

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chrons for November 1998 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1706

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, November 18, 1998. [Record ID: 9821041] [partial] (1 page)	12/01/1998	P3/b(3)
001b. draft	[Draft of 001a] [partial] (1 page)	11/18/1998	P3/b(3)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, November 24, 1998. [Record ID: 9821057] [partial] (1 page)	12/02/1998	P3/b(3)
003a. form	Cover Sheet (1 page)	12/14/1998	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For Leon Fuerth, Kristie Kenney et al. Subject: Summary of Conclusions for Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] [Copy No. 8] (1 page)	12/14/1998	P1/b(1)
003c. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] [Copy No. 8] (2 pages)	12/14/1998	P1/b(1)
004a. form	NSC/RMO Profile [Record ID: 9830287] (1 page)	11/25/1998	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: [Our Strategy] [Record ID: 9830287] [with cover sheet; copy 1 of 6] (2 pages)	11/25/1998	P1/b(1)
005. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: SFOR's Six-Month Review. [Record ID: 9808024] (2 pages)	11/27/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
DC

SOC

File

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 NOV DC MTG ON KOSOVO

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 27 NOV 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
COSGRIFF
HACHIGIAN
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

TR

DATE

12/1

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KTH NARA, Date 6/2/2009
2009-0983-m

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002

CAQ ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 98112519 FOR DECISION
X 98120119 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 98120119 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTIONDISPATCH FOR INFO

002 981201 FUERTH, L
002 981201 KENNEY, K
002 981201 REYNES, J
002 981201 BASKETTE, A
002 981201 ECHAVESTE, M
002 981201 HUPP, V
002 981201 MANNING, M

National Security Council
The White House

11/30
1006
12/1
0740

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21041

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 13 AD _____

3583

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>2</u>		<u>done</u>
Rice	<u>1/4</u>	<u>11/27 12/1</u>	<u>dit</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		<u>done</u>
Berger			<u>done</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>11/27 12/1</u>	
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>13 12/1</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dis

Edit
Made

her Action

DC:

COMMENTS:

1 NOV 25 11 5035

SOC - UL NOSOUD
18 NOV 98

Exec Sec Office has diskette

yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21041

December 1, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. MARIA ECHAVESTE
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on November 18, 1998 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on November 18, 1998. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify On: November 24, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidebook, September 11, 2006
By WHD NARA, Date 6/2/2009
2009-0903-M

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, November 18, 1998. [Record ID: 9821041] [partial] (1 page)	12/01/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21041

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 18, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 pm.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:

Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Joseph Ralston

Charles Wald

State:

Thomas Pickering

Anthony Wayne

James O'Brien

Chris Hill (via secure phone)

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke

Christopher Hill

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kaufmann

USNATO:

Douglas McElhaney (via secure
phone)

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS/NY)

White House:

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Nicholas Dowling

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassadors Hill and Walker should see Milosevic as soon as possible to press for (1) the withdrawal from Kosovo of MUP reinforcements normally based outside Kosovo and (2) the withdrawal of all MUP from Malisevo. The two ambassadors should also continue to press the UCK leadership to exercise

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)

Declassify on: November 24, 2008

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2009-0183-M (7.86)
12X 8/24/2010

~~SECRET~~

restraint in Malisevo and elsewhere to facilitate these withdrawals. (Action: State) (S)

- Early development of local police to replace the MUP remains a priority. Prior to the election of local Kosovar authorities, newly-constituted local police should be community-based with an appropriate link to the OSCE mission. (Action: State.) (S)
- A political settlement should provide for elections as soon as conditions permit and the necessary OSCE implementing structure can be put in place. To achieve the aim of early elections, a thorough voter registration campaign may need to take the place of a pre-election census. (Action: State) (S)
- Ambassador Hill should aim to conclude an interim political settlement prior to the end of December. The goal is a settlement endorsed by the Contact Group and agreed by representatives from Belgrade and a broad spectrum of the Kosovar Albanian community. As a fallback, Ambassador Hill should be prepared to press Belgrade to enact unilaterally the contents of the agreement as an elaboration of Milutinovic's 11-point declaration of October 13th. The DC will meet with Ambassador Hill in early December to provide instructions prior to the final negotiations. (Action: State, NSC) (S)
- The ExComm should:
 - determine how best to coordinate contacts with UCK representatives;
 - provide an assessment of the full range of inducements and penalties available for dealing with the UCK.(Action: NSC) (S)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9821041
DATE 01 DEC 98

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 NOV DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX +1</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
ECHAVESTE, M	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 1/24/2004
7-008-0994-F3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9821041
DATE 01 DEC 98

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 NOV DC MTG ON KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY

JOINT STAFF

ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 21041

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Summary of Conclusions for 18 Nov DC Mtg on Kosovo</u>		PAGES: <u>4</u>
		(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 1/24/724
208-044-F3

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____

 x IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ PAGES: 4
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk (202) 456-9425 WH Situation Room
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 18 Nov DC Mtg on Kosovo

NSC LOG # 21041

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Exec Asst to the Rep</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 1/24/2024
7009-0944-F3

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21041

November 24, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG


FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo, November 18, 1998

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on November 18.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (d)

Declassify On: November 24, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KPH NARA, Date 6/24/2009
2009-0483-m

restraint in Malisevo and elsewhere to facilitate these withdrawals. (Action: State) (S)

- Early development of local police to replace the MUP remains a priority. Prior to the election of local Kosovar authorities, newly-constituted local police should be community-based under ~~OSCE supervision~~. (Action: State.) (S)
- A political settlement should provide for elections as soon as conditions permit and the necessary OSCE implementing structure can be put in place. To achieve the aim of early elections, a thorough voter registration campaign may need to take the place of a pre-election census. (Action: State) (S)
- Ambassador Hill should aim to conclude an interim political settlement prior to the end of December. The goal is a settlement endorsed by the Contact Group and agreed by representatives from Belgrade and a broad spectrum of the Kosovar Albanian community. As a fallback, Ambassador Hill should be prepared to press Belgrade to enact unilaterally the contents of the agreement as an elaboration of Milutinovic's 11-point declaration of October 13th. The DC will meet with Ambassador Hill in early December to provide instructions prior to the final negotiations. (Action: State, NSC) (S)
- The ExComm should:
 - determine how best to coordinate contacts with UCK representatives;
 - provide an assessment of the full range of inducements and penalties available for dealing with the UCK.(Action: NSC) (S)

with an appropriate link to the OSCE mission

with an appropriate link to the OSCE mission

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	[Draft of 001a] [partial] (1 page)	11/18/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 18, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 pm.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions ⁶⁷Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (8)

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon
(b)(3)

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Charles Wald

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne
James O'Brien

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufman

USNATO:
Douglas McElhaney (secure phone)

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS/NY)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Nicholas Dowling

(Chris Hill??
secure phone)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassadors Hill and Walker should see Milosevic as soon as possible to press for (1) the withdrawal from Kosovo of MUP reinforcements normally based outside Kosovo and (2) the withdrawal of all MUP from Malisevo. The two ambassadors should also continue to press the UCK leadership to exercise restraint in Malisevo and elsewhere to facilitate these withdrawals. (Action: State) (8)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: O Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 01.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 24, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0483 -M
8/24/2010 RDS

~~Confidential~~
~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21041

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on November 18, 1998 ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on November 18, 1998. ~~(S)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~Confidential~~
~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify On: November 24, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 4314 NARA, Date 6/2/2009
2009-0983-M

November 30, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT:

Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia --
December 2, 1998

Attached is the draft agenda for the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia tentatively scheduled for December 2, 1998.

