VL* NARA, Date *2/15/2024*

2008-0944-F.3

CONFIDENTIAL

2

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Pre-brief followed by phone call

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: WH photographer only

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: VP will not be in town

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Andrew Weiss, x69169

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: NSC

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2707

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 13, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Telephone Call to Russian
President Yeltsin

The schedule proposal at Tab I recommends the President call
President Yeltsin on Wednesday, April 14.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth, Greg Schulte *AW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 3/24/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VR* NARA, Date *2/15/2024*
2008-0994-F-3

Pascual, Carlos E.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 2/15/2024

2008-0991-F.3

From: Sutphen, Mona K.
Sent: Monday, April 12, 1999 1:57 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @KOSOVO; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Proposed White House Contacts with Russians [CONFIDENTIAL]

Carlos -

Sandy "agreed" w/all the recommendations outlined below. You should follow-up w/EXEC re: Yeltsin call on Wednesday.

Mona

—Original Message—

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Thursday, April 08, 1999 4:03 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc:
Subject:
Importance:

PLEASE P

Yeltsin Le
ceasefire c
how much
Kosovo pri
Ministers r

Diplomati
say stop tl

- S
- P
- A
- S
- C

POTUS R

engaged than any of us imagined. Suggest the

- Friday: POTUS short response to Yeltsin letters: respect the Easter holiday, committed to diplomatic solution, appreciated your emphasis on how much we still have to accomplish, agree that Albright and Ivanov should meet.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

- **Wednesday: POTUS call to Yeltsin after Albright sees Ivanov.** Can build on anything constructive that comes out of that conversation. Can also see if renewed contact with Yeltsin helps renew a bit of the old chemistry. (State advises against a Monday call in case the NAC produces any news that will cause a harsh Yeltsin response.)

Agree _____

Disagree _____

SRB Meeting. The Russian ambassador has asked to see you for 10 minutes. His purpose is to send a cable back saying that he has been reassured even by you that we value the relationship, but our conditions to stop the bombing are firm. If you can spare 10 minutes, I recommend it.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

VP-Primakov. OVP is willing to look at another call to Primakov. Would suggest we keep this in abeyance till after

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

date 4 / 13 / 98

 ACCEPT

 REGRET

 PENDING

TO: Stephanie Streett

FROM: Samuel Berger (K) *FM*

REQUEST: Phone call to Russian President Yeltsin

PURPOSE: To discuss Kosovo, U.S.-Russian relations.

BACKGROUND: Yeltsin has been active on Kosovo over the past two weeks and remains concerned about the impact on U.S.-Russian relations. A call from the President would reaffirm the importance of not allowing Milosevic to drive lasting wedges between us. The call would build on Secretary Albright's meeting with Foreign Minister Ivanov on April 13 to encourage the Russians to engage constructively on the diplomatic track.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: N/A

DATE AND TIME: *As soon as possible*
~~Wednesday, April 14, 1999 or ASAP?~~

BRIEFING TIME: 10 minutes

DURATION: 20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, APNSA Berger, Strobe Talbott, Leon Fuerth, others TBD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/12/09

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By V2 NARA, Date 2/15/2024

2008-0994-F-3

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902769
RECEIVED: 14 APR 99 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 14 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
TELCALL

NATO

fle

PERSONS: SOLANA, J

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO & TALKING POINTS FOR TELCALL TO SYG SOLANA

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 20 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 2/15/2024
2008-0194-F-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902769

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99041418 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
X 99042114 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 990414
001 990414

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2769
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 23 NO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>VS</i> Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>HC</u>	
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	
Berger			
Situation Room			
Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>2 4/17</u>	<u>N/H</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>23 4/21</u>	<u>N</u>

A = N = No Further Action

cc:

COM

39 APR

Exec

*Delivered to
Exec & Sec*

*file for the Record.
SR3 has seen, but
not POTUS. (P)*

*ac,
wch*

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2769

April 14, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *original*

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Calls to NATO Leaders

Attached is a memorandum to the President forwarding talking points telephone calls to President Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder and Secretary General Solana.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be made for President Chirac
Tab B Points to be made for Secretary General Solana
Tab C Points to be made for Chancellor Schroeder
Tab D Targets Paper from JCS

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: April 14, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 2/15/2024
2008-0954-F.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. talking points	Points to be Made for Call to Secretary General Javier Solana. [Record ID: 9902769] [Duplicate ke5831_001a, this case. See also bm446_004, 2006-0325-F] (2 pages)	04/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [2]

2008-0994-F

vz6287

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. talking points	Points to be Made for Call to President Chirac. [Record ID: 9902769] [Duplicate ke5831_001b, this case] (2 pages)	04/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6287

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902778
RECEIVED: 14 APR 99 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BLUMENTHAL, SONIA
BLUMENTHAL, HARRY

DOC DATE: 03 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR SUGGESTING MORE PEACE TALKS & END BOMBING KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 26 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
GORDON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



HARRY BLUMENTHAL
RR 1 BOX 77
CLINTON CORRS, NY 12514

2 110
To: EXEC
ACTION: KOSOVO
EUR

April 3, 1999

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Much as we abhor Milosevic's savagery, we do not believe that NATO's savage bombing is the answer. The law of the jungle ill befits American democracy. NATO's strategy to-date invites failure. It is already painfully evident that Milosevic's supporters, and even his opponents, are united in patriotism for their country.

We urge that instead of burning up millions of dollars on waging war, we use our wherewithal to call on the very best brains in NATO, with responsible U.S. leadership, for creating tactics to re-start diplomatic negotiations. How else can the people on all sides of the conflict expect to obtain lasting justice?

In view of the impact which our government's Balkan policy has on every concerned voter in this country and elsewhere, we would be grateful for your response.

