

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chron Folder for February 1999 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1705

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, February 1, 1999. [Record ID: 9900657] (1 page)	02/03/1999	P3/b(3)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, February 3, 1999. [Record ID: 9900734] (1 page)	02/03/1999	P3/b(3)
003a. memo	For James Steinberg From Greg Schulte. Subject: Meeting with the Republic of Srpska Prime Minister Dodik, February 5, 1999. [Record ID: 9900751] [Duplicate of ke5745_001a, this case.] (3 pages)	02/04/1999	P1/b(1)
003b. report	U.S. Government Report. (3 pages)	02/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron Folder for February 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6269

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: FUERTH, L
ET AL

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 03 FEB 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
SOC

DC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR KOSOVO DC 1 FEB

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 06 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
HACHIGIAN
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide, September 11, 2006
By WDS NARA, Date 6/3/2009
2009-0983-21

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900657

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99020311 FOR DECISION
X 99020314 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99020314 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990203 FUERTH, L
002 990203 KENNEY, K
002 990203 REYNES, J
002 990203 BASKETTE, A
002 990203 KYLE, R
002 990203 RICCHETTI
002 990203 HUPP, V
002 990203 MANNING, M

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

2/3/96
0716

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0657

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TIC A/O _____


Coe

SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL/DATE

DISPOSITION

1 1/6 2/2 _____

3 2/3 _____

3 _____

3 _____

2 JS _____

4 2/3 DMK D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

FEB 2 1996 4:29

COMMENTS: SOCDC Kosovo
1 Feb 99

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 3, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. STEVEN RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on February 1, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on February 1, 1999. ~~(C)~~


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: February 1, 2009

~~SECRET~~

TAB A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, February 1, 1999. [Record ID: 9900657] (1 page)	02/03/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron Folder for February 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6269

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 1, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Charles Wald

George Casey

State:

Thomas Pickering

Lawrence Rossin

James O'Brien

James Pardew

USNATO:Alexander Vershbow (secure
voice)Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

Alan Romberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte

David Leavy

Michael Hurley

Miles Lackey

Matt Vaccaro

OMB:

Robert Kyle

Bryan Smith

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- State will circulate to Deputies a paper on the negotiating concept for the upcoming negotiations at Rambouillet on an

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: February 2, 2009

DECLASSIFIED**PER E.O. 13526**

2008-0483-N (4.10)

RDS 8/24/2010

interim political settlement for Kosovo. (Action: State)

~~(S)~~

- OMB will prepare a proposed answer to Congressional questions about funding for possible U.S. participation in implementing the military and civil aspects of an interim settlement.

(Action: OMB) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900657
DATE 03 FEB 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR KOSOVO DC 1 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>FAX + 1</u> _____
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u> _____
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
RICCHETTI	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RL Date: 1/30/2024
7008-06A4-F3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900657
DATE 03 FEB 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR KOSOVO DC 1 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF
ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOb

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 0657

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: SOC for 1 Feb Kosovo DC PAGES: 5
(w/
Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 1/30/2024
2008-0694-F3

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~PAGES: 5
(Including Cover)FROM: NSC West Wing Desk
(NAME)
(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for 7 Feb Kosovo DCNSC LOG # 0657

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DoD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>State</u>	<u>Alan Romberg "Asst to USUN"</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RL Date: 1/30/2024

2008-0914-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

0657

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 1, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

TROUGH: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on February 1, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on February 1.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: February 1, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide Post, September 11, 2006
By  NARA, Date 6/3/2009
2009-0983 - M

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900688
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 99 10

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: STAFF TRAVEL

ADMINISTRATIVE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NSC STAFF TRAVEL REQUEST FOR SCHULTE TO FRANCE 5 - 22 FEB

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 08 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: ADMIN

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
JACOBSON
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900688

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 DAVIES
002
002 BARTLETT
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99020316 FOR DECISION
X 99020612 RECD STATE APPROVAL
Z 99020612 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 99021118 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 990204 KENNEY, K

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 06876

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRB NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DMK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>2/4</u>	
Davies	<u>2</u>	<u>2/4</u>	
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>2/4 DMK</u>	<u>X</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>2/11 DMK</u>	<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: Jacobson, Schulte
(orig for sig)

COMMENTS: Trans for Schulte

Exec Sec Office has diskette 110

99 FEB 2000 0117

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel Notification

NSC Greg Schulte
Member: Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Purpose of Travel:

To travel to Rambouillet, France for the period of
February 4-22, 1999 as the NSC delegate to the Kosovo
Negotiations.

Itinerary:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
Feb. 4-22	Rambouillet	France	Kosovo Negotiations



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: _____ PAGES: 2
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC West Wing Desk (202) 456-9425 WH Situation Room
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NSC Travel Notification
NSC LOG # 0688

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Hachigian, Nina L.
Sent: Thursday, February 04, 1999 10:46 AM
To: Millison, Cathy L.
Cc: @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: RE: NSC Representation at Rambouillet [UNCLASSIFIED]



He did. SRB and he decided that Greg should go and not come back until they call

-----Original Message-----

From: Millison, Cathy L.
Sent: Thursday, February 04, 1999 10:27 AM
To: Hachigian, Nina L.
Cc: @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: FW: NSC Representation at Rambouillet [UNCLASSIFIED]

Nina:

We were asked to hold Greg Schulte's travel package (#0688), pending Jim's response to this note. I have now been notified that Greg leaves tonight instead of Friday. Did Jim make a decision and if so, can you let us know what it was. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 1999 3:14 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs
Subject: NSC Representation at Rambouillet [UNCLASSIFIED]

Jim -

I am currently scheduled to fly Friday evening to Rambouillet to serve as NSC rep for the two-week duration of the talks. However, today's DC discussion suggests that I would better serve you and Sandy by spending most of that time in Washington, since the locus of decision-making is likely to remain here -- at least at the outset.

I therefore propose:

- to join Marc Grossman leaving **tomorrow evening** for the preparatory CG meeting in Paris and the opening of the talks in Rambouillet;
- to return on Sunday, when I would dispatch Mike Hurley in my place;
- to be ready to fly out again with MKA for the end-game.

I would appreciate your guidance today, as I need to know whether to pack my bags and make arrangements for my children.

Rice, Edward A.

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 1999 3:14 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs
Subject: NSC Representation at Rambouillet [UNCLASSIFIED]

Jim -

I am currently scheduled to fly Friday evening to Rambouillet to serve as NSC rep for the two-week duration of the talks. However, today's DC discussion suggests that I would better serve you and Sandy by spending most of that time in Washington, since the locus of decision-making is likely to remain here -- at least at the outset.

I therefore propose:

- to join Marc Grossman leaving **tomorrow evening** for the preparatory CG meeting in Paris and the opening of the talks in Rambouillet;
- to return on Sunday, when I would dispatch Mike Hurley in my place;
- to be ready to fly out again with MKA for the end-game.

