

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chernomyrdin, [Viktor] / Ahtisaari, [Martti] / MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [3]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report #1 (Moscow) (4 pages)             | 05/26/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. email               | Greg Schulte to Nina Hachigian. Subject: More on Strobe's Mission. (1 page)                                                             | 05/27/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. email               | Carlos Pascual to @NSA. Subject: Strobe/Cherno/Ahtisaari [with marginalia] (2 pages)                                                    | 05/27/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. email               | Jonathan Vaccaro to Greg Schulte and Michael Hurley. Subject: POTUS decision for KFOR Troops. (1 page)                                  | 05/27/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report #2 (Moscow) (3 pages)             | 05/26/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. briefing paper      | Hammer & Anvil Strategy (Monday, May 24, 1999--version 1) (2 pages)                                                                     | 05/24/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report No. 4 (Shannon-Andrews) (5 pages) | 05/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 008. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report No. 3 (Moscow-Shannon) (4 pages)  | 05/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 009a. note               | Note to Sandy and Jim. Subject: [Three Items] (1 page)                                                                                  | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |
| 009b. cable              | Balkan Crisis/Kosovo: [U.S. Position at Helsinki Trilateral] (1 page)                                                                   | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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2008-0994-F

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| 010. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report No. 1 (Helsinki-Bonn) (2 pages) | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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May 25, 1999

To: S/SA - Ambassador Dobbins

From: D - John Bass *[Signature]*


Subject: Kosovo Wiring Diagram

I believe Strobe mentioned to you yesterday the attached wiring diagram. It grew out of a Talbott/Chernomyrdin conversation and subsequent discussions with Chernomyrdin staffer Markov last Friday. In both instances, the Russian officials were seeking ways to manage their domestic political concerns about the appearance of Russian troops serving under NATO with our requirement that NATO provide the core of the international security force - i.e., unified NATO command arrangements with NATO chain of command running up to SACEUR and the NAC. The wiring diagram is similar to sketches made with Markov and captures the discussion; it's an attempt to square our insistence on a NATO core and complete separation and distinct lines of authority for the civil and security presences with Russia's ability to participate in the force and retain national command and control without violating unity of command.

The Russians sought some type of mechanism to connect the two presences and place both under the control of a single individual - under a Russian concept, the special representative of the UNSYG. We pushed back strongly against any notion that the UN or its representative would have authority over NATO forces or should exercise any form of command and control over the international security force. We also explored whether we could address some of Chernomyrdin and Markov's goals of making the entire international presence less NATO-heavy by making a virtue of a necessity, creating a "vehicle" that could facilitate legitimate liaison between the civilian and security presences - and simultaneously insulate the NATO-core security force from any formal links to the UN special rep or other Kosovo czar that could have effect or intent of violating chain of command or force integrity/effectiveness.

It's possible the Russians may seek to revisit this wiring diagram during discussions this week, and it could also resurface further down the road if we make sufficient progress and eventually get into the nitty-gritty details of how the civil and security presences will interact. With that in mind, Strobe asked that you consider it carefully and also seek the interagency's views. It would be useful, but not essential to have preliminary reactions by OOB here Thursday.

Cheers -- JB





## Explanation of Kosovo Wiring Diagram

This diagram grew out of a Talbott/Chernomyrdin conversation and subsequent discussions with Chernomyrdin staffer Markov. In both instances, the Russian officials were seeking ways to obfuscate or gloss over, for domestic consumption, our requirement that NATO provide the core of the international security force – i.e., unified NATO command arrangements with NATO chain of command running up to SACEUR and the NAC. The wiring diagram is similar to sketches made with Markov and captures the discussion. It is a tool to demonstrate our insistence on: a NATO core; complete separation and distinct lines of authority for the civil and security presences. It also provides a way to demonstrate how Russian forces might participate in the force and retain national command and control without violating unity of command.

## Explanation of roles and organs

### 1. UN

UN at top provides overall umbrella for entire operation, but does not exercise effective operational control. UNSCR would endorse the entire operation via Chapter VII resolution; that resolution might also call for creation of a "Liaison Council" (roughly analagous to the Bosnia Peace Implementation Council) through which the security and civilian presences could exchange information and perhaps discuss longer-range priorities. FRY and regional states could contribute ideas, but would not have a seat at the table.

Link between NATO/NAC and the UN would be a reporting requirement/invitation, similar to that in IFOR/SFOR, by which NATO submits informational reports to the SYG on a regular basis.

### 2. Security Presence – NATO-core force

Right side of the graphic outlines the required NATO command and control arrangements, with unitary command structure running from NAC through SHAPE to KFOR.

Parallel arrangements for Russian participation similar to IFOR/SFOR arrangements; could use PJC, either formally or informally, to provide Russians with a consultation mechanism and input into political guidance to KFOR as developed and shaped by NAC.

Other partners plug into KFOR planning and operations via PFP liaison arrangements at SHAPE. Subset of EAPC, comprised of NATO + partners



contributing to the force, would provide partners with input to NAC/political authority over KFOR.

### 3. Civilian presence

Includes lead institution, coordinating personage overseeing all elements of implementation, division of labor along functional lines.

Civil presence has overarching responsibility for all aspects of civil implementation; respective organizations have operational responsibility for activities and requirements in each broad function.

### 4. Liaison/Coordinating Committee

Center of the graphic: new element – interaction between the presences: the liaison council and coordinating committee (center of the graphic).

Liaison council would provide clearinghouse, info-sharing arrangement between the civilian and security presences. It would be similar to the Peace Implementation Council utilized in Bosnia.

Would have no authority to instruct, direct, control or oversee either presence; not in the "chain of command" for either one

Nor would it substitute for the working-level coordination that will be essential to successful establishment of a secure environment, facilitation of refugee returns and other humanitarian activities, development of local democratic self-governing institutions w/ help of international civil administration.

Might also provide a forum for "input" from FRY authorities, providing them a vehicle to demonstrate symbolically their residual sovereignty over Kosovo without any operational recourse or consequences.

Liaison committee would meet on a quarterly basis. More frequently if useful.

On a more operational level, would be performed via a "coordinating committee" comprised of KFOR commander and head of the civil presence.

Instead, consultative forum for elements of both presences to discuss, hash out problems or challenges that cut across their respective responsibilities – i.e., operational aspects of policing, refugee returns.

**Coordinating committee could also provide local authorities forum to air grievances, submit priorities, discuss coordination problems, etc.**



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*NSC Final*

Question: How does Milosevic's indictment impact our objectives and diplomacy?

Answer:

- We strongly support the work of ICTY and continue to cooperate with its investigations.
- We have long urged the Tribunal to follow the evidence wherever it goes. We want to see justice follow its course and believe that President Milosevic should appear before the Tribunal for trial.
- We have long said that Milosevic is personally and politically responsible for the conflict in Kosovo. The Tribunal's prosecutor has now said she believes that he is criminally responsible as well.
- We will continue to support the Tribunal as it works to gather additional information and prepare further indictments related to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
- The indictment of Milosevic does not change our objective in Kosovo, which is to create conditions where the refugees can return with security and self-government.
- We will continue to press the authorities in Belgrade to take those steps necessary to achieve this objective; i.e., withdraw all forces from Kosovo, accept an international security force with NATO at core, and allow unconditional refugee return.
- We will also continue our efforts to promote democracy in Serbia, through and if necessary beyond the current conflict.
- We have said all along that Serbia will not be able to join the European mainstream without democratic reform and a change in leadership.

