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Folder Title:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

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1705

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39	1	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	04/26/1999	P3/b(3)
002a. memo	Telephone Calls with Decretary General Annan, president Chirac, and Prime Minister Blair. [Record ID: 9902660] [Released in Part per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)
002b. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Blair. [Record ID: 9902660] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)
002c. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversations with Secretary General Kofi Annan. [Record ID: 9902660]. [Duplicate of 2.11, 2009-1290-M] (2 pages)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, April 8, 1999. [Record ID: 9902661] [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1999	P3/b(3)
004a. talking points	Points to be Made for Meeting with Legislators. [Record ID: 9902683] [Duplicate of ke5828_002a, this case] (10 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)
004b. draft	Talking Points [Draft of 004a (9902683). Pages 1 and 4] [Duplicate of ke5828_004b, this case] (2 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, April 10, 1999. [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	04/24/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
005b. draft	[Draft of 005a (9902689), page 3 only] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	04/24/1999	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	04/26/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 26, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense


JAMIE METZL
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting scheduled for Tuesday, April 27, 1999 has been cancelled. There will a SVTS at 8:30 a.m.


Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902561
RECEIVED: 07 APR 99 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS

DOC DATE: 06 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO
MILITARY EXERCISES

HS
HUMAN RIGHTS

File

PERSONS: MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN

PRIMAKOV, Y

SUBJECT: NEED TO REVERT KOSOVO SITUATION FM MILITARY TO POLITICAL TRACK

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 19 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WEISS

FOR CONCURRENCE
HURLEY
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BELL
BERGER
DAVIES
MACDONALD
MCCARTHY
PASCUAL
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *W* NARA, Date *2/15/2024*
2008-0994-F.3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

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DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unofficial translation

April 6, 1999

Dear Bill,

Each day the situation in Yugoslavia grows more tragic and threatening. The bombings of towns resulting in destruction of public buildings, airfields, bridges and even residential areas bring multiple human casualties, terrorize the civilian population. The issue of refugees from Kosovo assumed a nature of genuine catastrophe. Its scope inexorably grows spreading out to neighboring states. The situation in the Balkans once again becomes a factor of European and international tension.

There is a clear need for most urgent measures in order to break up the critical situation, revert it from the military to the political track. Russia invariably takes actions in this direction using all available channels. In this context we certainly cannot but regret that the signal that S.Milosevic had given after Chairman of the Russian Government Ye.Primakov's trip to Belgrade was not heard. Time was lost which has brought new casualties and sufferings.

HIS EXCELLENCY

WILLIAM J.CLINTON

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Washington, D.C.

Today we succeeded in getting from Belgrade another signal of major importance in response to my message: S.Milosevic has just officially announced a cease of military and police actions in Kosovo. This decision made - what is particularly important - unilaterally and without preliminary conditions, in our view, allows to finally stop the senseless bloodshed and violence, immediately begin advancing to a lasting, just and humane Kosovo settlement.

I am urging you to give peace in Europe a chance - not to reject S.Milosevic's initiative, consider his Statement in an unbiased and constructive manner and react appropriately transferring resolution of the Kosovo problem from the military to diplomats. On my part, I will be ready to carefully study any of your considerations along those lines.

We have all received a real opportunity to avert through joint efforts the imminent common trouble. It should be used responsibly and most effectively. History and our nations will not forgive anything short of that.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, Kremlin

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Ситуация в Югославии с каждым днем становится все более трагичной и угрожающей. Бомбардировки городов, в результате которых разрушены государственные учреждения, аэродромы, мосты и даже жилые кварталы, оборачиваются многочисленными человеческими жертвами, терроризируют мирное население. Характер подлинной катастрофы приобрела проблема беженцев из Косово. Масштабы ее неумолимо растут, распространяясь на соседние государства. Положение на Балканах вновь становится фактором европейской и международной напряженности.

Совершенно очевидна необходимость принятия самых срочных мер, чтобы переломить критическую ситуацию, вернуть ее из военного в политическое русло. Россия неизменно действует в этом направлении, используя все доступные нам каналы. В этом контексте не может, конечно, не вызвать сожаления, что сигнал, поданный С.Милошевичем после поездки в Белград Председателя Правительства Российской Федерации Е.М.Примакова, не был услышан. Потеряно время, что обернулось новыми жертвами и страданиями.

В ответ на мое послание сегодня от Белграда удалось добиться еще одного принципиально важного сигнала: С.Милошевич только что официально заявил о прекращении военных и полицейских акций в Косово. Это решение, принятое - что особенно существенно - в одностороннем порядке без предварительных условий, позволяет, на наш взгляд, остановить, наконец, бессмысленное кровопролитие и насилие, незамедлительно начать движение к прочному, справедливому и гуманному косовскому урегулированию.

Обращаюсь к Вам с настоятельным призывом дать миру в Европе шанс - не отвергать инициативу С.Милошевича, рассмотреть его Заявление без предубеждения, в конструктивном ключе и отреагировать надлежащим образом, вновь передав решение проблемы Косово от военных дипломатам. Со своей стороны, буду готов внимательно изучить любые Ваши соображения, идущие в данном направлении.

Все мы получили теперь реальную возможность совместными усилиями отвести нависшую над нами общую беду. Ее следует использовать ответственно и с наибольшим эффектом. Другого история и наши народы не простят.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль

6 апреля 1999 года

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902642
RECEIVED: 08 APR 99 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS

DOC DATE: 08 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS

file

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: KOSOVO & US - RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 20 APR 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
HURLEY

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BERGER
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SCHWARTZ
STATE
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 2/15/2024
2008-0994-F.3

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DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unofficial translation

April 8, 1999

Dear Bill,

I have carefully studied your message on the situation over Yugoslavia of April 3. I fully share your feeling of anxiety which it is filled with.

The situation is not only critical, but - quite frankly - tragic. There is a serious and growing threat to both peace in Europe and everything positive that we have managed to accomplish over the recent years in the Russian-American relations. I anticipated that we would approach this benchmark with other results and other feelings. We did indeed achieve a great deal: in arms reduction, in economic interaction and, most importantly, in demolishing confrontational stereotypes in psychology. As well as you, I highly value this common heritage which I would like to pass on to my successor.

The fundamental agreements which you and I elaborated during the recent summit in Moscow should have become a pledge of constructive continuity in the Russian - US relations in the 21st century. They particularly underscored that from now on we will jointly seek a way out of most difficult situations taking into account each other's interests and experience - whether it is regional crises or combat against terrorism we are dealing with.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

I am committed to these understandings and once again publicly announced this in my message to the Federal Assembly. You have perceived correctly that it was quite difficult for me to do this at this moment. Our relations have been subjected to a serious test due to NATO military actions in the Balkans, and the Russian public opinion is nothing short of red-hot.

