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Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For James Pardew et al. [partial] (1 page)	04/12/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 12, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

DAVID ADAMS
Agency for International
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense


JAMIE METZL
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Tuesday, April 13, 1999, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.


Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of Dayton Accords

Attachment

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING
April 13, 1999

- I. Diplomatic Strategy State
 - Belgrade
 - Kosovar Albanians
- II. Pol-Mil Planning for a Possible Settlement
 - Nature of the SettlementState
 - Civil Implementation State
 - Military Implementation DOD
- III. Maritime OperationsNSC, JCS
- IV. Any Other IssuesAll

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For James Pardew et al. [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

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Ch 12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 19, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

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Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense


JAMIE METZL
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Tuesday, April 20, 1999, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.


Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of Dayton Accords

Attachment

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING
April 20, 1999

- I. Task Force Thunder Basing Options.State
- II. Pol-Mil Planning for a Kosovo SettlementState
- III. POW Planning. OSD
- IV. Summit Preparations.NSC
- V. Any Other Issues. All

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	For James Pardew et al. [partial] (1 page)	04/22/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6281

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 22, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
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FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

JAMIE METZL
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting scheduled for Friday, April 23, 1999
has been cancelled.



Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


April 28, 1999

Dear General Mataxis:

Thank you for your recent letter on Kosovo to Samuel Berger, the President's National Security Adviser, to which he has asked me to reply. Your concept of using the Treaty of Lausanne or the Partition of the Indian sub-continent as a point of departure for the Balkans is an intriguing one.

In the wake of this weekend's NATO Summit, we are optimistic that our renewed military and diplomatic strategies will facilitate a path to a negotiated settlement. In the meantime, I appreciate your constructive and supportive thoughts on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. Schulte', with a large, stylized 'A' or 'H' shape extending from the end of the signature.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for Implementation of the Dayton
Accords

BG Theodore C. Mataxis, USA (ret)
P.O. Box 1643
Southern Pines, NC 28387-1643

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

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(910) 692 - 4168
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10: KOSOVU/E
RESPONSE
ON BEHALF OF
AGRB.

5 April '99

Samuel Berger
Ast. to the President for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Penn.Ave.NW
Washington ,DC 20500

Dear Mr. Berger :

I am heart sick , the current events in Kosovo remind me of a WW I scenario with out of control mobilizations on a collision course which will result in our US ground forces becoming involved in a guerrilla war in the Balkans. Yes, we can win, if the public is willing to take the casualties and cost. But the deep commitment isn't there and I'm afraid we'll see another "bug out" reminiscent of Beirut or Somalia. This would be a disaster for both us and NATO!

However there is another way out . Rather than committing ground forces or declaring victory having "Damaged his military" or what ever the victory mantra of the day will be, there is another option. The third Option is to call for a conference on the entire Balkans which take a look at history and attempt to realign the boundaries of the region in a manner which will take into account the powerful influence of the ethnic ties in that region.

In 1994 I sent an OPED I had written about the tragedy in Bosnia to Tony Lake recommending that he take a look at history. I highlighted the example of how the League of Nations used the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 to end the Greco/Turk War. They exchanged two million Greeks and Turks -the Greeks to Greece and the Turks to Turkey. As you will note in Tab A he thanked me for the idea and later used it in a Conference in Europe on Bosnia. Unfortunately it was turned down by the Moslems.

I recommend that you follow this example today. Call on the UN Secretary General to use his "Good Offices" to broker an International Conference which will study long term solutions to the Balkans by reviewing and redrawing boundaries which will reflect the existence of hundred of years of mutual hatred between the different ethnic groups . Tab B. Perhaps then we would have the peace in Europe that that the President spoke of so eloquently for our grand children.

I commanded combat infantry troops in WW II, Korea and Vietnam and have a feel for the pain that body bags bring the families. And I fought against guerrillas for four years in Vietnam and supported the Reagan Doctrine's assistance to the Afghan Freedom fighters during the 1980's making seven trips of one to three months to the Afghan War. (Tab C) So I also have an understanding of the difficulties of combating a people who are willing to die for their cause. We don't need the "tar baby" of another Vietnam hanging around our neck for the next generation!

Respectfully,

Theo. C. Mataxis
Theo. C. Mataxis
Brig. Gen.(ret) USA

APR 9 14:22

Bosnia--Look To History

BY TED MATAXIS

An Editorial in *The Pilot* (5 Dec.) stated "There must be a way to end the horror in Bosnia." This is a goal for which all who have seen the daily TV News accounts of death and destruction in Bosnia would wish! Would that "Wishing would make it so." Then we could also wish that the unending killings not only around the world but in our central cities would end. However, in the real world things don't work that way.

Today the US's unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and shifting policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina is being depicted by our allies as "a debacle and a fiasco!" Which the European press claims has led to the worst disagreement between the US and its British and French allies since the 1965 Suez crisis. Current news releases from the Clinton administration seem to indicate that a decision has been made that salvaging our NATO alliance will have priority over supporting the Bosnian Muslim government.

With diplomacy now taking priority over massive air strikes to "Force the Serbs to accept a pull back from seized territory" a new look must be taken at the entire situation in Bosnia and Croatia. First we must accept that to address the real problem of what is happening in the Balkans requires a study of the history of the region. This isn't the first time that the ethnic and religious problems in the Balkans have frustrated Europe. Today's problem started 1600 years ago when the Roman Empire, overwhelmed by the difficulty of administering its wide flung empire, divided into two separate administrative parts. The western portion of the Empire was ruled from Rome and the eastern Empire was ruled by Byzantium, with the administrative border between them stretching from the Western border of Egypt north through the Balkans. The second significant traumatic event occurred in 1054 when a schism between the contending Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox Churches turned the administrative border into an antagonistic religious border.

The third major crisis came with the invasion of the Balkans by the Turkish Ottoman Empire. This invasion not only over ran the eastern capitol Constantinople but after conquering the Balkans laid unsuccessful sieges to Vienna in 1526 and 1683. Blocked in its expansion into Europe the Ottoman Empire began its slow decline. In the early 1800s with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and the growing struggle for freedom by the various Balkan ethnic and religious groups chaos descended on the Balkans. This "time of troubles" continued

as these various religious and ethnic groups, even after winning their freedom from the Ottoman Turks, continued to fight with each other in an attempt to establish new boundaries. Attempts by the major European powers to impose order foundered when Bismark, the Chancellor German Empire refused to become embroiled in the turmoil saying that "the entire Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier!"

In the early 1900s after two Balkan Wars, 1912 and 1913, new boundaries were drawn reflecting ability of the winners in these wars to draw the boundaries. However these boundaries left several large minority groups separated from countries where many of their religious and ethnic compatriots lived. In an effort to further cut down on these irredentist tensions between their countries Greece and Bulgaria exchanged their minorities by a treaty after WW I.

The largest and most successful exchange of minorities came after the abortive war in 1921 between Greece and Turkey. The exchange of their minorities was a key element of the settlement in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. It was specifically designed to break the unending cycle of wars between their two countries. This Treaty resulted in a mandatory exchange of two million of their minorities. This "ethnic cleansing" was designed to remove a "flash point," the mistreatment of minorities, which had led to so many insurrections and wars in the past. This exchange of minorities was strongly supported by Britain and France and closely supervised by the League of Nations. How successful it has been can be measured by the 70 years of peace which has existed between Greece and Turkey, in spite of crisis such as Cyprus, which is now being monitored by the United Nations.

The current civil war has gone far beyond the Serb insurrection in Bosnia. With this new diplomatic initiative another look should be taken at the actual situation on the battle field where the Bosnia Serbs have taken 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Serbs have taken 30 percent of Croatia. This current situation is well described by Deniau, a French parliamentarian. He said "Today all rules and references have been wiped out. The UN, US, Europe and NATO have been discredited--forget all these defeated institutions and failed solutions. We're going to have to come up with a new approach." This mirrors the Editor's plea of "There must be a way."

Well now that, there is a new approach, let's pay our dues to the Muse Cleo and study the Treaty of Lausanne. It not only ended the Turkish-Greek war of 1921-23, but

resolved their centuries long bitter minority problems by utilizing the League of Nations to supervise the exchange of their respective irredentist minorities. Using the Treaty of Lausanne as an example the first step would be to negotiate a "Cease Fire in Place" and call for a new diplomatic initiative to address the Civil War, both in Croatia and Bosnia. The Treaty of Lausanne would serve as a "departure point" for discussion of a compromise resolution of the civil war. A successful resolution would rest on the understanding that if this effort failed that the alternative would be a long bloody all out civil war which could extend far beyond the Balkans.

Using the Lausanne model the first action would be to agree in principle to a voluntary exchange of minorities as was done between the Greeks and Turks in 1923. The first step would be to remove the surrounded Muslim enclaves in Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla and Bihac and resettle them in areas, to be given up by the Bosnian Serbs, contiguous to Sarajevo. This resettlement should be designed to link Sarajevo to its Muslim hinterlands. Concurrently a program should be established, as during Partition between India and Pakistan in 1947, for the secure exchange of all those who desired to leave either the Croatian or Bosnian muslim government area or the break away Serb area.

