

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chronos for March 1999 Part I [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1705

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	03/01/1999	P3/b(3)
002. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	03/04/1999	P3/b(3)
003. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	03/18/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for March 1999, Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6272

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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001. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	03/01/1999	P3/b(3)

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Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 1, 1999

Chris

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Tuesday, March 2, 1999, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.

Greg Schulte

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of Dayton Accords

Attachment

AGENDA FOR SMALL GROUP MEETING ON KOSOVO
March 2, 1999

- I. Getting to March 15. State
- II. Civil Implementation Planning. State
- III. KFOR Planning. JCS
- IV. Any Other Issues All

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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002. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	03/04/1999	P3/b(3)

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National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

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2008-0994-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

ROBERT MCCARTHY
USIA

MARGUERITE HOUBE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense


JAMIE METZL
Department of State

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting scheduled for Friday, March 5, 1999
has been cancelled.


Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	For James Pardew et al. Subject: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	03/18/1999	P3/b(3)

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Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for March 1999, Part I [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6272

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 18, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

ALAN ROMBERG
Department of State

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

JOSEPH KAUFMANN
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

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Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Office of Management and
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Central Intelligence Agency

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Central Intelligence Agency

ROBERT MCCARTHY
USIA


FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

JAMIE METZL
Department of State

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting scheduled for Friday, March 19, 1999
has been cancelled.


Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President
for the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900533
RECEIVED: 26 JAN 99 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: ISUFI, LUAN ADAM

DOC DATE: 26 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
NSA CORRESPONDENCE

UN

PERSONS: HOLBROOKE, R

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION TO HOLBROOKE AS US AMB TO UN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 06 FEB 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BANDLER
RUDMAN
SCHWARTZ
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 3, 1999

Dear Mr. Isufi:

Thank you for your letter on the Kosovo conflict to Mr. Samuel Berger, the President's National Security Advisor. Mr. Berger has asked me to respond on his behalf.

The Racak massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians is yet one further example of the brutality of Slobodan Milosevic's policy of indiscriminate violence, a policy that has had such devastating consequences for Kosovo. The repressive Belgrade regime continues to be in breach of the agreements it concluded with NATO and the OSCE last October and in defiance of the international community and the rule of law.


United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the Kosovo peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process. For the first time, Kosovar Albanians came together as a single team and agreed in principle to sign the interim political settlement after consultations in Kosovo.

When signed and implemented, the settlement will end Serb repression, violence and bloodshed, establish self-government in Kosovo and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development there. To date, the Serbs have not agreed to sign but they have agreed to substantial parts of the political agreement on Kosovo self-government.

We are committed to ending the violence and repression in Kosovo. The March 15 implementation talks offer an important opportunity to end the conflict and it is up to both sides to

grasp its importance and begin to build a better future. Again,
thank you for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Greg Schulte', written over a horizontal line.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Luan Adam Isufi
Albanian American National Community
251 Main Street
Hackensack, New Jersey 07601

ALBANIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COMMUNITY

251 Main Street
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Phone/Fax: (201) 343-4180

January/21' 1999

The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.

FN-01/021001999

Right Honourable
Senator, Jesse Helms
Chairman, U.S. Senate.

Washington D.C.

Mr, Chairman.

In the name of the Albanian American National Community, we formally would like to ask the Senate on Foreign relations to withhold the nomination of Ambassador, MR, Richard C. Holbrooke as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

We have reason Sir, to believe that Mr, Holbrooke as U.S. negotiator for the Balkans during the Bosnian war, and now as our chief U.S. negotiator for the Kosova conflict between the innocent Albanian population and the Serbian terrorist, MR, Richard C, Holbrooke has not been Impartial, but has time and again taken the Serbian side against the Albanians in Kosova, and this has caused the deaths and destruction of thousands of innocent Albanian people.

On many occasions during MR, Holbrooke talks with some self proclaimed Albanian leaders in Prishtina, Kosova and other parts of Kosova, MR, Holbrooke has intimidated the Albanians and put un necessary pressure on them to cooperate with Mr, Milloshevic and accept the Serbian demands for self destruction.


Therefore Sir, it is our opinion that Mr, Holbrooke has not been a fair and honest U.S.diplomat,but has helped the Serbian international terrorism and genocide against the Albanian people in Kosova,and the results of his anti - Albanian policy are known to the whole world today.

We also demand that MR, Richard C. Holbrooke be taken out of any diplomatic negotiations that concern Albanian lands in former Yugoslavia,or any other place in the Balkans.

end.

Respectfully Yours


Luan Adam Isufi.



President.

0533
To: @BOGNIA

PLS SEND
RESPONSE ON
BEHALF OF SRB.

Dear MR, Burger.

The only persons that might be acceptable to the Albanian side in Kosova to have any semblance of success are former President of the U.S Mr, Jimmy Carter or Senator, Joseph Bidden, both Democrats, both are respected and trusted by us Albanians.

Forget Mr, Ch. Hill or Mr, Holbrooke, they are very close to the Serbian terrorist in Belgrade, no Albanian in his right mind will ever deal with those two persons.

P.S. Albanians do not want their fate to be decided by the children of the Russians Bolsheviks.

0533
To: @BOSNIA
PLS SEND
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BEHALF OF SRB.

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900939
RECEIVED: 10 FEB 99 13

TO: PANIC, MILAN

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 04 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
RUSSIA
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

KOSOVO
PEACEKEEPING

file

PERSONS: HSLOB

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LTR SUPPORTING POLICIES IN KOSOVO & SUGGESTION FOR
RUSSIAN TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACEKEEPING

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 22 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSTTS

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900939

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HURLEY
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99021013 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
X 99031614 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: PANIC, MILAN

DOC DATE: 29 FEB 99
SOURCE REF: 293196

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
RUSSIA
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

KOSOVO
PEACEKEEPING

*Approved by
Greg Schulte*

PERSONS: HSLOB

SUBJECT: PANIC WRITES IN SUPPORT OF POLICIES IN KOSOVO & SUUGESTS RUSSIAN
TROOPS PARTICIPATE IN PEACEKEEPING

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 22 FEB 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
SCHULTE
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
BOUCHARD
BUSBY
MCCARTHY
PASCUAL
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 4, 1999

Dear Mr. Panic:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President on events in Kosovo. The Administration deeply appreciates your thoughts as the United States presses forward in its efforts to resolve the conflict, end the suffering, and give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve.

United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the Kosovo peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process. For the first time, Kosovar Albanians came together as a single team and agreed in principle to sign the interim political settlement after consultations in Kosovo.

When signed and implemented, the settlement will end Serb repression, violence and bloodshed, establish self-government in Kosovo and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development there. Kosovars will run their own hospitals, go to their own schools, collect their own taxes, police their own streets, and have their own courts. Of paramount importance, the security chapters require the withdrawal of the majority of Serb army forces, except for a limited number of troops serving exclusively as border patrol units, and rapidly-phased removal of all Serb state police. To date, the Serbs have not agreed to sign but they have agreed to substantial parts of the political agreement on Kosovo self-government.


If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. Europeans will provide the bulk of the force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement. The Administration agrees with your view that

Russian participation in the implementation force would help in dealing with the Serbs and we are working hard to gain Russian cooperation to achieve that end.

The Administration is committed to ending the violence and repression in Kosovo. The March 15 implementation talks offer an important opportunity to end the conflict and it is up to both sides to grasp its importance and begin to build a better future.

Again, thank you for your letter and expression of support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G. Schulte', written over a horizontal line.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Milan Panic
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Corporate Headquarters, ICN Plaza
3300 Hyland Avenue
Costa Mesa, California 92626

0939 4224858
273196
N/C
Republique Federale de Yougoslavie
le Premier Ministre (1992-93)
Milan Panic

For attached

January 29, 1999


SENT VIA FAX AND FEDERAL EXPRESS

Dear Mr. President:

I am heartened by the leadership your administration has provided during the past week to take resolute action to reach, implement and enforce a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. It is good that the Russians have agreed to apply diplomatic pressure to the Milosevic regime. But I think the Russians are now prepared to play a more active role, as a participant in a peacekeeping force, which would be helpful for U.S.-Russian relations and also would help to undermine Milosevic's authority with the Serbian people.

As you know, I am a Serb by origin and I spend a great deal of time in both Serbia and Russia as CEO of the largest producer of pharmaceutical products in both countries. I am a leader of the Serbian democratic opposition and in constant contact with Russian officials. Former Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev is on my board of directors. I have a natural feel for the special relationship between these two Slavic Orthodox countries. I strongly believe that if the Serbs saw Russian troops participating in serious numbers with a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, they would begin to appreciate that their self-appointed emperor Milosevic indeed has no clothes.

Sincerely,


Milan Panic

FEB 01 1999
William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

MP/jac

FEB 4 1999

*Republique Federale de Yougoslavie
le Premier Ministre (1992-93)
Milan Panic*

January 29, 1999


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As you know, I am a Serb by origin and I spend a great deal of time in both Serbia and Russia as CEO of the largest producer of pharmaceutical products in both countries. I am a leader of the Serbian democratic opposition and in constant contact with Russian officials. Former Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev is on my board of directors. I have a natural feel for the special relationship between these two Slavic Orthodox countries. I strongly believe that if the Serbs saw Russian troops' participating in serious numbers with a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, they would begin to appreciate that their self-appointed emperor Milosevic indeed has no clothes.