Question: Does this mean no further contact or negotiations with Milosevic?

Answers:



- We do not intend to negotiate NATO's conditions. He and those around him know what needs to be done to meet NATO's conditions.
- We do not rule out future contacts if they are necessary to achieve our objectives and ensure that NATO's conditions are implemented.

Question: Would you promise Milosevic to protect him from the ICTY if he agrees to your conditions?

Answer: No. He must deal with the Tribunal judges and prosecutor.

Question: Do we demand his removal from office as a condition for suspension of airstrikes?

Answer: No. NATO's conditions remain the same.

Question: Is diplomacy dead?

Answer: We are prepared to support international diplomacy consistent with our conditions.

{IF ASKED} President Ahtisaari and Special Envoy Chernomyrdin will make their own decision on when and whether to travel to Belgrade.

[ IF ASKED ]

We do not have the authority to negotiate an immunity deal on behalf of the Tribunal and would not support efforts by anyone else to do so.

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Attached is President Ahtisaari's draft terms of reference for a possible Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari trip, to be discussed at trilateral Thursday 1000 AM Moscow time.

Ahtisaari personally developed this text based on the U.S. papers given to Finns and Russians last week in Helsinki. He told us his intention is to preserve the substance of the U.S. papers (including NATO redlines, which he understands must be met before bombing can be suspended) while at the same time shortening and consolidating the two papers, with an eye to increasing the acceptability of our approach to Chernomyrdin and providing a basis for a joint visit.

President Ahtisaari made a major point of his desire to include in the sixth bullet a slightly different formulation for return of Yugoslav/Serb forces than used in U.S. paper. Specifically, he wants to state that "a small **agreed** number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel **will** be permitted to return."

We need Washington reaction soonest on whether Ahtisaari's paper crosses any of our redlines so we can respond to him before 8:00 am Moscow time.

*Discussed 5/27*

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-military forces (e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the following functions:
  - liaison with international civil mission and international security force
  - marking/clearing minefields
  - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
  - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the



demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- A military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. Such modalities would include:

#### Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the timetable and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

#### Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Timetable for their return
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

---

It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 28, 1999

TO: S/SA - Ambassador Pardew

FROM: S/P - Jon Levitsky *jl*

SUBJECT: Attached Notional Chernomyrdin "Hammer and Anvil"  
Script for ASAP Review

Please find attached for interagency review a notional script for use by Chernomyrdin in a joint trip to Belgrade with President Ahtisaari as a part of the "hammer and anvil" strategy. Jim Swigert tells me he gave you a heads up that this would be on the way. The script has been approved by President Ahtisaari and the Deputy Secretary. I am also attaching for reference the script that President Ahtisaari intends to use on such a trip. (This script has already been reviewed by the interagency and was distributed in Moscow by the Finns yesterday.) Request that you coordinate interagency review of the notional Chernomyrdin script by COB Washington on Friday if possible, Noon on Saturday at the latest. Any comments or changes will have to be vetted and coordinated with Ahtisaari. Timing necessary to permit delivery in Moscow on Monday morning after Ahtisaari consultation, assuming Ahtisaari decides to go ahead with this approach after getting read out from Chernomyrdin of word from Belgrade. You can reach me through ops here in Helsinki over the weekend. Thanks for the help, and sorry for the quick turnaround.

To avoid any uncertainty in Washington, a few words on the purpose of the papers. The concept, as the Deputy Secretary has laid it out for Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari, is as follows. Chernomyrdin would use the first script to go as far as he can in support of NATO positions without crossing Russia's redlines. Ahtisaari would then use the second script to make the critical points on which we have not reached agreement with the Russians. (The bold type in the Ahtisaari script identifies those issues that are not covered by the Chernomyrdin script, and which it will be especially important for Ahtisaari to emphasize.) The two would agree not to undermine each other in the discussion.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 12/14/2003 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2008-0944-23

*Danger of "yes" /  
"no."*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The first (Chernomyrdin) script is a modified version of a document that the Russians passed to us yesterday after reviewing the Ahtisaari script. Changes to the Russian original are shown in the text. The Russian paper directly contradicts a number of key U.S. positions (e.g., NATO core and "all out"). This modified version aims to push the Russians as far as they are likely to go in our direction, while making the rest of the text ambiguous and not directly contrary to our positions.

If used, this script will represent Russia's position rather than that of the USG. It therefore does not seek to encompass all of our bottom lines. Some of the packaging - at President Ahtisaari's specific request -- is also probably not what we would choose, although he is not seeking to water down our substantive positions. Please ask the interagency to focus its review accordingly on ensuring that the script does not cross U.S. red-lines or contradict the positions to be stated by President Ahtisaari.

NSC requests clearance by Schulte/Pascual. Please also get a chop from S/P - Halperin/O'Brien. Thanks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RussianRussian Paper of 5/26/99 Belgrade Script: Part One (Chernomyrdin)

To ~~stop the NATO military operation and resolve~~ move toward the resolution of the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on the following principles:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and para-military forces.
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- ~~The An effective international security presence with the participation of NATO countries~~ must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. All NATO countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security presence.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- ~~After the suspension of hostilities, Belgrade authorities will plan for a small, agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian security personnel to remain in Kosovo to perform the following functions:~~

- liaison with international civil and security presences
- marking/clearing minefields
- maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
- maintaining a presence at key border crossings

no "all"

no "NATO"

with as spelled in #2

attend



- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- ~~After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a~~ suspension of military activity on terms to be elaborated by President Milisavljevic, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of remaining Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo. Such modalities would include:

#### Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule

#### Remaining Yugoslav/Serb Personnel in Kosovo

- Equipment associated with ~~remaining~~ Yugoslav/Serb personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences

~~NATO member states, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security presence. NATO units would be under NATO command.~~

Risk of withdrawal being delayed by disagreements over residual forces.

Does not require all to withdraw initially.

AhtisaariBelgrade Script: Part Two (Ahtisaari)

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of **all** military, police, and para-military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the following functions:
  - liaison with international civil mission and international security force
  - marking/clearing minefields
  - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
  - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account

"All"

"NATO"

Residual force  
return



of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. Such modalities would include:

Post

Withdrawal Buffer Zone

- ~~Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and~~ The delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

in

cannot open without  
ISF consent

Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Timetable for their return
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

NATO

It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.

p1 of 6

To: State Ops

From: Talbott Party  
(Helsinki)

SUBJECT: PAPERS ELABORATING  
CONDITIONS ON KOSOVO

TEXTS AS PROVIDED TO RUSSIANS + FINNS  
PASS ASAP TO U/S PICKERING,

S/SA DOBBINS/PARDEW

S/P HALPERIN/O'BRIEN

EUR GROSSMAN

S/NIS SESTANOVICH

NSC SCHULTE



The following principles must be adopted and implemented to resolve the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-military forces according to a precise and rapid timetable and subject to effective verification;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives;
- The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- After full withdrawal, a small number of Yugoslav and Serb security personnel may be permitted to return pursuant to strict and enforceable numerical limits and clear and restrictive terms of reference as established by the international security force only for purposes of: liaison with international civil mission and international security force, marking/clearing minefields, maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites, and maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK; negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.



