

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chron Folder for January 1999 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1705

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Kosovo Executive Committee Meeting, January 7, 1999. [partial] (1 page)	01/04/1999	P3/b(3)
002. memo	Thursday's Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	01/05/1999	P3/b(3)
003. memo	Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	01/11/1999	P3/b(3)
004. memo	Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	01/15/1999	P3/b(3)
005. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 11, 1999. [Record ID: 9900160] [partial] (1 page)	01/13/1999	P3/b(3)
006a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: Friday's PC on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9900218] [Duplicate of rs236, 2009-0983-M (2.44, 2.45)] (5 pages)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	Kosovo Strategy. [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
 OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron's for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CHRONS FOR JANUARY, 1999

LOG NUMBER

SUBJECT

NONE	KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING -- JANUARY 7
NONE	KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING -- JANUARY 7
NONE	KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING -- JANUARY 12
NONE	KOSOVO EXCOMM MEETING -- JANUARY 19
0009	PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO LETTER FROM SENATOR LUGAR ET AL., URGING STEPS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA
0160	SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR JAN 11 DEC MTG. ON KOSOVO
0165	NOTIFICATION AND AGENDA FOR PC ON KOSOVO ON JAN 15
0218	BRIEFING MEMO ON PC ON KOSOVO JAN 15
0221	RESPONSE TO DOLE RE INT'L COMMISSION ON MISSING PERSONS
0268	TRAVEL REQUEST FOR MIKE HURLEY -- APRIL 8-11 ROCHESTER, MN
0281	SOC FOR PC MTG. ON KOSOVO PC -- JAN 15
0290	KOSOVO: RESPONDING TO THE RACAK MASSACRE
0302	SOC FOR PC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 18
0303	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 16
0304	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 17
0312	TELCON WITH SEC. GEN. SOLANA
0320	EXTRADITION OF BUSIC TO CROATIA TO SERVE REST OF SENTENCE
0329	POTUS REPLY TO SEN DOLE ON MILOSEVIC DEFIANCE OF INT' LAW

0341	KOSOVO -- PREPARING NATO RESPONSE TO MASSACRE AT RACAK
0348	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 19
0349	SOC FOR PC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 19
0359	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 20
0360	SOC FOR PC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 20
0383	KOSOVO -- "THE DAY AFTER"
0386	BRIEFING MEMO FOR BLAIR TELCALL -- JAN 21
0398	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 21
0421	SOC FOR PC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 22
0458	SCHEDULE PROPOSAL FOR FOREIGN POLICY TEAM MEETING ON KOSOVO -- JANUARY 25
0482	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- JAN 25
0563	REP GILMAN FORWARDS ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIL LEAGUE STATEMENT ON KOSOVO
0567	KOSOVO -- CONSULTING WITH CONGRESS ON A POSSIBLE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO IMPLEMENTING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT
0590	POTUS MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY TEAM -- FEB 1
0601	BRIEFING MEMO FOR JAN 29 PC MEETING ON KOSOVO
0644	SOC FOR PC MEETING ON KOSOVO -- JAN 29
30004	KOSOVO -- CONTAINING FURTHER VIOLENCE
8653	SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STABILIZATION FORCE (SFOR)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Kosovo Executive Committee Meeting, January 7, 1999. [partial] (1 page)	01/04/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chen

January 5, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

WILLIAM WOOD
USUN

MICHAEL SHEEHAN
Department of State

JOHN BURNIM
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

MARGUERITE HCUZE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

BERND MCCONNELL
Office of the Secretary of
Defense


PETER KOVACS
U.S. Information Agency

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Thursday's Kosovo ExComm Meeting

The Kosovo ExComm meeting scheduled for Thursday, January 7, 1999, will now be held in room 6245 at the State Department from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m. Participants from outside the building can be cleared in by calling 202-647-2797 when they arrive in the visitors lobby. The agenda for the meeting is attached.


Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Thursday's Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	01/05/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrns for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chen

January 11, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

WILLIAM WOOD
USUN

MICHAEL SHEEHAN
Department of State

JOHN BURNIM
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

BERND MCCONNELL
Office of the Secretary of
Defense


PETER KOVACS
U.S. Information Agency

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Tuesday, January 12, 1999, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. In light of the Principals Committee meeting, there will be no ExComm meeting on Friday, January 15. The agenda for Tuesday's meeting is attached.


Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Attachment

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
January 7, 1999

- I. Compliance CIA/State
- II. Strategy Paper State
- III. Update on Humanitarian ReliefState
- IV. Update on Transition Assistance Initiative . . . USAID

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	01/11/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

WILLIAM WOOD
USUN

MICHAEL SHEEHAN
Department of State

JOHN BURNIM
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

BERND MCCONNELL
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

PETER KOVACS
U.S. Information Agency


JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Kosovo Executive Committee Meeting

There will be a Kosovo Executive Committee meeting on Thursday, January 7, 1999, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building.

Please call in your attendee's date of birth and social security number to Mary Quinn at 202-456-9101, NLT 9:00 a.m., Thursday, January 7.



Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
January 12, 1999

- I. Compliance CIA/State
- II. Deputies Committee meeting Follow-up.NSC
- III. Status of KVM and U.S. KDOM.State
- IV. Status of Police Development Efforts.State

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Kosovo ExComm Meeting. [partial] (1 page)	01/15/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

(Handwritten initials)

January 15, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT
Department of State

WILLIAM WOOD
USUN

MICHAEL SHEEHAN
Department of State

CAMERON LEUTHY
Office of Management and
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON
Department of State

(b)(3)
Central Intelligence Agency

MARGUERITE HOUZE
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON
Agency for International
Development

BERND MCCONNELL
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

PETER KOVACS
U.S. Information Agency

JAMES SCHEAR
Office of the Secretary of
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Kosovo ExComm Meeting

There will be a Kosovo ExComm meeting on Tuesday, January 19, 1999, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. An agenda is attached.

