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Chronos for November 1998 [5]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                | DATE       | RESTRICTION            |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------|
| 001. form                | Fax cover sheet. [partial] (2 pages)                         | 11/17/1998 | P3/b(3), b(7)(C), b(6) |
| 002. memo                | Cancellation of Tomorrow's Kosovo Excomm. [partial] (1 page) | 11/23/1998 | P3/b(3)                |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
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Chronos for November 1998 [5]

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### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7672

November 17, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *GS*  
FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *mh*  
SUBJECT: Letter to Michael Djordjevich, President, Council  
for Democratic Changes in Serbia

Michael Djordjevich, a Serb-American residing in California who is president of the "Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia," wrote you to describe measures his organization supports to promote democratic alternatives in Serbia. He requests a meeting with you and your staff to discuss further his group's proposals.

State officers who are familiar with Mr. Djordjevich speak highly of him, but suggest that it would be appropriate for Greg Schulte to reply to the letter and to represent you in a meeting with him.

Concurrences by: *SB* Susan Braden, *LB* Larry Butler, *MG* Matt Gobush

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Greg Schulte to meet with Mr. Djordjevich on your behalf and to sign the proposed reply at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Draft Reply to Michael Djordjevich Letter  
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 19, 1998

Dear Mr. Djordjeovich:

Thank you for your letter to Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, providing background on the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia. Mr. Berger asked me to answer on his behalf.

As you point out, the United States has a strong national interest in a peaceful, stable Balkans. The policies of Slobodan Milosevic have, for more than a decade, produced precisely the opposite result: instability and conflict in the region. Your organization's purpose -- promoting democratic alternatives in Serbia -- is central to achieving peace in the Balkans.

That goal is also in line with Administration policy. We are committed to promoting political pluralism and democratic rights in Serbia, as well as independent media. Our long-term aim is a democratic FRY that aspires to European integration.

I would be pleased to meet with you and other leaders of the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia to discuss your ideas in greater detail. Please contact Mary Quinn at (202) 456-9101 to arrange a convenient date to meet.

Again, I appreciate your thoughtful letter and look forward to meeting you in the near future.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Greg L. Schulte', written over a horizontal line.

Gregory L. Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President for  
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Michael Djordjeovich  
Council for Democratic Change in Serbia  
1299 Fourth Street, Suite 307  
San Rafael, California 94901



7672

TO: BOSNIA  
PLS. DRAFT  
RESPONSE ON  
BEHALF OF SRB.

## **COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA**

1299 Fourth Street, Suite 307, San Rafael, California 94901

Telephone: (415) 451-6900

Fax: (415) 451-6910

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November 4, 1998

Mr. Samuel A. Berger,  
Special Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Berger,

In May 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted that it is in the interest of the United States to have peace and stability in the Balkans.

This is a credible and reasonable position. American interests in the 21st century must include defusing regional crises and preventing regional wars. Finding the best practical means for advancing these interests is, of course, never easy. As you so correctly pointed out in your speech at the National Press Club on October 30, peace and stability in the Balkans will be impossible "until there is greater democracy in Serbia, where Milosevic holds an iron grip on power."

Many Serbs, including many of us in the Serb American community, wholeheartedly endorse this position. On March 10, 1998 on our stimulus the Congress passed Section 1814 of House Resolution 1757 which stated that "a stable and democratic Serbia is important to the interests of the United States, the international community, and to peace in the Balkans."

I am now writing to draw your attention to certain practical steps we are taking to fashion a democratic alternative in Serbia and to ask for a meeting to discuss these with you.

Early this year in Toronto, Canada a group of prominent Serbs from Diaspora established a "Council For Democratic Changes in Serbia" (membership list enclosed). We have also concluded that Milosevic is indeed the problem and to have democratic reforms

**Washington Representative**  
**Jonathan Clarke**  
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**Belgrade Office**  
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**11000 Beograd**  
**Serbia, Yugoslavia**

in Serbia and peace in the region, he must go. A "sister" council was formed in Belgrade in July, with the intent to provide a broad based platform for gathering of all democratic forces. In April, we submitted our plan to the State Department and we are now in discussion with the State Department to arrange an appointment with Secretary Albright this month, in order to follow up on our proposals. Senator-elect George Voinovich strongly supports our plans. In addition to him and myself, we expect that Senator DeWine (R-Ohio), Alex Machaskee, President and CEO of the Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, and Mr. Milos Milenkovic, attorney from Cleveland and President of the Serbian Unity Congress will be at the meeting.

As background to our plans (and with apologies for some bulky papers) I enclose some background papers:

1. "A Comprehensive Plan for Democracy in Serbia Leading to Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Balkans." Dated July 31, 1998, this sets out the background to our ideas and provides the political framework. This plan has been presented to, among others, SACEUR NATO, Chairman Ben Gilman of the House International Relations Committee, and the Senate and House foreign relations committees.
2. "Establishing a Democratic Consensus in Serbia." Dated October 30, 1998 this contains a project proposal for a public consultative forum to establish a highly specific for democratic and economic reform in Serbia. It outlines expenditure of approximately \$500,000 of which \$150,000 has already been raised and spent by the Council.

I hope these ideas will be of interest to you. I would welcome an opportunity to meet with you and your staff. I used to have a good relationship with Sandy Vershbow, formerly on your staff, for several years during the bleak days of the Yugoslav civil war. If you wish, you may also obtain references about me from my friend, Congressman Lee Hamilton, with whom I have also spent many agonizing hours in efforts to mitigate and shorten the war.

I would appreciate your early indication of interest in the proposed meeting.

Sincerely,



Michael Djordjevic  
President

# **COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA**

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## **ESTABLISHING A DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS IN SERBIA**

**October 30, 1998**

**Washington Representative  
Jonathan Clarke  
tel: (202) 785-8430 fax: (202) 466-4089  
email: [jcahi@mindspring.com](mailto:jcahi@mindspring.com)**

**Belgrade Office  
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# **COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA**

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October 30, 1998

## **Summary**

The Council for Democratic Changes is convinced about the need for democratic transformation in Serbia. This is not just in Serbia's own interests but in the wider interest of regional stability and economic development. The question, of course, is how to achieve this goal. Our belief is that our concept of a transitional 'government of experts' to bridge the transition from communism to democracy is worth serious consideration.

Before this goal can be achieved, however, there is much practical preparatory work to be done. Looking back on past attempts to bring about change in Serbia, we all agreed that a critical missing element was a coherent, practicable program that both commanded broad, cross-party support and addressed the practical needs of the day. Previous opposition movements concentrated on opposition alone centered around a few strong personalities. As events showed, they were woefully underprepared for actual administration. We agreed therefore that our most urgent task must be to fill this gap by establishing a broad based national consensus on the reform priorities and matching these with a body of specific policy options in the principal areas of government activity (justice, economy, constitution, health, social security, education, media, foreign relations, minorities, etc.)

Our first step will be to commission a national opinion poll to test support for democratic reform and to map out popular priorities in the specific areas of government activity.

Alongside this process, we propose to constitute a series of 'expert commissions' grouped around these issues. The commissions will be open to anyone with appropriate expertise without regard to political or ethnic affiliation. Residents of Serbia will form the majority, but the Serbian Diaspora will also be eligible. The effort will have two phases: one involving a small group of acknowledged experts to set the overall parameters by identifying three short-term and three long-term issues that merit top priority. The second phase will be to devise a 'Consensus Document' setting out national priorities for reform

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and an 'Policy Declaration' containing specific policy recommendations that might be implemented by a future democratically elected government.

We envision that the second phase consultation process will be an open one, with commissions holding public hearings and soliciting a wide range of opinion both among the intellectual elite and the grass roots. The political parties will also be encouraged to submit their ideas but will have no formal standing within the committees. At the end of the process, therefore, we envision having a truly democratic, broad based reform program around which all democratic forces in Serbia can unite.

The committees are designed to be non-political in character. They will, however, play a critical role in fostering healthy debate of alternatives other than those coming from the regime and also in providing a home (and means of modest support) to democratic experts forced from their jobs in the media or universities by the regime's actions.

Obviously a project of this nature requires resources. From the start to the end the gross figure is a little short of \$500,000. Of this the Council's sponsors have already contributed and spent about \$150,000 to get the project to its present stage following meetings in Serbia and Canada. Further, the Council has commissioned one opinion poll in April and is in the process of funding another.

Time is of the essence. Serbia has already fallen at least ten years behind other former East European socialist countries. If this deterioration continues, the task of returning Serbia to political and economic health will become almost insurmountable. My sense from my recent visit to Serbia is that there is now immense yearning for a way out of this impasse. We need to capitalize on this historic opportunity.

## PART A -- Public Opinion Survey

To provide the necessary context in terms of public opinion the leadership of the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia, both in the Diaspora and Serbia – have jointly decided that a new in-depth public opinion survey is essential at this time.

In April 1998 the Council commissioned its first survey of public opinion toward the concept of the 'Government of Experts.' This found overwhelming support for the concept. In the meantime, however, the deteriorating political climate in Serbia together with ensuing developments in Kosovo may have drastically changed public opinion since the first survey was conducted.

