

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chron Folder for January 1999 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1705

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo -- Preparing NATO's response to the Massacred at Racak. [Reord ID: 9900341] [Duplicate of ke5726_001a, this case] (2 pages)	01/19/1999	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee on Kosovo. [Reord ID: 9900348] (2 pages)	01/22/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
003a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, January 19, 1999. [Record ID: 9900349] [partial] (1 page)	01/22/1999	P3/b(3)
003b. memo	[Draft of 003a: 9900349] [partial] (1 page)	01/20/1999	P3/b(3)
004a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 20, 1999. [Record ID: 990359] [partial] (1 page)	01/28/1999	P3/b(3)
004b. draft	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 20, 1999. [Record ID: 990359] [See also 4.03, 2009-0983-M] (2 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)
005. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 20, 1999. [Record ID: 9900360] (1 page)	01/30/1999	P3/b(3)
006. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo--The Day After. [Record ID: 9900383] (3 pages)	01/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900329
RECEIVED: 19 JAN 99 18

TO: DOLE, BOB

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 27 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
HUMAN RIGHTS

WAR CRIMES
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POTUS REPLY TO SEN DOLE ON MILOSEVIC DEFIANCE OF INTL LAW

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 30 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HURLEY
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900329

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HURLEY
002 BERGER
002 STEIN, L
003 PRESIDENT
004
004 WH STRIPPING DESK

Z 99011918 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 99012515 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99012515 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 99012714 FOR SIGNATURE
X 99012808 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
X 99012808 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 990127
003 990127
004 990127 DOLE, BOB
004 990127 WH STRIPPING DESK

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0329
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 3 AVO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>1/2</u>	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>2/12</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

DATE

January 27, 1979 ?

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

11/25

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0329

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BY PASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ AO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>1/23</u>	<u>(edit)</u>
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>01/23</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>R</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>1/25</u>	<u>FOR</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: POTUS Reply to Senator Bob Dole on Milosevic's defiance of International Law

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0329
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC AVO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>TC 1/27</u>	<u>DEAD LAM</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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CC:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Senator ~~By~~ ^Bele:

Thank you for your letter about the recent violence in Kosovo and the repressive policies of Slobodan Milosevic.

I have condemned in the strongest possible terms the Racak atrocity, a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo. There can be no justification for this act, and its perpetrators must be brought to justice. The United States and its allies have demanded that Serb authorities act immediately to identify those responsible and to cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal.

Milosevic's attempted expulsion of Kosovo Verification Mission Director Bill Walker is, as you point out, an affront to the United States and the 54-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Milosevic's subsequent decision, under international pressure, to "freeze" the expulsion is far from sufficient to resolve the problems that he has created.

We cannot accept Milosevic's continuing defiance of the international community and his failure to comply with his commitments and obligations to the UN, OSCE and NATO. We are currently consulting within the Contact Group and NATO on how to force Milosevic back into compliance. In doing so, we also want to reinvigorate the process toward an interim political settlement. NATO is updating its planning and is readying its forces in order to back our diplomatic efforts with a credible threat of military force.

Belgrade's brutal tactics illustrate once again that a lasting political settlement in Kosovo must go hand-in-hand with political reform in Serbia. Thus we are intensifying our efforts to build political pluralism and independent media in Serbia, while bolstering Montenegrin President Djukanovic whose support for democratic reform is a welcome counterpoint to the autocratic regime in Belgrade.

In your letter you make reference to your service as Chairman of the International Commission on Missing Persons, which has been exceptional. I welcome your heartfelt commitment to peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. I am counting on your strong support as we seek to stop an escalation in the violence in Kosovo, to prevent further atrocities and to grant the Kosovar Albanians the self-government they deserve.

Thank you again for writing on this urgent and important matter.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Bob Dole
901 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 410
Washington, D.C. 20005-230

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT:

Letter from Senator Bob Dole on Milosevic's
Defiance of International LawPurpose

Respond to Senator Dole on the situation in Kosovo.

Background

Senator Dole writes to express outrage over the recent Serb massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. He sites Milosevic's attempted expulsion of Kosovo Verification Mission Director Bill Walker as further evidence that Milosevic has no intention to comply with his international commitments. He argues that only military force, or the threat of its use, can prevent future atrocities.

Your reply reiterates your public condemnation of the Racak massacre and demand that Serb authorities cooperate with independent investigators. It explains that the Administration is consulting closely with NATO allies to fashion an appropriate response to Milosevic's defiance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Dole
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

January 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE /X
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY
SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Senator Bob Dole on Milosevic's
Defiance of International Law

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response to former Senator Dole on recent events in Kosovo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letter to Senator Dole
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

CSC 1

SENATOR BOB DOLE
901 15TH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 410
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

January 19, 1999

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you about a matter of grave urgency -- a matter affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children in Kosovo. It is my hope that you will not only raise this conflict in your State of the Union address, but also put Slobodan Milosevic on notice that our great nation will no longer tolerate his genocidal attacks and defiance of international law.