The second step would be to extend the conference to explore an economically viable confederation between the Croatian government and the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Concurrently with this negotiation the accession of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia to Serbia should be addressed and actions taken to agree on new boundaries between the new Croatian-Bosnian state and an expanded Serbia. After all the boundaries of the Balkans have been "fluid" over the centuries. There were only two states in the Balkans during the 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires! After WW I there were seven, now with the break up of Yugoslavia we have twelve. How many of these will exist by the end of this century should now be decided not on the battlefield but by diplomatic conferences. With this background it is easy to see why the nations of Europe, who have closely dealt with the Balkan problem over the years and as a result are familiar with problems in the Balkans have a different view of what can be accomplished versus our optimistic American view.

Those who seek immediate solutions should take a look at the perennial problems in Israel and Ireland. Or review past United Na-

Speaker tells of impact of Afghan, Cambodian wars

The guest speaker for the weekly meeting of the Sandhills Golden K Kiwanis Club at the Brownson Memorial Presbyterian Church was Brig. Gen. Ten Mataxis of the Speakers Bureau Of The American Security Council. He gave a first hand report of his recent three month tour of Pakistan and Thailand where he visited the refugee camps and spoke with freedom fighters struggling to free their countries from the Soviet and Vietnamese armies, who now occupy Afghanistan and Cambodia.

He noted that while the battlefields of the Hind Kush mountains of Afghanistan and the jungles of Cambodia were separated by thousands of miles, there was a remarkable similarity between the two conflicts. Both resulted from a

change of Soviet strategy explained the DOD booklet "Soviet Military Power — 1987." As stated in this DOD publication, "A stronger more adventurous Soviet Union had begun to view the conflicts in the third world as an avenue for furthering Soviet interests." That view heralded an era of Soviet activism around the world including extensive support of Afghanistan a year later, in Dec. 1979.

Mataxis said the invasions of Afghanistan and Cambodia both resulted in the displacement of masses of refugees. Four million Afghans, and three million in Pakistan and one million in Iran, and a quarter of a million Cambodians fled into Thailand. Fortunately in both cases the host countries and international and private



Brig. General Ted Mataxis with a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun, and Pakistani freedom fighters.

humanitarian organizations banded together to assist these unfortunate victims fleeing from the "killing field." Fortunately, this new Soviet strategy was strongly challenged by

President Reagan's commitment to "support anti communist insurgencies around the globe." A meeting last summer sponsored by the conservative American Security Council Foundation to bring together key anti communist guerrilla leaders in Washington, D.C. At this meeting Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger further expressed this administrations commitment to the freedom fighters, saying, "Our message must remain what it has always been — we shall not abandon

you." He noted that these statements of support at the policy level have been followed up in Washington by the development of a strategy tailored to meet this new danger of Low Intensity Conflicts supported by the Soviets. In addition to back this up strategy steps have been taken by the military to increase the number and capability of our Special Operation Forces and to provide a new Special Operations Command headed by General Lindsay, former commander of the XVIII Abn. Corps at Fort Bragg.

Following this overview of the background of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia Mataxis reported his observations on the current status of the conflicts in these two regions. He explained that he has made four trips to Pakistan since 1983 for the Committee for a Free Afghanistan, an educational and humanitarian organization, officially recognized by the Pakistan government. The CFA supports several humanitarian projects within their limited budget such as providing medical care in the US for wounded Afghans who cannot be treated in Pakistan and assisting in establishing medical clinics in Afghanistan.

In addition CFA has provided seeds for Freedom Fighters based inside Afghanistan plus many other crash projects such as providing

food for unregistered refugees. In addition the CFA, which has offices in the Heritage Foundation building in Washington, provides speakers and material on the Afghan War. As he said a major responsibility is to keep the story of the resistance of the Afghan people against the Soviets invasion alive in the media. He noted that the committee had recently sponsored a group of international lawyers who traveled to the Pakistan refugee camps to obtain depositions of the Soviet violations of Human Rights and evidence of War Crimes. Their report has been presented to a House committee and is scheduled for presentation before a full Congressional Committee in the fall.

He said that since he had briefed the club in detail on the background of the Soviet invasion and occupation last spring, he would only briefly cover the key changes. He noted that the war continued into its eighth year with the Soviets unable to defeat the Mujahideen. The Soviets continue to hold the major cities and lines of communications while the Mujahideen held 80-90% of the country side. In place of the large sweeps and search and destroy missions of past years the Soviets are now concentrating on trying to cut the Mujahideen supply routes from Pakistan and isolate the guerrillas

(See WARS, page 149)

An example of exposure to Guerrilla war!

(* 7 trips)

"Assisting Freedom Fighters" through Public Diplomacy

CFA became the primary AFGHAN support group in DC "Worked" Congress, helped them set up Congressional Task Force, became primary contact with STATE, DOD with Guerrilla Leaders in Afghanistan. Became Point of Contact for Medical Groups, Newsman, etc going to Afghanistan. Brought leaders to DC to meet President, Congress & DOD officials. Assisted Cambodian guerrillas to organize in DC - attended World Anti Communist meeting, in SF at San Diego Convention.

Wars

from popular support by driving the people from areas outside their control into Pakistan and Iran as refugees.

On the plus side of the ledger was the effect of the Stinger Missiles on the war. According to reports the Mujahideen were shooting down an average of 20 Soviet planes and helicopters a month. And he said that in meeting he had with guerilla commanders they explained that the major benefit from these missiles was not only the planes they shot down, but the fact that the enemy pilots were now so cautious and launched their attacks from such a height that they were inaccurate. Further that reports coming out of Afghanistan from their agents have reported that many of Kabul's pilots have complained that the Soviets give them the most dangerous missions while they fly only the easy missions where there are few anti-aircraft weapons.

He reported that the Soviets have also increased their bombing raids on the Afghan refugee camps along the border and terrorist bomb attacks in the key cities to put pressure on the Pakistan government. This is why the Pakistan government need to obtain an effective radar system from the US to warn them of enemy attacks. In response to these raids the Mujahideen mounted a raid into Soviet Russia. The Soviet reaction was violent, they poured troops across the border devastating the area along the Oxus River. He explained he interviewed an Afghan who had witnessed the raid and fled south to escape the fighting. Their refugee said that the Mujahideen raid had been supported by Soviet Tajik citizens, who also supplied the mujahideen with food and horses to escape the Soviet swes:

In addition to this raid the Mujahideen are carrying out a series of small forays to distribute their holy book, the Koran and cassette recording of sermons and speeches banned by the Soviets. According to diplomatic reports from Moscow the Soviets are particularly sensitive to these Mujahideen initiatives since they feel they will further exacerbate the strained relations between the Soviets and their Soviet Muslim republics. They say the Soviets fear a resurgence of resistance from the grandsons of the Bashmachi guerrillas, who fought on for years until finally crushed in 1928.

Faced with more effective anti-aircraft weapons, increased morale among the Mujahideen and the possibility of increased unrest in the Muslim republic the Soviets have admitted that Afghanistan is a "bleeding wound." However they have yet to present a firm withdrawal agenda for their troop withdrawal. As the war continues and the cost, and unrest in Central Asia increases the Soviets are faced with continuing the war at its present level, withdrawing and abandoning the Kabul Communist government or seeking a military solution by pouring in more troops to attempt to finally crush the Mujahideen.

Turning to the war in Cambodia Mataxis said that his involvement with the Cambodians went back to 1971 when he was assigned from Vietnam to Phnom Penh on a one day's notice in January 1971 to supervise the military assistance funds voted by Congress to support the government of Lon Nol which had seized power in a coup from Prince Sihanour and had cut off the flow of communist weapons and supplies through the part of Kompong Som to the Vietnamese Base areas along the South Vietnamese border.

After his retirement in 1972 and move to Singapore as a consultant to their Ministry of Defense he continued to keep in contact with his friends for several years — until last summer one of them attended the conference held by the American Society Council in Washington, D.C.

While in Washington, D.C. MG Pok Sam an talked to the Afghan Leaders at the meeting and visited the offices of the CFA to see how it was organized. A couple of months later Gen. Sak Sutsakhan returned and asked the CFA's help to organize a similar support group for the Cambodian resistance fighters. After they organized the Committee for a Free Cambodia, with several local chapters throughout the country they asked Mataxis to visit their refugee camps and base areas in Thailand to obtain an overview of the current situation which would hopefully allow him to help them to increase their media coverage in the US.

On arrival in Bangkok he was met by General Sak Sutsakhan Commander of the KPNLF, one of the three resistance groups fighting the 170,000 man Vietnamese occupation force in Cambodia. He was taken to Site 2, a refugee camp of 150,000 refugees on the Cambodia border and was given an update on the local situation.

Using a map a Cambodia Mataxis explained that the Vietnamese invasion in Dec. 1978 drove the Khmer Rouge, who had seized the country in the spring of 1975, when Vietnam fell, into base areas along in the jungles of Cambodia's western borders. At this time two non-communist groups, the KPNLF,

under Son San, which consisted of remnants of the Lon Nol government and Prince Sihanouk's followers also organized bases in the border areas for their supporters.

In the fall of 1981, three years after the Vietnamese invasion the three resistance groups met at the urging of this supporters and agreed to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Prince Sihanouk became President Son San the Prime Minister and Khieu Samhan of the Khmer Rouge the Vice President for foreign affairs. This coalition formed under the pressure from the Chinese and

Asean governments soon proved its value in the UN where 116 nations have joined to call for the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia.

On the military side after the invasion the Vietnamese launched a series of attacks against the resistance forces: finally over running the camps and forcing the guerrillas to flee across the border into Thailand. Vietnam was quick to announce their victory over the resistance, however instead of giving up the three resistance groups reformed and changed their strategy. They switched to guerrilla war and moved

groups into the interior of Cambodia to continue the war, forcing the Vietnamese army to withdraw forces from the border to protect key areas across the country.