I would not like to get back to what I have told you about the danger and potential impasse of the chosen way of use of force. Regrettably, all my worst apprehensions begin to come true, and you are witnessing this. At this point we should not blame the circumstances, but through joint effort break up the situation, revert it from the military to the political track.

Believe me, it is not a matter of personal likes or dislikes, or historic ties which Russia and the US, for obvious reasons, have developed quite differently. Life should have taught us that most complex ethnic problems – whether in the Middle East or the Balkans – can not be resolved with one stroke. Their settlement requires patience and consideration of all factors.

We can not yield to emotional impulses when hundreds of thousands of lives are at stake. Military tragedy is a bad remedy for humanitarian tragedy.

I have already put forward specific proposals for political settlement of the Kosovo problem. I am pleased that you have appreciated them and underscore in your message readiness to do everything possible, not to lose a single chance, not to leave any path to peace untried.

The fact that S.Milosevic appears to be embarking upon the right course after my work with him instills confidence. I wrote to you and other heads of the “G-8” states in my message of April 6 about his recent proposals.

Time, indeed, does not stand still, and no international or domestic political calculations can overshadow the fact that the unfolding negative processes in Europe, the world and our relations threaten to become irreversible, to damage destinies of millions of people who already started to get used to a more happy, democratic and safe life – life in partnership, not in opposition.

Bill, there are moments when leaders of great powers must justify their predestination, must have their conclusive say. I believe that the moment has come, and you and I must place all our personal authority on the scales of diplomacy, not war. I suggest that we instruct our foreign ministers to meet in a third country with a clear-cut mission of finding a way out of the impasse – both Kosovo and Russian-American.

I am ready to give such an instruction to Minister I.Ivanov. I am certain that his meeting with Secretary Albright will not result in failure. On the contrary, it will serve the development of our common values, impart a powerful impulse to international efforts to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans. And that is our direct duty now, yours and mine. Let us prove that the relations between the Russian and American presidents are capable of ensuring an adequate way out of any trials even at most crucial moments in history.

Sincerely,

B.Yeltsin

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием о ситуации вокруг Югославии от 3 апреля. Полностью разделяю чувство тревоги, которым оно проникнуто.

Ситуация действительно складывается не только критическая, но и, прямо скажу, трагическая. Налицо серьезная - и растущая - угроза как миру в Европе, так и всему тому позитивному, чего нам удалось добиться за последние годы в российско-американских отношениях. Рассчитывал, что к этому рубежу мы подойдем с другими результатами и другими чувствами. Ведь сделано было немало: и в области сокращения вооружений, и в сфере экономического взаимодействия, и, самое главное, в ломке конфронтационных стереотипов в психологии. Так же, как и ты, я очень дорожу этим общим наследием, которое хотел бы передать своему преемнику.

Залогом конструктивной преемственности в российско-американских отношениях в XXI веке должны были стать те крупные договоренности, которые мы с тобой выработали на последней встрече в верхах в Москве. В них, кстати, особо подчеркивалось, что выход из самых трудных ситуаций мы

отношине будем искать совместно с учетом интересов и опыта друг друга - идет ли речь о региональных кризисах или борьбе с терроризмом.

Я верен этим пониманиям и вновь во всеуслышание заявил об этом в своем послании Федеральному Собранию. Ты правильно понял, что сделать это сейчас мне было нелегко. Наши отношения подверглись серьезнейшему испытанию из-за военных действий НАТО на Балканах, и российское общественное мнение накалено до предела.

Не хочу вновь возвращаться к тому, что говорил тебе по поводу опасности и тупиковости избранного силового пути. К сожалению, все мои самые худшие опасения начинают сбываться, и ты сам это хорошо видишь. Сейчас надо не пенять на обстоятельства, а, собрав волю в кулак, совместно переломить ситуацию, вернуть ее из военного в политическое русло.

И дело здесь, поверь мне, не в личных симпатиях или антипатиях и даже не в исторических связях, которые у России и США, по понятным причинам, складывались далеко не одинаково. Жизнь должна была научить нас, что сложнейшие этнические проблемы - будь то на Ближнем Востоке или на Балканах - нельзя разрубить одним махом. Их урегулирование требует терпения и учета всех факторов.

Нельзя поддаваться эмоциональным порывам, когда на карту поставлены сотни тысяч жизней. Военная трагедия - плохое лекарство от трагедии гуманитарной.

Мной уже выдвинуты конкретные предложения по политическому урегулированию косовской проблемы. Рад, что ты оценил их и подчеркиваешь

в своем письме готовность сделать все, не упустить ни одного шанса, не оставить непройденной ни одну дорогу, ведущую к миру.

Вселяет уверенность то, что, судя по всему, на верную дорогу после моей настойчивой работы с ним вступает С.Милошевич. О его последних предложениях я подробно писал тебе и другим руководителям государств «восьмерки» в своем послании от 6 апреля с.г.

Время действительно не ждет, и никакие международные или внутривластные расчеты не могут заслонить того, что разворачивающиеся негативные процессы - в Европе, в мире, в наших отношениях - грозят стать необратимыми, исковеркать судьбы миллионов людей, уже начавших привыкать к более счастливой, демократичной и безопасной жизни - жизни в партнерстве, а не в противостоянии.

Билл, есть моменты, когда лидеры великих держав должны оправдать свое предназначение, сказать решающее слово. Думаю, такой момент наступил, и мы должны с тобой положить весь наш личный авторитет на весы дипломатии, а не войны. Предлагаю тебе срочно поручить нашим министрам иностранных дел встретиться в третьей стране с твердым заданием найти выход из тупика - и косовского, и российско-американского.

Готов дать такое поручение И.С.Иванову. Уверен, что его встреча с М.Олбрайт не закончится неудачей. А наоборот, послужит продвижению наших общих ценностей, даст мощный импульс международным усилиям по прекращению кровопролития на Балканах. Это сейчас - наш с тобой прямой долг. Давай же докажем, что отношения между российским и американским

президентами способны обеспечить достойный выход из любых испытаний даже в самые критические моменты истории.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль

8 апреля 1999 года

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902642
RECEIVED: 08 APR 99 18

TO: YELTSIN, BORIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 11 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES YELTSIN RE KOSOVO

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DUE DATE: 20 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF: 9902561

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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NSC CHRON
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By V2 NARA, Date 2/15/2024
2008-0994-F.3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902642

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 WEISS	Z 99040818 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 99041014 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
003 PRESIDENT	Z 99041113 FOR DECISION
003	X 99041913 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM
004	X 99041914 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 990408	STATE
003 990410	VICE PRESIDENT
003 990410	WH CHIEF OF STAFF
004 990411 YELTSIN, BORIS	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2642
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TRC AO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Coagriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	<u>1</u>	<u>TRC 4/21</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

Please Add to Folder

COMMENTS:

1999 APR 12 PM 12:40

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

Marsh, Thomas S

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, April 19, 1999 2:04 PM
To: Marsh, Thomas S
Subject: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN REGARDING THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO .
AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 111537Z APR 99
MSGTO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW//NIACT IMMEDIATE
ORIG: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2710
TOR: 990411115430 M3794115

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2609-1290-M (2.01)
RDS 2/6/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS
QQQQ

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN REGARDING THE SITUATION
IN KOSOVO

AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. A COPY MAY ALSO BE PROVIDED TO PRIME MINISTER
PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA2710 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTERS, WHICH I READ
VERY CLOSELY. I AM GLAD THAT WE HAVE A SHARED RECOGNITION OF
THE NEED TO USE EVERY AVAILABLE MEANS TO END THE ON-GOING
TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO.