(Handwritten signature)
Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Attachment

AGENDA FOR KOSOVO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
January 19, 1999

- I. Compliance CIA/State
- II. Principals Committee Meeting Follow-up.NSC
- III. Kosovo Funding.OMB
- IV. KVM Stand-up and Security. State
- V. XFOR Update. JCS
- VI. Any Other Issues.All

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0009

January 13, 1999

Handwritten initials

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Letter from Senator Lugar,
et al., Urging Steps to Promote Democracy in
Serbia

Senator Lugar and seven other senators wrote the President to urge that the Administration take steps to facilitate a transition to a democratic government in Serbia.

We have coordinated the proposed response with Special Representative Robert Gelbard's office.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a proposed response.

Concurrences by: Mara Rudman, David Wippman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to POTUS at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Lugar, et al.

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEINSUBJECT: Response to Letter from Senator Richard Lugar,
et al. Urging Steps to Promote Democracy in
SerbiaPurpose

Respond to a letter from Senator Lugar and seven other Senators calling for the Administration to take specific steps to facilitate transition to a democratic government in Serbia.

Background

The Senators wrote you to urge that the Administration explicitly call for the replacement of Slobodan Milosevic and explore what inducements might motivate him to relinquish power. The Senators also recommend that the Administration condemn Belgrade's repression of independent media and call for increased support to democratic forces.

Your reply makes clear the Administration's determination to advance political reform in Serbia. It emphasizes that the Administration has no illusions concerning the harm that Milosevic has caused and that the United States only deals with him on a limited, as-needed basis. The reply also highlights the \$15.5 million allocated in FY 1999 to promote democracy in Serbia and the steps the Administration has taken to bolster Montenegro as a counterweight to Belgrade.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Senator Lugar, et al.
Tab B Incoming Correspondencecc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to last year's campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Unfortunately, we cannot ignore the reality of Milosevic's rule. That reality requires that we maintain a certain limited degree of interaction in order to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement. That said, we conduct our dealings with Milosevic on a pragmatic, as-needed basis. We do not accept his word at face-value but independently verify his compliance with obligations.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999 we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" ("FRY"). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being

used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the "FRY" will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, as well as the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, positive steps on state succession issues and full support for Dayton implementation.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the "FRY." We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the "FRY" and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge in Montenegro.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the "FRY" back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1401

0009

December 22, 1998

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to you with regard to the deepening crisis of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and the need for the United States to take steps to help facilitate a transition to a democratic government committed to the rule of law. Such a transition in the very near future is not only essential to the Serbian people but is a necessary prerequisite to a stable peace in the Balkans.

It is increasingly apparent that Milosevic is faced with a spirit of opposition by the forces of democratic change as well as a growing uncertainty of the loyalty of the props of his regime, an uncertainty heightened by the dismissal last month of the Army Chief of Staff, General Momcilo Perisic. Moreover, the Serbian Orthodox Church, a strong voice of national legitimacy, is opposed to Milosevic. In the current atmosphere, the Serbian democratic forces need a clear signal that the United States favors the replacement of the Milosevic regime with a democratic government and is taking steps to encourage that outcome.

The December 1, 1998, comments on American policy by State Department Spokesman Rubin regarding progress in Kosovo, the apprehension and prosecution of war criminals, and democratization of Serbia, were a step in the right direction. But his comments stopped short of an explicit acknowledgment that Milosevic's removal from power would be welcomed in Washington. Official American denials create the impression in Serbia that the United States favors Milosevic's continuation in power as a principal negotiating "partner," a perception which he exploits as a major asset in fostering a climate of inevitability that has helped him retain power. This is a very real problem within Serbia and a serious defect in American policy. Until Milosevic leaves power, he will be able, and willing, to reignite the Bosnian war (with possibly serious consequences for U.S. personnel deployed there), unleash renewed repression in Kosovo, or generate new crises as his needs require. We should not let our understandable concern about managing the crisis *du jour* outweigh the priority of removing the source of crisis.

Paradoxically, Milosevic's other major asset in manipulating his dwindling support among the Serbian people is his claim that he is the only force standing up to an American-led international policy determined to reduce the Serbian people to poverty and misery by sanctions, and, ultimately, the dismemberment of the Serbian republic. The democratic opposition in Serbia knows that, despite his claims, Milosevic's own policies are inexorably leading Serbia to that result.

It is important that the United States make clear that we are not opposed to the Serb people, to Serbia as a nation or to the legal and legitimate interests of the Serbian republic, and that the United States is ready to facilitate Serbia's return to the family of nations under a post-Milosevic, democratic government committed to the rule of law. By comparison, the United States has consistently and properly personalized its policy in Iraq: Saddam Hussein, not the Iraqi people, is the problem, and the United States does not favor the breakup of Iraq or a compromise of Iraq's territorial integrity. Unfortunately, we have not made the same point with respect to Serbia, to Milosevic's continuing advantage to further that objective.


In view of the foregoing, we appreciate the efforts your Administration has made to step up promotion of democracy in Serbia, and urge that the following points be integrated into a comprehensive U.S. program:


- An explicit statement that United States policy seeks the replacement of the Milosevic regime with a democratic government committed to the rule of law.
- An insistence that the repression of independent media in Serbia cease at once, including repeal of the media law recently enacted in the wake of the latest Kosovo crisis.
- Intensification of programs to promote American cooperation with Serbian democratic forces, including stepped-up exchanges and programs encouraging the independence of the media, trade unions, students, and professional groups.
- Encouragement of non-governmental organizations to create an international support group for Serbian democratic forces.
- A firm insistence that fair, orderly, and transparent internationally-monitored elections in any interim agreement in Kosovo must also include the same standards for elections in all of Serbia .
- Instructions to all senior Administration officials traveling to Serbia to meet with senior representatives of the democratic opposition, including representatives of the Church; for high-level meetings by senior U.S. officials with democratic opposition figures traveling to the United States or to third countries; and for an intensification of Embassy Belgrade contacts with the democratic opposition.


