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Folder Title:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Next Steps on Kosovo [with annotations] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001a, this case] (3 pages)	08/13/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Memo to the President (page 2 only) [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001b, this case] (1 page)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Memo to the President (page 2-4) [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001c, this case] (3 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001d, this case] (3 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)
001e. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a; page 1 only] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001e, this case] (1 page)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)
001f. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001f, this case] (3 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)
001g. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001g, this case] (4 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)
001h. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a; page 2 only] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001h, this case] (1 page)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

OFFICE: KOSOVO

STAFF OFFICER: GREG SCHULTE

PREPARED BY: MARY QUINN

DATE: AUGUST 2, 1999

BOX NUMBER TWO

[illegible]DO NOT WRITE BELOW / RECORDS MANAGEMENT USE ONLY

Reviewed by: _____

Date: _____

BOX NUMBER

1706

CHRONS FOR JULY/AUGUST 1998

LOG NO.	SUBJECT		
5130	POTUS RESPONSE TO REP RADANOVICH		
5208	POTUS CORRESPONDENCE		
5225	POTUS CORRESPONDENCE		
5414	BOSNIA BEFORE THE ELECTION		
5453	PROGRESS ON MAKING THE BOSNIAN ELECTIONS A SUCCESS		
5586	SP FOR CALL TO CHIRAC		
5574	SCHEDULE PROPOPSAL FOR POTUS CALL TO BLAIR		
5588	LETTER FROM SENATOR DOLE		
5631	NEXT STEPS ON KOSOVO		
5934	REQ. FOR SPECIAL AIR MISSIONS AIRCRAFT		
5690	FOREIGN POLICY TEAM MTG. ON RESPONSE TO BOMBINGS		
20606	SOC PC MTG ON KOSOVO		
20654	BRIEFING MEMO FOR JULY 31 SMALL GROUP MTG ON KOSOVO		
20660	NOTIFICATION AND AGENDA FOR DC MTG.		
20661	SOC FOR DC MTG ON BOSNIA AND KOSOVO		
20662	BRIEFING PAPER ON AUG 4 DC MTG ON BOSNIA AND KOSOVO		
20688	SOC DC MEETING ON KOSOVO		
20720	BRIEFING MEMO FOR DC MTG ON BOSNIA		
20726	SOC DC MTG ON KOSOVO/ALBANIA/ BOSNIA		
20736	NOTIFICATION AND AGENDA DISCUSSION PAPER FOR DC MTG ON KOSOVO		

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5130

July 30, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREG SCHULTE *GD*
FROM: J. NICHOLAS DOWLING *JD*
SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence

The memorandum to the President at Tab I recommends he sign a letter in response to correspondence from Representative Radanovich on the situation in Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Jay Farran *JF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Representative Radanovich
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter to Representative George Radanovich

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Representative Radanovich on Kosovo.

Background

Representative Radanovich urges a tough approach with Milosevic to prevent a recurrence of the humanitarian disaster in Bosnia. He advocates further sanctions, a NATO no-fly zone and consideration of NATO air strikes. He also underscores the importance of international monitoring and war crimes investigations.

Response at Tab A notes we share their concerns and are increasing pressure on Milosevic. It summarizes our policy approach on Kosovo and notes appreciation of his thoughts on the issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Radanovich
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Radanovich:

Thanks for your letter on the situation in Kosovo. I share your concern with the continuing violence, particularly the recent operations by Serb forces that have driven thousands of Kosovar Albanians from their homes.

President Milosevic is responsible for this crisis, due to his brutal suppression over many years, indiscriminant use of force in recent months and continued refusal to take necessary steps toward peace. If fighting continues, it could ignite one of several flashpoints and ignite a broader conflict.

To bring an end to the violence, we are working along two tracks: intense diplomacy backed by stiff sanctions, to craft a political solution; and NATO military planning. We have increased the pressure on Milosevic through sanctions including an assets freeze, investment ban and a ban on Yugoslav Air flights. On the Kosovar Albanian side, we are working to create a broad-based negotiating team that can effectively represent Kosovar Albanian interests. Our objective is initiation of a dialogue that can produce confidence building measures, reduce violence and lead toward a political settlement which provides an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserving the territorial integrity of the FRY and safeguarding the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo, regardless of ethnic origin.

In Brussels, NATO is continuing accelerated planning for a full range of contingencies. We have made no decisions on the use of military force, but it is essential that NATO be prepared to act if the situation continues to deteriorate, threatening regional stability. We have not ruled out any options. We will continue to consult with the Congress as this process moves forward.

As you noted in your letter, international monitors are also very important. We have established an international Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), which includes observers

drawn from the United States and European partner nations and will observe and report on freedom of movement, security and humanitarian conditions throughout Kosovo. The overt presence of the KDOM should help improve access by humanitarian relief organizations and build confidence among the parties. We will continue to insist that both parties allow complete and unimpeded access to these monitors.

Thank you again for writing. I welcome your further thoughts on these difficult issues as we move forward in the cause of peace in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George P. Radanovic
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9805130
RECEIVED: 17 JUL 98 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: RADANOVICH, GEORGE P

DOC DATE: 29 JUN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
CO

HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN KOSOVO & ETHNIC CLEANSING

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 29 JUL 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: DOWLING

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
DOWLING

FOR CONCURRENCE
COVEY
RUDMAN
SCHWARTZ

FOR INFO
BAKER
NAPLAN

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
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DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 1 OF 1

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GEORGE RADANOVICH
19TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON BUDGET
NATURAL RESOURCES WORKING GROUP

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
SUBCOMMITTEES:
WATER AND POWER RESOURCES
NATIONAL PARKS AND PUBLIC LANDS
FORESTS AND FOREST HEALTH



U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0519

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FRESNO, CA 93711
(209) 248-0800
FAX: (209) 248-0169

george.radanovich@mail.house.gov
<http://www.house.gov/radanovich/>

June 29, 1998

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing regarding some very serious issues that have been in the news and also have been brought to my attention by Dr. Mohammad Ashraf and the Muslim Society of the San Joaquin Valley and Mr. Mahmood Sultan and the Arab American Council of Central California.

I wish to express my deep concern about the ethnic cleansing campaign currently being carried out in Kosova. Slobodan Milosevic since the beginning of the year, has intensified his ethnic cleansing attacks on Kosova's 92% majority ethnic Albanian population and turned dozens of once peaceful villages into rubble. As I am sure you are aware, since the Serb campaign of terror started, well over 200 innocent people have died. The memory of the genocide, the carnage that took place at the so-called "Safe Havens", the systematic mass rape and the ethnic cleansing atrocities that were committed by the Serbs against the other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Croatia is still vividly fresh in people's minds.

Slobodan Milosevic has recently stepped up the brutality of his army and police attacks on the Kosovar population. The Financial Times and other news organizations have called Milosevic's policy a "scorched earth" policy. These events painfully remind many of the recent tragedy in Bosnia.

I urge you Mr. President not to allow Milosevic to use the recently begun talks as a cover for more vicious attacks on Kosovar civilians. He must be forced to immediately withdraw his heavily armed military and paramilitary units and fully commit himself to a diplomatic solution. Until that time, I urge the United States government and our partners in the Contact Group to reimpose the international ban on investment in Serbia and to consider further targeted economic sanctions.

I am asking you Mr. President to keep in mind the alternative of U.S. preemptive air strikes by our forces and NATO against the aggressors in Kosova. The American people do not want our ground forces to get involved. If necessary, air strikes will ensure that the need to involve our


ground forces will be greatly minimized. NATO should also enforce a no-fly-zone over Kosova. Mr. President, in Bosnia, Milosevic only responded after NATO jets struck the Serb forces.

Furthermore, I strongly support the immediate placement of international monitors throughout Kosova. Those responsible for committing or ordering war crimes or acts of genocide with respect to the Kosova conflict should be brought before an international tribunal.

Our forefathers created our country on the cherished principles of freedom and liberty for all. Today, Americans proudly stand for democracy around the world. Freedom, self-determination and peace are rights that should not be denied to the Kosovars. Democracy must not be compromised.

Mr. President, I share your commitment to preventing another Bosnia from occurring in Kosova and stand ready to work with you to halt the violence.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George P. Radanovich", written in a cursive style.

George P. Radanovich
Member of Congress

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 17, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JOCK COVEY 
FROM: J. NICHOLAS DOWLING 
SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence

We have received five different letters to the President, signed by dozens of Senators and Members of Congress, urging that we do more to end the violence in Kosovo. We and legislative affairs recommend that we respond with one comprehensive letter on our policy in Kosovo.

The memorandum to the President at Tab I recommends he sign a letter in response to these multiple inquiries.

Concurrence by: Mara Rudman 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Response for Signature
Tab B Incoming Correspondence from Senator Lott et al.
Tab C Incoming Correspondence from Representative
Olver et al.
Tab D Incoming Correspondence from Representative Lee
Tab E Incoming Correspondence from Representative Engel
et al.
Tab F Incoming Correspondence from Senator D'Amato
and Representative Smith

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter to Members of Congress

Purpose

Respond to letters from several dozen Members of Congress on Kosovo.