AS I WROTE BEFORE, I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS
TO MAINTAIN A STEADY AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES. I KNOW THAT DURING THESE
POLITICALLY CHARGED TIMES, RUMORS AND MISSTATEMENTS CAN
SPREAD QUICKLY. I AM PLEASED THAT YOUR TEAM MADE CLEAR ON
FRIDAY THAT RUSSIA HAS NOT CHANGED THE READINESS OR
TARGETTING STATUS OF ITS STRATEGIC ARSENAL, DEMONSTRATING TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT ONE OF OUR LANDMARK
ACCOMPLISHMENTS STILL STANDS. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT NONE
OF OUR ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS ARE AIMED AGAINST RUSSIA. I
APPRECIATE YOUR ASSURANCES THAT RUSSIA WILL, UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES, ALLOW ITSELF TO BE DRAWN INTO MILITARY
CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA.

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA2710 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NEEDLESS TO SAY, LIKE YOU, I REMAIN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO. I AGREE THAT WE MUST
INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, AND I STRONGLY
ENDORSE YOUR SUGGESTION THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD
MEET QUICKLY. I UNDERSTAND THAT MADELEINE WILL SEE FOREIGN

MINISTER IVANOV IN OSLO ON TUESDAY. THEY HAVE STAYED IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT BY TELEPHONE, AND THEIR DEPUTIES HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY TO EXCHANGE IDEAS AND WORK TOWARD A COMMON APPROACH TO RESOLVE THIS TRAGEDY.

WE NEED, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, TO JOINTLY APPLY AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC ENERGIES TO THE VITAL GOAL OF AN ENDURING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THIS CRISIS THAT THREATENS THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF A REGION THAT IS IMPORTANT TO US BOTH. IT IS SIMPLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ALLOW BELGRADE'S POLICIES, ESPECIALLY ITS BARBARIC ETHNIC CLEANSING AND ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILIZE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, TO JEOPARDIZE WHAT YOU AND I HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN SIX AND A HALF YEARS. THEY ALSO THREATEN THE HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH THAT YOU ACHIEVED IN LAYING THE BASIS FOR A COOPERATIVE, MUTUALLY

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA2710 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO.

ON THAT BASIS, I WELCOMED THE STATEMENT RELEASED ON FRIDAY BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN AND NOTED THAT THE KEY TO ITS SUCCESS WILL BE WHETHER PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC GOES BEYOND MERE COMMITMENTS AND IMPLEMENTS KEY PROVISIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT THE SAFE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND THE REALIZATION OF PEACE IN KOSOVO WHILE KEEPING IT WITHIN THE FRY. KOFI'S STATEMENT IS AN IMPORTANT EXPRESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SENTIMENTS ABOUT THE CRISIS AND OUTLINES A CONSTRUCTIVE PATH TOWARD ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SOLUTION. I HOPE YOU CAN EMBRACE THIS APPROACH, AND THAT MADELEINE AND MINISTER IVANOV CAN FURTHER DEVELOP THESE IDEAS FOR WORKING TOGETHER, ESPECIALLY IN THE UN, OSCE, THE CONTACT GROUP, AND THE G-8.

I KNOW IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE JOYOUS AT A TIME WHEN HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF FELLOW EUROPEANS ARE SUFFERING. BUT I DO WISH YOU, YOUR FAMILY AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE THE PEACE OF THE EASTER SEASON. IT IS MY SINCEREST HOPE, WHICH I KNOW YOU

PAGE 5 RHEHAAA2710 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SHARE, THAT THIS PEACE WILL COME SOON TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING ALL OF THOSE SUFFERING IN THE BALKANS. THE CHANCE OF THIS HOPE COMING TRUE DEPENDS MUCH ON THE WORK YOU AND I AND OUR COLLEAGUES DO IN COMING DAYS.

SINCERELY,
BILL

DECLAS: X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

NIACT IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2009-1290-M

RDS 2/6/2015

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN REGARDING THE SITUATION
IN KOSOVO

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. A COPY MAY ALSO BE PROVIDED TO PRIME MINISTER
PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

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PLEASED THAT YOUR TEAM MADE CLEAR ON FRIDAY THAT RUSSIA HAS NOT
CHANGED THE READINESS OR TARGETTING STATUS OF ITS STRATEGIC
ARSENAL, DEMONSTRATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT ONE
OF OUR LANDMARK ACCOMPLISHMENTS STILL STANDS. LET ME ASSURE YOU
THAT NONE OF OUR ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS ARE AIMED AGAINST
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SUGGESTION THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET QUICKLY. I
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OSLO ON TUESDAY. THEY HAVE STAYED IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT BY
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SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2642

4-12-99

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1999

Copied
Berger
Podesta
NSCW w Desk

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

President Yeltsin wrote to you twice this week about Kosovo. Yeltsin's second letter was an impassioned plea for working together to end the crisis. The message reviewed your joint accomplishments, emphasized Yeltsin's belief that NATO will not be able to fix the Kosovo problem with one strike -- and then came to the underwhelming punchline of: let's have our Foreign Ministers meet.

In light of the Orthodox Easter holiday and Madeleine's Tuesday meeting with Foreign Minister Ivanov, it would be useful to send Yeltsin a brief response. The message reviews our concerns about Milosevic's continued brutality and thanks Yeltsin for his public defense of the U.S.-Russian relationship and assurances that Russia will not be drawn militarily into the Yugoslavia conflict. You also highlight the importance of Kofi Annan's statement on Kosovo and ask Yeltsin to embrace it as a constructive approach toward a political solution.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/9/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1240-M (2.03)
RDS 2/6/2015

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1999

'99 APR 11 PM 12:14

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

V

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

7009-1290-M

RDS 2/6/2015

Background

President Yeltsin wrote to you twice this week about Kosovo. Yeltsin's second letter was an impassioned plea for working together to end the crisis. The message reviewed your joint accomplishments, emphasized Yeltsin's belief that NATO will not be able to fix the Kosovo problem with one strike -- and then came to the underwhelming punchline of: let's have our Foreign Ministers meet.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/9/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

APR 12 1999

Unofficial translation

April 8, 1999

Dear Bill,

I have carefully studied your message on the situation over Yugoslavia of April 3. I fully share your feeling of anxiety which it is filled with.

