

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chronos for October [1998] [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1706

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	6	2	V

CHRONS FOR SEPTEMBER 1998

LOG NUMBER	SUBJECT	CL	TO
NONE	FLOTUS DROP-BY WITH VERAN MATRIC	U	M. VERVEER
NONE	CHECKLIST FOR SEPT. 4 DC ON KOSOVO	S	KERRICK
NONE	IWG MEETING NOTICE	S	PRINCIPALS
NONE	HOLBROOKE MEMO ON KOSOVO	S	SRB/JS/DK
5225	LTR FM PRES DEMIREL OF TURKEY	C	SRB
5724	PRES. CORRESPONDENCE	U	SRB
6224	LTR. FROM HARRY BAJRAKTARI MANAGEMENT CORP.	U	SRB
6519	MEMO TO THE PRES ON KOSOVO	S	SRB
6685	MEMO TO THE PRES ON BOSNIAN ELECTIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD	S	SRB
20750	SOC DC MTG ON SEPT 4 -- KOSOVO	S	JS
20755	AGENDA/PAPER FOR 9/9 DC ON KOSOVO	S	JS
20756	BRIEFING MEMO FOR 9/9 DC ON KOSOVO	S	JS
20761	SOC FOR 9/9 DC ON KOSOVO	S	JS
20794	BRIEFING MEMO FOR 9/18 PC ON KOSOVO	S	JS
20800	SOC FOR 9/18 PC ON KOSOVO	S	SRB
20812	AGENDA FOR DC ON BOSNIA AND KOSOVO	S	JS
20818	BRIEFING MEMO 9/25 DC ON BOSNIA AND KOSOVO	S	JS
20825	DC PAPER FOR PRINCIPALS ON PREPARING FOR NATO DECISION ON AIR STRIKES	S	JS
20829	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- 9/26	S	JS
20836	NOTIFICATION AND AGENDA FOR PC MTG 9/30 -- KOSOVO	S	SRB

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VL Date: 1/4/2024

2008-0994-F3

20839	BRIEFING PAPER FOR PC ON KOSOVO 9/30	S	SRB
20840	BRIEFING PAPER FOR SEPT. 30 PC MTG. ON KOSOVO	S	SRB
20844	SOC FOR 9/30 PC MTG ON KOSOVO		

CHRONS FOR OCTOBER 1998

LOG NUMBER	SUBJECT
5651 REDO	POTUS REPLY TO LETTER FROM NINA BANG-JENSEN AND THE COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE ON THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KOSOVO
6432	REPLY RE CRISIS IN KOSOVO
6780	PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO SENATE REPUBLICAN CONCERNS ON KOSOVO
6617 REDO	PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO MORTON ABRAMOWITZ AND OTHER INFLUENTIALS ON FLIGHT OF KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
6626 REDO	PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS TO SENATORS D'AMATO ET AL. RE KOSOVO
6789	BRIEFING MEMO AND TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS 6 OCTOBER TELCALL TO BRITISH PM BLAIR
6817	POTUS MEETING ON KOSOVO WITH NSC PRINCIPALS
6846 REDO	POTUS LETTER ON KOSOVO TO CHAIRMAN GILMAN
6882	BRIEFING MEMO FOR POTUS MTG. W/SCHULTE ON KOSOVO
6927 REDO	POTUS LETTER TO SOROS RE KOSOVO
6964	PREPARING FOR END GAME IN KOSOVO
7031	POTUS MTG. WITH SPECIAL ENVOY RICHARD HOLBROOKE OCTOBER 14, 1998
7217 REDO	LETTER ON KOSOVO TO MILAN PANIC
7362	MEMO TO POTUS ON US RESPONSE TO CROATIAN HARDLINE LEADERSHIP AND POLICIES
20854	SOC FOR DC MTG. ON KOSOVO -- OCT 2
20856	NOTIFICATION AND AGENDA FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO OCT 5

20859	SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 OCT DC MTG ON KOSOVO
20860	SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 OCT PC MTG ON KOSOVO
20865	SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 OCT DC MTG ON KOSOVO
20867	SOC FOR PC MEETING ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 6
20871	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 7
20874	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 8
20885	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 9
20886	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 10
20886 REDO	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 10
20887	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 11
20888	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 11
20889	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 12
20890	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 12
20891	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 13
20894	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 13
20903	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 14
20906	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 15
20911	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 16
20914	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 19
20918	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 20
20926	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 21
20927	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 22

20933	NOTIFICATION/AGENDA/DISCUSSION PAPER FOR PC ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 24
20934	SOC FOR PC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 24
20936	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 26
20938	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 27
20939	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 27
20950	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 28
20955	ESTABLISHMENT OF KOSOVO EXCOMM
20959	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 30
21002	SOC FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO -- OCTOBER 4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5651 REDO

October 22, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM:

MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*

SUBJECT:

POTUS Reply to Letter from Nina Bang-Jensen and
the Coalition for International Justice on the
Humanitarian Crisis in Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding
a draft response to Nina Bang-Jensen and the Coalition for
International Justice.

Concurrence by: David Wippman *DW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Letter to Nina Bang-Jensen and the Coalition for
International Justice

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter on Humanitarian Situation in Kosovo from
Nina Bang-Jensen and the Coalition for
International Justice

Purpose

Respond to a letter from the Coalition for International Justice expressing concern about the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.

Background

Ms. Nina Bang-Jensen and the Coalition for International Justice, an organization representing relief agencies including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Doctors Without Borders among many others, writes to express deep concern about the escalating humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.

Your reply details the NATO pressure on Milosevic that has resulted in improved access and freedom of movement for humanitarian organizations and relief workers and increased deliveries of food and other necessities to Kosovar Albanians.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Ms. Bang-Jensen at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Ms. Bang-Jensen

Tab B Incoming correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Ms. Bang-Jensen:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter on behalf of the Coalition for International Justice about the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. As you point out, the dimension of human suffering there has been enormous. I appreciate your description of the important work international relief agencies are doing to provide needed assistance. Just as you suggested, a key objective of the international community has been to create the conditions on the ground that allow humanitarian organizations to carry out their vital work without interference.

As you point out, only a few weeks ago, prospects for Kosovars were bleak. Tens of thousands, driven from their homes by Serb forces, were facing the onset of winter without shelter and the basic necessities of life. I am heartened that our close cooperation with NATO allies and the unity of purpose we achieved has dramatically changed that situation for the better.

From the beginning, one of our principal objectives has been to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe. We have made substantial progress toward achieving that goal. NATO determination backed up by the credible threat of force has led to a cease-fire that has held since early October followed by a substantial reduction of Serb security forces in Kosovo. Now that the shooting has stopped and security checkpoints have been dismantled, more than 40,000 displaced people have returned to their homes.

With calmer conditions on the ground, a major international relief operation involving dozens of NGOs is well underway. Each day convoys are carrying essential supplies to Kosovars. By all accounts, since early October, relief agencies have had freedom of movement throughout the province and unfettered access to those in need. I am deeply concerned about any Serb security force interference with, or threats to the safety of, international aid workers. The establishment of an international verification mission with 2,000 personnel will

help ensure that aid workers are able to carry out their work without such interference; and the presence of a NATO force in Macedonia should deter aggressive Serb operations in Kosovo.

I do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead, but I believe we are on the right road. We have ended the cycle of violence, and I am hopeful that we are getting closer to a political resolution of the conflict.

As we move forward, the multitude of humanitarian organizations in the Coalition for International Justice will continue to play a key role in alleviating the pain and suffering in Kosovo. We are committed to ensuring that their courageous personnel on the ground are able to carry out their life-saving work without fear of personal harm. Again, thank you for writing and sharing your concerns with me on this serious issue. I appreciate your willingness to work with my Administration to provide vital aid to the long-suffering Kosovar people.

