

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chernomyrdin, [Viktor] / Ahtisaari, [Marti] / MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

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Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	7	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Strobe Talbott to Joe Ralston and Walt Slocombe. Subject: [Thanks for the suburb companionship] [nodis 9909135] (1 page)	05/14/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Version 1, En Route Brussels-Washington, Further Elaboration of Conditions. (5 pages)	05/14/1999	P1/b(1)
002. memo	To the File from Ambassador Eric Edelman. Subject: Readout on Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin Meeting, May 13, 1999. (3 pages)	05/14/1999	P1/b(1)
003. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Post-dinner update & Next steps. (2 pages)	05/13/1999	P1/b(1)
004. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Diplomacy as Antidote to the Wobbles. (5 pages)	05/14/1999	P1/b(1)
005. draft	Position Paper: Subject: Analysis of an counter to the Russian proposal. (4 pages)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)
006. memcon	To Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and Leon Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Chernomyrdin-Talbott One-on-One. (6 pages)	04/30/1999	P1/b(1)
007. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [En Route to Brussels] (5 pages)	04/29/1999	P1/b(1)
008. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Recommended Next Steps on Russia/Kosovo Diplomacy (4 pages)	04/28/1999	P1/b(1)
009. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [En Route, Moscow-Berlin] (4 pages)	04/27/1999	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

2008-0994-F

vz6233

RESTRICTION CODES

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010. memcon	[Strobe Talbott Draft] Vice President Gore-Viktor Chernomyrdin Telephone Call. (2 pages)	05/27/1999	P1/b(1)
011. memo	To Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and Leon Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [I'm writing this memo before our Sunday evening] (3 pages)	04/25/1999	P1/b(1)
012. paper	To Greg Schulte, Matt Vacarro, Greg Kauffman, and George Casey from Jon Levitsky. Subject: Military Structures for Kosovo. [with marginalia] (7 pages)	04/22/1999	P1/b(1)
013. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [As I head into my discussions with Ahtisaari] (2 pages)	05/12/1999	P1/b(1)
014. form	Fax Cover [partial] (1 page)	05/13/1999	b(7)(C), b(6)

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4

S/S #

'99

MAY 14 12:00

8

MESSAGE NO. 019139 CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** No. Pages 6FROM: Greg Berry S/S 7-5302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Message from Deputy Secretary Talbott on Kosovo

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Jim Steinberg</u>		
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Greg Schulte</u>		
<u>JCS</u>	<u>ADM Clark</u>		
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Gen. Joe Ralston</u>		
<u>DoD/OSD/ISP</u>	<u>Walter Slocombe</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐REMARKS: _____

_____S/S Officer: Gregory L. Berry

URGENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 12/14/2023
2008-0944-F3

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Provided
to Russians

CONCEPTS BOTH SIDES AGREE TO

- The international security force will have to provide an environment that ensures safety and security for returning refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as the inhabitants of Kosovo.
- The international security force should be under the command of a single commander (unity of command).
- 1. An armed international security force is necessary in Kosovo.
- 2. Yugoslavia must agree to conditions detailed in the G-8 principles.
- Must avoid a security vacuum as military, paramilitary and police forces withdraw – every attempt will be made to synchronize the withdrawal of these forces with the deployment of the international security force.
- The KLA and all [other]¹ illegal paramilitary forces must be demilitarized.
- The international security force will act taking full account of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and other countries in the region.
- [An international police presence in Kosovo is necessary as soon as possible, as an interim step toward the establishment, with international assistance and under international monitoring, of a multi-ethnic Kosovo police.]²
- Peacekeeping tasks must be clear and precise.
- Key tasks include:
 - verify military, paramilitary and police force withdrawal
 - rapidly deploy international security force
 - create safe and secure conditions for return of internally displaced persons and refugees
 - demilitarize KLA

¹ Russians sought to insert "other" to make clear that the KLA is an "illegal" organization; U.S. argued that they could choose to interpret "all" as including KLA as an illegal organization; for our part, it was not U.S. policy to characterize the KLA as an "illegal organization." Hence the brackets.