- Instructions to senior Administration officials to minimize visible, public contacts with officials of the Milosevic regime, and especially with Milosevic himself, that lend themselves to distorted portrayals in the Serbian media of evidence of American favor or "partnership."
- A commitment to lift the outer wall of sanctions against Montenegro and take steps to promote economic development in that republic; to lift sanctions, if possible, on localities in Serbia under control of the democratic opposition; and a clear commitment that all sanctions against the Serbian republic will be lifted upon Milosevic's replacement by a democratic government committed to the rule of law.
- A commitment that the United States will, upon Milosevic's replacement by a democratic government committed to the rule of law, formally grant *de jure* recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and will support a process for its integration into the United Nations, the OSCE, and international financial institutions.
- The designation of a special presidential representative for promotion of democratic change in Serbia, with the assistance of appropriate experts; this representative should be a visible and distinguished figure well known in Serbia but not seen as hostile to Serbia or as close to Milosevic.
- A closer coordination of American efforts to promote democracy in Serbia with those of our European friends and allies and of the European Union.
- Acceleration of humanitarian programs in Serbia, especially those directed toward the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons in and from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo; U.S.-supported programs in Kosovo must take care to be non-discriminatory.
- Exploration of options, as employed in other countries in the past, whereby Milosevic (with his wife, Mirjana Markovic) might be given incentives to relinquish power voluntarily and to leave Serbia, rather than to cling to power and inflict greater suffering on the people of Yugoslavia and the region.


Mr. President, we emphasize that these and other measures must be undertaken with all urgency given the growing governmental instability in Serbia. No American policy to promote a stable and peaceful Balkan region can succeed if Serbia remains, as it has since the breakup of Yugoslavia, under the grip of a regime that depends on crisis for its continued hold on power. We believe a democratic, law-abiding Serbia is essential to peace and stability in the region. The coming months — and perhaps weeks — may be crucial in ensuring that the source of war and instability in Belgrade is replaced. Moreover, it is essential that these steps be taken as soon as possible to ensure that the direction of change, whenever and however it comes, takes a positive, democratic direction. This would not only be in the interest of the people of Serbia, it is decidedly in our national interest. We urge you to consider these steps to help end the protracted crisis in the Balkans as soon as possible.


Sincerely,


Richard G. Lugar


Joseph I. Lieberman



Don Nickles


Larry E. Craig


Jesse Helms


Robert J. Kerrey


Gordon Smith


Carl Levin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: JANET MURGUIA
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting the responses.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call Eli Joseph at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letters:

- 1) Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC), expressing concern over a possible bipartisan commission to review US-Cuba relations;
- 2) Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS) and eight other Senators, concerning the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999;
- 3) Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-IN) and seven other Senators, concerning the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia;
- 4) Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) and six other Members of Congress, recommending the appointment of a bipartisan commission to review US-Cuba relations; and,
- 5) Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA), Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) and Rep. Charles B. Rangel (D-NY), supporting the appointment of a bipartisan commission to review US-Cuba relations.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chairman
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1401

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Senator Craig:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Larry E. Craig
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1203

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2704

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Carl:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2202

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0703

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Senator Nickles:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Don Nickles
Majority Whip
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3602

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1999

Dear Senator Smith:

Thank you for your letter on President Milosevic and his autocratic regime in Belgrade. I share your views on the enormous harm that Milosevic has inflicted on the Balkans and appreciate your policy recommendations for democratizing Serbia, an objective that I share.

At the outset, let me assure you that we have no illusions about Milosevic. His policies have contributed to almost every problem in the Balkans over the last decade, from the conflict in Bosnia to his campaign of violence and atrocities in Kosovo. His policies have destabilized the region, slowed progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and set Serbia back economically for a generation. Far from a partner for peace, he has been an instigator of turmoil and suffering.

Clearly, as you emphasize, bringing democracy to Serbia is of central importance not only to a settlement in Kosovo but also to the long-term stability of the Balkans. We would welcome a democratic government in Belgrade that respects human rights and fulfills its international commitments. We continue to work actively toward that goal. In FY 1999, we have budgeted \$15.5 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funding for the "Former Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). These funds are being used to support Democracy Commission grants to political opposition groups, labor and student organizations, and other civil society initiatives. These funds are also being used to support independent radio and television and to enable various non-governmental organizations to assist opposition parties to organize and implement democratic processes. Finally, we have made clear that the FRY will remain isolated and under sanctions until we see substantial progress toward democratization, the return of self-government to Kosovo, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

positive steps on state succession issues and full support for implementing the Dayton Accords.

A pluralistic and democratic Montenegro provides an important counterweight to the Belgrade regime and a model for political reform in the FRY. We strongly support Montenegrin President Djukanovic's efforts at reform. To demonstrate support, my Special Representative Robert Gelbard and Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh have recently met with Djukanovic and other Montenegrin officials. The Norwegian OSCE Chairman-in-Office Knut Vollebaek met with Djukanovic on January 11 and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Javier Ruperez, will visit Montenegro later this month. We have exempted Montenegro from sanctions placed on the FRY and are providing humanitarian assistance to help Montenegro aid the more than 20,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who found refuge there.