The poll is designed to test the following areas:

1. support for democratic reform alternatives, including the 'government of experts'
2. priority rankings for areas for government change

The survey will be conducted by a multi-national privately owned company in Belgrade which specializes in researching public opinion. The company is owned and operated by Srbobran Brankovic, with part ownership by Gallup International. Mr. Brankovic is a well-known and highly respected pollster ((Mr. Brankovic was recently quoted in the *New York Times* on October 25, 1998). The intention is to have a two-prong approach: (1) through a nationwide poll of several thousand individuals in Yugoslavia excluding Montenegro, and (2) through focused groups' in-depth interviews.

We have received and approved a proposal of DM 12,000.00 for the cost of the survey. Funds for this activity have already been secured.

## PART B EXPERT COMMISSIONS

### I. PURPOSE

#### A. Principal:

- i. to compose a 'Green Paper' consultative document outlining policy options in specific priority areas of governmental, constitutional, and economic reform in Serbia.
- ii. to develop through a process of public hearings and consultation a broad national consensus on these options.
- iii. to publish a 'White Paper' outlining an overall reform program.

#### B. Collateral:

- i. to create a forum for broad expert and citizen participation in the formulation of democratic alternatives in Serbia as a counter to the regime's oppressive measures to stifle democratic activity.
- ii. to provide a means by which best known and ablest Serbian experts can safely identify themselves with the reform process and thus contribute to its consolidation and prestige.

### II. ORGANIZATION OF COMMISSIONS

A. Ten commissions will be organized in the following major areas corresponding roughly to ministerial (Cabinet) competencies:

- i. Constitution and public administration
- ii. Privatization and economic reconstruction
- iii. Foreign relations
- iv. Finance and banking
- v. Human rights and minorities
- vi. Media and information
- vii. Energy and transportation
- viii. Health and welfare
- ix. Employment, labor, unions
- x. Education and culture

B. Each commission will be tasked to provide the answers to the following questions (the "3+3 process"):

- i. What are the three most critical current problems in your area which must be dealt with immediately, and which are the most effective feasible measures to deal with them?



ii. What are the three most critical long-range problems in your area whose solution is precondition for full recovery of country's potential, and which are the most effective ways of solving them?

B. In the first phase, the commissions will hold expert executive sessions. In the second phase, the commissions will also hold public hearings on a national basis to solicit citizen views.

C. The answers to the above questions will be collated to produce two final documents:

i. The Consensus Document: a short statement of the major priorities and commitments to affect the changes needed to democratize the country and revive its economic potential.

ii. The Policy Declaration: a more detailed elaboration of the programs and actions presupposed by the commitments listed in the consensus document. This will be used as an action document in more focused meetings and discussions with the key-influence groups (leadership of political parties, representatives of the major social-cultural institutions, various associations etc.).

### III. COMMISSION SELECTION AND PROCEDURES

A. The commissions will operate:

- i. as an expert consultative group
- ii. as a public body.
- iii. as a final drafting group.

B. Expert Consultative Group: Organization of ten expert groups will be undertaken by the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia (CDCS) and Serbian Diaspora. Membership of the initial expert drafting groups will be open to recognized authorities in their fields among all democratic and reform-minded citizens of Serbia and without regard to political background or ethnic origin. For selection purposes, CDCS will seek nominations for up to ten experts from leaders and major figures of political parties, leaders of major economic-professional associations (labor unions, chambers of commerce and industry, womens associations, legal and medical associations, etc.), leaders and prominent members of major social-cultural institutions (Academy of Science, major universities, Churches, national media etc.). CDCS may seek nominations from the general public through a series of public advertisements in the national media. Final selection will be made on the basis of the rankings that emerge from the nomination process. The task of these commissions will be to produce a consultative paper outlining specific policy options (the "3+3 process") in each of the ten areas of government activity.

C. Public bodies: On the completion of the first stage the commissions will be expanded to all interested and appropriately qualified citizens based upon nominations as outlined above. These bodies will deliberate in public and will hold public hearings on a nation-wide basis. the task of these bodies will be to incorporate public opinion into the options produced by the expert groups.

D. Final Drafting Groups: Following the public phase the expert groups will reconstitute themselves for the final drafting stage. As appropriate, members of the public bodies may be invited to join the expert groups for this purpose. The task of these groups will be to produce the final documents, namely the Consensus Document and the Policy Declaration.

E. Full time officials: on the basis of prior consultations CDCS will appoint an overall chairperson to be assisted by two vice-chairs. These officials will be responsible for the overall management of the project.

#### IV. DURATION

The overall project is expected to last nine months. Phase 1 (solicitation of names and formation of commissions) one month Phase 2 (expert discussions and preparation of consultative paper) three months, Phase 3 (public hearings) three months, Phase 4 (preparation of individual final reports) one month, Phase 5 (coordination, collation, and publication) one month.

#### V. BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS

##### A. Human resources

- i. Chair and Vice-Chairs: 3 persons
- ii. Commission Chairs: 10 persons
- iii. Commission Sub-committee members: up to 90 persons
- iv. Commission staff person: 10 persons
- v. Commission secretary and research assistant: 10 persons
- vi. Central office: office manager, editor, secretary: 3 persons

In addition, there will be substantial numbers of volunteer personnel, including plenary commission members, university students, and interns

##### B. Material resources

- i. Three-room office
- ii. Furniture, tele/faxes
- iii. Three desk-top computers, 10 laptops, 1 scanner, 3 printers, 1 copier

##### C. Operating Costs

- i. Advertising
- ii. Travel
- iii. Publication
- iv. Communications

## PART C -- Office Costs

Office organization: Space has been retained in Belgrade (Dositejeva 3) at a monthly rent of DM 1,400 DM. (Another space is being investigated for about half of this price).

In order to implement the work of the Commissions, as well as to properly follow up and analyze all the public surveys and other ongoing activities, the Council estimates the need for funding the office to promote democracy in Serbia for the next nine months to be approximately \$340,000. Please refer to the attached exhibit for more detailed information on the estimated expenses.



|                       |  |                  |
|-----------------------|--|------------------|
| Public Opinion Survey |  | \$7,500 (funded) |
|-----------------------|--|------------------|

Commissions:

Chairperson

|                  |          |  |
|------------------|----------|--|
| (\$1,500 pm x 9) | \$13,500 |  |
|------------------|----------|--|

Vice-chairs

|                   |          |  |
|-------------------|----------|--|
| (\$1,000 pm 9 x2) | \$18,000 |  |
|-------------------|----------|--|

Commission Chairs

|                 |          |  |
|-----------------|----------|--|
| (\$300 x10 x 9) | \$27,000 |  |
|-----------------|----------|--|

Commission Members

|                 |                     |  |
|-----------------|---------------------|--|
| (\$200 x 90 x9) | \$162,000 (maximum) |  |
|-----------------|---------------------|--|

Staff person

|                  |          |  |
|------------------|----------|--|
| (\$300 x 10 x 9) | \$27,000 |  |
|------------------|----------|--|

Secretary

|                  |          |  |
|------------------|----------|--|
| (\$200 x 10 x 9) | \$18,000 |  |
|------------------|----------|--|

Central office:

Manager

|                  |         |  |
|------------------|---------|--|
| (\$1,000 pm x 9) | \$9,000 |  |
|------------------|---------|--|

Secretary

|                |         |  |
|----------------|---------|--|
| (\$500 pm x 9) | \$4,500 |  |
|----------------|---------|--|

Editor

|                |         |  |
|----------------|---------|--|
| (\$500 pm x 9) | \$4,500 |  |
|----------------|---------|--|

|              |           |  |
|--------------|-----------|--|
| Staff costs: | \$283,500 |  |
|--------------|-----------|--|

Office costs:

|                  |         |  |
|------------------|---------|--|
| rent (9 x \$500) | \$4,500 |  |
|------------------|---------|--|

|                 |         |  |
|-----------------|---------|--|
| Basic furniture | \$3,000 |  |
|-----------------|---------|--|

computer lease

|                    |         |  |
|--------------------|---------|--|
| (\$60 pm x 12 x 9) | \$6,480 |  |
|--------------------|---------|--|

|                 |         |  |
|-----------------|---------|--|
| other equipment | \$2,000 |  |
|-----------------|---------|--|

|              |          |  |
|--------------|----------|--|
| Office costs | \$15,980 |  |
|--------------|----------|--|

Operating costs:

|             |         |  |
|-------------|---------|--|
| Advertising | \$4,000 |  |
|-------------|---------|--|

|                |         |  |
|----------------|---------|--|
| Communications | \$9,000 |  |
|----------------|---------|--|

|        |         |  |
|--------|---------|--|
| Travel | \$8,000 |  |
|--------|---------|--|

|          |         |  |
|----------|---------|--|
| Printing | \$8,000 |  |
|----------|---------|--|

|           |          |  |
|-----------|----------|--|
| materials | \$10,000 |  |
|-----------|----------|--|

|                 |          |  |
|-----------------|----------|--|
| operating costs | \$39,000 |  |
|-----------------|----------|--|

|                     |           |  |
|---------------------|-----------|--|
| total project costs | \$338,480 |  |
|---------------------|-----------|--|

Note: a significant portion of the expenses arises from honoraria paid to commission members. For purposes of wide consultation and range of advice, it is desirable that the strength of the commissions be retained at 10, but, if necessary, substantial savings could be achieved by reducing this number.