May 18, 1999

### Notional Elaboration of Conditions

#### Stage I

Mr. Chernomyrdin would undertake another trip to Belgrade for the purpose of elaborating the obligations Milosevic must accept as part of a settlement. In addition to his reiteration of the G-8 principles (as elaborated on in attached paper), Mr. Chernomyrdin would insist upon the following two-part obligation:

- **The Belgrade authorities will withdraw from Kosovo the VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces currently deployed there.**
  - **The Belgrade authorities will plan to reintroduce and maintain in Kosovo, after the cessation of hostilities, a small number of personnel to perform four functions:**
    1. **liaison with the international security and civilian presences;**
    2. **marking and clearing of minefields;**
    3. **maintenance of a Yugoslav presence at sites associated with the Serb patrimony;**
    4. **maintenance of a Yugoslav presence at key border crossings.**
- 

#### Stage II

President Ahtisaari would press Milosevic on additional clarification of his obligations, especially on those issues that relate to the safety and effectiveness of the international presence and to the achievement of the goal of encouraging the return of refugees.

On withdrawal/replacement of the Yugoslav presence in Kosovo, President Ahtisaari would seek Milosevic's agreement to...

1. *complete* withdrawal of all the VJ, MUP and paramilitaries;  
⇒ *all* means **all**

May 18, 1999

2. a precise and rapid timetable for their withdrawal;
  - ⇒ all VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces must be withdrawn from Kosovo within seven days of the suspension of bombing;
  - ⇒ All air defense weapons will be withdrawn within 48 hours outside a 25 kilometer mutual safety zone (MSZ).
  - ⇒ KFOR should be ready to deploy as Serb and FRY forces depart and be prepared to begin monitoring border.
  - ⇒ withdrawal modalities will be worked out and defined in a military technical agreement between VJ/MUP and police leadership and KFOR commander.
3. strict and enforceable numerical limits on any Yugoslav personnel that are permitted to return;
  - ⇒ within that overall limit, there would be limits within each functional area:
    - A. liaison personnel to international security and civilian presences
    - B. marking/clearing minefields: once minefields were marked/cleared, these personnel would depart Kosovo.
      - ◆ KFOR commander would have discretion to retain some personnel in this category or to request their subsequent reintroduction in order to help KFOR address unmarked minefields/other related contingencies.
    - C. Patrimonial sites:
      - ◆ FRY would be permitted a fixed number of personnel for site presence per sector (rather than setting fixed number of sites)
    - D. Border crossings: KFOR commander would designate "key border crossings;"
      - ◆ FRY would be allowed specific number of personnel at each key border crossing as determined by KFOR commander
4. clear and restrictive terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
  - ⇒ to be defined in military technical agreement



May 18, 1999

5. strict and enforceable limits on equipment associated with any Yugoslav personnel to be permitted to return;  
⇒ to be defined in military technical agreement
6. precise timetable for the return of any Yugoslav personnel permitted to return;  
⇒ reintroduction of agreed personnel to begin a certain number of days after cessation of hostilities;  
⇒ exceptions possible prior to that date if KFOR commander deems necessary.
7. clear delineation of their limited geographical areas of operation;  
⇒ to be defined in military technical agreement
8. clearly defined and enforceable rules governing their relationship to the commander of KFOR and the head of the International Civil Mission (return subject to agreement by the KFOR commander and, once in Kosovo, activities subject to KFOR supervision).  
⇒ to be defined in military technical agreement  
⇒ One principle: communication with FRY authorities outside Kosovo by these personnel will be subject to KFOR's supervision
9. On the international security force, although the force need not have a NATO label, it must have a robust NATO core, and no dual key. This means a NATO chain of command and the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on ISF operations.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 006. briefing<br>paper   | Hammer & Anvil Strategy (Monday, May 24, 1999--version 1) (2<br>pages) | 05/24/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1709

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6232

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]






- 9 pages to follow -

To: White House Situation Room  
(Voice - 202-456-9451)

From: Andrew Weiss

Please pass attached for ASAP to

- Carlos Pascual x69161
- Greg Schulte x69102
- OVP/Leslie Davidson x68512



- Note: attached slides  
were brokered to Ivashov and Mamedov. A couple of items  
are missing.

# FAX CHECK

## ***"Details" Response Briefing***

- **Mission Concepts / Tasks**
- **Addressing the Security Vacuum**
- **Kosovo Timeline / Withdrawal Phasing**
- **Kosovo Proposed Returnees (by Function)**
- **Proposed KFOR Composition**
- **Proposed KFOR Organization**



## ***Mission Concepts***

- **Unity of command is essential for efficient and effective military operations.**
- **Must ensure a safe and secure environment for refugees, IDPS, and residents of Kosovo.**
- **Force protection is a central element.**
- **Must avoid security vacuum as military, paramilitary and police forces withdraw.**
- **The KLA and all [other] [illegal] paramilitary forces must be demilitarized.**
- **Peacekeeping tasks must be clear and precise.**

## ***Unity of Command***

- **Facilitates rapid response across entire AOR.**
- **Facilitates interoperability.**
- **Provides rapid response to political directives.**
- **Expedites dissemination of orders/instructions.**
- **Ensures common doctrine, strategy, and tactics.**
- **Ensures consistency of policy, procedures, and execution.**
- **Avoids *de facto* partition of AOR.**
- **Facilitates liaison/cooperation with non-military organizations across AOR.**



## ***Mission Tasks***

- **Rapidly deploy an international security force.**
- **Create safe and secure conditions for return of internally displaced persons, refugees, and residents of Kosovo.**
- **Must verify, and if necessary enforce, military, paramilitary, and police force withdrawal.**
- **Demilitarize the KLA to avoid retribution and return to violence.**
- **Monitor the borders to enhance security and stability.**
- **Establish then contribute to secure environment for civil implementation.**

# ***How to Avoid a Security Vacuum***

- Phase 0:**
- 1) Identify/Train International Police**
  - 2) Begin training of local police outside Kosovo**
  - 3) Finalize plan for synchronizing FRY withdrawal/  
KFOR deployment in technical talks following  
Milosevic agreement with NATO 5 Points**
  - 4) Influence UCK to cooperate in KFOR deployment, not  
interfere with FRY withdrawal**


- Phase I:**
- 1) Deploy KFOR simultaneously with FRY force  
withdrawal -- KFOR to deploy heavy MP presence  
-- VJ clears lines of communications of mines and  
marks all minefields**
  - 2) Deploy International Police presence ASAP**
  - 3) Begin UCK demilitarization**

- Phase II:**
- 1) Begin deployment of Multi-Ethnic Police Force**

- Phase III:**
- 1) Complete training Multi-Ethnic Police Force**
  - 2) International Police monitor Police Force**




# Notional Kosovo Timeline



7

## ***KFOR Composition - Notional Sector***



**(10,000 - 12,000)**

# KFOR Participants\*



Slovenia



Finland



Czech Republic



Spain



Belgium



US



Germany



Lithuania




Poland



Portugal



Hungary



Romania



France



Italy



Norway



Sweden




Netherlands



Greece




United Kingdom




Canada




Turkey



Austria



Denmark



Bulgaria

\*Contributions from Non-NATO Countries are Welcome



9.