Respectfully yours,

Sonia Blumenthal Harry Blumenthal

Sonia and Harry Blumenthal

cc: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
Secretary of Defense William Cohen
National Security Advisor Samuel Berger ✓
Representative John Sweeney
Editor, The Register Herald

APR 6 12:22

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 5, 1999


Dear Mr. and Mrs. Blumenthal:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President on Kosovo, to which he has asked me to respond. All of us concerned with Kosovo policy both in this government and those of our NATO allies, fervently wish as you do, that Mr. Milosevic had kept his October promise to negotiate a settlement. Instead he unleashed a campaign of brutality and oppression against the Albanian population that has seen over one million people driven from their homes, hundreds assassinated or brutally murdered, and scores of villages destroyed. Over these crimes against humanity the NATO alliance had no choice but to take up arms.

At the Washington Summit, NATO reaffirmed its unity and resolve to end the Milosevic regime's violence, oppression and campaign of ethnic cleansing. At the same time, NATO leaders agreed the door must remain open for a negotiated settlement. To this end, the Alliance issued a declaration outlining five steps Belgrade must take to end military action in order to resolve the crisis. Mr. Milosevic knows what he has to do. This has been made clear to him in the open press, through his diplomatic representatives and through Russian negotiators, most recently Mr. Viktor Chernomyrdin, who visited Belgrade this past weekend.

I share your hope that the Alliance's military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a negotiated settlement which all parties can regard as proper and just, Serbs and Albanians alike. In the meantime, I appreciate your thoughts on this vital issue.

Sincerely,



Greg Schulte

Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. and Mrs. Harry Blumenthal
Rural Route 1, Box 77
Clinton Corners, New York 12514

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902778
RECEIVED: 14 APR 99 14

TO: BLUMENTHAL, HARRY

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 05 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO NATO
 PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY OBO POTUS RE KOSOVO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR DUE DATE: 26 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HURLEY

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902778

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HURLEY
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99041414 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
X 99050617 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BLUMENTHAL, SONIA
BLUMENTHAL, HARRY

DOC DATE: 03 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR SUGGESTING MORE PEACE TALKS & END BOMBING KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 26 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
GORDON

COMMENTS:

Ensured by Greg Schulte

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 5, 1999


Dear Mr. and Mrs. Blumenthal:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President on Kosovo, to which he has asked me to respond. All of us concerned with Kosovo policy both in this government and those of our NATO allies, fervently wish as you do, that Mr. Milosevic had kept his October promise to negotiate a settlement. Instead he unleashed a campaign of brutality and oppression against the Albanian population that has seen over one million people driven from their homes, hundreds assassinated or brutally murdered, and scores of villages destroyed. Over these crimes against humanity the NATO alliance had no choice but to take up arms.

At the Washington Summit, NATO reaffirmed its unity and resolve to end the Milosevic regime's violence, oppression and campaign of ethnic cleansing. At the same time, NATO leaders agreed the door must remain open for a negotiated settlement. To this end, the Alliance issued a declaration outlining five steps Belgrade must take to end military action in order to resolve the crisis. Mr. Milosevic knows what he has to do. This has been made clear to him in the open press, through his diplomatic representatives and through Russian negotiators, most recently Mr. Viktor Chernomyrdin, who visited Belgrade this past weekend.

I share your hope that the Alliance's military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a negotiated settlement which all parties can regard as proper and just, Serbs and Albanians alike. In the meantime, I appreciate your thoughts on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Greg Schulte', with a stylized flourish extending from the end.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. and Mrs. Harry Blumenthal
Rural Route 1, Box 77
Clinton Corners, New York 12514



HARRY BLUMENTHAL
RR 1 BOX 77
CLINTON CORRS, NY 12514

2110
To: EXEC
ACTION: KOSOVO
EUR

April 3, 1999

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Much as we abhor Milosevic's savagery, we do not believe that NATO's savage bombing is the answer. The law of the jungle ill befits American democracy. NATO's strategy to-date invites failure. It is already painfully evident that Milosevic, s supporters, and even his opponents, are united in patriotism for their country.

We urge that instead of burning up millions of dollars on waging war, we use our wherewithal to call on the very best brains in NATO, with responsible U.S. leadership, for creating tactics to re-start diplomatic negotiations. How else can the people on all sides of the conflict expect to obtain lasting justice?

In view of the impact which our government's Balkan policy has on every concerned voter in this country and elsewhere, we would be grateful for your response.

Respectfully yours,

Sonia Blumenthal *Harry Blumenthal*

Sonia and Harry Blumenthal

cc: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
Secretary of Defense William Cohen
National Security Advisor Samuel Berger ✓
Representative John Sweeney
Editor, The Register Herald

APR 6 12:22

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: Hurley

LOG NUMBER: 2778

DUE DATE: APR 26

DATE STAFFED: APR 15

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: Blumenthal, Smia & Hurley

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chen 2800

April 23, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *[initials]*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *[initials]*

SUBJECT: Serbian American Student Association Urges POTUS
to Stop NATO Action

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to Mr. Marko Krstic of the Serbian American Student Association.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Concurrence by: Matthew Gobush *[initials]*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Serbian American Student Association Urges a Halt
to NATO Action

Purpose

Respond to a letter from the Director of the Serbian American Student Association.

Background

Mr. Marko Krstic, Director of Public Affairs for the Serbian American Student Association, wrote to urge you to stop NATO air strikes against Serbia, which he asserts has caused havoc on the civilian population and led to an increase in the number of refugees.

Your response explains NATO resorted to military action reluctantly, only after exhausting diplomatic avenues. It points out that Milosevic's repressive policy of ethnic cleansing justifies, indeed demands, the use of force. The letter delineates what Milosevic must do to end the strikes.

Finally, it suggests that when the conflict ends the Serbian American Student Association can be a positive force in building democracy in Serbia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Serbian American Students
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Krstic:

Thank you for the letter on behalf of the Serbian American Student Association concerning the conflict in Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your candor and readily understand how difficult it must be for those who have strong family and emotional ties to Serbia to witness the events that are unfolding there.

The use of military strikes to resolve the conflict was never our preferred course of action. Over many months, culminating in the peace talks in France, we and our allies left no diplomatic avenue unexplored in our effort to achieve a just peace for both Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. But President Milosevic rejected each and every peace overture and all the while was preparing for the campaign of terror that has had such a devastating impact on hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians and on neighboring states in the region.