² U.S. attempted to indicate the need to quickly stand up an international police capability to ensure the ISF was able to shed public order and policing tasks as quickly as possible. Russians seized on this as vehicle to try to prefigure the nature of eventual local police within Kosovo. Language bracketed pending USG judgment of whether this phrasing was consistent with our overall position on police component of civil implementation.

- Monitor borders
- contribute to secure environment for civil implementation
- prevent resumption of hostilities and acts of violence
- Force protection of the international security force is the highest priority.

CONCEPTS THAT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

- Who stays in Kosovo? (U.S. position is that all FRY and Serbian military, paramilitary and police must depart initially; a limited number of Yugoslav army and Yugoslav Internal Police (MUP) might return subsequently to perform special functions. Russian position is that a limited number of Yugoslav army, police and border guards do not withdraw and remain for special purposes.)
- When does bombing stop? (U.S. position is FRY acceptance of conditions detailed in the G-8 principles and commencement of demonstrable withdrawal according to a rapid and precise timetable are required for bombing to be suspended. Bombing will not be halted until Serb withdrawals are complete and an international security force is established. Russian position is that bombing should stop immediately.³)
- Who can participate in the international security force in Kosovo? (U.S. position is that any NATO or Partner country may deploy into Kosovo. Russian position is that only those NATO countries that did not participate in bombing may deploy into Kosovo.)
- Who is in charge? (U.S. position is that NATO is at the core with SACEUR as CINC. Russian position is that the commander of the UN international security force is from a neutral nation and under a UN special representative of the UN SYG.)

³ Despite Russian WG acceptance of this characterization, there may be some movement in their position. Notional Russian timeline provided by the WG suggested suspension of bombing would occur simultaneously with Milosevic's acceptance of the G-8 principles and start of withdrawal of forces from Kosovo.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CLOSE HOLD

NODIS CHANNEL 9908865

OP CENTER

Deputy Secretary of State

Please pass ASAP to Pickering, Dobbins, Halperin,
Welch, Grossman (Rossin), Sestanovich.

Also pass to Deputy Secretary in Helsinki

FaxTo: OPCENTERFrom: Dep. Sec. Travelling Party: Moscow

Fax:

Pages: 1 of 8

Phone:

Date: 5/12/99

Re:

CC:

☒ Urgent ☐ For Review ☐ Please Comment ☐ Please Reply ☐ Please Recycle

Comments: Russian papers provided to military and civilian workign groups. Both groups will reconvene tomorrow:

(1) Military -- command structure and map. U.S. promised to provide comments overnight, i.e. tomorrow morning. (Casey working directly with Ralston)

(2) Civilian -- Russian draft Security Council resolution, with U.S. team's marginal notation. Russians asked this draft be close-hold, want work with us bilaterally, not in G-8. Russians (Mayorskiy) want to get agreement on text, then take to Belgrade (perhaps Chernomyrdin or Cherno + someone--not clear) for Belgrade's acceptance prior to UNSC adoption.* Still insist on bombing pause prior to UNSCR. We have not commented at all on text or given them any U.S. elements. Intend to review Chapter VII and NATO demands for full Serb military withdrawal, return of refugees again tomorrow morning, also MNF for military/security presence, as military working group already did.

* Also see need for separate agreement with Belgrade on details of withdrawal, civilian presence, no draft.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 12/15/2023

2008-0494-F3

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(2)

Basic elements to be included in a draft resolution of
the Security Council on Kosovo

UNACCEPTABLE - IGNORES NATO
DEMANDS; LEAKS ECALITY BETWEEN
FRY AND KOSOVAR.

UNACCEPTABLE - NOT COMPLETE
WITHDRAWAL

UNACCEPTABLE - RUNS THE
VICTIM

UNACCEPTABLE - VARIANT OF
SC21160, Q.E.