After covering these two items in the first part of the meeting, I propose that a restricted group of Principals address a State discussion paper (that I will provide separately) on a sensitive topic pertaining to the FRY.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the draft agenda at Tab A and authorize Glyn Davies to sign memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies

Tab A Draft Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)

Declassify On: 11/30/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 1/21/2024
2008-0994-F3

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND
Counsel for Intelligence
Policy
Department of Justice

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia on
December 2, 1998 from 4:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. in the Situation
Room. The agenda is attached at Tab A. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On: 11/30/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By W NARA, Date _____
720 9-0994-F3

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: December 2, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

AGENDA

- I. Dayton Implementation. State
- II. SFOR Six-Month Review. OSD

~~SECRET~~

Classified by : Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: 11/30/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By AL NARA, Date 1/24/2024
2008-0994-F3

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 02 DEC 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO 24 NOV

ACTION: JACOBSON SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 DEC 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
BARTLETT
COSGRIFF
HACHIGIAN
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTTS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KBH NARA, Date 6/2/2009
2009-0983-M

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9821057

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STEINBERG
001
002 DAVIES
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 98120110 FOR DECISION
X 98120208 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
Z 98120208 FOR SIGNATURE
X 98120208 JACOBSON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 981202 FUERTH, L
002 981202 KENNEY, K
002 981202 COMSTOCK, N
002 981202 REYNES, J
002 981202 BASKETTE, A
002 981202 HUPP, V
002 981202 MANNING, M
002 981202 WOOD, W

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

12/11/94

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21057

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 13 A/O _____

213

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	<u>12/1</u>	<u>done</u>
Jacobson	3	<u>has seen</u>	<u>A</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	2		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	<u>12/2</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

SOC - Kosovo DC
24 NOV 92

'98 NOV 30 7:54

Exec Sec Office has diskette

yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21057

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 2, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo on November 24, 1998 *let*

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies
Committee meeting on November 24, 1998. *let*

Glyn T. Davies
Glyn T. Davies *for*
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify On: November 30, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBR* NARA, Date *6/21/2009*
7009-1483-m

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, November 24, 1998. [Record ID: 9821057] [partial] (1 page)	12/02/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21057

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 24, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 1:00 - 2:30 pm.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon

(b)(3)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
James Pardew
Lawrence Rossin
James O'Brien

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)
Christopher Hill (via secure phone)

Treasury:
Mark Medish
Loren Dohm

USNATO:
Sandy Vershbow (via secure phone)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
William Wood

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Nicholas Dowling
Matthew Gobush
Philip Gordon

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- We should continue to keep pressure on Milosevic to withdraw excess MUP from Kosovo and to remove all MUP from Malisevo in exchange for reassurances concerning UCK restraint. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 30, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009 0983.M (3.69)
RDS 8/24/2010

- State should provide Deputies an overview of Kosovo funding requirements, showing the anticipated U.S. share. **(Action: State)** (U)
- State should support Ambassador Walker in seeking a new Italian candidate for the KVM deputy responsible for police. **(Action: State)** ~~(C)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9821057
DATE 02 DEC 98

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO 24 NOV
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX+1</u>
MR. NEAL COMSTOCK ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
COL JOSEPH REYNES, JR ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 1/24/2004
7009-0004-f3

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9821057
DATE 02 DEC 98

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO 24 NOV
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

COL. MICHELLE MANNING
SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF
ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

MR WILLIAM WOOD
USUN/W - ATTN: WILLIAM WOOD
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC #

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9425 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: SAC for DC mtg on Kosovo 24 Nov PAGES: 4
(w/
Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 1/24/2024

2009-0994-F3

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE:



IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____

CLASSIFICATION:

SECRET

PAGES: 4
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for DC mtg on Kosovo 24 Nov

NSC LOG # 21057

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Ex Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>Ex. Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EX- Sec.</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Acting Ex Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Col. M. Manning</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>William Wood</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: 12 Date: 1/24/2024
2009-0784-F3

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21057

November 30, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo, November 24, 1998

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo that you chaired on November 24.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and authorize that it be distributed to agencies.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (d)

Declassify On: November 30, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide, September 11, 2001
By KCH NARA, Date 6/2/2004
2009-0983-M

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 14 DEC 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC

KOSOVO
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR RESTRICTED DC MTG ON 12 NOV RE KOSOVO &
BOSNIA

ACTION: COSGRIFF SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 17 NOV 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: INT O

NSCP:

CODES: DC BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER #6

MCCARTHY #7

SCHULTE #8

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM

CLOSED BY: NSBTM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guide, September 11, 2001
By VR NARA, Date 1/24/2024
7009-0994 -73

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	JAMES STEINBERG	Security Advisor	
2	FILE	12/14/98	
3			
4			
5			
6			

XX	ACTION	FILE
	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CODEWORD~~

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 30272

COPY NO. 1 OF 6

HANDLE VIA INT SYSTEM CHANNEL ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

**Warning Notice**

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CODEWORD~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VZ Date: 1/24/2024

7009-0954-F3

November 13, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SIGNED

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Restricted Deputies
Committee Meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia --
November 12, 1998

The memorandum at Tab I summarizes the conclusions from the
Restricted Deputies Committee meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia that
you chaired on November 12.

Concurrence by: Mary McCarthy *mm* Jamie Baker *B*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions at Tab A and
authorize that it be distributed to agencies. *Deputies eyes*

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

only

*Deputies eyes
only*

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~

Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (d)

Declassify On: November 13, 2008

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CODEWORD~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *1/24/2024*
2007-0094-F3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. form	Cover Sheet (1 page)	12/14/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For Leon Fuerth, Kristie Kenney et al. Subject: Summary of Conclusions for Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo and Bosnia, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] [Copy No. 8] (1 page)	12/14/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, November 12, 1998. [Record ID: 9830272] [Copy No. 8] (2 pages)	12/14/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. form	NSC/RMO Profile [Record ID: 9830287] (1 page)	11/25/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: [Our Strategy] [Record ID: 9830287] [with cover sheet; copy 1 of 6] (2 pages)	11/25/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7217 REDO

November 5, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE 
SUBJECT: Letter on Kosovo to Milan Panic

Milan Panic wrote the President urging that NATO take action in Kosovo. Panic is a frequent correspondent and, in our view, does not always merit a Presidential response. In this instance, I propose to respond with the letter at Tab I.

Concurrence by: David Wippman

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree that I should respond to Mr. Panic along the lines of the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Mr. Panic
Tab II Incoming correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Dear Milan:

I wish to thank you for your recent letter to the President on Kosovo. Only a few weeks ago, prospects for Kosovars were bleak. Tens of thousands, driven from their homes by Serb forces, were facing the onset of winter without shelter and the basic necessities of life. This has changed thanks to our close cooperation with NATO allies.

From the beginning, we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo. First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans. Second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe. And third, to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government.

We have made substantial progress toward each of these objectives. NATO determination backed up by the credible threat of force has led to a cease-fire that has held since the beginning of October and substantial numbers of Serb security forces have withdrawn from Kosovo. Now that the shooting has stopped and security checkpoints have been dismantled, about 40,000 displaced people have returned to their homes.

Since the eruption of the conflict in February we have been pushing both sides towards a political settlement and we are pressing even harder now. The current draft agreement offers the Kosovars a high degree of autonomy, an indigenous police force, and complete control over education, health and other institutions that most affect their daily lives. We are working hard to convince armed insurgent groups in Kosovo that they, too, must cooperate to bring about a peaceful settlement.