I would appreciate your guidance today, as I need to know whether to pack my bags and make arrangements for my children.

*This could change, depending on answer to this e-mail.
Hold for now.*

(R)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 2, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

THROUGH: TRACEY JACOBSON *TJ*
FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*
SUBJECT: Travel Orders for Greg Schulte

Request travel orders to attend Kosovo negotiations as the National Security Council delegate in Rambouillet, France from February 5-22.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the travel request and sign the travel authorization form at Tab I and the memo to State Department at Tab II.

Approve *GS/4*

Disapprove _____



Attachments

Tab I Travel Authorization Form
Tab II Memo to State Department

Glyn-
this is \$800⁰⁰ more than
we budgeted for Greg.
If he does this trip,
Bosnia can do no others.

TJ
PS-we're going to have to cancel
the Econ Asia trip (or
not approve it if it occurs)

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: GREG SCHULTE
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): To attend the Kosovo Negotiations in Rambouillet, France from February 5-22, 1999.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Washington, DC to Rambouillet, France and return to Washington, DC
4. DEPARTURE DATE: 2-5-99 RETURN DATE: 2/22/99
DEPARTURE TIME: 5:50pm RETURN TIME: 7:55pm
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR xx POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION \$958.30 PER DIEM xx \$2260 OTHER \$75-
TOTAL \$3293-
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC xx OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO xx
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: _____
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: 
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director _____
Director of Administration _____
Executive Secretary 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel Notification

NSC Greg Schulte
Member: Special Assistant to the President for the
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Purpose of Travel:

To travel to Rambouillet, France for the period of
February 5-22, 1999 as the NSC delegate to the Kosovo
Negotiations.

Itinerary:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
Feb. 5-22	Rambouillet	France	Kosovo Negotiations



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0734

February 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

TROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on February 3, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on February 3.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)
Declassify on: February 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidebook, September 11, 2006
By *RDS* NARA, Date *6/3/2009*
2009-0983-W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0734

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. STEVEN RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on February 3, 1999 (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on February 3, 1999. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: February 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide, September 11, 2006
By 205 NARA, Date 6/3/2009
2009-0983-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, February 3, 1999. [Record ID: 9900734] (1 page)	02/03/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron Folder for February 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6269

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

0734

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 3, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Charles Wald
George Casey

OVP:
Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

State:
Thomas Pickering
Lawrence Rossin
James O'Brien

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocumbe
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
James Dobbins
Michael Hurley

CIA:

(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States should consult with NATO allies on the draft military annex to the Kosovo interim settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The text of the remainder of the draft settlement should be conformed to accommodate the draft military annex. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: February 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0983-M (4.11)
RDS 8/24/2010

- The United States should delay a decision on when the agreement would enter into force until we have more information on the timing of a possible force deployment.
(Action: State) (S)
- The IWG should further assess the timelines contained in the draft annex. (Action: NSC) (S)

TO: STEINBERG

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
KOSOVO

ADNSA



PERSONS: DODIK, MILORAD

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR DODIK VISIT ON 5 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY STEINBERG

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 1/30/2024
2008-0994.F-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9900751

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99020413 FOR INFORMATION
X 99031019 NOTED BY STEINBERG

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

24 05
0751 17

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Done

[Handwritten initials]

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	244	
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	2/5 amk	N
Records Mgt.	4		N/R

Cosgriff

Rice

Davies

Kerrick

Steinberg

Berger

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

Records Mgt.

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

5 Feb Mtg w/PM Dodik

Exec Sec Office has diskette

[Handwritten signature]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For James Steinberg From Greg Schulte. Subject: Meeting with the Republic of Srpska Prime Minister Dodik, February 5, 1999. [Record ID: 9900751] [Duplicate of ke5745_001a, this case.] (3 pages)	02/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron Folder for February 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6269

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 1999 9:06 PM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: SR GELBARD MEETING WITH RS PM DODIK

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 040149Z FEB 99
MSGTO: RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0058
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 1004
TOR: 990203205532 M3676942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 021004

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/09

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BK

SUBJECT: SR GELBARD MEETING WITH RS PM DODIK

CLASSIFIED BY ROBERT S. GELBARD, S/SR, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: SR GELBARD MET WITH RS PM DODIK FEBRUARY 3. GELBARD REITERATED U.S. SUPPORT FOR DODIK'S GOVERNMENT IN LIGHT OF POPLASEN'S LATEST PM NOMINEE, PETAR DJOKIC. GELBARD SAID AMBASSADOR KAUZIARICH IN SARAJEVO HAD SPOKEN WITH PLAVSIC, WHO HAD PUBLICLY CONDEMNED POPLASEN'S LATEST MOVE, AND HAD CALLED AN URGENT MEETING WITH RADISIC AND SLOGA DEPUTIES TO CONSIDER NEXT STEPS. GELBARD AND DODIK SPOKE WITH PLAVSIC, WHO SAID SHE WOULD PUSH FOR A STRONG SLOGA STATEMENT REJECTING THE DJOKIC NOMINATION AND WOULD CALL FOR DJOKIC TO REJECT THE NOMINATION. DURING THE MEETING, IZETBEGOVIC SENT WORD THAT THE BOSNIAKS WERE FIRM IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR DODIK. GELBARD AGREED WITH DODIK THAT MILOSEVIC HAD BEEN PRESSURING RADISIC AND THE SOCIALISTS HARD, AND WORRIED ABOUT THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE DODIK GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, RADISIC HAD SAID THAT ANY DECISION ON DJOKIC WOULD BE A SLOGA DECISION. GELBARD SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH WESTENDORP THE POSSIBILITY OF REMOVING POPLASEN, BUT HIS VICE PRESIDENT WAS EVEN WORSE. DODIK

AGREED WITH GELBARD THAT A DJOKIC VICTORY WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR MILOSEVIC, WHICH COULD NOT BE ALLOWED. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE GELBARD MET WITH RS PRIME MINISTER DODIK FEBRUARY 3. DODIK WAS IN WASHINGTON FOR THE FEBRUARY 4 PRAYER BREAKFAST. DODIK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ZORAN KORAC AND BIH AMBASSADOR SVEN ALKALAJ.

3. ~~(C)~~ DODIK AGREED WITH GELBARD THAT POPLASEN'S LATEST NOMINATION FOR RS PM, PETAR DDOKIC, WAS MORE EVIDENCE THAT POPLASEN WAS HOPELESS. DODIK SAID PLAVSIC HAD RE-ECTED PUBLICLY DJOKIC'S NOMINATION. HE HAD NOT YET SPOKEN WITH PRESIDENCY MEMBER RADISIC. GELBARD SAID THAT PLAVSIC AND RADISIC WERE CONVENING A MEETING IN DODIK'S OFFICE AND HAD ASKED DODIK TO CALL. GELBARD SAID HE WAS SUSPICIOUS WHEN RADISIC AND DJOKIC WENT TO BELGRADE MONDAY, BUT IT APPEARS PADISIC HAD SAID DJOKIC WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE NOMINATION. POPLASEN HAD PROPOSED DJOKIC WITHOUT CONSULTING HIM FIRST.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By KDE NARA, Date 1/10/2024
2028-0994-1-3

RADISIC TOLD AMBASSADOR KAUZLARICH THAT ANY DECISION ON DJOKIC WOULD BE A SLOGA DECISION.