As you are well aware, this past weekend a brutal execution of several dozen ethnic Albanians, including children and the elderly, was uncovered in Racak. This massacre was a bloody and vivid reminder that Milosevic's plan to ethnically cleanse Kosovo is alive and well. Along with Milosevic's recent call for the expulsion of U.S. envoy William Walker, it is also a clear indication that Milosevic had no intention to abide by even the very limited deal he agreed to with US envoy Richard Holbrooke.

I firmly believe that the time for warnings and other diplomatic maneuvers has long expired -- as has the myth that Milosevic is not orchestrating the actions of the Serb police force in Kosovo. And, while the prosecution of war crimes in The Hague is vitally important, it is not a substitute for the prevention of these crimes. Indictments of those responsible for war crimes may help those of us in the West to relieve our consciences, but it will not bring back to life those who have been slaughtered as the West has watched. Nor will it or other ex post facto measures prevent further killings like the ones in Racak.

Mr. President, I traveled to Kosovo four months ago at the request of high level officials in your administration. At that time, I saw the devastating consequences of an American and European policy that did not make Milosevic pay for his reprehensible actions -- despite countless promises to the contrary by American and NATO officials. Those actions have become increasingly more inhumane and unforgivable. And I have no doubt that they will continue, sooner rather than later, unless Milosevic is confronted with major military force -- or a credible threat thereof -- not only to punish, but also to deter further attacks by his forces on innocent civilians.

I respectfully urge you to let the American people know tonight what steps you will take to bring the bloodshed to an end in Kosovo. In my view, history will look favorably on any leader that has the courage to end Milosevic's reign of terror. It is my hope that you will be that leader. I stand ready to assist in any way you suggest.

Sincerely



BOB DOLE

In your letter you make reference to your ~~exceptional~~ service as Chairman of the International Commission on Missing Persons. I welcome your heartfelt commitment to peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. I am counting on your strong support as we seek to stop an escalation in the violence in Kosovo, to prevent further atrocities and to grant the Kosovar Albanians the self-government they deserve.

Thank you again for writing on this urgent and important matter.

Sincerely,

*which has
been exceptional.*

The Honorable Bob Dole
901 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 410
Washington, D.C. 20005-230

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER: HURLEY

LOG NUMBER: 0329

DUE DATE: 30 Jan

DATE STAFFED: 19 Jan

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: DOLE

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900341
RECEIVED: 19 JAN 99 20

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 19 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: KOSOVO - PREPARING NATO RESPONSE TO MASSACRE AT RACAK

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 25 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 1/26/2024
7008-0494-83

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9900341

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 99012112 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

1/20
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PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0341

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: X DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			<u>done</u>
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>B 1/20</u>	<u>dit</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>1/20</u>		
Berger	<u>2</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>1/20 AMF</u>	<u>NFA</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>		

OPBED

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: Kosovo - Preparing NATO's
Response to the massacre
at Racak.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0341

January 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT:

Kosovo - Preparing NATO's Response to the
Massacre at Racak

At your request, I attach a proposed memorandum to the President describing the results of the Clark/Naumann visit and this afternoon's meeting of NSC Principals.

Concurrence by:

Jamie Baker *JS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 1/19/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VL* NARA, Date *1/26/2024*
2008-6944-F3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo -- Preparing NATO's response to the Massacred at Racak. [Reord ID: 9900341] [Duplicate of ke5726_001a, this case] (2 pages)	01/19/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 22 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
SOC

DC

file

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MTG RE KOSOVO 19 JAN

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 26 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
COSGRIFF
HACHIGIAN
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTTS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VBH NARA, Date 6/2/2009

2009-0988-M

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900348

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99012113 FOR DECISION
X 99012212 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99012212 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990122 KENNEY, K
002 990122 FUERTH, L
002 990122 REYNES, J
002 990122 BASKETTE, A
002 990122 PODESTA, J
002 990122 HUPP, V
002 990122 MANNING, M
002 990122 ROMBERG, A

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

1/20/90

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DMK AD _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	1 <u>5</u>	10/20	
Rice	3	@ 1/22	
Davies	3		
Kerrick	2		
Steinberg	2		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TC 1/22	
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: SOC - DC on Kosovo

JAN 20 AM 4:07 Jan 19

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

January 22, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations


MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on January 19, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on January 19, 1999. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee on Kosovo. [Reord ID: 9900348] (2 pages)	01/22/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F
vz6264

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900348
DATE 22 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MTG RE KOSOVO 19 JAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX+1</u>
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: rz Date: 1/26/2024
2008-1994-E3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900348
DATE 22 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MTG RE KOSOVO 19 JAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY

JOINT STAFF

ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

MR ALAN ROMBERG

USUN/W - ATTN: ALAN ROMBERG

ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2201 C STREET NW

WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 4
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC mtg on Kosovo 19 JAN

NSC LOG # 9900348

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Asst. to the Rep</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Act. Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>SCS</u>	<u>Col. Manning</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: V2 Date: 1/26/2024
2008-0994-F3

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 9900348

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-8425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for DC mtg. PAGES: 4
ON Kosovo 19 JAN (w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VZ Date: 1/26/2024

2008-0944-23

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

January 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on January 19, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on January 19.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PC

SOC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 JAN PC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 26 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BERGER
COSGRIFF
EXECSEC
HACHIGIAN
JOSHI
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG
SUTPHEN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2005
By RDJ NARA, Date 5/20/2009
2009-0483-22

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99012113 FOR DECISION
X 99012515 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 99012515 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTIONDISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990125 FUERTH, L
002 990125 KENNEY, K
002 990125 REYNES, J
002 990125 BASKETTE, A
002 990125 PODESTA, J
002 990125 HUPP, V
002 990125 MANNING, M

National Security Council
The White House

H20
1/21
0750

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0349
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DMK AVO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>K/C 1/20</u>	<u>edit done</u>
Rice	<u>3</u>	<u>@ 1/25</u>	<u>A Table</u>
Davies	<u>8</u>		
Kerrick	<u>2</u>		
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		<u>edit done</u>
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>@ 1/25</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: SOC - PC on Kosovo

JAN 20 1995 19 Jan

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

January 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo -- January 19, 1999

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies forwarding the summary of conclusions for the Principals Committee meeting you chaired on January 19, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memorandum to agencies and file for the record.

Approve *B* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0349

January 25, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations


MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo held on January 19, 1999.
(C)


Glyn T. Davies
For Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: January 20, 2009

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide, September 11, 2006
By RD NARA, Date 5/20/2009
2009-0983-14

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, January 19, 1999. [Record ID: 9900349] [partial] (1 page)	01/22/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0349

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 19, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 6:30 - 8:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

Vice President:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

State:

Madeleine Albright

Thomas Pickering

Marc Grossman

Defense:

William Cohen

Walter Slocombe

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:

John Podesta

CIA:

George Tenet

John Gordon

(b)(3)

JCS:

Hugh Shelton

George Casey

Scott Fry

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via Secure
Phone)

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:

James Steinberg

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)

Declassify on: January 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2009-0983-M (251)

RDX 8/24/2010

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should warn Milosevic that the expulsion of Ambassador Walker as Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would cause the United States to withdraw its participation from KVM and that this would inevitably lead to the mission's full withdrawal. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of State should contact her Russian and Norwegian counterparts to ensure their full support for linking Ambassador Walker's retention to the future of the mission. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Subject to the President's agreement, the USG should begin to develop a consensus within the Alliance on a NATO ultimatum, backed by the threat of air strikes, that would aim to achieve a "status quo ante plus," including:
 - stricter limits on Serb security forces;
 - a KVM with greater authority and assurances of safety;
 - identify and bring to justice those responsible for Racak;
 - cooperation with the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and
 - agreement to elements of autonomy for Kosovo including local police and elections. (Action: NSC, State, DoD) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900349
DATE 25 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 JAN PC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: 1	_____
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: VIA FAX +1	_____
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: VIA FAX	_____
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: VIA FAX	_____
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: 1	_____
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: VIA FAX	_____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 1/26/2024
208-0994-73

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT. ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900349
DATE 25 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 JAN PC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY

JOINT STAFF

ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 0349

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: SOC for 19 Jan PC Mtg on Kosovo PAGES: 4
(w/
Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: rn Date: 1/26/2024

2008-0999-F3

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE: _____

 X

**IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE**

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for 19 Jan PC Mtg on Kosovo

NSC LOG # 0349

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
DOS	Exec Sec		
DOD	Exec Sec		
USUN	Staff Asst to the Rep		
CIA	Exec Sec		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: vr Date: 1/26/2024
2008-0494-F3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	[Draft of 003a: 9900349] [partial] (1 page)	01/20/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 19, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 6:30 - 8:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

CIA:

George Tenet

(b)(3) - John Gordon

Vice President:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Hugh Shelton

George Casey

Scott Fry

State:

Madeleine Albright

Thomas Pickering

Marc Grossman

USNATO:Alexander Vershbow (via Secure
Phone)Defense:

William Cohen

Walter Slocombe

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

White House:

James Steinberg

Donald Kerrick

Chief of Staff:

John Podesta

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should warn Milosevic that the expulsion of Ambassador Walker as Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)

Declassify on: January 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2009-0113-M (2.52)