There will be much work ahead to make the cease-fire and a settlement last. We know that Milosevic ended his campaign of hatred only because he fears NATO. NATO has retained authority and has the forces to act if he backslides. In order to verify Belgrade's compliance, NATO has implemented an intrusive air surveillance regime. And we are rapidly building up a 2,000-person verification mission, with personnel and funds contributed by OSCE nations, headed by Bill Walker, an

experienced American diplomat. NATO is establishing a force in Macedonia that will be close at hand to extract verifiers in an emergency.

Our longer-term aim, shared by our NATO allies, is a democratic FRY that aspires to European integration. In this regard, we continue to support political pluralism and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

We have ended the cycle of violence, but do not under estimate the challenges that lie ahead. We appreciate your concerns and hope that we can count on your support to our efforts to stabilize the region and alleviate the pain and suffering of the Kosovar people.

Sincerely,

Greg Schulte
Special Assistant to the President for
the Implementation of the Dayton Accords

Mr. Milan Panic
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
3300 Hyland Avenue
Costa Mesa, California 92626

7217
711-
27934

Republique Federale de Yougoslavie
le Premier Ministre (1992-93)
Milan Panic

October 3, 1998

SENT VIA FAX AND FEDERAL EXPRESS

Dear Mr. President:

On March 3, and again on March 19, 1998, I wrote you to express my doubts that we could get Milosevic to engage in serious and constructive negotiations for a solution to the Kosovo problem. I pointed out that he is a master of avoidance and obfuscation, and that his only objective is to retain his hold on political power, regardless of the consequences for the Serbian people. Now, seven months and 250,000 Albanian refugees later, the international community has come to the same conclusion. Unfortunately, however, the remedy being proposed is military intervention via air strikes on Serbian targets.

Milosevic will now quickly move to a posture of cooperation with international refugee agencies, while loudly proclaiming that he has exercised his sovereign right, and duty, in suppressing a terrorist rebellion in Kosovo, which was threatening the public order. While thus seeking to dodge the NATO bullet, he will use the threat of NATO intervention to fan the fires of xenophobia and ultra-nationalism among Serbs. If NATO does not intervene, he will have his controlled media herald him as a victorious international statesman who has faced down the international community, led by the United States, and successfully defended Serbian vital interests.


I believe we can and should counter Milosevic by having the Security Council declare that in view of the dimensions of the humanitarian disaster created in Kosovo by Milosevic, Kosovo will be regarded as a United Nations protectorate for purposes of administering to the refugee crisis, and call upon NATO to implement this program.

I believe we should also announce that we can no longer tolerate Milosevic's tactics, that our quarrel is not with the Serbian nation, it is with the policies of the Milosevic regime, and that we recognize and respect the legitimate rights of the Serbian nation, but that we no longer recognize Milosevic as the legitimate leader of that nation and will no longer deal with him.

I believe we should also announce our encouragement for democratic movements and alternatives in Serbia, and that we will do everything we can to support such movements.

For over six years I have stated that Milosevic is the problem, not the solution. It is high time that we declare that we no longer regard him as a necessary partner for the international community. If we isolate him, and international leaders no longer parade to Belgrade to meet with him, his public image as the internationally recognized leader and protector of the Serbian nation will quickly fade from Serbia's television screens and it will rapidly become apparent to an overwhelming majority of Serbs that their emperor has no clothes.

Sincerely,



Milan Panic

William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

MP/jac

OCT 21 11:58

JOI - 6

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	For Samuel Berger from Greg Schulte. Subject: SFOR's Six-Month Review. [Record ID: 9808024] (2 pages)	11/27/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chrons for November 1998 [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6251

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9807838
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 98 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: BIDDLE, GEORGE

DOC DATE: 09 NOV 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
KOSOVO
CROATIA

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
MACEDONIA
NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INTL CRISIS GROUP FWDS RPT ON STATE OF BALKANS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 28 NOV 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAWLEY

SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9807838

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 98111715 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

UNCLASSIFIED



international crisis group

November 9, 1998

The Honorable Samuel R. Berger
National Security Advisor
White House
1st Floor, West Wing
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Berger,

I am pleased to enclose the International Crisis Group's most recent report on the Balkans.

"State of The Balkans" offers a brief analysis of the current situation in the region and examines trends in every conflict area of the former Yugoslavia and Albania. More than seven years after the outbreak of the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, most of the region remains in crisis, conflict continues to spread and international involvement continues to grow. Despite intensive media focus on the region however, the many conflicts, claims and counter-claims, are generally not well understood.

The report concludes that there are no quick-fix solutions and that regional stability will require a long-term international presence and sustained, well thought-out policies backed by the credible threat of force. ICG recommends convening a permanent international conference on the Balkans and locating it within the region as a possible starting point for an overall settlement.

I believe the report provides an insightful overview of the current situation in the Balkans. If you have any questions or would like further information, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

George C. Biddle
Vice President

Board of Trustees

Senator George J Mitchell
Chairman
Alain Destexhe
President
Morton Abramowitz
Abdlatif Y Al-Hamad
Oscar Arias Sanchez
Gianfranco Dell'Alba
Ersin Arioglu
Christoph Bertram
Alan Blinken
Maria Livanos Cattai
Mong Joon Chung
Mark Eyskens
Issam M Fares
Malcolm Fraser
Vladimir Goussinsky
HRH El-Hassan bin Talal
Marianne Heiberg
James Ingram
Max Jakobson
Jeffrey Len-Song Koo
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Allan J MacEachen
Graça Machel
Nobuo Matsunaga
Barbara McDougall
Matthew McHugh
José Maria Mendiluce
Miklos Nemeth
Olusegun Obasanjo
Olara Otunnu
Wayne Owens
Shimon Peres
David de Pury
Cyril Ramaphosa
Michel Rocard
Christian Schwarz-Schilling
William Shawcross
Michael Sohlman
Stephen Solarz
George Soros
Pär Stenbäck
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Kevin O'Sullivan
William O Taylor
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Ed Turner
Simone Veil
Shirley Williams

George C. Biddle
Vice President
Charles Radcliffe
Director, Policy & Communications
Carole Corcoran
Of Counsel

NOV 16 1998



STATE OF THE BALKANS

ICG Report

4 November 1998

Sarajevo

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. BACKGROUND.....	1
III. SOUTHERN BALKANS.....	3
A. SERBIA: THE KEY.....	3
B. KOSOVO: SAVAGE REALITY.....	4
C. VOJVODINA, MONTENEGRO AND THE SANDZAK: MILOSEVIC'S PANDORA'S BOX.....	6
D. ALBANIA: ANARCHY AND POVERTY.....	7
E. MACEDONIA: ETHNIC TENSIONS.....	8
IV. NORTHERN BALKANS.....	9
A. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: \$9 BILLION ANNUAL HOLDING OPERATION.....	9
B. CROATIA: IMPENDING CHANGE.....	11
V. CONCLUSION.....	12
 ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.....	 14
SELECTED BALKANS PROJECT REPORTS.....	15
OTHER ICG REPORTS.....	16

STATE OF THE BALKANS

I. INTRODUCTION

More than seven years after the outbreak of the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, most of the region remains in crisis, conflict continues to spread and international involvement continues to grow. Some 2,000 unarmed "verifiers" are currently moving into the southern Serbian province of Kosovo in an attempt to contain fighting between Serbs and ethnic Albanians as part of the latest international agreement to be brokered with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic; some 35,000 peace-keepers are deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) as part of a Stabilisation Force (SFOR) providing security for implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA); and numerous international missions monitor and/or promote compliance with international agreements throughout the Balkans from Croatia in the north to Albania in the south, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), various UN agencies and departments, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and, within Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Despite intensive media focus on the region for the better part of a decade, the many conflicts, claims and counter-claims, are generally not well understood. The Balkans simply do not translate easily into journalism. The mushrooming of acronyms associated with new entities, armies and inter-governmental agencies add a further layer of complexity. This paper offers a brief assessment of the state of the Balkans. It considers the background to today's situation; it examines every crisis region in the former Yugoslavia and Albania in turn; and it concludes with proposals for international approaches to head off, or at least minimise, future conflict.