4. (C) GELBARD TOLD DODIK THAT THE USG POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. IN SPITE OF GOOD THINGS WE HAVE HEARD ABOUT DJOKIC, WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT DODIK. HOWEVER, WE REMAINED NERVOUS ABOUT RADISIC AND THE SPRS, ESPECIALLY WITH THE GREAT PRESSURE MILOSEVIC WAS EXERTING ON THEM. RADISIC WAS FIRM WITH KAUZLARICH THAT SLOGA WOULD NOT GO AGAINST THE U.S. WE ALSO REMAIN CONCERNED WITH POPLASEN'S ERRATIC, IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, HAVING NOMINATED TWO CANDIDATES THAT COULD NOT BE ELECTED AND (WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY) A THIRD WHO HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE NOMINATION. GELBARD SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH WESTENDORP THE POSSIBILITY OF REMOVING POPLASEN, BUT HIS VICE PRESIDENT IS EVEN WORSE.

5. (C) DODIK AGREED THAT SLOGA WAS PURSUING THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCEPT FOR SUCCESS IN THE RS. THE RETURN OF THE SDS AND RADICALS TO POWER WOULD ONLY DESTABILIZE THE RS. DODIK SAID POPLASEN WAS, THROUGH HIS NOMINATION OF DJOKIC, THE INCUMBENT RS ASSEMBLY SPEAKER, TRYING TO FIND ROOM TO PLACE KALINIC IN HIS PLACE. DODIK SAID MILOSEVIC AND SESELJ WERE DIRECTING POPLASEN'S ACTIONS. HE AGREED WITH GELBARD THAT THE SOCIALISTS ARE WEAK AND UNPREDICTABLE, BUT THAT RADISIC WOULD THINK TWICE BEFORE CROSSING THE U.S.

6. (C) DURING THE MEETING, IZETBEGOVIC'S ADVISER MIRZA HAJRIC CALLED TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM IZETBEGOVIC THAT

THE FEDERATION-BASED GD COALITION WILL SUPPORT ONLY DODIK. GELBARD HAD CALLED HAJRIC TO ENCOURAGE IZETBEGOVIC TO REITERATE HIS SUPPORT.

7. (C) DODIK SAID THAT A DJOKIC VICTORY WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR MILOSEVIC, WHICH CANNOT BE ALLOWED. GELBARD AGREED, SAYING THAT POPLASEN 5 LATEST NOMINEE SHOWS THAT MILOSEVIC IS DESPERATE. HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT MONTENEGRO AND HAS OBVIOUS WORRIES IN NOSOVO. GELBARD SAID PLAVSIC WAS CONVENING A MEETING WITH RADISIC AND SLOGA LEADERSHIP AND HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR KAUZLARICH SHE WOULD PUSH HARD FOR A STRONG STATEMENT REJECTING THE DJOKIC NOMINATION, CALLING IT A BELGRADE-DIRECTED MANEUVER. SHE WOULD ALSO PUSH FOR DJOKIC TO REJECT THE NOMINATION. GELBARD AND DODIK PHONED PLAVSIC, WHO CONFIRMED HER STRONG STAND.

8. (C) DODIK SAID HIS MEETING AT THE WORLD BANK HAD GONE WELL. GELBARD SAID THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED THE WORLD BANK
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 021004

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/09

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BK

SUBJECT: SR GELBARD MEETING WITH RS PM DODIK

IN DISBURSING PART OF THE NEXT ASSISTANCE TRANCHE TO THE PS WHILE HOLDING BACK THE FEDERATION'S SHARE, BECAUSE OF SLOW PROGRESS ON PRIVATIZATION IN THE FEDERATION. GELBARD SAID THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO REPLACE THE FRY DINAR WITH THE KM. DODIK SAID THAT DECEMBER RS SALARIES HAD BEEN PAID HALF IN KM, HALF IN DINAR, AND BY MARCH SHOULD BE MADE ONLY IN KM. THE PS GOVERNMENT WOULD ISSUE A DECISION FEBRUARY 4 ENDING PREFERENTIAL TARIFF TREATMENT OR THE FRY. BY FEBRUARY 8, HE SAID, ALL CUSTOMS AND EXCISE TAXES WOULD BE PAYABLE ONLY IN KM.

9. (C) GELBARD URGED DODIK TO TAKE STEPS TO CAPITALIZE ON RETURN OPPORTUNITIES IN THE RS, CITING ZVORNIK, BIJELJINA, AND BANJA LUKA AS SOME AREAS TO FOCUS ATTENTION. DODIK SAID THE U.S. COULD COUNT ON HIS SUPPORT. GELBARD ALSO URGED DODIK TO PRESS THE BOSNIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TO

RESPOND POSITIVELY TO A CROATIAN OFFER TO OPEN THE
DUBROVNIK-TREBINJE BORDER CROSSING AND TO PROVIDE NECESSARY
CUSTOMS AND POLICE SUPPORT. DODIK AGREED.
ALBRIGHT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. report	U.S. Government Report. (3 pages)	02/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1705

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron Folder for February 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6269

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900767
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 99 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
NATO

KOSOVO
TELCALL

File

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY

SUBJECT: POTUS TELEPHONE CALL TO PM BLAIR 4 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 08 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BUTLER

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDE NARA, Date 1/10/2021
2008-0994-F3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900767

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99020413 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99020413 FOR INFORMATION
X 99031020 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1999

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE: February 4, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER (S)

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Kosovo.

II. BACKGROUND

We anticipate that Prime Minister Blair will be calling to encourage you to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO force to help implement a settlement. The UK has been one of the early advocates for such a force, and Blair already raised this with you in his telephone call of January 21st. Last week, Blair and Chirac publicly announced their two governments' willingness to contribute forces to an implementation force "within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance."

We understand that the British government is considering a contribution of 8,000 troops, including the largely-British headquarters of NATO's rapid reaction corps (the "ARCC") which would command the force. British General Michael Jackson (an able general who commanded the British-led sector of IFOR) is the ARRC commander, and thus would become the commander of a NATO-led force for Kosovo under General Clark (SACEUR) and Admiral Ellis (CINCSOUTH).