Background

Five letters have come in, signed by several dozen Senators and Members of Congress, urging action to end the violence in Kosovo. These letters all echo the same themes: advocating stronger U.S. leadership and consideration of NATO military action to end the violence.

We have prepared a comprehensive response that is appropriate to answer all five letters. Draft response at Tab A summarizes our two track policy of negotiations backed by the credible threat of NATO military force.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Lott
Tab B Incoming Correspondence from Senator Lott et al
Tab C Incoming Correspondence from Representative Olver et al.
Tab D Incoming Correspondence from Representative Lee
Tab E Incoming Correspondence from Representative Engel et al.
Tab F Incoming Correspondence from Senator D'Amato and
Representative Smith

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter regarding Kosovo. I share your concern about the deteriorating situation there. Our efforts to facilitate a political resolution to the conflict have been augmented by stiff sanctions against Belgrade, but must ultimately be backed up by credible military force if the circumstances so warrant.

The nations of the Contact Group, led by the United States, demand that Belgrade cease repression and withdraw security forces, permit effective international monitoring, facilitate international assistance to and returns of those displaced by the fighting, and make rapid progress in talks with Kosovar Albanians.

To increase pressure on Belgrade, the United States led the international community application of stiff sanctions -- such as a freeze of overseas assets, a ban on new investment and suspension of Yugoslav Air landing rights. These measures are having a substantial impact on the FRY economy but are not in themselves decisive. We believe NATO must be prepared to act to prevent a broader regional conflict or a humanitarian disaster. We also believe that the clearer NATO's resolve, the greater the prospects for productive negotiations.

Under active U.S. leadership, NATO initiated and then accelerated contingency planning. While we have nearly finalized some of these plans, the needs of the Alliance will not have been met until we have in place a full range of concrete and effective plans and can demonstrate the Alliance's will to implement them, if necessary. We are working actively with our Allies and other partners, individually and collectively and at every level, to put this critical part of our strategy in place as soon as possible. That said, we have not reached a decision to employ military force and we will continue to consult with Congress as this process moves forward.

In the meantime, Ambassador Chris Hill is ably leading diplomatic efforts in the region, but the continued fighting has so far prevented a resumption of talks. Our objective remains the initiation of a dialogue that can produce confidence-building measures, reduce violence and lead toward a political settlement which provides an enhanced status for Kosovo and safeguards the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo, regardless of ethnic origin. We do not support demands for the independence of Kosovo, however, as that would feed pan-Albanian tendencies that clearly risk destabilizing the region, and would be inconsistent with important provisions of the Helsinki Accord and principles of international law. We admire Dr. Rugova's non-violent policies and are working to establish, under his leadership, a broadly representative negotiating team. We have urged both sides to cease offensive operations and return to the table, but we continue to hold Belgrade primarily responsible for both the situation and current level of violence.

To facilitate freedom of movement, security and humanitarian conditions throughout Kosovo, we have established a multinational Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), comprising monitors from the United States, the European Union, and Russia. The overt presence of the KDOM has already helped improve access by humanitarian relief organizations, and can in the future build confidence among the parties. We will continue to insist that both parties allow complete and unimpeded access to these monitors.

Again, thank you for writing. I am grateful for the support that you and other Members of Congress are showing toward our efforts on this issue as we move forward in the cause of peace in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

5208

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 15, 1998

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing out of concern for the present situation in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. We believe the escalating tension and violence presents a clear threat to international efforts toward peace in the Balkan region.

By continuing a United States military presence in Bosnia under NATO, the United States has made clear its intention to achieve sustainable peace in the Balkans. In addition to a military presence in Bosnia, the United States maintains a peacekeeping force in Macedonia and has allocated a substantial amount of funding for economic reconstruction and development across the region.

We are concerned that these investments made by the American people will be lost if Slobodan Milosevic continues to control the negotiation process in the region. In recent weeks the violence in the region has continued despite diplomatic efforts, and as tension in the region grows, the Serb and Albanian sides become more extreme in their positions. The power and influence of the Kosovar Liberation Army have clearly expanded and the moderate leadership of Dr. Rugova is waning.

The violence in Kosovo could easily spread to neighboring Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania and has already destabilized the region generally. The potential for refugee flows to Italy and other Mediterranean nations, coupled with age-old tensions with Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece, lead to an undeniable possibility for widespread conflict. In light of this, we believe decisive action under U.S. leadership is necessary to prevent a fourth Balkan war.

Although we acknowledge the efforts of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to resolve the situation in Kosovo, the United States must do more. Additionally, if Ambassador Holbrooke is confirmed as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, we urge you to appoint a special presidential envoy of notable public stature to Kosovo to ensure consistent attention is dedicated to finding a workable solution. Recent actions by Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo, as well as restricting free media in Serbia and manipulating the representative power structure for Montenegro, show his clear intention to defy the international community. A more comprehensive and serious approach, including restating the "Christmas Warning," is necessary to address growing problems in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Since the first massacre of ethnic Albanians at Drenica in February, the situation in Kosovo has only worsened. **Over 400 ethnic Albanians have reportedly been killed by Serb paramilitary units and the Yugoslav Army using helicopter gunships and ground troops. The United Nations estimates that 65,000 refugees have fled to neighboring Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. In addition, regional humanitarian sources indicate an estimated 150,000 internally displaced persons within Kosovo.** Both sides have been driven to extremes by the violence, and the prospect of a peaceful solution through negotiation is scarce.

Economic sanctions have had no effect on the leadership in Belgrade. Serbia, already suffering from economic hardship, feels little pain from these measures. In addition, Belgrade is aware of divisions among our European Allies on how to resolve the conflict in Kosovo.

Our Allies seek United States leadership, and we should accelerate the analysis of military options currently occurring within the NATO planning and command structure. If we fail in Kosovo, we not only face the inevitable consequence of renewed war, but a weakening of our leadership position in the Balkans and worldwide.

To demonstrate the concern of the United States, we urge you personally to make a statement outlining a clear stance toward Belgrade and the situation in Kosovo. Without a direct Presidential statement, the situation will likely deteriorate from low-intensity conflict to all-out war. Therefore, we recommend a Presidential statement consisting of the following requirements and commitments:

1. An immediate cessation of hostilities by both Serbian and Kosovar forces.
2. The immediate withdrawal of all Serb paramilitary and Yugoslav Army forces from Kosovo.
3. Full United States support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict if possible, but a commitment by the United States to lead future military efforts to end the conflict, if necessary.

In Kosovo, Milosevic has found a new political life and a new podium to appeal to his people. As a result, we believe he will continue to push the limits the international community has placed on him until you make a strong statement that the United States will not tolerate the senseless massacre of ethnic Albanians and are prepared to act. Therefore, we urge you to take the necessary steps toward ending this conflict now.

Sincerely,




Tim Johnson
United States Senator




Trent Lott
United States Senator



Gordon Smith
United States Senator




Christopher Dodd
United States Senator




Dianne Feinstein
United States Senator



Alfonse D'Amato
United States Senator



Joseph Lieberman
United States Senator



Robert Torricelli
United States Senator

5411

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

July 20, 1998

The Honorable William J. Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

On this third anniversary of the brutal massacre at Srebrenica in Bosnia, we urge the United States to stop Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic from pursuing his campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Serbian province of Kosova. It is time for the U.S. to send a clear message to Milosevic that NATO will intervene if Serbian forces do not stop attacking ethnic Albanian citizens and destroying their villages. It is also time to demand the prosecution of those responsible for the war crimes committed throughout the Balkans.

In 1991, Slobodan Milosevic launched his regime's campaign of terror across the former Yugoslavia -- beginning in Vukovar and the Krajina region of Croatia, then crossing over the border into Bosnia where they committed the gravest war crimes in Europe since WWII. The apex of their criminal acts occurred three years ago in Srebrenica. In July 1995, 8,000 unarmed men and boys were murdered in this small Bosnian town. The chief architects of this massacre, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), remain free. Yugoslav President Milosevic, the mastermind behind the genocide in Bosnia, has not even been indicted.

Over the past seven years, the U.S. and its allies have responded to this bloodshed through a series of compromising agreements with Milosevic. These agreements have served to bolster his position as Serb leader, and solidify his power in the region, to the extent that he is again killing and displacing large numbers of civilians -- this time in Kosova. Today, 700,000 Yugoslavian citizens of Albanian descent are living under siege in Kosova, 80,000 have been internally displaced, tens of thousands have fled to neighboring countries, and hundreds have been tortured and killed.

We urge the United States to lead the international community in recognizing that the Milosevic regime's violent pursuit of nationalistic aims is the primary cause of the continuing bloodshed and instability in the Balkans. **Specifically, we urge you to adopt the following measures as part of a comprehensive policy to ensure long-term peace and stability among the nations of the former Yugoslavia:**

- Demand that Milosevic immediately halt all attacks by Serbian special police, military and para military units against civilians in Kosova or face swift NATO intervention.
- Demand that Milosevic begin the complete withdrawal of all special police, military and

The Honorable William J. Clinton
July 20, 1998 -- Page 2


para military units from Kosova, and allow immediate access to food and medical convoys, independent human rights monitors, and the International War Crimes Tribunal.