II. BACKGROUND

Today's political geography of the Balkans is the result of four separate wars -- in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo -- and a series of partially-implemented, internationally-brokered peace agreements. It reflects the failure, on the one hand, of the former Yugoslavia to come to terms with the transition from one-party, Marxist rule to democracy, and, on the other hand, of the international community to manage the disintegration of the country.

The international community, led by the European Community (EC) as the European Union (EU) was then called, became involved in the wars of Yugoslav dissolution on its very first day, 27 June 1991, when the European Council, the summit of heads of government of member states and European Commission President, dispatched a *Troika* of foreign ministers to broker a cease-fire in Slovenia, the first republic to be engulfed in war following independence declaration two days earlier. The decision to intervene in Yugoslavia was in part taken in haste as a knee-jerk reaction to the first full-scale fighting in mainland Europe since the Second World War. Given Yugoslavia's geography -- it physically separates 14 EU states from Greece, the fifteenth -- and a nascent common European security and foreign

policy, non-involvement was not a serious option. On 7 July 1991 the *Troika* brokered the Brioni Accord ending the war in Slovenia and dispatching the ECMM to monitor the peace. By then, however, conflict had already spread into neighbouring Croatia, which had also declared independence on 25 June 1991, and successive cease-fire agreements failed to halt the fighting.

On 7 September 1991, the European Community convened a conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague, under the chairmanship of Lord Peter Carrington on the basis of three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, protection of the rights of all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations. Although Lord Carrington insisted that a lasting cease-fire was a prerequisite for the conference to proceed, he, nevertheless, embarked on negotiations, despite the violence. In the absence of the political resolve in key international capitals to intervene and thus neutralise the use of force, the fighting inevitably escalated.

After the addition of the UN, in the person of Cyrus Vance, to the international negotiating effort, the Sarajevo Accord of 2 January 1992 brought the war in Croatia to a halt. The peace agreement envisaged deployment of 14,000 UN peace-keepers and eventual reintegration of Serb-held regions of the republic into Croatia. EC recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992 signified a shift in approach. Instead of working towards an overall settlement for the entire country, international envoys were effectively dealing piecemeal with each individual region. Special talks began on Bosnia in January 1992, but, in the absence of the political will for preventive deployment of peace-keepers, they failed to head off another war. Fighting began at the end of March 1992, within a month of a referendum which was supposed to determine Bosnia's fate, but which simply saw Bosnians divide along ethnic lines. Lord Carrington's diplomacy failed to halt the fighting and was superseded in September 1992 by a joint EU-UN International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) meeting in permanent session in Geneva under Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance. Despite a series of proposals and the deployment of 36,000 UN peace-keepers, however, the conference failed to secure a settlement. The United States did not support the most realistic peace plan, since it entailed recognising many of the gains of ethnic cleansing. And no country was willing to risk deploying forces to reverse Bosnian Serb military gains.

The Bosnian war was eventually halted in November 1995 after three years and nine months of fighting following marathon talks in Dayton, Ohio brokered principally by the then US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. The DPA succeeded where earlier peace plans had failed because of the determination of the US negotiating team and the backing they received from other countries; because, after years of humiliation, there was a genuine threat that European troops (in particular British and French) who made up the backbone of the UN peace-keeping force in Bosnia would be withdrawn in the event of failure; and because of a fundamental shift in the military balance. In the course of 1995 the tide of battle changed, first in neighbouring Croatia and then in Bosnia. Two out of three Serb-held enclaves in Croatia were overrun by the Croatian Army in lightning strikes in May and August 1995 and, with the support of Bosnian Croat forces and the predominantly-Bosniac Bosnian Army, the offensive rolled forward into Bosnia reversing many of the early Serb war gains, resulting in a territorial division within the country similar to those envisaged in earlier peace plans. In addition, Britain, France and the Netherlands deployed a war-fighting Rapid Reaction Force within Bosnia and, following the second Sarajevo market place massacre on 28 August 1995, NATO systematically bombed strategic points from the air, destroying Bosnian Serb communications.

While the DPA succeeded in ending the fighting in Bosnia with the help of a 60,000-strong, NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), it was another piecemeal solution and failed to address the other conflicts or potential conflicts in the region, such as Kosovo. The UN remained in Croatia with two missions, one in Prevlaka along Croatia's southern border with Montenegro and the other in Eastern Slavonia, along the border with Vojvodina, as well as in Macedonia where peace-keepers were first deployed in January 1993.

III. SOUTHERN BALKANS

A. Serbia: The Key¹

The one factor common to all four wars of Yugoslav dissolution is Serbian involvement. This suggests that the evolution of all these conflicts depends, above all, on developments within Serbia, or, to be precise, on Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who during more than a decade in power has moulded Serbian society in his own image. Nevertheless, international envoys continue to shuttle between their capitals and Belgrade hoping that despite his track record, despite the benefits he personally reaps from conflict, indeed despite all logic, Milosevic will provide a solution. The latest example of this syndrome is the Kosovo agreement brokered on 12 October 1998 by Holbrooke.

The options open to policy-makers obliged to deal with dictators of Milosevic's ilk are undeniably limited. That said, Milosevic's position at home is no longer as unassailable as it once was. More than six years of economic sanctions have taken their toll on Serbia and its increasingly destitute population. Yugoslavia's GDP is now roughly that of 1970 with real wages at the level of 1959. In 1997 Milosevic bought himself some economic breathing space by selling 49 per cent of the state telephone company Serbia Telekom to Stet of Italy and OTE of Greece for \$1.2 billion. This year, the re-imposition of more stringent sanctions in response to the war in Kosovo has blocked further sales of state assets. Moreover, the expense of the war in Kosovo alone is pushing Yugoslavia inexorably closer to total economic collapse.

Milosevic used Kosovo and the alleged mistreatment of the province's Serbs to propel himself to absolute power within Serbia in the mid-1980s and the fighting there this year has, temporarily at least, boosted his standing at home. During the winter of 1996-1997, Milosevic's rule was challenged by daily demonstrations involving tens of thousands of protesters, and in January 1998 Belgrade's transport network was brought to a standstill as employees went on strike. Today, however, Milosevic stands at the head of another national crusade, this time in the struggle against "Albanian terrorism". Moreover, Milosevic has used the war in Kosovo as an excuse to clamp down further on dissenting voices. Since reaching agreement with Holbrooke on Kosovo, several newspapers and radio stations have been closed and a new law passed banning media reports which spread defeatism. Milosevic also dismissed the head of state security who, despite an often unsavoury past, was generally considered a restraining influence.

¹ For an analysis of Serbian politics, see ICG papers *Serbia: The Milosevic Factor* of February 1998 and *Again, the Visible Hand: Milosevic's Manipulation of the Kosovo Dispute* of May 1998.

Given his track record, it is hard to envisage Yugoslavia at peace with Milosevic still at the helm. The country has effectively been on a war footing ever since he came to power, and national hysteria remains the essence of Milosevic's rule. Conflict has been the key to his government and, apart from conflict, he has little to offer. Indeed, many Serbs fear that as soon as Milosevic extricates himself from the war in Kosovo he will have to find another conflict to divert attention away from the deficiencies of his rule. In Yugoslavia itself, he still has a Pandora's box of unresolved national questions to open.