UNACCEPTABLE - TOO WEAK

UNACCEPTABLE - PUT FRY BACK
INTO KOSOVO

OK, IF STRENGTHENED

UNACCEPTABLE - SECURITY FORCE
BLUE HELMET - DUAL KEY

- Call on the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to cease fire and all hostilities and to take immediately steps with a view of improving the humanitarian situation and providing aid to all in need;

- Call on the Government of FRY to withdraw Yugoslav army and security forces from Kosovo down to the levels, agreed upon with the United Nations, and in accordance with the timetable of deployment of the UN operation security component;

- Request the Kosovo Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist actions and pursue their goals by peaceful means only;

- Call on the Government of the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to resume, immediately and without any preconditions, a political dialogue with international involvement with a view to providing a substantially greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo, equality of the ethnic communities living in the province and meaningful self-administration with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY;

- Recognition of the importance of respecting the rights of refugees and displaced persons freely and peacefully to return to their homes of origin;

- Call on the Government of the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and provide assistance to all in need, including the returning refugees and displaced persons;

- Appeal to Member States and international organizations to allocate sufficient resources for the provision of humanitarian aid in the region;

- Establishment in Kosovo of a United Nations peacekeeping operation comprising civilian and security components;

- The general mandate of the UN operation will include:

- could be added
- OK • facilitating the transition of Kosovo to an enhanced autonomy status,
 - OK • monitoring the observance of human rights,
 - OK • facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons,

OK, WITH BETTER PHRASING

NO WORK

- maintaining and facilitating the maintenance of law and order,
- facilitating the creation of conditions for the restoration of destroyed facilities and the economic development of Kosovo,
- facilitating the demobilization of members of paramilitary forces; developing programs of their earliest reintegration to peaceful life;

will:

OK, EXCEPT FOR
TERRORISM

OK, WITH FIX

OK, WITH FIX

- Within the general mandate of the UN operation its security component

- monitor the cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities, terrorist activities and acts of violence in Kosovo,
- monitor the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and security forces units from Kosovo,
- disarm irregular paramilitary forces in Kosovo,
- facilitate the establishment of a secure environment for return of refugees and displaced persons;

THEY ALREADY SAID
THIS WAS WORK

- Request addressed to the Secretary General to submit recommendations concerning the strength and national composition of the UN operation in Kosovo

IDEA OK

- Appeal to the OSCE to undertake to coordinate the efforts aimed at reaching the goals related to the formation of democratic institutions and observance of human rights in Kosovo;

IDEA OK

- Appeal to Member States, international specialized agencies, financial institutions and regional organizations such as the European Union to provide assistance in and facilitate the implementation of rehabilitation programs in the region;

MAKES
SECURITY
FORCE
UN-DANGEROUS
KEY

UN Security Council


Вариант 1

Option 1

СБ ООН

Special Representative
of the UN Secretary GeneralСпециальный представитель
Генерального секретаря ООНCommander of Multinational
Force Командующий (neutral)
многонациональными
силами
(нейтрал)Polit
Аппарат политическ
советниковAdvise
StШтаб многонациональных сил
(Координация усилий и связь взаимодействия командующих секторов)
Head-Quarter of Multinational Force(Coordination of efforts and interaction link
between the sectoral commanders)СЕКТОРЫ
(ЗОНЫ)

Sectors (Zones)

Commanders of the Sectors
Командующие секторами

TRANSLATION of
boxes on preceding page

15

1. US

BASIC TASKS:

Control over the implementation of the agreement on cessation of military actions by the Sides in the conflict.

Control over the movement of humanitarian convoys and prevention of infiltration of armed units into and out of the territory of Kosovo.

Demilitarization of the region, including disarmament of paramilitary units of the Sides.

To provide for the work of the OSCE (UN) mission in Kosovo.

2. EAST EUROPIAN

BASIC TASKS:

Control over the implementation of the agreement on cessation of military actions by the Sides in the conflict.

Control over the movement of humanitarian convoys and prevention of infiltration of armed units into and out of the territory of Kosovo.

Demilitarization of the region, including disarmament of paramilitary units of the Sides.