RDS 8/24/2010

(KVM) would cause the United States to withdraw its participation from KVM and that this would inevitably lead to the mission's full withdrawal. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The Secretary of State should contact her Russian and Norwegian counterparts to ensure their full support for linking Ambassador Walker's retention to the future of the mission. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Subject to the President's agreement, the USG should begin to develop a consensus within the Alliance on a NATO ultimatum, backed by the threat of air strikes, that would aim to achieve a "status quo ante plus" including:
 - stricter limits on Serb security forces;
 - a KVM with greater authority and assurances of safety;
 - cooperation with the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and
 - agreement to elements of autonomy for Kosovo including local police and elections. (Action: NSC, State, DoD) ~~(S)~~

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should warn Milosevic that the expulsion of Ambassador Walker as Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would cause the United States to withdraw its participation from KVM and that this would inevitably lead to the mission's full withdrawal. (Action: State) (S)
- The Secretary of State should contact her Russian and Norwegian counterparts to ensure their full support for linking Ambassador Walker's retention to the future of the mission. (Action: State) (S)
- Subject to the President's agreement, the USG should begin to develop a consensus within the Alliance on a NATO ultimatum, backed by the threat of air strikes, that would aim to achieve a "status quo ante plus," including:
 - stricter limits on Serb security forces;
 - a KVM with greater authority and assurances of safety;
 - cooperation with the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and
 - agreement to elements of autonomy for Kosovo including local police and elections. (Action: NSC, State, DoD) (S)

Identify + bring to justice those responsible for Racak

Identify + bring to justice those responsible for Racak.

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should warn Milosevic that the expulsion of Ambassador Walker as Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would cause the United States to withdraw its participation from KVM and that this would inevitably lead to the mission's full withdrawal. (Action: State) (~~S~~)
- The Secretary of State should contact her Russian and Norwegian counterparts to ensure their full support for linking Ambassador Walker's retention to the future of the mission. (Action: State) (~~S~~)
- Subject to the President's agreement, the USG should begin to develop a consensus within the Alliance on a NATO ultimatum, backed by the threat of air strikes, that would aim to achieve a "status quo ante plus," including:
 - stricter limits on Serb security forces;
 - a KVM with greater authority and assurances of safety;
 - ~~X~~Identify and bring to justice those responsible for Racak;
 - cooperation with the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and
 - agreement to elements of autonomy for Kosovo including local police and elections. (Action: NSC, State, DoD) (~~S~~)

TO: STEINBERG

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
SOC

DC



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN DC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 26 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
COSGRIFF
EXECSEC
HACHIGIAN
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBI/NARA, Date 6/2/2009
2009-0983-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9900359

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STEINBERG
001

Z 99012520 FOR DECISION
X 99012822 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 990125 FUERTH, L
001 990125 KENNEY, K
001 990125 REYNES, J
001 990125 BASKETTE, A
001 990125 RICCHETTI, S
001 990125 HUPP, V
001 990125 MANNING, M

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 0359

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM 8 NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 7 AO _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>B 1/25</u>	<u>dit done</u>
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>g 1/28</u>	
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>JS 1/25</u>	<u>dit done</u>
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>B 1/20</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'99 JAN 25 AM 5:08

SOC - DC on Kosovo
20 Jan

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0359

January 28, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

Mr. STEVE RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S. to
the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on January 20, 1999 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on January 20, 1999. (C)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: January 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide, September 11, 2005
By KDH NARA, Date 6/2/2009
2009-0983-m

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 20, 1999. [Record ID: 990359] [partial] (1 page)	01/28/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0359

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 20, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

State:

Thomas Pickering

Marc Grossman

Lawrence Rossin

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Bernd McConnell

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

JCS:

Joseph Ralston

George Casey

Scott Fry

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Antony Blinken

James Baker

David Leavy

Michael Hurley

Mark Tavlarides

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: January 20, 2009

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0483-M (4.02)

RD 8/24/2010

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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassador Walker should remain in place, despite Belgrade's declaring him persona non grata, as long as Belgrade does not seek to hinder his ability to perform his functions or endanger him physically. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Ambassadors Hill and Pardew should meet with Milosevic and deliver U.S. requirements for "status quo ante plus." (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- USG should use the meeting of Contact Group political directors to build consensus for USG strategy. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- USG should aim to have the NAC agree to issuing an ultimatum on Saturday, January 23. The NAC decision should authorize SACEUR to conduct air operations after 96 hours unless there is a NAC decision to stop these operations. The USG would ask SYG Solana and General Clark to deliver the ultimatum to Belgrade. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Further consideration should be given to options for the "day after" air strikes if the ultimatum does not succeed in securing NATO's requirements. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

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2008-044-F3

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

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SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DATE/TIME: _____
MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 0359