Blair has read about our consideration of a force of between 2-4,000. He will implore you to commit to 4,000+. The higher the number, the harder the sell on the Hill. I would strongly recommend you remain non-committal on this. (Also, Bill is in Europe this weekend encouraging the Europeans to belly-up-to-the-bar; a commitment now to a higher number not only might not be deliverable, it would also undercut Bill's efforts this weekend.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/4/09

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By KDE NARA, Date 1/10/2024

7008-0994-F-3

We recommend that you describe the status of our decision-making and consultations with Congress, as well as the conditions under which we would consider contributing to a force.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

~~POINTS~~ TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Pleased that, since our phone call two weeks ago, we've been able to pull together a strategy with NATO and Russia aimed at preventing more fighting and reaching an interim settlement.
- With the negotiations beginning on Saturday, we now need to keep maximum pressure on both Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians to accept an interim settlement.
- If Belgrade refuses to accept a settlement, or uses the negotiations as cover to launch a new offensive, we must be ready to carry out effective air strikes. If the Kosovar Albanians refuse to cooperate, we will need to look for ways of increasing international pressure on them.
- We also need to explain the benefits of an interim settlement. For the Serbs, an interim settlement would keep Kosovo in Yugoslavia and protect the rights of the Serb minority. For the Albanians, it would offer a real prospect of autonomy and freedom from Serb repression.
- During our last phone call, you raised the question of a NATO ground force to help implement an interim settlement. Madeleine, Bill, and Sandy have spent the week on the Hill. I can't say that support is overwhelming, but I think I can sell it if the European portion is substantial.
- Our willingness to contribute troops will depend in part of the terms of the peace agreement. It must be comprehensive. The parties must be genuinely committed to implementing it and cooperating with NATO. We will need to see a manageable security environment, including the withdrawal of a sufficient number of Serb security forces and an agreement restricting the weapons and activities of paramilitary forces.
- We will also want to ensure that any NATO mission is well defined, with a clear exit strategy. Establishing new, local police will be crucial to this exit strategy, and I hope that the UK and our other allies will be prepared to help in that regard.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/4/09

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDE NARA, Date 1/10/2024
2008-0994-F-3

- I welcome the fact that your country is willing to make a substantial contribution, including the headquarters.
- A substantial European contribution, not only to the force, but also to implementing the civil aspects of an interim settlement, will be essential to gaining domestic support for what most in this country see as a European problem

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Sutphen, Mona K.
Sent: Thursday, February 04, 1999 1:12 PM
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Cc: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Subject: Blair Talking Points as edited/cleared by SRB ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Greg - Can you check w/Larry to see if bananas is likely to come up? If so, we need to add some fireproofer points.
Thanks.

Mona



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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDG NARA, Date 1/10/2024
2008-0994-F-3

Talking Points

- Pleased that, since our phone call two weeks ago, we've been able to pull together a strategy with NATO and Russia aimed at preventing more fighting and reaching an interim settlement.
- With the negotiations beginning on Saturday, we now need to keep maximum pressure on both Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians to accept an interim settlement.
- If Belgrade refuses to accept a settlement, or uses the negotiations as cover to launch a new offensive, we must be ready to carry out effective air strikes. If the Kosovar Albanians refuse to cooperate, we will need to look for ways of increasing international pressure on them.
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- A substantial European contribution, not only to the force, but also to implementing the civil aspects of an interim settlement, will be essential to gaining domestic support for what most in this country see as a European problem.

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Sutphen, Mona K.
Sent: Thursday, February 04, 1999 1:21 PM
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs; @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Cc: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Subject: Blair Background as cleared by SRB ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

Greg/Larry -

If we don't include bananas in the TPs/background paper, SRB needs to have an update so he can brief POTUS if the issues comes up. Thanks.

Mona



blair background.doc

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDE NARA, Date 1/10/2024
2008-0694-F-3

Background

We anticipate that Prime Minister Blair will be calling to encourage you to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO force to help implement a settlement. The UK has been one of the early advocates for such a force, and Blair already raised this with you in his telephone call of January 21st. Last week, Blair and Chirac publicly announced their two governments' willingness to contribute forces to an implementation force "within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance."

We understand that the British government is considering a contribution of 8,000 troops, including the largely-British headquarters of NATO's rapid reaction corps (the "ARCC") which would command the force. British General Michael Jackson (an able general who commanded the British-led sector of IFOR) is the ARRC commander, and thus would become the commander of a NATO-led force for Kosovo under General Clark (SACEUR) and Admiral Ellis (CINCSOUTH).

Blair has read about our consideration of a force of between 2-4,000. He will implore you to commit to 4,000+. The higher the number, the harder the sell on the Hill. I would strongly recommend you remain non-committal on this. (Also, Bill is in Europe this weekend encouraging the Europeans to belly-up-to-the-bar; a commitment now to a higher number not only might not be deliverable, it would also undercut Bill's efforts this weekend.)

We recommend that you describe the status of our decision-making and consultations with Congress, as well as the conditions under which we would consider contributing to a force.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0767

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 4, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: LAWRENCE BUTLER, ACTING *LB*

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with British Prime
Minister Blair

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding
talking points for his telephone call with PM Blair.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte *GS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(D)
Declassify On: 2/4/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *WDE* NARA, Date *1/10/2024*
2008-0994-F-3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE: February 4, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 2 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Kosovo.

II. BACKGROUND

Kosovo. We anticipate that Prime Minister Blair will be calling to encourage you to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO force to help implement a settlement. The UK has been one of the early advocates for such a force, and Blair already raised this with you in his telephone call of January 21st. Last week, Blair and Chirac publicly announced their two governments' willingness to contribute forces to an implementation force "within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance."

We understand that the British government is considering a contribution of 8,000 troops, including the largely-British headquarters of NATO's rapid reaction corps (the "ARCC") which would command the force. British General Michael Jackson (an able general who commanded the British-led sector of IFOR) is the ARRC commander, and thus would become the commander of a NATO-led force for Kosovo under General Clark (SACEUR) and Admiral Ellis (CINCSOUTH).

We recommend that you describe the status of our decision-making and consultations with Congress, as well as the conditions under which we would consider contributing to a force.