Until such time as there is a change in government in Belgrade, we will maintain limited, clear-eyed contacts with Milosevic to advance our overall policy goals, including maintenance of the cease-fire in Kosovo and negotiation of an interim political settlement.

In conclusion, let me assure you that my Administration is determined to advance political reform in Serbia, thus helping to bring the FRY back into Europe and to attain a lasting peace in the Balkans. I appreciate your support in pursuing this important objective.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Gordon H. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3704

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 13 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
DC

SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 11 JAN DC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 18 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
COSGRIFF
EXECSEC
HACHIGIAN
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 1/2/2009
2009-0983-11

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STEINBERG
001
002

Z 99011321 FOR DECISION
X 99011321 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99011321 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	990113	FUERTH, L	
002	990113	KENNEY, K	
002	990113	REYNES, J	
002	990113	BASKETTE, A	
002	990113	KYLE, R	
002	990113	RICCHETTI, S	
002	990113	HUPP, V	
002	990113	CONROY, R	
002	990113	MANNING, M	

National Security Council
The White House

11053
1

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 0160

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG R AO _____

SB
Cosgriff

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	1	(R) 1/12 4/13	dit's done
Davies	4	has seen	
Kerrick	2	(R) 1/12	
Steinberg	3		<i>[Signature]</i>
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	(R) 1/13	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: '99 JAN 12 pm 3:20 SOC -DC Kosovo
11 JAN

Exec Sec Office has diskette *[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0160

January 13, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. STEVE RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on January 11, 1999 ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on Kosovo on January 11, 1999. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
FR: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify On: January 12, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide/Regs, September 11, 2006
By: *424* NARA, Date *6/2/2009*
2009-0923-m

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 11, 1999. [Record ID: 9900160] [partial] (1 page)	01/13/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 11, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

AID:
Frederick Barton

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
Lawrence Rossin

JCS:
Edward Anderson
George Casey

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy: (via SVTS)
Richard Holbrooke

USUN:
Alan Romberg

White House:
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Rodney Bent

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Mara Rudman
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Phillip Gordon
Matthew Gobush

Chief of Staff:
Steven Ricchetti

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- USG strategy must not rely on the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) managing a series of crises like the present one

involving the seizure of eight VJ soldiers by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The USG should use a successful resolution of the current crisis to convince all sides of their mutual interest in (1) taking steps to avoid further incidents, (2) cooperating with KVM, and (3) pursuing positive change on the ground and an interim political settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The three-track strategy described in the State Department paper should be presented to NSC Principals after being modified to reflect the Deputies' discussion. The revised paper should:
 - describe and assess the following two options for the negotiations: (1) continuing to focus on an interim political settlement; or (2) shift emphasis to pursuing the incremental implementation of a settlement based on the commitments already made by Belgrade;
 - describe and assess two broad options for handling the KLA: (1) seeking to co-opt KLA moderates and isolate the extremists by creating positive change on the ground and offering to bring the KLA into the political process; or (2) threatening to apply negative pressure if the KLA fails to abide by the cease-fire, cooperate with KVM or allow negotiations to proceed; and,
 - identify which elements are currently funded or unfunded. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should consider what strategy to pursue if conditions deteriorate to the point that the three-track strategy described in the State Department paper can no longer be implemented and consideration must be given to the withdrawal of KVM. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 0160

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>SOC FOR 11 JAN DC on FORO/D</u>	PAGES: <u>4</u>	(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 1/25/2024
2-08-0994-F3

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____ IMMEDIATE RELEASER: _____
 _____ PRIORITY _____
 _____ J _____ ROUTINE DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: _____
 (Including Cover)
 FROM: NSC West Wing Desk (202) 456-9425 WH Situation Room
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR 11 JAN DC ON KOSOVO
 NSC LOG # 0160

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>DOS</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____	_____
<u>OSUN</u>	<u>STAFF ASST TO REP REP</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____	_____
<u>AID</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: nr Date: 1/25/2024
 2008-0094-F3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900160
DATE 13 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 11 JAN DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/ SECRET ATTACHMENT

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX +1</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
RICCHETTI, S	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 1/25/2024
208-0994-F3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900160
DATE 13 JAN 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 11 JAN DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	
MS. RYAN CONROY 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE ROOM 6.08 WASHINGTON, DC 20523-6801 AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	
COL. MICHELLE MANNING SECRETARY JOINT STAFF ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

January 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG


FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo on January 11, 1999

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on January 11.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

involving the seizure of eight VJ soldiers by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The USG should use a successful resolution of the current crisis to convince all sides of their mutual interest in (1) taking steps to avoid further incidents, (2) cooperating with KVM, and (3) pursuing positive change on the ground and an interim political settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The three-track strategy described in the State Department paper should be presented to NSC Principals after being modified to reflect the Deputies' discussion. The revised paper should:

- describe and assess the following two options for the negotiations: (1) continuing to ~~pursue~~ ^{focus on} an interim political settlement; or (2) ~~immediately shifting~~ ^{focus on} emphasis to pursuing the incremental implementation of a settlement based on the commitments already made by Belgrade;
- describe and assess two broad options for handling the KLA: (1) seeking to co-opt KLA moderates and isolate the extremists by creating positive change on the ground and offering to bring the KLA into the political process; or (2) threatening to apply negative pressure if the KLA fails to abide by the cease-fire, cooperate with KVM or allow negotiations to proceed; and,
- identify which elements are currently funded or unfunded. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The USG should consider what strategy to pursue if conditions deteriorate to the point that the three-track strategy described in the State Department paper can no longer be implemented and consideration must be given to the withdrawal of KVM. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 12 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR PC ON KOSOVO 15 JAN

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 18 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BERGER
COSGRIFF
HACIGIAN
JOSHI
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG
SUTPHEN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSTTS DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 1/25/2024
208-0994-13