The most realistic alternative to Milosevic in Serbia at present appears even worse. The ultra-nationalist leader of the Serbian Radical Party Vojislav Seselj -- who led para-military forces during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and advocates ethnic cleansing as a solution in Kosovo -- entered government at the end of last year as Deputy Prime Minister. Moreover, he was only narrowly defeated in a controversial election last year for the Serbian Presidency by Milosevic's preferred candidate, amid allegations of vote-rigging. Seselj is currently biding his time in the wings, staking out a populist position vis-à-vis Kosovo and gaining experience of government.

ICG proposes a twin-track international policy towards Serbia aimed at, on the one hand, maximising pressure on/further isolating Milosevic and, on the other, boosting the democratic alternative. After so many years of broken promises and deception, Milosevic must be viewed and treated as the problem, not as the key to a potential solution. However, given the possibility of a Seselj succession in the event of Milosevic's demise, it is critical, at the same time, to nurture other forces within Serbian society.

B. Kosovo: Savage Reality²

The Kosovo powder keg whose explosion was so long predicted, finally ignited at the end of February this year. Since then, international media have focused attention on this, the fourth war of Yugoslav dissolution, and the inability of international negotiators to halt the fighting and the emptiness of their threats. To be fair, finding a political formula which reconciles the legitimate interests of Serbs, who comprise less than 10 per cent of Kosovo's population, and the Albanian majority is a remarkably difficult objective, especially now that the conflict has escalated into a war. Those working towards a settlement have to balance the relative strengths of arguments concerning the inviolability of existing international borders, on the one hand, and the principle of self-determination on the other. They also have to consider the impact of the conflict on the rest of the region.

The exact terms of the accord reached between Holbrooke and Milosevic of 12 October 1998 remain unclear. Though parts have been made public and others leaked, many operational details are, it seems, still being worked out. Milosevic has, nevertheless, agreed both to let 2,000 unarmed foreign observers or "verifiers" enter Kosovo to monitor the withdrawal of the additional Serbian troops and special police deployed in the province since March this year, and also take part in political talks that would restore greater self-rule to the province. In

² For a comprehensive analysis of the issues in Kosovo on the eve of bloodshed, see ICG paper *Kosovo Spring* of March 1998 and for an examination of the course of the war, see ICG paper *Kosovo's Long Hot Summer* of September 1998.

essence, the accord is a holding operation which should enable humanitarian workers to distribute aid to displaced ethnic Albanians, thus keeping them alive during the winter, and to enable them to return to their homes. It is not a lasting political settlement.

Despite the obvious stake Kosovo's ethnic Albanians had in the Milosevic-Holbrooke talks, they were not represented and are not party to the accord. This is clearly problematic. Whereas OSCE verifiers may attempt to hold Serbian troops to the letter of the accord Milosevic has signed, ethnic Albanian fighters in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) have not agreed to anything. Moreover, despite recent reverses, they have at times during the past eight months achieved military successes. Indeed, at one point early in the summer they claimed to control some 40 percent of Kosovo. Having already sensed that liberation was within their grasp, many fighters are determined to continue the armed struggle, irrespective of peace agreements or the wishes of the mainstream ethnic Albanian leadership in Pristina.

Logistically, the Milosevic-Holbrooke accord also appears fraught with difficulties. Given that, despite a leisurely lead time, the OSCE struggled to recruit some 300 staff for its Croatian mission, and that it has had recurring staffing problems in Bosnia during the past three years, assembling 2,000 qualified verifiers at short notice is a massive undertaking. Moreover, these unarmed observers may in practice end up as little more than potential hostages. Critically, despite the threats, it is unclear how NATO would respond in the event the verifiers report that Serbian troops were refusing to withdraw.

It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for peace in Kosovo. The current fighting must be viewed in the light of almost a decade of *apartheid*-like oppression since Kosovo was forcibly stripped of its autonomy in 1989. The time for negotiations was before the conflict escalated into a war. Moreover, the possibility of the conflict spreading beyond Kosovo is great. In Bosnia, fall-out from the fighting has already been felt as Serb media coverage of the conflict, in particular the opinions expressed about the international community and Islam, has strengthened the position of ultra-nationalists, thus further undermining already-difficult prospects for reconciliation. Meanwhile, prospects for peace and democracy in Albania and Macedonia, with its large ethnic Albanian minority in the west of the country, are inextricably linked to events in Kosovo.

ICG believes that averting renewed conflict in Kosovo will require swift and decisive action to establish genuine, all-party negotiations on the future constitutional status of the province. Such talks should proceed according to a strict timetable, under close international supervision. ICG further believes that the international community should drop its opposition to discussion of independence for Kosovo. Explicitly including independence as a legitimate proposal for negotiation would be a powerful way of demonstrating that radical constitutional change, of the kind supported by the vast majority of Kosovo Albanians, is possible through peaceful rather than violent means.³

³ ICG will shortly publish a discussion paper prepared by the Public International Law and Policy Group examining the legal arguments for and implications of an independent Kosovo.

C. Vojvodina, Montenegro⁴ and the Sandzak:⁵ Milosevic's Pandora's Box

Vojvodina and Montenegro were the first two federal units of the former Yugoslavia to fall under Milosevic's control in October 1988 and January 1989 respectively. As a result of military failure, economic collapse and the isolation imposed on them by international sanctions, opposition to the link with Serbia has grown to the point that it is a realistic proposition, especially in Montenegro. Vojvodina and Montenegro were prepared to tie their fortunes to Serbia while they were deriving some benefit from the link, but as the disadvantages of association have come to outweigh the advantages, both have sought to distance themselves from Milosevic.

Relations among Vojvodina's many peoples came under strain as soon as pro-Milosevic supporters toppled the province's government in 1988. All Vojvodina's non-Serbs complain that, since hard-line nationalists seized power, their rights have been slashed and their position in society diminished. According to the 1981 census, 56.6 percent of Vojvodina's 1.15 million population were Serbs or Montenegrins, and the remaining 43.4 percent a mixture of peoples, including Hungarians (19 percent), Croats (5.4 percent), Slovaks and Romanians. However, in the intervening years Vojvodina's non-Serb population has declined sharply. The number of Hungarians, for example, slipped to 340,000 in the 1991 census from 385,000 a decade earlier and the decline has continued throughout the 1990s. Given the situation in Kosovo, Hungary has this year begun to voice concern for the fate of the Hungarian minority with the foreign ministry publishing its first strong statement on the issue in June 1998.

Though smaller than Vojvodina, Montenegro was a fully-fledged republic in the former Yugoslavia and is now officially an equal partner with Serbia in the new Yugoslav federation. The nature of the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia and whether a separate Montenegrin identity exists, are perennial questions in Montenegrin politics. According to the 1991 census, about 380,000 (61.8 percent) of the republic's 615,000 population considered themselves Montenegrin, while about 57,000 or 9.2 percent declared their nationality as Serb. In many ways, the relationship is akin to that between Austria and Germany, and Austrians and Germans. Serbs and Montenegrins speak the same language and theoretically belong to the same Church, but have different historical experiences. The precise nature of the relationship depends not on historical and cultural ties but on whether it is advantageous, and as far as many Montenegrins are concerned they now have little to gain from the alliance and much to lose. Moreover, in elections a majority of the population, including the republic's Albanians and Muslim Slavs, backed the anti-Milosevic candidate Milo Djukanovic for president last year and his supporters for parliament this year. Although the rift between Serbia and Montenegro appears to be growing by the day and has been exacerbated by the war in Kosovo, Djukanovic is aware that he must tread warily since Serbia is land-locked and will not easily give up its last remaining outlet on the sea.