Mataxis said that the Vietnamese, under pressure at the UN have agreed to withdraw in 1990. In preparation for this anticipated withdrawal the non communist groups of Son San and Prince Sihanouk have formed a Joint Military Planning staff and are cooperating with each other and coordinating their operations with the Khmer Rouge. He said is the felling of the resistance forces

that the best chance to keeping the Vietnamese thus increasing the cost to their Soviet backers, who have now spent an estimated \$9 billion in military aid and 8 billion in economic aid.

Mataxis ended his presentation saying that in his view the best chance for the Afghans and Cambodians to free their country is to continue to resist, raising the cost so high for the Soviets and Vietnamese that they will be encouraged to negotiate for a withdrawal at the conference table.

TODAY'S QUESTION

It's scary to think about where this Balkan mission could take us. So today the Q section examines whether the United States and NATO should expand their efforts to stop the forces of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo.

Tough question for Triangle

BY VAN DENTON
AND BURGETTA EPLIN WHEELER
STAFF WRITERS

RETIRED Brig. Army Gen. Theo Mataxis, who fought in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, never would have gone to war over Kosovo in the first place.

But now that the United States is enmeshed in the conflict, Mataxis says he hopes that diplomats can end it before ground troops have to be brought in.

"We can either call on the United Nations and get diplomacy in the Balkans to settle the boundaries and then utilize people to make sure the boundaries are stable," Mataxis says.

"Or we mass troops, 100,000 troops, and take lumps. What else?

You could pull out, but that would be bad for NATO and America."



Gen. Theo Mataxis says no one has clean hands.

Gen. Theo Mataxis

Mataxis, who lives in retirement in Southern Pines, looks to history for a solution to the problem in the Balkans.

But first, he warns that none of the groups involved in the fighting has clean hands. He highlights a passage from the 1997 book, "The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia" that tells of Bosnian Muslims joining Nazi SS troops during World War II to fight the Serbs. He reminds

a visitor of Jasenovac, where Croatian soldiers held Serbs in a concentration camp during the same war.

"What we have down there is unending ethnic hatred going on and on and on," Mataxis says. "When the Ottoman Turks were there for 500 years, they held that area by terror. They impaled people. They flayed them alive."

Since the Balkans conflict heated up in Bosnia earlier in the 90s, Mataxis has seen only one solution, and he takes it from another lesson in history. In 1923, Mataxis says, the League of Nations brokered peace between Greece and Turkey by redrawing their boundaries and then resettling the warring ethnic populations.

"They moved two million Greeks and Turks," he says.

"Greeks from Turkey into Greece. Turks from Greece into Turkey. They separated them. And why did they separate them? Because Greece and Turkey had agreed that when you have ethnic hatred that has run on over hundreds of years there is no way to settle it. ... The only solution is pulling them part."

So today, Mataxis, a soldier who has advised guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan, thinks that it is up to the diplomats to solve the war in Yugoslavia, not the soldiers.

"What I would suggest is that we call on the United Nations to call their diplomats together, sit down with the Balkans, and have all the countries discuss the redrawing of boundaries," Mataxis says. "If the League of Nations could do it in '23, then why in the hell can't we do it today?"

International developments

■ Russian leaders tried to rally support Saturday for an international meeting on ending the NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia, while furiously condemning the overnight attacks that struck the heart of Belgrade. Italy and France on Saturday expressed support for a conference of the ...

tions Peace Keeping Operations. For example the current UN mission in Kashmir, was established in 1948 and the UN mission in CYPRUS was established in 1965. Problems that have existed for 1600 years cannot be resolved in a couple of years, it may take decades or even generations. The objective should be to have the UN available for humanitarian assistance when needed--and Cease Fire Peace keeping forces available when both sides finally decide they've had enough and are seriously searching for a peaceful solution.

To answer the Editor's plea "there must be away"--There is a way--population exchange! In fact it is the only way in view of the refusal by both the Americans and Europe to accept heavy casualties which would result if they decided to go to war in the Balkans. We must also realize that this is not the first time America has faced a similar dilemma. In the mid 1950s President Eisenhower asked General Ridgeway what it would take to assist the French in Indo China. Ridgeway stated it would take 500,000 troops. Faced with such a cost Eisenhower refused to become involved. Unfortunately later Presidents ignored this advice and we became deeply involved in Vietnam!

Two years ago the Senate Armed Forces Committee held a hearing with the Joint Staff which discussed in great detail what it would take militarily to resolve the crisis in Bosnia. The estimate given by the Joint Staff on what was needed to resolve the crisis militarily in Bosnia was 400,000 troops. We didn't heed the "caution light" in Vietnam with results which still echo through out our country. Will we ignore military advice again in the Balkans and have a rerun of the Vietnam War which could not only require a restitution of the draft to replace the thousands of casualties which would be suffered but also add billions to our already staggering debt!

Or will we accept that there are some things that we cannot change, particularly if the cost in casualties and treasure are too great! We must face the fact there are some things which we can not change, particularly if we are unwilling to pay the costs in casualties and treasure. We must wake up and realize that there is no "tooth fairy--and wishing won't make it so!"

However there is a way--one which has worked successfully in the past, that is to use the Treaty of Lausanne population exchange formula before it is too late and the dogs of war spread beyond the Balkans!

Mataxis is a retired Army brigadier general. He is on the board of the Federalist Research Institute at Raleigh and also serves on the faculty of the American Military University.

Thursday, February 2, 1995

THE PILOT

"In taking over The Pilot no changes are contemplated. We will try to keep this a good paper. We will try to make a little money for all concerned. Wherever there seems to be an occasion to use our influence for the public good we will try to do it. And we will treat everybody alike."--James Boyd, May 23, 1941.

Public Speaking

Mataxis Thanked

To the Editor:

General Theo C. Mataxis of Southern Pines has received the following letter:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning my appearance on "Meet the Press." I share your hope that the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreement in Bosnia will facilitate renewed peace negotiations. We are working very hard with our Contact Group partners to make that happen.

I also appreciate receiving a copy of your article "Bosnia-Look to History" which I have taken the choice of sharing with my staff. It will be useful for us in thinking through the difficult policy choices we will face as the Bosnia situation unfolds over the next several weeks.

Again, thank you for writing.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

→ And he did utilize the idea. But it was turned down by the Muslims!

Among Challenges: Getting Muslims to Consider New Territorial Division

Aug. 25 By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

National security adviser Anthony Lake yesterday gave President Clinton an upbeat assessment of European reaction to new U.S. peace initiatives in Bosnia but warned that getting the Bosnian Muslims to consider a new division of land is only one of several major problems that could doom a settlement.

On the diplomatic side, Lake carried "ideas" for a Bosnian land settlement giving Muslims and ethnic Croats 51 percent of the territory and the Bosnian Serbs the rest. But it would more clearly recognize Serb military gains in Bosnia and offer the idea of trading control over Gorazde, the only Muslim eastern enclave, for more territory around Sarajevo as "the easiest and most logical" route to a new land settlement that the Serbs would accept.

But officials said they cannot force the Bosnian Muslims to accept a land settlement they oppose and that there are "other routes" being explored.

NOTE:

1. I have selected the classic "Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare" for two reasons. First to complement O'Neil by highlighting case studies stressing geography and demography in several regions of the world. Second to stress the overthrow of governments by coups as well as revolutions from the early 1930's through the 1960's.

2. This article is to supplement week 10, Objective c. - Former Yugoslavia. The media stress ethnic cleansing with horror as if it was something new. Here you have an example of the League of Nations pragmatically using it as the basis for a Treaty to end a war between the Greeks and the Turks. It in my view it's like using an amputation of an arm to save a patient's life. And should be used in a final settlement in conjunction with a conference to reestablish new boundaries in the region!

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	For James Pardew et al. [partial] (1 page)	04/29/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
April 29, 1999

Chior

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense


JAMIE METZL
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting scheduled for Friday, April 30, 1999 has been cancelled. There will a SVTS at 8:30 a.m.



Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 30, 1999


Dear Professor Hay:

Thank you for your recent letter on Kosovo to Samuel Berger, to which he has asked that I reply. I share your hope that Russia will cooperate and collaborate with us in facilitating a peaceful negotiation to the Kosovo crisis. To that end, we are working very hard both with Moscow and our NATO allies.

Our discussions over the past few days with Viktor Chernomyrdin make us cautiously optimistic that we may achieve this goal. As the President has stated repeatedly, Russia has a vital role to play in the resolution of this crisis and we want them with us in the international force.

Thank you for writing on this vital issue.

Sincerely,



Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for the Implementation of the
Dayton Accords

Professor Stephen Hay
Department of History
University of California, Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara, California 93106-9410



DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93106-9410

April 20, 1999

The Hon. Sandy Berger
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Berger:

I think you will agree that Senator McCain, by calling for ground troops to free Kosovo, is ignoring the weightier issue of the future of democracy in Russia. There the West is already widely blamed for the failure of economic reforms and the Communists form the strongest political party. The attempted conquest of Serbia--for the Serbs would not cease fighting if only Kosovo were liberated--would probably bring the Communist Party to power after Russia's December elections and could lead to another era of East-West conflict.

Our best hope lies working together with Russia and other Orthodox Christian countries in pressuring their Serb co-religionists into allowing the refugees to return home under United Nations peacekeepers' protection.