Sincerely,

Ms. Nina Bang-Jensen
Coalition for International Justice
740 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-1009

Protocol II, Article 13 of the Geneva Conventions

Protection of the civilian population— 1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. 2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Protocol II, Article 14 of the Geneva Conventions

Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population—Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.

Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned humanitarian and human rights organizations, urgently appeal to you concerning the dramatically escalating humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The situation is dire and has deteriorated severely in recent days. In direct violation of Protocol II, Article 13 of the Geneva Conventions, unarmed civilians are systematically targeted through a campaign of indiscriminate attacks and atrocities, as they were just three short years ago in Bosnia. Our local partners in Kosovo and the region are pleading desperately for access, protection, and resources to meet the basic needs of the besieged, displaced and attacked civilian population, already close to one million people. Thousands of civilians, overwhelmingly women, children, and elderly, are being forcibly expelled from their villages and towns every day. Brutal attacks on civilians continue to escalate.

As large numbers of newly homeless people crowd in with already poor Kosovo Albanian families, winter food supplies are being consumed. A food crisis looms, particularly as cold weather approaches in the foothills and mountains where tens of thousands of civilians have been forced to flee. Unless urgent action is taken, an enormous crisis— requiring a massive and expensive humanitarian response—is inevitable. Current relief efforts and resources are woefully inadequate.

President Clinton
Page Two

Our representatives and partners on the ground report that hundreds of thousands of people have now been forced out of their homes and are wandering, terrorized, looking for any shelter, food, and medical care they can find. Humanitarian organizations on the ground cannot reach many of the people who need help because of blockades, shelling and harassment. Serbian authorities have intermittently seized or diverted humanitarian relief supplies away from victims.

Local humanitarian organizations attempting to provide emergency assistance to the homeless, wounded and hungry are under attack. We have received credible reports that many local humanitarian workers and medical personnel have recently been arrested and interrogated. Other humanitarian workers have been killed, wounded, or gone missing after abductions by Serbian authorities. Serbian authorities have plundered food warehouses, most recently seizing more than 12 metric tons of grain from the Mother Theresa Society's facility in Vuciturn/Vushtri.

In addition to the killing and abduction of Kosovo's civilians, which has been widely reported, we are gravely concerned by the increasingly systematic use of food and access to rudimentary medical care as tools of war. Serbian paramilitaries and soldiers are burning food stock and crops and killing livestock. Snipers regularly fire on civilians attempting to harvest their wheat crops. Belgrade has imposed strict food controls on Kosovo, not only stopping the transport of goods to many Kosovo Albanian communities altogether, but allowing only state stores, run by ethnic Serbs, to buy and sell food staples. Using food as a weapon in internal armed conflict is explicitly prohibited under Protocol II, Article 14 of the Geneva Conventions.

With your leadership, the international community can and must ensure that the civilian victims of Kosovo find protection within Kosovo, and obtain secure access to food, shelter, and basic medical care. These desperate people are on the run and have nowhere safe to go, as thousand of homes have already been shelled and burned. International and local humanitarian groups—such as the Mother Theresa organization—must be able to distribute food and medical supplies to the hundreds of thousands of unarmed people who need their help. Local health professionals, aid workers, and human rights monitors, who are particularly at risk of arrest and abuse, need protection and access to the regions where internally displaced populations are moving.

President Clinton
Page Three

We urge you to do everything in your power to stop Belgrade's military onslaught against civilians in Kosovo. The international community cannot wait for a cease-fire or political solution to the war in Kosovo before taking necessary action to address this immediate humanitarian disaster. The lives of the mass of unarmed, defenseless people are at stake in Kosovo, just as they were in alarmingly similar circumstances in Bosnia.

Respectfully,

Amnesty International, USA
Balkan Action Council
Bosnian Action Coalition
Codman Square Health Center
Coalition for International Justice
Domovina Net
Freedom House
Friends of Bosnia
The Foundation for a Civil Society
Human Rights Watch
Hunt Alternatives
InterAction
International Crisis Group
International Human Rights Law Group
International League for Human Rights
International Rescue Committee
Lasiewicz Foundation

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
Medicins Sans Frontieres USA /
Doctors Without Borders, USA
Mercy Corps
Network Bosnia
Nonviolence International
Open Society Institute
Physicians for Human Rights
Public International Law and Policy Group
Refugees International
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
U.S. Committee for Refugees
Women's Commission for Refugee Women
and Children
World Vision Relief and Development

cc:

Hillary Clinton
The First Lady
The White House
Washington, DC

Madeleine Albright
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C.

Samuel Berger
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
National Security Council
Washington, D.C.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BANG-JENSEN, NINA

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO HUMAN RIGHTS
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM COALITION FOR INTL JUSTICE RE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER DUE DATE: 21 AUG 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHWARTZ LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SCHWARTZ

FOR CONCURRENCE
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BAKER
RAGAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

*DORA - PLEASE
PUT INTO
system, for
response.*

COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

740 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-1009

*Copies ~~to~~ to
Pasan
Shulte*

FAX	Date: 8/6/98 # of pgs. including cover: 6.
TO: Eric Schwartz Fax: 456-9141 Phone: cc:	FROM: COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE John Heffernan: (202) 662-1595 Nina Bang-Jensen: (202) 662-1684 ✓ Fax: (202) 662-1597 E-mail - coalition@cij.org

REMARKS:

Eric -
Would you please see that
Mr. Berger sees this as soon
as possible? Thanks very much.
Nina Bang-Jensen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806432
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 98 15

TO: YELTSIN, BORIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 03 OCT 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
HS

REFUGEES
TERRORISM

file
p

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY RE CRISIS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DUE DATE: 02 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SCHULTE
WEISS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: re Date: 1/4/2024
2008-0994-F3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9806432

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCHULTE
002 BERGER
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 98091815 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 98100512 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
X 98100617 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

001 980917
003 981003 YELTSIN, BORIS

DISPATCH FOR INFO

KENNEY, K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

10/3/45

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6432
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRG NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>KFC 10/3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>ad 10/5</u>	<u>N/R</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

*Response to Russian President
Yeltsin on Kosovo*

10/3/45

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806432
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 98 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS

DOC DATE: 17 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
HS

REFUGEES
TERRORISM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 24 SEP 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
PASCUAL

FOR CONCURRENCE
SCHULTE
SCHWARTZ

FOR INFO
BERGER
CLARKE
DAVIES
DOWLING
KERRICK
SIMON
STATE
STEINBERG

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 1/4/2024
2008-094-13

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER:

Weiss
PASCUAL

LOG NUMBER:

*Rec'd in R 1E
9/22*
6432

DUE DATE:

2 OCT

DATE STAFFED:

18 SEP

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:



PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM:

YELTSIN

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER COMM COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE SIT
STEINBERG SUTPHEN

SIT: COQ MCELDFOWNEY PASCUAL SCHULTE SCHWARTZ SUM2 WEISS

SIT: NODIS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 032033Z OCT 98

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

7015-0415-M-3 (7.16)

KBM 12/13/2019

AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL
BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO IS REACHING A CRITICAL POINT. A
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY THAT HAS ENVELOPED TENS OF THOUSANDS
OF INNOCENT PEOPLE WILL WORSEN WITH THE ONSET OF WINTER.

ONCE AGAIN THE WORLD IS CONFRONTED BY COMPELLING EVIDENCE
OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY MILOSEVIC'S SECURITY FORCES ON
CIVILIANS AND SENSELESS MASSACRES. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO
WATCH IDLY AS MILOSEVIC LEADS THE BALKANS INTO ANOTHER CYCLE
OF BLOODSHED, ATROCITIES AND MISERY.

THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TOGETHER TO BRING THE
CONFLICT IN KOSOVO TO AN END. THANKS LARGELY TO OUR
SUCCESSFUL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AN IMPORTANT RESOLUTION ON
KOSOVO ON SEPTEMBER 23. THAT WORK BUILT ON A LONG SERIES OF
REINFORCING EFFORTS BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IN MARCH, WE AND
OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES SPELLED OUT THE PRECISE STEPS
THAT MILOSEVIC MUST TAKE TO REGAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. AT A MEETING WITH YOU IN MOSCOW IN
JUNE, MILOSEVIC PROMISED YOU THAT HE WOULD TAKE SEVERAL OF
THESE ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY.

IN HIS ACTUAL BEHAVIOR, MILOSEVIC HAS BEEN NOTHING BUT
DEFIANT. FOR MONTHS NOW, HE HAS IGNORED THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY'S CLEAR-CUT DEMANDS FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ACTION BY SECURITY FORCES AND THEIR WITHDRAWAL; ACCESS AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS; UNIMPEDED ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS; AND CLEAR PROGRESS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION. MILOSEVIC'S COMPLIANCE WITH THESE DEMANDS REMAINS INADEQUATE.

THE DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS AT OUR DISPOSAL ARE QUICKLY RUNNING OUT. AFTER THE UN RESOLUTION, THE CONTACT GROUP MET IN NEW YORK AND GAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR AMBASSADORS IN BELGRADE TO UNDERScore ONCE AGAIN OUR EXPECTATIONS OF MILOSEVIC. WHEN MILOSEVIC RECEIVED THEM, HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE PLANNED TO IGNORE THEIR MESSAGE. THE CONTACT GROUP POLITICAL DIRECTORS MET AGAIN LAST FRIDAY IN LONDON. I AM PLEASED THAT WE AGREED ON A UNIFIED PLAN FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO PRESENT BOTH TO MILOSEVIC AND THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS. WE ALL WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, BUT WE MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE IF AND WHEN DIPLOMACY HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS.

IN RECENT DAYS, NATO HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE TO MILOSEVIC THAT HIS ACTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO COMPEL HIM TO CHANGE COURSE. WE DO NOT WISH TO USE FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS URGENT TASK, BUT MILOSEVIC'S ACTIONS -- THE CEASELESS VIOLENCE AND THE FLOUTING OF THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- LEAVE US LITTLE ALTERNATIVE. IF HE DOES NOT COMPLY IN COMING DAYS WITH OUR LONG-STANDING DEMANDS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO RESPOND DECISIVELY.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE BALKANS. WE MUST KEEP UP THE REGULAR AND MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TEAMS, INCLUDING EXCHANGES BETWEEN MADELEINE AND IGOR, OUR IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS AT NATO, AND THE CONTACT GROUP'S ATTENTIVE WORK ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. MILOSEVIC MUST NOT FEEL THAT HE CAN SPLIT US OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF FORCE IS OFF THE TABLE. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO STOP THE KILLING IN KOSOVO, USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, AND SHOW THE ENEMIES OF

PEACE THAT THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED. AS IN BOSNIA, I KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE OVERCOME THIS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS.

SINCERELY,
BILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>0611

<MSGID> M3494485

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS~~

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0815-M-3 (7.17)

KBH 12/13/2019

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO IS REACHING A CRITICAL POINT. A HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY THAT HAS ENVELOPED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE WILL WORSEN WITH THE ONSET OF WINTER. ONCE AGAIN THE WORLD IS CONFRONTED BY COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY MILOSEVIC'S SECURITY FORCES ON CIVILIANS AND SENSELESS MASSACRES. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO WATCH IDLY AS MILOSEVIC LEADS THE BALKANS INTO ANOTHER CYCLE OF BLOODSHED, ATROCITIES AND MISERY.

THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TOGETHER TO BRING THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO TO AN END. THANKS LARGELY TO OUR SUCCESSFUL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AN IMPORTANT RESOLUTION ON KOSOVO ON SEPTEMBER 23. THAT WORK BUILT ON A LONG SERIES OF REINFORCING EFFORTS BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IN MARCH, WE AND OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES SPELLED OUT THE PRECISE STEPS THAT MILOSEVIC MUST TAKE TO REGAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. AT A MEETING WITH YOU IN MOSCOW IN JUNE, MILOSEVIC PROMISED YOU THAT HE WOULD TAKE SEVERAL OF THESE ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY.

IN HIS ACTUAL BEHAVIOR, MILOSEVIC HAS BEEN NOTHING BUT DEFIANT. FOR MONTHS NOW, HE HAS IGNORED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S CLEAR-CUT DEMANDS FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO ACTION BY SECURITY FORCES AND THEIR WITHDRAWAL; ACCESS AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS; UNIMPEDED ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS; AND CLEAR PROGRESS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION. MILOSEVIC'S COMPLIANCE WITH THESE DEMANDS REMAINS INADEQUATE.

THE DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS AT OUR DISPOSAL ARE QUICKLY RUNNING OUT. AFTER THE UN RESOLUTION, THE CONTACT GROUP MET IN NEW YORK AND GAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR AMBASSADORS IN BELGRADE TO UNDERSCORE ONCE AGAIN OUR EXPECTATIONS OF MILOSEVIC. WHEN MILOSEVIC RECEIVED THEM, HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE PLANNED TO IGNORE THEIR MESSAGE. THE CONTACT GROUP POLITICAL DIRECTORS MET AGAIN LAST FRIDAY IN LONDON. I AM PLEASED THAT WE AGREED ON A UNIFIED PLAN FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO PRESENT BOTH TO MILOSEVIC AND THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS. WE ALL WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, BUT WE MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE IF AND WHEN DIPLOMACY HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS.

IN RECENT DAYS, NATO HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE TO MILOSEVIC THAT HIS ACTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO COMPEL HIM TO CHANGE COURSE. WE DO NOT WISH TO USE FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS URGENT TASK, BUT MILOSEVIC'S ACTIONS -- THE CEASELESS VIOLENCE AND THE FLOUTING OF THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- LEAVE US LITTLE ALTERNATIVE. IF HE DOES NOT COMPLY IN COMING DAYS WITH OUR LONG-STANDING DEMANDS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO RESPOND DECISIVELY.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE BALKANS. WE MUST KEEP UP THE REGULAR AND MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TEAMS, INCLUDING EXCHANGES BETWEEN MADELEINE AND IGOR, OUR IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS AT NATO, AND THE CONTACT GROUP'S ATTENTIVE WORK ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. MILOSEVIC MUST NOT FEEL THAT HE CAN SPLIT US OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF FORCE IS OFF THE TABLE. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO STOP THE KILLING IN KOSOVO, USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, AND SHOW THE ENEMIES OF PEACE THAT THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED. AS IN BOSNIA, I KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE OVERCOME THIS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6432

October 2, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Response to Russian President Yeltsin on Kosovo

The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Kosovo. The message underscores the seriousness of the situation in Kosovo and the need to work closely together to ensure Milosevic's compliance with the international community's long-standing demands.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte, Leon Fuerth *AW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/2/08

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0815-M-3 (7.18)

KDH 12/13/2015

4752

Unofficial translation

September 17, 1998

Dear Bill,

As a follow up of our recent discussions of Kosovo I would like to inform you what we have done to build on the Moscow joint statement on Kosovo.

I have urgently sent to Belgrade the First Deputy Foreign Minister, currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor S.Ivanov to deliver my personal message to President Milosevic. In this message I frankly expressed my deep concern regarding the situation in Kosovo emphasizing the acute humanitarian problem which is turning into severe suffering for the civilian population and threatening to develop into a real catastrophe.

As a result of difficult negotiations with S.Milosevic we managed to persuade him to make very serious additional moves.

The president of the FRY publicly confirmed that in the interest of Kosovo settlement he would strictly adhere to the commitments assumed by him in Moscow.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.

SEP181998

In response to my call he promised that the Yugoslav authorities would grant guarantees of safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to the places of their permanent residence.

Belgrade is ready for full cooperation with all international humanitarian organizations. The Yugoslav authorities intend to conduct jointly with UNHCR and ICRC verification of the number of refugees and inspect the areas of their location to provide urgent aid.