- Demand that the Kosova Liberation Army cease all attacks against Serb civilians.
- Establish a NATO no-fly zone over Kosova to neutralize Serbian air superiority and prevent escalation of the conflict by any party.
- Pursue the immediate arrest of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for war crimes committed in Srebrenica as required by UN Security Council Resolutions.
- Actively support the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic by the ICTY and release any evidence of his role in the Bosnian genocide.
- Maintain full economic sanctions on Yugoslavia until significant progress has been made in restoring full autonomy and human rights to Kosova.


In remembering the victims of Srebrenica, we believe the continued, conciliatory response of the international community toward Milosevic is ineffective and dangerous. We are strongly in favor of resolving violent conflict by diplomatic negotiation. However, Milosevic has demonstrated -- both in Croatia and Bosnia -- that his aggression will only be deterred by the credible threat of force.


We urge you to adopt the above proposals in order to stop the conflict in Kosova and bring an end to the campaign of terror that has been waged by the Milosevic regime throughout the pre-1991 Yugoslavia.

Sincerely,



John W. Olver
Member of Congress



Steny H. Hoyer
Member of Congress



Tom Lantos
Member of Congress



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Member of Congress


The Honorable William J. Clinton
July 20, 1998 -- Page 3



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Ed Pastor, M.C.


Cynthia A. McKinney, M.C.


Stephen Horn, M.C.


Doug Bereuter, M.C.


Loretta Sanchez, M.C.


Darlene Hooley, M.C.


Martin Frost, M.C.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0509

5332

July 16, 1998

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to share my concern regarding the situation in Kosovo. As the representative of a well-informed, engaged and involved constituency, my thoughts reflect the concerns of those who provide humanitarian supplies, as well as moral and spiritual support to the embattled people in Bosnia and Kosovo.

In my opinion, the current situation in Kosovo requires urgent and timely United States involvement, direction and guidance.

As you are aware, for months Serbian forces have not allowed food and medicines to reach the people in the areas of conflict in Kosovo. In spite of the war that is going on in the region, women still need to give birth to babies, and illness and infection need to be treated.

In 1989 massive numbers of Serbian troops were moved into Kosovo. Albanian students were forced out of the University and secondary educational system. Almost all of the Albanian civil servants in Kosovo were fired. Throughout the war in Bosnia, people in Kosovo adopted a nonviolent strategy assuming that their desires for a return to normalcy at the end of the war would be settled along with the Bosnia-Croatia-Slovenia situation. Kosovo was hardly mentioned in the Dayton peace accords and clearly was not part of the negotiated settlement. Human rights abuses, as well as deterioration of educational and medical services in Kosovo, are serious violations of international agreements and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

Albanians students have been denied education in their own language in secondary and higher education since 1989. The Albanian parallel government established parallel schools that met in homes, and empty buildings. The students began a nonviolent campaign to regain access to their schools, which continues to this day but has been entirely eclipsed by the violence of a small, but rapidly growing group of armed resistance fighters, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). An education agreement was signed by all parties almost two years ago promising to return secondary schools and parts of the University to Albanian students.

Page Two

To: President William J. Clinton

Re: Kosovo

July 16, 1998

The Serbian side has systematically ignored this agreement. At the present, only one badly damaged building has been returned to the Albanian University students. Before the Albanians will trust any further negotiations, the schools agreement must be honored by the Serbian regime.

Before March, 1998 nonviolence was embraced by the vast majority of Albanians in Kosovo. However, as the Serbian forces intensified the attacks on many communities in Kosovo, the appeal of a violent strategy increased.

Frustration with the increased hostility and violence from the Serbian forces meant that the KLA began to draw support away from the nonviolent leadership. The media gave broader coverage of the increased violence in Kosovo although it had ignored the violent movement for many years. This communicated to the Albanian Kosovars that a violent strategy could be more effective on the global stage. The moment for nonviolent solutions is passing as warfare continues to escalate and hundreds are killed and tens of thousands are driven from their homes. The citizenry is increasingly feeling the need and the willingness to fight.

I believe that it is crucial now that the international communities ensure that humanitarian aid can reach Pristina as well as the villages and towns all over Kosovo that are under attack. This would communicate to the people of Kosovo that they are not alone and that the world cares. It would also enable respected members of the international humanitarian aid community to assess the current situation within Kosovo and disseminate information to the rest of the world. In addition, it would strengthen those in Kosovo supporting a nonviolent resolution to the conflict. In my opinion, our reticence will only serve to strengthen the forces within Kosovo supporting war and their goal of complete independence.

The UN should impose a no-fly zone. The Kosovar Albanian villagers have no recourse against Serbian attacks with helicopter gun ships. A no-fly zone would send a signal to Belgrade that the west will not countenance this aggression. The political forces in Montenegro are also growing stronger and that country is becoming more interested in independence itself. A "Balkania" proposal is circulating in Kosovo that Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo assemble to form a federation in which each state is autonomous with its own police force, its own education system, and its own constitutional Assembly. It is thought that some form of this proposal could be the basis for a negotiated settlement. However, until the schools agreement is implemented and other agreements are kept, it will be very difficult for the Albanians to have confidence in any negotiations concerning the long-term resolution to this problem.

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To: President William J. Clinton

Re: Kosovo

July 16, 1998

Things are changing very rapidly in this environment as approximately ten Albanians per day lose their lives. It is not known how many Serbian people are losing their lives, as they do not release casualty figures. Presently ethnic cleansing continues.

I respectfully suggest that maximum pressure be exerted on the combatants to stop the violence immediately, to allow humanitarian aid into the villages as well as the cities, and to implement agreements already made as a way of building trust. The time to act is now, not after hundreds of people are killed and Kosovo lies in ruins.

Thank you for your continued monitoring of the situation and effort to develop a proper course of action to prevent further ethnic killing in Kosovo will prevent a repetition of our behavior in Rwanda.

Your consideration is greatly appreciated. I look forward to your response and to working with you on this and other issues of critical concern.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Barbara Lee".

Barbara Lee
Member of Congress

BL/yl

ELIOT L. ENGEL
17TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE:
COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEES:

TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRADE, AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION
FINANCE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
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2303 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3217
(202) 225-2464

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3217

August 6, 1998

5721
DISTRICT OFFICES
3655 JOHNSON AVENUE
BRONX, NY 10463
(718) 796-9700
655 EAST 233RD STREET
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(718) 652-0400
177 DREISER LOOP, ROOM 3
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(718) 320-2314
250 SOUTH 6TH AVENUE
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(914) 699-4100
87 NEPPERHAN AVENUE
YONKERS, NY 10701
(914) 423-0700

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for taking the time to talk with me yesterday morning about the situation in Kosova. I enjoyed our conversation and the brief opportunity to share my views with you. As I explained, I am chairman of the Congressional Albanian Issues Caucus and have worked extensively on Balkan Issues during my years in Congress.

As you are aware, the people of Kosova, of whom more than 90% are ethnic Albanian, have faced harsh repression and ethnic discrimination throughout the 1990s. However, because the question of Kosova was not included in the Dayton process, it did not received the attention it deserved from the United States or the international community when the current crisis could have still been prevented.

During this decade, I and others consistently warned that sooner or later the situation in Kosova would boil over. Now, vital United States interests are at stake as a regional conflagration seems more likely each day and a humanitarian catastrophe seems around the corner. Tragically, 10% of the Kosovar population -- over 200,000 people -- have been forced out of their homes since the beginning of Milosevic's attacks and, only yesterday, credible news agencies reported the existence of two mass graves -- one containing the bodies of hundreds of children.

Earlier this year, you said that the United States would not permit another Bosnia-like situation to recur in Kosova. I am afraid that with these reports of ethnic cleansing and mass murders, the world is witnessing a series of events in Kosova alarmingly similar to that which consumed Bosnia.

Mr. President, in the short term, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic only understands force, or at the very least the credible threat of force. In Bosnia, you drew the line for Milosevic with air strikes and ended the horror. That is what is needed in Kosova -- robust air strikes ending the ethnic cleansing coupled with a no-fly-zone. Specifically, our diplomats should tell Milosevic that unless his troops immediately halt attacks and withdraw from the region, American

The President
August 6, 1998
page two

jets will heavily bomb his military forces and their command and control network. Ironically, if we issued such a credible threat, it is rather possible that we would never have to proceed down the military route as Milosevic understands all too well -- because of the potency of your actions in Bosnia -- that he should not tangle with United States military power.

In the long term, after halting the bloodshed and the growing humanitarian catastrophe, the world can then focus on what the ultimate status of Kosova should be and how that should be achieved. Please allow me to offer my suggestions for United States policy in that regard.

Our diplomats have said many times publicly that independence is off the table for Kosova. I believe that this policy is severely misguided because it sets as a precondition to the Albanians' participation in talks the rejection of the Albanians' very goal. Properly focused, our diplomats should say that all topics are appropriate for discussion.