While we resorted to force with great reluctance, there are circumstances when it is justified -- in fact demanded -- and Milosevic's odious policy of ethnic cleansing is one of these. Ethnic hatred and violence have caused too much death and suffering in this century. On the eve of the 21st Century, we must do our utmost to oppose those who carry it out. I would ask you to consider that 19 democratic nations -- all of whose leaders are accountable to their peoples -- have agreed that Milosevic's goal of wiping out an entire people cannot go unchallenged.

I want to emphasize that NATO's actions are not directed at the Serbian people and we are going to great lengths to minimize harm to innocent civilians. That some have been hurt in NATO's efforts to halt Milosevic is yet a further example of the harm he has inflicted on Serbia.

We and our NATO allies are resolved to seriously damage the war machine that Milosevic uses for repression and end his grip on

Kosovo. He can choose to bring about an end to the suffering by withdrawing his security forces from Kosovo, accepting the deployment of an international security force, and making it possible for all refugees to return with security and self-government.

Your letter succinctly states the goal towards which we and our allies are striving: a just, lasting solution to the Kosovo conflict. When the conflict ends, the energy, drive and commitment of the Serbian American Student Association will be a positive force in helping advance democracy in a Serbia in which all of its citizens, regardless of ethnicity, can begin to build a better future.

Again, I am grateful for your thoughtful letter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Marko P. Krstic
Director of Public Affairs
The Serbian American Student Association
514 19th Street, N.W.
Suite 116
Washington, D.C. 20006



copied
Steinberg
NSC w/ desk
Podesta

2800
PRESIDENT
4-14-99

April 14, 1999

President William Jefferson Clinton
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

For three weeks now, the world's most powerful military alliance has been unloading a brutal arsenal of bombs and missiles upon a tiny Balkan nation of 10 million people. For three weeks now, 1.5 million Serbian-Americans have been horrified by stories of family members in Serbia and Montenegro stranded in bomb shelters for days at a time, stories of mothers scurrying to find something with which to feed their children when NATO warplanes are not flying overhead, stories of a nation being devastated by their allies of two world wars. Mr. President, it is time for this madness to stop.

The Serbian American Student Association urges you to immediately order a stop to the NATO air campaign over Serbia and Montenegro which has wreaked so much havoc upon the civilian population and led to an increase in the number of refugees fleeing Kosovo. The United States should now commence working with even more conviction in conjunction with our European allies and Russia to forge a comprehensive diplomatic solution that would bring peace to Kosovo, and democracy and stability to all nations on the Balkan peninsula. The first step in working towards peace in the Balkans, Mr. President, is ending this war against Serbia.

Mr. President, the Serbian-American community remains committed to working with you or any other person of goodwill to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Balkans. Our dedication to peace is firm, even in these most difficult of times, as it has been throughout the tragedies the Serbian people have experienced during this decade. We implore you to end this latest tragedy—the airstrikes against the people of Serbia and Montenegro—without any further delay: what you consider to

Steinberg
Fyi —
we're saying
He was in the city
today —
BC



page 2

be "collateral damages" are for us real people. We owe it to the suffering on all sides of the terrible conflict to immediately stop all hostilities and come to the negotiating table--the only place where a just, lasting solution to the Kosovo conflict can be found.

Yours sincerely,



N. Neno Djordjevic
Director of Political Affairs



Marko P. Krstic
Director of Public Affairs

The Serbian American Student Association
514 19th Street, NW
Suite 216
Washington, DC 20006
202/242-2320

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chor 2803

April 30, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *W*

FROM: K. C. BROWN *S*

SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence -- Reply to Ambassador
Swanee Hunt

Attached at Tab I is your memo to the President conveying a reply to Swanee Hunt, formerly Ambassador to Austria, who wrote from Cambridge expressing support for the President's Kosovo policies, commending his Norfolk speech and Wes Clark's performance. The reply at Tab A thanks her for her support as well as for her thoughts and prayers.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Reply to Ambassador Swanee Hunt
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Ambassador Hunt:

You were kind to write with your thoughts about the Kosovo situation. I thank you for your words of support, and fully agree with your assessment of the top team at NATO. We are fortunate to have Javier Solana, Klaus Naumann, and Wes Clark during these turbulent times.

In the wake of the successful NATO summit at which our military and diplomatic strategies were reaffirmed, together with the encouraging signs we began to see this week in Moscow, I am confident we are on the right path. In the meantime, I appreciate your taking the time to write and even more, your thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Swanee Hunt
138 Brattle Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT: Reply to Ambassador Swanee Hunt

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Ambassador Swanee Hunt

Background

Ambassador Hunt wrote from Cambridge expressing support for your Kosovo policies, commending your Norfolk speech and Wes Clark. In reply, you thank her for her support as well as for her thoughts and prayers.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Swanee Hunt at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Reply to Ambassador Swanee Hunt
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NSC
Ambassador Swanee Hunt

168 Brattle Street
Cambridge, MA 02138

orig 2803

April 6, 1999

President Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

— a few thoughts —

- 1) The current wave of refugees in Kosovo is only more visible than the hundreds of thousands that have been displaced in the past year, and the millions across the decade in Bosnia. You had no other moral choice but military action.
- 2) I have heard the idea floated of an Orthodox Easter cease-fire. It is a naïve idea and would have ungodly consequences. You are right to stay the course. The world is watching: victims and tyrants alike.
- 3) We must expunge any ideas in the press that any of our actions are about retribution. The Kosovar refugees want to return home, just like the refugees in Bosnia still want to return. That is why we must continue the campaign, even after Milosevic declares his fait accompli of a "cleansed" Kosovo.
- 4) You are most fortunate to have Wes.
- 5) Your address at Norfolk was excellent.

I am thinking of and praying for you in these tough times.