It is also important that S.Milosevic firmly promised that there would be no new refugee flows out of Yugoslavia.

We believe that the practical implementation of these essential agreements would indisputably promote relief of tension in Kosovo and around it.

Therefore, as we have agreed, I have exerted strong pressure on S.Milosevic in order not to allow a humanitarian tragedy there.

It is critical now to exert similar pressure on Kosovo Albanian leaders as well. Provocative sallies, terrorist acts, constant threatening of civilians must end. It is a common knowledge that Albanian fighters formations operate openly from the Albanian territory where they have bases and enjoy complete impunity.

We talked with your in Moscow, Bill, about the need for parallel efforts in combating terrorism - one of the most dangerous challenges to the security of the contemporary world. This is precisely the approach we need regarding terrorist activity in Kosovo.

Russian representatives maintain continuous contact with Ambassador Hill. Sound interaction has been established. The practice of achieving intermediate

agreements as a step to a complete settlement in Kosovo based on strict respect for territorial integrity of Yugoslavia appears to us well-justified.

As to the humanitarian problem I believe that it is important to take advantage of the obligations assumed by the FRY President without any delay and focus on ensuring a possibility for refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes before winter.

Now, more than ever, it is particularly important to act in concert using the entire set of political means. Only this way we can alter the situation in the region and ultimately untie this complex knot. This can not be achieved through force. That I am certain about.

The resolution of the Kosovo problem will largely depend on our close future interaction on this track.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, Kremlin

bc/n 18.9.98

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г. ВАШИНГТОН

Дорогой Билл,

В продолжение наших недавних обсуждений косовской проблематики хочу проинформировать тебя о том, что нами было предпринято в развитие Московского совместного Заявления о ситуации в Косово.

Я срочно направил в Белград первого заместителя министра, а теперь министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации И.С.Иванова с моим личным посланием президенту С.Милошевичу. В нем откровенно изложил глубокую озабоченность положением в Косово с особым акцентом на остроту гуманитарной проблемы, обращающейся тяжелыми страданиями для мирного населения и грозящей перерасти в настоящую катастрофу.

В результате непростых переговоров с С.Милошевичем удалось подвигнуть его на очень серьезные дополнительные шаги.

Президент СРЮ публично подтвердил, что он будет строго придерживаться взятых им в Москве обязательств в интересах косовского урегулирования.

В ответ на мой призыв он объявил о предоставлении югославским руководством гарантий безопасного возвращения всех беженцев и перемещенных лиц в места их постоянного проживания.

Белград готов к самому широкому сотрудничеству со всеми международными гуманитарными организациями. Совместно с УВКБ и МККК югославские власти намерены провести выверку численности беженцев и обследовать районы их сосредоточения для оказания неотложной помощи.

Важно и то, что С.Милошевич твердо обещал, что новых потоков беженцев за пределы Югославии не будет.

Мы считаем, что практическая реализация этих принципиально важных договоренностей, несомненно, способствовала бы ослаблению напряженности в Косово и вокруг него.

Таким образом, как мы с тобой и договаривались, я серьезно нажал на С.Милошевича, чтобы не допустить там гуманитарной трагедии.

Крайне важно сейчас оказать такое же давление и на лидеров косовских албанцев. Должны быть прекращены провокационные вылазки, террористические акции, постоянное запугивание мирного населения. Ведь всем известно, что формирования албанских боевиков открыто действуют с территории Албании, где они имеют базы и пользуются полной безнаказанностью.

Билл, мы говорили с тобой в Москве о необходимости параллельных усилий в борьбе с терроризмом – одним из самых опасных вызовов безопасности современного мира. Именно такой подход нужен и в отношении террористической деятельности в Косово.

Российские представители поддерживают постоянный контакт с послом К.Хиллом. С ним налажено неплохое взаимодействие. Тактика достижения промежуточных договоренностей как этапа к полному урегулированию в Косово, основанному на строгом уважении территориальной целостности Югославии, представляется нам оправданной.

Что касается гуманитарной проблемы, то считаю важным без промедления воспользоваться обязательствами, взятыми президентом СРЮ, и сосредоточиться на том, чтобы обеспечить беженцам и перемещенным лицам возможность вернуться к своим очагам до наступления зимы.

Сейчас как никогда важно действовать согласованно, используя весь набор политических средств. Только так можно переломить ситуацию в крае и в конечном итоге развязать этот сложный узел. Силowym путем этого не добиться. Я в этом твердо убежден.

От того, насколько мы и дальше будем тесно взаимодействовать на этом направлении, во многом будет зависеть разрешение проблемы Косово.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
17 сентября 1998 года

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9806432

REFERRAL

DATE: 21 SEP 98

MEMORANDUM FOR: KENNEY, K

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: YELTSIN, BORIS

DATE: 17 SEP 98

SUBJ: LTR RE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KOSOVO

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR



JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806432
DATE 17 SEP 98

SUBJECT: LTR RE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KOSOVO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6432

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to Russian President Yeltsin

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Kosovo.

Background

The message to President Yeltsin is a key aspect of our strategy to engage the Russians on Kosovo. In the coming days we will continue to consult closely with them bilaterally, through the Contact Group, and at NATO. On Friday, Yeltsin and other Russian officials publicly criticized the potential use of force and called for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. They clearly have not come to terms with the reality that the threat to use force is the only way to change Milosevic's behavior. Your message underscores our desire for a political solution in Kosovo, but notes that our patience is running out.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 1/4/2021
708-0954-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 10/2/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6617 REDO

October 22, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MH*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Morton Abramowitz and
Other Influentials on Plight of Kosovar Albanians

Morton Abramowitz and a group of thirty influentials wrote the President to call attention to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and to urge a strong U.S. response.

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft response.

Concurrence by: Steve Flanagan *SF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign memorandum to POTUS attached at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Abramowitz et al.

Tab B Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Morton Abramowitz and
Other Influentials on the Plight of Ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to an incoming letter from Morton Abramowitz and other influentials urging the United States to lead an international effort to resolve the crisis in Kosovo.

Background

Morton Abramowitz and a group of 29 other influentials, including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Lane Kirkland, and Stephen Solarz, write to express their deep concern for the plight of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. They recommend that the United States pressure Milosevic to reach a political settlement.

Your response details NATO pressure that resulted in Milosevic's acceptance of the Kosovo Verification Mission and the NATO air verification regime and the improving humanitarian situation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Morton Abramowitz
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mort:

Thank you for the thoughtful letter from you and your colleagues about Kosovo. I share your view that ending the conflict and alleviating the humanitarian crisis there require decisive action by the West, and that understanding has guided our actions in recent months. Mort, before I address specific recommendations you make, I'd like to begin by filling you in on where we are in our policy.

As you point out, only a few weeks ago, prospects for Kosovars were bleak. Tens of thousands, driven from their homes by Serb forces, were facing the onset of winter without shelter and the basic necessities of life. I am heartened that our close cooperation with NATO allies and the unity of purpose we achieved has dramatically changed that situation for the better.

From the beginning, we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo. First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans. Second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe. And third, to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government.

We have made substantial progress toward each of these objectives. NATO determination backed up by the credible threat of force has led to a cease-fire that has held since early October followed by a substantial reduction of Serb security forces in Kosovo. Now that the shooting has stopped and security checkpoints have been dismantled, more than 40,000 displaced people have returned to their homes and a large-scale humanitarian relief effort has resumed.

Since the eruption of the conflict in February we have been aggressively pushing both sides towards a political settlement and we are pressing even harder now. The current draft agreement offers the Kosovars a high degree of autonomy, an indigenous police force, and complete control over education, health and other institutions that most affect their daily lives. We are working hard to convince armed insurgent groups in Kosovo that they, too, must cooperate to bring about a peaceful settlement.