My colleague Professor Dmitrije Djordjevic, an expert on the history of Yugoslavia, fully agrees with this proposed solution, as I trust you do also.

Sincerely yours,

Stephen Hay

Stephen Hay
Emeritus Professor of History

TO: RUSSIA
PLS. SEND
SHORT NOTE
OPO GRB.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903164
RECEIVED: 27 APR 99 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: HAY, STEPHEN

DOC DATE: 20 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO RUSSIA
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUPPORTS WORKING TOGETHER W/ RUSSIA TO PRESSURE SERBS

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 08 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
PASCUAL
SCHULTE
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: SEE MONA'S NOTE

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

3164

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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93106-9410

April 20, 1999

The Hon. Sandy Berger
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Berger:

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My colleague Professor Dmitrije Djordjevic, an expert on the history of Yugoslavia, fully agrees with this proposed solution, as I trust you do also.

Sincerely yours,

Stephen Hay

Stephen Hay
Emeritus Professor of History

TO: RUSSIA
PLS. SEND
SHORT NOTE
OPO SRB.

APR 27 12:00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2092

(Redo)

March 25, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM:

MIRIAM SAPIRO *MS*

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on March 24, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on March 24.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: March 25, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *JD* NARA, Date *7/29/2024*
2014-0549-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. STEVEN RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on March 24, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on March 24, 1999. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: March 25, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~SD~~ NARA, Date 7/25/2019
2008-0444-F-
2014-0544-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, March 24, 1999. [Record ID: 9902092] [partial] (1 page)	03/25/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 24, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 7:30 - 9:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (G)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

JCS:

Joseph Ralston

George Casey

OVP:

Richard Saunders

Leslie Davidson

USNATO:Alexander Vershbow (via secure
video)State:

Thomas Pickering

James Dobbins

James Pardew

Special Envoy:Richard Holbrooke (via secure
video)Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Jeffrey Moore

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Peter Burleigh

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro

David Leavy

James Baker

Miles Lackey

Michael Hurley

Matthew Vaccaro

P.J. Crowley

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- It is essential to complete and implement a diplomatic strategy for addressing the expected situation in Montenegro and frontline states, and for restraining the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: March 25, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0544-M (1.07)

KBA 7/31/2019

Kosovar Albanians from taking advantage of an air campaign. The strategy should address requests from frontline states for NATO assurances and assistance with refugee flows. State should continue high-level contacts with the Montenegrin leadership; Macedonia, Albania and other frontline states; Kosovar Albanians and Republika Srpska officials. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~

- The Congressional leadership should be informed of the beginning of the air campaign prior to any action on the ground. These calls should be followed by calls to the Chairs of the relevant committees. (Action: All) ~~(C)~~
- Messages from the President should be prepared for transmission to the leaders of the front-line states, NATO allies with whom he has not spoken recently, Prime Minister Persson, President Kuchma, Prime Minister Obuchi and President Jiang. (Action: NSC) ~~(C)~~
- USUN should work with other NATO members on the Security Council on a strategy to address calls by Russia or China for UNSC action. (Action: USUN) ~~(C)~~
- The warning to Milosevic on the consequences of attacking NATO forces should be conveyed publicly to bolster State's direct approach to Belgrade. (Action: State) (U)
- NATO should develop an active press strategy for briefing on air operations. This will properly shift the focus from national press efforts to the fact that the air campaign is an Alliance action. (Action: USNATO) (U)
- State and USIA should explore the Hungarian offer to use its radio stations for broadcasting into the FRY and other opportunities to convey messages directly to the Serbian people. (Action: State/USIA) ~~(C)~~

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
KOSOVO

TELCALL

file

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCALLS W/ SEC GEN SOLANA & GEN CLARK

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 30 MAR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

CCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 2/14/2024
7008-0994-f-3

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSEMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902127

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99032422 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99032512 FOR INFORMATION
X 99041217 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

3/25/07 44

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2127
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>[Signature]</i> Cosgriff			<i>done</i>
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>3/24</u>	<u>edit</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>3/24</u>	
Steinberg	<u>3</u>		
Berger	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>TTC 3/25</u>	<u>PCAPLAN</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: *Kerrick* ✓

COMMENTS:

19 MAR 24 PM 9:34

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	Telephone Calls with Secretary General Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark, March 25, 1999 [Record ID: 9902127] [Duplicate at vz6275_003 and vz6278_010, this case. See also rc1239_001a, 2013-0436-S and rc2585_006a, 2018-0530-S] (2 pages)	03/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 24, 1999

2127

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Calls to Secretary General
Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his telephone calls to Secretary General Solana and General Clark.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: March 25, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VR* NARA, Date *2/14/2024*
2008-0644-F-3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. draft	Telephone Calls with Secretary General Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark, March 25, 1999 [Record ID: 9902127] [Duplicate at vz6275_004, this case] (3 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. draft	Telephone Calls with Secretary General Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark, March 25, 1999 [Record ID: 9902127] (3 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. draft	Telephone Calls with Secretary General Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark, March 25, 1999 [Record ID: 9902127] (2 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006e. draft	Scheduling Proposal for Secretary Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark. [Record ID: 9902105] [Near duplicate of vz6275_009 and vz6277_006, this case.] (2 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1)

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Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

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2008-0994-F
vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 21, 1999

Chron 2217

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY

SUBJECT: Semiannual Report to the Congress on Military
Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding the Report to the Congress on Military Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in connection with the FY 2000 budget request, as required by Section 1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999.

Concurrences by: *cmh* Miles Lackey, Charles Allen

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Report to the Congress

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report to the Congress on Military Operations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Purpose

To forward the Report to the Congress on Military Operations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Background

Section 1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act requires that you submit a report to Congress when requesting funds for continued operations of U.S. forces in Bosnia. This report fulfills the requirement for the Fiscal Year 2000 budget request that included a request for funds for Bosnia.

Responding to specific requirements of the statute, the report delineates SFOR's key military and key supporting tasks. It details that progress has been made in bringing war criminals to justice, supporting civilian police functions, implementing free and fair elections and establishing an independent media. The report indicates that more work remains to be done in each of these areas. It describes the aftermath of the early March arbitral decision making Brcko a neutral district, pointing out that initial Bosnian Serb reaction has subsided somewhat.

The report reflects that until the March 24 commencement of NATO air strikes against the FRY the security threat to SFOR and any follow-on force was relatively low. Because of the ongoing conflict with the FRY and the risk of spillover, SFOR is now at a higher state of alert.

The report concludes that SFOR's presence continues to be required in Bosnia, though progress made towards achieving

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

objectives of the Dayton Accords will allow for reductions in U.S troop commitments. It details that NATO is currently studying several options for achieving those reductions. The report points out that the evolving situation in Kosovo will clearly affect decisions concerning the size and shape of SFOR.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached Report to the Congress on Military Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Report to the Congress

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Section 1203 of the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act requires submission of a report to Congress whenever the President submits a request for funds for continued operations of U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Section 1203 requires the following information:

(1) The expected duration of the deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) in support of implementation of the benchmarks set forth in the report to Congress of March 3, 1998.

(2) The percentage of those benchmarks that have been completed to date, the percentage expected to be completed within the next reporting period, and the expected time for completion of remaining tasks.

(3) The status of the NATO force of gendarmes, including the mission and composition of the force, and the extent of U.S. Armed Forces participation.

(4) The military and nonmilitary missions directed for U.S. forces in B-H, including specific discussion of:

(a) the mission of those forces, if any, in connection with the pursuit and apprehension of war criminals;

(b) the mission of those forces, if any, in connection with civilian police functions;

(c) the mission of those forces, if any, in connection with the resettlement of refugees; and

(d) the missions undertaken by those forces, if any, in support of international and local civilian authorities.

(5) An assessment of the risk for the U.S. forces in B-H, including, for each mission identified pursuant to paragraph (4), the assessment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the nature and level of risk of the mission for the safety and well-being of U.S. military personnel.

(6) An assessment of the cost to the United States, by fiscal year, of carrying out the missions identified pursuant to paragraph (4) and a projection of any additional funding that will be required to meet mission requirements for those operations for the remainder of the fiscal year.

(7) A joint assessment by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State of the status of planning for:

(a) the assumption of all remaining military missions inside B-H by European military and paramilitary forces; and

(b) the establishment and support of a forward-based U.S. rapid response force outside of B-H that would be capable of deploying rapidly to defeat military threats to a European follow-on force inside B-H and of providing whatever logistical, intelligence, and air support is needed to ensure that a

European follow-on force is fully capable of accomplishing its missions under the Dayton Accords.

In connection with the Administration's request for funds for FY 2000, this report fulfills the requirements of section 1203(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.

Expected duration of U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina

U.S. military force structure in B-H has been and will continue to be reduced, as progress is made on implementation, or the capability of other non-military institutions increases. The six-month review process that began with initial deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995 continues today. The reviews include assessments of the security situation, compliance by the parties with the provisions of the Dayton Accords, the progress towards achievement of benchmarks, as well as recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian implementation agencies, and/or any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force. The December 1998 assessment concluded that no immediate major reductions in SFOR force levels were warranted but that "routine" administrative adjustments in areas such as logistics and non-maneuver unit headquarters were possible in the short-term. Based on this review, the Secretary of Defense announced the reduction of U.S. forces operating in Bosnia from 6,900 to

approximately 6,200. This reduction, to be fully realized later this year, resulted from an analysis of the current SFOR mission, its key military and supporting tasks and six months of experience of operating under Operation JOINT FORGE. It is important to remember that the current U.S. force level of 6,900 already represents a 20 percent reduction from the 8,500 U.S. military personnel deployed in June 1998, and is 66 percent less than the peak U.S. deployment of 20,000 in 1996. This reduction does not signal a change in the SFOR mission, nor will it affect SFOR's ability to support implementation of the Dayton Accords. SHAPE has also recommended sourcing the second authorized Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) battalion and consideration of a shift from heavy to light units in order to achieve some additional force reductions. We expect a comprehensive, wide-ranging mission and force structure analysis, based on the Six Month Review (SMR), will be completed by the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) in the Spring of this year.