On Northern Ireland, the IRA released a statement today admitting that dissidents stole a "small quantity" of weapons, blaming the Real IRA. This is likely the result

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By KDE NARA, Date 1/10/2024208-0994-1-3CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/4/09

of recent accusations by persons claiming to have been kidnapped or otherwise harassed by the IRA, including the murder last week of an IRA man-turned informant. Separately, Trimble is reported to have proposed asking for international observers to tackle the problem of punishment beatings. Involving Amnesty International and other groups is an interesting idea worth exploring.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDE NARA, Date 1/10/2024
2008-0994-F-3

- Pleased that, since our phone call two weeks ago, we've been able to pull together a strategy with NATO and Russia aimed at preventing more fighting and reaching an interim settlement.
- With negotiations beginning on Saturday, we now need to keep maximum pressure on both Belgrade and Kosovar Albanians to accept an interim settlement.
- If Belgrade refuses to accept a settlement, or uses negotiations as cover to launch new offensive, we must be ready to carry out effective air strikes. If Kosovar Albanians refuse to cooperate, we will need to look for ways of increasing international pressure on them.
- We also need to explain benefits of an interim settlement. For Serbs, an interim settlement would keep Kosovo in Yugoslavia and protect rights of Serb minority. For Albanians, it would offer real prospect of autonomy and freedom from Serb repression.
- During our last phone call, you raised question of NATO ground force to help implement an interim settlement. Today, following consultations with Congress, I announced that we are seriously considering a U.S. contribution to such a force.
- Our willingness to contribute troops will depend in part of terms of peace agreement. It must be comprehensive and just. Parties must be genuinely committed to implementing it and cooperating with NATO. We will need to see a manageable security environment, including withdrawal of a sufficient number of Serb security forces and an agreement restricting the weapons and activities of paramilitary forces.
- We will also want to ensure that any NATO mission is well defined, with a clear exit strategy. Establishing new, local police will be crucial to this exit strategy, and I hope that UK and our other allies will be prepared to help in that regard.
- It will also be important that our European allies contribute a substantial share of the force. In IFOR, United States

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/4/09

contributed over a third of the force. For a Kosovo force, we would expect to contribute less than 20 percent.

- I welcome fact that your country is willing to make a substantial contribution, including the headquarters.
- A substantial European contribution, not only to force, but also to implementing civil aspects of an interim settlement, will be essential to gaining domestic support for what most in this country see as a European problem.

NORTHERN IRELAND

- Noted the IRA statement today on weapons taken from their control by dissidents. Do you think they are setting up for some kind of movement on decommissioning? Anything we can do to help between now and March 10?
- Trimble's proposal for international observers as a means to stop punishment beatings is novel. Have you had any contact with Amnesty or Human Rights Watch regarding this idea?

TO: LOTT, TRENT

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 19 FEB 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

CO
NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POTUS LTR TO SEN LOTT RE KOSOVO

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 17 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAPIRO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN
BELL
LACKEY
NSC CHRON
SAPIRO
VACCARO

COMMENTS: HAND-CARRIED BY RMO 2/22

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 4 OF 4

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900832

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SAPIRO
002 BERGER
002 SAPIRO
002 BERGER
002 STEIN, L
003 PRESIDENT
004

Z 99020519 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 99021023 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99021218 FOR REDO
Z 99021811 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99021815 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99021819 FOR SIGNATURE
X 99022208 PRESIDENT SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

004 990219 LOTT, TRENT

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>LC 2/20</u>	
Rice	<u>2</u>		
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TK 2/22</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>DML 2/22</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

DATE February 19, 1999

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

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Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
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COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LLC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>② 2/18</u>	<u>Done</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor</u>	
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>has seen</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>2/18 omk</u>	<u>DET</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0832
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 13 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
TMA			
Cosgriff			
Mr. J. J. [unclear]	B 1	of 2 (1)	<i>[Signature]</i>
Davies			
Kerrick	<i>Copy Done</i>		
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TTC 2/12	DSAP120
Records Mgt.			
<i>Copy Done</i>	5		

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CC:

COMMENTS: POTUS letter to Senator
Lott re Kosovo

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1999

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter and observations on Kosovo. We are clearly at a crucial juncture in the Kosovo crisis and have an opportunity at Rambouillet to establish a peace process that can end the bloodshed. I share your interest in ensuring that any NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo have a clear and achievable mission.

The draft agreement under consideration at Rambouillet establishes self-government for the Kosovar Albanians and requires the withdrawal of all Serbian police and military units from the interior of Kosovo. If a settlement is reached, the withdrawal would take place as rapidly as possible and in scheduled phases to allow for an orderly transition as NATO military forces deploy and newly developed Kosovar police forces assume responsibility for law enforcement. Within 90 days, half of the Yugoslav Army forces must withdraw from Kosovo. The vast majority of Serbian Police forces are required to withdraw within 120 days, during which time the Kosovo Liberation Army will be demilitarized. Within 180 days, all Yugoslav Army forces, except for a limited number of border forces, will be withdrawn from Kosovo. The final withdrawal of 2,500 Serbian police, including from Serb-majority areas of Kosovo, is called for within one year. During that year, none of those police will be allowed to operate except under limited conditions and under international supervision.

With a strong agreement, a NATO implementation force with U.S. participation would give the parties the confidence needed to sign the agreement and successfully implement it. The United States would provide just under 4,000 troops out of a total NATO force of about 28,000. I plan to make a final decision concerning possible participation by U.S. forces after I have reviewed the agreed settlement and conducted further consultations with the Congress. As NATO finalizes its

2

operations plan for the force, we are insisting that its mission and tasks be clearly defined and that the command structure run from SACEUR (General Wesley Clark) through the U.S.-led CINCSOUTH to the Commander of the force. No one outside the NATO chain of command will be able to task this force. Given that our European allies plan to provide about 85 percent of the troops for the force, we expect NATO to use the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) commanded by British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson. Any U.S. contingent in this force would remain under the full command of Admiral James Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, while under the operational control of the ARRC.

The missions and tasks of such a force would be described in the operations plan developed by NATO military authorities and General Clark. A NATO force would have robust rules of engagement and would not have a police function. It would monitor the drawdown of all Serbian forces (except for a contingent of 1,500 forces on the Yugoslav international border and 1,000 support personnel), and the demilitarization of the KLA. In this manner, the NATO-led force would contribute to a secure environment while the OSCE supervises elections and trains an indigenous police force capable of maintaining law and order.

If we do send forces to Kosovo, we will ensure that our commitment would not be open-ended. Learning from Bosnia, we do not plan to set fixed deadlines, but rather establish benchmarks to measure progress and enable the force to draw-down during periodic reviews. These benchmarks will be keyed to the core issues of military security, building upon an indigenous police force capable of maintaining law and order, and bolstering legitimate political institutions that can satisfy Kosovar aspirations for self government. I am fully aware that the cost of U.S. participation in a Kosovo operation would be significant. Once I have decided on the scope of any U.S. participation, we will provide you with a detailed cost estimate and discuss how to secure funding.

I fully share your concern about the readiness implications of a deployment to Kosovo that involves U.S. forces. It is in response to these concerns that we have insisted our NATO allies bear the substantial burden of contributions to the force and sought to keep any U.S. contingent at the lowest possible level. As I recently emphasized in my letter to you on military readiness, I hope and expect that the Congress will support

proposals in my budget for increased defense spending in FY 2000 and throughout the FY 2000-2005 Future Year Defense Plan.

A resumption of the conflict in Kosovo poses a direct risk of wider war in Europe that would endanger U.S. national interests. We hold Slobodan Milosevic responsible for the violence and are determined to see more responsible and democratic leadership emerge in Serbia. A settlement that achieves self-government for the Kosovar Albanians is an important step in this direction. We must also continue to work with our allies to stand firm against further ethnic violence from Belgrade.