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DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA**

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**A  
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR  
DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA  
LEADING TO PEACE, STABILITY, AND PROSPERITY  
IN THE BALKANS**

**July 31, 1998**

**Washington Representative  
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# ***COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA***

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## **A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA LEADING TO PEACE, STABILITY, AND PROSPERITY IN THE BALKANS**

### **OVERVIEW**

Over the past years, the Yugoslav conflict has inflicted immense suffering on the entire region and its peoples. Serbia has been particularly affected. It is impoverished and has become an outcast among nations. For the international community, the outcome has been equally disastrous. Massive amounts of attention and resources have been consumed.

For Serbia and the Serbs, the problems of war have been immeasurably magnified by incompetent, oppressive, and tyrannical government within Serbia. The international community has also paid a high price for the absence of a reasonable, responsible government in Belgrade. Rather than establishing a durable regional stability, it finds itself in a perpetual state of emergency fire-fighting. The day-to-day need to dampen down hot spots has taken precedence over a comprehensive plan to deal with the source of the conflagration.

The following document sets out a comprehensive strategy of democratic and economic reform developed by the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia ("Council") to address these problems.

The Council's first priority is to restore democracy "the people of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians and other ethnic minorities," who have now been suffering under Milosevic's dictatorial rule for over a decade. Secondly, by restoring Serbia to the mainstream of Europe as a well-governed, democratic state, the Council expects to set the stage for sustained peace and stability in the Balkans.

Further information may be obtained from the Council's U.S. President, Mr. Michael Djordjevic or from the Council's Washington representative, Mr. Jonathan Clarke.

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Mr. Michael Djordjevic  
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## **Overcoming Tyranny and Conflict**

Over the past years, the Yugoslav conflict has inflicted immense suffering on the entire region and its peoples. Serbia has been particularly affected. It is impoverished and has become an outcast among nations. For the international community, the outcome has been equally disastrous. Massive amounts of attention and resources have been consumed.

For Serbia and the Serbs, the problems of war have been immeasurably magnified by incompetent, oppressive, and tyrannical government within Serbia. The international community has also paid a high price for the absence of a reasonable, responsible government in Belgrade. Rather than establishing a durable regional stability, it finds itself in a perpetual state of emergency fire-fighting. The day-to-day need to dampen down hot spots has taken precedence over a comprehensive plan to deal with the source of the conflagration.

### **A Comprehensive Strategy**

The Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia ("Council") sets out to address these problems through a comprehensive strategy of democratic and economic reform.

Its first priority is to bring relief to "the people of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians and other ethnic minorities," who have now been suffering under Milosevic's dictatorial rule for over a decade. Secondly, by restoring Serbia to the mainstream of Europe as a well-governed, democratic state, the Council expects to set the stage for sustained peace and stability in the Balkans.

The Council is the result of a year-long period of preparation between a group of Serb leaders inside Serbia and Diaspora Serbs. The ratio of Serbs to Diaspora Serbs is approximately 2:1. The Diaspora Council's inaugural meeting was held in Toronto in February and the second for the Serbian side was held in July in Belgrade.

Within Serbia the Council's membership is drawn from the core elements of Serbian society -- the academy, the military, the Church, and private business. In addition, it draws on grass roots membership, including students, blue-collar and rural workers, the free unions, and pensioners. Within the Diaspora, the Council is supported by prominent Serbian business leaders, academics, professionals, and the monarchy. A list of the Council's inaugural members is attached.

The Council has established a blueprint for a Transitional Government of Experts to lead Serbia out of communist-style authoritarianism toward western liberal democracy and a market economy. Given that current Serbian societal and political structures are in a state of grave disrepair and skilled human expertise is in desperately short supply, the Council believes that extraordinary measures are needed to repair this damage and compensate for the skills deficit. The available talent pool will also have to be expanded and augmented from the Serbs from the Diaspora.



### **Forming a Transitional Government of Experts**

To address these extraordinary circumstances, the Council's objective is to gain support for a Transitional Government of Experts to manage the reform process. The Transitional Government will take office for a specific pre-determined period of time with the mandate of reconstituting Serbia's political structures and of introducing economic reform in accordance with market principles, as well as opening normal relations with the U.S. and EU.

The Transitional Government will take office with the support of the political parties and following a fair election. However, unlike a conventional government, it will not be formed from politicians and political appointees. The existing political structures are woefully inadequate for this purpose. Instead, the best experts recommended by the Council in cooperation with its member organizations and with the agreement of the political parties will staff the key ministries. The experts will come mainly from within Serbia but will be complemented with nominees from the Diaspora.

The Transitional Government will thus be a 'Government of Experts.' It will carry out designated reform tasks for a specific pre-determined limited period. At the expiry of the Transitional Government's mandate, the experts would retire from government and return the administration to the normal democratic process.

### **The Transitional Government's Program**

The Transitional Government main priority will be to reestablish Serbia as country and a people in peace with themselves, their neighbors and the world. Serbia should be a democratic, modern state, abiding by her own Constitution, by her own laws and her international commitments. She should enjoy political and social stability within a market economy, while promoting work, innovation, savings and profits.

To achieve this objective the Transitional Government will offer the Serbian people an honest vision of hope and a realistic way out of the current quagmire. Immediate and steady improvements in the overall standards of living will be required -- e.g., more jobs, improved sense of overall security, end of isolation and psychology of war and crisis, growing trust in the government, other major social institutions and the like.

The Transitional Government's key areas of concentration will be:

1. Reconstruction of Government structures, including constitutional reform.
2. The Economy.
3. Social Security.
4. The Rebuilding of Civic Society including media liberalization.
5. Foreign and defense policy, including Kosovo.
6. Establishment of good relations with the U.S. and EU.

Below the level of national government the Transitional Government will also install 'Reconstruction Task Teams' in the various sectors of the economy and civic life. These teams will draw heavily on experts from the Serbian Diaspora and NGOs and private institutions in the U.S. and EU. There are already encouraging developments in this field, such as the establishment of an international bank to facilitate investment and reconstruction in Serbia.

### **Democratic Support**

Although unconventional in structure and acting independently of partisan politics, the Transitional Government will enjoy substantial democratic underpinning from the conventional political structures. It is envisioned that, prior to nationwide elections, the Council will seek agreement from the existing political parties to endorse the concept of the Transitional Government. Those that do so will campaign on the understanding that, if they are elected, they will offer a mandate to form a government to the Transitional Government team. The latter's program and mandate will be publicly available before the election and will receive wide publicity.

Opinion research has already been conducted among the Serbian electorate. In a nationwide sample undertaken in March 1998, 74.3% of those interviewed either 'completely' or 'generally' supported the concept of a non-ideological, non-partisan transitional government of experts. Only 10.7% were 'generally' or 'completely' opposed.

### **The Role of the International Community**

The Council is principally an indigenously Serb initiative with the assistance of the Diaspora. The role of the international community is, however, important. At present the international community is following a misguided policy of imposing sanctions on Serbia which do nothing other than further punish and impoverish the Serbian people. At the same time, the international community continues to treat the Milosevic regime as its only diplomatic interlocutor in Serbia. This policy must end.

Instead of this counterproductive approach, the U.S. and international community should throw its weight behind the development of democracy in Serbia. In March 1998 the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 1757, Section 1814 of which stated:

- A stable and democratic Republic of Serbia is important to the interests of the United States, the international community, and to peace in the Balkans.
- Democratic forces in the Republic of Serbia are beginning to emerge, notwithstanding the efforts of Europe's longest-standing communist dictator, Slobodan Milosevic.

It called upon the U.S. and international community to promote the building of democratic institutions and civic society in the Republic of Serbia, help strengthen the independent news media, and press for the Government of the Republic of Serbia to respect the rule of law.

The Council urges the U.S. and international community to follow these principles. Only a democratic Serbia with healthy and free institutions and a rational foreign policy based on traditional relationships with the western democracies will secure peace and stability in the Southeast European region.



# **COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SERBIA**

1299 Fourth Street, Suite 307, San Rafael, California 94901, USA

Telephone: (415) 451-6900

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Dusan Bilbija  
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International Labor Office (retired)  
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Senior Bank Executive (Retired)  
Europe

Dr. Mark M. Marinkovich, OAM  
Australia

Mr. Milan Vesovic, P. Eng.  
Europe

# A Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia

July, 16, 1998

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

Initials: W Date: 1/24/2024

## M E M B E R S

1. Avramovic Zoran, Ph.D., senior research fellow at the Institute for Pedagogical Research.
2. Antonic Slobodan, Ph.D., associate professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad.
3. Acovic Dragomir, architect, a president of the Crown Council.
4. Babic Jovan, professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade.
5. Batakovic Dusan, Ph.D., historian, a research fellow to the Balkan Institute of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art.
6. Beckovic Matija, member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, writer.
7. Bigovic Radovan, Ph.D., assistant professor at the Theological Faculty in Belgrade.
8. Blagojevic Marina, Ph.D., sociologist, an assistant professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade.
9. Bozovic Ratko, professor at the Faculty of Political Science.
10. Brankovic Srbobran, Ph.D., a research fellow at the Institute for Political Science and a chief to the agency for public opinion called "Medium".
11. Vasovic Mirjana, Ph.D., a psychologist, Center for Political and Sociological Research and Public Opinion at the Institute for Social Science.
12. Vesic Dragan, president of the trade union of electrical industry of Serbia.
13. Vucetic Slobodan, a judge to the Constitutional Court of Serbia.
14. Goati Vladimir, Ph.D., counselor at the Institute for Social Science
15. Grgurovic Slavenko, Ph.D., a research fellow to the Economic Institute in Belgrade.
16. Djordjevic Zivota, Ph.D., counselor at the Economic Institute, Belgrade.
17. Djuretic Jagos, director of the publishing company "Filip Visnjic".
18. Egeric Miroslav, professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Novi Sad.