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN DC MTG ON PAGES: 4
KOSOVO
(w/
Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 1/26/2024
2008-0994-F3

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900359
DATE 25 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
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MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
RICCHETTI, S	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 1/26/24
2008-0994-F3

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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LOG 9900359
DATE 25 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF
ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0359

January 25, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *WS*

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on January 20, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on January 20.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve *[Signature]*

W/ [Signature] edits made
Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: January 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBA* NARA, Date *6/2/2009*
2009-0983-m

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. draft	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 20, 1999. [Record ID: 990359] [See also 4.03, 2009-0983-M] (2 pages)	01/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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0359

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint S

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Cor
Meeting on Kosovo on January 20, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on January 20, 1999. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: January 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 1484 NARA, Date 6/2/2009
2009-0483-M

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 30 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PC

SOC

file

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 26 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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BERGER
COSGRIFF
EXECSEC
HACHIGIAN
JOSHI
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
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STEINBERG
SUTPHEN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

(B)

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1/30

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CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By ROS NARA, Date 5/20/2009
2009-0983-m

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900360

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99012520 FOR DECISION
X 99013014 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99013014 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990130 FUERTH, L
002 990130 KENNEY, K
002 990130 REYNES, J
002 990130 BASKETTE, A
002 990130 PODESTA, J
002 990130 HUPP, V
002 990130 MANNING, M

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>1/25</u>	<u>edit done</u>
Davies	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>1/30</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

7 Cosgriff

Rice

Davies

Kerrick

Steinberg

Berger

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

Records Mgt.

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

JAN 25 AM 5:12

SOC PC on Kosovo

1/20

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

January 30, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo held on January 20, 1999.
(S)


Glyn T. Davies
For Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WITH
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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify On: January 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By EDS NARA, Date 5/20/2009
2009-0983-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 20, 1999. [Record ID: 9900360] (1 page)	01/30/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 20, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

State:
Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Christopher Hill

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

CIA:
George Tenet
John Gordon

(b)(3)

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
George Casey
Scott Fry

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via Secure
Phone)

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte
James Baker

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: January 20, 2009

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0983-M (2.55)
RDS 8/24/2010

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should secure NATO support to issue an ultimatum, and be prepared to conduct air strikes, in order to achieve a "status quo plus ante" to include:
 - retaining the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission in place with strengthened authority and guarantees for its security;
 - Milosevic's agreement to proceed with "Track II" of the strategy agreed by the Principals on January 15, including local police and elections;
 - Milosevic's agreement to cooperate with the ICTY in investigating the Racak massacre;
 - Milosevic's commitment to negotiate an interim political settlement. (Action: State) (S)
- The NATO ultimatum should be part of an overall political strategy that addresses the Kosovo Liberation Army, options for implementing a settlement, and options for the "day after" air strikes if the ultimatum does not succeed in securing NATO's requirements. (Action: State, NSC) (S)
- The APNSA and Secretary of State would call appropriate counterparts to make clear that Belgrade reversing its decision to expel Ambassador Walker is necessary but not sufficient to bring the FRY into compliance with its international obligations and commitments to the OSCE and NATO. (Action: NSC, State) (S)

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 0360

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for 20 Jan PC Mtg on Kosovo PAGES: 4
(w/
Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

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Initials: VL Date: 1/26/2024

2008-1994-F3

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DTG: _____

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(Including Cover)

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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 20 Jan PC Mtg on Kosovo

NSC LOG # 0360

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<u>DOD</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Staff Asst to the Rep</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: VL Date: 1/26/2024

2008-0994-K3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900360
DATE 30 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX +1</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VZ Date: 1/26/2004

2008-0994-F3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900360
DATE 30 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY

JOINT STAFF

ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0360

January 25, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *gh*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on Kosovo -- January 20, 1999

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies forwarding the summary of conclusions for the Principals Committee meeting you chaired on January 20, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memorandum to agencies and file for the record.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: January 20, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RDS* NARA, Date *5/20/2009*
2009-0983-m

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should secure NATO support to issue an ultimatum, and be prepared to conduct air strikes, in order to achieve a "status quo plus ante" to include:
 - retaining the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission in place with strengthened authority and guarantees for its security;
 - Milosevic's agreement to proceed with "Track II" of the strategy agreed by the ~~PC~~ on January 15, including local police and elections; *Principals*
 - Milosevic's agreement to cooperate with the ICTY in investigating the Racak massacre;
 - Milosevic's commitment to negotiate an interim political settlement. (Action: State) *(S)*
- The NATO ultimatum should be part of an overall political strategy that addresses the Kosovo Liberation Army, options for implementing a settlement, and options for the "day after" air strikes if the ultimatum does not succeed in securing NATO's requirements. (Action: State, NSC) *(S)*
- The APNSA and Secretary of State would call appropriate counterparts to make clear that Belgrade reversing its decision to expel Ambassador Walker is necessary but not sufficient to bring the FRY into compliance with its international obligations and commitments to the OSCE and NATO. (Action: NSC, State) *(C)*

~~SECRET~~

0383

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Kosovo -- "The Day After"

I attach at your request a proposed memorandum to the President describing the four "day after" options emerging from yesterday's PC.