Sincerely,



Milan Panic

William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

MP/jac

FEB 5 1999

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 08, 1999

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE MILAN PANIC

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN REGARDING THE LEADERSHIP
THE PRESIDENT HAS PROVIDED TO REACH,
IMPLEMENT, AND ENFORCE A POLITICAL SOLUTION
TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
SAMUEL R. "SANDY" BERGER		ORG	99/02/08			
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                      *                      *
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

FEB 08 1999

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900495
RECEIVED: 25 JAN 99 16

TO: TRAFICANT, JAMES A

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CONGRESSIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS
CO

file

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM REP TRAFICANT RE KOSOVO

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 05 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HURLEY
LACKEY
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900495

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCHULTE	Z 99012516 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
001	Z 99012917 ACTION TRANSFERRED
001 HURLEY	Z 99012917 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 99021011 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002 HURLEY	Z 99022414 FOR FURTHER ACTION
003 BERGER	Z 99030517 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
003 STEIN, L	Z 99030616 FOR SIGNATURE
004 PRESIDENT	Z 99030918 FOR SIGNATURE
004 EXECSEC	Z 99031014 FOR FURTHER ACTION
004 PRESIDENT	Z 99031014 FOR SIGNATURE
005	X 99031111 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
005 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 99031111 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
004	990309		VICE PRESIDENT
004	990309		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
005	990308	WH STRIPPING DESK	
005	990308	TRAFICANT, JAMES A	

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0495
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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 3 A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>KJC</u>	
Rice			
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Kerrick			
Steinberg			
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Situation Room			
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Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>DMK 3/11</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

DATE March 8, 1999

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council 3/18
The White House

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Berger	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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Rep. Tray done 10

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National Security Council
The White House

2/10 2000

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Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>Ⓟ 2/10</u>	<u>crit done</u>
Davies			
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Berger			
Situation Room			
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Records Mgt.			
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: INcoming received 2/10 am.
Ⓡ

COMMENTS: con gressional Correspondence --
re Kosovo

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1999

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your recent letter on events in Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts as we press forward in our efforts to resolve the conflict, end the suffering, and give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve.

United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the Kosovo peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process. For the first time, Kosovar Albanians came together as a single team and agreed in principle to sign the interim political settlement after consultations in Kosovo. Ambassador Chris Hill has been meeting with members of the Kosovar delegation and sees positive indications that they are prepared to sign when the talks resume on March 15. To advance the process, I asked Bob Dole to travel to the region on March 5 to encourage Kosovar Albanian leadership to agree to the settlement.

To address your request that the Administration support independence for Kosovo, we continue to believe that supporting independence in Kosovo would adversely affect security in the region. Indeed, it carries with it substantial risks for regional stability and U.S. strategic interests in the Balkans. It could, for example, fuel ethnic tensions in neighboring countries, such as Macedonia, Greece and Turkey, that have significant Albanian minorities. An independent Kosovo would have a destabilizing effect on Albania and would undermine our policy that supports a multi-ethnic Bosnia. Moreover, it would not solve the Kosovo crisis.

When signed and implemented, the settlement will end Serb repression, violence and bloodshed, establish self-government in Kosovo and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development there. Kosovars will run their own hospitals, go to their own schools, collect their own taxes, police their own streets, and have their own courts. Of paramount importance, the security chapters require the withdrawal of the majority of Serb army forces, except for a

limited number of troops serving exclusively as border patrol units, and rapidly-phased removal of all Serb state police.

President Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis. We are making clear to Milosevic that if his intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 implementation talks, he will face NATO air strikes.

We are concerned about Belgrade's recent build-up of forces in and around Kosovo and have warned Milosevic of the consequences should he launch an offensive. NATO is poised to carry out this threat.

If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. Europeans will provide the bulk of the force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement. Before approving the participation of U.S. forces, I would ensure that a NATO-led force in Kosovo has a clear and achievable mission, is deploying into a permissive environment with the consent of the parties, has robust rules of engagement, and has a realistic exit strategy.

I will consult closely with the Congress in the days ahead as the talks proceed and NATO completes its planning. Again, thank you for your letter and support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill", is centered below the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900495
DATE 08 MAR 99

SUBJECT: LTR FM REP TRAFICANT RE KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

WH STRIPPING DESK

PRINT LAST NAME:

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT. ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9900495

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 MAR 99

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK


DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: TRAFICANT, JAMES A

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 08 MAR 99

SUBJ: LTR FM REP TRAFICANT RE KOSOVO

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'D' with a horizontal line through it and a vertical line extending upwards from the top of the 'D'.

DUE DATE: 12 MAR 99

COMMENT:

FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'99 MAR 9 PM5:18

March 9, 1999

ACTION*signed 3-10-99*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

date 3-8-99

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN *JS*

SUBJECT:

Response to Representative Traficant's Letter
Concerning the Situation in KosovoPurpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Traficant on the situation in Kosovo.

Background

Representative James Traficant's letter to you warns that Slobodan Milosevic should not be trusted. He argues that Belgrade's brutal repression of Kosovo, as evidenced by the Racak massacre, supports the conclusion that the only answer to the conflict is independence for Kosovo. He calls for the Administration to review its policy on independence and includes a 1986 report that provides a historical perspective on the conflict.

Your response summarizes progress made at the Rambouillet peace conference and describes the draft interim political agreement which will provide Kosovo substantial autonomy and control over the institutions that most affect daily life. It explains why we do not support independence for Kosovo, as independence would undermine our broader regional goals. The response also details the conditions under which you would decide to deploy American forces to assist in implementing a peace agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Representative Traficant at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Traficant
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.
17TH DISTRICT, OHIO

COMMITTEE:
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE

SUBCOMMITTEES:
RANKING DEMOCRAT: PUBLIC BUILDINGS
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AVIATION

COMMITTEE:
SCIENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE:
SPACE

0495

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3517

January 20, 1999

2446 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-5261

125 MARKET STREET
ROOM 311
YOUNGSTOWN, OH 44503
(330) 743-1914

5555 YOUNGSTOWN-WARREN ROAD
SUITE 503
NILES, OH 44446
(330) 652-5649

109 WEST 3RD STREET
EAST LIVERPOOL, OH 43920
(330) 385-5921

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

I am writing to respectfully urge your Administration to strongly endorse the right of the Albanians of Kosova to self-determination and independence from Serbia. Recent events in Kosova have underscored the sad reality that the only way to stop the brutal repression and genocide of the Albanian Kosovars is through the establishment of an independent Kosova.

The tragic situation in Kosova did not happen overnight. In fact, the oppression of the Albanian Kosovars has been going on for almost 20 years. I was deeply disturbed to learn that U.S. officials were warned as early as 1986 that the failure to secure independence for Kosova would result in genocide and repression. An unclassified 1986 U.S. intelligence report (enclosed) that was recently sent to me anonymously noted that:

"The continued systematic oppression of the predominantly Albanian population in Kosova by the Yugoslav government could lead to more serious instabilities. If left unchecked, it is projected that the oppression will surpass the use of tanks and troops, brute force, indiscriminate house arrests and torture employed by Yugoslav authorities to quell peaceful demonstrations in Kosova during the Spring of 1981; during that period thousands of ethnic Albanians were killed, wounded, imprisoned and buried secretly as Yugoslav authorities closed borders, declared martial law, expelled the international news media and continued the brutal roundup of Albanians. The lack of an appropriate response by Western governments has set the stage for an explosion in Kosova with unpredictable consequences. An in depth analysis of the KOSOVA situation clearly shows that the oppression of the Albanian people will end either (a) through the concerted action by the outside world aimed at pressuring Belgrade to grant the Albanians their republic or (b) by revolution."

This report raises some very disturbing questions. The Racak massacre and other atrocities committed by the Serbian government in Kosova are precisely the kinds of tragedies the 1986 report warned would occur if the United States did not work to achieve

(next page)

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton

Page Two

January 20, 1999


independence for Kosova. Why were these warnings ignored by successive Administrations, including yours?

Mr. President, the time for diplomacy has come and gone. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is a dangerous dictator who will stop at nothing to crush the Albanian Kosovars' dreams of self-determination. He is no Anwar Sadat. Milosevic cannot and should not be trusted!

Once again, I respectfully urge you to reassess your Administration's position on Kosova's status. It's time to stop almost 20 years of oppression and genocide. The only way to ensure self-determination and human rights for the Albanian Kosovars is through the establishment of an independent Kosova. America should lead the way.

Thank you for your time and consideration of this urgent matter. I look forward to your expeditious response.

Respectfully,



James A. Traficant, Jr.
Member of Congress

JAT/pm

Enclosure

c: The Honorable Benjamin Gilman

In Reply, Please Refer to

✓ ELMS-KOSOVA

ELMS-NICARAGUA

-a-

To: [REDACTED]
From: ELMS-KOSOVA
Subject: KOSOVA REPUBLIC PROJECT

Date: August 20, 1986

Attached is a preliminary, working draft of Volume II, ELMS-SPO-KOSOVA, dated 9-1-86. Sections relating to AAC input, academic assessments, SPO proposals and budgets, AAC acknowledgements, etc. are under review and will be forwarded separately. Volume I should be completed in its preliminary form as scheduled.

It is the assessment of [REDACTED] that Volume II in its incomplete, preliminary form should serve as a catalyst to the AAC. We have learned that a [REDACTED] and this should be supportive of the Volume I tasks outlined.

Final Report, Volumes I and II are scheduled for April 1, 1988 as planned.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SECRET

(This page is Unclassified)

-b-

Volume II does not contain information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner is not prohibited by law.