Moreover, we should realize that similar to Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosova deserves the right to determine its future political status. There are those who would argue that Kosova was an autonomous province, not a republic, in the former Yugoslavia and, therefore, does not deserve to exercise the right to full self determination. I believe that this interpretation is incorrect.

First, the international community should recognize that autonomy is not a viable option. In the old Yugoslavia, there were seven other representatives, including Kosova, on the Yugoslav federal presidency to counter Serbia. This is no longer the case. Indeed, Kosova's position in Yugoslavia and its autonomy were unilaterally -- and unconstitutionally under Yugoslav law -- taken from the region in 1989 and 1990. In the end, there is no reason to believe that autonomy would work in the future or that it would ever be trusted by the Kosovars. Why would those oppressed by Belgrade want to be part of a nation that oppresses them? Second, the West should finally acknowledge that the Yugoslav and Serbian governments, especially as ruled by Milosevic, have, through their barbarous policies, forfeited the right to govern Kosova or determine its future status.

Given those necessary starting points, one is unavoidably led to the conclusion that the Kosovars must be granted the full ability to determine their future. While I understand that this could occur over a period of stages, they already governed themselves during the 1990's through the shadow administration of President Ibrahim Rugova, even as they peacefully campaign for freedom -- a breath of fresh air for the Balkans. That it took many Kosovars

The President
August 6, 1998
page three

this long to turn to force of arms in the face of what this year's State Department's Human Rights report called the most widespread and worst abuses in Yugoslavia is actually a testament to their patience and Rugova's nonviolent approach.

In that vein, I believe that we must do what we can to bolster Rugova's authority within Kosova. He is the democratically elected leader of the Kosovars and needs to show his people that he can improve their lives and deliver in future negotiations. We help him by working to create a Kosovar negotiating team that has the imprimatur of the elected parliament and by helping him press Milosevic to remove a large block of Yugoslav forces.

Mr. President, the world is looking to the United States for leadership to end the bloodshed in Kosova and to find a way out of the crisis. I have been always among the strongest supporters of your Administration and will be pleased to continue our dialogue in the future to find a way to resolve the Kosova conflict.

Sincerely,

Eliot

Eliot L. Engel
Member of Congress

I look forward to calling you to dialogue further on this important issue.

4704

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 23, 1998

JUN 29 1998

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write to express our extreme concern about the deteriorating situation in Kosova. As you know, since the beginning of the year more than 200 people have died as Belgrade stepped up its attacks against Kosovar villages.

First, we would like to express our support for the fine work carried out by Ambassador Robert Gelbard and most recently by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Their efforts created the climate for the first face-to-face meeting between Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova and FRY President Slobodan Milosevic, and a follow-on meeting with negotiating teams -- albeit without the crucial participation of an international mediator.

Unfortunately, just as the negotiating teams began to talk, Milosevic stepped up the brutality of his attacks on the Kosovar population. In fact, on May 25, 1998, alone, ten ethnic Albanians were killed and their villages burned in what the Financial Times and other media are calling a 'scorched earth' policy. These events not only remind us of the Bosnia tragedy, but demonstrate that another spate of deliberately engineered ethnic cleansing is intensifying and the number of refugees is swelling.

We must not allow Milosevic to use the recently-begun talks as a mere cover for stepped up attacks on Kosovar civilians. Rather, he must immediately withdraw his armor and heavily-armed military and paramilitary units and fully commit himself to a diplomatic solution. Until that time, we urge the United States and our partners in the Contact Group to reimpose the international ban on investment in Serbia which helped to bring Milosevic to the table in the first place and to consider further targeted economic sanctions.

Given the intensified violence, the United States and the international community must also now begin to consider the implementation of more effective measures to halt Belgrade's escalation and prevent the conflict from spreading throughout the region. We strongly support the on-going, intensified planning at NATO headquarters for a military response to the crisis. In Bosnia, Milosevic only responded after NATO jets pounded Serb

The President
June 23, 1998
page two

forces there. If the conflict over Kosova continues to escalate, military operations such as air strikes or the enforcement of a no-fly-zone may be needed.


Furthermore, we strongly support the immediate imposition of additional steps, including the placement of international monitors throughout Kosova and the indictment in the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of anyone suspected of committing or ordering war crimes or acts of genocide with respect to the Kosova conflict.


~~Every day, Kosova is being transformed more and more from a site of smothering repression to a battlefield of open inter-ethnic warfare. We share your commitment to preventing another Bosnia from occurring in Kosova and stand ready to work with you to halt the violence.~~


Sincerely,



Eliot L. Engel
Member of Congress



James P. Moran
Member of Congress



Tom Lantos
Member of Congress



John W. Olver
Member of Congress



Sander M. Levin
Member of Congress



Maurice Hinchey
Member of Congress



Peter T. King
Member of Congress


Sue W. Kelly
Member of Congress


John Edward Porter
Member of Congress


James P. McGovern
Member of Congress



James A. Traficant, Jr.
Member of Congress


Edolphus Towns
Member of Congress


The President
June 23, 1998
page three




Donald M. Payne
Member of Congress




Nita M. Lowey
Member of Congress



George Miller
Member of Congress



Jerrold Nadler
Member of Congress




Charles E. Schumer
Member of Congress




Jesse Jackson, Jr.
Member of Congress




Steny Hoyer
Member of Congress



Carolyn Maloney
Member of Congress




John D. Dingell
Member of Congress




Frank Pallone, Jr.
Member of Congress




Dana Rohrabacher
Member of Congress



Robert I. Wexler
Member of Congress




Patrick J. Kennedy
Member of Congress




Elizabeth Furse
Member of Congress




Michael R. McNulty
Member of Congress




Steven R. Rothman
Member of Congress



Christopher H. Smith
Member of Congress



Robert Menendez
Member of Congress




Robert Underwood
Member of Congress





Lynn Woolsey
Member of Congress


The President
June 23, 1998
page four


Howard L. Berman
Member of Congress



Major M. Owens
Member of Congress


Dennis J. Kucinich
Member of Congress



Thomas H. Allen
Member of Congress



William J. Pascrell, Jr.
Member of Congress



Thomas J. Manton
Member of Congress



Carrie P. Meek
Member of Congress


Gary L. Ackerman
Member of Congress



Charles B. Rangel
Member of Congress



Carolyn McCarthy
Member of Congress



Frank R. Wolf
Member of Congress



Bobby Rush
Member of Congress



John E. Peterson
Member of Congress


Vito Fossella
Member of Congress



Constance A. Morella
Member of Congress


Christopher Shays
Member of Congress


Thomas M. Davis III
Member of Congress


Marcy Kaptur
Member of Congress



Michael P. Forbes
Member of Congress


James H. Maloney
Member of Congress


The President
June 24, 1998
page five

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Peter Deutsch".

Peter Deutsch
Member of Congress

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sam Gejdenson".

Sam Gejdenson
Member of Congress

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. J. Hayworth".

J. J. Hayworth
Member of Congress

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Steny H. Hoyer, Maryland
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Louise McIntosh Staughton, New York

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JOHN SHATTUCK, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(Vacant), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(Vacant), DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

MICHAEL R. HATHAWAY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DOROTHY D. TAFT, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

5730
**COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**
234 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6480
(202) 225-1901
FAX: (202) 226-4199
E-MAIL: CSCE@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV

August 4, 1998

AUG 7 - 2:05

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We urge you to take immediate and decisive action to stop the conflict in Kosovo before the ethnic cleansers win.

Yugoslav/Serbian forces using tanks and other heavy weapons are attacking Albanian-inhabited towns and villages in several regions of Kosovo. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is engaged in a major escalation of the conflict, despite his personal assurances to the contrary to U.S. officials just last week. The dead numbers at least in the hundreds, though the actual number may be much higher. The displaced population has climbed rapidly to 200,000, and humanitarian organizations face mounting difficulties obtaining access to them as winter approaches, threatening the largest humanitarian catastrophe to date in the Balkan wars.

We believe that strong action to stop the fighting is urgently needed. We need a forceful response to these Yugoslav/Serbian attacks, or a new crisis in the Balkans will result. This crisis cannot be avoided by additional aid, but only by stopping its cause, Milosevic's use of armed force to pursue his political ambitions. Moreover, we know Milosevic's record not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 but now in Kosovo as well. Milosevic will only cooperate with our diplomatic efforts when he can no longer freely use force to attain his goals.

Therefore, Mr. President, we urge you to seek an agreement within NATO to act directly against those within Kosovo who are attacking civilian populations. We understand that the Alliance is planning for action in Kosovo. Furthermore, unless attacks against innocent civilians are halted, the continued slaughtering and displacement of innocent people will preclude a viable negotiated agreement on Kosovo's future. The Serbian ethnic cleansers will have prevailed.

The Honorable William J. Clinton

August 4, 1998

Page 2

Dozens of Senators and Members of Congress have already written to you urging a variety of responses to Kosovo. We support these efforts. An active and direct response, however, is what is needed most right now. It is strongly in our interest to prevent this conflict from escalating further rather than to wait until massive atrocities, or the flow of fighting and refugees across international borders brings other parties into the conflict, and compel our involvement under even more difficult conditions. As with Bosnia-Herzegovina, delay will prove costly and reduce the chance for success.