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 99011312 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
001	990112	FUERTH, L	
001	990112	KENNEY, K	
001	990112	REYNES, J	
001	990112	BASKETTE, A	
001	990112	KYLE, R	
001	990112	PODESTA, J	
001	990112	HUPP, V	
001	990112	CONROY, R	
001	990112	MANNING, M	
001	990112	WOOD, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0165
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PS AO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Cosgriff</u>			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>(B) 1/12 4/13</u>	<u>Ac Tab 5</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TRC 1/13</u>	<u>[Initials]</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: PC m by - 15 JAN
Agenda - Kosovo

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 13, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Kosovo ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo on January 15, 1999 from 2:30 to 4:00 p.m., in the Situation Room of the White House. An agenda is attached at Tab A. The State Department is circulating separately a paper on Kosovo Strategy for Agenda Item II. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: January 15, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By Y2 NARA, Date 1/25/2024
2008-0994-F3

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON KOSOVO

DATE: January 15, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

AGENDA

- I. Current Situation.CIA/State
- II. Kosovo Strategy.State
- III. Funding.OMB

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By r NARA, Date 1/25/2024
 2008-0994-73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by : Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: January 15, 2009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900165
DATE 12 JAN 99

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR PC ON KOSOVO 15 JAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	_____
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX+1</u>	_____
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	_____
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	_____
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	_____
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	_____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 1/25/2024
2008-09A4-F3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9900165
DATE 12 JAN 99

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR PC ON KOSOVO 15 JAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. RYAN CONROY 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE ROOM 6.08 WASHINGTON, DC 20523-6801 AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
COL. MICHELLE MANNING SECRETARY JOINT STAFF ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>1</u>
WOOD, W	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>1</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 9900145

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notification + Agenda for TC mtg on Kosovo 15 JAN</u>		PAGES: <u>3</u> (w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: rz Date: 1/25/2024

2028-0964-173

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

January 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Kosovo --
January 15, 1999

Attached is the draft agenda for the Principals Committee meeting on Kosovo scheduled for January 15, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the draft agenda at Tab A and authorize Glyn Davies to sign memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *GS* _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Draft Agenda

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 14 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO ON PC ON KOSOVO 15 JAN

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 20 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RDS NARA, Date 5/20/2009
2009-0983-11

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99011419 FOR INFORMATION
X 99012109 NOTED BY BERGER

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0219
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 15 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
TMA Jacobson Cosgriff	1	1/14 <u>(initials)</u>	
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick	(copy) ✓		
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3	<u>(initials)</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TTC 1/16	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Friday's PC on Kosovo
(Briefing memo for SRB)

Exec Sec Office has diskette no

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: Friday's PC on Kosovo. [Record ID: 9900218] [Duplicate of rs236, 2009-0983-M (2.44, 2.45)] (5 pages)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. paper	Kosovo Strategy. [Released in Part Per E.O. 13526] (1 page)	01/14/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for January 1999 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6262

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

January 14, 1999

Kosovo Strategy

Negotiations on a political settlement in Kosovo are at an impasse and the international community has little leverage over the key parties --Belgrade/Milosevic, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Rugova's negotiators. Regardless of our efforts, we can expect a continued level of police harassment, KLA provocations and increasingly intense and destabilizing violence over the coming weeks. The essential challenge is to prevent this violence from escalating beyond a point that threatens our basic objectives, undercuts NATO credibility in advance of the summit, and destroys any chance for a political settlement. Our strategy cannot and should not rely on KVM successfully managing a series of crisis along the lines of the recent VJ prisoner situation. There is a high-risk of failure with each such undertaking, the ever-present possibility of escalation and the chance of verifiers being caught in the cross-fire.

Our fundamental strategic objectives remain unchanged:

- Promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia;
- Prevent a resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and a renewed humanitarian crisis;
- Preserve U.S. and NATO credibility.

Building confidence in the negotiating process and in the broader role of the international community in Kosovo is essential to achieving these objectives. We intend to pursue progress on three independent, but inter-connected, tracks to advance prospects for a settlement and reduce the risk of serious violence. **We need to focus energies on:**

- **Revitalizing the negotiating process;**
- **Creating positive change on the ground to build confidence;**
- **Building leverage on Belgrade and on the KLA.**

Implementation of the Strategy

Once approved by the USG, State will present the program to members of the Contact Group plus Norway bilaterally as soon as possible. State will seek formal Contact Group endorsement and approval for immediate

Released in Part

SECRET/NOBIS

Per E.O. 13526

2009-0983-M (2.44)

VZ 9/21/2023

implementation. This will almost certainly require a Contact Group meeting, probably an expert-level meeting followed by a meeting of Political Directors.

Russian can be expected to resist any activity that is not explicit in the OSCE KVM agreement including elections, police, KVM radio, and any XFOR activity. We should outline the proposal to the Russians in advance of Secretary Albright's January visit to Moscow. This will help avoid a log jam with the Russians in the Contact Group.

To be successful, however, this effort will need to be seen as more than a Contact Group proposal. As we work for Contact Group endorsement, we should also reach out to other key European states and continue to work aggressively with OSCE, NATO and KVM contributors to identify resources and build leverage on the parties.

The international community's engagement in Kosovo currently amounts to an unfunded mandate. This cannot be an all-American effort. We will need to engage potential donors in the process early on and push the Europeans to take the lead on program implementation in many areas. Careful coordination among donors will be essential to ensure that adequate resources are available to see the programs through to successful conclusion.

Track I: Revitalize the Negotiations

Chris Hill and EU Representative Petritsch are pressing forward with efforts to strengthen the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team and bring Belgrade and Pristina closer to resolution. There will be a number of opportunities in the weeks ahead to frame the negotiations and advance prospects for a settlement.