The situation is not only critical, but - quite frankly - tragic. There is a serious and growing threat to both peace in Europe and everything positive that we have managed to accomplish over the recent years in the Russian-American relations. I anticipated that we would approach this benchmark with other results and other feelings. We did indeed achieve a great deal: in arms reduction, in economic interaction and, most importantly, in demolishing confrontational stereotypes in psychology. As well as you, I highly value this common heritage which I would like to pass on to my successor.

The fundamental agreements which you and I elaborated during the recent summit in Moscow should have become a pledge of constructive continuity in the Russian - US relations in the 21st century. They particularly underscored that from now on we will jointly seek a way out of most difficult situations taking into account each other's interests and experience - whether it is regional crises or combat against terrorism we are dealing with.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

209-1292-44 (2.05)

I am committed to these understandings and once again publicly announced this in my message to the Federal Assembly. You have perceived correctly that it was quite difficult for me to do this at this moment. Our relations have been subjected to a serious test due to NATO military actions in the Balkans, and the Russian public opinion is nothing short of red-hot.

I would not like to get back to what I have told you about the danger and potential impasse of the chosen way of use of force. Regrettably, all my worst apprehensions begin to come true, and you are witnessing this. At this point we should not blame the circumstances, but through joint effort break up the situation, revert it from the military to the political track.

Believe me, it is not a matter of personal likes or dislikes, or historic ties which Russia and the US, for obvious reasons, have developed quite differently. Life should have taught us that most complex ethnic problems – whether in the Middle East or the Balkans – can not be resolved with one stroke. Their settlement requires patience and consideration of all factors.

We can not yield to emotional impulses when hundreds of thousands of lives are at stake. Military tragedy is a bad remedy for humanitarian tragedy.

I have already put forward specific proposals for political settlement of the Kosovo problem. I am pleased that you have appreciated them and underscore in your message readiness to do everything possible, not to lose a single chance, not to leave any path to peace untried.

The fact that S.Milosevic appears to be embarking upon the right course after my work with him instills confidence. I wrote to you and other heads of the “G-8” states in my message of April 6 about his recent proposals.

Time, indeed, does not stand still, and no international or domestic political calculations can overshadow the fact that the unfolding negative processes in Europe, the world and our relations threaten to become irreversible, to damage destinies of millions of people who already started to get used to a more happy, democratic and safe life – life in partnership, not in opposition.

Bill, there are moments when leaders of great powers must justify their predestination, must have their conclusive say. I believe that the moment has come, and you and I must place all our personal authority on the scales of diplomacy, not war. I suggest that we instruct our foreign ministers to meet in a third country with a clear-cut mission of finding a way out of the impasse – both Kosovo and Russian-American.

I am ready to give such an instruction to Minister I.Ivanov. I am certain that his meeting with Secretary Albright will not result in failure. On the contrary, it will serve the development of our common values, impart a powerful impulse to international efforts to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans. And that is our direct duty now, yours and mine. Let us prove that the relations between the Russian and American presidents are capable of ensuring an adequate way out of any trials even at most crucial moments in history.

Sincerely,

B.Yeltsin

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием о ситуации вокруг Югославии от 3 апреля. Полностью разделяю чувство тревоги, которым оно проникнуто.

Ситуация действительно складывается не только критическая, но и, прямо скажу, трагическая. Налицо серьезная - и растущая - угроза как миру в Европе, так и всему тому позитивному, чего нам удалось добиться за последние годы в российско-американских отношениях. Рассчитывал, что к этому рубежу мы подойдем с другими результатами и другими чувствами. Ведь сделано было немало: и в области сокращения вооружений, и в сфере экономического взаимодействия, и, самое главное, в ломке конфронтационных стереотипов в психологии. Так же, как и ты, я очень дорожу этим общим наследием, которое хотел бы передать своему преемнику.

Залогом конструктивной преемственности в российско-американских отношениях в XXI веке должны были стать те крупные договоренности, которые мы с тобой выработали на последней встрече в верхах в Москве. В них, кстати, особо подчеркивалось, что выход из самых трудных ситуаций мы

отныне будем искать совместно с учетом интересов и опыта друг друга - идет ли речь о региональных кризисах или борьбе с терроризмом.

Я верен этим пониманиям и вновь во всеуслышание заявил об этом в своем послании Федеральному Собранию. Ты правильно понял, что сделать это сейчас мне было нелегко. Наши отношения подверглись серьезнейшему испытанию из-за военных действий НАТО на Балканах, и российское общественное мнение накалено до предела.

Не хочу вновь возвращаться к тому, что говорил тебе по поводу опасности и тупиковости избранного силового пути. К сожалению, все мои самые худшие опасения начинают сбываться, и ты сам это хорошо видишь. Сейчас надо не пенять на обстоятельства, а, собрав волю в кулак, совместно переломить ситуацию, вернуть ее из военного в политическое русло.

И дело здесь, поверь мне, не в личных симпатиях или антипатиях и даже не в исторических связях, которые у России и США, по понятным причинам, складывались далеко не одинаково. Жизнь должна была научить нас, что сложнейшие этнические проблемы - будь то на Ближнем Востоке или на Балканах - нельзя разрубить одним махом. Их урегулирование требует терпения и учета всех факторов.

Нельзя поддаваться эмоциональным порывам, когда на карту поставлены сотни тысяч жизней. Военная трагедия - плохое лекарство от трагедии гуманитарной.

Мной уже выдвинуты конкретные предложения по политическому урегулированию косовской проблемы. Рад, что ты оценил их и подчеркиваешь

в своем письме готовность сделать все, не упустить ни одного шанса, не оставить непройденной ни одну дорогу, ведущую к миру.

Вселяет уверенность то, что, судя по всему, на верную дорогу после моей настойчивой работы с ним вступает С.Милошевич. О его последних предложениях я подробно писал тебе и другим руководителям государств «восьмерки» в своем послании от 6 апреля с.г.

Время действительно не ждет, и никакие международные или внутривполитические расчеты не могут заслонить того, что разворачивающиеся негативные процессы - в Европе, в мире, в наших отношениях - грозят стать необратимыми, исковеркать судьбы миллионов людей, уже начавших привыкать к более счастливой, демократичной и безопасной жизни - жизни в партнерстве, а не в противостоянии.

Билл, есть моменты, когда лидеры великих держав должны оправдать свое предназначение, сказать решающее слово. Думаю, такой момент наступил, и мы должны с тобой положить весь наш личный авторитет на весы дипломатии, а не войны. Предлагаю тебе срочно поручить нашим министрам иностранных дел встретиться в третьей стране с твердым заданием найти выход из тупика - и косовского, и российско-американского.