19. Ivic Pavle, professor, member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, a linguist, professor at the Philological Faculty in Novi Sad.
20. Ivosevic Zoran, Ph.D., judge to the Supreme Court of Serbia.
21. Indjic Trivo, M.A., a research fellow to the Institute for European Studies.
22. Jevtic Nebojsa, student, president of the student association called "Democratic Youth for Kingdom".
23. Jokic Aleksandar, Ph.D., philosopher, Belgrade/Santa Barbara.
24. Kovacevic Djuro, Ph.D., director of the Institute for European Studies.
25. Konstantinovic Zoran, professor, member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, professor at the Philological Faculty in Belgrade.
26. Labus Miroljub, professor, economist, professor at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade.
27. Majic Vigor, director of the Research Center Petnica, Valjevo.
28. Marinkovic Darko, Ph.D., research fellow to the Institute for Political Research in Belgrade, chief of the expert's team of the united trade unions "Independence".
29. Mijatovic Bosko, Ph.D., economist, counselor to the Economic Institute.
30. Milovanovic Vojislav, professor, Faculty of Civil Engineering, Belgrade.
31. Ostojic Zoran, journalist, director of the production group called "Net".
32. Pajevic Milan, editor of the publishing company "Pillors of Culture" (Stubovi kulture), president of "European Movement in Serbia".
33. Popovic Danko, writer.
34. Ratkovic Jovan, student, president of "Student's Association from Abroad".
35. Raskovic Ivic Sanda, Ph.D., doctor, psychiatrist.
36. Samardzic Slobodan, Ph.D., counselor to the Institute for European Studies.
37. Stojanovic Svetozar, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade.
38. Tadic Ljubomir, professor, member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at University of Belgrade.



## Candidates

1. Arandarenko Mihail, economist, Faculty of Economics, Belgrade, member of the Group 17.
2. Bishoup Artemije
3. Velmar Jankovic Svetlana, writer.
4. Grubac Momcilo, professor, Law School, Novi Sad.
5. Dinkic Mladjan, economist, Faculty of Economics, Belgrade, member of the Group 17.
6. Zdanski Fedor, professor, Faculty of Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering, Belgrade.
7. Ivic Ivan, professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade.
8. Kovacevic Dusan, writer.
9. Koljevic Svetozar, professor, Serbian Academy of Science and Art, Novi Sad.
10. Bishoup Lavrentije
11. Milicevic Miroslav, professor, surgeon, professor at the Medical Faculty in Belgrade.
12. Nedeljkovic Dragan, professor of literature in Paris and Belgrade.
13. Ognjenovic Vida, writer.
14. Popovic Dejan, professor, Law Faculty, Belgrade.
15. Protic St. Milan, Ph.D., historian, Balkan Institute, Serbian Academy of Science and Art.
16. Savic Dragisa, composer.
17. Savicevic Milorad, businessman, owner of a private company in Switzerland.

39. Cosic Dobrica, member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, writer.

40. Cvetkovic Vladimir, Ph.D., professor of sociology at the Faculty of National Defence, chief editor of the magazine "New Serbian Political Thought".

41. Ana Mitrovic, M.A. degree in law and diplomacy, spokesman to Biljana Plavsic, president of Republika Srpska.

42. Cvetkovic Milan

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9807670  
RECEIVED: 10 NOV 98 08

TO: RAPAPORT, RAYMOND

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 23 NOV 98  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: SLOBODAN, MILOSEVIC

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LTR ON KOSOVO

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 21 NOV 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBBINS

HURLEY

SCHULTE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9807670

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCHULTE  
001  
001 HURLEY  
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 98111008 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER  
Z 98112316 ACTION TRANSFERRED  
Z 98112316 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER  
X 98112320 SCHULTE SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 23, 1998

Dear Mr. Rapaport:

Thank you for your letter to Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, concerning U.S. policy on Kosovo. Mr. Berger asked me to answer on his behalf.

We agree that Slobodan Milosevic bears responsibility for the crisis in Kosovo. His effort to crush the legitimate aspirations of Kosovar Albanians through a systematic campaign of violence and expulsions, all waged against citizens of his own country, is another sad chapter in his now more than ten years of harsh rule in the Balkans.

From the outset, we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo: First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans; second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe; and third, to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government.

We have made substantial progress on each of these objectives. NATO determination, backed by the credible threat of force, led to a cease-fire that has largely held since early October and a substantial reduction of Serb security forces in Kosovo. Now that the shooting has stopped, people are returning to their homes. Since the conflict erupted last February, we have been pushing aggressively for both sides to find a political solution.

We respectfully differ with Mr. Hiatt's editorial critique of Administration policy. While Mr. Hiatt concedes that progress has been made on averting a humanitarian crisis, his commentary suggests that was a secondary objective. In fact, saving the lives of tens of thousands of displaced Kosovars who faced the coming of winter with no shelter was a critically important objective of our policy, one that has been substantially achieved. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees recently announced that no displaced Kosovars remain living in the open.

We also disagree with Mr. Hiatt's conclusion that Milosevic "won." To the contrary, Milosevic has had to make a series of concessions to the West. First, he has had to concede that Kosovo is not his private domain, but that his actions there are of international concern. Second, he has conceded to having a highly intrusive verification regime, including 2000 OSCE personnel on the ground and NATO aircraft overhead. Third, he has accepted international mediation and conceded that a political settlement for Kosovo should include local self-government and police, aspects of autonomy that he has denied to the Kosovars for the last ten years.

We do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead, but believe we are headed in the right direction. Thank you again for your thoughtful letter on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Greg. L. Schulte". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Greg" and last name "Schulte" clearly distinguishable.

Gregory L. Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President for  
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Raymond N. Rapaport  
5142 Durnham Drive  
Waterford, Michigan 48327



7670

Raymond N. Rapaport  
5142 Durnham Drive  
Waterford, Michigan 48327

TO: BOSNIA  
PLS. DRAFT  
RESPONSE ON  
BEHALF OF  
GRB.

2 NOVEMBER 1998

DEAR MR. BERGER;

PLEASE BE SO KIND AS TO TELL ME WHICH OF YOU IS  
MORE CORRECT, YOURSELF, OR FRED HIATT.

OUT HERE IN THE HEARTLAND, WE'D LIKE TO BELIEVE  
THAT YOU KNOWLEDGEABLE PEOPLE IN THE POSITION OF  
AUTHORITY HAVE FINALLY BROUGHT MILOSEVIC TO ~~HEEL~~,  
ONCE AND FOR ALL. SINCE BOTH SECRETARY RUBIN, AND  
YOURSELF ARE BOTH HIGHLY RESPECTED - ACTUALLY  
THE TWO MOST HIGHLY RESPECTED MEN IN THE WHITE  
HOUSE - WHEN YOU MAKE A STATEMENT, WE  
BELIEVE YOU.

EDUCATED PEOPLE FEEL FORTUNATE TO HAVE  
BOTH SECRETARY RUBIN & YOURSELF SERVE OUR  
COUNTRY.

I DO REALIZE THAT, WHEN DEALING WITH THE  
LIKES OF 'SLOBO', FORCE IS PROBABLY THE ONLY  
THING THAT HE UNDERSTANDS, AND THE BALKANS  
REPRESENT A TIME-WORN SLIPPERY SLOPE, AT BEST,  
BUT WE JUST CAN'T IGNORE WHAT HE'S DONE, AS WELL AS  
WHAT HE CONTINUES TO DO.

I KNOW HOW VERY BUSY YOU ARE, SIR, BUT IF YOU  
COULD HAVE SOMEONE REPLY TO MY QUESTION, I'D VERY MUCH  
APPRECIATE IT.

YOURS VERY TRULY,  
Ray Rapaport

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9807670  
RECEIVED: 10 NOV 98 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: RAPAPORT, RAYMOND

✓  
DOC DATE: 02 NOV 98  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: SLOBODAN, MILOSEVIC

SUBJECT: LTR OF CONCERN RE KOSOVO & SERBIA W/ REQUEST FOR REPLY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 21 NOV 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOWLING

HURLEY

WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSDMK

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DOC 1 OF 1

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Samuel R. Berger

## A Chance for Peace in Kosovo . . .

NATO's willingness to use force in Kosovo two weeks ago compelled Slobodan Milosevic to agree to the demands of the international community. The commitments he made, if he implements them fully, will ease the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and achieve important U.S. objectives.

Some post-mortems have questioned what the international community has gained. We will only know the final outcome in the days ahead as we test whether Milosevic follows words with deeds. But some preliminary conclusions are clear:

The commitments Milosevic made meet the goals we set. The international community has had three overriding objectives in Kosovo: End the violence that could spill over into neighboring countries and threaten the fragile stability of the Balkans; prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe by stopping the repression of Kosovar Albanians and making it safe for displaced persons to return to their homes; and put the Kosovars back on the path to autonomy by compelling Milosevic to negotiate with them peacefully.