There will be much work ahead to make the cease-fire and a settlement last. We know that Milosevic ended his campaign of hatred only because he fears NATO. NATO has retained authority and has the forces to act if he backslides. In order to verify Belgrade's compliance, NATO has implemented an intrusive air surveillance regime. And we are rapidly building up a 2,000-person verification mission, with personnel and funds contributed by OSCE nations, headed by Bill Walker, an experienced American diplomat. In support of this mission, NATO is establishing a force in Macedonia that will be close at hand to extract verifiers in the event of an emergency.

I agree with your recommendation that we support those dedicated to democracy in Serbia. Our long-term aim, shared by our NATO allies, is a democratic FRY that aspires to European integration. In this regard, we continue to support political pluralism and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy. Keeping tough economic sanctions in place, as you also recommend, will keep pressure on Milosevic and make clear to FRY citizens that he is unable to provide for their welfare.

We vigorously support the ICTY's investigations in Kosovo and are pressuring Belgrade to provide visas for ICTY personnel and cooperate with their mission. Let me say, in answer to your suggestion that we pursue Mr. Milosevic himself, that we will go where evidence developed by ICTY and others leads us. No war criminal in the FRY should feel beyond the reach of international justice.

I do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead, but I believe we are on the right road. We have ended the cycle of violence, and I am hopeful that we are getting closer to a political resolution of the conflict. Most, I deeply appreciate your offer of full support to our efforts to stabilize the region and alleviate the pain and suffering of the Kosovar people.

Sincerely,

Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz
Project for the New
American Century
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 510
Washington, D.C. 20036

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: ABRAMOWTZ, MORTON I
ABRAMS, ELLIOTT
ARMITAGE, RICHARD

DOC DATE: 11 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO HUMAN RIGHTS
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE PLIGHT OF ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER DUE DATE: 09 OCT 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE
NAPLAN

FOR INFO
BAKER
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

September 11, 1998

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing out of deep concern for the plight of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo, many thousands of whom, having been driven from their homes and farms by the latest Serbian offensive, now face the possibility of a winter of starvation. Over 15 percent of the Kosovo population is already homeless. It is inexplicable to us that the West simply watches as this disaster grows daily after watching similar disasters unfold in Bosnia between 1992-95.

Stopping the carnage in Kosovo is essential and requires decisive action by the West. But this will not by itself provide a solution to the continuing Balkan conflict.

Mr. President, the events of recent months, when added to the history of the conflict since 1991, lead to one inescapable conclusion: There can be no peace and stability in the Balkans so long as Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. He started the Balkan conflict, and he continues it in Kosovo. He has caused untold suffering to millions; he has severely damaged his own country. We must face the facts.

We understand that the United States has sought and on occasion achieved Milosevic's cooperation in carrying out the Dayton settlement; and there is no guarantee that a successor to Milosevic will be significantly more committed to peace. Nevertheless, we believe the time has come for the United States to distance itself from Milosevic and actively support in every way possible his replacement by a democratic government committed to ending ethnic violence. Our "pact with the devil" has outlived whatever usefulness it once had.

At a minimum, the United States should lead an international effort along the following lines:

- First, the humanitarian crisis needs to be addressed urgently. Milosevic must order his police and military forces to stop all violence immediately. However, the crisis cannot be ended without an agreement on a new political status for Kosovo. And that will require massive Western pressure on Milosevic.
- Second, the administration should seek, and the Congress should approve, a substantial increase in funds for supporting the democratic opposition within Serbia.

- Third, the U.S. and its allies must do everything possible to tighten the economic sanctions on Serbia to help undermine Milosevic's ability to maintain his power in Belgrade.
- Fourth, the administration should cease attempting to strike diplomatic bargains with Milosevic.
- Finally, the U.S. should vigorously support The Hague tribunal's investigation of Milosevic as a war criminal.

Mr. President, we are under no illusion that the steps we recommend are easy or guarantee success. We are certain, however, that after seven years of aggression and genocide in the Balkans, the removal of Milosevic provides the only genuine possibility of a durable peace. We urge you to act forcefully in this crisis, and we offer you our full support should you do so.

Sincerely,

Morton I. Abramowitz Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage

Jeffrey Bergner George Biddle John R. Bolton Frank Carlucci

Seth Cropsey Dennis DeConcini Paula Dobriansky Morton H. Halperin

James R. Hooper Bruce P. Jackson Robert Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad

Lane Kirkland Jeane Kirkpatrick Peter Kovler William Kristol

Mark P. Lagon Richard Perle Peter Rodman Gary Schmitt

Stephen Solarz Helmut Sonnenfeldt William Howard Taft IV

Ed Turner Wayne Owens Paul Wolfowitz

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6626 REDO

October 22, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *ly*

FROM: MICHAEL HURLEY *MA*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Senators D'Amato et al.
re Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding draft responses to Senator D'Amato et al.

Concurrence by: Mara Rudman *MR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Letters to Senator D'Amato et al.

Tab B Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Senator D'Amato et al. on
the Humanitarian Crisis in Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Senator D'Amato and other members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe urging action on Kosovo.

Background

Senator D'Amato and three other members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe wrote to condemn atrocities in Kosovo and to urge that action must be taken to avert a more severe humanitarian crisis.

Your reply describes NATO pressure on Milosevic that resulted in his acceptance of intrusive verification measures and the resulting improving humanitarian situation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to Senator D'Amato et al. at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Senator D'Amato et al.
Tab B Incoming correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the thoughtful letter on the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo from you and your colleagues on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I appreciate your candid advice that resort to armed force to end the violence should not be taken lightly but that action must be taken to avert a more severe humanitarian catastrophe. The policy we implemented is consistent with your recommendation that we weigh the risks and responsibilities of a NATO intervention in Kosovo. I am heartened that the unity of purpose we achieved with our NATO allies has dramatically changed the situation in there for the better.

From the beginning, we have had three overriding objectives in Kosovo. First, to end the violence that threatens the fragile stability of the Balkans. Second, to prevent a humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe. And third, to help the Kosovar people achieve a high degree of self-government.

We have made substantial progress toward each of these objectives. NATO determination backed up by the credible threat of force has led to a cease-fire that has held since early October followed by a substantial reduction of Serb security forces in Kosovo. Now that the shooting has stopped and security checkpoints have been dismantled, more than 40,000 displaced people have returned to their homes and a major international relief effort is underway to provide them with the vital assistance they need.

Since the eruption of the conflict in February we have been aggressively pushing both sides towards a political settlement and we are pressing even harder now. The current draft agreement offers the Kosovars a high degree of autonomy, an indigenous police force, and complete control over education, health and other institutions that most affect their daily lives. We are working hard to convince armed insurgent groups in Kosovo that they, too, must cooperate to bring about a peaceful settlement.

There will be much work ahead to make this cease-fire and a settlement last. We know that Milosevic ended his campaign of hatred only because he fears NATO. NATO has retained authority and has the forces to act if he backslides. In order to verify Belgrade's compliance, NATO has implemented an intrusive air surveillance regime. And we are rapidly building up a 2,000-person verification mission, with personnel and funds contributed by OSCE nations, headed by Bill Walker, an experienced American diplomat. In support of this mission, NATO is establishing a force in Macedonia that will be close at hand to extract verifiers in an emergency.

As you recommend, it is important to make our interests in bringing peace to Kosovo clear to the American people. In recent months, I and senior members of the Administration have made numerous public statements explaining America's interests and the policy we have implemented to advance them.

I do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead, but I believe we are on the right road. We have ended the cycle of violence, and I am hopeful that we are getting closer to a permanent political resolution of the conflict. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for writing and sharing your concerns with me about this important issue. We will continue to consult with Congress in the critical days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Alfonse D'Amato
Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

ALFONSE D'AMATO, NEW YORK, CHAIRMAN
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY, CO-CHAIRMAN

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DOROTHY D. TAFT, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

6626
**COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**
234 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6460
(202) 225-1901
FAX: (202) 226-4199
E-MAIL: CSCE@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV

September 23, 1998

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500-0001

Dear Mr. President:

We write once again to urge that you obtain NATO agreement to take action to stop those attacking and killing civilians in Kosovo and destroying their homes and livelihoods.