To provide for the work of the OSCE (UN) mission in Kosovo.

3. SCANDINAVIAN (NEUTRALS)

BASIC TASKS:

Control over the implementation of the agreement on cessation of military actions by the Sides in the conflict.

Support for cessation of fire.

Prevention of infiltration of armed units into and out of the zone of responsibility.

Demilitarization of the region, including disarmament of paramilitary units of the Sides.

To provide for the work of the OSCE (UN) mission in Kosovo.

4. RUSSIAN

BASIC TASKS:


Control over the implementation of the agreement on cessation of military actions by the Sides in the conflict.

Support for cessation of fire.

Prevention of infiltration of armed units into and out of the zone of responsibility.

Demilitarization of the region, including disarmament of paramilitary units of the Sides.

To provide for the work of the OSCE (UN) mission in Kosovo.



Proposals on deployment of int'l forces
ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ ПО РАЗМЕЩЕНИЮ
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ СМЛ

(7)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION PROPOSALS ON CONDUCTING PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) IN KOSOVO

Political aspects:

- Deployment of PKO will become possible after the cessation of military activities by all warring parties (NATO, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), FRY) as a precondition for a political settlement and the resumption of negotiations between the leadership of FRY and Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians including the KLA.
- General tasks for the multinational UN forces (MNF) (mandate) should be formulated in the UNSC Resolution and in the report of the General Secretary which supplements the UNSC Resolution. The seven principles of political resolution to the Kosovo crisis, formulated at the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting in Peterberg, Germany on May 6, must form the basis of the UNSC Resolution.
- In the process of implementing the Security Council Resolution, taking into account the political nature of that Resolution, the basic tasks of the multinational forces of the PKO must be elaborated by the sections on military control of the UN Secretariat and the corresponding MNF Headquarters in the PKO area. There may be other tasks in addition to the basic ones, which would depend on the specific conditions that develop in the areas where military contingents are deployed.
- Political control over the Peace Keeping Operations must be the responsibility of the UNSC and should be implemented through the Special Representative of the UN General Secretariat.

Military aspects, organization of control over the UN operation:

Deployment of international forces must take place in four zones:

- In Macedonia and Albania (Zone A) deploy the military forces of NATO countries which are actively participating in the military operations in FRY. Their task will be to control the borders within the states neighboring Yugoslavia, as well as control the actions of the KLA and ensure its subsequent disarmament.
- Within the two kilometer border zone of Kosovo (Zone B) deploy the military forces of NATO member states which are not participating in military actions against FRY.
- Within the low-intensity conflict zone (Zone C) deploy military contingents of States which are not members of NATO.
- Within the high intensity conflict zone (Zone D) deploy contingent of Russia and the other CIS States.

- For direct control over the multinational forces the Office of the Special Representative of the UNSC must create a special UN mission which must include the Military Advisors Group (sector commanders). A multinational forces HQ is formed within the Military Advisors Group.
- A Chief of Staff is appointed by the UNSC (a representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or a neutral state). The staff of the multinational forces HQ is appointed by the Department on Peacekeeping Operations for the UN Secretariat and will consist of representatives of countries that are taking part in this operation.
- Command over the forces in each of the zones is exercised by a joint command, which includes the representatives of all national military contingents deployed in that zone. Interaction between the zones is achieved through an exchange of communication and interaction groups. It is the responsibility of the Multinational Forces Chief of Staff and the heads of the zone Joint HQ to organize communications during operations.
- It will be the task of military contingents within the zones to ensure that the conflicting sides carry out the agreements/treaties on cessation of military actions, to support the cease-fire, to demilitarize the area of conflict, to prevent the penetration of illegal armed paramilitary units into the control zone, and to control the disarmament process. More detailed tasks should be determined on the basis of reconnaissance with further clarification during the process of deployment and operations.
- Pull-out of the FRY forces will be concurrent with deployment of the international multinational forces. United police forces are created with the participation of representatives of all the religious and ethnic groups residing in Kosovo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPTD 71.