Volume II is not subject to special export controls. Transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made without prior approval of [REDACTED].

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ELMS-SPO-KOSOV
VOL. II 9-1-8
PRELIMINARY

-C-

FOREWORD

This report is a continuation of a systems strategy and assessment for providing the U.S. government and NATO allies with policy options in concert with organized non-government efforts for the purpose of ending the oppression of 3-million Albanians in South Yugoslavia and creating a new (Albanian) Republic of Kosova as a means of ensuring stability and sound economic development along the southern flank of NATO.

The ELMS-KOSOVA project is part of a broader reassessment of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia following its role in providing refuge to confirmed terrorists such as Muhammad Abbas, mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking. (Reference [REDACTED] Directive [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED], for (a) centralizing information on state-sponsored terrorism and assassinations and (b) punishing governments which aid terrorists or sponsor terrorism.)

Volume I of this report is classified. Transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may not be made without prior approval.

Volume II of this report is unclassified. The preliminary version dated Sept. 1, 1986, is a limited distribution, official use working draft structured to allow maximum feedback by government and non-government recipients such as select members of the American-Albanian community (AAC). It contains ELMS-SPO editorial comments and requests which require follow-up and refinement. This volume also offers American-Albanians guidance using non-government funds for rallying public support for their Kosova cause; their public efforts would buttress the official policy options and tasks detailed in Volume I.

The scheduled release of Volume II, Final Report, is April 1, 1988.

Review and approval for both volumes is scheduled for February 1988. Permission to reprint open literature materials prior to publication will be the responsibility of ELMS-SPO-KOSOVA. Volume II Final Report is projected to number 350 pages with a target distribution of 5000 copies.

Volume II of this preliminary report dated Sept. 1, 1986, was prepared without the expenditure of U.S. government funds. No direct charges were made to any U.S. government agency. No U.S. government office has approved Volume II, preliminary report.

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ELMS-SPO-I
VOL. II
PRELIM

-d-

KADDAFI ON YUGOSLAVIA AND ASSASSINATIONS

Excerpts from a speech by Yuri Shymko, Member of Ontario Provincial Parliament
New York City, November 21, 1982

"Last year, the same journalist from Der Spiegel, Hans Peter Rullman, had an interview with Libyan President Kaddafi. He asked, 'Why is it that you, Mr. Kaddafi, are sending Libyan assassins throughout Europe to kill and assassinate people?' Do you know what Kaddafi replied? He said: 'Why are you asking me? I Tito's Yugoslav regime can send assassins to murder and kill, why can't I do the same? Have you ever blamed that regime?'"

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I-1

ELMS-SPO-KOSOVA

VOL. II 9-1-8

PRELIMINARY

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-1-

I. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Albanian people occupy the southeastern part of Europe, numbering approximately 6-million, and are bordered by the part of the Mediterranean known as the Adriatic Sea to the west, Greece to the southeast, and the Yugoslav republics of Macedonia to the east, Serbia to the northeast, and Montenegro to the North.

The Albanians have their own language and scholars have traced their existence as a race of people to the Illyrians, who occupied the above lands before the existence of the Roman Empire. As such, they are not part of the Greek, Macedonian, Serbian or Montenegrin ethnic groups. By virtue of centuries of invasions by foreigners and their neighbors, the Albanian people have become accustomed to foreigners temporarily occupying their land. Their history is replete with racial hatred and oppression by occupation. The attempts to deny the existence of the Albanian people have been partially successful; they have been called "Turks, Muslims, Greek (Orthodox) and most Americans do not know where Albania is located nor have heard of KOSOVA, which today numbers 3-million Albanians.

The problem of KOSOVA has its roots for more than a century, but it began to surface in 1878 and 1912, when the Albanians made short-lived declarations of independence from foreign occupation. The Albanians drew up boundaries for their new State, much along ethnic borders for delineation to contain their race. The map on the inside front cover of this report shows part of their planned State.

A combination of factors during the early 1900s frustrated the Albanians from realizing their dream. The Balkan Wars, World War I, power politics, and the spoils of war permitted new borders to be drawn. The territory of the Albanian people was carved up and awarded to the Montenegrins, Serbians, Macedonians and Greeks. If it were not for the efforts of President Woodrow Wilson and Albanian nationalist Fan Noli, the existence of the Albanian race would have been denied. As such, part of the Illyrian land was saved for the Albanian people, leaving about half of the Albanians left to form their own State. In essence, at the close of World War I, the Albanians had their own East Germany-West Germany situation with the exception that the Albanians who were excluded from their own State were carved up among 4 ethnic groups who expanded the borders of their own countries at the expense of the Albanians.

To defeat Hitler during World War II, the United States and its allies supported the Communists in the Balkans. At the close of the war, a civil war erupted in the region pitting the more powerful Communists with allied-supplied weapons against anti-Communists. The Communists won, closing the borders of the State of Albania and asserting their will over the fate of the Albanians to the North in what was a loose federation of ethnic states.

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ELMS-SPO-
VOL. II
PRELIM

2

The Albanians of the North, known as Kosovars, found themselves to be part of the Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) of Yugoslavia. Whereas Montenegro and Macedonia had fewer ethnic nationals than the Albanians, both were made republics with self-governing powers. On the other hand, the government of Yugoslavia by design opted to deny the existence of the Albanians within their borders by incorporating their lands officially into the republics of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. In effect, the Albanians were stripped of political power and influence by dividing and conquering. Coupled with the racial hatred between the Slavs and the Albanians, who are not Slavs, as this report shows, the stage was set for an eruption in the region known as KOSOVA the Albanian lands occupied by Yugoslavia.

To curb smoldering Albanian nationalism, part of the Albanian region occupied by Serbia was converted into what the Yugoslav government calls the "Autonomous Province of Kosova" or "Administrative Kosova", which still is under Serbian tutelage in Belgrade. Therefore, today the Albanian people are divided in Yugoslavia into 4 regions administratively speaking: Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Administrative Kosova.

Because of the gross human rights violations committed against the Albanian people by the Slavic-controlled provincial and federal governments of Yugoslavia, documented in this report, the Albanians of the above regions, known as KOSOVA, demand their own republic -- a new republic to become part of the federation as a means of having more control over their own lives and ending the oppression.

The Yugoslav government has refused to consider republic status for KOSOVA and has replied in kind with the worst oppression and human rights violations among other countries in the world.

In conclusion, the stage is set for a new eruption which could lead to a revolution unless the outside world exerts pressure on Belgrade to negotiate with the Albanians of KOSOVA. These developments affect U.S. and NATO security interests.

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I-3

ELMS-SPO-KOSOV

VOL. II 9-1-8

PRELIMINARY

This report contains a systems strategy for ending the oppression of 3-million Catholic, Orthodox and predominately Muslim Albanians in the region known as Administrative Kosova, as well as those Albanians who live in the republics of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro -- Yugoslavia.

The continued systematic oppression of the predominately Albanian population in Kosova by the Yugoslav government could lead to more serious instabilities in this part of the Balkans which borders the southern flank of NATO. If left unchecked, it is projected that the oppression will surpass the use of tanks and troops, brute force, indiscriminate house arrests and torture employed by Yugoslav authorities --all documented in this report -- to quell the peaceful demonstrations in Kosova during the Spring of 1981; during that period thousands of ethnic Albanians were killed, wounded, imprisoned and buried secretly as Yugoslav authorities closed borders, declared martial law, expelled the international news media and continued the brutal roundup of Albanians.

The lack of an appropriate response by Western governments has set the stage for an explosion in Kosova with unpredictable consequences. It also has permitted the Yugoslav secret police known as UDBA to infiltrate Europe and North America for the purpose of intimidating and assassinating political opponents and those persons, including foreign nationals, who exercise Western values of free speech and peaceable assembly to protest human rights violations in Yugoslavia. The UDBA network has expanded its operations to include drug trafficking and support of terrorism. These are all areas of concern to Western internal security agencies.

All reliable government and public information sources such as the London Times estimate that the number of ethnic Albanians arrested since the peaceful demonstrations in March 1981, exceed 35,000, with many intellectuals and Albanian prisoners of conscience who have not used, nor advocated, the use of violence, receiving jail sentences of 15-20 years.

Unlimited powers of arrest and systematic torture of Albanian political prisoners are documented in this report, along with substantive eye witness accounts smuggled to the West which show that the oppression is increasing.

The number of Albanian political prisoners in Yugoslavia today is greater than the number of black political prisoners in South Africa, yet Albanians are still being crushed in great numbers in silence.

Today, Yugoslavia has the highest per capita number of political prisoners in Europe, including the Soviet Union.

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I-4

ELM

VOL

E

It is the recommendation of this report that diplomatic, economic and legal international measures in concert with unofficial private efforts be initiated by the Western and Third Worlds, including Muslim States, on a post-haste basis to pressure the Yugoslav government to (a) grant fundamental human rights for the Albanians of Yugoslavia and (b) create an (Albanian) Republic of Kosova, to include those regions that are predominately Albanian within the Yugoslav federation of republics to satisfy the just demands of the Albanian nationalist movement.

The above measures would (a) give 3-million Albanians equal status with Yugoslavia's other ethnic groups such as Macedonians and Montenegrins who in fact have less people in Yugoslavia than the number of Albanians according to official Yugoslav census figures and (b) set the stage for real economic development along the southern flank of NATO within the framework of a more just and stable society.

The creation of an (Albanian) Republic of Kosova would serve U.S. and NATO security interests given the Albanian propensity for absolute independence and hatred of the Soviet Union. Years of oppression by Slavic nationalists have left deep scars on Albanians who would rather remain independent than align themselves with Moscow or Belgrade.