Next Steps

- Reinforce Hill team with senior advisors on policing and elections issues (not necessarily Americans).
- Contact Group to host a meeting of all Albanian parties in Vienna within the next two weeks. Hill and Petritsch to determine the timing, venue and invitees.

-- Objective is to broaden the base of the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team and reinforce the ability of the negotiators to compromise on outstanding issues. Keeping up the pressure on the KLA to engage in the negotiating process is critical. Rugova's team will be

SECRET/NOBIS

more inclined to move forward if the participants feel less isolated and exposed.

-- Too early to include KLA military commanders in the all-parties meeting, but political representatives -- i.e. "Demaci +1" -- should be invited.

-- U.S. and other CG member states should request the Albanian government also urge Demaci to participate in the conference.

- If the all-parties conference is successful, Hill and Petritsch should move rapidly toward face-to-face or proximity talks between Belgrade's team and a reinforced Kosovo Albanian negotiated team. Target time-frame should be early February.
- If the conference is unsuccessful or inconclusive, Hill and his team will look at options for imposing a solution -- including by circumventing the current Kosovo Albanian leadership.)
- In parallel, KVM head Walker should begin negotiations with Belgrade authorities on side agreements that would support the police training program and elections.

Alternatively, Chris Hill rather than Walker could focus his energies on negotiating the parallel agreements with Milosevic. Some argue that negotiations for an overall political settlement demonstrably cannot succeed in the required timeframe, given the fractiousness of the Albanians and the limited leverage on both sides. Indeed, the effort to obtain a comprehensive agreement may be an active impediment to progress in specific areas because it creates discord and mistrust. Thus, the best course would be to shift our focus to getting Milosevic's agreements on sectoral areas.

Focussing Hill on negotiating more limited agreements would almost necessarily mean putting aside efforts at achieving a larger political settlement. It would also mean a reduced role for the Kosovo Albanian negotiators, as most of the work would be done on a bilateral basis with Belgrade; that would be politically controversial. **A variant** would be to proceed with efforts to convene the all-Albanian meeting, but use it to rally the Albanians behind sectoral activities and reduce the divisive pressure on them for an overall settlement.

SECRET/NODIS

Track II: Creating New Realities in Kosovo

While the negotiating process goes forward, the OSCE, through KVM, and other key parties (including USAID) will begin implementation of specific programs in Kosovo independent of the negotiating process. This will include implementing aspects of the draft settlement proposal that establish a basis for local administration in areas such as education, health care, social services, police, justice, etc.

Ideally, this will be done on the basis of agreement between the parties. Full implementation of programs related to police and justice issues in particular would almost certainly require the conclusion of formal agreements with Belgrade. Elections are another area in which Belgrade's acquiescence is essential. These are also the most critical areas for building confidence in the negotiating process among the Kosovo Albanian population and progress in these areas would demonstrate the advantages of working with the international community to achieve a political solution to the problems of Kosovo.

Even in the absence of agreement, however, we should be prepared to move forward on implementation as far as possible using Walker's personal authority and the authority of the KVM to provide the political support. While protecting the safety of its personnel, KVM should continue to take an active approach to verifying compliance, negotiating confidence-building measures, mediating disputes and using diplomatic tools to prevent and contain violence. To the degree feasible, KVM should aim to broker not only cease-fires when hostilities erupt but pull-backs by combatants from discrete areas of conflict. Verification patrols should follow up to keep these areas "demilitarized."

We should consolidate and focus our limited jump-start initiatives -- police training, civil society, and elections initiatives -- on selected communes with the full spectrum of our initiatives working in tandem. This will maximize the synergy among them and generate political momentum. It is more important to have fewer well-functioning demonstrations early on than to work towards Kosovo-wide coverage many months down the road." Proposals for action in specific program areas are outlined below.

SECRET/NODIS

KVM Ramp-up**Goals**

- Broad and intrusive international verification of the cease-fire and Serb security force activities.
- Foster confidence on the ground and an environment conducive to a negotiated solution.
- Maintain a separate USG presence in Kosovo to support Hill, the KVM and other U.S. priorities.

Critical Milestones

- *January 12* - open final two regional centers in Pristina and Gnjilane, for a total of five centers.
- *January 31* - KVM verifiers should exceed 1,000.
- *February 28* - KVM should reach full strength by mid to late February.

-- Note: KVM currently budgeted for a full-strength complement of 1,650 personnel. As Mission grows, we will need to re-evaluate whether this complement is adequate for the task at hand.

Police

Absent formal agreement with Belgrade on police, new "recruits" can accompany KVM police monitors, combining on-the-job training with visibility for the police program. Police monitors and trainees should also deploy to communities targeted for other jump-start initiatives.

Goals

- Establish a locally-based police force representative of the population and responsible to democratically-elected local authorities.
- Reduce abuses by Serbian police against the civilian population.
- Use the build up of local police to achieve additional withdrawal of MUP forces from Kosovo.