Deputy Secretary of State

Fax

P-AMB PICKERING
SISA-AMB DIBBINS
To: JO- MR WILLET
EUR- MR ROSSIN

Bill Wood
- WITH
From: Dep. Sec. Travelling Party, Moscow

Fax:

Pages:

Phone:

Date:

Re:

CC:

☒ Urgent ☐ For Review ☐ Please Comment ☐ Please Reply ☐ Please Recycle

• Comments:

DRAFT U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
ON KOSOVO, MOST RECENTLY REVISED PER
AMB. DIBBINS REQUEST. NOT SHOWN TO
ANYONE OUTSIDE DEPSec PARTY. STRIDE
HAS NOT YET SEEN.

OP CENTER PLS PASS TO ADDRES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VL Date: 12/15/2003

2008-0994-73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NODIS 9908861**The Security Council**

Recalling all its relevant resolutions, including 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998, and 1207 (1998) of 17 November 1998,

Noting the agreement on 18 March 1998 of the Kosovo-Albanian leadership to the Rambouillet Accords (UN doc#),

Noting with approval the statement of 6 May 1999 of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States (UN doc#), including their call for deployment of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives

Deploring the grave humanitarian situation in the region caused by the systematic repression and forced expulsion of the Kosovo-Albanian population by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo-Albanian population and other ethnic groups in Kosovo,

Expressing deepest regret at the innocent civilians who were hurt or killed as a result of military actions arising from the situation in Kosovo, including all casualties in the Embassy of the Peoples' Republic of China in Belgrade,

Reaffirming the commitment of all member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region,

Recalling the principles of the Helsinki Final Act (UN doc#),

Affirming that the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately put an end to its killings, expulsions, and other human rights violations in Kosovo;
2. Demands also that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately withdraw all Yugoslav and Serbian military and police forces as well as paramilitary and irregular units from Kosovo and cooperate in a verification of this process;
3. Requests the establishment under unified command and control of an international security force to deploy, following implementation by the Federal Republic of

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VL NARA, Date 12/15/2023

2008-0994-f3

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4.

Yugoslavia of the demands above in accordance with a timetable developed by the force and the immediate suspension of all military actions thereafter, in order to provide a safe environment for all ethnic groups in Kosovo and to allow all displaced persons to return to their homes in safety;

4. Insists that the Kosovo Liberation Army and all paramilitary groups demilitarize;
5. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cooperate fully with the international and non-governmental organizations for humanitarian aid, including by allowing them unimpeded access;
6. Calls for a peaceful political resolution of the situation in Kosovo based on the Rambouillet Accords;
7. Requests the OSCE to take all necessary measures to organize an interim provisional administration to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo, including through the provision of civilian police monitors, and to develop a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo as laid out in the statement of 6 May 1999 of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States;

Or

7. Decides to take all necessary measures to organize an interim provisional administration to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo, including through the provision of civilian police monitors; requests the Secretary General to appoint an SRSG to head the international provisional administration; and requests the OSCE in cooperation with the SRSG to develop a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government in Kosovo as laid out in the G8 Principles;
8. Requests the UNHCR, in cooperation with the interim provisional administration, to organize international efforts to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;
9. Requests the European Union, in cooperation with the interim provisional administration, to organize a comprehensive international approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region;
10. Demands that all parties cooperate fully in the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to support the investigation of all those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

5

11. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council every 90 days on the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. draft	Position Paper: Subject: Analysis of an counter to the Russian proposal. (4 pages)	05/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6233

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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5/3/99

Questions on Kosovo

1) What is the size, pace and manner of the withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo?

- NATO is prepared to suspend its air strikes once Belgrade has unequivocally accepted NATO's conditions and demonstrably begun to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable.
- All Serb military, police and paramilitary forces must be withdrawn from Kosovo within seven (7) days.

2) How will the withdrawal be verified and can Russia participate?

- The verification will take place under arrangements established by the international military force.
- Russia will be welcome to participate in the international military force and its verification functions according to arrangements to be developed.