Thank you again for raising important issues concerning the possible deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo. I look forward to discussing this with you further and my foreign policy team will continue its consultations with you and other Members of Congress as the Kosovo negotiations proceed and NATO prepares for possible deployment of a military implementation force.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "B" and a long, sweeping underline.

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900832
DATE 19 FEB 99

SUBJECT: POTUS LTR TO SEN LOTT RE KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

LOTT, TRENT
ROOM SR-487
RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2403

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

2-19-99

0832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*
LARRY STEIN *LS*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Lott on Kosovo

Purpose

Reply to a letter from Senate Majority Leader Lott on Kosovo.

Background

Senator Lott wrote to convey concerns over a number of issues relating to the possible deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo, including the size of the force, command and control arrangements, cost, readiness implications and exit strategy. Your reply assures Senator Lott that his important questions are already being addressed by the Administration, and that we will continue to consult closely with Congress on all aspects of a potential U.S. contribution to a Kosovo settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senator Lott
Tab B Incoming correspondence

*Might want to
make sure this is
still accurate based
upon the weekend's
events.*

Kevin

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20504

February 8, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: MIRIAM SAPIRO *mw*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Letter from Senator Lott
on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a draft response to Senate Majority Leader Lott's questions about a potential U.S. force contribution to Kosovo.

Concurrences by: Miles Lackey, Robert Bell, Chuck Allen, *m*
Matthew Vaccaro *mw*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Reply to Senator Lott
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

SRB -
REDRAFTED.
WE SHOULD
GET THIS OUT
NOW BEFORE
THE WEEKEND.
(9)

TRENT LOTT
MISSISSIPPI

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010CAPIRO 0032
To: EXEC
EX-100 ALLEN
NEEDS WRITTEN
RESPONSE ASAP.

February 5, 1999

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for directing your national security team to begin consultations with the Congress on the Administration's plans for Kosovo. Although we share the same goal of ending the bloodshed in Kosovo and promoting regional stability and security, I am deeply concerned by the prospect that U.S. military forces could become embroiled in yet another costly, open-ended, and ill-defined peacekeeping mission. Recognizing that you may decide to commit U.S. forces to a NATO-led mission in the coming days, however, I felt it was important to share with you some specific comments and concerns about the Administration's proposed course of action.

First, I understand that the draft agreement would permit the Serbs to retain 2,500 armed security forces in Kosovo for at least one year, and possibly much longer. This is a recipe for disaster. Allowing the Serbs to maintain an armed presence in Kosovo will likely lead to further hostilities between the warring parties, increase the threat to any NATO forces deployed to Kosovo, and undermine the overall objective of the agreement -- namely, to separate the parties and allow Kosovar autonomy to take root in earnest. The United States must insist that any final agreement requires the prompt departure of all Serb security forces from Kosovo. Were the parties ultimately to agree to this position, could the size of a NATO force be reduced below the 30,000 now under discussion within NATO councils, and would U.S. ground forces be needed at all?

Second, issues related to the command and control of U.S. and NATO military forces, and whether U.S. and NATO forces can be tasked by and in support of civil authorities, must be clarified well in advance of the deployment of any NATO forces to Kosovo. For example, will U.S. forces come under the command and control of a foreign national, and if so what precedent will this set for future operations? What specific missions might U.S. and NATO forces be called upon to perform? Who will decide their rules of engagement? Will they be tasked to secure Kosovo's borders or perform other, non-traditional missions or policing functions such as apprehending those who violate the terms of the agreement?

FEB 5 1999

Third, the question of how to pay for such a deployment, assuming it goes forward, is also extremely important. No funds are included in either the fiscal year 1999 Defense budget or the budget request for fiscal year 2000 for this operation. The Bosnia experience, wherein Congress is asked year-after-year to approve supplemental funds for that operation, certainly should not serve as the model for any future Kosovo mission. Therefore, if you decide to

The President
February 5, 1999
Page two

commit U.S. forces to serve as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping mission, I would expect that you would promptly submit to the Congress a request for supplemental Defense funds in fiscal year 1999 to cover the estimated costs of the operation, together with an amended budget request for fiscal year 2000 that includes a top-line increase in the Defense budget in order to fully fund the mission through the next fiscal year, if necessary.


The fourth issue involves the need to minimize the damaging effects that yet another peacekeeping mission will have upon an American military force that is already stretched thin. During his briefing to Senators, National Security Advisor Berger raised the prospect of withdrawing U.S. forces from various peacekeeping missions, including those underway in Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, and the Sinai, as one way to reduce such pressures. I hope and expect that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will in fact be given the opportunity to realign U.S. forces engaged in such missions so as to reduce the strain on all already overburdened U.S. military.

Fifth, in the discussions with Senators regarding the Administration's "exit strategy", Secretary Albright refused to establish a fixed "end date" for any U.S. ground troop deployment, instead citing the successful completion of certain "benchmarks" as the determinant of when U.S. forces could come home. Just what are those benchmarks, and who will determine whether they have been achieved? What other measures can or will be taken to limit the duration of any U.S. ground troops-deployment? Will the United States insist that NATO adopt a policy of rotating the forces of member countries so that the burden of peacekeeping in Kosovo is shared among all Alliance members?

Sixth and finally, I am deeply concerned that the Administration does not have a long-term strategy for dealing with Serbian President Milosevic. As Secretary Albright noted in a speech yesterday, "His policies of ethnic polarization and hate-mongering in Kosovo ushered in a decade of police repression and human rights abuses throughout Yugoslavia. Those policies led to the breakup of Yugoslavia and to the devastating conflict in Bosnia." I and many of my colleagues would strongly support a more aggressive effort to undermine and replace Mr. Milosevic, and look forward to working with your Administration to this end.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your willingness to consider my views on this important matter. I look forward to your response. As always, I am

Sincerely yours,



Trent Lott

"D832"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter and observations on Kosovo. We are clearly at a crucial juncture in the Kosovo crisis, and have an opportunity at Rambouillet to establish a peace process that can end the bloodshed. I share your interest in ensuring that any NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo have a clear and achievable mission. ~~For this reason, we need to continue to consult closely as these talks unfold and NATO makes plans for a military force to implement an agreement.~~

~~I would like to address each issue you raise.~~ The draft agreement under consideration at Rambouillet establishes self-government for the Kosovar Albanians and requires the withdrawal of all Serbian police and military units from the interior of Kosovo. If a settlement is reached, the withdrawal will ~~be done~~ take place as rapidly as possible and in scheduled phases to allow for an orderly transition as NATO military forces deploy and newly developed Kosovar police forces assume responsibility for law enforcement. Within 90 days, half of the Yugoslav Army forces must withdraw from Kosovo. The vast majority of Serbian Police forces are required to withdraw within 120 days, during which time the Kosovo Liberation Army will be demilitarized. Within 180 days, all Yugoslav Army forces, except for a limited number of border forces, will be withdrawn from Kosovo. The final withdrawal of 2,500 Serbian police, including from Serb-majority areas of Kosovo, is called for within one year. During that year, none of those police will be allowed to operate except under limited conditions and under international supervision.