Mr. President, the Balkan wars have presented the greatest challenge to internationally protected human rights in Europe since the end of World War II. If the ethnic cleansers win, even while the spotlight of international attention is turned on them, hope for a peaceful future for all of mankind where each individual's rights are respected under the rule of law will be diminished for the foreseeable future. The promise of Nuremburg will have been repudiated by Milosevic's successful aggression. The time for action is now.

Sincerely,



Christopher H. Smith, M.C.
Co-Chairman



Alfonse D'Amato, U.S.S.
Chairman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5225
Redo

August 13, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD BANDLER *B*

FROM: J. NICHOLAS DOWLING *JD* / JOCK COVEY *JC*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President of the Republic of Turkey

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he sign a letter to the President of the Republic of Turkey Suleyman Demirel on Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Miriam Sapiro *ms*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to the President of the Republic of Turkey

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter from the President of the Republic of
Turkey

Purpose

Respond to letter from President Suleyman Demirel on Kosovo.

Background

President Demirel wrote to express concern about the situation in Kosovo. He is urging you and other leaders to take action to end the violence in Kosovo and facilitate a dialogue between the parties. He notes that Turkey is ready to contribute to "all measures to be taken with respect to resolution of the Kosovo problem, including participation in any multinational peace mission."

Your response thanks President Demirel for his support and outlines our three-part policy of negotiations, humanitarian efforts and NATO planning.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response to the President of the Republic of
Turkey
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter concerning the situation in Kosovo. I share your concern about the continuing violence and human suffering, as well as the risks posed to regional stability.

We believe that the responsibility for the situation rests squarely with Slobodan Milosevic. We have joined with others in the international community in demanding that he halt his security forces' operations against the civilian population and enter into a serious dialogue with the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community.

Our strategy with respect to the crisis has three parts. First, Ambassador Christopher Hill is leading U.S. diplomatic efforts to stop the violence and initiate negotiations toward a political settlement which provides an enhanced status for Kosovo and safeguards the rights of all its inhabitants. Ambassador Hill has had some recent success in this regard, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team and attaining Milosevic's consent to an agreement that would grant the Kosovar Albanians a degree of self-government and be subject to review in 3-5 years.

Second, we are working with other nations to put in place a substantial humanitarian effort to alleviate the suffering of those displaced by the fighting and to create the conditions for the safe return to their homes before the onset of winter. Working with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees and other humanitarian agencies, we are seeking to increase the scale of humanitarian relief efforts and ensure a visible international presence in locations to which Kosovars return. We have sent additional staff to assess humanitarian requirements and I have just authorized an additional \$20 million in emergency assistance. We have made very clear to Milosevic what steps he needs to take to create the necessary conditions for returns.

The multinational Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) is also playing a useful role in promoting freedom of movement and we will continue to insist that both parties accord it complete and unimpeded access. We would certainly welcome Turkish participation in the KDOM and other efforts by your government to help improve the humanitarian situation in Kosovo.

Third, as you know, we are implementing various measures through NATO to help stabilize the surrounding region, including through intensified Partnership for Peace activities with Albania and Macedonia. As you know, NATO has also developed a wide range of military options to contain the conflict and help achieve a political settlement. Milosevic, however, apparently believes that he is immune from any military response, on the assumption that NATO would only act on the basis of a United Nations Security Council resolution but that Russia would block it. We must not allow Milosevic to have this sense of security.

Again, thank you for writing. I am grateful for your country's active support in seeking a resolution to this crisis.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Suleyman Demirel
President of the Republic of Turkey
Ankara

TURKISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 13, 1998

The Honorable Donald Bandler
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director of European Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Room 368
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Bandler.

As a follow-up to my letter dated July 21, 1998, I have the pleasure to enclose herewith the original of a letter addressed to The Honorable William J. Clinton, President of the United States, from His Excellency Suleyman Demirel, President of the Republic of Turkey, regarding the situation in and around Kosovo.

Your kind assistance in forwarding this original letter to its High Destination would be most appreciated.

With the renewed assurances of my highest consideration,

Sincerely,

Baki Ilkin

Baki Ilkin
Ambassador

Enclosure



The President

Ankara, 21 July 1998

Dear Mr. President;

I wish to convey to Your Excellency through this letter my growing concern about the situation in and around Kosovo.

As you very well know, during the past weeks the problem has unfortunately spilled over beyond the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Close to 100 thousand refugees have fled the region, moving either within the country or leaving it, particularly to Albania, where around 15 thousand Kosovar refugees are now already displaced.

Last week I paid a visit to Albania and had useful talks with President Meidani. The Kosovo issue was our main topic of discussion and our mutual concern was the urgency to stop bloodshed and start discussions. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, who accompanied me, visited Tropoja in northern Albania, where around 7 thousand Kosovar refugees are living in dire conditions. Minister Cem saw for himself the deplorable situation of the refugees and the limited capacity that the compassionate local population had to offer them for shelter. There is no question that the Albanian government is in urgent need of well coordinated and large-scale humanitarian assistance to cope with this serious problem.


The situation in and around Kosovo seriously threatens stability and security in southeastern Europe. In order to prevent the recurrence of the great human tragedy we all witnessed in Bosnia and Herzegovina the international community should be giving a more timely and proportionate response to this issue.

I strongly believe that putting an immediate end to the bloodshed in Kosovo should be our first and foremost priority. Secondly, the Yugoslav authorities and the representatives of all the people of Kosovo must be urged to enter into constructive dialogue, the purpose of which should be to reinstate the democratic rights and basic freedoms of all the inhabitants of Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic origin. Certainly, effective measures also have to be taken to ensure the safe and secure return of all displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

The international community failed to thwart the aggression and prevent the vast human suffering that Bosnia and Herzegovina was exposed to just a few years ago, leaving a scar on its credibility. As time is running short, I am afraid the region may witness a human tragedy of similar proportions if effective and resolute action is not taken. That is why I am calling on all leaders to shoulder their responsibilities to maintain peace and security.

On its part, Turkey is carrying on consultations with the countries of the region and is ready and willing to contribute to all measures to be taken with respect to the resolution of the Kosovo problem, including participation in any multinational peace mission.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Süleyman Demirel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Chon 5414

July 30, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREGORY SCHULTE 
SUBJECT: Bosnia Before the Elections

Attached at Tab I for your signature is the memorandum to the President that you requested to update him on the status of Dayton implementation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (a), (c), (d)
Declassify On: July 30, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 12/15/2023
2008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5414

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 12/15/2023
2008-0994-F3

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Bosnia Before the Elections

The crisis in Kosovo has diverted attention from Bosnia. However, implementation of Dayton is still far from complete, and we must ensure that it continues to receive the necessary attention and resources. With this in mind, I thought it would be useful to review the current status of Dayton implementation and to look ahead to the elections that are only six weeks away.

Continued Progress -- But Continued Obstacles

During your visit to Bosnia last December, you pressed the joint Presidency for progress on two specific issues: a common flag and a common currency. I am pleased to report that a common flag is now flying on government buildings and at the border and that a common currency is now widely circulating.

There has been progress in other areas as well. Most cars have common license plates, promoting freedom of movement. A new passport is being issued. The media is being reformed and an independent commission has been set up to oversee it. SFOR helped the two Entity armies to organize a successful amnesty for war-like materiel. Half of those indicted for war crimes are now in The Hague.

However, progress has often required active international intervention. Just last week Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative, was forced to impose a long-delayed law on privatization. He has also imposed decisions on issues ranging from the design of the national flag to the schedule of customs tariffs. We will need to guard against a "dependency culture" in which Bosnian authorities rely on the international community to sort out their problems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (c), (d)

Declassify On: July 30, 2008

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Progress has been most difficult in returning refugees, particularly to areas in which they will be a minority. In January, Madame Ogata proclaimed 1998 as the year of refugee returns. There have been important breakthroughs, such as the return of 500 Muslims to Prijedor, a city that was heavily ethnically-cleansed during the war. However, overall progress has been disappointing so far this year, with actual returns running well under half of the number anticipated.

The attitude of local officials and police remains a major hurdle. Police complicity in attacks on returning refugees often goes uninvestigated and unpunished, and police restructuring is still incomplete in the Federation and lagging in the Republika Srpska. Judicial reform is even less advanced. The introduction into SFOR of specialized units of gendarmes and carabinieri, to begin early next week, should help provide additional security for refugee returns. We are also supporting the initiation of a UN-run court-monitoring program.

Looking to the Elections

The elections will be conducted on September 12-13 under OSCE supervision. Voters will elect representatives at the level of the state (including the tripartite Presidency), the two entities, the ten cantons in the Federation and certain municipalities. Political campaigning has begun, and this has inevitably slowed many aspects of Dayton implementation.