We commend you and Secretary of State Albright for requesting that Senator Bob Dole join Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck in a fact-finding mission to Kosovo, both to investigate the reported atrocities and to assess the humanitarian crisis. On September 17, the Senator and Secretary appeared together before a hearing of the Helsinki Commission, and their testimonies about the situation on the ground in Kosovo were alarming. We and seemingly all the Members present concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity are without question taking place regularly in Kosovo and that Slobodan Milosevic will only stop this carnage when confronted with NATO action, or the fact of concrete preparations for action.


At the hearing, we noted that the use of armed force is not something to be taken lightly, and we are not easily convinced that such action is prudent. You know, Mr. President, of the need to weigh the risks and responsibilities that would arise from any NATO intervention in Kosovo. We believe strongly, however, that horrors like those reported by Secretary Shattuck and Senator Dole must be addressed when deciding whether or not to act. Bosnia taught us that delayed action costs lives. In the case of Kosovo, we are convinced that action must be taken soon in order to avert a more severe humanitarian crisis and catastrophe.

Mr. President, we hope that we and the American people will hear from you soon on this important issue.

Sincerely,



CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, M.C.
Co-Chairman



STENY H. HOYER, M.C.
Ranking Member



ALFONSE D'AMATO, U.S.S.
Chairman



FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, U.S.S.
Ranking Member

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-3765 / 202-226-4199 fax

STAFF :
EUR
LEG

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TO: Sandy Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Advisor
National Security Council
202-456-9490

FR: Dorothy Douglas Taft
Deputy Chief of Staff

DT: September 24, 1998

RE: Letter sent to the President

For your information and reference.

PLEASE DELIVER FAX IMMEDIATELY

Pages: 2

SEP 24 19:11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SMITH, CHRISTOPHER H
HOYER, STENY H
D'AMATO, ALFONSE M

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NATO

HUMAN RIGHTS
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: URGE PRES OBTAIN NATO AGREEMENT TO TAKE ACTION IN KOSOVO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 09 OCT 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SCHULTE

FOR CONCURRENCE
MCELDOWNEY
RUDMAN
SCHWARTZ
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO
BAKER
BANDLER
BOUCHARD
FLANAGAN
GOBUSH
NAPLAN
WEISS

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR MARA RUDMAN'S SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6780

October 5, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT:

Proposed Presidential Response to Senate
Republican Concerns on Kosovo

I attach a proposed letter from the President responding to
Friday's letter from Senate Republicans on Kosovo.

Concurrence by:

Mara Rudman *MR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed response at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Response
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senate Republican Concerns on Kosovo

Purpose

To gather support from Congressional Republicans on Kosovo.

Background

On Friday, Trent Lott and other Senate Republican leaders wrote to you expressing concern about the Administration's policy on Kosovo. They raise four primary concerns: first, the need for a significant increase in the defense budget; second, the need to address possible ground force commitments; third, NATO's planning for the use of air power; and fourth, the need for a convincing plan that advances our interests, avoids an open-ended military commitment and helps to replace Milosevic with a democratic government. I believe that this letter deserves a rapid, lengthy and thoughtful response as part of the process of building Congressional support for possible military action.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to the Senate Republicans.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senate Republicans
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:

- immediately cease offensive operations;
- withdraw security forces;
- allow full access to international monitors and relief agencies;
- negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.

Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the potential use of force. I want to provide you and others in the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.

As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when Serbian special police launched an offensive against the Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven months that have followed, Serbian military and police have steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and expulsions designed to terrorize the local population and suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic

revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since 1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making clear that this was a prerequisite to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local affairs, including education, justice and a separate police force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity because we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the wrong signal to those in the region calling for a "greater Albania," and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's security forces.

In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

It is important to focus on U.S. interests that are at stake here.

- First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political tensions and

civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the threat of terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.

- Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe. Today, the United Nations Secretary General's report on the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed atrocities, including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such acts.
- Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary of Defense Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several months to support military

operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming which reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For fiscal 1999, I have proposed a \$1.9 billion emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of our Bosnia deployment. To preclude serious readiness problems in fiscal 1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure.

In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration to work with Congress to provide adequate resources for readiness and other defense programs in fiscal 1999 and beyond. For the short term, I proposed that members of my Administration work with you prior to the Congressional adjournment to craft a \$1 billion supplemental package that will augment fiscal 1999 funding for key readiness programs. For the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council have been instructed to work with Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year plan that provides the resources necessary to preserve military readiness, support our troops, and modernize aging weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my fiscal 2000 defense budget request to Congress. As I wrote you last month, the men and women of our armed forces will have the resources they need to do their job.

The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would be a function of the scope and intensity of such operations. My Administration will work with the Congress to ensure timely passage of appropriate funding measures and that this does not come at the expense of our defense program.

Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO planners have reviewed a broad range of options, some of which would involve ground forces in hostile circumstances, I can assure you the United States would not support these options and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The mission under consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not military forces on the ground.

In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a substance political settlement, some form of international presence may be needed. Whether this can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and whether Americans should participate are matters we will need to consider in the context of any such agreement and with full consultation with the Congress.

Third, regarding the nature of the air campaign in Kosovo, NATO has developed a clear military plan. It entails the graduated but effective use of air power harnessed to two achievable objectives. The primary objective is by threat of force, or its use, to persuade Milosevic to comply with the demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. If initial use of air power does not result in compliance, NATO's secondary objective is to strike Belgrade's military capabilities in ways that will damage his ability to conduct repressive operations in Kosovo, the same objective you identify in your letter.

Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power to be used effectively. There will be no "pin prick" strikes. Even the initial use of air power will send a very clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY military and special police, and follow-on phases will progressively expand in their scale and scope. These operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.

Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to advance our overall objectives of promoting a political settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are combining the two to achieve our objectives. Secretary Albright recently dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus reducing the risk of wider conflict, averting a humanitarian catastrophe and lessening the chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term objective is to secure a political settlement that grants broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the Kosovars have their own bodies of government and police. Our longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration. This requires a responsible government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free and independent media in the FRY.

Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current situation including the brutal tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.

While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong and exacerbate it. I am referring in particular to the various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Ambassador Holbrooke this week delivered a firm message to these groups to cooperate in bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true autonomy. We have told them that failure to cooperate will cause us to reassess our operations against the Serbs.

Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador to Yugoslavia, once said that the war in Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will ultimately end there. His prediction was correct. Our job is to bring that war to an end, to keep it from destabilizing the region and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I appreciate your willingness to work with the Administration to protect American interests in southeastern Europe. We will continue to consult closely with you in the critical days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

WASHINGTON DC 20510-7010

October 2, 1998

Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our concerns about your Administration's policy toward Kosovo. Since the Serbian military offensive began in Kosovo more than seven months ago, senior Administration officials have repeatedly stated that Serbian actions would not be tolerated. For example, in March 1998, Secretary of State Albright stated, "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia." The same month, your Special Representative threatened "the most dire consequences imaginable" in response to Serbian offensives. Since these statements, many of us indicated we would support military action to halt Serbian ethnic cleansing. However, it is now more difficult for us to have confidence that military action will accomplish the stated goals. U.S. credibility has suffered great damage because U.S. threats have not been carried out. Milosevic has had the luxury of time to accomplish his goals in Kosovo.

We listened carefully as your senior national security officials briefed Senators yesterday. Clearly, we recognize the stakes involved in Kosovo, including the danger the conflict will spread to neighboring countries, the importance for our credibility and for that of the NATO alliance, and the ongoing human tragedy created by months of ruthless attacks by Serbian forces. We also recognize the seriousness of the action you are contemplating. It means, as Senator Lugar stated yesterday, going to war with an attack on a sovereign country. We do not believe you have taken the necessary steps to prepare the Congress and the American people for such a weighty decision. In fact you have not even asked the Congress to authorize the use of military force.