The commitments Milosevic has made meet all three objectives. He agreed to comply fully with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199, which requires that he maintain a cease-fire; to withdraw recently deployed military and special forces from Kosovo and place the rest in garrison; and to give humanitarian relief workers full and

immediate access to persons in need. And he accepted a specific timetable for completing talks with the Kosovar Albanians that will give them democratic elections, self-government and their own local police—in short, rights they have been demanding since Milosevic stripped their autonomy in 1989. Only through a political settlement that leads to a withdrawal of the forces of repression and real autonomy can there be a chance for stability in Kosovo.

The proof is in the doing. As President Clinton made clear, commitments are not the same as compliance. That is why the international community demanded, and President Milosevic accepted, an unprecedented international presence that until now he had steadfastly resisted: a highly intrusive on-the-ground and in-the-air verification system. It will include 2,000 international verifiers in Kosovo, who will serve as watchdogs to ensure that the cease-fire holds and Serb forces withdraw, while building confidence among Kosovars to return to their homes. And it will involve comprehensive NATO aerial surveillance—which NATO can launch with as little as one hour's notice—to monitor compliance and quickly detect violations.

The verification teams are being organized by the 54-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and led by Ambassador Bill Walker, a highly experienced U.S. diplomat. They will be backed up by a NATO reaction force to ensure they can be withdrawn safely if necessary. And we have made clear to President

Milosevic that there will be the gravest consequences if his forces attempt to harm or take hostage international observers or humanitarian aid workers. The first regular overflights by U-2 and other reconnaissance aircraft began Oct. 16.

So far, there has been some compliance, but not full compliance, in four key areas. First, the cease-fire has largely held for two weeks, despite occasional skirmishing between Serb security forces and the Kosovar Liberation Army.

Second, most humanitarian relief organizations are back in Kosovo at pre-withdrawal numbers, with minimal interference from Serb authorities. Many are planning to increase their presence. Eight convoys of humanitarian supplies—including food, clothing and medicine—already have flowed into Kosovo.

Third, the Serb police presence is less obtrusive. But Milosevic has failed to date to go far enough fast enough with regard to withdrawing military forces deployed to Kosovo at the start of the crisis and pulling back his special police. There is reason for some forces to remain in Kosovo to provide border security—but no justification for those forces to be used to repress the local Albanian population. NATO's commander, Gen. Wesley Clark, has given President Milosevic a detailed list of military and police forces that he must withdraw or place in garrison. Through air surveillance and reports from observers on the ground, NATO will determine whether Milosevic meets these marks.

Fourth, as a result of the improving but still inadequate security climate, between 15,000 and 35,000 displaced persons have returned to their homes from the mountains, escaping the mortal jeopardy of a winter without shelter. But a large number of refugees—about 35,000—remain in peril. Provided the cease-fire holds and Milosevic meets his commitments to improve the security situation, more humanitarian relief workers and verifiers move in, and more Serb military forces move out, the confidence level of the remaining refugees should increase—and most of them will be able to come in from the cold.

NATO must remain ready to act if Milosevic does not. To keep the pressure on Milosevic to comply with his commitments, NATO is keeping its finger on the trigger: The activation order to use force remains in effect but on hold until Oct. 27, as we test and measure President Milosevic's compliance. If he fails to make substantial progress by that date, NATO will be in a position to commence airstrikes to compel compliance and damage Milosevic's capability to conduct his campaign of repression against the Kosovar Albanians.

The final chapters of the Kosovo crisis remain to be written. But thanks to NATO's strong stand, there is a chance to bring to an end the suffering and repression—and to put the region on a path to peace.

*The writer is assistant to the president for national security affairs.*

Fred Hiatt

## . . . But a Phony Deal

*"We will not rely on what President Milosevic says, but what he does for the whole world to see."*

—President Clinton, Oct. 13

*"What really matters is Iraq's compliance, not its stated commitments; not what Iraq says, but what it does."*

—President Clinton, Feb. 23

As U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke was negotiating in Belgrade with Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, Serb special forces cruised through Kosovo streets in open trucks, taunting the conquered civilian population with insolent victory signs.

As the talks drew to a close, Serb tanks and artillery pounded already abandoned homes and shops in Drenica, setting many on fire. The shelling has yet to stop.

And in the days since, the Serb dictator has shut down one independent newspaper after another, confiscating computers and silencing all but a few of the lonely voices that dared challenge his despotism.

The message was clear: Not only had Milosevic won again, but he was so contemptuous of the West and its threats that he flaunted his victory even as a supposed deadline to bombing ticked down. And sure enough, as the deadline loomed on Oct. 16, the United States and its allies summoned all their will—and extended the deadline another 10 days.

Once again, the Clinton administration had brandished a weapon it desperately and visibly wanted not to use. And so once again it

had proved that phony threats can produce little more than phony deals.

Unfair? Well, maybe so; as with the Iraq deal that Clinton welcomed last February—which took five months to definitively unravel with no U.S. response—Holbrooke's deal with Milosevic will be tested in time. Perhaps it will permit relief workers to help some of the thousands of Kosovars left homeless and hungry by Milosevic's war of terror. That would be an important humanitarian accomplishment, even if short-lived.

But it is not unfair, nor too soon, to measure the deal against what might have been accomplished—against the goals the administration had proclaimed. Foremost among these was the withdrawal of all Serb forces involved in repression, a prerequisite for the return home of displaced people, the immediate start of real negotiations on Kosovo's political status and other stated goals.

When Milosevic balked at withdrawing his troops, the administration settled for a "less intimidating presence" and a return to February troop levels—itsself a phony benchmark, since the Serb buildup began last November. When he spurned the presence of NATO troops, the administration settled for 2,000 unarmed "verifiers."

Given the imprecision of the deal, what are they to "verify?" More to the point, what will anyone do when Kosovo guerrillas resume their campaign for independence—next March, say—and Milosevic once again takes their attacks as a pretext for destroying one village after another? The "verifiers" will be kept far from the atrocities—for their safety. Serb police

will explain—and what will NATO do then?

"Milosevic got everything he wanted," says Peter Bouckaert, a Human Rights Watch attorney who just returned from Kosovo. "He finished his offensive. He created a humanitarian disaster that will force Albanians to focus on survival. . . . He created this mess, and now the West will clean it up. And he's still the guy to deal with."

When Kofi Annan's pact with Iraq was questioned eight months ago, Clinton and his team dismissed all doubts. "Failure to allow the inspectors to go where they want, when they want, will result in the use of serious force," national security adviser Samuel Berger wrote on this page. "The time for diplomacy will be over."

But when Saddam Hussein kicked the inspectors out in August, diplomacy was the administration's only retort. Having allowed its armed force to stand down, the administration found it difficult to stand up again.

Milosevic is no less skilled than Hussein at gauging the West's threshold of outrage, and staying just below it. But he's gone Hussein one better, thumbing his nose at the deal even before it goes into force.

So what's the point, NATOcrats may reply—would you be happier if we had bombed? Would you prefer a dangerous war to an imperfect peace?

The human and political risks of bombing are evident, and never to be taken lightly. But the proper question is this: How does the administration end up, both in Iraq and in Kosovo, having to choose between appeasement and a military option it does not believe in?

Admittedly Hussein and Milosevic, canny and ruthless destabilizers, pose formidable challenges. But the response cannot be capitulation, or long months of idle threats followed by beseeching negotiation.

What is needed is sustained strategies. When the Clinton administration allowed Hussein to crush his opposition in the north in 1996, its ability to respond to his flouting of U.N. rules 1½ years later was affected. When it failed to support Kosovo's nonviolent leadership throughout this decade, when it stood aside as Milosevic shelled hundreds of thousands of civilians out of their homes, its credibility as peacemaker in crisis was affected.

Bombing alone is not a strategy. But an air campaign against Milosevic's tools of terror, combined with a willingness to station a modest number of soldiers in Kosovo for a reasonable period of time, could contribute to a political solution. But the administration won't even talk about developing a real plan.

Sadly, each defeat contributes to the next. Last March, the United Nations and the Clinton administration threatened Hussein with "the severest consequences" if he broke his word it's been almost three months since he shredded the Annan deal.

Now Secretary of State Madeleine Albright threatens Milosevic with "the gravest of consequences" if Milosevic breaks his word. She speaks without apparent embarrassment. / You can be sure that Milosevic hears the hol echo.