In light of international developments, KOSOVA, meaning the Albanian regions occupied by Yugoslavia and not limited to what is known as Administrative Kosova, offers the Executive Branch of the U.S. government the opportunity to dramatically display to the world that the United States is not the enemy of the Muslim World. This can be achieved if the Executive Branch reverses its present policy and addresses the Kosova problem publicly. This would be supportive of the policy options and tasks detailed in Volume I.

This report also outlines the first published strategy and options that individuals in the West can undertake to buttress organized and private steps to help end the oppression in Yugoslavia. It enables the Executive Branch to maintain its present public posture while lending private support to Albanian nationalists, if the decision is made to nudge Yugoslavia via private diplomacy first.

The KOSOVA situation can be used as a pilot project to show other ethnic nationalists that it is possible to rally uninterested but decent human beings for the purpose of destroying the architects of oppression and terror, even when it is state-sponsored and occurs in relatively unknown regions of the world. This policy would be supportive of the President's National Security Directive on terrorism. The KOSOVA project would bridge the "public relations" problem encountered by the Executive Office in enlisting the support of moderate Muslim States for combatting terrorism; though Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim Albanians are the victims of Yugoslav oppression, there are regions of KOSOVA that are 95 per cent Muslim-Albanians.

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PRELIMINARY

To protect U.S. and NATO security interests in the Balkans, it is desirable to set in motion the machinery for liberating the 3-million Albanians of Yugoslavia by creating a new (Albanian) Republic of KOSOVA. The Albanians can be used as the vehicle for achieving this objective. The methods proposed in this report are structured to support peaceful negotiations, if Belgrade elects to go this route. Otherwise, if the oppression increases and the Albanians of Yugoslavia elect to undertake a course of action other than the past, the machinery can support this movement.

The architects of the oppression of the Albanian people in Yugoslavia are on a course that will lead to the destruction of the Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) of Yugoslavia. An in depth analysis of the KOSOVA situation clearly shows that the oppression of the Albanian people will end either (a) through concerted action by the outside world aimed at pressuring Belgrade to grant the Albanians their republic or (b) by revolution.

As documented in this report, the Yugoslav government, has shown little interest in dealing with the Albanian demands other than increasing the level of violence and oppression. Promises have not been kept, deceit and manipulation have been used by Belgrade to buy time while Albanians are rounded up in the evenings, jailed, tortured, and murdered, and disdain for Western public opinion and news gathering agencies is reflected by periodic expulsion of the news media whenever the degree of violence is exposed.

A review of the KOSOVA situation shows that the process of documenting human rights violations has not had the desired impact on Yugoslavia during the past two decades as originally intended. Though the violations must be documented, and this work is important, official and other reports emanating from Yugoslav prisons show that political prisoners are being tortured and killed by mocking prison officials who believe the extent of the Albanian human rights movement is limited to intellectuals who document abuses on sheets of paper that are read and thrown away or filed.

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VOL. I
PREL

Accordingly, a non-government [REDACTED] has been created for the purpose of coordinating a movement in the United States to support the liberation of Albanians in KOSOVA. [REDACTED] will be terminated only after the Albanians of KOSOVA achieve republic status. Coordination will be from several locations in the United States. American citizens of Albanian descent with past records of defending human rights and having an appreciation for freedoms of speech, press and religion will be used to interface by the [REDACTED] with both the U.S. government and the American-Albanian Community (AAC).

In anticipation of a new crackdown on political dissidents in KOSOVA, the [REDACTED] recommends that "KOSOVA REPUBLIC 2000" be incorporated into a logo for the KOSOVA project to signal Yugoslav authorities that this will be a long, arduous, irreversible public struggle for liberation, to the year 2000 if necessary. The brutal oppression of Albanians in Yugoslavia during the past century clearly shows that nothing short of republic status should be attained, regardless of promises made in the future by the Yugoslav authorities, who have a track record of making new promises to buy time for future crackdowns.

In the sections that follow, the [REDACTED] has listed tasks that must be implemented immediately to cover phase I operations. Since the projects listed involve lobbying Washington and Capitol Hill, no U.S. government funds can be used for the [REDACTED] Phase I program. This means that American-Albanians, religious institutions and other individuals and groups will be asked to cover expenses for the [REDACTED]. The projected costs for Phase I is broken down in later sections of this report.

The [REDACTED] Phase I operations can be categorized as follows:

1. Organization of Office and Staff
2. Development of a KOSOVA [REDACTED]
3. Strategy and Coordination Center
4. Public Relations and Lobbying

Among the preliminary ideas being evaluated by official reviewers are the following:

Coordination of Human Rights Demonstrations in America

The [REDACTED] believes that the American-Albanian community should undertake an aggressive human rights campaign featuring legal demonstrations before the Yugoslav embassy in Washington, its Mission to the United Nations, its consulates in North America, and all functions in North America sponsored directly or indirectly by the Yugoslav government; no official Yugoslav function should be left uncovered by legal protestors who can distribute literature documenting human rights violations in Yugoslavia, and more importantly, what North Americans can do about it. A special section in this report contains the names of U.S. police organizations and official offices which can help ensure that the protestors will abide by the law. In most instances, as was the case in Washington, D.C., police officers will escort the protestors and hold up traffic. This is important when children join the demonstration to protest the abuse of Albanian children in Yugoslavia.

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PRELIMINAR

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With the [] coordinating the general direction of each demonstration, its public relations office will handle press releases and the preparation of banners, posters and other support material needed to offer continuity of purpose and clarity of objectives. One of the [] primary responsibilities is to encourage demonstrators to abide with local, county, state and federal law enforcement agencies, especially when it involves knowledge of illegal UDBA or other Yugoslav activities in the United States and Canada.

Under review is a plan to organize protestors at all of the major international airports which serve the official Yugoslav airlines, JAT. The objective would be to carry signs documenting human rights abuses and to suggest to travelers that they not visit Yugoslavia, nor fly its state-owned airline company. A list of airline companies that fly to Yugoslavia should be updated monthly, including flight schedules, so that their passengers can also be notified.

Under review is a plan to give airline passengers traveling to Yugoslavia a condensed report on human rights abuses for reading literature across the Atlantic Ocean, with the stern warning that they can be arrested if they take this material into the country; it would serve as a reminder that freedom of speech does not exist in Yugoslavia. The condensed report should show examples of people jailed because they had in their possession an epic Albanian poem.

CALL FOR MAJOR DEMONSTRATION IN WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1988

During the last week in March 1988, the [] recommends that American and Canadian-Albanians throughout North America organize massive human rights protests to demonstrate and commemorate the events of Spring 1981, when in KOSOVA the Yugoslav government used troops and tanks to crush a peaceful demonstration. The first 6-days of "KOSOVA HUMAN RIGHTS WEEK" should be used to lobby Congress and local politicians, brief the press and media, and "prime the pump" for day seven, when all supporters of the KOSOVA Human Rights Movement converge on Washington. This should be the first of an annual event in North America, with marchers walking from Lafayette Park in front of the White House to Capitol Hill.

It is recommended that the American-Albanian community proceed with all existing plans, independent of the [] recommendations, but to plan on holding the first major march on Washington on Friday, April 1, 1988. The [] needs this time to organize the event properly and permit others to initiate the tasks detailed in Volume I.

The [] strongly recommends that the American-Albanian community begin to organize its annual march on the United Nations for the purpose of greeting Yugoslav diplomats when the UN convenes in the Fall. This annual event, which would fall about one-half year after the Washington demonstrations, should be supported by simultaneous peaceful protests before all Yugoslav Consulates.

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PRELIMINAR

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ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF THE "YUGO CAR"

Preliminary information indicates that the YUGO CAR is built by workers who in some cases are paid 40¢ per hour in Yugoslavia. The YUGO CAR sells for approximately \$5000 in Yugoslavia, yet in the United States it is sold for \$3990. This is accomplished by granting Yugoslavia special consideration and subsidizing its economy via the international banking community. Yugoslavia is a debtor nation. Given its track record in the area of human rights, a strategy is under review which would get America's organized and independent auto workers in concert with the auto industry to launch a boycott of the YUGO CAR. The [REDACTED] recommends that the American-Albanian human rights demonstrations be used as the vehicle for the auto workers. The strategy to use is that it does not make sense to undercut the jobs of patriotic American auto workers by giving a Communist government which has among the worst human rights records in the world special privileges and subsidies.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION PROPOSED

[REDACTED] recommends that Congress be lobbied using non-government funds to adopt sanctions aimed at ending the oppression of Albanians in Yugoslavia. The following should be imposed:

1. Ban the import of products produced in Yugoslavia (i.e., the "Yugo etc.).
2. Prohibit the sale of computers and other high-tech products to Yugoslavia, and authorize the President to impose a total trade embargo
3. Terminate grant aid provided under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program.
4. End the U.S. landing rights for JAT, the official Yugoslav airline.
5. Direct the State Dept. to refuse visa applications for travel to the United States for Yugoslav government employees.
6. Give the President authority to ban travel to Yugoslavia.
7. Freeze U.S. bank accounts of Yugoslav government employees and state controlled companies; freeze U.S. investments in such companies.
8. Prohibit any new investment in Yugoslavia by any U.S. company.
9. Prohibit bank loans to Yugoslavia.
10. Punish foreign companies that move to take a competitive advantage of U.S. sanctions against Yugoslavia at the expense of American companies.