We are troubled by a number of aspects of the plans and policies contemplated by your Administration.

First, we cannot support military operations by U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo unless and until you commit to request a significant increase in the defense budget to address the shortfalls in military readiness, personnel and modernization recently acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crisis in military readiness that has only belatedly been acknowledged by your Administration is grave. To support ongoing operations around the world, our men and women in uniform are deployed away from their homes and families for unprecedented lengths of time

during peacetime. Morale among the troops is suffering, and recruiting and retention statistics are dangerously low. Modernization of the force is seriously underfunded across the services. Training in many of the combatant commands must halt well before the end of the fiscal year due to funding and supply shortages. Nearly 12,000 military families rely on food stamps. Failing to provide additional funding for a potentially costly military operation in Kosovo, while U.S. forces are about to complete three years in Bosnia at a cost of nearly \$10 billion, will severely and perhaps irreparably exacerbate this critical readiness crisis.

Second, the issue of potential deployment of U.S. ground forces was not adequately addressed in yesterday's briefing. Press accounts report that detailed plans for nearly 50,000 ground troops in Kosovo have been developed. Yet Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that there has been no discussion of deploying U.S. ground forces in Kosovo. We believe that a ground force in Kosovo, which could be a likely follow-on to airstrikes, should be European, not American.

Third, we are concerned about the proposed use of NATO airpower. Press reports contain information about U.S. targeting plans that was not discussed in the briefing. To the extent we understand the proposed strikes, they appear to envision gradual and incremental measures. General Ralston discussed a "limited option" that may or may not achieve its stated objectives. A more "robust" option is under consideration but apparently has not yet been finalized. We believe any air attack should be sustained and overwhelming. Air attacks should be designed to decimate Milosevic's forces in Kosovo and in Serbia -- in order to permanently end his ability to perpetuate the conflict in Kosovo.

Finally and most importantly, we are concerned that U.S. policy is not based on a coherent and convincing plan and neither protects our interests nor recognizes the danger of becoming involved in another open-ended military commitment in the Balkans. Your policy seems to recognize that Milosevic is the problem but also proposes to make him part of the solution. By so doing, your policy helps to perpetuate his hold on power; your Administration has yet to formulate a policy for replacing Milosevic with a democratic government.

Yesterday, your officials stated that the credible threat of force was necessary to induce Milosevic to negotiate seriously. Yet in June, Secretary of State Albright stated, "The issue here is that we want a diplomatic solution. And I don't want to threaten strikes when what I'm trying to do is get a diplomatic solution." This is a disturbing and confusing inconsistency. A central question involves subsequent actions if any use of military force is not immediately successful in accomplishing its stated objectives. If Milosevic does not accept U.S. or NATO demands either before or after the employment of military force, what is our next step? It is not sufficient to state, as Secretary of Defense Cohen did yesterday, that you have not reached that decision point.

Your policy apparently envisions a status of limited autonomy for Kosovo, a status that both parties have shed blood to reject. Independence has been the choice of the majority of inhabitants in Kosovo. Serb assaults since February have served to increase this sentiment. Your policy currently opposes independence for Kosovo but we are concerned that you do not have an achievable program to implement your policy.

Mr. President, we believe in bipartisanship in foreign policy. We will not support any plan that requires American military personnel alone to bear the burden of the sacrifice and risk involved. To the contrary, we expect other member of NATO and their military personnel to share the sacrifice and risk. We stand ready to work with you and your officials to protect American interests in southeastern Europe.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond

Clark HAGEL

Pete Domenici

Zip Stevens

Don Nickles

Frank Lauter

John Warner

Richard L. Lugar

Jesse Helms

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806789
RECEIVED: 05 OCT 98 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

TELCALL

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO & TALKING POINTS FOR PRES 6 OCT TELCALL TO BRITISH
PM BLAIR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 10 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BANDLER

BUTLER

NSC CHRON

SCHULTE

Re
[Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: *RL* Date: *1/4/2004*

2008-0994-F3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD ID: 9806789

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 98100612 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 98100614 FOR INFORMATION
X 98100616 NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 981006
002 981006

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6789

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<u>J</u>	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>G 10/5</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>D 10/5</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Pres telcall to Blair
6 Oct

98 OCT 5pm 6:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette

yes
Revised
Can you sign
out?

Blair -

① no contact group unless
commitment to Aetors first
gato

② delinking Aetors from
ground troops (NATO)

WAA

See → Fri See

→ Calheta old + new Aetors

→ Bous. - See there/used

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

10-6-98

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'98 OCT 6 AM 9:12

October 6, 1998

PHONE CALL TO
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

DATE: October 6, 1998

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:30-9:45 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER I. PURPOSE

To discourage the British from seeking a new UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo by opening the possibility of a Contact Group meeting prior to ACTORD and from pressing to link authorization of air strikes to the generation of ground forces to implement a cease-fire/settlement.

II. BACKGROUND

While fighting in Kosovo has slowed in recent days, Milosevic has maintained his heavy police and military presence there. The UK is pressing for an ACTORD on air strikes to be accompanied by an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) for ground forces. However, the "lightest" option thus far developed at NATO involves 27,000 troops. Securing Congressional support for U.S. participation in such a force would be difficult, unless we were to play only a supporting role. You should discourage the UK from linking air and ground options, and ask that they wait until we see the outlines of a settlement before deciding what role the international community might play in its implementation.

Blair may also raise with you the possibility of a further UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force. The British think that an attempt at a resolution, even blocked by the Russians, will help provide the necessary basis for military action.

We are convinced that Russia will block any resolution (particularly following Yeltsin's phone call to you) and think that seeking one is a dangerous idea. Not only does

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 10/05/08

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0706-m (1.17)

VZ 1/4/2024

it put Yeltsin in an extremely difficult position, but it will also complicate securing early NATO consensus on issuing an Activation Order (ACTORD) authorizing SACEUR to initiate air strikes. This would undercut Ambassador Holbrooke's current mission, which will likely require the imminence of an ACTORD or its actuality to succeed.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS
10-6-98

6789

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

*Set Hct 980
Keep Marked*

- Kofi Annan's report is a graphic account of Milosevic's defiance of international community. Believe we need to maintain momentum and build consensus for NATO decision to authorize force.
- Holbrooke continues his meetings in Belgrade and Pristina today. Fighting has been in a lull for the past few days, but Milosevic has not yet withdrawn the necessary police and military forces, nor agreed to measures that would make the end of hostilities verifiable and durable.
- Know that you've been thinking about ways to get Russia on board.
- We have all gotten a clear signal from Moscow that they will not support another UN resolution. Seems to me only harm can come at this point in forcing Yeltsin to veto.
- Although I have doubts about the wisdom, we can agree to Contact Group meeting prior to NATO ACTORD but only if key allies agree in advance that NATO will proceed regardless of what Russian position is.
- Also, I understand that some of your officials are pressing to link a decision on approving air strikes to NATO's willingness to commit ground forces to oversee a cease-fire or political settlement.
- You should know that this is a very difficult issue for us, particularly with the Congress. It's been an uphill struggle to sustain support for SFOR given Congress's concerns about readiness and any suggestion that we are also raising forces for Kosovo will make it very difficult to ensure domestic support for possible air strikes.
- Our objective now is to secure full compliance with UNSCR 1199. If there is an agreement on a peace settlement, then we will need to consider what kind of international presence is needed and what if any role we will play in implementing it.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 10/05/08

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

7013-0472-M (2.42)

KBH 8/6/2015

- We want to keep all options open at this point, rather than beginning to generate forces for a large NATO-led implementation force.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6789

October 5, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER *h*

FROM: LAWRENCE BUTLER *(1)*

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call to Prime Minister
Blair

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his telephone call to British Prime Minister Blair.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte *(1)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Points to be Made

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 10/05/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VL* NARA, Date *1/5/2024*
200X-0994-F3

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Kofi Annan's report is a graphic account of Milosevic's defiance of international community. Believe we need to maintain momentum and build consensus for NATO decision to authorize force.
- Holbrooke continues his meetings in Belgrade and Pristina today. Fighting has been in a lull for the past few days, but Milosevic has not yet withdrawn the necessary police and military forces, nor agreed to measures that would make the end of hostilities verifiable and durable.