*The writer is a member of The Washington Post's editorial page staff.*



# PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

## IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER:

*Schulte*  
*Mike Furman*

LOG NUMBER:

*7670*

DUE DATE:

*11-21*

DATE STAFFED:

*11-10*

*Done see copy of package*  
**CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:**

☐

PRESIDENT

☒

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM:

*R Rapaport*

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



Schultz

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION:

RELEASER: \_\_\_\_\_

**IMMEDIATE**

~~SECRET~~

DATE/TIME: **11/17/98**

MESSAGE #: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: **JAMIE METZL** PH: **456-9141** ROOM: **365**  
SUBJECT: **SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF  
NOVEMBER 25, 1998 IPI-KOSOVO MEETING** PAGES: **4**

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

| LOCATION                  | DELIVER TO          | ROOM | PHONE    |
|---------------------------|---------------------|------|----------|
| USIA                      | PETER KOVACH        |      | 619-6554 |
|                           | JAMES KELLMAN       |      |          |
|                           | ROBERT MCCARTHY     |      | 619-4563 |
|                           | BRIAN CARLSON       |      | 619-6565 |
|                           | WILLIAM KIEHL       |      | 647-5265 |
|                           | CAROL LYNN MACCURDY |      | 619-5590 |
| VOA                       | (b)(3)              |      | 619-5661 |
|                           | MYRNA WHITWORTH     |      | 619-0085 |
|                           | FRANK SHKRELI       |      | 260-6447 |
| CIA/BTF<br>FBIS           | (b)(3)              |      |          |
| STATE PA<br>STATE EUR/SCE | JONATHAN PRINCE     |      | 647-6607 |
|                           | MATT PALMER         |      | 736-7479 |
|                           | JEFF MURRAY         |      | 647-6925 |
|                           | DOUGLAS EBNER       |      | 647-6291 |
|                           | RICK SHERMAN        |      | 647-5624 |
| OASD/SO/LIC<br>OSD/BTF    | (b)(6), (b)(7)c     |      |          |
| JCS J-3                   | (b)(6), (b)(7)c     |      |          |
| JCS-J5                    |                     |      |          |

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VZ Date: 3/12/2024

2008-0614-F3



|               |                                                                                                       |                                              |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| NSC (BY HAND) | ERIC SCHWARTZ<br>MARY MCCARTHY/DAVID SHERMAN<br>TONY BLINKEN/MATT GOBUSH<br>GREG SCHULTE/NICK DOWLING | 456-9141<br>456-9341<br>456-9371<br>456-9151 |
| USAID/OTI     | FREDERICK BARTON<br>DAVID COSTELLO<br>NICK COX                                                        | 712-0962<br>712-5231<br>712-5062             |
| NIC/GMI       | (b)(3)                                                                                                |                                              |
| OVP           | TOM ROSSHIRT                                                                                          | 456-7035                                     |

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED PLEASE FIND THE SUMMARY OF TODAY'S MEETING. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE HELD WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, FROM 1000-1100 IN OEOb ROOM 208. PLEASE PROVIDE CLEARANCE INFORMATION TO DORA KALE AT 456-9141. THANK YOU.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 17, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION  
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON KOSOVO

THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ

FROM: JAMIE METZL

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions - November 17, 1998  
Meeting of International Public Information (IPI)  
Working Group for Kosovo (U)

Agencies agreed to take the following steps:

- NSC agreed to follow up on the proposed Leon Fuerth Global Exchange focused on Arab states. (U)
- USIA agreed to consult with PAOs in Tirana and Pristina to ensure the fullest utilization of the decoder for RTV Tirana in support of KVM and USG efforts. (U)
- State agreed to follow up with posts regarding ANEM's negotiations with the Montenegrin authorities to allow ANEM to obtain a frequency for a terrestrial transmitter to broadcast into Kosovo and to use possible uplink facility. (U)
- USAID/OTI agreed to prepare a report with recommendations for submission to and consideration by the Kosovo ExComm. (U)
- USIA/State agreed to consult with Ambassador Walker regarding the establishment of a weekly radio interview to be aired on VOA and RTV Tirana. NSC agreed to follow up on this idea with VOA.
- USIA/State agreed to follow up with Ambassador Walker to determine the status of plans for KVM radio and discussions with the FRY authorities regarding frequencies and permissions for independent media broadcasters in Kosovo, and assess what support can be provided by the IPI Kosovo group. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Jamie MetzL  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: October 26, 2008

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By VZ NARA, Date 1/24/2024  
72900994-F3

- NSC agreed to examine the draft peace settlement and make proposals as to how support for media activities might better be included. (U)



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002. memo                | Cancellation of Tomorrow's Kosovo Excomm. [partial] (1 page) | 11/23/1998 | P3/b(3)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1706

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for November 1998 [5]

2008-0994-F

vz6257

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 23, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

JAMES PARDEW  
Department of State

GEORGE CASEY  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ROBERT BEECROFT  
Department of State

WILLIAM WOOD  
USUN

MICHAEL SHEEHAN  
Department of State

JOHN BURNIM  
Office of Management and  
Budget

WILLIAM BROWNFIELD  
Department of State

(b)(3)  
Central Intelligence Agency

LESLIE GERSON  
Department of State

(b)(3)  
Central Intelligence Agency

MARGUERITE HOUBE  
Department of State

FREDERICK BARTON  
Agency for International  
Development

BERND MCCONNELL  
Office of the Secretary of  
Defense


PETER KOVACS  
U.S. Information Agency

JAMES SCHEAR  
Office of the Secretary of  
Defense

LESLIE DAVIDSON  
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Tomorrow's Kosovo ExComm Meeting

Tomorrow's meeting of the Kosovo ExComm is hereby cancelled in light of the Deputies' Committee meeting now being scheduled for tomorrow. The date and time of the next ExComm meeting will be provided separately.



Greg Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President  
for the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9807217  
RECEIVED: 21 OCT 98 17

TO: PANIC, MILAN

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 09 NOV 98  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO  
NATO

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: SLOBODAN, MILOSEVIC

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PANIC ON KOSOVO LTR

file

ACTION: SCHULTE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 02 NOV 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HURLEY  
NSC CHRON  
SCHULTE  
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DMK DATE 11/9 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9807217

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

|             |                                           |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 001 SCHULTE | Z 98102117 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER        |
| 002 BERGER  | Z 98102715 FOR SIGNATURE                  |
| 002 HURLEY  | Z 98102722 FOR REDO                       |
| 002 BERGER  | Z 98110515 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE |
| 003 BERGER  | Z 98110919 FOR DECISION                   |
| 003         | X 98110919 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM         |
| 004         | X 98110919 SCHULTE SGD LTR                |

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

004 981109 PANIC, MILAN

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7217 REPO  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG SND A/O 02

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE    | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| <i>Cosgriff</i> | <u>1</u>    | <u>KPC 11/6</u> |             |
| Rice            |             |                 |             |
| Davies          |             |                 |             |
| Kerrick         | <u>2</u>    | <u>(K) 11/9</u> | <u>X</u>    |
| Steinberg       | <u>2</u>    | <u>(K)</u>      |             |
| Berger          |             |                 |             |
| Situation Room  |             |                 |             |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>3</u>    | <u>HTC 11/9</u> | <u>X</u>    |
| Records Mgt.    | <u>4</u>    | <u>JMK 11/9</u> | <u>X</u>    |
| <i>Schulte</i>  |             |                 |             |

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

*Letter to Milan Panic  
on Kosovo*

COMMENTS:

198 NOV 8 PM 5:11

Even Sec Office has diskette yes  
**RETURN TO G. SCHULTE**  
**PLS SIGN LTR @ TAB I**  
**and RETURN ENTIRE FOLDER**  
**to RECORDS Mgmt 379 FOR**  
**DISPATCH**

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7217-Redo  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG HC A/O 01

|                                    | SEQUENCE TO  | INITIAL/DATE   | DISPOSITION      |
|------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|
| <i>✓</i><br>Cosgriff               | <del>1</del> |                |                  |
| Rice                               | <del>2</del> |                |                  |
| Davies                             |              |                |                  |
| Kerrick                            |              |                |                  |
| Steinberg                          |              |                |                  |
| Berger                             |              |                |                  |
| Situation Room                     |              |                |                  |
| West Wing Desk                     | <u>1</u>     | <u>HC 11/6</u> | <u>Ø Schulte</u> |
| Records Mgt.                       |              |                |                  |
| <del>Brown</del><br><u>Schulte</u> | <u>2</u>     |                |                  |

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

*Letter on Kosovo to  
Milan Funic*

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_



National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # ~~6617~~ 7217

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG 7217 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                      | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE | DISPOSITION  |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>J</i><br>Cosgriff |             |              |              |
| Rice                 | 1           | 10/21        | <i>Rice</i>  |
| Davies               |             |              |              |
| Kerrick              | 2           |              |              |
| Steinberg            | 3           |              |              |
| Berger               |             |              |              |
| Situation Room       |             |              |              |
| West Wing Desk       | 3           | 10/27        | D            |
| Records Mgt.         |             |              |              |
| <i>Hurley</i>        | 4           |              | A = DLK note |

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

08 OCT 26 1983

Exec Sec Office has diskette *if*

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7217 7217 7217

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 3 A/O 01

|                | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE   | DISPOSITION |
|----------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| Cosgriff       | _____       | _____          | _____       |
| Rice           | _____       | _____          | _____       |
| Davies         | <u>1</u>    | <u>g 10/31</u> | _____       |
| Kerrick        | <u>2</u>    | _____          | _____       |
| Steinberg      | _____       | _____          | _____       |
| Berger         | _____       | _____          | _____       |
| Situation Room | _____       | _____          | _____       |
| West Wing Desk | _____       | _____          | _____       |
| Records Mgt.   | _____       | _____          | _____       |
| _____          | _____       | _____          | _____       |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

POTUS letter to Milan Panic  
Add # 1

Exec Sec Office has diskette up

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 7217 REDO

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG 8W AVO 01

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

Cosgriff

Rice

Davies

Kerrick

Steinberg

Berger

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

Records Mgt.

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

35 NOV 1985

Exec Sec Office has diskette

yes



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 9, 1998

Dear Milan:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President on Kosovo. I am responding on his behalf. As always, we appreciate having your views and advice. Only a few weeks ago, prospects for Kosovars were bleak. Tens of thousands, driven from their homes by Serb forces, were facing the onset of winter without shelter and the basic necessities of life. This has changed thanks to our close cooperation with NATO allies.