## ***Proposed Returnees***

**Border Presence**

**small contingent**

**Liaison Teams (11)**

**small contingent**

**De-mining Teams**

**as necessary**

**Site Presence (Patrimony Sites)**

**small contingent**

## ***How to Avoid a Security Vacuum***


- Phase 0:**
- 1) Identify/Train International Police
  - 2) Begin training of local police outside Kosovo
  - 3) Finalize plan for synchronizing FRY withdrawal/  
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Milosevic agreement with NATO 5 Points
  - 4) Influence UCK to cooperate in KFOR deployment, not  
interfere with FRY withdrawal

- Phase I:**
- 1) Deploy KFOR simultaneously with FRY force  
withdrawal -- KFOR to deploy heavy MP presence
  - 2) Deploy International Police presence ASAP
  - 3) Begin UCK demilitarization

- Phase II:**
- 1) Begin deployment of Multi-Ethnic Police Force

- Phase III:**
- 1) Complete training Multi-Ethnic Police Force
  - 2) International Police monitor Police Force

# *Notional Kosovo Timeline*






## ***Proposed Returnees***

|                                        |                        |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------|
| <b>Border Presence</b>                 | <b><u>50-70</u></b>    |
| <b>Liaison Teams (11)</b>              | <b><u>40-60</u></b>    |
| <b>De-mining Teams</b>                 | <b><u>250-350</u></b>  |
| <b>Site Presence (Patrimony Sites)</b> | <b><u>80-120</u></b>   |
| <b>Total</b>                           | <b><u>420-600*</u></b> |

**\* Multinational Force Commander retains the authority to expand or contract this range based on actual circumstances.**



# *Notional Withdrawal of Serb Forces from Kosovo*





# **International Police Force**

- 2000-3000 international police with sidearms and executive authority
- Deploy quickly after KFOR entry to assume responsibility for basic public security; KFOR provided backup
- Enforce serious felony provisions under existing law
- Capability to do small-scale civil disorder management
- As local police deployed, IPF become mentors; first-line backup to local police



# Developing Local Police For Kosovo

- 100-200 international trainers
- Recruits/screens 3000 multi-ethnic local police in the first year
- Citizen advisory committees on police issues established
- Conducts 5-week basic training; extra week for leaders
- Phased deployment of local police in units
- 6-week on-the-job field training; weekly in-service training
- Assume primary responsibility for law enforcement; mentored/monitored/disciplined by International Police Force
- Police academy established; recruitment and 4-6 month training of police; advanced police training

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 007. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report No. 4 (Shannon-Andrews) (5 pages) | 05/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1709

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2008-0994-F  
vz6232

### RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 008. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report No. 3 (Moscow-Shannon) (4 pages) | 05/21/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1709

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6232

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Friday, May 21, 1999 (5 a.m. Moscow time/9 p.m. DC time, 5/20/99)

MEMORANDUM TO SEC. ALBRIGHT, APNSA BERGER, OVP FUERTH

FROM STROBE TALBOTT

TRIP REPORT NO. 2 (FROM MOSCOW)

Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin and I have agreed that we've made enough progress on Hammer-&-Anvil to justify a follow-up meeting here in Moscow next Wednesday. Depending on how that goes, it's probable the two of them would travel to Belgrade the next day (Thursday, May 27). The purpose would be to see if they can lock in and improve upon what Cherno says he got from Milosevic Wednesday and, more important, to give us a fresh set of eyes on the target: is Milosevic really ready to make peace on NATO's terms, as Chernomyrdin keeps saying?

Our six hours of talks (on the birch forested premises of Stalin's dacha) produced agreement — what I'd call grudging acceptance on Chernomyrdin's part — that NATO must be at the core of KFOR.

Moreover, Chernomyrdin claims that he argued for something like this arrangement strenuously with Milosevic in Belgrade yesterday, and that Milosevic accepts that NATO will have to be "on the ground in Kosovo."

That said, it is not at all clear that the Russian government — and the Russian military — will sign up to the Alliance's definition of, and requirements for, NATO-at-the-core, much less that Milosevic will agree to it. In his seven hours of talks with Milosevic in Belgrade, Chernomyrdin probably extracted more of an indication than he's letting on to us about what Milosevic will settle for, and he is probably calibrating the welcome but highly imprecise Russian change of position accordingly. But we still have what I keep calling "the empty chair problem." (I got up at one point during the meeting and brought an empty chair to the table to dramatize the missing man; I kept pointing to the chair and saying, "Yeah, great, but what about *that* guy? Will he say 'yes' to what we're agreeing to?")

We probably won't have much more of an answer on that crucial subject for the next six days, before Cherno and Ahtisaari take their trip. Meanwhile, even as we continue to communicate directly with Milosevic in our own way through the air strikes, we've got to concentrate on clarifying and solidifying our own diplomatic positions. To that end, Doc Foglesong and I have told Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin that we will work intensively within the USG and at NATO in the coming days, so that when we come back here next Tuesday morning, we'll be in a position to take the discussion of what we mean by NATO-at-the-core down to the next level of specifics. (Doc is working his own channels back to DoD right



now.) I have talked briefly to Javier Solana and told him that we're going to need to work hard in SHAPE on this subject. Chernomyrdin has agreed to our proposal that Doc and George Casey be accompanied next week by one or two U.S. officers currently attached to SHAPE. Javier was great on this score and will continue to be instrumental in providing both support and cover within the Alliance; but we've got to do some quick, deft work with the Quad to get them on board the contents of the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin package without opening it up to a frenzy of Euro-micro-management. Our team will give you more on this subject tomorrow (which is, actually today — anyway, Friday.)

On a cautionary note, when Doc, George and I were here last week, they ran into a stone wall with Gen. Ivashov and other Russian military, who refused to discuss NATO-at-the-core in the absence of political instructions from on high to do so. Chernomyrdin promised us he'd get those instructions to the Russian military. We'll see. We'll have a first hint of his willingness and ability to follow through on that during Doc's scheduled session with Ivashov tomorrow.

On withdrawals/returns, the Russians are still fighting hard for an outcome that attaches a number to the four categories of Yugoslav personnel we're prepared to allow back into Kosovo and then convert that number into a ceiling on the number that can stay, especially MUP. We were adamant that "all" means "all," and that only after total withdrawal can some (a small but unspecified number) come back, and then only under the control of the SFOR commander.

Part of our job in coming days is to prepare for another knock-down-drag-out on this critical issue.

A third issue is the nature of a UN "umbrella." The Russians want one that to our ears sounds perilously close to UN political control; we said so, and made clear that was a non-starter. We've got further work to do with our Allies on this as well. (More on that below when I report on my earlier stops, especially Paris earlier today.)