Concurrence by: James Baker ^{JB}

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: January 21, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 1/26/2024
7008-0994-13

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Kosovo--The Day After. [Record ID: 9900383] (3 pages)	01/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron for January 1999 [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900386
RECEIVED: 21 JAN 99 09

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 21 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

TELCALL

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR BLAIR TELCALL 21 JAN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 27 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By W NARA, Date 1/26/2024
7008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9900386

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99012113 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99012113 FOR INFORMATION
X 99012211 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0386

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TE A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>b</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>1/21 DMK</u>	<u>Scaplan</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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CC:

COMMENTS:

Call to Blair

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
TONY BLAIR

- Cannot accept Milosevic's flat rejection of NATO demands delivered by Clark and Naumann. And we must not let current crisis that Milosevic has created over Ambassador Walker distract us from Belgrade's basic failure to comply with NATO and cooperate with OSCE.
- Need to begin pulling together a NATO ultimatum that could be issued as early as Saturday. Objective should not be to return us to status quo ante. Rather, we should use it to leverage Milosevic to accept stricter restrictions on his security forces, to cooperate with OSCE's verification mission and UN's war crimes tribunal, and to create positive change on ground that will help create conditions for an interim political settlement.
- In this way, an ultimatum can be part of broader strategy to tamp down violence and move us toward an autonomy agreement.
- Milosevic is trying both to distract us and to undermine KVM by crisis he has created over Ambassador Walker. We have directed Bill Walker to remain. If Milosevic relents on Walker, we must carry forward with an ultimatum. If Milosevic carries through with ejecting Walker, KVM will become a sham and we should withdraw it.
- We must not let NATO be seen as slow or indecisive. Otherwise, we will lose all leverage with both Belgrade and Kosovo Liberation Army, and our Alliance will suffer a major blow to its credibility.

If Blair presses for a Contact Group meeting

- We'll be joining a Contact Group meeting in London tomorrow, where we can discuss our overall political strategy. But we must not allow a succession of Contact Group meetings to stand in way of firm NATO action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1/21/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By 12 NARA, Date 1/26/2024

2008-0904-13

If Blair raises the question of a ground force

- Mind
agreements*
- We are considering a number of options, but I can assure you that it would be extremely difficult to gain domestic support for another operation in the Balkans. We could find ourselves caught in middle of fragile cease-fire, with little incentive for either side to come to settlement. Or we could find ourselves becoming Milosevic's police force, suppressing Kosovar extremists bent on independence.
 - In either case, risks would be high and commitment long. NATO has estimated that a force to implement a cease-fire would require 50,000 troops and one to implement a peace settlement would require up to 36,000 troops. In both cases, this assumes that we would not need to fight our way in.

Bananas (only if raised)

- Agree that this issue should not have come to this point.
- We have been trying to negotiate a GATT-consistent solution since EU introduced restrictions in 1992, but Commission has steadfastly refused. We still want that solution and welcome EC sending a team here to work one out quickly. We need to agree on reform measures immediately.
- I have no flexibility to delay U.S. retaliation. I made a firm commitment to Congress last November on that. Credibility of international trade agreements with Congress at stake -- which will be essential to making progress on new WTO round.
- Also, credibility of WTO is at stake; if countries do not comply after years of litigation, what's the point?
- There is time to negotiate before imposing 100 percent tariffs (*Feb 1 deadline plus 10 days for implementation depending on whether the EC requests WTO arbitration on the amount of the retaliation -- \$520 million*).
- We would need another week or so after that for U.S. Customs to begin enforcement, giving EC additional time. USTR is ready to work hard on a WTO-consistent solution.
- (If Blair complains about impact on UK) I am told that value of UK products on our list is consistent with value of UK exports to United States.

- (If Blair asks relief for cashmere) Congress would react badly if we were to take such a key, luxury product off list.
- (If asked to wait for outcome of a new panel) We asked EC to reconvene a WTO panel month between July and November last year; EC refused. In view of my commitment to Congress, there is too much pressure now to delay.
- (If asked about impact on Caribbean nations) We are prepared to negotiate a WTO-consistent system that protects Caribbean interests, while also protecting Central American nations who are currently disadvantaged by EC system.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 21, 1999

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

DATE: January 21, 1999

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: 2:15 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER I. PURPOSE

Secure British support for U.S. plan for Kosovo.