SECRET/NOBIS

Critical Milestones

- *January 27* - Begin implementation of pilot police training program
- *By January 31* - All 51 U.S. police verifiers deployed to Kosovo
- *February 17* - Pilot Program concludes
- *February 14-20* - Identify/Screen candidates for training course
- *March 3* - Begin first course for 300-400 recruits
- *March 24* - First group of trainees graduates
- *By May 5* - 1,000 local police trained and on the job
- *By August 4* - 2,700 local police (may require additional firearm training)

Early Local Elections**Goals**

- Build civilian confidence in the reality of democratic change.
- Establish local authorities (town councils, mayors) with mandate to implement reconstruction programs, oversee police, etc.
- Lay the groundwork for future elections to institutions established by the political settlement

Critical Milestones

The timetable below is longer than optimal. But a minimum six months preparation time is required for elections to be fully credible and transparent. In the absence of any progress on an agreement with Belgrade that would allow formal elections to go forward, we should proceed with accelerated local elections on an informal and ad hoc basis. Funding for assistance projects and police training programs should be targeted to support those municipalities in which early elections are held. Benchmarks for a more formal elections procedure should include:

- *January 29* - establish Rules and Regulations; Identify offices for which to hold elections
- *Mid-February* - Begin voter registration process
- *March* - Complete voter registration. Begin training poll commissions

SECRET/NOBIS

- *March 15* - International supervisors arrive
- *April 15* - Survey of polling sites begins; party/candidate application period ends
- *April and May* - Voter civic education; training poll commissions; media campaign
- *June 30* - Election Day

Press/Public Affairs

Goals

- Establish a KVM Radio station quickly to provide a platform for supporting the cease-fire and progress on a political settlement.
- Foster the development of independent media in Kosovo.

Critical Milestones

- *Week of January 11*: Norwegian CiO to press Milosevic on frequencies for KVM Radio, as well as for indigenous Kosovo stations.
- *January 12* - Complete installation of radio broadcast tower in Montenegro able to reach 70% of Kosovo
- *January 15* - Begin negotiations with radio/TV Tirana in Albania on broadcasting a weekly program about KVM's work in Kosovo.
- *January 31* - KVM radio to begin broadcasting.
- If frequencies are not granted, KVM should broadcast through the Montenegrin facilities or via satellite
- *February* -- KVM begins producing radio and TV spots at the studios of the U.S. Information Service in Belgrade for distribution throughout Serbia, including Kosovo, by the ANEM network.

Civil Society Development

Communities selected for this initiative should also be the platforms for other jump-start programs. This initiative has progressed the furthest, enjoys quick turnaround in results, and in the near-term is best funded. Police and elections initiatives should piggy-back on this program.

SECRET/NO DIS

Goals

- Engage broadest possible segments of Albanian community to participate in local governance and community improvement through the establishment of up to 120 local governance councils.
- Provide a focus for the activities of elected local officials (town councils, etc.) in project implementation.
- Develop and implement quick-impact projects -- such as health clinic repair, agricultural inputs, or school refurbishing -- with the assistance of international contractors.
- Identify adequate resources to fund 400 projects by the end of May. To date, only \$5.1 million has been allocated for a program that will require an estimated \$15 million in capitalization.

Critical Milestones

- *By January 10* - Deployment of trained international staff to Kosovo;
- *By end of January* - estimated 20 councils established, 10-20 projects underway
- *By end of February* - estimated total of 45 councils established, total of 80 projects underway
- *By end of March* - estimated total of 60 councils established, total of 180 projects underway
- *By end of April* - estimated total of 90 councils established, total of 270 projects underway
- *By end of May* - estimated total of 120 councils established, total of 400 projects underway

Humanitarian Initiatives**Goals**

- Ensure that aid agencies are able to maintain their ability to address humanitarian needs.
- Build up adequate stockpiles to prepare for a possible upsurge in violence/large number of IDPs.
- Promote IDP/refugee returns to places of origin.

SECRET/NOBIS

Critical Milestones

- *January* - Secure Presidential approval for \$25 million drawdown of Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Account to fund UN and NGO efforts.
- *January* - Respond to the UN Consolidated Appeal for former Yugoslavia, including UNHCR, WFP, and other International Organizations.
- *Ongoing* - Press Europeans and other donor countries to provide funding to UN agencies and NGOs.

Human RightsGoals

- Significant improvement in the human rights environment in Kosovo.
- Ensure that KVM includes human rights concerns -- monitoring, reporting, verification, and intervention in all areas governed by the OSCE KVM agreement -- among its highest priorities.
- Continue to press for a general amnesty in Kosovo and the release of detainees.

Critical Milestones

- *January 15* - KVM press conference to provide initial assessment of the human rights climate, "success stories," and a statement of mission goals.
- *January 15* - DOS-funded senior human rights expert attached to KVM to advise Walker on organizing human rights mission and establish priority issues.
- *January 18* - Demarche to COE countries pressing them to follow through on manpower and resource commitments.
- *By January 31* - First tranche of USG-funded human rights officers seconded to KVM through the DynCorp contract.
- *February 15* - KVM human rights element to be fully staffed (12 human rights experts per regional center).

Track III: Building Leverage

We should attempt to capitalize on the positive resolution of the latest mini-crisis in Kosovo to underscore with both sides their mutual interest in (1) taking steps to

SECRET/NODIS

avoid further such incidents, (2) cooperating with the KVM, and (3) supporting progress on Tracks I and II of our strategy.

Belgrade

On Track II, we are attempting to build off vague -- and in some cases minimal -- commitments by Milosevic to push aggressively on implementation of specific programs. Fully implementing the programs above will require the active cooperation of the Belgrade government, and the acquiescence of President Milosevic. Under current conditions, it is unlikely that such cooperation will be forthcoming. There is an urgent need to identify new sources of leverage against the Milosevic regime that can be used in support of both the negotiations and program implementation.

The first step is to re-establish and profile Belgrade's record on non-compliance. This is essential for shoring up allied unity and building a base for future punitive or leverage-building actions against the FRY.