And then there's a fourth issue: the bombing. The dreaded "p"-word did not come up in any context other than the one that NATO has stipulated: the Alliance will suspend air strikes when, by its own lights, Milosevic has accepted our five conditions and we've seen the beginning of withdrawals. The Russians seem to accept the fact that while the diplomacy continues, including perhaps more Cherno trips to Belgrade, so will the bombing. Ahtisaari understands that will be the case if he goes along.

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\* Chubais told you, Mme. Secretary, and me on Sunday that Ivashov would be fired. No hint of that here tonight.



However, both men are interested in whether the Alliance will take care not to endanger their own safety, and in Cherno's case, he is pressing hard for NATO at least not to intensify bombing in the immediate wake of his trip. He claims that in the case of all three of his trips, he's gone, he's left and the strikes have intensified. He says the Yugoslavs have noticed, are wondering if there's a causal connection and are questioning whether it's a good idea to invite him back. Doc will be working this issue through his channels.

Given what he regarded as the significant Russian movement on a NATO-at-the-core KFOR, plus the hint of some movement in Belgrade, Ahtisaari is prepared to return here on Wednesday with a default position in favor of going to see Sloba the next day. But that's *only* if what's happened in the intervening days confirms Cherno's repeated statements that Russia is now prepared to help bring about such a force rather than doing everything it can to block it or UNPROFORize it.

If Ahtisaari does decide next Wednesday to go ahead with the trip on Thursday, he will do so only after first reiterating and establishing with Chernomyrdin (happy coincidence!) five conditions that he laid out earlier tonight:

1. While they will divide their speaking parts into the "general principles" for suspension of hostilities (Chernomyrdin's affirmation of the G-8 principles, perhaps as amended in our direction in NATO-at-the-core) and the "essential specifics" (Ahtisaari's layout of the elaboration of conditions), there must be, in advance of their trip, total clarity between them on the contents and meaning of the entire package.
2. They must understand in advance that the only circumstance in which NATO will suspend military action would be Milosevic's total and unambiguous acceptance of the package, plus verifiable beginning of withdrawal.
3. They must understand in advance that NATO reserves exclusively to itself the decision on what constitutes acceptance on Milosevic's part — and what constitutes adequate verification of withdrawal (although we've indicated we're open to ideas about how Russia might participate in verification). In other words, we and only we will decide what we hear to be a "yes," and any form of "yes, but..." equals "no."
4. They must understand in advance that neither is asking for nor receiving authority to negotiate on behalf of NATO.
5. They must promise in advance that neither will — in Belgrade or afterward, no matter what the outcome — contradict each other or blame each other for the consequences of Milosevic's refusal to accept — i.e., continuation of bombing.

For this approach to accomplish what the Russians most want — a suspension of bombing — there can't be any ambiguity, imprecision or lacunae about the "essential specifics" that Ahtisaari would lay out to Milosevic. We



know how Milosevic will try to exploit any such loopholes, and we don't want Chernomyrdin — in what he says, doesn't say or says afterward — to give aid and comfort to our enemy in this regard.

The U.S. role — including my return to Europe next week — will be to help the two gentlemen in that regard. It was in that spirit that we saw fit to commit to paper the key points in Helsinki, and that document remains, as we've told Cherno, a canonical text from our standpoint. (Ahtisaari has referred to NATO's five conditions plus the five conditions he's setting for joining Cherno as "The Ten Commandments.")

What matters, of course — and what we must now test — is whether the Russian government as whole really does understand, as Cherno has said *he* understands, that KFOR has got to be, in Ahtisaari's phrase, "hard-core NATO." As we've speculated, Yeltsin has ordered Cherno to get Kosovo fixed — and that means the bombing stopped — almost no matter what it takes, even if that means Russia as part of a hard-core NATO KFOR.

It will be interesting in several hours for me to meet with Ivanov. Will he be up on what transpired earlier tonight, and supportive of it? Or will he react the way he did to Helsinki? On Wednesday, Mme. Secretary, Ivanov told you that he regarded our Helsinki paper as a step backward from the Bonn G-8 statement. It is, of course, exactly the opposite: it makes clear how we can move forward from Bonn. I'll go over that ground with him before departure. If he seems to be clueless or, worse, in a blocking mode, it will not augur well for next steps — or for next week.

As you know, we've sensed that Cherno is leaning, sometimes unsteadily, forward while Ivanov tries to pull him backward (with a lot of help and maybe some instigation from his sort-of namesake Ivanovsky, the career diplomat whom Ivanov has seconded to Cherno and who, throughout tonight's session, was whispering negative advice in Cherno's ear like a very grumpy Jimminy Cricket).

Part of the reason for this, I suspect, is butt-covering by Ivanov. Back at the Bonn G-8 Ministerial, Ivanov acceded to some important, though less than ideal improvements in wording, especially description of KFOR as an "*effective international security presence*." We can be pretty sure that he sold this at home *as our concession to him*, that is, he bragged about how he beat back our attempts to add the word "military" vice "security" and "force" vice "presence." Now, in our Helsinki paper, we're making unmistakably clear that it's got to a military force *with NATO at its core*. So Ivanov may be getting, or anticipating, heat for having fallen into a trap you set for him in Bonn.

Beyond that, the last three weeks have been full of evidence that there's both institutional and personal bad blood between Ivanov and Cherno (Primakov's guy versus Yeltsin's guy, etc.).



We had what may have been a precursor of Cherno's position being ascendant Wednesday at the G-8 political directors meeting in Bonn. Boris Mayorsky, the Russian master stone-waller, said Russia does not think KFOR should be blue-helmeted; it should have a "nominal" authority from the UN; it should report "nominally" to the SYG or his designated representative. Boris knows English very well, including loaded adverbs. That isn't our position, of course, but it's moving in the right direction, and Cherno took it further tonight.<sup>†</sup>

What we've got to do is try to keep 'em movin'. There are three ways to do that.

One is not, under any circumstances, to give into the temptation to expose the Russians publicly as positioning themselves to concede to us on NATO-at-the-core, since that will, Chernomyrdin made clear, queer whatever further movement the Russians might make. If only for Russian domestic political reasons, the Russian government would have to deny having made any concession. My guess is that, as they think through their own next moves, including the endgame, they can imagine sacrificing a major piece — i.e., accepting NATO-at-the-core — *only* if it's in the context of a peace (i.e., suspension of hostilities); in other words, they may be counting on the cheers of praise at home to drown out the howls of protests as Russian soldiers head off to keep the peace under the command of General Clark, who is well known to Russian audiences these days.

The second thing we can do is to be equally careful not to appear to be *adding* conditions on NATO's behalf and/or walking back from principles that Russia has associated itself with, specifically the Bonn G-8 statement. That's why it was good that Wednesday, in response to press reports on Cherno's visit to Belgrade, we reaffirmed *both* the G-8 principles and the NATO conditions. We must publicly remind everyone, and reassure the Russians, that our diplomacy is all about *amplifying* and *making operational* the G-8 principles, not changing them or toughening them up. We're not moving the goal posts; we're trying to move a

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<sup>†</sup> Mayorsky also signaled movement on withdrawals. Here's his argument there: rather than going from the 80-100,000 (including paramilitaries) armed Serbs that are in Kosovo now, let's figure out how many we're prepared, under NATO's scheme, to let comeback in the designated four categories. Then let's take the aggregate number and say the Serbs need to go down from 100,000 to X.

