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Folder Title:

Chernomyrdin, [Viktor] / Ahtisaari, [Martti] / MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1709

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39	1	7	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Greg Schulte to Michael Hurley, Carlos Pascual, Andrew Weiss et al. Subject: Milosevic ready to accept NATO's demands? (1 page)	05/31/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Robert Bell, Daniel Benjamin et al. Subject: [Possible agreement] (3 pages)	05/29/1999	P1/b(1)
003. email	Bonnie Broadwick to Andrew Weiss and White House Situation Room. (2 pages)	05/30/1999	P1/b(1)
004. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report #3 (Moscow-Bonn) (4 pages)	05/27/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]

2008-0994-F

vz6231

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



MISSION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
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No. 184/99

Ø per FAX SOBOS
VOTAB
2/7/6


Brussels, 31 May 1999

EU COUNCIL
Mr. Brian Crowe
Director general
PESC
Rue de la Loi 175
Brussels

URGENT

Dear Sir,

I should like to ask you to hand the attached letter to
the Presiding of the EU, Mr. Joska Fisher, during today's GAC meeting.

Yours sincerely,

Nikola Lukic
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

ENCL. LETTER OF MR. ZIVKIN JOVANOVIĆ,
FRY'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER,
ADDRESSED TO EU COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
FOR URGENT CONSIDERATION



FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
FEDERAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

31 May 1999

Mr. Chairman,

I understand that the issues related to the political settlement in Kosovo and Metohija will be discussed today at the meeting of the European Union Foreign Ministers.

Both the Yugoslav and Serbian governments continue to be deeply engaged in reaching a stable political settlement in Kosovo and Metohija, based on principles which guarantee equality of citizens and national communities within autonomy- self governance and with full respect of the integrity and sovereignty of the FR of Yugoslavia.

In this regard, as you are aware, the FR of Yugoslavia has accepted G-8 principles including a United Nations presence, mandate and other elements to be decided by a UN Security Council resolution in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

In order to achieve a successful solution, it is necessary immediately to end the NATO aerial bombardment and to concentrate on a political agenda aimed at reaching a stable and long-lasting political settlement.

In spite of the peace efforts by Yugoslavia and other countries and factors, NATO resorts to a systematic killing of civilians and civilian destruction resulting in the present escalation of the conflict.

Mr. Joseph Fischer
Chairman
Preparatory Meeting of the EU
Foreign Ministers
Brussels

2.

May I remind you of the catastrophic consequences of extended NATO bombing which has caused so far the death of thousands of civilians and seriously wounding thousand others, including children, women, the sick, as well as massive destruction of civilian structures (hospitals, refugee camps and convoys), infrastructure, power and water supply systems, environmental disaster, etc. All these are a crime against peace and humanity. The consequences of NATO bombing are not only felt in Yugoslavia itself but all around Europe.

While you are proceeding with your meeting, the latest NATO bombing struck among other targets, a bridge and marketplace in Varvarin, a town in Serbia, killing many civilians including children and seriously wounding over sixty more people. Shortly after midnight, in an another Serbian town, Surdulica, NATO warplanes hit directly a hospital and sanatorium killing many patients including the elderly. Thus far, 13 bodies have been recovered as rescue operation continues, but there is fear that the death toll is much higher. Those are only the latest catastrophic instances illustrating the humanitarian catastrophe affecting 11 million citizens of Yugoslavia and the inhumane nature of NATO bombing focused on civilians, proving thereby that NATO destruction continues to jeopardize the political process and to underestimate peace efforts.

At the moment when serious diplomatic efforts are being made to reach a political solution, the FR of Yugoslavia, as a European country which is firmly committed to peaceful settlement, is expecting from the Ministerial meeting of the European Union to condemn this senseless aggression and demand its immediate cessation, undertaking thereby its part of historical responsibility.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.


Zivan Jovanovic

GESAMT SEITEN 03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0100, June 2, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR STROBE TALBOTT

The 6/2/99 (A.M.) text has been reviewed by Sandy Berger, Jim Steinberg, Leon Feurth, Jim Dobbins and Jim Bodner. We assume that Doc Foglesong and George Casey have reviewed it on behalf of the JCS.

We can agree to the text with two caveats:

First, Ahtisaari will need to make clear, as part of the "further, previously identified, required elements" that:

- suspension of NATO's air strikes also depends on the demonstrable beginning of FRY withdrawal;
- conclusion of a military-technical agreement should not be allowed to slow the withdrawal.

Second, OSD requests that the "NATO" footnote be clarified to read: "It is understood that NATO considers an international security force with "substantial NATO participation" and "unified command and control" to mean having NATO at the core. This in turn means a unified NATO chain of command....."