Swanee

c.c. Hillary Rodham Clinton

APR 15 1999

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902854
RECEIVED: 16 APR 99 12

TO: STRETT, S

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 17 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

SP

Handwritten initials

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY

SUBJECT: SP FOR TELCALL TO PM BLAIR

ACTION: KERRICK SGD SP

DUE DATE: 22 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BANDLER

BLINKEN

HILLIARD

~~BUTLER~~ *Handwritten BUTLER*

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902854

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002

Z 99041617 FOR SIGNATURE
X 99042114 KERRICK SGD SP

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990417 STREETT, S

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2054
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 75 AVO _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	② 4/16	edit done
Davies	2	② 4/16	
Kerrick	3/4	② 4/17	see
Steinberg	com		
Berger	com		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	4/17	4/17
Records Mgt.			
		NOTE 4/17	N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SFB AB RH DE KJC
JS LEB NLE EAR GTD

COMMENTS: SP - mty w/ Blair 22 apr

99 APR 16 PM 5:40

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(1)

Schedule Proposal

date 4 / 17 / 1999 ACCEPT REGRET PENDING

TO: Stephanie Streett

FROM: Samuel Berger (K) fm

REQUEST: Meeting with Prime Minister Blair.

PURPOSE: Coordinate regarding Kosovo in preparation for the NATO Summit.

BACKGROUND: During a phone call on April 16, the President invited Blair to spend the night at the White House and meet with him Thursday morning, April 22. A two-hour meeting is needed.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Frequent phone calls; last meeting was in New York last September for the NYU Law School conference.

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 22, 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

BRIEFING TIME: 15 minutes

DURATION: 2 hours

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Blair
Others, TBD

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: TBD

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: TBD

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required.

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Larry Butler, 6-9151

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: NSC

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2854

April 16, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER 
THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN 
FROM: LAWRENCE E. BUTLER 
SUBJECT: Presidential Schedule Proposal for Blair Meeting

As you know, Tony Blair has requested a meeting with the President next Thursday, in advance of the NATO Summit while en route to Chicago, where he will give a speech in the evening. The two options for the meeting are a straight Oval Office session, or a working breakfast. The only tricky thing about this meeting is that it will attract considerable press attention as the other Alliance leaders are boarding their aircraft to travel to Washington. We will need to emphasize that Blair's planned early arrival in the United States and developments in Kosovo made this a target of opportunity for the President, i.e. our initiative.

Concurrence by:  Don Bandler, Greg Schulte, David Leavy

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

date ____/____/____

____ ACCEPT

____ REGRET

____ PENDING

TO:

Stephanie Streett

FROM:

Samuel Berger

REQUEST:

Meeting ~~or working breakfast~~ with
Prime Minister Blair.

PURPOSE:

Coordinate regarding Kosovo in
preparation for the NATO Summit.

BACKGROUND:

*The President & Blair
Spoke on the phone
April 16*

*He wanted Blair to spend the night at the
White House while he was
in the city. Blair
said he would
not. A
2 hour note
is needed.*

Blair will be en route to Chicago on
Thursday, April 22, and has asked to
meet with the President prior to the
start of the NATO Summit on Friday.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:

Frequent phone calls; last meeting
was in New York last September for
the NYU Law School conference.

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, April 22, ~~time TBD~~ 10-12:00.

BRIEFING TIME:

15 minutes

DURATION:

2 hours

LOCATION:

Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Prime Minister Blair
Others, TBD

OUTLINE OF EVENTS:

TBD

REMARKS REQUIRED:

To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE:

TBD

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE:

Not required.

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Larry Butler, 6-9151

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: NSC

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

date ____/____/____

____ ACCEPT

____ REGRET

____ PENDING

TO: Stephanie Streett

FROM: Samuel Berger

REQUEST: Meeting or working breakfast with Prime Minister Blair.

PURPOSE: Coordinate regarding Kosovo in preparation for the NATO Summit.

BACKGROUND: Blair will be en route ^{to} Chicago on Thursday, April 22, and has asked to meet with the President prior to the start of the NATO Summit on Friday.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Frequent phone calls; last ~~face-to-face~~ ^{to} meeting was in New York last September for the NYU Law School conference.

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 22, time TBD

BRIEFING TIME: 15 minutes

DURATION: ~~30 minutes~~ 2 hours

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Blair
Others, TBD

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: TBD

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: TBD

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902862
RECEIVED: 16 APR 99 13

TO: STUART, RICHARD

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 21 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MONTENEGRO
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

SERBIA



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY OBO POTUS RE CRISIS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 28 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902862

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCHULTE
002 BERGER
002 SCHULTE
003

Z 99041613 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 99041918 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99042216 FOR FURTHER ACTION
X 99042612 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 21, 1999

Dear Mr. Stuart:

Thank you for your letter about the current crisis in Kosovo, and the threat to the government in Montenegro. We share your concern that President Milosevic might try to move against the democratically-elected government of President Djukanovic in Montenegro. We and our European allies have made clear our support for President Djukanovic and have taken a number of measures to bolster his government, including exempting Montenegro from aspects of the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In a recent statement, NATO Foreign Ministers warned Milosevic that any move against President Djukanovic and his government would have grave consequences.

In nearby Kosovo, the unrestrained assault on the civilian population by FRY security forces, under the direction of President Milosevic, has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe that also threatens to destabilize the surrounding region. NATO has reacted firmly and swiftly to stop the slaughter and ethnic cleansing, and to deliver humanitarian relief to those who have been forcibly evicted from their country. Our objectives are clear: we want the Serb forces out of Kosovo, and we want the refugees to be able to go home with security and self-government.

We have looked hard at the question of ground forces. While we are prepared to contribute to a NATO-led force to implement an agreed settlement, the President has no intention of committing American soldiers to an invasion of Serbia. The risks would be great, and we believe that we can achieve our goals through the sustained use of airpower. We're striking at Belgrade's machinery of repression and the infrastructure that supports it. And we will continue to do so until either Milosevic changes his calculations, or he loses his ability to maintain his grip.

Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your thoughts on this critical issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. Schulte', with a stylized, overlapping flourish at the end.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Richard Greenway Stuart
11909 120th Avenue East
Puyallup, Washington 98374

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2862

April 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT:

Letter Regarding the Possible Serbian Takeover in
Montenegro

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding a proposed response to Richard Stuart regarding a possible Serbian takeover in Montenegro.

Concurrence by:

 David Wippman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Richard Stuart
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Richard Stuart Regarding a Possible
Serbian Takeover in Montenegro

Purpose

Respond to Richard Stuart regarding a possible Serbian takeover in Montenegro.

Background

Mr. Stuart expresses concern about the possibility of a Serbian coup d'etat in Montenegro and recommends that we act quickly to prevent this. He also recommends that we deploy ground forces into Serbia to administer a "coup de grâce."

Your response echoes his concern about Milosevic's attempts to subvert the Montenegrin government, and explains our policy on ground forces.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Richard Stuart.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Richard Stuart
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Stuart:

I wish to thank you for your thoughtful letter about the current crisis in Kosovo, and the threat to the government in Montenegro. We share your concern that President Milosevic might try to move against the democratically-elected government of President Djukanovic in Montenegro. We and our European allies have made clear our support for President Djukanovic and have taken a number of measures to bolster his government, including by exempting Montenegro from aspects of the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In a recent statement, NATO Foreign Ministers warned Milosevic that any move against President Djukanovic and his government would have grave consequences.

In nearby Kosovo, the unrestrained assault on the civilian population by FRY security forces, under the direction of President Milosevic, has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe that also threatens to destabilize the surrounding region. NATO has reacted firmly and swiftly to stop the slaughter and ethnic cleansing, and to deliver humanitarian relief to those who have been forcibly evicted from their country. Our objectives are clear: we want the Serb forces out of Kosovo, and we want the refugees to be able to go home with security and self-government.

We've looked hard at the question of ground forces. While we are prepared to contribute to a NATO-led force to implement an agreed settlement, I have no intention of committing American soldiers to an invasion of Serbia. The risks would be great, and we believe that we can achieve our goals through the sustained use of airpower. We're striking at Belgrade's

machinery of repression and the infrastructure that supports it. And we will continue to do so until either Milosevic changes his calculations, or he loses his ability to maintain his grip.

Sincerely,

Mr. Richard Greenway Stuart
11909 120th Avenue East
Puyallup, Washington 98374

- 1000 Italian troops
- U.S. paratroop drop
- U.S. Marine landing

THE NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 1999

Night, but Where Are the Missiles?

ntinue npaign

Comments at the busy day of mili-

stration officials said that the goal of Mr. Milosevic from him to observe made, and then

sian threats to lift arms embargo Clinton said, "I e a terrible mis-

Moscow's angry raids was emphasis of State Made at a briefing. A al for the Admin- the air strikes bright said, was acts with Russia that our differ- need not disrupt onts."

ilosevic against ry campaign to on, Ms. Albright ng made for "a es."

es in Kosovo," continuing their vilians, burning acking political

critics' question- stration would ardment failed, d the assault, in- ilosevic would rious damage if de out an air

nger underlined ertion that the ee the commit- s fighting forces s something we . Mr. Berger



IN MA

En
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By

SKO

Giving bombu try, the Serbia Embas rocks, and se pound

Ther and sr British riots w of the round NATO' Preside goslavi lic to e from th poor co rivalrie

Today George anti-NA ment a strikes via con

"The country the infl and the anti-Ar Macedc gievski ciated I

The ground keep a and now of milit in Serb temper: So ha

The New York Times

Here is the plan I propose for Montenegro. I believe that President Djukanovic will welcome Nato peace keepers to guarantee the neutrality of his country. The Yugoslav 2d Army will not welcome us. Therefore we must surprise them with a fait accompli. Under cover of darkness we must airdrop Nato rapid deployment units from Europe and 82d Airborne units with intercontinental reach from the United States. The drop sites should be north of Danilovgrad Army base and avoid Yugoslav troops. The same night Marines from ships in the Adriatic should land in force on the least guarded stretches of beach. Now the main concentration of Yugoslav troops will be caught between the marines and the paratroops. At dawn President Djukanovic will broadcast to the Montenegrin population a message saying that he has asked Nato peace keepers to guarantee the neutrality of Montenegro. He will urge all 2d Army troops loyal to him to break ranks. The rest he will order to leave Montenegro peaceably. Simultaneously Nato will drop leaflets with a similar message.

Nato attack aircraft will perch over Yugoslav forces, who will be ordered to surrender. If they choose to fight, they will be bombarded by aircraft and naval artillery and then attacked by our ground forces.

Time is of the essence. If Serbia is allowed to co-opt the Montenegrin government before we are invited in, we will have to fight our way in and kill Montenegrins in the process. If we do not save Montenegro from Serbia, then Albania will be completely surrounded by allies and friends of Serbia. A war for Albania could de-stabilize the peace of Bosnia and the Nato alliance between Greece and Turkey. You must **immediately** do whatever it takes to prevent Milosevic from brutalizing and subverting the government of Montenegro, as Hitler did the Czech and Hungarian governments.

As you know one third of the Kosovar population has been uprooted and moved toward the border. The Serbs are depopulating a fertile, mineral-rich province to create "Lebensraum" and wealth for Serbia. We must not allow Serbs to supplant the ancient Illyrians in Kosovo. All of this ancient population will be exiled for a time, despite Nato and the Kosovo Liberation Army. But if you leave them in exile, the Balkans will remain a "powder keg." This outcome will not be in the long-term best interests of the American people, or the Kosovars. But I believe that we are only at the beginning of the story, not at the end.

Here is the outcome that I see, if you take charge of the situation and act now to alter the course of events in the future. This is my plan for Kosovo. First recognize the independence of the Kosovo Republic, which was proclaimed in 1991, ratified by popular referendum, and recognized by Albania. Urge the Nato countries to do likewise. In light of the ethnic cleansing and murder, Kosovo must never again fall under Serb rule. Yes, the Kosovars will be driven from their land, that cannot be prevented. More even will die, but the remaining Kosovar population will be safe beyond Serbia's borders. Maybe that's not all bad... If massive relief efforts succeed.