There are two problems with this suggestion. First, we believe that zero has to mean zero, and we must consider returns only after we've established, in principle and to the extent possible in fact, the totality of withdrawals. Second, when Cherno got notional about the number X, it was much too large: "UNESCO says there are 8,000 religious and historical sites in Kosovo, and let's say it takes three guys for each site..." — the math lands you suspiciously close to one number that Slobo has hanging out there (22,000). At the Bonn meeting yesterday, Mayorsky floated a number in the range of 500 of 1,200, the low end of which is in the universe of what our experts are thinking about.



team that includes the Russians closer to the only goal line there is. (I hear a wee, small voice in my ear — maybe it's Doc Foglesong, a big sports fan, saying: block that metaphor!)

Third, especially in the light of what we heard tonight, we need to do a lot more work, on a faster schedule and in a way that includes both the Alliance and the Russians, on some gritty but important "essential specifics" (as opposed to genuine 'details' that can wait until after there's a peace). Here are the ones that our stops in Helsinki, Bonn, Paris and Moscow this week have highlighted:

- What exactly do we mean by NATO-at-the-core? What's the actual command structure? How does it relate to sectors? How does it relate to the UN? The French (Levitte) are pushing a single, UN-ish over-guy (as opposed to over-lord) who would not give orders to the KFOR commander but, as Jean-David puts it, "would have coffee with him every morning." Call this the "coffee-with-Kofi option." Is there some version of it we can live with? We've got to decide with our Allies *and* with the Russians before we get a whole lot further.<sup>†</sup>
- What exactly do we mean by MUP? Right now, we (i.e., SHAPE) mean every single policemen, including traffic cops and cops on the beat. The Russians (specifically Cherno) are arguing that if we insist on "expelling" every last policemen of every job description, track record and background, including ones whose families have lived in Kosovo for generations, we'll be committing "ethnic cleansing in reverse." Therefore, they say, we should not be "rigid and total" in the way we define MUP.
- As Serb forces withdraw, how do we prevent a "security vacuum" that unleashes chaos, including an orgy of Albanian-on-Serb retribution and an accompanying new refugee crisis, this time Serbs fleeing across borders, including in Montenegro and Macedonia?
- More generally, how do we protect Serbs who decide to stay on in Kosovo?

By the way, on this last point, Michael Steiner, our interlocutor this week who knows the Balkans best, was quite blunt in predicting that — despite our good intentions and reassuring rhetoric about Kosovo's ending up as a "multiethnic democracy" — it's in fact going to be, fairly soon after it's, what?, liberated from Belgrade an all-Albanian, what?, protectorate of the international community. If we succeed in our mission short-term — i.e., get all armed Serbs

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<sup>†</sup> Cherno's proposal is for a "troika" to "coordinate" KFOR that would be chaired by a NATO member, with one Russian deputy and one traditional neutral one; a FRY representative would be attached to the troika as a liaison — "to take orders, not to give them," in Cherno's words.



out — and open up return to refugees, no Serbs of any description will want to stay.

Be that as it may, it's equally (if not even more) true that if we fail in our mission short-term, no Albanians of any description except for UCKsters bent on vengeance and independence will return.

Whatever the answers to these and other such questions, Levitte on Thursday formally and rather urgently proposed that we set up a Quad working group right away — in coming days, if possible — and that we make a real effort, as he put it, "to take account of the Russian factor in our planning for KFOR and civilian implementation" so that when we talk to them in the future, we're not just giving them our answers to their questions.

The French, as you know, have been quite resistant to the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin gambit, partly for not-invented-in-Paris reasons, partly (and relatedly, for reasons of hypersensitivity to the *hyperpuissance*). With a lot of stroking and a special trip to Paris just to see Védrine and Levitte, we've got them calmed down. But we have more work to do there. Levitte had just come from seeing Chirac, who is still pushing the idea that if Ahtisaari goes to Belgrade, with or without Cherno, he should undertake in advance to see, while he's there, every conceivable Serbian politician, especially democrats (and "democrats"), in order to encourage anti-Milosevic feeling and to demonstrate our distaste for dealing with Slobo.

Ahtisaari, who had gotten this message directly from Chirac, tonight over dinner told Cherno that he intended to see opposition figures in Belgrade if he goes there next week. Cherno said, why not? Maybe he'd do the same. This aspect of their mission requires, to put it mildly, more thought.

Via Levitte yesterday, we heard Chirac also wanted a G-8 Ministerial to approve the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin package *in advance* of the trip (which, of course, would flush out the Russians on hard-core-NATO). We didn't quite hear that in Paris Thursday — maybe in part because I preempted — but Jean-David did say that Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin should "agree" in advance on "their" message. If that means what we're saying with the five ground rules above (the 2<sup>nd</sup> five of the Commandments), then *d'accord*. If, however, it means making it harder for Chernomyrdin to associate himself, *in Belgrade*, with Ahtisaari's half of the script, then *pas de tout*.

On Bildt, his name never came up in Moscow, but it did come up in Paris earlier because I raised it: I decided, at the tail end of a generally very *accord*-filled session with Levitte to lay down our marker on Bildt: a) we support him in his assignment to begin now preparing for peace-implementation; b) we oppose — and will do whatever necessary to thwart — his involvement in any aspect whatsoever of peace-brokerage; c) we reserve on whom we will support for the



Big Job in Kosovo, whatever its institutional auspices. Jean-David's reaction:  
*hmmmm....*

Among the issues we didn't get to in Paris or Moscow are critical ones of sequencing and synchronization among the various tracks: Ahtisaari-Chenromyrdin, G-8 and UNSC.

While Doc & Co. are working hard on the hard military/security questions, we've got a considerable challenge of our own ahead on the diplomatic front.

As our team sorts through all that it heard today, we'll provide further impressions and suggestions on how to prepare for next week, and how to manage Allies in the meantime.

Schulte, Gregory L.