Izetbegovic is the only member of the Presidency certain to be re-elected. Zubak, with whom I met last week, will likely be replaced, having broken from the main Bosnian Croat party. Krajisnik, isolated in Pale, might be replaced by a more moderate Bosnian Serb, but this is not assured. His removal would give the Presidency and other common institutions an important boost.

We have already secured a major victory in the Republika Srpska through the emergence of Prime Minister Dodik. A victory by Plavsic and Dodik will be essential to continued progress, although we will need to press them to achieve progress in such areas of refugee return. In the Federation, the main Bosniac and Croat parties will still dominate the elections, but we are working to encourage greater political pluralism and multi-ethnicity. Bob Gelbard is developing a strategy to break the back of the Bosnian Croat hard-liners, whom we now see as the major obstacle to Dayton implementation.

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While we are trying to isolate Bosnian politics from the Kosovo crisis, the fighting in Kosovo is headline news in Bosnia and will inevitably impact on the elections. Unfortunately, the likely result is a strengthening of the nationalist parties, particularly in the Republika Srpska.

The elections will be a critical point in the continuing implementation of Dayton. Thus I have asked the Deputies to meet next week to review the preparations for the elections, including the supporting role to be played by SFOR.

Looking Beyond the Elections

It will take a month for the OSCE to certify the results of the elections and up to several months to ensure that they are fully implemented. During this time, NATO will conduct a review of SFOR's mission and size, using the benchmarks agreed by the Alliance and considering an assessment of Dayton implementation that the High Representative is due to produce in mid-September.

Elections which are successful, not just in their conduct but also in producing pro-Dayton results, could open the door for a decision to restructure and reduce SFOR. Before making such a decision, however, we will also need to consider the difficult implementation issues which will still lie ahead, including the continued return of refugees and a final resolution of the status of Brcko. Continued violence in Kosovo could also limit our ability to draw down the force.

Protecting Our Investment

Given the importance of protecting our investment in Bosnia and preparing for the coming elections, I have asked Bob Gelbard to devote his full attention to Dayton implementation, leaving the handling of Kosovo in the able hands of Chris Hill. Bob is in Bosnia now, and Madeleine Albright plans to travel there at the end of next month.

CONFIDENTIAL

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5453

REDO

August 25, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*
SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

Bob Gelbard's July 29 letter on this subject includes a range of activities that he is pursuing or intends to pursue. At this time, he has only asked for your help in securing assistance from the FBI, DEA and Customs in helping the restructured Bosnian police forces to combat organized crime.

RECOMMENDATION

That you telephone Janet Reno and Bob Rubin using the talking points at Tab II of the original package.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b,d)

Declassify On: 08/25/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 12/15/2023
208-094-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5453

August 4, 1998

AUG 10 1998

*Greg/Arch -
please help
me to
prioritize this
inventory so
I can focus on
most urgent/
helpful items*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

At the July 15 Principals meeting, you emphasized the need to make the Bosnian elections a success and to develop a sound post-elections strategy. The attached letter from Bob Gelbard describes actions by other agencies that would help. These include:

- direct elections support;
- pre-and post-election media initiatives;
- targeted assistance to support opposition candidates and refugee returns;
- additional Train and Equip funding;
- getting the Peace Corps into Bosnia;
- support for forest management;
- commercial visits;
- an Internet-based "Virtual University"; and
- additional support for police and customs reform.

With respect to the last item, Bob has asked for you to help secure assistance from the FBI, DEA and Customs in helping the restructured Bosnian police forces to combat organized crime. While the FBI conducted some initial assessments, no further support has been provided, largely because the agencies do not see this as a high priority.

Police reform and restructuring must be one of our highest priorities in consolidating Dayton. We therefore support Bob's request that you make calls to energize Justice and Treasury on this assistance. While Gelbard's memo recommended calls directly to Louis Freeh and Ray Kelly, we recommend (and Bob agrees) that you should call Janet Reno and Bob Rubin, to maintain proper channels.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 08/04/08

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By 12 NARA, Date 12/15/2023
2008-0994-F3

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Concurrence by: Chuck Allen, Fred Rosa

W-7-2

RECOMMENDATION

That you telephone Janet Reno and Bob Rubin using the talking points at Tab II.

Attachments

Tab I July 29 letter from Ambassador Gelbard

Tab II Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VL NARA, Date 12/15/2023
2008-0999-73

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:07/29/03

TO: Samuel R. Berger

FROM: S/SR - Robert S. Gelbard *mg*

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

SUMMARY

You offered, during the July 15 Principals Committee meeting, to provide whatever was needed to make the Bosnian elections a success, and to enable us to move quickly to consolidate post-election gains. We have in train a significant level of election support designed to improve the prospects of pro-Dayton candidates, targeted particularly at Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Croats.

I have outlined below a series of actions and initiatives which would improve our ability to consolidate post-election gains, but which require support from other U.S. agencies, or greater political engagement. Your support in meeting these gaps would go a long way to making many of these proposals a reality, and thus to locking in the President's achievements in Bosnia.

Election Initiatives

We are implementing -- both through OSCE and USAID--a series of pre-election initiatives, including expanded campaign assistance to opposition parties, media assistance, voter education, public service announcements and mailings on the elections. We also plan, in the run-up to the elections, to devote some additional resources for small, local infrastructure and community development projects in Republika Srpska and Middle Bosnia that can be announced as a means of enhancing support for President Plavsic and Prime Minister Dodik, Bosnian Serb candidate for the tri-partite presidency Radisic, and President Zubak. An outline of these initiatives is attached (Tab 1).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert S. Gelbard, S/SR
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

In the post-election period, we will continue to use targeted assistance -- USAID high-impact projects and municipal infrastructure, and increased support for "Open Cities" minority refugee return efforts -- both to demonstrate that a vote for Dayton brings rapid, positive returns for a community, and to make clear to Dodik that our steadfast support has a price tag -- results on tough issues like refugee returns. We also plan to increase our support for broad educational exchanges and programs which will help foster a new generation of more democratic leaders.

We are studying our resources and the range of implementation priorities, and may ultimately seek your support for securing additional monies from outside the 150 account, if current budget levels prove inadequate. One area where we do need your support now, is in securing an additional \$10 million in drawdown authority from the Congress for the Train and Equip Program. Such funding will insure that the U.S. equipment provided to the Federation remains fully operational and that Bosnian Muslim and Croat leaders continue to see their future security tied to each other and the U.S. Equally as important, the continued consolidation of the Federation joint military is critical to isolating and marginalizing Bosnian Croat hard-liners.

BROADENED USG INVOLVEMENT

Peace Corps - Getting Peace Corps Volunteers into both the educational and small business development areas could provide a tremendous boost to our ability to reach out to young Bosnians of all ethnic groups and begin to influence a new generation of community leaders. To date, Peace Corps has ruled out starting a program due to security concerns. Diplomatic Security is prepared now to authorize the Peace Corps to operate in Sarajevo, and to look at other locations on a case-by-case basis. I just discussed this issue with Mark Gearan, who was positive about getting involved. Your encouragement would help engender a heightened sense of urgency on the part of the Peace Corps to move forward rapidly.

Law Enforcement Participation- To date, FBI has conducted three assessments of the organized crime threat in Bosnia as well as the local capabilities to combat the problem. Despite repeated commitments to be helpful, the FBI has so far declined -- on the basis of a lack of a specific threat to the United States which would involve the FBI and the security threat to its officers -- to send agents to Bosnia to work with the reformed, restructured police forces and the newly formed Federation police on combating organized crime. Both DEA and U.S. Customs should provide similar expertise but also have proved reticent. Ray Kelly was supportive of an earlier request for Customs to provide four officers to work with the European Union, Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO), but Customs has resisted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Frankly, this will not happen unless you weigh in with Louis Freeh and Ray Kelly now to reinforce the priority the Administration places on this effort and secure their active participation. Talking points for your use are attached (Tabs 2, 3).

Forest Management - Bosnia's forests are one of its most important natural resources -- one that is rapidly being depleted by both poor management and illegal logging operations. The World Bank has a major loan in work in the Forestry sector, and we will seek the Department of Agriculture's cooperation in providing a senior advisor to work with the state and entity governments, and the Bank on a forestry management program and the design of a legal/enforcement regime to protect state-owned forests.

- NEMA already has conducted an imagery survey, at our request, mapping Bosnian deforestation -- a critical tool in launching an advisory program.
- The loss of potential state income from illegal logging is estimated to be very significant. As part of our broader effort to establish state and entity control over legitimate sources of revenue, we are developing a strategy to establish tighter border controls and to crack down on corruption throughout Bosnia which should benefit any forest management program.

HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Commerce/Privatization - The Department of Commerce has shown no real interest in Bosnia since Ron Brown's tragic plane crash. We intend to engage Dick Sklar in an effort to help organize this effort. We will seek your help in the near term in bringing Commerce on board with this strategy.

- The situation on the ground has improved markedly, both from a security and developmental standpoint.
- A range of different types of commercial visits, linked to recent progress made in both Republika Srpska and the Federation, could have a tremendous impact in terms of our ability to advance privatization.
- These visits, if timed to follow shortly after the elections, would highlight the clear payoff, in terms of international investment, for those leaders willing to implement Dayton.