In addition to the above sanctions, Congress should launch an investigation into the activities of the Yugoslav secret police in North America vis-a-vis allegations that UDBA (a) threatens, harasses and intimidates Americans who cooperate with Congress, the Executive Branch and/or assemble peacefully in the United States to protest human rights violations in Yugoslavia, (b) organizes the assassinations of American citizens, (c) is involved with trafficking drugs to the United States, and (d) has organized a network of informers who, among many tasks, are responsible for observing and photographing American demonstrators in the United States so that they can be arrested in Yugoslavia if they ever travel to that country.

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I-9

ELMS-SPO-KOSOV
VOL. II 9-1-8
PRELIMINARYHIGH VISIBILITY POST CARD CAMPAIGN

█████ recommends an unprecedented high-visibility post card campaign be organized by the AAC and directed at the policymakers in Washington and another at Yugoslav authorities in the United States, Canada and Yugoslavia. This campaign is to be executed with increasing frequency in concert with demonstrations and other events planned until the oppression ends (i.e., republic status for KOSOVA).

LEGAL PICKETS AND EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

A non-government economic boycott and education campaign against purchasing the YUGO CAR and other major Yugoslav products and services exported to North America should be initiated at once, to be buttressed by legal pickets in front of those firms marketing these products. Reviews of the YUGO CAR are poor and these should be amplified to potential consumers.

IDENTIFICATION OF ALBANIANS ABUSED, TORTURED OR KILLED BY YUGOSLAVIA

█████ suggests that all Albanian prisoners of conscience who have suffered in Yugoslav prisons or have been murdered or arrested without trace be identified by name, age, occupation, family and last known address. █████ proposes that after liberation (republic status or otherwise), a monument be erected in Prishtina, Kosova so that these nationals can be remembered. The AAC should review bids for the design of the monument -- design to parallel the concept behind the Vietnam Memorial in Washington -- with █████ contributing matching funds, subject to approval, for the purpose of presenting the monument as a present to the Albanians of Yugoslavia as a gift by American, Canadian and other freedom-loving citizens.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR OPPRESSION OF ALBANIANS

█████ recommends that the identities of all persons responsible for committing crimes against Albanian political dissidents in Yugoslavia (Crimes Against Humanity), such as the tortures described in this report, be determined so that these individuals can be held accountable and brought to justice in the future.

The human rights campaign should send a clear message to Yugoslavia that persons committing crimes against humanity will be tracked down and brought to justice. To date, there has been no organized effort to hold accountable those Yugoslav officials who sanction crimes against Albanians. The lack of any form of reprisal, legal or otherwise, has contributed to a climate that Albanians are fair game for oppression in Yugoslavia. █████ strongly suggests that the campaign for restitution be personalized so that individual Yugoslav officials no longer feel immuned from reprisal.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 25, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. James M. Jeffords (R-VT) and Sen. Russell D. Feingold (D-WI), concerning the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa;
- 2) Rep. Bill Archer (R-TX) and seven other Members of Congress, concerning their visit to South America as an official Congressional delegation to explore opportunities for expanding markets for U.S. goods and services;
- 3) Rep. Tom Bliley (R-VA), concerning efforts to detect and respond to acts of terrorism involving biological or chemical warfare agents;
- 4) Rep. David E. Bonior (D-MI) and fifty-three other Members of Congress, concerning the impact of Hurricane Mitch upon countries in Central America;
- 5) Rep. Joseph R. Pitts (R-PA), concerning human rights violations in Indonesia; and,
- 6) Rep. James A. Traficant, Jr. (D-OH), concerning the right of Albanians of Kosova to self-determination and independence from Serbia.

JAN 25 1999

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 5, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *WS*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *mt*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Letter from Representative
Traficant Concerning the Situation in Kosovo

Attached at Tab A is a draft Presidential reply to a letter from Representative James Traficant concerning the situation in Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Miles Lackey *mlA*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Representative Traficant
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 6, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: MIRIAM SAPIRO *ms*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *cmh*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Letter from Representative
Traficant Concerning the Situation in Kosovo

Attached at Tab A is a draft Presidential reply to a letter from Representative James Traficant concerning the situation in Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Mark Tavlarides *cmh*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the draft reply at Tab A and sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Representative Traficant
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Traficant

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Traficant on the situation in Kosovo.

Background

Representative James Traficant's letter warns that Slobodan Milosevic should not be trusted. He argues that Belgrade's brutal repression of Kosovo, as evidenced by the recent Racak massacre, supports the conclusion that the only answer to the conflict is independence for Kosovo. He calls for the Administration to review its policy on independence and includes a 1986 report that provides a historical perspective on the conflict.

Your response summarizes the steps that led to the Rambouillet peace conference and describes the draft interim political agreement which will provide Kosovo substantial autonomy and control over the institutions that most affect daily life. It also explains why we do not support independence for Kosovo, which would undermine our broader regional goals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Traficant
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter and observations on the situation in Kosovo.

I appreciate your views on how the Serbs are handling the situation.

Last fall, NATO's ~~credible~~ threat of military action resulted in Belgrade's acceptance of a cease-fire and the presence of a 2,000 person international mission in Kosovo to verify compliance. Relief supplies flooded into Kosovo, the displaced found shelter and a humanitarian catastrophe was averted this winter. But Belgrade has continued to violate its commitments, including by maintaining a large army and police presence in Kosovo and reacting with disproportionate force to insurgent provocations. The recent Racak massacre is a tragic example of Belgrade's continuing disrespect for international law and human life and defiance of NATO and the international community.

In late January, the Contact Group endorsed the draft interim peace agreement that U.S. Envoy Christopher Hill has been negotiating with the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians since last spring. It called upon the parties to convene at a peace conference in France, which began on February 6. To back up the Contact Group, NATO, under U.S. leadership, issued an ultimatum to Belgrade, making clear that NATO would initiate air strikes if Belgrade's actions were responsible for failure to reach a settlement at the conference or if Belgrade fails to comply with its existing obligations. I can assure you that NATO is determined to enforce this ultimatum.

The interim political agreement under discussion at Rambouillet would provide substantial autonomy for Kosovo. Kosovars would elect a President and Assembly and have an independent judiciary. Moreover, they would have complete control over the institutions and issues that most affect their daily lives: police, schools and education, health care and culture. Upon entry into force, the agreement would sharply reduce the Serbian police presence in Kosovo and provide for their removal within one year. Yugoslav army forces would be reduced to the minimum number necessary to protect the FRY's international borders.

We continue to believe that supporting independence in Kosovo would adversely affect security in the region. Indeed, it carries with it substantial risks for regional stability and U.S. strategic interests in the Balkans. It could, for example, destabilize neighboring countries, including Bosnia. Moreover, it would not solve the Kosovo crisis. Under these circumstances, we believe that the most viable solution is to give the Kosovars democratic self-government and their own court system and police, initially under the supervision of the international community.

Given the animosity that the conflict has generated, it is likely that a NATO force will be necessary to implement the terms of the settlement. Such a force would only enter Kosovo with adequate guarantees from the parties of full cooperation in assuring the security of the force. If a strong agreement is achieved, we would expect our European allies to supply the majority of troops for any deployment to Kosovo. ~~I am seriously considering~~ ^{concerning} ~~the~~ ^{My Administration} consultations with the Congress whether to commit U.S. forces under these circumstances.

~~by the~~ Promoting peace and stability in the Balkans has been a key objective of my Administration. I am proud that ~~United States~~ ^{our} efforts have been decisive in getting the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians to Rambouillet. It is now up to the parties ~~whether~~ to seize this opportunity for peace and work together to build a brighter future.

~~Again, thank you~~ ^{your}
Thank you again for your thoughtful letter and interest in this important issue.

Sincerely,

6
Lines

The Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Traficant's ~~Letter~~
~~Concerning the Situation in Kosovo~~

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Traficant on the situation in Kosovo.

Background

Representative James Traficant's letter to you warns that Slobodan Milosevic should not be trusted. He argues that Belgrade's brutal repression of Kosovo, as evidenced by the recent Racak massacre, supports the conclusion that the only answer to the conflict is independence for Kosovo. He calls for the Administration to review its policy on independence and includes a 1986 report that provides a historical perspective on the conflict.

Your response summarizes the steps that led to the Rambouillet peace conference and describes the draft interim political agreement which will provide Kosovo substantial autonomy and control over the institutions that most affect daily life. It also explains why we do not support independence for Kosovo, which would undermine our broader regional goals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter ~~to Representative Traficant~~ at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Traficant
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter and observations on the situation in Kosovo. I appreciate hearing your views on how to bring peace to that troubled region.

Last fall, NATO's credible threat of military action resulted in Belgrade's acceptance of a cease-fire and the presence of a 2,000 person international mission in Kosovo to verify compliance. Relief supplies flooded into Kosovo, the displaced found shelter and a humanitarian catastrophe was averted this winter. But Belgrade has continued to violate its commitments, including by maintaining a large army and police presence in Kosovo and reacting with disproportionate force to insurgent provocations. The recent Racak massacre is a tragic example of Belgrade's continuing disrespect for international law and human life and defiance of NATO and the international community.

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Given the animosity that the conflict has generated, it is likely that a NATO force will be necessary to implement the terms of the settlement. Such a force would only enter Kosovo with adequate guarantees from the parties of full cooperation in assuring the security of the force. If a strong agreement is achieved, we would expect our European allies to supply the majority of troops for any deployment to Kosovo. My Administration is in close consultation with the Congress concerning whether to commit U.S. forces under these circumstances.