~~We have insisted that~~ ~~NATO begins to develop an operations plan for the force, we~~ ~~will insist that its mission and tasks, be clearly defined and~~ ~~that the command structure will run from SACEUR (General Wesley Clark) through the U.S.-led CINCSOUTH to the Commander of the force.~~ ~~No one outside of the NATO chain of command will be able to task this force.~~ ~~Given that the vast majority of any forces in Kosovo would be provided by our European allies, we~~

eliminate? yes

expect NATO to use the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The ARRC Commander, British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, would be dual-hatted as the Commander of the force. Any U.S. contingent in this force would remain under the full command of Admiral James Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, while under the operational control of the ARRC.

The missions and tasks of such a force would be described in the operations plan under development by NATO military authorities and General Clark. Any NATO force will have robust rules of engagement and will not have a police function. It would monitor the drawdown of all Serbian forces (except for the small force on the Yugoslav international border) and the demilitarization of the KLA. In this manner, the force would contribute to a secure environment while the OSCE supervises elections and trains an indigenous police force capable of maintaining law and order.

Following approval of a military plan, NATO authorities ^{are seeking} would seek force contributions from all NATO allies. I have not decided whether U.S. military personnel should participate, but I am seriously considering a contribution and will consult closely with you in the days ahead. I am fully aware that the cost of U.S. participation in a Kosovo operation would be significant. Once NATO has agreed on the military plan and I have decided on the scope of any U.S. participation, we can provide you with a detailed cost estimate and discuss how to secure funding.

If U.S. forces participate, we will ensure that our commitment would not be open-ended. Learning from Bosnia, we do not plan to set firm deadlines, but rather establish benchmarks to measure progress and enable the force to draw down during periodic six-month reviews. These benchmarks will be keyed to the core issues of military security, law and order, elections and democratic institution-building, and also take into account other factors essential to implementing the settlement.

I fully share your concern about the readiness implications of a deployment to Kosovo that involves U.S. forces. It is in response to these concerns that we have insisted our NATO allies bear the substantial burden of contributions to the force and will strive to keep any U.S. contingent at the lowest possible level. As I recently emphasized in my letter to you on military readiness, it is also important that the Congress support my

proposals for increased defense spending in FY 2000 and throughout the FY 2000-2005 Future Year Defense Plan.

There has been too much death and destruction in the Balkans. We hold Slobodan Milosevic responsible for the violence and are determined to see more responsible and democratic leadership emerge in Serbia. A settlement that achieves self-government for the Kosovar Albanians is an important step in this direction. We must also continue to work with our allies to stand firm against further ethnic violence from Belgrade.

Thank you again for raising important issues concerning the possible deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo. My foreign policy team will continue its consultations with you and other Members of Congress as the Kosovo negotiations proceed and NATO prepares for possible deployment of a military implementation force.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Lott on Kosovo

Purpose

To Reply to a letter from Senate Majority Leader Lott on Kosovo.

Background

Senator Lott wrote to convey concerns over a number of issues relating to the possible deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo, including the size of the force, command and control arrangements, cost, readiness implications and exit strategy. Your reply assures Senator Lott that his important questions are already ~~are~~ being addressed by the Administration, and that we will continue to consult closely with Congress on all aspects of a potential U.S. contribution to a Kosovo settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter ~~to Senator Lott~~ at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senator Lott
Tab B Incoming correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter and observations on Kosovo. We are clearly at a crucial juncture in the Kosovo crisis and have an opportunity at Rambouillet to establish a peace process that can end the bloodshed. I share your interest in ensuring that any NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo have a clear and achievable mission.

The draft agreement under consideration at Rambouillet establishes self-government for the Kosovar Albanians and requires the withdrawal of all Serbian police and military units from the interior of Kosovo. If a settlement is reached, the withdrawal would take place as rapidly as possible and in scheduled phases to allow for an orderly transition as NATO military forces deploy and newly developed Kosovar police forces assume responsibility for law enforcement. Within 90 days, half of the Yugoslav Army forces must withdraw from Kosovo. The vast majority of Serbian Police forces are required to withdraw within 120 days, during which time the Kosovo Liberation Army will be demilitarized. Within 180 days, all Yugoslav Army forces, except for a limited number of border forces, will be withdrawn from Kosovo. The final withdrawal of 2,500 Serbian police, including from Serb-majority areas of Kosovo, is called for within one year. During that year, none of those police will be allowed to operate except under limited conditions and under international supervision.

With a strong agreement,
A NATO ~~implementation~~ force, with U.S. participation, ^{would} ~~is~~ essential to give the parties the confidence needed to sign the agreement and successfully implement it. The United States would provide just under 4,000 troops out of a total NATO force of about 28,000. I plan to make a final decision concerning possible participation by U.S. forces after I have reviewed the agreed settlement and conducted further consultations with the Congress. As NATO finalizes its operations plan for the force,

we are insisting that its mission and tasks be clearly defined and that the command structure run from SACEUR (General Wesley Clark) through the U.S.-led CINCSOUTH to the Commander of the force. No one outside the NATO chain of command will be able to task this force. Given that our European allies plan to provide about 85 percent of the troops for the force, we expect NATO to use the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) commanded by British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson. Any U.S. contingent in this force would remain under the full command of Admiral James Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, while under the operational control of the ARRC.

Saying
admits
to
SILB
Command

The missions and tasks of such a force would be described in the operations plan developed by NATO military authorities and General Clark. A NATO force would have robust rules of engagement and would not have a police function. It would monitor the drawdown of all Serbian forces (except for a contingent of 1,500 forces on the Yugoslav international border and 1,000 support personnel), and the demilitarization of the KLA. In this manner, the NATO-led force would contribute to a secure environment while the OSCE supervises elections and trains an indigenous police force capable of maintaining law and order.

fixed
If we do send forces to Kosovo, we will ensure that our commitment would not be open-ended. Learning from Bosnia, we do not plan to set ~~firm~~ deadlines, but rather establish benchmarks to measure progress and enable the force to draw-down during periodic reviews. These benchmarks will be keyed to the core issues of military security, law and order, elections and democratic institution-building, and also take into account other factors essential to implementing the settlement. I am fully aware that the cost of U.S. participation in a Kosovo operation would be significant. Once I have decided on the scope of any U.S. participation, we will provide you with a detailed cost estimate and discuss how to secure funding.

to
general-
police
elections,
other
examples

I fully share your concern about the readiness implications of a deployment to Kosovo that involves U.S. forces. It is in response to these concerns that we have insisted our NATO allies bear the substantial burden of contributions to the force and sought to keep any U.S. contingent at the lowest possible level. As I recently emphasized in my letter to you on military readiness, ~~it is also important that the Congress support~~ well proposals for increased defense spending in FY 2000 and throughout the FY 2000-2005 Future Year Defense Plan.

in my budget

I hope and expect that

a resumption of the conflict in Kosovo poses a direct

~~There has been too much death and destruction in the Balkans.~~
We hold Slobodan Milosevic responsible for the violence and are determined to see more responsible and democratic leadership emerge in Serbia. A settlement that achieves self-government for the Kosovar Albanians is an important step in this direction. We must also continue to work with our allies to stand firm against further ethnic violence from Belgrade.