Internet-based ``Virtual University'' - As part of an expanded focus on multi-ethnic, multi-cultural education in Bosnia, we are exploring with Bosnian academics the potential for developing an internet-based consortium of U.S. and possibly European partner universities with direct links to Bosnian Universities -- a

``virtual university.'' If the project can be fleshed out in the near term, we will seek your support, and that of the Vice President's office, in launching this initiative as a means of focusing attention on the importance of cultivating a new generation of leaders in Bosnia.

- We are studying an initial proposal from Bosnia, and are consulting both with U.S. and Bosnian Universities about the feasibility, and potential scope of such a project. (This includes the technical capabilities -- phone lines and computer access -- of Bosnian Universities to participate.)
- We also will explore ways to link up potential corporate sponsors for such a program with Universities willing to participate.
- If successful, a ``Virtual University'' concept could serve as a model that could be replicated in Kosovo or elsewhere.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Planned/Ongoing Election Support
Tab 2 - Talking points for call to Freeh
Tab 3 - Talking points for call to Kelly

PLANNED/ONGOING ELECTION SUPPORT

Direct Elections Support

- Increased USAID support (through NDI) to campaign training and advisory activities for opposition parties in the Republika Srpska and among both ethnic groups in the Federation.
- Funding, through OSCE, for 22 opposition political parties.
- Production and distribution of over 3,000,000 elections-related pamphlets, flyers and posters.
- The organization of more than 100 public forums and round table discussions involving numerous political actors and parties,
- Production and ``no fee'' distribution of over 300,000 ``special elections related editions of area newspapers and magazines,
- Monitoring of Bosnian elections by 200+ Bosnian civil society organizations
- The Production and mailing of reform-backing mailings on candidates to 155,000 out-of-country voters.
- Additional funding to cover the costs of establishing more polling-station time to ensure a ``claims period'' -- an unplanned commitment designed to ensure recently returned refugees get the opportunity to vote.
- Support for Monitoring Coordinating Groups designed to monitor campaign activity and to handle complaints filed by political parties, coalitions and candidates.
- Funding to establish and upgrade existing reading rooms used by displaced persons with information on elections, candidates, etc.
- Support to OSCE voter education, political party training, resource assistance.
- Creation of special Bosnian Elections Internet web site.

Pre- and Post-Election Media Initiatives

- Production and airing of over 110 locally-produced, elections-related, TV and radio broadcasts involving more than 50 Bosnian and Serbian stations.
- The production and repeated airing of elections related public service announcements, infomercials and ``jingles'' for radio and television.
- Support for establishment of independent radio stations in Mostar, Zvornik and Livno.
- Support for the expansion of the Belgrade-based ``B-92'' radio network into Bosnia (involving some 15 Bosnia-based stations), and to purchase additional programming.
- Funding for expansion of independent TV Sky Sat and Montena in Montenegro
- Support for the Independent Journalists Association of the RS.

Targeted Assistance - Advance Opposition Candidates.

- Increased USAID funds (up to \$1.5 million) for community infrastructure or development projects that can be announced in conjunction with key candidates in the RS (Plavsic, Dodik, Radisic) and in Middle Bosnia (Zubak).

**TALKING POINTS FOR YOU CALL
TO LOUIS FREEH, DIRECTOR FBI**

- I understand you have discussed with Bob Gelbard the possibility of FBI getting more engaged in Bosnia, and have conducted a series of assessments of the situation.
- Police reform and restructuring have taken off with the political changes in the Bosnian Serb entity and their new willingness to cooperate with the UN International Police Task Force.
- We are at a critical juncture now. We have put in place the law enforcement structures -- including the equivalent of a federal police agency in the Federation.
- We now must ensure that these newly-minted, democratically-oriented police forces have the best possible advice and training to deal with the threats posed by organized crime, corruption and drugs and arms trafficking.
- Our overall effort in Bosnia -- and the ultimate ability of SFOR to withdraw -- hinges on the ability of the Bosnians to ensure the security of their own citizens and their fragile, new institutions.
- This effort is especially urgent as dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnian Croats is central to our ability to forge a truly strong Bosnian nation.
- It is critical that FBI, as well as U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies take a more active role in shaping Bosnia's approach to the rule of law. An up front investment will certainly save us countless time and resources if it helps consolidate the democratic reform of Bosnia's justice sector.
- Success in Bosnia remains a top priority for is administration. The President does not want to leave behind in Bosnia a lawless jungle--we need to leave law and order. We need your help in this.
- I hope FBI will get more directly involved, particularly by sending some experienced officers to work with police in both entities on trans-national crime issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 9 -

**TALKING POINTS FOR YOU CALL TO RAY KELLY
DIRECTOR FOR ENFORCEMENT, TREASURY DEPARTMENT**

- I understand you have discussed with Bob Gelbard the possibility of Customs getting more engaged in Bosnia, and that you have seconded a senior Customs agent (Oscar Vera) to the State Department to advise him and General Clark on Customs enforcement issues.
- This type of interagency cooperation on Bosnia is critical to our success.
- As we have made progress on police reform and restructuring, we have begun to focus on other law enforcement challenges -- corruption and organized crime -- which will go to the heart, ultimately, of Bosnia's ability to consolidate truly democratic, functioning institutions.
- Developing a functioning customs service, with enforcement capabilities is a top priority. This effort is especially urgent as dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnian Croats is central to our ability to forge a truly strong Bosnian nation.
- It is critical that U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies take as active a role as possible in this process.
- In the past, Customs has made invaluable personnel contributions, through CAFAO, to this effort. The lack of U.S. participation now has slowed CAFAO's reform efforts, and reduced our ability to influence this process.
- I hope that you will consider, on an urgent basis, again detailing some officers to work in Bosnia on this critical effort.
- Success in Bosnia remains a top priority for is administration. The President does not want to leave behind in Bosnia a lawless jungle--we need to leave law and order. We need your help in this.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 30, 1998

5453

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:07/24/03

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GLYN T. DAVIES
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

Please pass the attached memorandum from Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, to Mr. Berger.

Stephen J. Mullen
Kristie A. Kenney */for*
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Memorandum from Ambassador Gelbard

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 12/15/2023
2008-0994 - F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Robert S. Gelbard, S/SR
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CALL
TO ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO

- We both know importance of implementing the peace in Bosnia. Calling to ask for more support from FBI and other federal enforcement agencies in addressing public security and corruption in Bosnia.
- Bob Gelbard has discussed with Louis Freeh, but we have not yet moved beyond assessments.
- Police reform and restructuring has taken off in Bosnia, due to more pro-Dayton attitudes in Republika Srpska.
- We are at a critical juncture now. We have put in place the law enforcement structures -- including the equivalent of a federal police agency in the Federation.
- We now must ensure that the new, reformed police have needed training to deal with organized crime, corruption and drugs and arms trafficking.
- Our overall effort ~~is~~ hinges on the ability of the Bosnians to ensure the security of their own citizens and their fragile, new institutions. Dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnia Croats is central to our ability to forge a stable peace.
- Essential to this success that FBI, as well as U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies, take a more active role in shaping Bosnia's approach to the rule of law.
- Creating effective law enforcement fundamental to our success in Bosnia. We need your help in this.
- I hope you will ask Louis Freeh to have the FBI fully support this effort, particularly by sending some experienced officers to work with police in both entities on trans-national crime issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 08/04/08

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 12/15/2013
2008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CALL
TO SECRETARY ROBERT RUBIN

- We both know importance of implementing the peace in Bosnia. Calling to ask for your support in having Customs get more engaged in Bosnia, as Bob Gelbard has discussed with Ray Kelly.
- I understand Treasury has seconded a senior Customs agent (Oscar Vera) to the State Department to advise him and General Clark on Customs enforcement issues.
- This type of interagency cooperation on Bosnia is critical to our success.
- As we have made progress on police reform and restructuring, we have begun to focus on other law enforcement challenges -- corruption and organized crime -- which will go to the heart, ultimately, of Bosnia's ability to consolidate truly democratic, functioning institutions.
- Developing a functioning customs service, with enforcement capabilities is a top priority. This effort is especially urgent as dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnian Croats is central to our ability to forge a truly strong Bosnia nation.
- It is critical that U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies take as active a role as possible in this process.
- In the past, Customs has made invaluable personnel contributions, through CAFAO, to this effort. The lack of U.S. participation now has slowed CAFAO's reform efforts, and reduced our ability to influence this process.
- I hope that you and Ray Kelly will consider, on an urgent basis, again detailing some officers to work in Bosnia on this critical effort.
- Creating effective law enforcement fundamental to our success in Bosnia. We need your help in this.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 08/04/08

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 12/15/2023

2008-0944-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5586

Schulte

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

date 08 / 07 / 98

 ACCEPT

 REGRET

 PENDING

TO: Stephanie Streett

FROM: Samuel Berger 

REQUEST: Telephone Call to French President Chirac

PURPOSE: To discuss situation in Kosovo

BACKGROUND: Requested by the President.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President and President Chirac have talked on many occasions

DATE AND TIME: Monday, August 10, 1998, time TBD

BRIEFING TIME: 10 minutes

DURATION:  ~~15~~ ²⁰ minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: N/A

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

RECOMMENDED BY: Sandy Berger

CONTACT: Greg Schulte, NSC x69101

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: Requested by POTUS after Blair telephone call

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 8/6/2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2023
2008-0997-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5574

August 8, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD BANDLER *DB*

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *JS*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for POTUS Call to Prime
Minister Blair

Tab A is the schedule proposal for POTUS to call Prime Minister Blair about Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Larry Butler *LB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Stephanie Street at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A POTUS Schedule Proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 8/6/2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VL* NARA, Date *12/15/2023*
2008-0994-F3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal

date ____/____/____

____ ACCEPT ____ REGRET ____ PENDING

TO: Stephanie Streett

FROM: Samuel Berger

REQUEST: Telephone Call to UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair

PURPOSE: To discuss situation in Kosovo and
Iraq

BACKGROUND: Per my discussion with the President.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President and Prime Minister
Blair have talked on many occasions

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, August 6, 1998 at 4:30 p.m.