- Understand that your representative in New York is considering possibility of seeking UN Security Council Resolution more specifically authorizing force.

- We have all gotten a clear signal from Moscow that they will not support ~~such a~~ resolution. Seems to me only harm can come at this point in forcing Yeltsin to veto.

- Seeking a new resolution would also complicate our effort to secure NATO consensus later this week to authorize air strikes.

- Rather than pursuing a UNSCR, we can agree to Contact Group meeting prior to NATO ACTORD as long as key allies agree in advance that NATO will proceed regardless of what Russian position is.

- Also, I understand that some of your officials are pressing to link a decision on air strikes to ~~the generation of~~ ground forces to oversee a cease-fire or political settlement.

- You should know that this is a very difficult issue for us, particularly with the Congress. It's been an uphill struggle to get ready for SFOR and any suggestion that we are also raising forces for Kosovo will make it very difficult to ensure domestic support for possible air strikes.

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PER E.O. 13526

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big about
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Russia
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Although I have doubts about the wisdom,

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NATO's wish to commit

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concern about
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given
Congress is
concerns
about
readiness

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PHONE CALL TO
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
DATE: October 5, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discourage the British from pressing for a ground force to implement a cease-fire/settlement and from seeking a new UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo.

II. BACKGROUND

While fighting in Kosovo has slowed in recent days, Milosevic has maintained his heavy police and military presence there. The UK is pressing for an ACTORD on air strikes to be accompanied by an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) for ground forces. However, the "lightest" option thus far developed at NATO involves 27,000 troops. Securing Congressional support for U.S. participation in such a force would be difficult, unless we were to play only a supporting role. You should discourage the UK from linking air and ground options, and ask that they wait until we see the outlines of a settlement before deciding what role the international community might play in its implementation.

Blair may also raise with you the possibility of a further UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force. The British think that an attempt at a resolution, even blocked by the Russians, will help provide the necessary basis for military action.

We are convinced that Russia will block any resolution (particularly following Yeltsin's phone call to you) and think that seeking one is a dangerous idea. Not only does it put Yeltsin in an extremely difficult position, but it will also complicate securing early NATO consensus on

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2008-0994-F3

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prior to
NATO
ACTORD*

issuing an Activation Order (ACTORD) authorizing SACEUR to initiate air strikes. This would undercut Ambassador Holbrooke's current mission, which will likely require the imminence of an ACTORD or its actuality to succeed.

~~An alternate approach we would find more acceptable would be to agree to Moscow's proposal for a Contact Group meeting, -- but only if key allies agreed in advance to proceed at NATO with ACTORD regardless of the Russian position.~~

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Kofi Annan's report is a graphic account of Milosevic's defiance of international community. Believe we need to maintain momentum and build consensus for NATO decision to authorize force.
 - Holbrooke continues his meetings in Belgrade and Pristina today. Fighting has been in a lull for the past few days, but Milosevic has not yet withdrawn the necessary police and military forces, *not good to measure that would make the end of hostilities*
 - Understand that your representative in New York is considering *variable* possibility of seeking UN Security Council Resolution more specifically authorizing force. *double*
 - We have all gotten a clear signal from Moscow that they will not support such a resolution. Seems to me only harm can come at this point in forcing Yeltsin to veto.
 - Seeking a new resolution would also complicate our effort to secure NATO consensus later this week to authorize air strikes.
- (A) →
- I understand that some of your officials are pressing to link a decision on air strikes to the generation of ground forces to oversee a cease-fire or political settlement.
 - You should know that this is a very difficult issue for us, particularly with the Congress. It's been an uphill struggle to get ready for SFOR and any suggestion that we are also raising forces for Kosovo will make it very difficult to ensure domestic support for possible air strikes.
 - Our objective now is to secure full compliance with UNSCR 1199. If there is an agreement on a peace settlement, then we will need to consider what kind of international presence is needed and what if any role we will play in implementing it.
 - We want to keep all options open at this point, rather than beginning to generate forces for a large NATO-led implementation force.

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208-0494-F3

VZ 1/5/2024

(If Raised)

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- Can agree to Contact Group meeting prior to ACTORD at NATO as long as key allies agree in advance that NATO will proceed regardless of what Russian position is.
- This would give the Russians an opportunity to consult and to align themselves with our position.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PHONE CALL TO
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

DATE: October 5, 1998

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

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→ while fighting in Kosovo has slared in recent days, Milosovic has ~~kept~~ ^{maintained} his heavy ^{police} and military presence there.

II. BACKGROUND

Following yesterday's
~~The follow up on today's report from the UN Security Council, the UK Foreign Office in New York is pressing for a further UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force. The British think that an attempt at a resolution, even blocked by the Russians, will help provide the necessary basis for military action.~~

Blair may raise with you the possibility of

We are convinced that Russia will block any resolution (particularly following Yeltsin's phone call to you) and think that seeking one is a dangerous idea. Not only does it put Yeltsin in an extremely difficult position, but it will also complicate securing early NATO consensus on issuing an Activation Order (ACTORD) authorizing SACEUR to initiate air strikes. This would undercut Ambassador Holbrooke's current mission, which will likely require the imminence of an ACTORD or its actuality to succeed.

The UK is ~~also~~ pressing for an ACTORD on air strikes to be accompanied by an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) for ground forces. However, the "lightest" option thus far developed at NATO involves 27,000 troops. Securing Congressional support for U.S. participation in such a force would be difficult, unless we were to play only a supporting role. You should discourage the UK from linking air and ground options, and ask that they wait until we see the outlines

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
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PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

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- (if raised)*
 - Understand that your representative in New York is considering possibility of seeking UN Security Council Resolution more specifically authorizing force.
 - We have all gotten a clear signal from Moscow that they will not support such a resolution. Seems to me only harm can come at this point in forcing Yeltsin to veto.
 - Seeking a new resolution would also complicate our effort to secure NATO consensus later this week to authorize air strikes.
 - If Allies know that Security Council is considering a resolution on use of force, this will reinforce view of some that a further resolution may be necessary. Could also enable Moscow to delay NATO action by prolonging debate in New York.
- I also understand that some of your officials are pressing to link a decision on air strikes to the generation of ground forces to oversee a cease-fire or political settlement.
- You should know that this is a very difficult issue for us, particularly with the Congress. It's been an uphill struggle to get ready for SFOR and any suggestion that we are also raising forces for Kosovo will make it very difficult to ensure domestic support for possible air strikes.
- Our objective now is to secure full compliance with UNSCR 1199. If there is an agreement on a peace settlement, then we will need to consider what if any role we will play in implementing it.
- We want to keep all options open at this point, rather than beginning to generate forces for a large NATO-led implementation force.

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208-0001-F3

R2 1/5/2024

10/1/99 continued his mtg w/ Blair to impress upon him need for full launch w/ 1199. Blair was seen to be signing up to this but in two mtgs with Blair...

kind of int'l presence is needed and

kind of int'l presence is needed and what

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TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

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(If Raised)

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- If Allies know that Security Council is considering a resolution on use of force, this will reinforce view of some that a further resolution may be necessary. Could also enable Moscow to delay NATO action by prolonging debate in New York.

~~if raised~~ → if used

- Can agree to LG meeting prior to ACORD at NATO as long as key allies agree in advance that NATO will proceed regardless of what Russian position is.
- This would give the Russians an opportunity to consult and to align themselves with our position.