Percentage of benchmarks completed

I would refer you to the report I submitted in February 1999, pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, that provides an update on the status of benchmarks identified in March 1998. The report provides a complete assessment on the progress of each benchmark. I would also emphasize that the benchmarks are not a checklist that must be completed before NATO can depart

but rather a road map to guide civil implementation aimed at reaching the point where it can proceed without the need for a major international military force. Overall, we are pleased with the progress made during the past year on successful implementation of those benchmarks; however, much remains to be accomplished before we can look to the complete withdrawal of our forces.

The status of the NATO "force of gendarmes"

In response to the North Atlantic Council's guidance to consider specialized support to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the possible establishment of specialized units, SHAPE recommended that a unit be formed in "order to assist in partially closing the public security gap and increasing civil implementation." In July 1998, the Multinational Specialized Unit Force (MSU) was established in Bosnia as part of SACEUR OPLAN 10407. The MSU was established as an integral element of SFOR and operates under the existing rules of engagement and within the SFOR command structure. The unit, led by the Italians, is authorized two battalions and a brigade headquarters. To date, only one of the battalions has been formed and staffed, along with the headquarters element. The United States contributes two individuals to the headquarters element. The MSU provides Commander SFOR with a centrally controlled reserve capability to assist in reducing

the public security gap by supporting local authorities in responding to civil disorder. Since certification, the MSU has conducted a continuous series of exercises, orientation deployments, reconnaissance missions and information gathering operations throughout the country. Since August 1998, the MSU has conducted several intervention and preventive deployments to potential problem areas. In all cases, their actions served to defuse the situation and provide stability to allow local law enforcement to assume control.

The military and nonmilitary missions that the President has directed for U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The North Atlantic Council has tasked Commander SFOR through SACEUR with the mission of providing a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace in B-H, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain broad support for ongoing civil implementation plans.

Key military tasks:

- Maintain a deterrent military presence.
- Act to prevent major breaches of the cessation of hostilities or removal of heavy weapons from cantonment.
- Continue to operate Joint Military Commissions.
- Contribute, within means and capabilities, to a secure environment in which the international civil

organizations and parties to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia (GFAP) can carry out their responsibilities.

- Ensure force protection and freedom of movement for the force.
- Ensure continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of Separation and other military aspects of the GFAP.
- Monitor, and if required, enforce compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP.
- Enforce rules and procedures governing the use of airspace over B-H.

Key supporting tasks, within the means and capabilities of SFOR

- Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the High Representative.
- Support the Supervisor in implementation of Brcko arbitration decision.
- Support conduct of elections and installation of elected officials.
- Support phased and orderly returns of displaced persons and refugees by contributing to a safe and secure environment, but not forcibly return them or undertake to guard individual locations.
- Support organizations tasked with media reform efforts.

- Support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and efforts against persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs).
- Support the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and International Police Task Force (IPTF) in assisting local police, providing back-up support and a secure operating environment, directed towards the creation of a reformed and restructured indigenous police force, but without undertaking civil police tasks.
- Provide, on a case-by-case basis, selective support to the OSCE, if requested in implementing Annex 1B of the GFAP in B-H.
- Contribute to the continued improvement of freedom of movement in B-H.
- Support the Standing Committee on Military Matters.

Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs)

Progress is being made on bringing war criminals to justice. Less than half of the indictees charged by the Tribunal remain at large, and SFOR has conducted several operations to date to facilitate the transfer of 29 indictees to The Hague for trial. There are still fugitives at-large, though, that must be brought to justice and held accountable for their actions. Congressional action in October 1998 that allows

the Department of State to offer rewards to persons for information leading to the apprehension and/or conviction of PIFWCs by the ICTY may accelerate this program. The reward incentive is not a substitute for the apprehension/detention of war criminals, but only meant to complement existing programs and to put more pressure on indictees to turn themselves in to authorities. The Government of the Republika Srpska (RS) has openly stated that they would not support or assist in arrests of Bosnian Serbs indicted for war crimes who live in the RS. The Bosniaks and Croats have cooperated with the ICTY, but there are still areas in need of improvement. Under Dayton, the parties are primarily responsible for apprehension and surrender of PIFWCs. The SFOR is not a police force, but it will continue to detain PIFWCs in accordance with its mandate and rules of engagement and provide detainees safe passage to The Hague.

Support to civilian police functions

Public security is fundamental to the continued development of B-H. Bosnia and Herzegovina's current public safety situation is not viable without the support of SFOR; however, progress is being made. In December 1998, an agreement for restructuring of the police in the RS was signed between RS authorities and UNMIBH, and the OHR has increased efforts to build professional and multi-ethnic police forces in B-H. The IPTF relies on SFOR's back-up in cases of civil unrest; while

IPTF has accomplished a great deal in the development, organization, and training of indigenous police forces, the process is far from being complete.

Return of refugees

The SFOR contributes, within means and capabilities, to the secure environment needed by the international community to promote the return of refugees to their homes. For example, SFOR expelled some police from Croatia who were illegally present in Martin-Brod and had been harassing newly returned refugees to that area. We are disappointed with the low level of support by the Sarajevo authorities in allowing minority returns in their canton. Likewise, we are displeased with the continuing resistance by authorities in the RS to minority returns in key centers such as Banja Luka. Bosnian Croat authorities have also been lackluster in their support of returns and quelling outbursts in communities such as Stolac. The value of SFOR support is clearly evident in areas such as Brcko and Central Bosnia, where SFOR has been more closely involved in the planning and implementation process and returnee rates have risen.

Support to local and international authorities

Elections. One of the most significant benchmarks is the ability to hold and implement free and fair elections, the latest of which took place in September 1998 for all offices

above the municipal level. Although the September elections show that the electorate has not yet totally repudiated the hard-line nationalist parties in B-H and members of these parties continue to hold many of the major elected offices, the elections confirmed an overall trend in favor of moderation, pluralism and pragmatism. They were conducted in a secure environment with only very minor security incidents noted. While SFOR provided an increased presence to foster wide-area security in potentially problematic areas, for the first time, SFOR was able to reduce its level of election support as compared to the three previous elections. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the IPTF, and the Bosnians were able to step in and successfully execute many responsibilities previously shouldered by SFOR. This signaled an important step on the path to further reductions in U.S./NATO force responsibilities in Bosnia.

President Milosevic of the FRY and Serbian hard-line followers continue to meddle in RS politics. Their maneuverings have resulted in failure to confirm a new Prime Minister following the elections. In early March the High Representative removed RS President Poplasen for his deference to Belgrade (a foreign power) and for trying to remove Prime Minister Dodik, who continues in office. The SFOR continues to provide a stabilizing presence during this political uncertainty.

Media. Significant progress has been realized in media reform throughout B-H. Over 80 percent of the population are covered by the footprint of the internationally funded Open Broadcast Network (OBN) TV network. A new broadcast management control board has been installed that has restructured radio and television networks in both the RS and the Federation. Compliance with GFAP requirements is now monitored by the Independent Media Commission, and with the continual presence of SFOR to enforce standards, media reform has improved throughout the region. The SFOR will continue to support this initiative and the newly founded Media Commission.

Brcko. On March 5, the Brcko Arbitration Panel announced its decision that Brcko would be a neutral district within the territory of both the Federation and the RS. The award sparked some public demonstrations in the RS but these caused relatively little damage and subsided fairly quickly. Brcko has made some progress in self-government as well as in freedom of movement and resettlement. The SFOR's proactive involvement supporting the IPTF and providing area security has been key to these initiatives. Now, and for the foreseeable future, Brcko, coupled with Bosnian Serb animosity toward NATO air strikes as a result of the conflict in Kosovo, present the highest potential for civil unrest and renewed ethnic tension in the region. The SFOR will continue to support international and civil

organizations involved in the implementation of the Brcko decision.

Assessment of the expected threats to the United States forces

Until commencement of NATO air strikes against the FRY in March, which had the effect of inflaming Serb opinion, the experience of IFOR and SFOR indicated the security threat to any follow-on force was low. From the initial IFOR deployment, the former warring factions (FWFs) generally complied with military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord and with NATO's military mission. The FWFs have not challenged NATO's power and authority. Moreover, the FWFs have remained in compliance as the overall force size declined. There have been no combat-related casualties. The established rules of engagement and IFOR/SFOR's willingness to use force, if necessary, have generally deterred the police, security forces and criminals from threatening activities. NATO forces have encountered isolated incidents largely as a result of volatile crowd situations beyond the ability or willingness of local police and IPTF to control.

- NATO commanders have made it clear that any challenge to SFOR will generate a prompt and decisive response.
- Reactions to SFOR detentions of war criminals in July 1997 were directed primarily at United Nations and OSCE targets, and dissipated when SFOR threatened to respond. Subsequent

detentions did not spark reactions on as large a scale; reactions remained more localized. Apprehension of Bosnian Serb Army General Krstic in December 1998 provoked a reaction that was limited largely to demonstrations in several cities in the RS.