3) Will any residual Serb security presence be allowed in Kosovo?

- All Serb military, police and paramilitary forces must be withdrawn initially.
- A limited number of Serb security personnel might be allowed to return to Kosovo, under terms agreed to by, and under the supervision of, the international military force, to protect Serb patrimony or to serve as liaison to the international military force.

4) What is the nature of the international military force?

- Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution.
- NATO forces will be under NATO command.
- Russian forces would be under Grachev-Joulwan command arrangements.

5) What is the nature of the international protected area?

- An international provisional administration will be established under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY.
- We would be open to having this administration mandated by the UN Security Council.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memcon	To Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and Leon Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Chernomyrdin-Talbott One-on-One. (6 pages)	04/30/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

2008-0994-F
vz6233

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [En Route to Brussels] (5 pages)	04/29/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

2008-0994-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Recommended Next Steps on Russia/Kosovo Diplomacy (4 pages)	04/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [En Route, Moscow-Berlin] (4 pages)	04/27/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. memcon	[Strobe Talbott Draft] Vice President Gore-Viktor Chernomyrdin Telephone Call. (2 pages)	05/27/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memo	To Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and Leon Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [I'm writing this memo before our Sunday evening] (3 pages)	04/25/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. paper	To Greg Schulte, Matt Vacarro, Greg Kauffman, and George Casey from Jon Levitsky. Subject: Military Structures for Kosovo. [with marginalia] (7 pages)	04/22/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

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99 MAY 12 AM 15

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

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TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO: (Person/Office)	Phone no.	Room no.
NSA	Mr. Bergen		
DVP	Mr. Fuertu		
	Schulte		

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Fry

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Fuerth

Date May 12, 1999Number of pages including cover sheet 3

U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW

To: OPS CENTER

From: Julie Fisher

Ambassador's Office

AmEmbassy Moscow

Phone _____

Fax Phone _____

Phone 7-095-956-4144Fax Phone 7-095-956-4441**REMARKS:**☐ Urgent☒ For your review☒ Reply ASAP☒ Please comment

OPS Center-

Please pass the attached memo from Deputy Secretary Talbott to the Secretary, APNSA Berger and OVP Fuerth, eyes only, as soon as possible.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1999

MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, APNSA BERGER AND
OVP FUERTH

FROM STROBE TALBOTT (EN ROUTE MOSCOW-HELSINKI)

A quick-and-dirty report from a fairly hectic day in Moscow, during which our Kosovo talks coincided with Yeltsin's ouster of Primakov and his decision to nominate Stepashin. This shake-up is clearly a preemptive strike on Yeltsin's part in the face of the Communists' determination to go forward with the impeachment process tomorrow. Yeltsin is sending a powerful though immensely controversial and risky signal that he is not willing to let his legacy be shaped by the Communist agenda; for better or for worse, he judges a showdown with the Communists now as more propitious than waiting for one closer to the parliamentary elections in December. There are many shoes to drop in coming days and weeks as the Duma calculates whether it has the votes or the will to go all the way with impeachment, and Yeltsin will push the use of his three nominations to try to get Stepashin confirmed.

As for Stepashin, he is well known to us; we've worked with him over the past two years in a variety of security posts. He brings little economic expertise to the job, and will be dependent on others for his handling of domestic and international economic issues.

While the latest domestic political developments are clearly a big deal, with uncertain ramifications, we have nonetheless had highly focused sessions with Ivanov and Chernomyrdin. Three points emerge:

- The Russians are increasingly desperate to see the bombing stop, claiming to fear that its continuation will strengthen hawks in Russia who want, at a minimum, to sever what's left of U.S./NATO-Russian cooperative relations and, at the worst, who are looking for a pretext to force a confrontation that could be, in Ivanov's words, "dangerous beyond all imagining." Chernomyrdin, just back from Beijing, cites the Embassy hit as a cautionary example of "catastrophic accidents" that could occur in the fog of war. (There was a joint protest demonstration by Chinese and Serbs across from our Embassy as I set off to see Chernomyrdin.)
- Their own official idea for the next step – a bombing pause followed by a negotiation with Belgrade – has a fatal flaw that they (privately, when away from plenaries and notetakers) recognize: it would leave Milosevic with substantial armed forces in Kosovo, no commitment from him on even eventual withdrawal of all forces and a high degree of ambiguity about the composition of the international security force. When we point out the obvious problem with a half-a-loaf compromise, their response is essentially to shrug and say, "Yes, but anything is better than continued bombing."