BRIEFING TIME: 10 minutes

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Blair

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: White House operator will arrange
call.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 8/6/2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 12/15/2023
2008-0994-53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

RECOMMENDED BY: Sandy Berger
CONTACT: Greg Schulte, NSC x69101
ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: NSC
SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chia

5588

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 14, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JOCK COVEY 

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Robert Dole Regarding
Situation in Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he sign a letter responding to Senator Dole's.

Note that the letter does not take issue directly with the exaggerated information Dole cites. More important, note that the letter makes clear the President's current frustration with Allies' insistence on a UN mandate.

Concurrence by: Mara Rudman 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Robert Dole
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Robert Dole on Kosovo

Purpose

Respond to letter from Senator Dole on Kosovo.

Background

Senator Dole wrote to urge you to lead NATO to deliver a message to Milosevic in the language of force he understands.

Some of the information Dole cites is greatly exaggerated. About 500 persons have died in the conflict in the last five months, not the "thousands" he cites. Nor have mass graves been discovered. Nor have the remains of 430 children been recovered. Without quibbling over these details, however, the attached letter explains forthrightly your continuing efforts to move the Allies forward.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Robert Dole
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter. I share your concern about the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. While some of the information you cite is different from my understanding, I fully agree that our efforts to facilitate a political resolution to the conflict must ultimately be backed up by credible military force.

As you know, it has taken persistent, active U.S. leadership to focus the international community on conflict in Kosovo, and the dangers it holds for regional stability. The nations of the Contact Group, led by the United States, demanded that Belgrade cease repression and withdraw security forces, permit effective international monitoring, facilitate international assistance to and returns of those displaced by the fighting and make rapid progress in talks with Kosovar Albanians.

At our insistence, stiff sanctions were applied to Belgrade -- such as a freeze of overseas assets, a ban on new investments and suspension of Yugoslav Air landing rights. These measures are having a substantial impact on the FRY economy but will not in themselves be decisive. I believe NATO must be prepared to act to prevent a broader regional conflict or a humanitarian disaster. I also believe that the clearer NATO's resolve, the greater the prospects for productive negotiations.

Under active, continuing U.S. leadership, NATO initiated and then accelerated contingency planning, and the rapid progress already made is a historical achievement. The needs of the Alliance will not have been met, however, until we not only have in place a full range of concrete and effective plans, but can demonstrate the Alliance's will to implement them, if necessary.

To be very frank with you, the key obstacle to this is the desire of some Allies for a United Nations mandate. Some fear the precedent it might set for NATO to act on its own authority.

For others, it is a matter of practical parliamentary politics. In any case, Milosevic has clearly concluded that NATO action is for the moment less likely.

My foreign policy team and I are working actively with our Allies and other partners, individually and collectively and at every level, to resolve this critical part of our strategy as soon as possible. We have made some headway but it will take a major, continuing effort.

Thank you for writing. I am grateful to know that I have your support.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
901 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 401
Washington, D.C. 20005-2301

5500

SENATOR BOB DOLE
901 15TH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 410
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

August 5, 1998

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you to express my deepest concern regarding the evolving catastrophe in Kosova. We stand on the brink of regional war and humanitarian disaster.

Although we had our differences during the war in Bosnia, once NATO launched its airstrikes under your leadership, I offered my public support. Soon after Dayton, I also offered my assistance and helped to build a coalition in the Senate to support the deployment of US troops as part of a NATO led peacekeeping force -- despite the fact that I viewed the Dayton agreement as flawed. I did so because of my belief that this deployment would stabilize the situation, not only in Bosnia, but in the rest of the former Yugoslavia and eventually help bring about the conditions for a genuine peace.

I also believed that any steps by Slobodan Milosevic to pursue ethnic cleansing and aggression in genocide would be met with force, as you had pledged by repeating President Bush's Christmas warning. The combination of the deployment of a NATO-dominated force in Bosnia and the credible threat of force in Kosova was the only appropriate and realistic policy to prevent another outbreak of war.

However, over the past few months we have witnessed precisely the same genocidal attacks in Kosova that we saw in Bosnia. Already the death rate is in the thousands and more than 263,000 Albanians have been forced from their homes. UN aid teams have found houses burning and reports indicate that Serb forces are burning fields and livestock. Just this week, one

The Honorable William J. Clinton
August 5, 1998
Page 2

mass grave was found estimated to contain a thousand people; already the remains of 430 children have been recovered.

In late spring, Kosovar President Rugova recounted to me his meeting with you and your pledge that you would not allow a second Bosnia to happen. That is the right policy. But, the time for action is now. A second Bosnia is happening at this very moment. The Kosovar Albanians cannot wait much longer for you to fulfill this commitment.

I understand that Milosevic promised US envoy Chris Hill last week that he would stop. Characteristically, he has not. Today, I read a news report that quoted Department of Defense officials as saying that NATO will intervene if "intolerable levels of atrocities" occur. Mr. President, what constitutes "intolerable?" Are not the bodies of 430 innocent children intolerable?

As Chairman of the International Commission on Missing Persons, I have witnessed the exhumation of mass graves in Bosnia. Too many innocent men, women and children died unnecessarily. Without your leadership and immediate action, countless more will die. Should this tragedy occur, history will recount that this slaughter happened not because the US and NATO did not have the means, but because the US and NATO did not have the will.

Mr. President, I urge you to lead NATO in delivering to Milosevic the only message he understands -- force. I stand ready to support you in any way I can.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Bob Dole', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

BOB DOLE

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9805631
RECEIVED: 07 AUG 98 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 13 AUG 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
NATO

RUSSIA

Al

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON KOSOVO

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 13 AUG 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 12/15/2023
2008-0994-73

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9805631

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001 SCHULTE
001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 98080809 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98081009 FOR REDO
Z 98081315 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98081315 FOR INFORMATION
X 98081805 NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980813
002 980813

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

7/15/91
8/13/91
8/26/91

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 5631 redo

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM FRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>8/11</u> <u>(Schultz)</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D)</u> <u>See No 1E</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>(Schultz)</u>	<u>✓</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>8/13</u>	<u>PC</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Informatic

cc:

COMMENTS: memo
on

1984/10/10 8:11

Exec Sec Office has diskette ye

Per Covey...
Schultz put this
together per SRB
direction. It is his
understanding (Covey's) that
SRB wanted a draft he
could work with.
This has not, therefore,
been heavily edited.

ion

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 5031

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BY PASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG HC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>g</u> Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>HC 8/18</u>	<u>(initials)</u>
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>		
Steinberg			
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
Records Mgt.			

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

88 AUG 8 PM 244

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

NO
yes

Log # _____

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm (K) To SLB Date 8/11

This refers to your/Colon's
calls to leaders in
Kosovo. If all have
have not been called,
will need to modify
page 3. (K)

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5631
Redo

August 8, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Next Steps on
Kosovo

I attach at your request a draft memorandum to the President on this subject, drawing upon Thursday's discussion among the Principals.

The memorandum reflects the view of RUE that NATO action in Kosovo may be less of a domestic political problem for Yelstin than we had feared, given the magnitude of the other domestic problems that he faces.

Concurrence by: DON BANDLER, CARLOS PASCUAL, MARA RUDMAN *[Signature]*

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify On: 8/8/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 12/15/2023
2008-0944-F3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Next Steps on Kosovo [with annotations] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001a, this case] (3 pages)	08/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	Memo to the President (page 2 only) [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001b, this case] (1 page)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. draft	Memo to the President (page 2-4) [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001c, this case] (3 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001d, this case] (3 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a; page 1 only] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001e, this case] (1 page)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001f, this case] (3 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F

vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001g, this case] (4 pages)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001h. draft	Memo to the President. [Draft of 001a; page 2 only] [Record No: 9805631] [Duplicate of ke5704_001h, this case] (1 page)	08/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1706

FOLDER TITLE:

Chronos for July, August 1998 [1]

2008-0994-F
vz6235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]