From the beginning, we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo. First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans. Second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe. And third, to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government.

We have made substantial progress toward each of these objectives. NATO determination backed up by the credible threat of force has led to a cease-fire that has held since the beginning of October and substantial numbers of Serb security forces have withdrawn from Kosovo. Now that the shooting has stopped and security checkpoints have been dismantled, about 40,000 displaced people have returned to their homes.

Since the eruption of the conflict in February we have been pushing both sides towards a political settlement and we are pressing even harder now. The current draft agreement offers the Kosovars a high degree of autonomy, an indigenous police force, and complete control over education, health and other institutions that most affect their daily lives. We are working hard to convince armed insurgent groups in Kosovo that they, too, must cooperate to bring about a peaceful settlement.

There will be much work ahead to make the cease-fire and a settlement last. We know that Milosevic ended his campaign of hatred only because he fears NATO. NATO has retained authority and has the forces to act if he backslides. In order to verify Belgrade's compliance, NATO has implemented an intrusive air surveillance regime. And we are rapidly building up a 2,000-

person verification mission, with personnel and funds contributed by OSCE nations, headed by Bill Walker, an experienced American diplomat. NATO is establishing a force in Macedonia that will be close at hand to extract verifiers in an emergency.

Our longer-term aim, shared by our NATO allies, is a democratic FRY that aspires to European integration. In this regard, we continue to support political pluralism and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

We have ended the cycle of violence, but do not under estimate the challenges that lie ahead. We appreciate your concerns and hope that we can count on your support to our efforts to stabilize the region and alleviate the pain and suffering of the Kosovar people.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Gregory L. Schulte', with a large, stylized flourish extending from the end of the signature.

Gregory L. Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President for the  
Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Milan Panic  
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  
3300 Hyland Avenue  
Costa Mesa, California 92626

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7217 REDO

November 5, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Letter on Kosovo to Milan Panic

Milan Panic wrote the President urging that NATO take action in Kosovo. Panic is a frequent correspondent and, in our view, does not always merit a Presidential response. In this instance, I propose to respond with the letter at Tab I.

Concurrence by: David Wippman

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree that I should respond to Mr. Panic along the lines of the letter at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Mr. Panic

Tab II Incoming correspondence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Dear Milan:

*I am replying to your letter. As always, we hear your advice.*

I wish to thank you for your recent letter to the President on Kosovo. Only a few weeks ago, prospects for Kosovars were bleak. Tens of thousands, driven from their homes by Serb forces, were facing the onset of winter without shelter and the basic necessities of life. This has changed thanks to our close cooperation with NATO allies.

From the beginning, we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo. First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans. Second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe. And third, to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government.

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We have ended the cycle of violence, but do not under estimate the challenges that lie ahead. We appreciate your concerns and hope that we can count on your support to our efforts to stabilize the region and alleviate the pain and suffering of the Kosovar people.

Sincerely,

Greg Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President for  
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Milan Panic  
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  
3300 Hyland Avenue  
Costa Mesa, California 92626



7217  
711-  
4116255  
H 2 7 7 1  
281934

*Republique Federale de Yougoslavie*  
*le Premier Ministre (1992-93)*  
*Milan Panic*

October 3, 1998

SENT VIA FAX AND FEDERAL EXPRESS

Dear Mr. President:

On March 3, and again on March 19, 1998, I wrote you to express my doubts that we could get Milosevic to engage in serious and constructive negotiations for a solution to the Kosovo problem. I pointed out that he is a master of avoidance and obfuscation, and that his only objective is to retain his hold on political power, regardless of the consequences for the Serbian people. Now, seven months and 250,000 Albanian refugees later, the international community has come to the same conclusion. Unfortunately, however, the remedy being proposed is military intervention via air strikes on Serbian targets.

Milosevic will now quickly move to a posture of cooperation with international refugee agencies, while loudly proclaiming that he has exercised his sovereign right, and duty, in suppressing a terrorist rebellion in Kosovo, which was threatening the public order. While thus seeking to dodge the NATO bullet, he will use the threat of NATO intervention to fan the fires of xenophobia and ultra-nationalism among Serbs. If NATO does not intervene, he will have his controlled media herald him as a victorious international statesman who has faced down the international community, led by the United States, and successfully defended Serbian vital interests.


I believe we can and should counter Milosevic by having the Security Council declare that in view of the dimensions of the humanitarian disaster created in Kosovo by Milosevic, Kosovo will be regarded as a United Nations protectorate for purposes of administering to the refugee crisis, and call upon NATO to implement this program.

I believe we should also announce that we can no longer tolerate Milosevic's tactics, that our quarrel is not with the Serbian nation, it is with the policies of the Milosevic regime, and that we recognize and respect the legitimate rights of the Serbian nation, but that we no longer recognize Milosevic as the legitimate leader of that nation and will no longer deal with him.

I believe we should also announce our encouragement for democratic movements and alternatives in Serbia, and that we will do everything we can to support such movements.

For over six years I have stated that Milosevic is the problem, not the solution. It is high time that we declare that we no longer regard him as a necessary partner for the international community. If we isolate him, and international leaders no longer parade to Belgrade to meet with him, his public image as the internationally recognized leader and protector of the Serbian nation will quickly fade from Serbia's television screens and it will rapidly become apparent to an overwhelming majority of Serbs that their emperor has no clothes.

Sincerely,

  
Milan Panic

William Clinton  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20500

MP/jac

OCT 21 11:58



7217

ID# 281934

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 20, 1998

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE MILAN PANIC

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES VIEWS REGARDING THE MILOSEVIC  
REGIME IN KOSOVO

|                            |              | ACTION      |                  | DISPOSITION  |                           |
|----------------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| ROUTE TO:<br>OFFICE/AGENCY | (STAFF NAME) | ACT<br>CODE | DATE<br>YY/MM/DD | TYPE<br>RESP | C COMPLETED<br>D YY/MM/DD |
| SAMUEL R. "SANDY" BERGER   |              | ORG         | 98/10/20         |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |
| REFERRAL NOTE:             |              |             |                  |              |                           |

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *      CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING     *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE        *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                      *                      *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

OCT 21 11:58

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: PANIC, MILAN

DOC DATE: 03 OCT 98  
SOURCE REF: 281934

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO  
NATO

PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: SLOBODAN, MILOSEVIC

SUBJECT: LTR EXPRESSING VIEWS ON MILOSEVIC REGIME

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 02 NOV 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE  
MCELDOWNEY  
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO  
BANDLER  
BOUCHARD  
BUTLER  
DOWLING  
FLANAGAN  
HURLEY  
WIPPMAN

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

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7217

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Milan:

Thank you for the letter about Kosovo. Only a few weeks ago tens of thousands of Kosovars, driven from their homes by Serb forces, were facing the onset of winter without shelter and the basic necessities of life. As a result of U.S. leadership and the involvement of the international community, the situation has changed dramatically and a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted.

NATO determination backed up by the credible threat of the use of force has compelled Milosevic to implement a cease-fire, withdraw substantial numbers of security forces from Kosovo (more than 4,000 police left Kosovo on October 27), allow relief agencies unimpeded access to resupply Kosovars, and agree to hold meaningful talks with Kosovars on a political settlement.

The cease-fire has held for thirty days. Now that the shooting has stopped and Serb security checkpoints have been dismantled, about 40,000 displaced people already have returned to their homes. About 10,000 remain in peril. The conditions are being created for all of them to return to their homes. At present, 40 NGOs are operational in Kosovo and more vital supplies are arriving every day.

But we are not going to accept Milosevic's word; his agreement is not compliance. We have made clear to him that we will look to his deeds, not his words. NATO has retained authority and has the forces to act if he backsides. In order to verify Belgrade's compliance, NATO has implemented an intrusive air surveillance regime. Moreover, we are rapidly building up a 2,000-person verification mission, with personnel and funds contributed by OSCE nations, headed by Bill Walker, an experienced American diplomat. ✓

In support of the Kosovo Verification Mission, NATO is rapidly moving to establish a force in Macedonia that will be close at hand to extract verifiers in the event of hostilities. Its very



presence will have a deterrent effect on aggressive Serb operations in Kosovo. We expect that the bulk of the personnel for the force will be supplied by our European allies, with the United States primarily providing headquarters administrative ~~personnel~~ <sup>staff</sup> and support.

Since the eruption of the conflict in February we have ~~been~~ aggressively pushing ~~both~~ <sup>all</sup> sides towards a political settlement. We are pressing even harder now. The current draft agreement offers the Kosovars a high degree of autonomy, an indigenous police force, and complete control over education, health and other institutions that most affect their daily lives. We have made it clear to armed insurgent groups in Kosovo that they must also cooperate to bring about a peaceful settlement.

The international community's longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration. In this regard, we continue to support political pluralism and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

Arriving at a political settlement will be a challenge, but as recent events have shown we are on the right road. <sup>(2)</sup> The United States can be proud that its actions have saved the lives of thousands. Thank you again for writing and sharing your concerns with me on this important issue.