- Other confrontations involving SFOR personnel resulted from providing support to IPTF-backed returns of refugees and internally displaced persons.
- The SFOR is fully capable of handling these situations. The addition of the MSU, which is trained in public security tasks, has further enhanced SFOR's capability to handle situations and reduced the overall risk to the force. The parties are in favor of a continued NATO security presence, although for differing reasons.

Commencement of the air strikes against the FRY has had an impact on the threat to U.S. forces in the RS, and they have gone to a heightened alert posture. Bosnian Serbs have mounted public demonstrations, and there have been some isolated incidents of violence. The SFOR took action to cut a FRY rail line that transited a portion of Bosnian territory. Some members of the RS army have entered the FRY to fight alongside fellow Serbs. Although it is unlikely, the FRY could attack SFOR; to date, with the exception of some in-and-out cross-border incursions into northern Albania, the FRY has avoided

widening the conflict. The SFOR, however, is prepared for such an eventuality.

Assessment of Bosnia costs

Since FY 1996, the cost to the Department of Defense of carrying out the military missions directed in Bosnia and Herzegovina is about \$8.6 billion. These costs are summarized below:

	FY 1999	FY 1998	FY 1997	FY 1996
<u>DoD Costs in Millions</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Deliberate Forge	161.3	159.4	183.3	225.9
Joint Forge	1,589.1	1,792.8	-	-
IFOR/IFOR Prep	-	-	2,087.5	2,231.7
Provide Promise	-	-	-	21.7
Sharp Guard	-	-	-	9.3
Totals	1,750.4	1,952.2	2,280.8	2,488.6

Operation Deliberate Forge (follow-on to Deny Flight, Decisive Edge and Deliberate Guard) involves air operations for maintaining the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

Operation Joint Forge (follow-on to IFOR, SFOR, Deliberate Force, Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard) is the NATO operation to deter the resumption of hostilities and to contribute to a secure environment that promotes the reestablishment of civil authority in B-H.

The category IFOR/IFOR Preparation includes the costs of preparing U.S. armed forces for deployment to IFOR, which was the peace implementation force in the former Yugoslavia.

Operation Provide Promise was the military operation that airlifted and airdropped humanitarian supplies into Bosnia.

Operation Sharp Guard was the enforcement of the United Nations sanctioned embargo against the former Yugoslavia (excluding the enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia) conducted in conjunction with Western Europe Union forces.

For FY 1999, the Department projects costs of \$1.8 billion for Bosnia. A detailed breakout of these costs follows:

Estimated FY 1999 DoD Bosnia Costs (\$ in Millions)

	<u>Joint Forge</u>	<u>Deliberate Forge</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Military Personnel:			
Army	292.1	-	292.1
Navy	8.5	1.2	9.7
Marines	2.7	-	2.7
Air Force	31.5	1.5	33.0
Navy Reserve	<u>2.2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Total	337.0	2.7	339.7
Operations & Maintenance:			
Army	1,041.5	-	1,041.5
Navy	19.2	52.4	71.6
Marine Corps	1.9	0.3	2.2

Air Force	86.0	105.1	191.1
Defense-Wide	90.7	0.8	91.5
Defense Health Program	12.7		12.7
Navy Reserve	<u>0.1</u>	<u> </u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	1,252.1	158.6	1,410.7
GRAND TOTAL	1,589.1	161.3	1,750.4

Future plans for operations in Bosnia

Based on Commander SFOR's Six Month Review (SMR), SHAPE has recommended to NATO's Military Committee that there be no immediate major reductions in SFOR force levels but indicated that "routine" administrative adjustments in areas such as logistics and non-maneuver unit headquarters were possible in the short-term. SHAPE also suggested that adding a second Multinational Specialized Unit battalion and consideration of a shift from heavy to light units would result in additional force reductions. The Military Committee and, subsequently, the NATO Policy Coordination Group (PCG) generally agreed with, but expanded upon, SHAPE's conclusions. Both emphasized the need for SFOR flexibility and recognized a requirement for further analysis. In December, the NAC tasked the PCG to prepare comprehensive political-military guidance for a NATO Military Authorities study of options for long-term SFOR restructuring/reductions. The resulting paper fostered a two-phase approach. Phase One involves short-term administrative reductions while

Phase Two consists of a wide-ranging study including analysis of more radical approaches to SFOR's restructuring/reductions. Potential topics for further study include adjustments in Multinational Division (MND) and other administrative boundaries, reorganization of the basic command structure, and review of the lead nation principle in the MNDs. On December 17, 1998, SACEUR General Clark briefed NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels on the nature and timing of future SFOR force reductions. He reported that efficiency reductions, totaling 11.3 percent, would come from consolidation, commercialization, and streamlining headquarters and support. As a result of this process, the United States decided to reduce its contribution to SFOR by approximately 10 percent, from 6,900 to 6,200 military personnel. These reductions will be completed later this year.

Commenting on the NAC's proposed SFOR structural review, SACEUR anticipated that restructuring reductions could come from enhanced intelligence, availability of multinational specialized units, more flexible reserves and adjustments of tactics and techniques. SHAPE would aim for a NAC decision on any restructuring or reductions by June 1999, with implementation to begin later in the year.

The NATO Defense Ministers subsequently endorsed the SFOR Six-Month Review, including SACEUR's recommendations for short term force reductions, and tasked the NATO Military Authorities

to produce a study of options for the future size and structure of SFOR. All the Ministers agreed that, although no major reductions in SFOR size should be undertaken in the short-term, SFOR could not remain in Bosnia indefinitely and it was important to prevent a dependency syndrome on the part of the Bosnian parties.

The NATO Military Authorities are developing three options, taking into account the crisis in Kosovo that could affect the size of SFOR. A NAC decision on Military Committee recommendations will follow the completion of the review.

I want to emphasize again my continued commitment to close consultation with Congress on political and military matters as they concern Bosnia-Herzegovina. My Administration looks forward to continuing to work with the Congress in the months ahead with a goal of establishing the basis for a lasting peace in the Balkans.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301




MAR 25 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Report to Congress—"Military Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina"

The attached report responds to section 7(b) of the general provisions of Chapter I of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations Act (Public Law 105-174, 112 Stat.64) and Section 1203 of the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act. The law requires that the President submit a report as long as the U.S. has military ground forces deployed in support of the Bosnia Stabilization Force. The Department's input is next under.


Joseph Reynes Jr.
Colonel, USAF
Executive Secretary



The Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act requires submission of a semiannual report to Congress as long as United States ground combat forces continue to participate in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). The Act requires the following information:

- (1) The expected duration of the deployment of US forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) in support of implementation of the benchmarks set forth by the President in March 1998.
- (2) The percentage of those benchmarks that have been completed to date, the percentage expected to be completed within the next reporting period, and expected time for completion of remaining tasks.
- (3) The status of the NATO force of gendarmes, mission, composition, and extent of US Armed Forces participation.
- (4) The military and nonmilitary missions that I directed for US forces in B-H, including specific discussion of:
 - (A) the mission of forces, if any, in connection with the pursuit and apprehension of war criminals;
 - (B) the mission of those forces, if any, in connection with civilian police functions;
 - (C) the mission of those forces, if any, in connection with the resettlement of refugees; and
 - (D) the missions undertaken by those forces, if any, in support of international and local civilian authorities.
- (5) An assessment of the risk for the US forces in B-H, including, for each mission identified pursuant to paragraph (4), the assessment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the nature and level of risk of the mission for the safety and well-being of US military personnel.
- (6) An assessment of the cost to the US, by fiscal year, and a projection of any additional funding that will be required to meet mission requirements for those operations for the remainder of the fiscal year.
- (7) A joint assessment by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State of the status of planning for:
 - (A) the assumption of all remaining military missions inside B-H by European military and paramilitary forces;
 - (B) the establishment and support of a forward-based US rapid response force outside of B-H that would be capable of deploying rapidly to defeat military threats to a European follow-on force inside B-H to accomplish its missions under the Dayton Accords.

This report fulfills the requirements of section 1203(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.

Expected duration of US forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

US military force structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) has been and will continue to be reduced, as progress is made on implementation, or the capability of other non-military institutions increases. The six-month review process that began with initial deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995 continues today. The reviews include assessments of the security situation, compliance by the parties with the provisions of the Dayton Accords, the progress towards achievement of benchmarks, as well as recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian implementation agencies, and/or any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force. The December 1998 assessment concluded that no immediate major reductions in SFOR force levels were warranted but that "routine" administrative adjustments in areas such as logistics and non-maneuver unit headquarters were possible in the short term. Based on this review, the SECDEF recently announced the reduction of US forces operating in Bosnia from 6,900 to approximately 6,200. This reduction, to be fully realized later this year, resulted from an analysis of the current SFOR mission, its key military and supporting tasks, and six months of experience of operating under Operation JOINT FORGE. It is important to remember that the current US troop level of 6,900 already represents a 20 percent reduction from the 8,500 US troops deployed in June 1998, and is 66 percent less than the peak US deployment of 20,000 troops in 1996. This reduction does not signal a change in the SFOR mission, nor will it effect SFOR's ability to support implementation of the Dayton Accords. SHAPE has also recommended sourcing the second authorized Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) battalion and consideration of a shift from heavy to light units in order to achieve some additional force reductions. We expect a comprehensive, wide-ranging mission and force structure analysis, based on the Six Month Review (SMR), will be completed by the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) in the Spring of this year.