Greg Schulte

WASHFAX
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SITE

4

8

Message No. 019571 Classification CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages Attached 4

From: DEP SEC TALBOTT
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Phone number) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION RESULTS FROM JUNE 1-2 MEETING

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO: (Person/Office)</u>	<u>Phone no.</u>	<u>Room no.</u>
<u>WHSE</u>			
	<u>STEINBERG</u>		
	<u>SCHULTE</u>		
	<u>PASCUAL</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 12/14/2023
2008-0924-F3

June 2, 1999

TO: P - Under Secretary Pickering

S/SA - Dobbins

S/P - Halperin/O'Brien

EUR - Grossman

FROM: Talbott Party (Levinsky)

FYI, attached is the result of today's efforts, at the Russians' and Finns' urging, to reach an agreement on a common Atihisaari-Chernomyrdin script for their use in Belgrade. Outstanding issues are use of the word "all" in the second bullet, and "Among the other elements" in the footnote, which the Russians rightly read to mean that this paper does not purport to state all of NATO's conditions for a suspension of military action. Russians have not yet reviewed this text, which represents the results of the discussion. We will meet with the Russians at 9 am local today to compare texts.

TEXT 6/2/99 (A.M.)

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police, and para-military forces according to a rapid timetable.
- Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security presence with substantial NATO participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with international civil mission and international security force
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to further, previously identified, required elements. A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Timetable for their return
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

* Among the other elements: It is understood that NATO considers an international security force with a NATO core, or "substantial NATO participation," to mean a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. It is understood that Russia's position is (to be filled in).

To: Jim Steinberg
From: Andrew Weiss

As discussed. 6 pages to follow

cc: Schutte/Pascal

Attachments:

- p. 1: Fixes we are trying to make to 1st. part of joint document.
- p. 2: Fixes we are trying to make on suspension based on SRB/MICA guidance to Strobe.
- p. 3, 4: Base document being worked off of.
- p. 5, 6: Original Ahtisaari document.

CB

Draft Loutsky/Singoff
Comments on Russian
mark-up of Ahtisaari
paper 6/1

Modify Russian mark up of Ahtisaari text (attached and numbered) for what is now conceived of as a joint script as follows:

- 1) okay
- 2) Crosses U.S./NATO redlines. See proposed fix at para. 10 below.
- 3) "Under UN flag" implies UN control and traditional UN peacekeeping operation. "As may be required" suggests requirement for UNSCR. Options for fix:
 - Option 1:
Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting under the UN Charter including Chapter VII, capable of guaranteeing the achieving of common objectives.
 - Option 2:
Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- 4) Russian use of "presence" consistent with G-8. Substitution of "substantial NATO participation" for "NATO core" could be problematic, Russian change to para. 11 even more so. Proposed fix: handle at para. 10 below.
- 5) Okay with deletions (Rambouillet reference preserved in para. 8).
- 6) Deletions blur authority of international security force, and could lead to misinterpretation of number of returns. Proposed fix, see para. 10.
- 7) Okay, UNHCR supervision sufficient for time being.
- 8) No change.
- 9) No change.

This language proposed to Russians; going in circles in discussion.

10. SUSPENSION PARA

Option 1:

Keep reference to suspension, but move tricky points down to the spot where suspension is discussed by modifying paragraph beginning "After agreement on the above . . ." to read:

"There will be a suspension of military activity after agreement on the key points set forth above, the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, and acceptance of the following additional points:

All military, police, and paramilitary forces will withdraw to elsewhere in Serbia (e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).

The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" or "substantial NATO participation" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces.

The small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel permitted to return after withdrawals will act under the supervision of the international security force.

During the suspension of military activity, a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. The discussion and achieving of this agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. Such modalities would include:"

Option 2:

"After agreement on the above . . ." to the end of the document. Replace with:

"Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to further, previously identified, required elements. A military-technical agreement will be then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: "

Base Document
Used For Mark-Up

Anti-Saraj Document
w/ Russian comments
8/1

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- ① • Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- ② • Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo ^{or} elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-military forces ~~according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; all defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).~~
under UN auspices of
- ③ • Deployment in Kosovo under the UN flag of an international operation consisting of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations acting, as may be required, under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- ④ • The international security ~~force~~ presence with a substantial NATO ~~core~~ participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- ⑤ • Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while ~~establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.~~
- ⑥ • After full withdrawal and, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with international civil mission and international security force
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- ⑦ • Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- ⑧ • A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
- ⑨ • Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe

Need to see ALL



*

*How strongly do we feel?
Change out*

with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.

(10) After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. Such modalities would include.

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Timetable for their return
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

It is understood that the substantial NATO participation considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to would mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force presence. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SEFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations. The Russian units will not be under the NATO command.

Ahtisaari: document
6/11/99

Original Ahtisaari
Paper

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with international civil mission and international security force
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. The discussion and achieving of this agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. Such modalities would include:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Timetable for their return
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.

NOTE FOR SANDY AND JIM

Subject: Developments in Bonn

Again, Sandy may have more detail on the following from Strobe, but here's what I know on the political and military discussions.

Political. Russians were adamantly opposed to "hammer and anvil" duo script and insisted on a unified script.

- Basis for the unified script is the previously revised Finn paper, further revised by the Russians, then "elaborated" during today's discussions, then modified at ST's instructions after ST spoke to Sandy and MKA. Script should be on the way back imminently; Greg is trying to track it down.
- The unified script, however, would not be enough to get a bombing pause. ST recognizes that the Russians and our Allies would need to understand that before Ahtisaari and Strobe go in. (Rather than speculate on the missing pieces in the script, it is probably better to wait and see it.)