Sincerely,

Mr. Milan Panic  
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  
3300 Hyland Avenue  
Costa Mesa, California 92626

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7217-5 EDO

October 26, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*

SUBJECT: POTUS Letter on Kosovo to Milan Panic

Milan Panic wrote the President urging that NATO take action in Kosovo and advising that the United States should no longer deal with Milosevic.

Concurrence by: *DW* David Wippman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Letter to Panic

Tab B Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER  
SUBJECT: Letter to Milan Panic on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to letter from Milan Panic on the situation in Kosovo.

Background

Milan Panic, an American citizen who was Prime Minister of the FRY from 1992-93, wrote to urge action to resolve the crisis in Kosovo. Panic says that Milosevic will respond to the threat of air strikes by making a public show of cooperation while at the same time using it to fan the flames of Serb nationalism. Panic also advises that the United States should no longer deal with Milosevic.

Your reply describes how NATO pressure compelled Milosevic to accept two intrusive verification regimes and relates that the humanitarian situation is already improving. Moreover, your reply concurs with Panic that Milosevic is the problem and makes clear that our longer-term aim is the democratization of Serbia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Panic at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Milan Panic  
Tab B Incoming correspondence

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Milan:

Thank you for your letter concerning the situation in Kosovo and the role NATO should play in addressing the crisis brought on by the actions of the Milosevic regime.

NATO's willingness to use force in Kosovo compelled Milosevic to agree to the demands of the international community. In particular, Milosevic agreed to comply fully with UN Security Council Resolution 1199. The resolution requires that he maintain a cease-fire, withdraw recently deployed military and special forces from Kosovo and return the rest to garrison, provide freedom of access and movement to relief workers to aid those in need, and accept a specific timetable for completing negotiations with Kosovar Albanians on their political future.

To ensure compliance, the international community will deploy a 2,000-person verification mission to Kosovo. A strong NATO air surveillance regime, which has already begun to operate, will allow us to confirm the withdrawal of Serb forces.

To date we have confirmed some compliance, although not full compliance, in several key areas. First, the cease-fire has largely been maintained for three weeks, although some skirmishing between Serb security forces and the UCK continues. Second, humanitarian agencies have returned to Kosovo and have enjoyed free movement. Third, Serb police presence is less obtrusive. Milosevic has yet to comply fully with the requirement to withdraw military forces deployed to Kosovo at the start of the crisis, but we will continue to press him on this issue.

I share your concern that large-scale humanitarian efforts are necessary to avert a human catastrophe this winter in Kosovo. We have compelled Belgrade to agree to provide unfettered access and freedom of movement to international relief organizations. Furthermore, the Serbs are required, under the terms of the agreement, to remove all restrictions on the import into Kosovo

of fuel, food, and other staples. These terms, which NATO will ensure are enforced, will allow the United States, allied countries, and international organizations to provide the emergency aid so desperately needed by Kosovars.

Since the cease-fire, conditions have begun to show improvement. Thousands of Kosovars have returned to their homes. But approximately 35,000 are still living in the open. NATO allies working with international humanitarian organizations are helping refugees return and convoys delivering vital supplies are increasing. There is reason for optimism that many thousands of lives will be saved.

As your letter urges, we are, and have been, pursuing broader aims with respect to Serbia. There is no question that Milosevic has been the source of instability and suffering throughout the former Yugoslavia since 1989. Our policy is designed to promote the emergence of democratic forces that will lead to a more stable and responsible Serbian government that is accountable to all of its citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia, and that is on the path to European integration. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free and independent media in the FRY and we intend to keep international sanctions in place. The Serb economy is in serious difficulty and our belief is that maintaining tight international restrictions may hasten an internal crisis that could lead to a change in government and move Serbia in the direction of democracy. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199. Our mid-term objective is to secure a political settlement that grants broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the Kosovars have their own local governing institutions and police. Our longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration.

The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current situation. Not only has he displaced a quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and

forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.

I want to assure you that I share your commitment to bringing an end to the tragedy Milosevic has inflicted on the Kosovar people. Thank you again for sharing your thoughts with me on this critically important issue.

Sincerely,

Mr. Milan Panic  
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  
3300 Hyland Avenue  
Costa Mesa, California 92626



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7217 REDO

October 30, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM:

MICHAEL HURLEY *CH*

SUBJECT:

POTUS Letter on Kosovo to Milan Panic

Milan Panic wrote the President urging that NATO take action in Kosovo. Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response.

Concurrence by:

David Wippman *DW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Letter to Panic

Tab B Incoming correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7217 REDO

November 5, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Letter on Kosovo to Milan Panic

*is a frequent correspondent and, in our view, does not always merit Presidential response. In this instance, I*

Milan Panic wrote the President urging that NATO take action in Kosovo. Panic writes frequently to express his viewpoints. But in my view, they do not merit either the President's or your response. We recommend that you authorize me to sign the letter at Tab I.

Concurrence by: David Wippman

RECOMMENDATION

*see that I should respond to Mr. Panic along the lines of*

That you approve the letter at Tab I and authorize me to sign the letter to Mr. Panic.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Panic

Tab II Incoming correspondence

*proper to respond with the letter at Tab I.*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Dear Milan:

~~I wish to thank you for your recent letter to the President.~~  
~~Thank you for the thoughtful letter about Kosovo. As you point out, only a few weeks ago, prospects for Kosovars were bleak. Tens of thousands, driven from their homes by Serb forces, were facing the onset of winter without shelter and the basic necessities of life. I am heartened that our close cooperation with NATO allies and the unity of purpose we achieved has dramatically changed that situation for the better.~~

This has  
now  
changed  
things

From the beginning, we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo. First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans. Second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe. And third, to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government.

We have made substantial progress toward each of these objectives. NATO determination backed up by the credible threat of force has led to a cease-fire that has held for five weeks. ~~I am encouraged that substantial numbers of Serb security forces in Kosovo have withdrawn. (more than 4,000 police departed the province on October 27).~~ Now that the shooting has stopped and security checkpoints have been dismantled, about 40,000 displaced people have returned to their homes. ~~About 10,000 remain in peril. While this is still too many, the conditions are being created for all of them to return to their homes. At present, 40 NGOs are operational in Kosovo, their movement and access is unimpeded, and more vital supplies are arriving every day to those in need.~~

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and

Since the eruption of the conflict in February we have been aggressively pushing both sides towards a political settlement and we are pressing even harder now. The current draft agreement offers the Kosovars a high degree of autonomy, an indigenous police force, and complete control over education, health and other institutions that most affect their daily lives. We are working hard to convince armed insurgent groups in Kosovo that they, too, must cooperate to bring about a peaceful settlement.



There will be much work ahead to make ~~this~~ settlement last. We know that Milosevic ended his campaign of hatred only because he fears NATO. NATO has retained authority and has the forces to act if he backslides. In order to verify Belgrade's compliance, NATO has implemented an intrusive air surveillance regime. And we are rapidly building up a 2,000-person verification mission, with personnel and funds contributed by OSCE nations, headed by Bill Walker, an experienced American diplomat.

~~In support of the Kosovo Verification Mission, NATO is establishing a force in Macedonia that will be close at hand to extract verifiers in the event of hostilities. Its very presence will have a deterrent effect on aggressive Serb operations in Kosovo. We expect that the bulk of the personnel for the force will be supplied by our European allies. The United States will primarily provide administrative personnel and support for the force's headquarters.~~

Our longer-term aim, shared by our NATO allies, is a democratic FRY that aspires to European integration. In this regard, we continue to support political pluralism and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

~~I do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead, but I believe we are on the right road. We have ended the cycle of violence, and I am hopeful that we are getting closer to a permanent political resolution of the conflict. I deeply appreciate your concerns and hope I can count on your support to our efforts to stabilize the region and alleviate the pain and suffering of the Kosovar people.~~

Sincerely,

Greg Schulte  
Special Assistant to the President for  
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Milan Panic  
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  
3300 Hyland Avenue  
Costa Mesa, California 92626

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We

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7217

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Milan:

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NATO's willingness to use force in Kosovo compelled Milosevic to agree to the demands of the international community. In particular, Milosevic agreed to comply fully with UN Security Council Resolution 1199. The resolution requires that he maintain a cease-fire, withdraw recently deployed military and special forces from Kosovo and return the rest to garrison, provide freedom of access and movement to relief workers to aid those in need and accept a specific timetable for completing negotiations with Kosovar Albanians on their political future.

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I share your concern that large-scale humanitarian efforts are necessary to avert a human catastrophe this winter in Kosovo. As noted above, we have compelled Belgrade to agree to provide unfettered access and freedom of movement to international relief organizations. Furthermore, the Serbs are required, under the terms of the agreement, to remove all restrictions on



the import into Kosovo of fuel, food, and other staples. These terms, which NATO will ensure are enforced, will allow the United States, allied countries, and international organizations to provide the emergency aid so desperately needed by Kosovars.

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As your letter urges, we are, and have been, pursuing broader aims with respect to Serbia. There is no question that Milosevic has been the source of instability and suffering throughout the former Yugoslavia since 1989. Our policy is designed to promote the emergence of democratic forces that will lead to a more stable and responsible Serbian government that is accountable to all of its citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia, and that is on the path to European integration. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free and independent media in the FRY. <sup>and</sup> We intend to keep international sanctions in place. The Serb economy is in serious difficulty and our belief is that maintaining tight international restrictions may hasten an internal crisis that could lead to a change in government and move Serbia in the direction of democracy. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

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