Thank you again for raising important issues concerning the possible deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo. My foreign policy team will continue its consultations with you and other Members of Congress as the Kosovo negotiations proceed and NATO prepares for possible deployment of a military implementation force.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

*risk of
wider war
in Europe
that would
endanger US
national interests.*

*I look forward
to discussing
this with you
further and you*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter and observations on Kosovo. We are clearly at a crucial juncture in the Kosovo crisis and have an opportunity at Rambouillet to establish a peace process that can end the bloodshed. I share your interest in ensuring that any NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo have a clear and achievable mission.

The draft agreement under consideration at Rambouillet establishes self-government for the Kosovar Albanians and requires the withdrawal of all Serbian police and military units from the interior of Kosovo. If a settlement is reached, the withdrawal would take place as rapidly as possible and in scheduled phases to allow for an orderly transition as NATO military forces deploy and newly developed Kosovar police forces assume responsibility for law enforcement. Within 90 days, half of the Yugoslav Army forces must withdraw from Kosovo. The vast majority of Serbian Police forces are required to withdraw within 120 days, during which time the Kosovo Liberation Army will be demilitarized. Within 180 days, all Yugoslav Army forces, except for a limited number of border forces, will be withdrawn from Kosovo. The final withdrawal of 2,500 Serbian police, including from Serb-majority areas of Kosovo, is called for within one year. During that year, none of those police will be allowed to operate except under limited conditions and under international supervision.

A NATO implementation force, with U.S. participation, is essential to give the parties the confidence needed to sign the agreement and successfully implement it. The United States would provide just under 4,000 troops out of a total NATO force of about 28,000. I plan to make a final decision concerning possible participation by U.S. forces after I have reviewed the agreed settlement and conduct further consultations with the Congress. As NATO finalizes its operations plan for the force,

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Lott on Kosovo

Purpose

To Reply to a letter from Senate Majority Leader Lott on Kosovo.

Background

Senator Lott wrote to convey concerns over a number of issues relating to the possible deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo, including the size of the force, command and control arrangements, cost, readiness implications and exit strategy. Your reply assures Senator Lott that his important questions are already ~~are~~ being addressed by the Administration, and that we will continue to consult closely with Congress on all aspects of a potential U.S. contribution to a Kosovo settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to ~~Senator Lott~~ at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senator Lott
Tab B Incoming correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

"0832"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter and observations on Kosovo. We are clearly at a crucial juncture in the Kosovo crisis, and have an opportunity at Rambouillet to establish a peace process that can end the bloodshed. I share your interest in ensuring that any NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo have a clear and achievable mission. ~~For this reason, we need to continue to consult closely as these talks unfold and NATO makes plans for a military force to implement an agreement.~~

~~I would like to address each issue you raise.~~ The draft agreement under consideration at Rambouillet establishes self-government for the Kosovar Albanians and requires the withdrawal of all Serbian police and military units from the interior of Kosovo. If a settlement is reached, the withdrawal will ~~be done~~ *take place* as rapidly as possible and in scheduled phases to allow for an orderly transition as NATO military forces deploy and newly developed Kosovar police forces assume responsibility for law enforcement. Within 90 days, half of the Yugoslav Army forces must withdraw from Kosovo. The vast majority of Serbian Police forces are required to withdraw within 120 days, during which time the Kosovo Liberation Army will be demilitarized. Within 180 days, all Yugoslav Army forces, except for a limited number of border forces, will be withdrawn from Kosovo. The final withdrawal of 2,500 Serbian police, including from Serb-majority areas of Kosovo, is called for within one year. During that year, none of those police will be allowed to operate except under limited conditions and under international supervision.

As NATO begins to develop an operations plan for the force, we will insist that its mission and tasks be clearly defined and that the command structure ~~will~~ run from SACEUR (General Wesley Clark) ~~in~~ through the U.S.-led CINCSOUTH to the Commander of the force. No one outside ~~of~~ the NATO chain of command will be able to task this force. Given that the vast majority of any forces in Kosovo would be provided by our European allies, we

eliminate? yes

expect NATO to use the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The ARRC Commander, British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, would be dual-hatted as the Commander of the force. Any U.S. contingent in this force would remain under the full command of Admiral James Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, while under the operational control of the ARRC.

The missions and tasks of such a force would be described in the operations plan under development by NATO military authorities and General Clark. Any NATO force will have robust rules of engagement and will not have a police function. It would monitor the drawdown of all Serbian forces (except for the small force on the Yugoslav international border) and the demilitarization of the KLA. In this manner, the force would contribute to a secure environment while the OSCE supervises elections and trains an indigenous police force capable of maintaining law and order.

Following approval of a military plan, NATO authorities would seek force contributions from all NATO allies. I have not decided whether U.S. military personnel should participate, but I am seriously considering a contribution and will consult closely with you in the days ahead. I am fully aware that the cost of U.S. participation in a Kosovo operation would be significant. Once NATO has agreed on the military plan and I have decided on the scope of any U.S. participation, we can provide you with a detailed cost estimate and discuss how to secure funding.

If U.S. forces participate, we will ensure that our commitment would not be open-ended. Learning from Bosnia, we do not plan to set firm deadlines, but rather establish benchmarks to measure progress and enable the force to draw down during periodic six-month reviews. These benchmarks will be keyed to the core issues of military security, law and order, elections and democratic institution-building, and also take into account other factors essential to implementing the settlement.

I fully share your concern about the readiness implications of a deployment to Kosovo that involves U.S. forces. It is in response to these concerns that we have insisted our NATO allies bear the substantial burden of contributions to the force and will strive to keep any U.S. contingent at the lowest possible level. As I recently emphasized in my letter to you on military readiness, it is also important that the Congress support my

proposals for increased defense spending in FY 2000 and throughout the FY 2000-2005 Future Year Defense Plan.

There has been too much death and destruction in the Balkans. We hold Slobodan Milosevic responsible for the violence and are determined to see more responsible and democratic leadership emerge in Serbia. A settlement that achieves self-government for the Kosovar Albanians is an important step in this direction. We must also continue to work with our allies to stand firm against further ethnic violence from Belgrade.

Thank you again for raising important issues concerning the possible deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo. My foreign policy team will continue its consultations with you and other Members of Congress as the Kosovo negotiations proceed and NATO prepares for possible deployment of a military implementation force.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510