Now Nato can press a full attack against the Serb occupation of Kosovo without fear of causing civilian casualties. An expeditious war with an **all-encompassing plan** will save lives. A tentative, confused war effort will escalate and then degenerate into a war of attrition that will waste many lives.

A majority of 54 percent of Americans favors sending ground troops into Kosovo, as do majorities in Britain and France. Now you must decide to deploy Nato ground troops **in overwhelming force** outside Kosovo's borders. Nato needs a large expeditionary force in Albania, far more than the 9,000 now planned. In Macedonia, the current 12,000 Nato peacekeeping troops waiting near the Serbian border should be augmented and rearmed to match the 16,000 heavily armed Serbs deployed along the other side of the border in Kosovo. The capture of three American peace keepers on patrol near the Kosovo border last week is ominous, because they were trapped by Serb troops who may have crossed the border into Macedonia. The 1,200 American Marines underway will be absorbed in helping refugees.

With our troops in Montenegro and Albania, we will have a chance of winning back Kosovo with minimal losses of life. We will have overwhelming forces arrayed against Milosevic's troops in Kosovo. Our forces do not have to attack. Their presence will make it clear to Milosevic that he is on the verge of losing Kosovo and his army to a sweeping Nato onslaught. At that point Nato should ask Russia to make one last try for peace with the Serbs under the following terms: Serbia must surrender Kosovo unconditionally and withdraw all forces from the province. Serbia recognizes the Kosovars' right to self-determination. The Kosovo-Serb border will be sealed by Nato and Russian peace-keepers under joint command. The expropriated, expatriated Kosovars will then be returned to their homes and to their lives.

If Serbia refuses these terms, there are no negotiations. Nato immediately attacks according to the battle order drawn up by the Nato commander Gen. Wesley Clark and Nato's best strategists. The Serbs may feel compelled to amass troops along the Montenegrin and Albanian borders to counter Nato troop deployments. There will be opportunity for Nato to bombard the Serb army as it musters more troops on the borders. At this point Nato should ask the Montenegrin government to relinquish its neutrality and allow its territory to be used as a base for attacking Serb forces. Or, Nato could hold its position in Montenegro and attack only if Serb forces dare to breach Montenegro's neutrality. The main onslaught can come from Nato forces in Albania, arriving by sea and military airlift. The attack must be all out and unlimited ground and air war against Serb military forces.

Knowing and telling underlying truths will under-gird your war effort and bring God's blessing.

Britain's Chamberlain could not avoid war with Hitler's Germany and you could not avoid war with Milosevic's Serbia. Milosevic is a shrewd megalomaniac. He is not the road to Balkan peace--but a snake on the road. His plan is clear, to succeed Tito using Hitler's tactics. He has set out to plunder Kosovo, subvert Montenegro's sovereignty, de-stabilize Macedonia, overrun Albania in its weakness, re-ignite Bosnia's Serbs, **and ally himself with Greece and Russia.** If you had allowed him to do that, the potential for mischief was infinite. You had to bomb him, and now you have to defeat him on the ground.

You and you alone stood up for Bosnia when others were resigned to "sit by and watch" a holocaust. You were right, they were wrong. America won an incredible victory for peace in Bosnia. **And that's why the majority of Americans today support your bombing Serbia, because they know that America can triumph over evil.** You can and you must now rally the American people to this war effort.

The notion that the American people will not accept casualties in a just war is demeaning and false. Many casualties were expected in the Gulf War, which the American people supported. Casualties are certainly expected in the current air war over Serbia. The American people support this war--even though you have not yet prepared them as President Bush prepared them for the Gulf War.

The images of Kosovars packed in trains and dumped over the border in the tens of thousands without shelter, sanitation or enough food will galvanize public opinion against Serbia. And stories of the holocaust behind them are just beginning to be told. The trial and imprisonment of three American servicemen will bring out yellow ribbons. Not only will the American people support a victorious war against Serbia, they may in their hearts demand this of you. And I believe that you in your heart want this victory. I have seen your anger as you have embraced the Kosovar cause by telling the stories of their holocaust.

You cannot win this war without the American Army. It is not fair to make the Air Force and Navy bear the responsibility for losing a war that the three services and Nato can win. **You must fight on the ground.** And you must rally the American people to a full, balanced war effort.

Give Gen. Clark and the military leaders on the battlefield wide latitude in prosecuting this war. Events are moving too fast to run decisions through 19 Nato political leaders. Move quickly and boldly. Europe is in no mood for pacifism, and woe to the political leader who abandons Nato under fire. Nato is in a state of war with Serbia, and it should be a war declared by as many of the 19 as possible. Officially at war, Nato will operate as a military unit, taking orders only from a strong commander-in-chief. That is you, and General Clark is the Supreme Allied Commander who represents you in Europe. As such, he is the spiritual heir of General Dwight Eisenhower, who led us to victory over Nazi Germany and then forged Nato out of the ashes of Europe. Once Nato is at war, as it is now, what Gen. Clark says goes. He deserves your unflinching support, and the other Nato nations should either fall in line or fall out. Now it's a military matter, and how well and decisively the war is conducted will determine the political affects. It's not the other way around.

The Nato nations will insist that American troops share the risks in any ground attack, as you know. That is the price we pay for leadership. American troops are the glue that holds the alliance together. And yet we must insist that each Nato country bear its fair share of the risk. Americans have flown 90 per cent of the sorties over the former Yugoslavia, and that trend needs to be reversed. Gen. Clark has complete authority to ask each nation to contribute ground troops according to its particular strength. Nato is more than an alliance. Nato troops are trained to fight in as an integrated, disciplined **multilateral** force.