Promoting peace and stability in the Balkans has been a key objective of my Administration. I am proud that our efforts have been decisive in getting the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians to Rambouillet. It is now up to the parties to seize this opportunity for peace and work together to build a brighter future.

Again, thank you again for your letter and your interest in this important issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.
 House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

limited number of troops serving exclusively as border patrol units, and rapidly-phased removal of all Serb state police.

To date, the Serbs have not agreed to sign but they have agreed to substantial parts of the political agreement on Kosovo self-government. With Kosovar Albanian agreement in hand, we and our allies can focus pressure on President Milosevic, who bears primary responsibility for the current crisis. We are making clear to Milosevic that if his intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 implementation talks, he will face NATO air strikes.

We have also made it clear that NATO Secretary General Solana may authorize air strikes against Serb targets for Belgrade's failure to comply with its October commitments. We are concerned about Belgrade's recent build-up of forces in and around Kosovo and have warned Milosevic of the consequences should he launch an offensive. NATO is poised to carry out this threat.

If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. Europeans will provide the bulk of the force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement. Before approving the participation of U.S. forces, I would ensure that a NATO-led force in Kosovo has a clear and achievable mission, is deploying into a permissive environment with the consent of the parties, has robust rules of engagement, and has a realistic exit strategy.

We are committed to ending the violence and repression in Kosovo. The March 15 implementation talks offer an important opportunity to end the conflict and it is up to both sides to grasp its importance and begin to build a better future.

I will consult closely with the Congress in the days ahead as the talks proceed and NATO completes its planning. Again, thank you for your letter and support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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
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Sincerely,

The Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please attach the following note to package 0495.

This package was returned as a "redo", asking only for a minor addition. At time package was returned we were nearing the end of the Rambouillet conference. As a result of the changing dynamics of Rambouillet and its immediate aftermath, the entire letter had to be recast.



UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900592
RECEIVED: 28 JAN 99 14

TO: MILENKOVICH, MILOSH

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 04 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

CONGRESSIONAL

file

PERSONS: LUGAR, RICHARD

DJORDJEVICH, MICHAEL

SUBJECT: RESPONSES TO CONGRESS URGING POTUS TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO SERBIA

ACTION: SCHULTE SDG LTR

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
SCHULTE

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSTTS

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900592

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCHULTE
001
001 HURLEY
002

Z 99012814 APPROPRIATE ACTION
Z 99012917 ACTION TRANSFERRED
Z 99012917 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 99031615 SCHULTE SDG LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900592
RECEIVED: 28 JAN 99 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MILENKOVICH, MILOSH

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 98
SOURCE REF: 289624

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS: LUGAR, RICHARD

DJORDJEVICH, MICHAEL

SUBJECT: SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS URGES POTUS TO GIVE DJORDJEVICH PROPOSALS
TO BRING DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA SERIOUS CONSIDERATION

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE
BAKER
RUDMAN
WIPPMAN

FOR INFO
BLINKEN
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: REFERRAL STATES MILENKOVICH MET W/ NSC STAFF

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 4, 1999

Dear Mr. Milenkovich:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter to the President concerning democratic reform in Serbia. I have been asked to respond on the President's behalf.

It is clear that Slobodan Milosevic's policies have caused untold suffering in the Balkans over the last ten years. He has had a direct and devastating impact on the region. But, as you rightly point out, the problem runs deeper than Milosevic alone. Serbia remains enmeshed in totalitarian structures which prevent it from developing a constructive relationship with the international community.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. A democratic Serbia will focus on improving the life and possibilities of its own citizens and will not pose a threat to neighboring countries or its own ethnic minorities.

The Administration continues to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, the Administration has budgeted \$24.3 million in Support for East European Democracy funding for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. The funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization and compliance with its other commitments to the international community.

In conclusion, let me assure you that the Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping

to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. The Administration appreciates your support and that of the Serbian Unity Congress in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. Schulte', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Milosh D. Milenkovich
President of the Serbian Unity Congress
5851 Pearl Road
Suite 302
Cleveland Ohio 44130

NSC
FYI

TRACKING SHEET

	DATE	INITIAL
RECEIVED BY PLM	1/14	TS
DRAFT WRITTEN		
EDITED BY	John - 1/26	
TO SUPV	This person met w/ NSC	
REVIEW	staff, so I thought	
PRINTED	they might want to	
APPROV	see the letter	
	16-5515 - KSC	
APPROVED FOR SIG.		



0592 289624

SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS

December 29, 1998

President William J Clinton,
The White House,
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

On behalf of the Serbian Unity Congress, I am writing to commend to your attention the letter to you of December 23, 1998 signed by seven senators led by Senator Richard Lugar on the subject of democratic reform in Serbia.

As the largest Diaspora-based Serb organization, the SUC has for many years espoused and promoted this goal as being in the best interests of both the United States and the people of Serbia. Political and economic reform will allow Serbia to emerge from its present totalitarian structures inherited from the communist era and permit the country to rejoin the international community. We see this as doing much to alleviate the suffering of the people in Serbia, to encourage economic revival, to pave the way for refugee return, and generally to enhance regional stability. As you noted in your address to the National Democratic Institute on December 8, 1998: "we still must have a political settlement and political reform in Serbia to have a lasting peace."

Achieving democratic reform is easier said than done. The problem runs deeper than the regime's present incumbents. If we are to have a chance of success, we need a strategic plan and someone with the management skills and commitment to carry it out. One such person is Mr. Michael Djordjevic of San Rafael, California. In 1996 Mr. Djordjevic founded the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia (CDCS) as a vehicle for achieving the reform goals which we all support. The CDCS has grown into a dynamic organization with an impressive and well-respected membership in Serbia and the Diaspora. It has developed a viable and practicable action plan that addresses the goals in the Senators' letter.

Mr. Djordjevic is in regular contact on this subject with members of the National Security Council and State Department. I urge you to give his proposals your serious consideration and active support.

Respectfully,

Milosh D. Milenkovich
President

5851 Pearl Road, Suite 302,
Cleveland, OH 44130
tel: (440) 842-2770 fax: (440) 842-2740

<http://www.suc.org>

Milosh D. Milenkovich
Cleveland, Ohio
President

Ron Radakovich
San Francisco, California
Executive Vice President

Ann Jaksic Erne
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
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Nikola Kostich
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Vice President

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Detroit, Michigan
Vice President

Nenad Vukicevic
San Francisco, California
Vice President

Michael Lees
Honorary Member
(1921-1992) England

JAN 20

1999

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900592
RECEIVED: 28 JAN 99 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MILENKOVICH, MILOSH

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 98
SOURCE REF: 289624

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS: LUGAR, RICHARD

DJORDJEVICH, MICHAEL

SUBJECT: SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS URGES POTUS TO GIVE DJORDJEVICH PROPOSALS
TO BRING DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA SERIOUS CONSIDERATION

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE

BAKER
RUDMAN
WIPPMAN

FOR INFO

BLINKEN
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: REFERRAL STATES MILENKOVICH MET W/ NSC STAFF

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NSC
FYI

TRACKING SHEET

	DATE	INITIAL
RECEIVED BY PLM	11/14	TS
DRAFT WRITTEN		
EDITED :	John - 1/26	
TO SUP	This person met w/ NSC	
REVIEW	staff, so I thought	
PRINTED	they might want to	
APPROV	see the letter	
	16-5515 - K/L	
APPROVED FOR SIG.		

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 4, 1999

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It is clear that Slobodan Milosevic's policies have caused untold suffering in the Balkans over the last ten years. He has had a direct and devastating impact on the region. But, as you rightly point out, the problem runs deeper than Milosevic alone. Serbia remains enmeshed in totalitarian structures which prevent it from developing a constructive relationship with the international community.


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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Greg Schulte', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Milosh D. Milenkovich
President of the Serbian Unity Congress
5851 Pearl Road
Suite 302
Cleveland Ohio 44130



0592 289624

SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS

December 29, 1998

Milosh D. Milenkovich
Cleveland, Ohio
President

Ron Radakovich
San Francisco, California
Executive Vice President

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Treasurer

Dr. Predrag Banic
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Katalina Petrov Platzer
Detroit, Michigan
Vice President

Nenad Vukicevic
San Francisco, California
Vice President

Michael Lees
Honorary Member
(1921-1992) England

President William J Clinton,
The White House,
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

On behalf of the Serbian Unity Congress, I am writing to commend to your attention the letter to you of December 23, 1998 signed by seven senators led by Senator Richard Lugar on the subject of democratic reform in Serbia.

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Achieving democratic reform is easier said than done. The problem runs deeper than the regime's present incumbents. If we are to have a chance of success, we need a strategic plan and someone with the management skills and commitment to carry it out. One such person is Mr. Michael Djordjevic of San Rafael, California. In 1996 Mr. Djordjevic founded the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia (CDCS) as a vehicle for achieving the reform goals which we all support. The CDCS has grown into a dynamic organization with an impressive and well-respected membership in Serbia and the Diaspora. It has developed a viable and practicable action plan that addresses the goals in the Senators' letter.

Mr. Djordjevic is in regular contact on this subject with members of the National Security Council and State Department. I urge you to give his proposals your serious consideration and active support.

Respectfully,

Milosh D. Milenkovich
President

5851 Pearl Road, Suite 302,
Cleveland, OH 44130
tel: (440) 842-2770 fax: (440) 842-2740

<http://www.suc.org>

JAN 20

1999

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 5, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *[Signature]*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Leonard Rubenstein on
Kosovo

Attached is a draft Presidential reply to Leonard Rubenstein on the human rights situation in Kosovo.