Готов дать такое поручение И.С.Иванову. Уверен, что его встреча с М.Олбрайт не закончится неудачей. А наоборот, послужит продвижению наших общих ценностей, даст мощный импульс международным усилиям по прекращению кровопролития на Балканах. Это сейчас - наш с тобой прямой долг. Давай же докажем, что отношения между российским и американским

президентами способны обеспечить достойный выход из любых испытаний даже в самые критические моменты истории.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль

8 апреля 1999 года

Unofficial translation

April 6, 1999

Dear Bill,

Each day the situation in Yugoslavia grows more tragic and threatening. The bombings of towns resulting in destruction of public buildings, airfields, bridges and even residential areas bring multiple human casualties, terrorize the civilian population. The issue of refugees from Kosovo assumed a nature of genuine catastrophe. Its scope inexorably grows spreading out to neighboring states. The situation in the Balkans once again becomes a factor of European and international tension.

There is a clear need for most urgent measures in order to break up the critical situation, revert it from the military to the political track. Russia invariably takes actions in this direction using all available channels. In this context we certainly cannot but regret that the signal that S.Milosevic had given after Chairman of the Russian Government Ye.Primakov's trip to Belgrade was not heard. Time was lost which has brought new casualties and sufferings.

HIS EXCELLENCY

WILLIAM J.CLINTON

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Washington, D.C.

Today we succeeded in getting from Belgrade another signal of major importance in response to my message: S.Milosevic has just officially announced a cease of military and police actions in Kosovo. This decision made - what is particularly important - unilaterally and without preliminary conditions, in our view, allows to finally stop the senseless bloodshed and violence, immediately begin advancing to a lasting, just and humane Kosovo settlement.

I am urging you to give peace in Europe a chance - not to reject S.Milosevic's initiative, consider his Statement in an unbiased and constructive manner and react appropriately transferring resolution of the Kosovo problem from the military to diplomats. On my part, I will be ready to carefully study any of your considerations along those lines.

We have all received a real opportunity to avert through joint efforts the imminent common trouble. It should be used responsibly and most effectively. History and our nations will not forgive anything short of that.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, Kremlin

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2660

April 9, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

ANTONY BLINKEN / GREG SCHULTE *AS* *bl*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Telephone Calls to President Chirac,
Prime Minister Blair and Secretary General Annan

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his telephone call to President Chirac, Prime Minister Blair and Secretary General Annan.

Concurrence: Ken Pollack *AS* *6-5*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Points to be Made to President Chirac

Tab B Points to be Made to Prime Minister Blair

Tab C Points to be Made to Secretary General Annan

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 9. 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VL* NARA, Date *2/15/2024*
2008-0994-F.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Telephone Calls with Decretary General Annan, president Chirac, and Prime Minister Blair. [Record ID: 9902660] [Released in Part per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Released in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2009-1290-M (2.08)
2/6/2015 RDS

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH SECRETARY GENERAL ANNAN,
PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE: April 10, 1999

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

Annan: welcome his strong statement on Kosovo; urge him to encourage Moscow to pressure Belgrade and cease all support; explain strategy; lay down markers on Iraq.

Blair and Chirac: review the road ahead on Kosovo, including Monday's foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, intra-alliance relations, managing Russia and helping the front line states. With Blair, you also should seek support for increased economic pressure on Belgrade and compare notes on Iraq strategy.

II. BACKGROUND

Annan issued a statement on Friday expressing his deep distress at the humanitarian situation in Kosovo and urging a resumption of political negotiations at the earliest possible moment. He called on Belgrade to make a series of commitments, including an end to its "campaign of intimidation and expulsion", a withdrawal of forces, unconditional acceptance of refugee return and the deployment of an "international military force." Thanks to phone calls from Madeleine and Tom Pickering, Annan's requirements are essentially the same as our own. The one major difference is that Annan calls for NATO to suspend air strikes once Belgrade commits to these steps, rather than beginning to implement them. We are now trying to use Annan's statement in our efforts to make the Russians be a constructive part of our diplomatic strategy.

Mrs. Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the lead coordinator of refugee protection and assistance

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 9, 2009

efforts, was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the Kosovo crisis and slow to accept a strong NATO role in assisting with relief. She has now acknowledged that the NATO role is critical and we are beginning to reach most of the refugees with assistance. Mrs. Ogata, is currently in the region, visiting the camps.

You also should use this opportunity to lay down markers on Iraq. We're prepared to be very forthcoming in providing additional humanitarian assistance but we want to make sure the aid actually gets to the Iraqi people and we are adamant on the need for a revived WMD inspection program.

Both Blair and Chirac remain rock solid on Kosovo, and continue to enjoy strong public support for NATO's airstrikes. Indeed, as images of dispossessed Kosovars and reports of atrocities multiply, editorial and even public support for ground troops is growing in both countries.

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b)

You will want to bring both leaders up to date on your conversation with D'Alema and convey your basic satisfaction with Koffi Annan's statement of conditions. The NATO ministerial on Monday will signal Allied resolve and offer an opportunity to make smaller allies feel more involved. At the same time, we must make Milosevic feel there is no end in sight if he continues to hold out. This will require additional military resources and increased economic pressure. You might also compare notes on our common efforts to help the refugees, assist front line states, and channel Russian initiatives in positive directions.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points for Phone Calls with Chirac
Tab B Talking Points for Phone Calls with Blair
Tab C Talking Points for Phone Call with Koffi Annan

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

- Want to review where we are on Kosovo; my conversation with D'Alema; Kofi's statement, the military campaign; the humanitarian effort; and Russia.

D'Alema

- Spoke to him yesterday. He's doing a great job navigating a difficult political situation at home and seems solidly behind continued air operations. No mention of "pauses" or diplomatic initiatives.

Kofi's Statement

- Pleased by Kofi Annan's statement on Friday. His conditions are identical to our conditions. The only difference is that he asks NATO to suspend air strikes once Milosevic commits to the conditions, whereas we would certainly want to see some clear signs of implementation first.
- Kofi's statement gives NATO's stance that much more international legitimacy. I hope that we can use his statement to help in our effort to get the Russians to engage constructively on the diplomatic track.

NATO Ministerial

- Madeleine and Robin/Hubert will be meeting with their NATO counterparts on Monday in Brussels. This is important for two reasons. First, to signal NATO's determination to stay the course. And second, to make all the allies feel involved. There is some resentment about among the smaller allies about the regular contacts between the Contact Group allies. The meeting of all 19 Foreign Ministers should help, and I am also making a point of calling the leaders from non-Contact Group countries, particularly those who are contributing forces.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: April 9, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1290-M (2.09)
RDS 2/6/2015

Next Steps

- We must make Milosevic feel that there is no end in sight if he doesn't accept our conditions. I understand that General Clark will shortly be asking all of us to commit additional military resources, and we will need to look at this very carefully.
- We also need to supplement our military operations with increased economic pressure on Milosevic and his war machine. We're encouraging neighboring countries to stop oil supplies to Serbia. This is also a good moment for the EU to take a serious look at tightening its sanctions regime.