⁴ For a partial discussion of Montenegrin politics in the run-up to Montenegro's parliamentary elections of May 1998, see ICG paper *Inventory of a Windfall: Milosevic's Gains from the Kosovo Dialogue* of May 1998.

⁵ ICG is currently preparing an examination of politics in the Sandzak.

The Sandzak is a little-known former Ottoman province or military district sandwiched between Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, where, in the 1991 census, some 230,000 Muslim Slavs formed about 54 percent of the population. It was conquered in 1912 in the First Balkan War and divided between Serbia and Montenegro. The Sandzak is significant, in particular, for its geography since it separates Serbia from Montenegro and in the past has been used to keep the two apart. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, for example, the Habsburgs decided to station a garrison there to prevent the unification of Serbia and Montenegro. Conditions for the Sandzak's Muslim Slavs depend on which side of the Serbian-Montenegrin border they live. In the Sandzak's six Montenegrin municipalities, Muslim Slavs have relatively few complaints about their status and generally support Djukanovic's anti-Milosevic ruling coalition. In the Sandzak's 16 Serbian municipalities, by contrast, the Muslim Slav population has been subject to arbitrary justice for much of the past decade.

Despite the presence of so many Muslim Slavs and the fighting in neighbouring Kosovo, the chances of conflict spreading to the Sandzak appear, for now at least, minimal. This is because of a coincidence of interests between the Serbian authorities and wealthy Muslim Slav entrepreneurs who have built a large apparel and shoe-manufacturing industry in Novi Pazar, the region's largest town, during the past 10 years. The Muslim Slav entrepreneurs produce bogus designer jeans, including Levis, Versace and Bugle Boy, as well as shoes that mimic famous Italian designs but sell for a fraction of the price. Western analysts estimate the annual output to be worth between \$50 million and \$100 million and the Muslim Slav entrepreneurs boast that Serbia's tax authorities collect more money in Novi Pazar than in any other district in the republic.

D. Albania: Anarchy and Poverty⁶

As the war in Kosovo refuses to die down and Kosovo Albanian refugees continue making their way to neighbouring Albania, that country -- Europe's most impoverished -- has inexorably been drawn into the conflict. Indeed, given the nature of the fighting in Kosovo and the ethnic and, in some cases, family ties between Kosovo Albanians and Albanians from Albania proper, it is almost impossible for Tirana to stand passively by. Moreover, since a violent outbreak of anarchy in spring 1997 in the wake of the collapse of a series of pyramid investment schemes, parts of northern Albania on Kosovo's border have been largely beyond Tirana's control and thus fertile soil for insurgents, whether from Kosovo or Albania. In the wake of the anarchy, some 750,000 weapons were stolen from military depots and much of the army deserted. Many of the missing weapons have ended up in the hands of the KLA.

Although Tirana's initial response to the fighting in Kosovo was restrained, the government has found itself under increasing pressure to adopt a more aggressive stance. A policy of restraint may win international approval, but it brings into question the administration's nationalist credentials, both with Kosovo Albanians and within Albania proper. It has also played into the hands of ex-president Sali Berisha who has exploited the Kosovo conflict to mount a political comeback. Tension between Berisha's Democratic Party and the ruling

⁶

For an examination of the impact of the Kosovo conflict on Albania, see ICG paper *The View from Tirana: The Albanian Dimension of the Kosovo Crisis* of July 1998, and for an analysis of recent internal political developments, see ICG paper *Albania Crisis Briefing* of October 1998.

Socialist Party erupted into violence in September 1998 with an attempted coup d'état, political arrests and the assassination of a key Berisha ally. In response, Prime Minister Fatos Nano resigned on 28 September 1998. The unrest has paralysed the work of the parliament, derailed the constitutional reform process, and, with an exodus of foreigners, led to the scaling down of international aid projects.

The political crisis in Tirana has, in part, deflected attention away from a new wave of Kosovo refugees who have been expelled from Montenegro. On 12 September 1998, Montenegro, which had already accepted some 45,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, closed its borders to further refugees and sent some 3,000 recent arrivals across the border into Albania. Montenegro says that it cannot take in any more refugees since its reception centres are severely over-stretched. Facilities for refugees in Albania, however, are virtually non-existent, and as winter approaches the humanitarian situation is likely to deteriorate. With average income only \$32 a month, the country is not equipped to deal with the scale of the crisis.

ICG proposes increased humanitarian aid for Kosovo refugees fleeing to Albania and the deployment of an international peace-keeping force in the country. The deployment should be along the lines of the Italian-led Operation Alba, which oversaw the restoration of law and order there in 1997, and it should patrol the entire country, including the crime-ridden regions along the Greek border as well as the northern border with Kosovo.

E. Macedonia: Ethnic Tensions⁷

As the one former Yugoslav republic which has managed to keep itself out of the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, Macedonia has often appeared to outsiders as a beacon of hope in the Balkans. Despite difficulties, Macedonia has held together as a country since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. However, almost everything about the country, from its borders, to its language, history and flag, even its name and ethnic composition is controversial. Hence fears persist about its long-term viability. Inter-ethnic relations in the young state -- in particular those between ethnic Albanians, who make up at least 23 percent of the population, and ethnic Macedonians, who make up 61 percent -- are poor. In the event of continued fighting in Kosovo and the influx of large numbers of refugees fleeing southward, Macedonia is poorly prepared, despite the presence of UN peace-keepers, and the country's very existence may be imperilled.

Fall-out from the violence in Kosovo has already begun to be felt in Macedonia. Five bombings have been blamed on the KLA; Macedonian police and suspected KLA activists were involved in a shoot-out in September 1998; and the head of Macedonia's intelligence agency has stated on the record that KLA cells are operating in the country. Ethnic Albanians overwhelmingly support their kin in Kosovo. Ethnic Macedonians tend to draw parallels between Kosovo Albanian demands for independence and ethnic Albanian politics in Macedonia, believing that ethnic Albanian demands for increased rights in Macedonia undermine the ethnic Macedonian identity and by extension the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state. They therefore increasingly identify with the Serbian side. Ethnic

⁷

For analyses of the politics of ethnicity and conflict in Macedonia, see ICG papers *The Albanian Question in Macedonia* of August 1998 and *1998 Elections in Macedonia* of October 1998.

Macedonians tend also to view Albanians as a minority that, while entitled to certain rights under the constitution -- a constitution which declares Macedonian the sole official language and the Macedonian Orthodox Church the official creed -- should not be granted greater rights than those accorded to other minorities.

Recent parliamentary elections -- which took place in two rounds on 18 October and 1 November 1998 -- heightened ethnic tensions and did little to alleviate fears that Macedonia is institutionally ill-equipped to reconcile the legitimate interests of its various communities. Neither ethnic Macedonian nor ethnic Albanian political leaders made any attempt to appeal across the ethnic divide in the course of the electoral campaign. Instead, they appeared to be outbidding each other on ethnic issues and the manner in which they intend to defend the interests of their own communities.

ICG proposes an increased international presence, both military and political, in Macedonia in order to head off future conflict, and the maintenance and expansion of international assistance programmes. In return for increased aid, the international community should demand a greater commitment from the Macedonian authorities to fostering better relations between the country's communities.