Concurrence by: David Wippman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Leonard Rubenstein
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Leonard Rubenstein on
Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Leonard Rubenstein on the human rights situation in Kosovo.

Background

Dr. Leonard Rubenstein, Executive Director of Physicians for Human Rights, wrote to condemn Serb atrocities in Kosovo, urge the United States and its allies to deploy ground forces to protect civilians, and press for granting the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) complete access to Kosovo to investigate war crimes.

Your reply summarizes our efforts to achieve a just peace in Kosovo, and notes that the proposed settlement agreement requires the parties to cooperate with the ICTY.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Leonard Rubenstein at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Leonard Rubenstein
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Rubenstein:

Thank you for your recent letter on behalf of Physicians for Human Rights concerning events in Kosovo. In documenting atrocities committed in Kosovo, Physicians for Human Rights is doing extremely important work. I deeply appreciate your thoughts as we press forward in our efforts to resolve the conflict, end the suffering and give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve.

The Racak massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians is, as you rightly point out, yet one further example of the brutality of Slobodan Milosevic's Kosovo policy. We are acutely aware of the humanitarian situation and working hard to improve it.

As you know, United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process.

When the political settlement we have pursued is signed and implemented, it will end Serb repression, establish self-government in Kosovo, and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development there. Kosovars will run their own hospitals, go to their own schools, collect their own taxes, police their own streets, and have their own courts. Serb police and army units will be largely withdrawn, and the KLA will be required to demilitarize. The agreement also directly addresses your concern that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have access to all parts of Kosovo to facilitate collection of evidence for future prosecution of war crimes. Under the agreement, the parties will be required to cooperate with the ICTY in its investigations and prosecutions, and to comply with its requests for assistance and its orders.

To date, the Serbs have not agreed to sign the settlement agreement, but they have agreed to substantial parts of its

provisions on Kosovo self-government. We have made it clear to Milosevic that if his intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 implementation talks, he will face NATO air strikes.

We have also made it clear that NATO Secretary General Solana may authorize air strikes against Serb targets for Belgrade's failure to comply with its October commitments. We are concerned about Belgrade's recent build-up of forces in and around Kosovo and have warned Milosevic of the consequences should he launch an offensive. NATO is poised to carry out this threat.

If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. Europeans will provide the bulk of the implementation force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement.

We are committed to ending the violence and repression in Kosovo. The March 15 implementation talks offer an important opportunity to end the conflict and it is up to both sides to grasp its importance and begin to build a better future.

Again, thank you for your letter and support.

Sincerely,

Dr. Leonard S. Rubenstein, J.D.
Executive Director
Physicians for Human Rights
100 Boylston Street, Suite 702
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: RUBENSTEIN, LEONARD

DOC DATE: 22 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

WAR CRIMES
HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS RE KOSOVO ATROCITIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 12 FEB 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
BROWN, K
NAPLAN
WIPPMAN

FOR INFO
BAKER
BOBBITT
SCHULTE
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSTSM

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DOC 1 OF 1

PHYSICIANS for HUMAN RIGHTS



FOUNDING MEMBER
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN
TO BAN LANDMINES
RECIPIENT OF THE
NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

utilizing the health
missions and enlisting
public support to protect
promote the human
rights of all people

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*Harvard Center for Population and
Development Studies*

Lana Louise Lynn, M.P.A., R.N.
National Medical Center

Viktor B. Penchaszadeh, M.D.
Albert Einstein College of Medicine

Irwin Redlener, M.D., F.A.A.P.
Children's Health Fund

P. Preston Reynolds, M.D., Ph.D.
Harvard Medical School

Vin Ryan
Schwartz Capital Corporation

Alicia Ely Yamin, J.D., M.P.H.
Columbia School of Public Health

STAFF

Leonard S. Rubenstein, J.D.
Executive Director

Susannah Sirkin
Deputy Director

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Director of Communications

Holly Burkhalter
Advocacy Director

Gina Cummings
Director of Campaigns

Richard Solim
Senior Program Associate

Vincent Iacopino, M.D., Ph.D.
Senior Medical Consultant

William Haglund, Ph.D.
Director, International Forensic Program

January 22, 1999

Hon. William J. Clinton
President of the United States
White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Clinton:

The events of the past week
United States policy and di

1/29/99
Please
put into
log system.

from: Eric Schwartz

The massacre at Racak on
vulnerability of Albanian Kosovar civilians to
military and police forces. The efforts of the United States, NATO and the
UN Security Council have utterly failed to provide protection from gross
human rights violations perpetrated continually by Serbian forces under the
control of President Slobodan Milosevic. They have also failed to prevent
violations of human rights perpetrated by the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA).

This most recent attack is just the latest example of an eight-year campaign
of brutality and murder by President Milosevic and his forces against
civilians seeking to remain in their homes and villages.

Time after time, in Croatia, in Bosnia, and now in Kosovo, Milosevic has
presided over the deliberate killing of civilians, the destruction of entire
villages and forced removal of their inhabitants, torture, and the
desecration of bodies of those who have been murdered. His tactics have
devastated every aspect of life in the region. He has blatantly violated
international agreements and repeatedly has concealed or destroyed
evidence of the atrocities committed by his troops and police under his
control.

Physicians for Human Rights has been documenting these atrocities since
the wars in the former Yugoslavia began and, most recently, released
findings that Serbian forces under President Milosevic's control attacked,
arrested, intimidated and, in some cases, even murdered ethnic Albanian
physicians who sought to do nothing more than to provide medical care to
civilians in Kosovo.

The time has come for the United States and the European powers to say
no, not again, never again, and this time, to back their words with action.

We agree with your demand that President Milosevic immediately
withdraw Serb forces at a minimum to the level negotiated under the

Hon. William J. Clinton
President of the United States
January 22, 1999
Page 2

Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, provide immediate access to all parts of Kosovo to independent human rights investigators and forensic experts, including those affiliated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, permit Ambassador William Walker to retain his responsibilities as head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, and engage in good faith in negotiations to end the conflict. These steps alone, however, are insufficient.

To protect the civilian population from deliberate attack and atrocity the U.S. and its allies should employ all necessary means, including ground troops with an explicit mandate to enforce a cessation of hostilities, protect civilians, and prevent war crimes in accordance with international law. It is all too obvious that an unarmed monitoring mission such as the one that was present in the vicinity of Racak at the time of the massacre is incapable of preventing armed assaults, and could even be vulnerable to attack itself.

A bombing campaign alone might open Kosovar civilians and international humanitarian workers to reprisals by the thousands of Serb forces that remain in Kosovo. The deployment of ground forces across Kosovo is needed to protect the human rights of civilians living in the region. The rugged terrain and the dispersal of the Albanian Kosovar people throughout the countryside and in the mountains make them vulnerable to ongoing attack by Serb forces that are also spread across the region. Only ground forces can provide adequate protection.

Moreover, the threat to civilians comes not only from uniformed military troops in organized battalions but from police and paramilitary forces that have a history of brutality and will remain in the region even if formal military forces are withdrawn.

Finally, and most importantly, we know from far too many examples that without a force on the ground, even after an initial pullback brought about by the threat or reality of air strikes, massacres such as the one at Racak will surely recur at some time and some place of President Milosevic's choosing.

Once security has been established for all civilians in Kosovo, the diplomatic community should reengage vigorously in negotiations aimed at ending the military conflict, restoring civil society, and resolving Kosovo's political status.

Such a force should also make possible the access to all parts of Kosovo to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia so that collection of evidence for future prosecution of war crimes may be facilitated.

Hon. William J. Clinton
President of the United States
January 22, 1999
Page 3

Moreover, the U.S. and its allies should secure all suspected massacre sites as well as remains that have been removed by Serb authorities and make them available to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for immediate investigation. They should also make available to the ICTY all intelligence relating to the Racak massacre and other massacres, including satellite photographs, telephone and radio intercepts, and any other intelligence information that could lead to identification of those responsible.


We also call on you to provide the necessary leadership so that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe dramatically increases the number of monitors deployed in Kosovo; saturates the area with witnesses; implements an aggressive early warning system in which monitors are deployed to observe and report on military developments and assists civilians in such areas in finding shelter and protection from the fighting or from targeted attack.

We think it is appropriate to call upon the KLA to refrain from attacks on any member or segment of the civilian population and to respect international humanitarian and human rights law.

Finally, as documented in findings recently released by Physicians for Human Rights, the United States should call upon all authorities in the region to allow medical personnel and transport full and unfettered access to all people in need of care, civilian and combatant alike, and to uphold all requirements to treat all medical personnel, transport, facilities, equipment, and supplies as neutral and protected under international law.

The human rights abuses inflicted on the people of Kosovo can and must be stopped. We urge you to take the steps necessary to end them.

Sincerely,


Leonard S. Rubenstein

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 5, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *W*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *CR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Letter from
Representative Ben Gilman on the Situation in
Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a Presidential response to a brief letter on the situation in Kosovo from Representative Gilman who copied you with the same letter. Representative Gilman writes that recent events in Kosovo raise doubts about the international community's policy to end the conflict.

Concurrences by: Miles Lackey, Stephen Flanagan

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Representative Gilman

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Gilman

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Gilman on the situation in Kosovo.