Easter Pause [if asked]

- [SACEUR is looking at possibility of directing strikes away from Belgrade and other urban areas in Saturday night, during the late night resurrection mass.
- We don't think NATO needs to announce this in advance. But we could suggest that the NATO spokesman describe this restraint at his press briefing on Sunday.]

Help for the Refugees

- Our estimates are that some 800,000 Kosovars are now displaced. The world is now responding but we've got to do more.
- Just formed a national coordinating council here to run our response to the refugee crisis. We are airlifting relief supplies into the region and have just added another \$50 million in aid.
- The Macedonian government is so overwhelmed that we have to relieve the pressure by moving some of the refugees to temporary safehavens elsewhere. Grateful for what you're doing. Hope we can increase aid to the international organizations in the region.

Assistance for the Frontline States

- Also need to step up efforts to help other frontline states.

- Need to be thinking about post-conflict efforts. We'll need a comprehensive plan for Kosovo and Yugoslavia -- a resettlement and recovery program.

Russia

- Important we all stay engaged to channel Russian initiatives in positive direction. Have emphasized we can't let Milosevic drive a wedge between Russia and United States and almost all of Europe. Recognize that Kosovo is difficult for them, but have too much important work to do.
- Need to encourage Russians to uphold Yeltsin's pledge to stay out of conflict. Have reason to believe that people in Ministry of Defense and other government entities are preparing shipments of military equipment to Yugoslavia. Should make sure Boris and Primakov understand that intel sharing or military cooperation with Serbs would be a very big mistake.
- Hungary and Romania carrying burden of inspecting humanitarian shipments. Should help them however we can.
- Also ask that you encourage public information agencies to get real news into Russia, Ukraine other NIS. USIA started getting TV feeds in this week; already see some shifts.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Blair, [Record ID: 9902660] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

- Want to review where we are on Kosovo, my conversation with D'Alema, Kofi's statement, the military campaign and the humanitarian effort. Also like to have a word about Iraq.

D'Alema

- Spoke to him yesterday. E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Kofi's Statement

- Pleased by Kofi Annan's statement on Friday. His conditions are identical to our conditions. The only difference is that he asks NATO to suspend air strikes once Milosevic commits to the conditions, whereas we would certainly want to see some clear signs of implementation first.
- Kofi's statement gives NATO's stance that much more international legitimacy. I hope that we can use his statement to help in our effort to get the Russians to engage constructively on the diplomatic track.

NATO Ministerial

- Madeleine and Robin/Hubert will be meeting with their NATO counterparts on Monday in Brussels. This is important for two reasons. First, to signal NATO's determination to stay the course. And second, E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

and I am also making a point of calling the leaders from non-Contact Group countries, particularly those who are contributing forces.

Next Steps

- We must make Milosevic feel that there is no end in sight if he doesn't accept our conditions. I understand that General

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: April 9, 2009

Released in Part

Per E.O. 13526

2009-1290-M (2.10)

2/6/2015 RDS

Clark will shortly be asking all of us to commit additional military resources, and we will need to look at this very carefully.

- We also need to supplement our military operations with increased economic pressure on Milosevic and his war machine. Anything that you can do to block Milosevic's access to offshore accounts, particularly in Cyprus, would be most important. We're encouraging neighboring countries to stop oil supplies to Serbia. This is also a good moment for the EU to take a serious look at tightening its sanctions regime.

Easter Pause [if asked]

- [SACEUR is looking at possibility of directing strikes away from Belgrade and other urban areas on Saturday night, during the late night resurrection mass.
- We don't think NATO needs to announce this in advance. But we could suggest that the NATO spokesman describe this restraint at his press briefing on Sunday.]

Help for the Refugees

- Our estimates are that some 800,000 Kosovars have been displaced. The world is now responding but we've got to do more.
- Just formed a national coordinating council here to run our response to the refugee crisis. We are airlifting relief supplies into the region and have just added another \$50 million in aid. Hillary went over yesterday to see the departure of some humanitarian rations.
- The Macedonian government is so overwhelmed that we have to relieve the pressure by moving some of the refugees to temporary safehavens elsewhere. Grateful for what you're doing. Hope we can increase aid to the international organizations in the region.

Assistance for the Frontline States

- Also need to step up efforts to help other frontline states.

- Need to be thinking about post-conflict efforts. We'll need a comprehensive plan for Kosovo and Yugoslavia -- a resettlement and recovery program.

Russia

- Important we all stay engaged to channel Russian initiatives in positive direction. Have emphasized we can't let Milosevic drive a wedge between Russia and United States and almost all of Europe. Recognize that Kosovo is difficult for them, but have too much important work to do.
- Need to encourage Russians to uphold Yeltsin's pledge to stay out of conflict. E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

- Hungary and Romania carrying burden of inspecting humanitarian shipments. Should help them however we can.
- Also ask that you encourage public information agencies to get real news into Russia, Ukraine other NIS. USIA started getting TV feeds in this week; already see some shifts.

Iraq

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversations with Secretary General Kofi Annan. [Record ID: 9902660]. [Duplicate of 2.11, 2009- 1290-M] (2 pages)	04/09/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 19 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PC

SOC

file

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 8 APR PC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 16 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER

COSGRIFF

JOSHI

KERRICK

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VZ NARA, Date 2/15/2024

2008-0994-6-3

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902661

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001 SCHULTE
001 BERGER
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99041113 FOR DECISION
Z 99041218 FOR REDO
Z 99041218 FOR DECISION
X 99041914 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99041914 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990419 FUERTH, L
002 990419 KENNEY, K
002 990419 REYNES, J
002 990419 PODESTA, J
002 990419 WOLFE, T
002 990419 MANNING, M

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National Security Council
The White House

4/13

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PR NO _____

TMA

SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL/DATE

DISPOSITION

Coe-griff

1/3

KPC ~~done~~

Rice

4

2/17 Act Tab I

Davies

Kerrick

2

2 4/12

Steinberg

3

~~done~~

Berger

X

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

5

TIC 4/19

Records Mgt.