IV. NORTHERN BALKANS

A. Bosnia and Herzegovina: \$9 Billion Annual Holding Operation⁸

Although originally scheduled to remain in Bosnia for only one year, the NATO-led peace-keeping mission is still there almost three years after the DPA came into force. Moreover, it has little prospect of withdrawing in the near future lest the country slide back into war. Despite a prolonged period without fighting and five separate internationally-supervised elections, the peace process is far from self-sustaining. It is no exaggeration to state that to date domestic political institutions have failed to function; that every issue has been viewed in "zero-sum" terms; and that almost all "breakthroughs" have required disproportionate, indeed often ridiculous, amounts of time and effort on the part of the international community. In practice, the political impasse has created a position in which, on the one hand, most public offices have to be filled simultaneously by three Bosnians (a Serb, Croat and Bosniac); and, on the other hand, these Bosnians do less and less work of any substance because they cannot reach accord. Meanwhile, refugee return to areas controlled by the armed forces of a different ethnic group is disappointing. Fewer than 52,000 so-called minority returns have been registered in total since the DPA came into force, of which only some 2,000 have been to Republika Srpska. Although 28 out of 57 public indictees have been removed to The Hague, the key war crimes suspects, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, as well as 22 other Bosnian Serbs, three Yugoslav citizens, and two Bosnian Croats, remain at liberty. The annual cost of this holding operation is some \$9 billion.

The peace process began in earnest in July 1997 with the first snatch operation against a key indicted war criminal by British NATO troops. As the cycle of impunity which had hitherto

⁸ For an analysis of the current situation in Bosnia and where it is heading, see ICG papers, *Whither Bosnia?* and *Doing Democracy a Disservice* of September 1998.

characterised the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, was broken, the political climate in Bosnia changed overnight. Moreover, in order to speed implementation of the DPA, the powers of the High Representative were augmented in December 1997 so that he now has the authority to dismiss any officials, elected or otherwise, who oppose the peace process and impose solutions in intractable disputes.

With his new authority, the High Representative has pushed through a series of key measures aimed at bringing communities together. These include a common vehicle licence plate, which has made it possible for Bosnians to travel throughout the country with a reasonable degree of security (knowing that their ethnic identity is not on public display), a new Bosnian flag and passport. He has also dismissed obstructionist officials. And increasingly he is appointing special envoys to supervise DPA implementation in strategic parts of the country. The OHR has also begun the systematic restructuring of the Bosnian media, wresting control of the principal television stations from the ruling parties, placing international supervisors in the stations, and imposing a new regulatory framework. As a result, Bosnia closely resembles a protectorate in which ever increasing numbers of foreigners are imposing decisions by decree, thus allowing Bosnian politicians to wash their hands of responsibility for the reconstruction of their own country.

Given the nature of the Bosnian war and the entrenched and opposed positions of the various factions, international involvement was always intended to be a fundamental part of the DPA with overall co-ordination entrusted to the High Representative, under the authority of the UN Security Council. The OSCE has a four-pronged mandate in Bosnia. It monitors the human rights situation; it promotes civil society and democratic government; it supervises elections; and it oversees arms reduction. A UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), made up of 2,500 unarmed foreign police officers, assists, advises, monitors and observes the work of local police. Foreign influence is equally crucial in a host of ostensibly domestic institutions. For example, a foreign Human Rights Ombudsperson was appointed by the OSCE for the first five years of DPA implementation, the Governor of the Central Bank is a foreigner appointed by the International Monetary fund (IMF) for the first six years; and three out of nine members of the Constitutional Court and three out of nine members of the Commission for Real Property Claims are foreigners appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights for five-year terms. This massive presence is made palatable by a five-year \$5.1 billion reconstruction plan, designed and guided by the World Bank.

Though critical to the peace process, the scale of the international presence is in some ways counter-productive to Bosnia's long-term future. On the one hand, domestic institutions and politicians have to a large extent given up responsibility for governing their own country. On the other, the massive international stake has led key players to declare the peace process a success, irrespective of how it is actually evolving, since failure would reflect badly on those states-persons, organisations and countries responsible for the agreement. This has been especially evident in the case of elections, all of which have been declared democratic advances, irrespective of reality. In Bosnia's most recent September 1998 elections, for example, the international strategy of favouring certain candidates and parties, in particular the then President of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic, was clearly dealt a massive blow by an electorate which refused to reject nationalism.

Democratic elections are all too often simplistically presented in the West as a panacea. It is as if any violence-free vote will produce leaders who are freely chosen even where those

leaders control the media, the police, and most voters' jobs and benefits. Here, it is worth bearing in mind that both Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia had already held democratic elections when they fell apart in war. Indeed, the disintegration both of the former Yugoslavia and of Bosnia can, in part at least, be attributed to the nature of the democracy which emerged. In Bosnia, for example, in the 1990 elections, the voting corresponded to a poor ethnic census. Bosniacs voted for the Bosniac party, Serbs for the Serb party and Croats for the Croat party. Moreover, although the three ethnically-based parties were ostensibly in coalition, they rapidly fell out with each other after the poll. As politicians exclusively represented the narrow interests of their own ethnic group and not the entire electorate, Bosnian society polarised and politics degenerated into a "zero-sum" affair.

Given Bosnia's unfortunate experience of democracy to date, observers must inevitably wonder how it may be made to work more successfully, or whether it can work at all. Indeed, a cursory examination might suggest that Bosnians rejected both ethnic reconciliation and the international community's peace-building efforts in the most recent election. But this is not the case. The results are simply the latest manifestation of a political system which panders to extremists and does not afford Bosnians the luxury of forsaking nationalism. Electors fear living under the ethnic rule of another community and therefore vote for the most robust defence of their own interests, thus sustaining a vicious cycle of fear and insecurity. Though it is possible to contain the Bosnian conflict almost indefinitely with a sufficient NATO presence, this requires policing and is extremely costly. Moreover, international leaders who have troops deployed in Bosnia are acutely aware of the political risks they are running domestically, should any of their soldiers be killed. In addition to containing the conflict, therefore, they are hoping to find an exit strategy.

ICG proposes a fundamental redesign of Bosnia's political and, in particular, electoral system in such a way as to offer incentives to encourage moderate, multi-ethnic behaviour.⁹ Only after such reform has taken place, will there be any prospect of a self-sustaining peace process which may, in time, enable peace-keepers to withdraw confident that the country will not slide back into war.

B. Croatia: Impending Change¹⁰

Whereas Serbia's strongman Milosevic has led Serbs to successive defeats, his Croatian counterpart Franjo Tudjman has been, in comparison, remarkably successful achieving most of his nationalist aims. As a result, like many politicians who have been in power for too long, Tudjman is convinced that what is good for him must also be good for Croatia and confuses his own interests and those of his party with the national interest. This has contributed to the emergence of sleaze as a factor in Croatian politics, with revelations about the Tudjman family's private fortune, a series of banking scandals and the removal of the title of Miss Croatia from the winning contestant when it was discovered she was a Muslim. As long as Tudjman remains in power, prospects for change are minimal. However, he is already 76 years old and has been reported to be suffering from stomach cancer since 1996.

⁹ For a comparative analysis of electoral systems in Bosnia, see ICG paper *Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politics: Discussion Paper on Electoral Reform* of March 1998.

¹⁰ ICG is currently preparing two papers on Croatia, one examining the position of Serbs there, the other a look forward at Croatian political developments.

Despite military set-backs in 1991 and the existence for four years of a Serb mini-state within its borders, Croatia now controls all of its territory. This follows victories over Croatian Serb rebels in 1995 and the hand-over of Eastern Slavonia at the beginning of 1998 to Zagreb's rule after two years of transitional UN authority. The solution to the national question in Croatia has, however, consisted largely of the expulsion of the Serb population. Serbs who remain in Croatia complain of being second-class citizens and Serb refugees find it exceptionally difficult to return. An OSCE mission is currently in Croatia monitoring these and other human rights' issues. With a weak mandate, however, it finds itself in an especially uncomfortable position, effectively observing an on-going exodus of Serbs.