Background

In a brief letter to you, Representative Gilman maintains that recent events in Kosovo call into question the current policy of the international community. He encloses a 3-page "Statement on the Crisis in Kosovo from the Albanian American Civic League" dated January 21. According to the statement, Milosevic has flaunted the October agreements. It argues that Milosevic only understands force and the West's inaction has only increased the risk of a wider regional conflict. It calls for air strikes against Serbian military targets and independence for Kosovo.

Your reply summarizes progress made at the Rambouillet talks and describes key elements of the political settlement. It details the conditions under which you would decide to deploy a NATO force to assist in the implementation of the agreement and states that the Administration will continue to consult closely with Congress concerning a possible deployment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Gilman
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter on events in Kosovo. I deeply appreciate your thoughts as we press forward in our efforts to resolve the conflict, end the suffering, and give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve. I also very much appreciate you forwarding the statement of the Albanian American Civic League on the crisis.

As the statement asserts, the Racak massacre of ethnic Albanians, including women and children, is yet one further example of the brutality of the Milosevic regime. I have condemned that atrocity in the strongest possible terms. The United States and its allies have demanded that Serb authorities identify those responsible and cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal.

United States and allied diplomacy backed by the credible threat of NATO force compelled Belgrade to participate in the Kosovo peace talks at Rambouillet last month. While the talks did not yield an agreement, they were a significant step forward in the peace process. For the first time, Kosovar Albanians came together as a single team and agreed in principle to sign the interim political settlement after consultations in Kosovo. Ambassador Chris Hill has been meeting with members of the Kosovar delegation and sees positive indications that they are prepared to sign when the talks resume on March 15. To advance the process, I asked Bob Dole to travel to the region on March 5 to encourage Kosovar Albanian leadership to agree to the settlement.

When signed and implemented, the settlement will end Serb repression, violence and bloodshed, establish self-government in Kosovo and deeply engage the international community in reconstruction and economic development there. Kosovars will run their own hospitals, go to their own schools, collect their own taxes, police their own streets, and have their own courts. Of paramount importance, the security chapters require the withdrawal of the majority of Serb army forces, except for a

limited number of troops associated with border patrol units, and rapidly-phased removal of all Serb state police.

To date, the Serbs have not agreed to sign but they have agreed to substantial parts of the political agreement on Kosovo self-government. With Kosovar Albanian agreement in hand, we and our allies can focus pressure on President Milosevic, who bears primary responsibility for the current crisis. We are making clear to Milosevic that if his intransigence blocks agreement at the March 15 implementation talks, he will face NATO air strikes.

We have also made it clear that NATO Secretary General Solana may authorize air strikes against Serb targets for Belgrade's failure to comply with its October commitments. We are concerned about Belgrade's recent build-up of forces in and around Kosovo and have warned Milosevic of the consequences should he launch an offensive. NATO is poised to carry out this threat.

If the parties reach agreement, NATO is preparing to help implement the settlement. Europeans will provide the bulk of the force, but U.S. troops would be necessary to give the parties, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, confidence in the settlement. Before approving the participation of U.S. forces, I would ensure that a NATO-led force in Kosovo has a clear and achievable mission, is deploying into a permissive environment with the consent of the parties, has robust rules of engagement, and has a realistic exit strategy.

We are committed to ending the violence and repression in Kosovo. The March 15 implementation talks offer an important opportunity to end the conflict and I hope both sides will grasp its importance and begin to build a brighter future.

I will consult closely with the Congress in the days ahead as the talks proceed and NATO completes its planning. Again, thank you for your letter and support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: GILMAN, BENJAMIN A

DOC DATE: 21 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
HUMAN RIGHTS

ALBANIA
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FWDS STATEMENT FM ALBANIAN AMER CIVIC LEAGUE RE ATROCITIES IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 15 FEB 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF: 9900563

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
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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

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January 21, 1999

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
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The present situation in Kosovo clearly calls into question the international community's policy for ensuring a peaceful resolution of the conflict there. I am forwarding to you a statement by the Albanian American Civic League, which I believe merits your consideration. The League represents a significant portion of the Albanian American community, and I hope you will give this statement the attention it deserves.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman

BAG:jmh/kpr
Enclosure



ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE



STATEMENT ON THE CRISIS IN KOSOVA FROM THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE January 21, 1999

**To: Bill Clinton, President of the United States
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Great Britain
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor of Germany
Jacques Chirac, President of France
Knut Vollebaek, Chairman of the OSCE
Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations**

On January 15, Serbian police and military forces massacred forty-six innocent Albanian civilians in the village of Racak. At the site of the massacre, bodies were found with their eyes gouged out, faces slashed and, in one case, decapitated. Also, three women, a twelve-year old boy, and many elderly lay among the dead. While the international community voiced shock and anger at this premeditated slaughter of civilians and portrayed it as the worst moment in the Serbian-Albanian conflict, the killing in all of its dimensions was not a novel occurrence for the 92 percent Albanian population of Kosova.

Since 1989, Serbian police and military at the direction of Slobodan Milosevic have been responsible for the most brutal occupation that the world has witnessed since the Nazi era. And since the end of February 1998, they have conducted scores of execution-style killings, leaving 2,000 dead and 300,000 Kosovar Albanian civilians burned and bombed out of their homes. The only thing new about this latest example of the Serbian regime's crimes against humanity is that the events in Racak took place when Western monitors, under the auspices of the OSCE, were on the ground and NATO warplanes were flying overhead.

Ironically, most of the 700 international monitors were elsewhere in Kosova on January 15, trying to fulfill the humanitarian, but impossible, mission given to them under the premature and hollow agreement signed by U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke with Europe's preeminent war criminal, Slobodan Milosevic. But even if they had been in Racak that day, what could they have done to help? The Holbrooke agreement gives them no power to oppose Serbian state-sponsored terrorism.

The ill-fated Albanian inhabitants of Racak did not die simply at the hands of the Serbian army. They died because they believed that they would be protected under the Holbrooke agreement—especially after the Kosova Liberation Army had just released eight captive Serbian soldiers. They died as victims of the so-called peaceful diplomatic solution represented by NATO, the United Nations, the Contact Group, Richard Holbrooke, Christopher Hill, and Ibrahim Rugova. They died as victims of the West's inaction and empty threats in the face of Slobodan Milosevic's ongoing campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against the Albanian people of the Balkans.

The members of the Albanian American Civic League, along with the rest of the Albanian diaspora, are shocked and outraged by the actions of the Serbian terrorist forces in Racak and by the ongoing refusal of the West to oppose Slobodan Milosevic with force. But above all, the Albanian American Civic League, led by former Congressman Joseph DioGuardi, is completely mystified, as are most Americans, by the West's continuing embrace of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. As the Civic League has publicly declared, the October accord is a total failure when it comes to resolving the Serbian-Albanian conflict and related problems in the Balkans. It has amounted to a legalization of the violence and terror perpetrated by Milosevic's army against Kosovar Albanians. By introducing the compromising presence of unarmed international monitors in Kosova, by failing to force the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosova, and by foregoing air strikes against Serbia, the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement is a death sentence for the Albanian people of Kosova.

The habitual false agreements and empty threats by the West will not work to conceal this new phase of Milosevic's reign of terror. The only language that Milosevic will now understand is the use of force. As we have seen from the beginning, the threat of force has no impact on Slobodan Milosevic whatsoever. It is time to abandon the appearance of resolve in the absence of resolve. It is time to stop clinging to the diplomatic proposals and measures that might have worked years ago, before the brutal occupation and genocide that have left the Albanians of Kosova no other option than to fight for their physical survival and for freedom, democracy, and self-determination. As Paddy Ashtown, leader of the Liberal Democrats in Britain's House of Commons, said in response to the Racak massacre, "Milosevic has lost the moral authority to govern the Albanian majority of Kosova." Therefore, the only solution for the Albanians of Kosova and for peace and stability in the Balkans is the independence of Kosova.

The West's refusal to intervene militarily in the face of the unspeakable horror of the Racak massacre increases the risk of a wider regional conflict. So, too, does the renewed attempt by some NATO members to criminalize, instead of recognize and support, the Albanian defense force, the Kosova Liberation Army. If the international community continues to abandon the Albanians of Kosova, it can expect its worst fears to be realized in a self-fulfilling prophecy: the Albanians of Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro will join the KLA in a war that will spread throughout the Balkans, and Turkey and Greece, two NATO members will be forced to take sides in the conflict, leading to a full-scale war. Those U.S., French, British, Russian, and German politicians who reject

independence and who continue to insist on some form of "autonomy" for Kosova under conditions of genocide have taken a politically untenable and morally objectionable position.

It should now be clear to all that as long as the Milosevic regime remains in power, the war will continue. To stop the war, NATO forces led by the United States must be mobilized to wage air strikes against Serbian military targets in Serbia and Kosova. And, to repeat, the only way to lasting peace and stability in the Balkans is to allow the Albanian people the right to declare their independence under international law, just as we allowed the Slovenes, Croatians, Macedonians, and Bosnians after the demise of the former Yugoslavia.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD) and eleven other Members of Congress, concerning import permit applications for Blue Sky Productions, Inc., and the Gibbs Rifle Company, Inc.;
- 2) Sen. Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ), concerning Ms. Lori Berenson, who is currently in prison in Socabaya, Peru;
- 3) Rep. Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), concerning Jonathan Pollard;
- 4) Rep. Bob Filner (D-CA), concerning the President's upcoming trip to Mexico;
- 5) Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), concerning the current situation in Kosovo;
- 6) Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), concerning the declassification of secret documents relating to Augusto Pinochet; and,
- 7) Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), concerning Executive Order 13107.

Enclosures

FEB 04 1999