6

N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: SOC - PC on Kosovo 8 April

APR 12 1998 5:32

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

April 19, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 8, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo on April 8, 1999. Please
pass to Principals only. ~~(C)~~


for Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, April 8, 1999. [Record ID: 9902661] [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

2661

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 8, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:00 - 7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(C)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

OVP:
Richard Saunders

State:
Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
James Dobbins

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta
Steven Ricchetti

CIA:
John Gordon

(b)(3)

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
Joseph Ralston
Edward Anderson

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (in person)

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte
James Baker

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The purpose of the upcoming meeting of NAC Foreign Ministers should be to ensure and demonstrate Alliance solidarity behind the ongoing NATO air operation and to set out publicly the Alliance's conditions for its suspension. (Action: State)
~~(C)~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: April 10, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0920-M (1.13)
KBH 9/9/2019

- In the communique to be issued at the NAC Ministerial, we should ensure some flexibility in the presentation of the conditions and not make a cessation of NATO air operations contingent upon signature of the Rambouillet accords. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG should oppose any pause in NATO air operations during Orthodox Easter. However, JCS should request SACEUR to redirect targeting away from urban areas from dusk Saturday to dusk Sunday to avoid accidents and a further hardening of Serb opposition to NATO demands. We should not introduce this idea into the NAC or have it announced in advance. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____ IMMEDIATE
 _____ PRIORITY
 _____ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
 DTG: _____

SECRET

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: _____ PAGES: 5
 (Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk (202) 456-9425 WH Situation Room
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SAC for PC on Kosovo 8 Apr
 NSC LOG # 2661

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<u>DoD</u>	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: VL Date: 2/15/2004
 2008-0994-F.3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9902661
DATE 19 APR 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 8 APR PC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1+F</u> _____
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____
COL. MICHELLE MANNING SECRETARY JOINT STAFF ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 2/15/2024
2008-0994-F.3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2661

Redo

April 10, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 8, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on April 8.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to ~~agencies~~ *people*

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

*Approved by S.S. per
NH.
E.A. Ziff
4/17/99*

CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: April 10, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VZ* NARA, Date *2/15/2014*
2008-0694-1.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2661

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 8, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo on April 8, 1999. Please
pass to Principals only. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
for Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: April 10, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 2/15/2024
2008-0944-P.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2661

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 8, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo on April 8, 1999. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: April 10, 2009

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VC NARA, Date 2/15/2024
2008-0994-F.3

- In the communique to be issued at the NAC Ministerial, we should ensure some flexibility in the ~~conditions imposed on Milosevic~~ (e.g., by using the term "international security ~~presence~~" instead of "NATO led" force) and not make a cessation of NATO air operations contingent upon signature of the Rambouillet accords. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~ *point of re calibration presentation of the conditions*
- The USG should oppose any pause in NATO air operations during Orthodox Easter. However, JCS should request SACEUR to redirect targeting away from urban areas from dusk Saturday to dusk Sunday to avoid accidents and a further hardening of Serb opposition to NATO demands. We should not introduce this idea into the NAC or have it announced in advance. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 12 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
AP

CONGRESSIONAL



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POTUS MTG W/ KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RE KOSOVO ON 13 APR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 17 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VACCARO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COSGRIFF

LACKEY

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 2/15/2024

2008-0444-F.3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902683

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001 SCHULTE
002 PRESIDENT
002

CAQ ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99041218 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99041219 FOR REDO
Z 99041223 FOR INFORMATION
X 99041915 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

002 990412
002 990412

DISPATCH FOR INFO

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

SECRET

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2693

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 2 AQ _____

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

Cosgriff 1 KR _____

Rice _____

Davies _____

Kerrick _____

Steinberg 2 Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen _____

Berger _____

Situation Room _____

West Wing Desk 3 4/12 AF

Records Mgt. 4 4/21 N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: LEW, STEIN BYPASSED

COMMENTS: POTUS mtg w/ congres
13 April
19 APR 12 09:27

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-13-99

2683

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'99 APR 12 PM10:26

April 12, 1999

MEETING WITH LEGISLATORS

DATE: April 13, 1999

LOCATION: Yellow Oval Room

TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *MB*

I. PURPOSE

To provide background and talking points for you April 13 meeting with Congressmen on Kosovo.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting is a follow-up to your April 12 meeting with leadership and is part of a series of meetings by you and your Foreign Policy team during the first few days of Members' return to Washington from the Easter recess. A broad range of Senators and Representatives will hear directly from the Administration on where we are and where we are going on Kosovo. By making you and others available to brief them and respond to their questions, we are demonstrating that we are committed to close cooperation and consultation with Congress every step of the way. We will also be able to get a better fix on Congressional sentiment.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Some four or more dozen Members from relevant committees.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Official photographer.

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VC* NARA, Date *2/15/2024*
2008-0594-F.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)

Declassify On: 4/12/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V. SEQUENCE

You should begin with a clear commitment to consultation and then move into a restatement of our military objectives. After proving an overview of how we are progressing, you transition into our diplomacy. Subsequently you discuss the ongoing humanitarian efforts and close by touching on the supplemental. Background on these and possible issues they might raise is attached. These are virtually the same points (differences are in bold) you used with leadership but include a warning about the risks of the operation and the fact that the cost of operations (and therefore the size of the supplemental) will be substantial.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points and Contingency Points

Tab B OMB Background on the Supplemental

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. talking points	Points to be Made for Meeting with Legislators. [Record ID: 9902683] [Duplicate of ke5828_002a, this case] (10 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

FY 1999 Kosovo Budget Supplemental: Since the Leadership will undoubtedly bring up the funding question, we recommend you pre-empt by laying out the urgency of the situation. You should discuss the broad outlines of the package we are currently developing and emphasize that the package is too vital -- with respect to the safety of American troops and the lives of displaced Kosovars -- to be embroiled in budgetary politics. It is therefore essential this package be passed as a non-offset emergency. We are nearly finished with internal deliberations on a Kosovo package and we plan to describe it publicly as allowing us to conduct and sustain the ongoing air campaign in Yugoslavia, maintain military readiness, and provide resources to ease the plight of Kosovo's refugees.

The budget package is based on four key assumptions that you should review with the leadership:

- 1) Resources are provided to fund military activities at current levels through October 1. It is important that we obtain sufficient funding to maintain our military effort as long as necessary.
 - **Note:** This includes funds for Apache helicopters which require significant support personnel outside of Kosovo.
- 2) No funding is provided for any ground forces (peacekeeping forces or other) in Kosovo.
- 3) Resources are provided to aid efforts to accommodate the 650,000 refugees, and contingent funding is provided to handle more people if necessary. This is based on the U.S. providing 25% civilian humanitarian assistance.
- 4) Funding is provided to reinforce front-line states dealing with the brunt of the humanitarian and military fallout.

We will use the following themes to present the package:

- **Military Readiness:** This package provides funding for Kosovo operations, ensuring that the Defense Department would not be forced to compromise readiness to pay for Kosovo. The funding will allow us to keep your commitment to ensure military readiness.
- **Munitions:** We intend to replenish munitions used thus far in Kosovo and Iraq and restock inventories to maintain the air superiority required for the United States tactical advantage against adversaries in the current and any future conflicts. In addition to replenishing current stocks of munitions, we are working with DOD to ensure that we acquire additional resources if necessary to maintain readiness.
- **Humanitarian Assistance:** We will provide funding to the coordinated multilateral relief effort for Kosovo's refugees to pay for transport, the construction of temporary housing, food, and other assistance. In addition, in keeping with the commitment of all NATO nations to host refugees during the conflict, we will be temporarily providing for 20,000 displaced Kosovars.