- Publicize the Clark-Naumann agreement spelling out in detail what Belgrade agreed to and what specific violations have been observed. Efforts to build international consensus on Serb non-compliance are hampered by our inability to use the force levels established by the Clark-Naumann agreement as a public benchmark.
- Encourage Bill Walker to submit frequent OSCE/KVM reports detailing incidents and patterns of Serb non-compliance with its obligations, including specific reference to the Clark-Naumann agreement as well as UNSCRs 1199 and 1203.
- Frequent public statements -- U.S., OSCE, Contact Group, UNSC, NATO, etc -- condemning Serb patterns of non-compliance. Press Norway as OSCE CiO, as well as Solana and Annan, to issue periodic "cumulative judgments" on FRY non-compliance.
- Continue efforts to press for action in the UNSC (i.e. ICTY sanctions resolution), independent NATO action on compliance assessments, etc.

Second, we should look for opportunities to exploit those factors which motivate Milosevic. The FRY President

cares primarily about maintaining his grip on power and enhancing his personal prestige--particularly with the US. Milosevic is sensitive to the level of interaction with him, and he reads virtually all international press reports related to him and his regime. We should aggressively promote democratic alternatives to Milosevic in the FRY. In private, we should intimate to Milosevic that the United States will shift its position on independence for Kosovo if Belgrade does not improve cooperation with the KVM.

In addition to building new realities in Kosovo, we need to continue efforts to open up the political system and support movement toward our longer-term goal of a democratic FRY. We should also consider whether it will be possible to employ positive incentives with Belgrade as well as negative leverage. Milosevic is more likely to respond constructively to pressure when he sees a way forward. Some have suggested using the prospect of FRY participation in OSCE, conditioned on both progress on Kosovo and on acceptance and implementation of OSCE standards, as a vehicle to secure an OSCE mission in FRY to drive democratization.

Broader engagement within the OSCE framework could help promote conditions that would encourage the Kosovar Albanians to accept an interim status within a more democratic FRY, and encourage stronger European support for the negotiations. While Milosevic would certainly like to get into the OSCE, however, experience demonstrates that he is not likely to pay much for the privilege. We would also need to be careful that FRY membership in the OSCE neither damages the Outer Wall of sanctions, which includes membership in international organizations nor allows the FRY to use the organization's consensus rule to take other OSCE priorities hostage.

In the longer run, we will need to sustain in Milosevic's mind the potential for NATO action -- including air strikes -- if we are to contain the violence in Kosovo and move Belgrade on key issues. NATO and our allies must frequently reiterate that we are still demanding full and sustained compliance with UNSCR 1199 and the Clark-Naumann agreement and that we are keeping FRY compliance under continuous review. The U.S. should ask NATO to consider enhancing its regional exercise program, both air and ground, to emphasize NATO's continued interest in FRY compliance and in the security of KVM verifiers.

SECRET/NOBIS

The KLA

Recent developments highlight the urgent need to develop leverage over this organization and may help us deal with the political downsides of sanctioning the KLA. The goals would be to induce KLA compliance on the ground and collaboration in the entire process and to isolate the more extremist elements within the KLA from the rest of the KLA and its popular support base.

Positive incentives for the KLA are at least as important as negative leverage. We have offered them the possibility to engage in the political process conditioned on restraint on the ground, and have assured them that our goal is to "get Serbia out of Kosovo." They express interest. Our conversations, however, lead to the conclusion that the KLA will not be motivated by the prospect of elections or Community Improvement Councils. It wants Serbia out visibly and progressively -- i.e., MUP/VJ . withdrawals -- and it wants Albanian prisoners released. Those require leverage on Belgrade. Establishing meaningful positive incentives for the KLA is therefore a function of building effective leverage over Milosevic. If we cannot show we are getting "Serbia out of Kosovo," all indications are that they will keep preparing to fight for it themselves.

While we seek to build leverage on Belgrade that can increase our positive leverage with the KLA, which will take time, the U.S. -- in coordination with allies -- should take immediate steps to interfere with KLA fund-raising activities,

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

We should also work with the Albanian American community to establish a diaspora donors fund supporting civil society development projects in Kosovo. This would ensure legitimate funding could still flow through clean channels and help develop the broadest possible base of support for the CICs and associated program activity among the general population of Kosovo.

Other avenues for building leverage on the KLA that we should take action on include:

- Offering inclusion in the political process
- Pressing for Serbian pullouts
- Pushing Belgrade on Albanian prisoners
- Warning of the potential for a pullout of KDOM/KVM
- Threatening the KLA with ICTY action

SECRET/NO DIS

Other options, including interfering with KLA arms flows, should be kept in reserve.

Actions If Hostilities Resume

A complete breakdown of the cease-fire in Kosovo would likely unfold in a series of stages rather than in an immediate collapse. At each stage, the international community will intervene to reduce tensions, negotiate local or Kosovo-wide cease fire arrangements, and limit the impact of the violence on the civilian population. As always, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and we should continue efforts to minimize the risk of a breakdown in the cease-fire. VJ/MUP cross border operations in Albania are a particular concern and could widen the Kosovo conflict.

If the cease-fire breaks down:

- KVM will continue to negotiate local cease-fire arrangements;
- The OSCE CiO and the PC will be asked to respond rapidly and forcefully to cease-fire violations and recommend actions to end local conflicts and ease tensions;
- OSCE and NATO issue assessments on compliance and begin to build a case for the use of force. U.S. to press for early engagement of the NAC and UNSC;
- OSCE must be prepared to threaten both sides that it will withdraw from Kosovo if the security situation deteriorates beyond the level of acceptable risk or if FRY non-cooperation makes it impossible for the KVM to do its job. The KVM should pull out before casualties or hostages are taken and use the withdrawal as "shock therapy" for the parties;
- U.S. should move on an urgent basis to build consensus in the Alliance for possible NATO intervention as OSCE considers withdrawal.

The OSCE should continue to operate in Kosovo until the security environment or FRY non-cooperation have deteriorated to a point where the risk to verification personnel is unacceptable and the mission can no longer be effective.