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From: O'Brien, Penelope R.  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 1999 7:56 AM  
To: O'Brien, Penelope R.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers  
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @KOSOVO  
Subject: RE: Readout from Strobe Talbott [CONFIDENTIAL]

CORRECTED VERSION: Correction (highlighted line 6) and upgraded to ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

@comm: please pass this version to Mr. Steinberg in Germany. thanks, pob

-----Original Message-----

From: O'Brien, Penelope R.  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 1999 6:59 AM  
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers  
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @KOSOVO  
Subject: Readout from Strobe Talbott [UNCLASSIFIED]

@Comm: Please also pass to Mr. Steinberg in Germany. Thanks, pob

SRB:

Strobe called this morning and dictated the following message over an open line:

Sequel to My Long Memo:

A problem, perhaps insurmountable. Ivanoff professed to be stunned by "NATO at the Core" and repudiated it. We went back at Chernomyrdin for over three hours and he reaffirmed the words "NATO at the Core" but, clearly on advice of overnight counsel, tried to hold out for Russian participation outside of KFOR command. We have insisted on "unity of command" (which we have explained and justified at great length), making clear that otherwise we can not go forward together diplomatically. Our team will still return here next week, but I think it is less likely that Ahtasaari will want to go to Belgrade on Thursday. He will argue that not one single Finn will be in KFOR on any terms other than those NATO is insisting upon. He will probably call Chernomyrdin over the weekend to make that point. We will be in further touch by the end of the day.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VR NARA, Date 12/14/2023  
2008-0994-f3



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 009a. note               | Note to Sandy and Jim. Subject: [Three Items] (1 page) | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1709

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [3]

2008-0994-F  
vz6232

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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| 009b. cable              | Balkan Crisis/Kosovo: [U.S. Position at Helsinki Trilateral] (1 page) | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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| 009c. cable              | Balkan Crisis/Kosovo: [Acceptable UNSC Resolution] [Duplicate of 1.28, 2014-0547-M (rs1039_001c)] (1 page) | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

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- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

## Schulte, Gregory L.

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**From:** Pascual, Carlos E.  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 19, 1999 7:58 AM  
**To:** @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @ADHOC KOSOVO  
**Cc:** @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Leavy, David C.  
**Subject:** Strobe-Cherno Update ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

I've already passed the following to Jim, Leon and Greg in early morning calls. Sandy should have this from them (or directly from Strobe). In case it is helpful (and for the benefit of others), let me summarize key points from a de-brief from Andrew as meetings in Helsinki broke up.

- Chernomyrdin walked away this morning from the elaborated statement developed yesterday with G-8 principles and NATO 5 conditions. Said that it would be tantamount to Milosevic raising a white flag and he would never accept it.
- On full Serb force withdrawal, Chernomyrdin said that we are demanding that every last fireman leave Kosovo and that it would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing as there would be no protection for the Serb population.
- Chernomyrdin is on the way to Belgrade. He said he will present the G-8 statement from early May to Milosevic. How this differs from his last trip is unclear. What he will do if Milosevic accepts the Russian interpretation of the statement (without full Serb force withdrawal or NATO at the core of an ISF) is unclear.
- Strobe is going to Bonn G-8 political directors meeting. Strobe and Athisaari will then go to Moscow and meet with Cherno on Thursday.
- Ralston is seeking Shelton concurrence for someone from SHAPE to join the Thursday meeting in Moscow. Focus would be twofold: (1) what exactly does full Serb force withdrawal entail (particularly, what police if any would stay behind); (2) what does NATO at the core mean.
- Cherno wants to go back to Belgrade with Athisaari on Saturday, Sunday or Monday. Athisaari said Monday at the earliest, and that depends on how the next meeting goes with Cherno.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VZ NARA, Date 12/14/2023  
2008-0994-73



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                            | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 010. memo                | For [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from<br>Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report No. 1 (Helsinki-Bonn) (2 pages) | 05/19/1999 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)  
OA/Box Number: 1709

### FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [3]

2008-0994-F

vz6232

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Sunday, May 16, 1999

TO SEC. ALBRIGHT, SEC. COHEN, APNSA BERGER, OVP FUERTH  
FROM STROBE TALBOTT

In preparation for my meeting in Helsinki on Tuesday with Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin, I'd like consideration of an idea that I believe has some potential benefit as well as considerable risk:

A 48-hour pause in the bombing at the time of an Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin mission to Belgrade in exchange for a guaranteed, unconditional, up-front Russian commitment to go along with a Chapter VII United Nations Security Council Resolution supporting our efforts in Kosovo, *including resumption of bombing immediately after Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin get what we unilaterally regard as a no from Milošević.*

The purpose would be to fortify, or advance, three of our objectives at once:

1. **Alliance management:** First and foremost, the approach I'm suggesting here would shore up international (especially Allied) support for a resumed and then on-going military campaign in the event — which I think we must consider the overwhelming likelihood — that Milošević refuses to accept our conditions. A Chapter VII UNSCR would help with virtually all the Allies, especially the Germans, French and Italians, to stay the course.
2. **Russia management:** This approach *might* help with the Russians, who are increasingly desperate to stop the bombing. They care about that outcome more than any of the tough nuts we've been trying to crack in our negotiations (including the issue of "NATO at the core" and unitary command). Getting the bombing stopped is the be-all-and-end-all of Russian diplomacy. The question is: would getting the air strikes stopped for a couple of days check that box for them? Maybe. I believe that we've come close to convincing them of our own resolve to see this thing through on our terms. They may realize they face a fork in the road: they either stay with Milošević and are increasingly marginalized and humiliated, or they give him "one last chance" — again, on *our* terms — then wash their hands of him. That would mean they *might* settle for getting just a *suspension* of bombing rather than cessation; they'd then take credit, with their own pro-FRY constituencies, for having masterminded the pause, calculating that they would then better be able to stand back and let us resume bombing in the wake of Milošević's continuing intransigence.
3. **Increasing pressure on Milošević:** Finally (least promisingly), the approach I'm proposing — insofar as it brings the Russians and Security Council on board NATO's objectives and conditions — might conceivably make a decisive difference with Milošević himself.



Having summarized the pro's, I would like to lay out the many and considerable risks of a pause, which I fully acknowledge but think can be bounded and managed as long as the willingness to consider a pause that is properly conditioned.

- NATO has stated repeatedly and clearly that bombing can be suspended only under NATO's established conditions. Any deviation from that position, no matter how conditioned, is in and of itself questionable, since it could jeopardize the hard-won consensus that bombing will not stop until Milošević has agreed to NATO's conditions. More wobbly allies can be expected to look for ways to keep a pause going past its tactical utility and to seek further pauses in the future.
- Again, no matter how conditioned, a pause will cause pressure instantly to build to extend it in order to "give talks a chance."
- Appearing even to consider a pause, and having that consideration become public, would be interpreted by Milošević as a sign of weakness, even if the conditions we attached to it proved impossible to nail down and the idea goes no further.
- Milošević can be expected to nickel and dime Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin and to try to extend their mission to Belgrade in the hopes of extending the pause. Ahtisaari is solid on that; Chernomyrdin's not.
- Milošević will also likely engage in theatrical but non-substantive "withdrawals" in order to divide the allies.
- A pause might give Milošević the opportunity to regroup his forces and rebuild his air defenses (which may be a subject for further conditions we could add to our willingness to consider the pause).
- It would open us to criticism that Milošević shouldn't be able to earn a pause simply by agreeing to see yet another envoy or two, and that we have stopped hitting him while he continues to commit further atrocities and ethnic cleansing.

In the face of all these dangers and downsides, the only conceivable justification for a pause would be if we could lock the Russians in to a Chapter VII UNSCR, which would have the very significant pluses that I laid out above.