II. BACKGROUND

Following your approval Tuesday evening, on Wednesday we began in Brussels the process of building consensus for a NATO ultimatum, backed by the threat of air strikes, in response to the massacre at Racak and Milosevic's continuing non-compliance and defiance of NATO demands. Our objective is not only to compel Milosevic to comply with his earlier commitments but to force him to:

- accept stricter restrictions on his security forces;
- accept a KVM with enhanced authority and stronger guarantees for its safety;
- cooperate with the UN war crimes tribunal;
- and cooperate in creating positive changes on the ground that will help create the conditions for an interim political settlement.

A united alliance front on an ultimatum is the best way to convey our seriousness of purpose to Milosevic and convince him to move -- and so make the use of force less likely.

Tony Blair may raise three concerns with you. The first is that we are raising the bar too high. However, we believe that the situation has fundamentally changed after the

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Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1/20/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By VR NARA, Date 1/26/2024

2008-0994-73

Racak massacre, Milosevic's defiant rejection of NATO's demands and his attempt to expel Ambassador Walker. Thus, we must use the threat of air strikes not just to punish Milosevic and restore the status quo ante, but to advance us toward a political settlement. Only by upping the ante can we get the necessary leverage over Milosevic while checking the desire of the Kosovo Liberation Army to exact retribution for the massacre at Racak.

The second concern Blair may raise is that we are moving too quickly toward an ultimatum. They have proposed a Contact Group Ministerial meeting next week when Madeleine already plans to be in London. However, we are concerned that delaying an ultimatum will only make it more difficult to achieve the necessary Alliance consensus, and that NATO will be left looking weak and indecisive.

Finally, Tony Blair might suggest that an ultimatum needs to be part of a broader political strategy that includes the deployment of NATO ground forces either before or after a political settlement. British thinking on this subject still seems unclear, and they have been unable to articulate either a mission or exit strategy for such a force. I am sending you separately a memorandum on strategy options for the "day after" an ultimatum and air strikes, recommending that we stick to an approach -- like last October -- that relies on the threat of air strikes and does not commit us to sending in ground forces.

Bananas. The British trade minister told Charlene Barshefsky that Blair might raise the EU banana issue. Blair wrote you to express his concern that retaliatory tariffs on UK products will cost jobs. Noting that he is bothered at the prospect of U.S. sanctions on an ally, he asks that you postpone retaliation until after the WTO examines the new EU banana regime. He pledged to make best efforts to bring the regime into conformity with WTO rules if it is found to violate them. He invoked the credibility of the WTO system and the vulnerability of Caribbean economies in closing. Blair has an election problem in Scotland as our retaliation threatens the economically important cashmere sector. However, it was lobbying by the UK that brought the EC banana regime into existence in 1992. The UK's largest fruit company, with a monopsony position in the Caribbean, posted \$100 million in profits last year -- at Chiquita's expense. Until now, the UK has been unwilling to support change and the EC has repeatedly

refused either to work with us on a WTO-compatible regime or to accept three WTO findings. Only the prospect of retaliation has galvanized the UK and the EC to seek an accommodation; however, we are not in a position to postpone imposition of retaliation absent a settlement.

Attachment

Tab A Points to make

Tab A

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
TONY BLAIR

- Cannot accept Milosevic's flat rejection of NATO demands delivered by Clark and Naumann. And we must not let current crisis that Milosevic has created over Ambassador Walker distract us from Belgrade's basic failure to comply with NATO and cooperate with OSCE.
- Need to begin pulling together a NATO ultimatum that could be issued as early as Saturday. Objective should not be to return us to status quo ante. Rather, we should use it to leverage Milosevic to accept stricter restrictions on his security forces, to cooperate with OSCE's verification mission and UN's war crimes tribunal, and to create positive change on ground that will help create conditions for an interim political settlement.
- In this way, an ultimatum can be part of broader strategy to tamp down violence and move us toward an autonomy agreement.
- Milosevic is trying both to distract us and to undermine KVM by crisis he has created over Ambassador Walker. We have directed Bill Walker to remain. If Milosevic relents on Walker, we must carry forward with an ultimatum. If Milosevic carries through with ejecting Walker, KVM will become a sham and we should withdraw it.
- We must not let NATO be seen as slow or indecisive. Otherwise, we will lose all leverage with both Belgrade and Kosovo Liberation Army, and our Alliance will suffer a major blow to its credibility.

If Blair presses for a Contact Group meeting

- We'll be joining a Contact Group meeting in London tomorrow, where we can discuss our overall political strategy. But we must not allow a succession of Contact Group meetings to stand in way of firm NATO action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1/21/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By 12 NARA, Date 1/26/2024

208-0094-A3

If Blair raises the question of a ground force

- We are considering a number of options, but I can assure you that it would be extremely difficult to gain domestic support for another operation in the Balkans. We could find ourselves caught in middle of fragile cease-fire, with little incentive for either side to come to settlement. Or we could find ourselves becoming Milosevic's police force, suppressing Kosovar extremists bent on independence.
- In either case, risks would be high and commitment long. NATO has estimated that a force to implement a cease-fire would require 50,000 troops and one to implement a peace settlement would require up to 36,000 troops. In both cases, this assumes that we would not need to fight our way in.