We are still working on the final funding levels in several key areas, but we expect the package to likely total \$2.5 - \$4 billion. We would strongly recommend that you not discuss the dollar range under consideration. We would prefer the leadership to agree to the principles you lay out before discussing funding levels. In addition, we are concerned that any discussion of funding levels would be construed or portrayed as your request. If questions are raised or if you are pressed on the issue, we would recommend that you defer the questions to Jack Lew, who will be in the meeting.

As you know, the Congress will consider the Kosovo package in the context of your other pending supplemental requests for Central America, Jordan, and agriculture. There is also a risk that Republican leaders will see it as an opportunity to break through your Social Security commitment. In this regard, it is important to define our actions in Kosovo as an extraordinary emergency, similar to the Gulf War of 1990 about which there was bipartisan agreement on "emergency" funding status. We also expect this will be seen as an opportunity to erode our positions in resolving the FY 2000 budget, the "on-budget, off-budget" question, and other budget requests we will make in coming weeks such as those for the decennial census, embassy security, and possibly another agriculture package for income assistance. Your economic team has discussed how these issues relate to your overall policy regarding the use of the surplus. If pressed, we would recommend you turn to Jack Lew to elaborate.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2683

April 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: KEVIN COSGRIFF *Kc*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Members of Congress

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President for his meeting with members of Congress tomorrow derived from the memo that he used in today's meeting with Congressional Leaders. Changes are bolded.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte (Drafter)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B OMB Background on the Supplemental

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (b)

Declassify On: 4/12/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VL* NARA, Date *2/15/2024*
2008-6994-F.3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. draft	Talking Points [Draft of 004a (9902683). Pages 1 and 4] [Duplicate of ke5828_004b, this case] (2 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 24 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PC

SOC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 10 APR PC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: COSGRIFF SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 17 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
COSGRIFF
EXECSEC
JOSHI
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VZ NARA, Date 2/15/2024

2008-0994-F.3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902689

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99042117 FOR DECISION
X 99042417 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99042417 COSGRIFF SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990424 FUERTH, L
002 990424 KENNEY, K
002 990424 REYNES, J
002 990424 KYLE, R
002 990424 PODESTA, J
002 990424 WOLFE, T
002 990424 CONROY, R
002 990424 MANNING, M

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

4/23

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LOG # 2689

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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SSB
Coughlin

SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL/DATE

DISPOSITION

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Donek

Adm
Edits

Rice

1

R 4/22

Davies

Kerrick

Steinberg

Berger

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

Records Mgt.

3

D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

SocPC - 10 apr 99

'99 APR 21 PM 5:13

Exec Sec Office has diskette

Yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2689

April 24, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President


MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 10, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo on April 10. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: April 12, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 2/15/2024
2008-0994-7.3

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, April 10, 1999. [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (2 pages)	04/24/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2689

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 10, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:00 - 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

AID:
Brian Atwood

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
James Cartwright
Edward Anderson

State:
Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
James Dobbins
Anne Richard

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Treasury
Larry Summers

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House:
Larry Stein
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Jack Lew
Sylvia Mathews

NSC:
Greg Schulte
James Baker
Miles Lackey
Robert Bell
Eric Schwartz

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta
Steven Ricchetti

CIA:
John Gordon

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: 4/07/09

Released in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2014-0920-M (1.20)
9/9/2019 KBH

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The emergency supplemental package for Kosovo military and humanitarian operations should be based on the following principles and assumptions:
 - air operations and Task Force Hawk should be funded through the end of the fiscal year;
 - there should be no funding for ground forces in Kosovo, whether in a permissive or non-permissive environment;
 - funding for humanitarian relief should assume 650,000 refugees (with a contingency for a larger number) and a 25 percent U.S. share of international civilian efforts;
 - funding should be provided for reconstruction planning but not reconstruction itself;
 - funding to stabilize the frontline states that are facing the brunt of the humanitarian and military aspects of the crisis. (Action: OMB, State, DOD) (U)
- The President should describe these principles and assumptions in his upcoming meetings with Congressional leadership and members, and OMB should be prepared to present the supplemental package itself shortly thereafter with the objective of having it adopted on an emergency, non-offset basis. (Action: NSC, OMB) (U)
- Principals should meet with Congressional caucuses on Tuesday afternoon (April 13) to follow up on the President's meetings. (Action: All) (U)
- While the preference is to keep refugees in the region, the USG should keep open the option of accepting up to 20,000 refugees at Guantanamo. (Action: State, DOD) (U)
- The U.S. Government should work with NATO to develop options to get humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in Kosovo. (Action: State, DOD) (U)

E.O. 13526 1.4(c)

- The U.S. Government should also step up its efforts to influence Serbian public opinion both directly and through the Serb-American community. A main message should be that Milosevic is responsible for the ongoing violence.
- (Action: All) (C)
- The U.S. Government should send a direct message to Milosevic following Monday's (April 12) NATO Ministerial meeting, making clear our determination to sustain air operations and our conditions for ending them. (Action: State) (C)
- The U.S. Government should refine the concept of an "international protectorate" for Kosovo, within the territory of the FRY, administered by the UN or OSCE and protected by an international security presence organized and led by NATO. (Action: All) (S)
- Principals will recommend to the President that the U.S. Government rule out strategies to train and equip the KLA or to contain and isolate Serbia, while leaving refugees outside Kosovo, if NATO air strikes do not achieve the our stated objective of allowing all refugees to return with security and self-government. (Action: NSC) (S)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9902689
DATE 24 APR 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 10 APR PC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX +1</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 2/15/2024
2028-0554-F.3

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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LOG 9902689
DATE 24 APR 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 10 APR PC MTG ON KOSOVO
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for 10 Apr PC Mtg on Kosovo

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REMARKS:

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2008-0974-F.3

April 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER


FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on April 10, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on April 10.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. draft	[Draft of 005a (9902689), page 3 only] [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	04/24/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part II [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6286

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

E.O. 13526 1.4(c)

- The U.S. Government should also step up its efforts to influence Serbian public opinion both directly and through the Serb-American community. A main message should be that Milosevic is responsible for the ongoing violence.
(Action: All) (C)
- The U.S. Government should send a direct message to Milosevic following Monday's (April 12) NATO Ministerial meeting, making clear our determination to sustain air operations and our conditions for ending them. (Action: State) (C)
- The U.S. Government should ^{refine} ~~pursue~~ the concept of an "international protectorate" for Kosovo, within the territory of the FRY, administered by the UN or OSCE and protected by an international security presence organized and led by NATO.
(Action: All) (S)
- Principals ^{will} ~~should~~ recommend to the President that the U.S. Government rule out strategies to train and equip the KLA or to contain and isolate Serbia, while leaving refugees outside Kosovo, if NATO air strikes do not achieve the our stated objective of allowing all refugees to return with security and self-government. (Action: NSC) (S)
- ~~Principals should recommend to the President that the Administration reposition its public line on the deployment of ground troops in a "non-permissive" environment so as to not exclude all options if Milosevic remains defiant in the face of an extended NATO air campaign. (Action: NSC) (S)~~

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