Here's how I would suggest proceeding:

Chernomyrdin is certain, on Tuesday, to renew Russian entreaties for a pause. After Ahtisaari and I double-team him intensively and unrelentingly with a reiteration of our basic position and the immutability of our five principles, I would tell the Russians that I am prepared to pass back to Washington the idea of a pause, but only on one condition: that it be inextricably linked to *prior Russian acquiescence* in a UNSCR authorizing all necessary means to secure and

implement a just peace in Kosovo on our terms, including a NATO-core force. This could be achieved through a resolution that:

- demands Milošević meet the NATO conditions;
- authorizes a multinational force to deploy under unified command and control; and
- urges/requests NATO to stop the bombing only after Milosevic has accepted and abided by the terms of the resolution.

The language I'm suggesting here derives from the work that's already been done within our government and with Allies on possible content of a UNSCR. NATO would not be named in the resolution, and the Russians would probably abstain (as well as elicit a Chinese abstention — which can't be taken for granted). But it would be clearly understood and agreed in advance, before we'd commit to the pause, that NATO was the "regional organization" that was going to be at the core of the military implementation envisioned by the UNSCR.

Since the pause would have to be announced in order to do the Russians any good, so would their commitment to the resolution have to be announced.

We'd need to give further thought to the exact sequencing of the UNSCR itself, along with a G-8 Ministerial and the Cologne Summit. But in trying to assemble the package I'm describing here, we would not leave the Russians any wiggle room to welsh on their end of the deal.

It's likely that the Russians would reject this scheme on the grounds that that can't deliver Milošević and don't want to get caught in the trap of supporting air strikes (to say nothing of an eventual ground war), even implicitly.

It's also likely that the Russians will try to use the offer as an opening to build support for a pause on terms we could not accept, in which case I would shut all discussion down — and, of course, would have been careful not to commit our government (or the Alliance) to any possibility of a pause.

On the other hand, our willingness to consider a pause on the stipulated conditions would put the Russians, if they refuse to go forward, in the position of having turned down a pause that we are — in response to their repeated entreaties — were finally prepared to look at.

Only if they sign up to the whole package I've outlined here would I even send it back to you, and then it would be entirely *ad ref.* It would probably be necessary to go to Moscow and talk to Ivanov to make sure that he understands all our conditions and their firmness. During this period, the package would simply be "under consideration" in Washington.

During that period we would need to test Allied support for the approach, including a resolution text, all of our bottom lines for the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari



mission and *the absolute imperative of restarting bombing after 48-hours if there is no success.*

In other words, I would not suggest we float this idea with the Alliance before Tuesday's meeting in Helsinki. First, the meeting may merely dramatize the inability of the Russians to move forward along this route or any other that we can accept. In which case, Helsinki is the end of a road rather than a new opening.

Last point — which takes us back to a first principle: even if all of this were to fall into place, there's still the looming question of whether Milošević is ready to say, unambiguously, "yes" to all our terms, un-adjusted, un-negotiated. I've designed this proposal on the assumption that he is *not*, and that his answer will still be "no," even if it's disguised as a "yes, but..." In that event, under what I'm suggesting, I think that, having tried this approach, we'll be in better shape to continue pounding away at him for as long as necessary.

**Schulte, Gregory L.**

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**From:** WHSR  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 15, 1999 8:16 PM  
**To:** Allen, Charles A.; Babbitt, James F.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Black, Steven K.; Braden, Susan R.; Brody, Richard J.; Brown, Keim C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Elkind, Jonathan H.; Faranda, Regina D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Miller, Laurel E.; Naplan, Steven J.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Schwartz, Eric P.; Segal, Jack D.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Tedstrom, John E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt); Weiss, Andrew S.; Wippman, David  
**Subject:** US-GOR UNDERSTANDING ON KOSOVO CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION  
**CLASS:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**DTG:** 152105Z MAY 99  
**MSGTO:** RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1016  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9356  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1074  
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6866  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4484  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0296  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7845  
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7409  
**ORIG:** SECSTATE WASHDC  
**PREC:** IMMEDIATE  
**SSN:** 0628  
**TOR:** 990515170807 M3858592

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 090628

INFO USNATO BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE, USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE&

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/09  
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, NARR, SM, RS  
SUBJECT: US-GOR UNDERSTANDING ON KOSOVO CIVILIAN  
IMPLEMENTATION

1. CLASSIFIED BY STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES. REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (S) FOR MOSCOW: DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT AMB. COLLINS PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING PAPER TO GOR AMB. MAYORSKIY. THESE POINTS REPRESENT THE USG VIEW OF THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WAS REACHED WITH THE GOR ON KOSOVO CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE MAY 12-MAY 13 MOSCOW TALKS ON KOSOVO, LED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV.

3. (S) FOR LONDON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, TOKYO, AND OTTAWA: PLEASE SHARE THE PAPER WITH POLITICAL DIRECTORS.

4. (S) BEGIN POINTS:

THE CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE FOR KOSOVO MUST BE EFFECTIVE, WELL-PLANNED, AND DEPLOY RAPIDLY TO AVOID A DANGEROUS VACUUM.

WITH SERBIAN/YUGOSLAV FORCE WITHDRAWAL AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCES, BELGRADE WILL NO LONGER EXERCISE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OVER KOSOVO, ALTHOUGH AS A FORMAL MATTER THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE FRY WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, AND KOSOVO WILL THEREFORE NOT BE SEEN AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORATE.

THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PRESENCE AND INTERIM

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VR NARA, Date 12/14/2023  
2008-0994-Z3



ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COME UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF A UNSC RESOLUTION.

THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PRESENCE SHOULD COORDINATE REFUGEE RETURN (UNHCR), RECONSTRUCTION (EU-LEAD), AND DEMOCRATIZATION-INSTITUTION BUILDING (OSCE). IT MUST BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE. LOCAL POLICE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND MONITORING (UN OR OSCE).

A SINGLE INTERNATIONAL FIGURE SHOULD BE DESIGNATED AS TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR OF KOSOVO TO WORK WITH LOCAL LEADERS AND ESTABLISH AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. (THE RUSSIAN VIEW IS THAT THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD REPRESENT THE UN).

RUSSIA BELIEVES THAT THE KOSOVO TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD ESTABLISH A COUNCIL TO WORK WITH THE KOSOVO TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION. (RUSSIA CONSIDERS THAT THIS COUNCIL SHOULD INCLUDE A REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGRADE). THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATOR WOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ANY ISSUE ALONE.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION (EDUCATION, SOCIAL AND MUNICIPAL SERVICES, ETC.) SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED AS SOON AS FEASIBLE TO LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES. PRIOR TO ELECTIONS, THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR WILL DESIGNATE LOCAL OFFICIALS WHO WILL ACT UNDER HIS GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION (CHOOSING FROM ELDERS, ETC.)..-

A TOP PRIORITY WILL BE REFUGEE RETURN. RATHER THAN FRY/SERBIAN OFFICIALS, UNHCR IN CONSULTATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATOR WILL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHO QUALIFIES FOR VOLUNTARY RETURN TO KOSOVO.

ELECTIONS IN KOSOVO WILL BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES FOR A SETTLEMENT SHOULD NOT DELAY OR DISRUPT ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS IN KOSOVO.

END POINTS.  
TALBOTT