Bananas (only if raised)

- Agree that this issue should not have come to this point.
- We have been trying to negotiate a GATT-consistent solution since EU introduced restrictions in 1992, but Commission has steadfastly refused. We still want that solution and welcome EC sending a team here to work one out quickly. We need to agree on reform measures immediately.
- I have no flexibility to delay U.S. retaliation. I made a firm commitment to Congress last November on that. Credibility of international trade agreements with Congress at stake -- which will be essential to making progress on new WTO round.
- Also, credibility of WTO is at stake; if countries do not comply after years of litigation, what's the point?
- There is time to negotiate before imposing 100 percent tariffs (Feb 1 deadline plus 10 days for implementation depending on whether the EC requests WTO arbitration on the amount of the retaliation -- \$520 million).
- We would need another week or so after that for U.S. Customs to begin enforcement, giving EC additional time. USTR is ready to work hard on a WTO-consistent solution.
- (If Blair complains about impact on UK) I am told that value of UK products on our list is consistent with value of UK exports to United States.

- (If Blair asks relief for cashmere) Congress would react badly if we were to take such a key, luxury product off list.
- (If asked to wait for outcome of a new panel) We asked EC to reconvene a WTO panel month between July and November last year; EC refused. In view of my commitment to Congress, there is too much pressure now to delay.
- (If asked about impact on Caribbean nations) We are prepared to negotiate a WTO-consistent system that protects Caribbean interests, while also protecting Central American nations who are currently disadvantaged by EC system.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0386

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 21, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

ANTONY BLINKEN (1)

FROM:

LAWRENCE BUTLER/GREG SCHULTE (1)

SUBJECT:

Blair Telephone Call Briefing Package

Attached at Tab I is your memo to the President forwarding talking points for his telephone call to PM Blair. There is material included on bananas as a fireproofer (USTR reported that Blair may raise).

Concurrence by:

Lori Hendricks (1)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1/21/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 1/26/2024
2008-0694-F3

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
TONY BLAIR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1/21/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 1/26/2024

2008-0994-F3

If Blair raises the question of a ground force

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~~• Would UK be prepared to participate in a largely European force, like Extraction Force in Macedonia?~~

Bananas (only if raised)

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- We have been trying to negotiate a GATT-consistent solution since EU introduced restrictions in 1992, but Commission has steadfastly refused. We still want that solution and welcome EC sending a team here to work one out quickly. We need to agree on reform measures immediately.
- I have no flexibility to delay U.S. retaliation. I made a firm commitment to Congress last November on that. ~~My~~ credibility is at stake, as is credibility of international trade agreements in Congress -- which will be essential to making progress on new WTO round.
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- We would need another week or so after that for U.S. Customs to begin enforcement, giving EC additional time. USTR is ready to work hard on a WTO-consistent solution.

- (If Blair complains about impact on UK) ~~UK firms are primary beneficiaries of EC banana import system;~~ value of UK products on our list is consistent with value of UK exports to United States. *I am told that*
- (If Blair asks relief for cashmere) Congress would react badly if we were to take such a key, luxury product off list.
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
TONY BLAIR

Talking Points

- Cannot accept Milosevic's flat rejection of NATO demands delivered by Clark and Naumann. And we must not let current crisis that Milosevic has created over Ambassador Walker distract us from Belgrade's basic failure to comply with NATO and cooperate with OSCE.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1/21/09

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By 12 NARA, Date 1/26/2014

7-08-0944-F3

If Blair raises the question of a ground force

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Bananas (only if raised)

- Agree that this issue should not have come to this point.
- We have been trying to negotiate a GATT-consistent solution since EU introduced restrictions in 1992, but Commission has steadfastly refused. We still want that solution and welcome EC sending a team here to work one out quickly. We need to agree on reform measures immediately.
- I have no flexibility to delay U.S. retaliation. I made a firm commitment to Congress last November on that. My credibility is at stake, as is credibility of international trade agreements in Congress -- which will be essential to making progress on new WTO round.
- Credibility of WTO is at stake; if countries do not comply after years of litigation, what's the point?
- There is time to negotiate before imposing 100 percent tariffs (Feb 1 deadline plus 10 days for implementation depending on whether the EC requests WTO arbitration on the amount of the retaliation -- \$520 million.)
- We would need another week or so after that for U.S. Customs to begin enforcement, giving EC additional time. USTR is ready to work hard on a WTO-consistent solution.