Percentage of benchmarks completed:

I would refer you to the report I submitted in February 1999, pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, that provides an update on the status of benchmarks identified in March 1998. The report provides a complete assessment on the progress of each benchmark. I would also emphasize that the benchmarks are not a checklist which must be complete before NATO can depart but rather a road map to guide civil implementation aimed at reaching the point where it can proceed without the need for a major international military force. Overall, we are pleased with the progress made during the past year on successful implementation of those benchmarks; however, much remains to be accomplished before we can look to the complete withdrawal of our forces.

The status of the NATO "force of gendarmes:"

In response to the North Atlantic Council's guidance to consider specialized support to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the possible establishment of specialized units, SHAPE recommended that a unit be formed in "order to assist in partially closing the public security gap and increasing civil implementation." In July 1998, the Multinational Specialized Unit Force (MSU) stood-up in Bosnia as part of SACEUR OPLAN 10407. The MSU was established as an integral element of SFOR and operates under the existing rules of engagement and within the SFOR command structure. The

unit, led by the Italians, is authorized two battalions and a brigade headquarters. To date, only one of the battalions has been sourced along with the headquarters element. The US contributes two individuals to the headquarters element. The MSU provides COMSFOR with a centrally controlled reserve capability to assist in reducing the public security gap by supporting local authorities in responding to civil disorder. Since certification, the MSU has conducted a continuous series of exercises, orientation deployments, reconnaissance missions, and information gathering operations throughout the country. Since August 1998, the MSU has conducted several intervention and preventive deployments to potential problem areas. In all cases, their actions served to defuse the situation and provide stability to allow local law enforcement to assume control.

The military and nonmilitary missions that the President has directed for US forces in B&H:

The North Atlantic Council has tasked COMSFOR through SACEUR with the mission of providing a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace in B-H, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain broad support for ongoing civil implementation plans.

Key military tasks:

- Maintain a deterrent military presence
- Act to prevent major breaches of the cessation of hostilities or removal of heavy weapons from cantonment
- Continue to operate Joint Military Commissions
- Contribute, within means and capabilities, to a secure environment in which the international civil organizations and parties to the GFAP can carry out their responsibilities
- Ensure force protection and own freedom of movement
- Ensure continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of Separation and other military aspects of the GFAP
- Monitor, and if required, enforce compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP
- Enforce rules and procedures governing the use of airspace over B-H

Key supporting tasks, within the means and capabilities of SFOR:

- Provide, on a case by case basis, support to the High Representative
- Support the Supervisor in implementation of Brcko arbitration decisions
- Support conduct of elections and installation of elected officials
- Support phased and orderly returns of displaced persons and refugees by contributing to a safe and secure environment but not forcibly return them or undertake to guard individual locations
- Support organizations tasked with media reform efforts
- Support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and efforts against persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs)

- Support the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and International Police Task Force (IPTF) in assisting local police, providing back-up support and a secure operating environment, directed towards the creation of a reformed and restructured indigenous police force, but without undertaking civil police tasks
- Provide, on a case by case basis, selective support to the OSCE, if requested in implementing Annex 1B of the GFAP in B&H
- Contribute to the continued improvement of freedom of movement in B&H
- Support the Standing Committee on Military Matters

Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs):

Progress is being made on bringing war criminals to justice. Less than half of the indictees charged by the Tribunal remain at large, and SFOR has conducted several operations to date to transfer 15 indictees to the Hague for trial. There are still fugitives at-large, though, that must be brought to justice and held accountable for their actions. Congressional intervention to change the law in October 1998 to allow the US Department of State to offer rewards to persons for information leading to the apprehension and/or conviction of PIFWCs indicted by the ICTY may accelerate this program. The reward incentive is not a substitute for the apprehension/detention of war criminals, but only meant to complement existing programs and to put more pressure on indictees to turn themselves into authorities. The Government of the Republika Srpska (RS) has openly stated that they would not support or assist in arrests of Bosnian Serbs indicted for war crimes who live in the RS. The Bosniaks and Croats have cooperated with the ICTY but there are still areas for improvement. Under Dayton, the parties are primarily responsible for apprehension and surrender of PIFWCs. SFOR is not a police force but it will continue to detain PIFWCs in accordance with its mandate and rules of engagement and provide detainees safe passage to The Hague.

Support to civilian police functions:

Public security is fundamental to the continued development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina's current public safety situation is not viable without the support of SFOR; however, progress is being made. In December 1998, an agreement for restructuring of the police in the Republika Srpska (RS) was signed between RS authorities and UNMIBH, and the Office of the High Representative has increased efforts to build professional and multi-ethnic police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The IPTF relies on SFOR's back-up in cases of civil unrest and while IPTF has accomplished a great deal in the development, organization, and training of indigenous police forces, the process is far from being complete.

Resettlement Return of refugees:

SFOR contributes, within means and capabilities, to the secure environment needed by the international community to promote the return of refugees to their homes. For example, SFOR recently expelled some police from Croatia who were illegally present in Martin-Brod and had been harassing newly returned refugees to that area. We are disappointed with the low-level of support by the Sarajevo authorities to allow minority returns in their municipality. Likewise, we are displeased with the continuing resistance by authorities in the RS to minority returns in key centers such as Banja Luka. Bosnian

Croat authorities have also been lackluster in their support of returns and quelling outbursts in communities such as Stolac. The value of SFOR support is clearly evident in areas such as Brcko and Central Bosnia, where SFOR has been more closely involved in the planning and implementation process and returnee rates have risen.

Support to local and international authorities:

Elections. One of the most significant benchmarks is the ability to hold and implement free and fair elections, the latest of which took place in September 1998 for all offices above the municipal level. Although the September elections show that the electorate has not yet totally repudiated the hard-line nationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina and members of these parties continue to hold many of the major elected offices, the elections confirmed an overall trend in favor of moderation and pragmatism. They were conducted in a secure environment with only very minor security incidents noted. While SFOR provided an increased presence to foster wide-area security in potentially problematic areas, for the first time, SFOR was able to reduce its level of election support as compared to the three previous elections. OSCE, IPTF, and the Bosnians were able to step in and successfully execute many responsibilities previously shouldered by SFOR. This signaled an important step on the path to further reductions in US/NATO troop responsibilities in Bosnia.

Media. Significant progress has been realized in media reform throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over 80 percent of the population are covered by the footprint of the internationally funded Open Broadcast Network (OBN) TV network. A new broadcast management control board has been installed that has restructured radio and television networks in both the RS and Federation. Compliance with GFAP requirements is now monitored by the Independent Media Commission and with the continual presence of SFOR to enforce standards, media reform has improved throughout the region. SFOR will continue to support this initiative and the newly founded Media Commission.

Brcko. Brcko, under the international supervision of the Office of the Deputy High Representative, has made significant progress in self-government, as well as in freedom of movement and resettlement. SFOR's proactive involvement supporting the IPTF and providing area security have been key to these initiatives. Now, and for the foreseeable future, Brcko presents the highest potential for civil unrest and renewed ethnic tension in the region. SFOR will continue to support international and civil organizations involved during the arbitration process and the implementation of the approaching Brcko Arbitration Tribunal decision.

Assessment of the expected threats to the United States forces:

Based on the experience of IFOR and SFOR, the security threat to any follow-on force is assessed as low. From the initial IFOR deployment, the former warring factions (FWFs) generally complied with military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord and with NATO's military mission. The FWFs have not challenged NATO's power and authority. The FWFs have remained in compliance as the overall force size declined. There have been no combat-related casualties. The established rules of engagement and IFOR/SFOR's

willingness to use force, if necessary, have generally deterred the police, security forces, and criminals from threatening activity. NATO forces have encountered isolated incidents largely as a result of volatile crowd situations beyond the ability or willingness of local police and international police task force (IPTF) to control.

- NATO commanders have made it clear that any challenge to SFOR will generate a prompt and decisive response.
- Reactions to SFOR detentions of war criminals in July 1997 were directed primarily at UN and OSCE targets, and dissipated when SFOR threatened to respond. Subsequent detentions did not spark reactions on as large a scale; they remained more localized. Apprehension of Bosnian Serb Army General Krstic in December 1998 provoked a reaction that was limited largely to demonstrations in several cities in the Republika Srpska.
- Other confrontations involving SFOR troops resulted from providing support to IPTF-backed returns of refugee/internally displaced persons.

SFOR is fully capable of handling these situations. The addition of the MSU, which is trained in public security tasks, has further enhanced SFOR's capability to handle situations and reduced the overall risk to the force. The parties are in favor of a continued NATO security presence, although for differing reasons.

Assessment of Bosnia Costs:

Since FY 1996, the cost to the Department of Defense, of carrying out the military missions that I directed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is about \$8.6 billion. These costs are summarized below:

	FY 1999	FY 1998	FY 1997	FY 1996
<u>DoD Costs in Millions</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Deliberate Forge	161.3	159.4	183.3	225.9
Joint Forge	1,589.1	1,792.8	-	-
IFOR/IFOR Prep	-	-	2,087.5	2,231.7
Provide Promise	-	-	-	21.7
Sharp Guard	-	-	-	9.3
Able Sentry	10.5	10.5	11.7	30.9
UNCRO	-	-	-	0.5
Totals	1,760.9	1,962.7	2,282.5	2,520.0

Operation Deliberate Forge (follow-on to Deny Flight, Decisive Edge, and Deliberate Guard) involves air operations for maintaining the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

Operation Joint Forge (follow-on to IFOR, SFOR, Deliberate Force, Joint Endeavor, and Joint Guard) is the NATO operation to deter the resumption of hostilities and to

contribute to a secure environment that promotes the reestablishment of civil authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

IFOR Preparation and IFOR included the costs of preparing U.S. troops for deployment to IFOR, which was the peace implementation force in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Operation Provide Promise was the military operation which airlifted and airdropped humanitarian supplies into Bosnia.