- While holding firm to their almost pleading advocacy of a pause-then-talk scenario, they *are* willing to talk through with us at a serious enough level of detail on both military and civilian implementation to warrant continued engagement.

Given point 3, we're continuing our discussions with them today, at the expert level, while I go off to Helsinki for consultations with Ahtisaari, and I'm returning to Moscow tomorrow to continue on the political level. Our approach, I suggest, should be to press ahead both with the *practical* imperatives for a full-withdrawal/robust-KFOR outcome and the *practical* pitfalls in half-a-loaf.

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99 MAY 12 12:53

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OVP	Mr. Fawth		
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5/2

American Embassy HelsinkiIt. Puistotie 14 A, 00140 Helsinki, Finland
Tel: 358-9-171-931 Fax: 358-9-605-182

May 12, 1999

URGENT

TO : STATE OPS

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FROM : STROBE TALBOTT
HELSINKI, FINLANDMessage

PLEASE URGENTLY PASS THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM TO
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, SANDY BERGER(NSC), AND LEON FUERTH
(OVP).

URGENT~~SECRET~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Initials: VZ Date: 12/15/2023

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: [As I head into my discussions with Ahtisaari] (2 pages)	05/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [4]

2008-0994-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

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014. form	Fax Cover [partial] (1 page)	05/13/1999	b(7)(C), b(6)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

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
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THE JOINT STAFF J-5 EUROPEAN DIVISION



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● ORIGINATOR ●

COL DEMPSEY

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*4**RUSSIAN PAPER*

TEXT PAGES

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REMARKS

ATTN: COL DONOVAN AND CARLOS PASCUAL

● ADDRESSEE ●

ORGANIZATION	OFC. SYM	NAME	PHONE
		<i>CARLOS PASCUAL</i>	<i>202/456-9160</i>

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MAY.13.1999 4:12PM

JAN 34

703-614-1158

(202) 456-9160

Carlos Pascual

COL DONOVAN, JS, CEC.

JACK,

Attached in the paper we worked with Russians. We used it as a vehicle to flesh out their position. Secretary Talbott would like to get inter-agency clearance on this tonight so he can give it to Delina tomorrow.

We told the Russians that this was a "non-paper" subject to approval of the two governments. We stuck closely to the 6-8 principles and our work on elaborating NATO's conditions.

You are working clearance on a second paper for Secretary Talbott. Purpose is to have Chernomyrdin [VS] go to Belgrade to press Milosevic on the requirement to withdraw all security forces from Kosovo (ST has given the position above the line to Chernomyrdin). Below the line is information to pass to the FNU Albanians who will make a subsequent visit to Belgrade to work the further details. Purpose is to take the particulars of the withdrawal to another level.

Need both of these in Brussels tonight - start for 2200 Brussels time. Work them the morning.

Will call from Geneva.

WJG

CONCEPTS BOTH SIDES AGREE TO

- The international security force will have to provide an environment that ensures safety and security for returning refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as the inhabitants of Kosovo.
- The international security force should be under the command of a single commander (unity of command).
- 1. An armed international security force is necessary in Kosovo.
- 2. Yugoslavia must agree to conditions detailed in the G-8 principles.
- Must avoid a security vacuum as military, paramilitary and police forces withdraw – every attempt will be made to synchronize the withdrawal of these forces with the deployment of the international security force.
- The KLA and all [other]¹ illegal paramilitary forces must be demilitarized.
- The international security force will act taking full account of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and other countries in the region.
- [An international police presence in Kosovo is necessary as soon as possible, as an interim step toward the establishment, with international assistance and under international monitoring, of a multi-ethnic Kosovo police.]²
- Peacekeeping tasks must be clear and precise.
- Key tasks include:
 - verify military, paramilitary and police force withdrawal
 - rapidly deploy international security force
 - create safe and secure conditions for return of internally displaced persons and refugees
 - demilitarize KLA

¹ Russians sought to insert "other" to make clear that the KLA is an "illegal" organization; U.S. argued that they could choose to interpret "all" as including KLA as an illegal organization; for our part, it was not U.S. policy to characterize the KLA as an "illegal organization." Hence the brackets.