Since the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the ruling Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) has struggled to define its place in peace-time politics. The HDZ resembles a movement, representing a wide range of views, united behind Tudjman with the aim of asserting Croatian statehood, more than a modern political party. Long-standing divisions within the HDZ may broadly be characterised as being between relative moderates committed to integration in western institutions and nationalists with links to the so-called Herzegovina lobby, that is the hard-line Bosnian Croat position. Tudjman has sought to maintain a balance between the two wings of the party, but this has proved increasingly difficult especially since the death of Tudjman's most trusted lieutenant, the then defence minister Gojko Susak in May 1998. The HDZ is currently haemorrhaging senior figures every week. Meanwhile, politicians inside and outside the HDZ are jostling for position in preparation for the succession battle. As economic issues increasingly become the focus of politics, the goal of reviving tourism will assume greater significance. This will require regional stability, and to achieve that Croatia will likely have to change its current policy towards its neighbours and, in particular, towards Bosnia.

ICG proposes maintaining pressure on Zagreb to democratise society and accept the return of Serb refugees. Although the current administration is unlikely to adopt a more enlightened approach, other trends in Croatian politics are encouraging and should, in time, lead to positive changes.

V. CONCLUSION

The international response to the wars of Yugoslav dissolution has been a case study in the way the world is ordered. It illustrates, above all, the lack of cohesion in the international community, and even within NATO, the failings of short-term approaches aimed at dealing with the crisis of the moment, and the consequences of inactivity at critical junctures. Instead of extricating itself from the region, the international community is being sucked in ever more deeply, with little prospect of withdrawal in the next several years. The key lesson to be learned is that there are no quick-fix solutions and that regional stability will require a long-term international presence and sustained, well thought-out policies backed by the credible threat of force. The piecemeal approach, treating every conflict in isolation, has failed since what takes place in one region will inevitably have an impact elsewhere. It must therefore be dropped for a strategy which addresses the region as a whole, much like the now defunct EC-UN International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. This time, however, such a conference should have teeth and, if necessary, be able to neutralise the use of force via, for example, preventive military intervention, including deployment of ground troops. Mediation alone is simply not sufficient.

Convening a permanent international conference on the Balkans and locating it within the region in, say, Skopje, could be the starting point for an overall settlement. In addition to being backed by a credible threat of the use of force, such a conference would have to adopt a highly original approach to conflict resolution, including examining the very concept of democracy in divided societies. The issue throughout the region is essentially the same, namely how to find a political framework which reconciles the legitimate interests of different ethnic groups sharing the same territory. The solution may be democratisation, but this entails more than just elections. To date processes which have served to promote democracy elsewhere have largely proved destabilising in the region. Mechanisms tailored to local conditions should be explored, including redesigned electoral systems, regional security and disarmament treaties, the creation of a regional broadcasting network and regional and/or reciprocal commitments to "special measures" to protect the employment, property, educational and other rights of minorities.

Sarajevo, 4 November 1998

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

We want to head off crises before they develop,
rather than react to crises after they happen.

Senator George Mitchell, ICG Board of Trustees Chair

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to understand and respond to impending crises. Teams of political analysts based on the ground in countries at risk of crisis, gather information from a wide range of sources, assess local conditions and produce regular analytical reports containing practical policy recommendations targeted at key international decision-makers.

ICG's reports are distributed widely to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations, to journalists and others. The ICG Board -- which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media -- is closely involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG's advocacy efforts are reinforced by a media strategy designed to increase press coverage of key issues identified in ICG's analyses.

ICG currently operates field projects in eight countries worldwide: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Algeria, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cambodia.

ICG's projected budget for 1998 is \$2.5 million. The organisation raises approximately 50 percent of its funds from charitable foundations, companies and individual donors, and the balance from governments. The following governments currently have funding agreements with ICG: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, The Republic of China (Taiwan), States of Jersey (Channel Islands), Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.

SELECTED BALKANS PROJECT REPORTS

Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina - September 1996
Addendum to the 22 September 1996 ICG Report on Elections in BiH - October 1996
State Succession to the Immovable Assets of Former Yugoslavia - February 1997
Grave Situation in Mostar: Robust Response Required - February 1997
Media in BiH: How International Support Can Be More Effective - March 1997
Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons in BiH - April 1997
House Burnings: Obstruction of the Right to Return in Drvar - June 1997
Ridding BiH of Landmines: The Urgent Need for Sustainable Policy - July 1997
Constitutional Crisis in Republika Srpska: A Legal Analysis - July 1997
Beyond Ballot Boxes: Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina - September 1997
Systematic Restructuring of Hate-mongering Media in Bosnia - October 1997
ICG Analysis of 1997 Municipal Election Results - October 1997
The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict in Macedonia - October 1997
A Review of the Dayton Peace Agreement's Implementation - November 1997
A Peace or Just a Cease-Fire? The Military Equation in Post-Dayton BiH - December 1997
Hollow Promise? Return of Serb DPs to Drvar, Grahovo & Glamoc - January 1998
Rebuilding a Multi-Ethnic Sarajevo: The Need for Minority Returns - February 1998
Brcko: What Bosnia Could Be - February 1998
Kosovo Briefing - February 1998
Serbia: The Milosevic Factor - February 1998
Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politics: Paper on Electoral Reform - March 1998
Supporting Albania's Long Haul Recovery - March 1998
Kosovo Spring - March 1998
Working Towards Security Within a Political Framework - April 1998
Again, the Visible Hand: Milosevic's Manipulation of Kosovo Dispute - May 1998
Minority Return or Mass Relocation? - May 1998
Inventory of a Windfall: Milosevic's Gains from the Kosovo Dialogue - May 1998
A Tale of Two Cities: Return of Displaced Persons to Jajce and Travnik - June 1998
The Konjic Conundrum: Why Minorities Have Failed to Return to Open City - June 1998
The View from Tirana: The Albanian Dimension of the Kosovo Crisis - July 1998
Western Gate of Central Bosnia: Politics of Return in Bugojno and Prozor - July 1998
The Albanian Question in Macedonia - August 1998
Changing Course? Implications of the Divide in Bosnian Croat Politics - August 1998
Impunity in Drvar - August 1998
Kosovo's Long Hot Summer - September 1998
Too Little Too Late: Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration - September 1998
Doing Democracy a Disservice: 1998 Elections in BiH - September 1998
Whither Bosnia - September 1998
Albania Crisis Briefing - October 1998
1998 Elections in Macedonia - October 1998

**Reports can be accessed through the ICG web site at
<http://www.crisisweb.org>**

OTHER ICG REPORTS

SIERRA LEONE

ICG's Good Governance Project in Sierra Leone - March 1996

Report on Sierra Leone - May 1996

Tackling Crisis in the Labour Market - May 1997

Sierra Leone, Another New Beginning? - March 1998

CAMBODIA

Getting Cambodia Ready for Elections - January 1998

Why Cambodia will not be ready for Free and Fair Elections on 26 July 1998 - June 1998

Cambodia's Elections Turn Sour - September 1998

ALGERIA

Between Death Threats and Censorship - April 1998

CENTRAL AFRICA

Lift the Sanctions; Re-launch the Peace Process - April 1998

Burundi's Peace Process: The Road from Arusha - July 1998

North Kivu: Into the Quagmire - August 1998

**Reports can be accessed through the ICG web site at
<http://www.crisisweb.org>**