Operation Sharp Guard was the enforcement of the United Nations sanctioned embargo against the FRY (excluding the enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia) conducted in conjunction with Western Europe Union forces.

Operation Able Sentry is the U.S. participation in the United Nations operation to observe the Serbian/Macedonian border.

UNCRO was support provided to the Zagreb hospital in support of the United Nations in Croatia.

For FY 1999, the Department projects costs of \$1.8 billion for Bosnia. A detailed breakout of these costs follows:

<u>Estimated FY 1999 DoD Bosnia Costs (\$ in Millions)</u>				
	<u>Able Sentry</u>	<u>Joint Forge</u>	<u>Deliberate Forge</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Military Personnel:				
Army	5.6	292.1	-	297.7
Navy	-	8.5	1.2	9.7
Marines	-	2.7	-	2.7
Air Force	-	31.5	1.5	33.0
Navy Reserve	-	2.2	-	2.2
Total	5.6	337.0	2.7	345.3
Operation & Maintenance:				
Army	4.9	1,041.5	-	1,046.4
Navy	-	19.2	52.4	71.6
Marine Corps	-	1.9	0.3	2.2
Air Force	-	86.0	105.1	191.1
Defense-Wide	-	90.7	0.8	91.5
Defense Health Program	-	12.7	-	12.7
Navy Reserve	-	0.1	-	0.1
Total	4.9	1,252.1	158.6	1,415.6
GRAND TOTAL	10.5	1,589.1	161.3	1,760.9

Future plans for operations in Bosnia:

Based on COMSFOR's Six Month Review (SMR), SHAPE has recommended to NATO's Military Committee (MC) that there be no immediate major reductions in SFOR force levels but that "routine" administrative adjustments in areas such as logistics and non-maneuver unit headquarters were possible in the short term. SHAPE also suggested that adding a second MSU battalion and consideration of a shift from heavy to light units would also result in additional force reductions. The MC and, subsequently, the NATO Policy Coordination Group (PCG) generally agreed with, but expanded upon, SHAPE's conclusions. Both emphasized the need for SFOR flexibility and recognized a requirement for further analysis. In December, the NAC tasked the PCG to prepare comprehensive political-military guidance for a NATO Military Authority study of options for long-term SFOR restructuring/reductions. The resulting paper fostered a two-phase approach. Phase one involves short-term administrative reductions while phase two consists of a wide-ranging study including analysis of more radical approaches to SFOR's restructuring/reductions. Potential topics for further study include adjustments in Multinational Division (MND) and other administrative boundaries, reorganization of the basic command structure, and/or review of the lead nation principle in the MNDs. We are pressing for a comprehensive, wide-ranging mission and force structure analysis, based on the SMR, to be completed by the NMAs in the Spring.

On 17 December, General Clark briefed NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels on the nature and timing of future SFOR force reductions. He reported that efficiency reductions, totaling 11.3 percent, would come from consolidation, commercialization, and streamlining headquarters and support. As a result of this process, the U.S. decided to reduce its contribution to SFOR by approximately 10 percent, from 6,900 to 6,200 troops. These reductions will be complete later this year.

Commenting on the NAC's proposed SFOR structural review, SACEUR anticipated that restructuring reductions could come from enhanced intelligence, availability of multinational specialized units, more flexible reserves and adjustments of tactics and techniques. SHAPE would aim to implement any restructuring or reductions between June and November 1999.

The NATO Defense Ministers subsequently endorsed the SFOR Six Month Review, including SACEUR's recommendations for short-term force reductions, and tasked the NMAs to produce a study of options for the future size and structure of SFOR. All the Ministers agreed that while no major reductions in SFOR size should be undertaken in the short term, SFOR could not remain in Bosnia indefinitely and it was important to prevent a dependency syndrome on the part of the Bosnian parties and the civil implementation organizations.

SHAPE will be required to complete the SFOR structural review. The NATO Policy Coordination Group is currently in the process of further refining guidance for SHAPE

on the parameters of the review. A NAC decision on SHAPE recommendations will follow the completion of the review.

We want to emphasize again our continued commitment to close consultation with Congress on political and military matters as they concern Bosnia-Herzegovina. My Administration looks forward to continuing to work with the Congress in the months ahead with a goal of installing a lasting peace in the Balkans.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2256

Reds

March 29, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on March 27, 1999

*I don't
understand
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understand
second
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The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on March 27.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: March 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SDP NARA, Date 7/24/2019
2014-0549-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2256

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. STEVEN RICCHETTI
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on March 27, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on March 27, 1999. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: March 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 508 NARA, Date 7/27/2014
2014-1544-m

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, March 27, 1999. [Record ID: 9902256] [partial] (2 pages)	03/29/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2256

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 27, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 12:30 - 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

Chief of Staff:
Steve Ricchetti

OVP:
Richard Saunders

CIA:

(b)(3)

State:
Strobe Talbott
James Dobbins
James Pardew
Julia Taft

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Scott Fry
George Casey

Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)
Richard Holbrooke (via Secure
voice)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

NSC:
Greg Schulte
David Leavy
James Baker
Eric Schwartz
Miles Lackey
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro
P. J. Crowley

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: March 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0544-M (1.12)
KBH 7/31/2019

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should produce a short, unclassified summary of Serbian violence and atrocities prior to the start of NATO air operations. (Action: NSC) (U)
- Deputy Secretary Talbott should lead an inter-agency team to the front-line states to provide reassurance and announce additional economic assistance. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- Principals should be invited to consider the proposal presented by the State Department to seek Milosevic's consent to return his forces to the deployment agreed in October and to accept armed enforcement by NATO aircraft. (Action: State/NSC) ~~(C)~~
- In its public line, the USG should stress that NATO is united, is imposing a price on Milosevic for the atrocities he is committing, and is diminishing his capacity to conduct offensive operations. (Action: All) (U)

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 19 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
SOC

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 29 MAR DC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 03 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
COSGRIFF
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SPB NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0549-02

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STEINBERG	Z 99040111 FOR DECISION
001 HURLEY	Z 99040514 FOR REDO
001 STEINBERG	Z 99041914 FOR DECISION
001	X 99041914 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
002	X 99041914 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTIONDISPATCH FOR INFO

002	990419	FUERTH, L
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002	990419	REYNES, J
002	990419	BASKETTE, A
002	990419	RICCHETTI, S
002	990419	WOLFE, T
002	990419	MANNING, M

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			A-Par I
Rice	1/3	④ 4/14 4/19	④ 4/14 4/19
Davies			
Kerrick			
berg	2		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TR 4/19	N
Records Mgt.	5		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: SOC-29 Mar DC
on Kosovo

APR 16 PM 5:17

Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

4/1/82

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Concgriff</u>			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(P) 4/1</u>	<u>done</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			
<u>Hurley</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>A = per Nina's note</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

C:

PR 1 0410:00

COMMENTS: SOC Mar 29 DC mtg

Sec Office has diskette

yes

April 19, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. STEVEN RICCHETTI
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on March 29, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on March 29. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Glyn T. Davies
for Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WITH ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: March 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SDB NARA, Date 7/20/2014
2014-0549-m

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, March 29, 1999. [Record ID: 9902257] [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for April 1999 Part I [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 29, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 9:30 - 11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

OVP:
Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Dobbins
James Pardew
Julia Taft

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)
Douglas McElhaney (via secure
voice)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:
Steve Ricchetti

CIA:
John Gordon

(b)(3)

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

White House:
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte
David Leavy
James Baker
Eric Schwartz
Miles Lackey
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: March 29, 2009

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PER E.O. 13526
2014-0549-M (1.15)
KBH 3/20/2024

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should press NATO to take the lead in organizing the humanitarian relief effort in Albania and Macedonia. (Action: State, DOD) ~~(C)~~
- State should contact UN High Commissioner Ogata and the French government to encourage a positive attitude toward NATO involvement in supporting humanitarian relief. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- NATO should assure Macedonia that the Alliance will respond to any challenges to its security stemming from NATO's presence and activities. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The USG should adopt a more forward-leaning public affairs posture on NATO air operations to complement briefings by NATO. This should include a daily J-2/J-3 press briefing. (Action: All) ~~(C)~~
- State should assure President Djukanovic that Montenegro would not be targeted by NATO air strikes other than as required for force protection. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should press NATO to strike selected high-value targets in Belgrade prior to the visit by Russian Prime Minister Primikov. (Action: State, DOD) ~~(S)~~

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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SITUATION ROOM**

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC #

2257

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-8425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: SOC for DC on Kosovo 29 Mar PAGES: 5
(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

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(PHONE NUMBER)WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for DC on Kosovo 29 MarNSC LOG # 2257

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>State</u>	<u>Alan Romberg</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS:

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2008-0994-F-3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 19 APR 99

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____
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RICCHETTI, S	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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TIME

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COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF
ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

Hells

March 29, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on March 29, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on March 29.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: March 29, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By SDP NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2014-0549-m