Have nothing to do with limited war or protected enclaves. An enclave, safe haven, or strategic hamlet by definition is surrounded by the enemy. That is exactly the strategy in Macedonia that trapped our three servicemen. They were surrounded by Serbs. It is our job to surround, out-flank, cut off, surprise and hit the enemy's rear. That saves Nato lives. Have nothing to do with a plan to escort refugees back over the border under Nato protection. Our armed forces are not body guards. We must avoid all piecemeal approaches to war.

Military strategy has become commercialized. Expensive weapons have become strategy instead of tools. The fallacy of thinking this war could be won from the air was in confusing weapons with strategy. Even Apache helicopters and rockets, though desperately needed, cannot win this war. But if you will allow Gen. Clark to use ground troops, he will assemble the best strategic minds in Nato and devise a strategy that will save lives. Only then will our advanced weapon systems become effective in winning the war.

This war ends in the defeat of Serbia, not at the peace table. Serbia must be brought to the point where it sees that it cannot win and further resistance is futile. Milosevic will not surrender easily and it may be necessary to take Belgrade.

Any peace agreement Milosevic signs is waste paper. The notion that Milosevic's indictment as a war criminal should be delayed, because we might otherwise find ourselves making peace with a convicted war criminal, is revolting. The United States should demand an expeditious indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Milosevic cannot escape responsibility for atrocities in Kosovo. Ample evidence exists and he should be indicted now.

Serbs describe themselves as a noble people. If they knew what their army and special police forces are doing in Kosovo, they would be mortified. That is why Milosevic will not admit what they are doing in Kosovo and he says Kosovars are leaving because of the bombing. The Serb people must be told the truth. The indictment of Milosevic would do that.

Nato should make a clear effort to reach out to the Serbian people. They do not understand why Nato has attacked Serbia, because the state-controlled media are lying to them. We must jam Serbian television daily and broadcast the truth, via subtitled American network news. **We must begin immediately in Montenegro to win the hearts of the people, by using our media.** Montenegrin support for a Nato peace-keeping force could save lives.

The bombing of Serbia should not stop until Serbia is run out of Kosovo. It is a miracle that 19 Nato nations have agreed on bombing. Any pause in the bombing will be exploited by Milosevic to divide the alliance between hawks and doves.

One last truth, you uttered beautifully. "I think there are too many weapons." Nato should not arm the Kosovo Liberation Army in violation of the arms embargo. This would give Russia the pretext for rearming the Serbs with modern weapons. The retreating KLA can probably find all the arms they want in Albania. But 1.8 million Kosovars are still no match for 8 million Serbs.

In your body language, the American people need to hear you say, "This shall not stand," or "Ich bin Berliner." And they need to hear that in the sound of screaming jets and marching feet.

A great deal of work must be done in a hurry to prepare for this war. The United States government must give liberally to a massive relief effort for the suffering refugees. They must be moved from the borders of Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia to safe refugee centers set up in the rear of these countries. The refugees should not be dispersed across Europe. They **will return** to Kosovo. But the borders are too dangerous. Right now, the refugee form a human buffer zone that protects Serb forces from any invasions of Nato troops across the border.

Nato must expressly guarantee the security of the Albanian nation, and then request that Albania be available as a staging area for a ground attack on Serb forces in Kosovo. There are risks for Albania, but the deluge of refugees already threatens to de-stabilize the country. Albania is still grateful to Nato for embracing the cause of their people in Kosovo. The danger from a Serb-occupied Kosovo across the border will outweigh the danger of a war to return Kosovo to its own people.

A Nato expeditionary force must be assembled in the Adriatic to land in Albania. As refugees are moving toward refugee centers in the rear, the troops should move inland. They should set up bases for combat helicopters, artillery and rockets, which are effective in bad weather. A similar force should be assembled in Montenegro, either peaceably or forcibly. Nato's flank in Albania must be protected by more than the neutral intentions of Montenegro. Likewise, the peace-keeping force in Macedonia must be upgraded with heavy weapons and reinforced with Slavic Nato troops. Nato peace-keeping forces in Bosnia should be reinforced quietly.

The governments of nations surrounding Serbia should be informed of the impending Nato military deployments and any contingency plans for their countries. Nato troops should be specifically earmarked to aid each nation should Serbia attack any of them. Priority should be given to the Bosnian Muslims, Croatia and Hungary. A Nato army should be assembled in Hungary. While our Albania-based troops engage the Serbs in the south (Kosovo), we will need to deploy troops along the northern border of Serbia (Vojvodina). This will force Serbia to divide its armies between the southern front and the north. If the war drags on, the Nato troops in Hungary must move against Belgrade to administer the coup de gras. And Romania and Bulgaria should be kept in the loop.

At all times, Nato should closely monitor Russian navy ships in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Any attempt to ship arms to Serbia by sea--or by land--must be intercepted. But the United States should continue to assure Russia that it wants good relations despite the confrontation over Serbia.

In closing let me say that you have political capital to spare. Now is the time to invest it in a righteous war that will prevent world war. America is strong economically and militarily. We are at peace with Russia, which is too weak to fight. Now may be the last time we have, to pacify the Balkans and create lasting peace in Europe.

My children, born since I wrote you before, are my reasons for writing again. What you do now, do for all our children.

Godspeed,

Enclosures

Copies:

1. Vice President Al Gore
2. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
3. Secretary of Defense William Cohen
4. National Security Adviser Samuel Berger
5. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

NATO forces in place
 (NATO) forces to be deployed for assaults 1, 2, 3, 4
 Serbian forces



Richard Greenway Stuart
11909 120th Avenue East
Puyallup, Washington 98374

April 8, 1999, by Federal Express

Sandy Berger
Adviser to the President on National Security
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Berger,

A copy of my letter to President Bill Clinton concerning the Kosovar war is enclosed for your information / action. I have highlighted lines that may touch your sphere of interest. Attached are copies of letters which the President and I exchanged during the Bosnia crisis in 1993.

You are to be congratulated for the energy and courage with which you have pursued an end to Serbia's brutalization of Kosovo. I believe your priorities in that area now are to stop the coup plot in Montenegro and to plan on a ground war.