² U.S. attempted to indicate the need to quickly stand up an international police capability to ensure the ISF was able to shed public order and policing tasks as quickly as possible. Russians seized on this as vehicle to try to prefigure the nature of eventual local police within Kosovo. Language bracketed pending USG judgment of whether this phrasing was consistent with our overall position on police component of civil implementation.

- Monitor borders
- contribute to secure environment for civil implementation
- prevent resumption of hostilities and acts of violence
- Force protection of the international security force is the highest priority.

CONCEPTS THAT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

- Who stays in Kosovo? (U.S. position is that all FRY and Serbian military, paramilitary and police must depart initially; a limited number of Yugoslav army and Yugoslav Internal Police (MUP) might return subsequently to perform special functions. Russian position is that a limited number of Yugoslav army, police and border guards do not withdraw and remain for special purposes.)
- When does bombing stop? (U.S. position is FRY acceptance of conditions detailed in the G-8 principles and commencement of demonstrable withdrawal according to a rapid and precise timetable are required for bombing to be suspended. Bombing will not be halted until Serb withdrawals are complete and an international security force is established. Russian position is that bombing should stop immediately.³)
- Who can participate in the international security force in Kosovo? (U.S. position is that any NATO or Partner country may deploy into Kosovo. Russian position is that only those NATO countries that did not participate in bombing may deploy into Kosovo.)
- Who is in charge? (U.S. position is that NATO is at the core with SACEUR as CINC. Russian position is that the commander of the UN international security force is from a neutral nation and under a UN special representative of the UN SYG.)

³ Despite Russian WG acceptance of this characterization, there may be some movement in their position. Notional Russian timeline provided by the WG suggested suspension of bombing would occur simultaneously with Milosevic's acceptance of the G-8 principles and start of withdrawal of forces from Kosovo.

Delegation Summary: Civilian Implementation

- The civilian implementation structure for Kosovo must be effective, well-planned, and deploy rapidly to avoid a dangerous vacuum.
- With Serbian/Yugoslav force withdrawal and deployment of international military and civil presences, Belgrade will no longer exercise administrative authority over Kosovo, although as a formal matter the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY will be uninterrupted, and Kosovo will therefore not be an international protectorate.
- The international civil presence and interim administration should come under the umbrella of a UNSC resolution.
- The international civil presence should coordinate refugee return (UNHCR), reconstruction (EU-lead), and democratization/institution building (OSCE). It must be closely coordinated with the international security presence. Local police should be established as soon as possible under international monitoring (UN or OSCE).
- A single international figure should be designated as temporary administrator of Kosovo to work with local leaders and establish an interim administration. (The Russian view is that the temporary administrator should represent the UN.)
- Russia believes that the Kosovo temporary administrator should establish a council to work with the Kosovo temporary administration. (Russia considers that this council should include a representative of Belgrade.) The international administrator would have the authority to decide any issue alone.
- Responsibility for implementation (education, social and municipal services, etc.) should be transferred as soon as feasible to local representatives. Prior to elections, the temporary administrator will designate local officials who will act under his guidance and direction (choosing from elders, etc.).
- A top priority will be refugee return. UNHCR, rather than FRY/Serb officials, will have the authority to determine who qualifies for voluntary return to Kosovo.
- Elections in Kosovo will be held as soon as feasible.
- Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should begin as soon as possible but should not delay or disrupt establishment of democratic self-governing institutions in Kosovo.