You have a rare opportunity to build a lasting peace in the Balkans and Europe, even if we must fight for that peace. My wife Cynthia and I will pray for you.

Sincerely,

Richard G. Stuart

Enclosures:
(The Seattle Times)
(Seattle Post-Intelligencer)
(Tacoma News Tribune)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 27, 1993

Mr. Richard G. Stuart
Suite 204
3200 West Commodore Way
Seattle, Washington 98199-1165

Dear Richard:

I appreciate hearing your views on the situation in the former Yugoslavia. I am deeply concerned about the continuing aggression there and the atrocities that are still being inflicted upon the people of that region.

I am working closely with my foreign policy team to help resolve the problems that have caused this conflict. Bringing peace and stability to that area of the world is one of my Administration's highest priorities. We face many tough choices in dealing with the tragedy in Bosnia, but it remains my intention to work with our allies on a course that will help repair the damage that this conflict has done to the Balkans and to Europe.

Thank you for your interest in this important issue.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

Richard G. Stuart
3200 West Commodore Way, Suite 204
Seattle, Washington 98199-1165

April 12, 1993

By Federal Express

Mr. Thomas "Mack" McClarty
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McClarty:

I worked for Clinton-Gore in Texas, and Washington state. We won one of the states, so I broke even!

I want to give President Clinton a plan for breaking the Serbian-Bosnian deadlock.

The enclosed letter is confidential. Please convey the envelope to President Clinton personally. Please convey the other copy to Vice President Gore personally.

I was born in Memphis, Tennessee. I am related to Jeb Stuart, the Confederate cavalry general.

I went to Scout camp in your home state, Arkansas (the Ozarks). I attended a liberal college in Oberlin, Ohio.

I did academic work in foreign affairs, while earning a master's degree in journalism in Washington, D.C. I know Europe as a journalist, speaking German and French.

I served in the U.S. Army in Germany during the Vietnam era.

The collapse of Soviet power in Europe, in 1989, ignited my passion for peace. I co-founded an ad hoc peace organization, Earthpeace II Thou, for the purpose of prodding the Bush Administration to end the Cold War.

Europe remains my passion--united and secure from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains of Russia.

I hope the enclosed plan will help President Clinton to formulate a successful Bosnian policy.

Sincerely

Richard Stuart

Copies--
President Bill Clinton
Vice President Al Gore

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: STUART, RICHARD G

DOC DATE: 07 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MONTENEGRO
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

SERBIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE POSSIBLE SERBIAN TAKEOVER IN MONTENEGRO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 28 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE
HURLEY
WIPPMAN

FOR INFO
BANDLER
BLINKEN
SCHWARTZ
WEISS

COMMENTS: COMPLETE PACKAGE W/ STAFF OFFICER

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: EXEC
ACTION: KOSOVO
EU

Richard Greenway Stuart
11909 120th Avenue East
Puyallup, Washington 98374

April 7, 1999, by Federal Express

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, District of Columbia 20500

Dear Mr. President:

You may remember that I wrote to you concerning Bosnia in 1993, a time when conventional wisdom held that it was too late to alter the course of events. You proved conventional wisdom wrong, established a U.S. embassy in Bosnia and rallied Nato forces, who with the help of a Croatian offensive stopped Serbian savagery in that country.

Today, conventional wisdom would probably hold that it is too late to alter the course of events in Kosovo. But I believe that would be wrong again, and I want to give you a plan that will sweep Serbian forces out of Kosovo and return the original Kosovar inhabitants to their homeland.

Immediately, you must address the **ominous crisis** in neutral Montenegro--a Serbian takeover by coup d'état. Montenegrin neutrality is vital to the safety of American troops in Albania and Bosnia. Montenegro is key to this Balkan conflict, because it borders on Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania, and because it is the former Yugoslavia's only outlet to the sea. This strategic plum must not fall into the hands of Serbia. Nato must quickly deploy a large peacekeeping force in Montenegro to guarantee the neutrality of that republic. Montenegrin President Milo Dukanovic is clearly reaching out to the international community for support. He has publicly blamed Serbia for provoking the bombing of Yugoslav forces in Montenegro. The current ceasefire in Kosovo may be an attempt discredit Dukanovic by casting Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic as peacemaker. Serbian anti-NATO peace rallies are preparing the Montenegrin people for a take-over. You may have only a few days, at most weeks, before the Montenegrin government falls. To avoid this you must **immediately** ask President Djukanovic if he will accept a powerful Nato peacekeeping force in his country. There is no time to consult Nato. The initial force may have to be American. Our troops must be prepared to confront the Yugoslav 2nd Army stationed in Montenegro. The alternative is to risk mobilized Yugoslav forces in Montenegro and Kosovo threatening our troops in northern Albania. Also Russian ships in the Adriatic may try to resupply Yugoslav armies via Montenegro. (Please see map).

APR 9 13:33

Rally today in Montenegro being

Pro-West president tries
to hold on against Serbs

By DAVID HOLLEY
LOS ANGELES TIMES

PODGORICA, Yugoslavia — With fears of a coup attempt at fever pitch here in the capital of Montenegro, the pro-Western government is trying desperately to mobilize support from its citizens and the international

community.

Supporters of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic have planned a large outdoor anti-NATO concert today, and while it is being billed as a nonviolent peace rally to protest the bombing of Yugoslavia, there are concerns that opponents of reform-minded Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic might use the situation to stage anti-government rioting.

Large-scale civil disturbances could provide a pretext for the Yugoslav

2nd Army, which is stationed in Montenegro, to take action against the democratically elected government. Montenegro is the smaller republic, after Serbia, constituting Yugoslavia.

"I can't say how real is the danger of a coup d'etat," Radomir Sekulovic, a government spokesman, said Saturday. "Our primary task is to warn the international public of a possible coup d'etat, but we don't want to provoke the Yugoslav army."

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Choose your free gift with

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: Schulte

LOG NUMBER: 2862

DUE DATE: 4.28

DATE STAFFED: 4.16

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: R Stuart

*Answered by
Schulte
July 4/21*

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.