Strobe has asked for comments on the paper ASAP; Greg will coordinate as soon as he gets the paper.

Unsolicited reaction: it is unclear what we get from presenting Milosevic a new position that is not enough to warrant a suspension. Worst case scenario would be that Milosevic accepts the presentation in full, even signs it. Then the Euros and the Russians say we should take this as the basis for a suspension - in effect increasing pressure on ourselves to back off NATO's conditions. The separate 1-on-1s could also be dangerous; it eliminates our ability to counter inaccurate portrayals by Cherno.

Is there an alternative to the unified script? Unclear to me at this point given the levels at which this has been discussed. Perhaps one option would be to play hard ball and insist on the two separate scripts since this was Cherno's idea to begin with.

Military. Russians now talking about a "substantial" NATO role, a NATO presence in Kosovo to perform humanitarian and engineering task, but not NATO command and control. Russians hated idea of PJC political control.

cc: Greg

Carlos

June 1

FOR SANDY AND JIM

News from Bonn is incomplete; discussions still very much in process, so I'm hesitant to put anything on e-mail at this time. Three points and process recap:

1. Russian proposal is more a formula for a bombing pause than a detailed peace proposal. Per Andrew, at best it might be turned into part of the "hammer" script reinforced by details in the "anvil" script. The Russians had not give the proposal to Ahtisaari as of this morning. We will know more after Strobe, Chernov and Ahtisaari meet (see 4 below).
2. Chernov wants a UN blessing for the trip. Strobe has raised with MKA and she has asked State to follow up with UN.
3. Military talks: opened, went for 5 minutes, then Russians said that they had to wait to talk. Not clear if they are negative on our ideas or whether they first want "political" discussions to occur.
4. Process: ST met with Chernov, then with Ahtisaari, then with Chernov again. As of 9:35 am (EST), ST was still waiting for trilateral meeting to start.

Carlos

cc: Gray, Tony

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'99 MAY 30 P7:23

B

S/S # _____

019538

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 1+5

FROM

Officer name	Office Symbol	Extension	Room #
Col John Bell	EUR/RPM/	647-3374	6513

TO

Agency	Officer name	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Greg Schulte	456-9102	
OSD/BTF	CDR Jim Fraser	695-6539	
JCS/BTF	Col Jack Donovan	614/9431	

USNATO AMB VERSHROU; Doug McELHANEY

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Pol/Mil Considerations for Russian Participation in KFOR

FOR

CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS

Attached is to provide and complement pol/mil discussions with Russia above the mil-to-mil structural issues re potential Russian participation in KFOR. Need your comments by 11:00, Monday, May 31. Please provide comments via Wash-fax or voice to Peter Hinz at (202) 647-3405.

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 12/14/2023
7008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATO/Russia Consultations on Military Aspects of Kosovo Implementation

This paper lays out a mechanism for creating and managing the political framework which overlays the practical and operational arrangements by which Russia would participate in KFOR. It offers ways in which Russia could characterize its relationship with NATO and help manage the domestic political consequences of participating in a NATO-led operation in Kosovo only shortly after NATO has been bombing Yugoslavia. More importantly, it not only provides an opportunity to revive the NATO-Russia relationship and imbue it the "serious" content the Russians sought in the PJC prior to the Kosovo crisis. This option would be presented to Russia for consideration as part of further discussions concerning Russian participation in KFOR.

I. Objectives

1. Reinvigorate NATO-Russia relations.
2. Protect integrity of NATO's command structure and the NAC's position as ultimate political authority for KFOR.
3. Ensure all arrangements for political authority over KFOR maintain or increase the force's effectiveness.
4. Maintain/protect the principle of NATO's right to independent action/non-subordination to other institutions or organizations.
5. Provide Russia to maximum extent possible a politically acceptable mechanism to enable it to participate in NATO-core KFOR.

II. Assumptions

- U.S. supports maximum practicable involvement of Russia within full range of Kosovo implementation aspects, including KFOR, short of subordinating NATO decision-making in any way.
- In U.S. interest to rejuvenate NATO/Russia relationship and PJC specifically
- Russians want to participate in KFOR but need ways to manage domestic political considerations and fallout stemming from working w/ "NATO bombers" after hostilities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By VZ NARA, Date 12/14/2023

2008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- **NATO chain of command, command structure, pol/mil framework are mechanisms used for KFOR operation**
- **UNSCR requests regional organizations to establish security presence, defers to them on composition/structure, etc.; also requests the organizations to report to the UNSC at regular intervals.**

III. Underlying Principles

- **Shared interest in regional peace and stability: full implementation of the G-8 principles for resolution of the Kosovo conflict**
- **Principles enshrined in the Founding Act, especially respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states and the inviolability of borders and peoples' right to self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents.**
- **NATO and Russia's shared interest in identifying as many opportunities for joint decisions and joint action as possible.**
- **Recognition that neither NATO nor Russia has a veto over the actions of the other; both retain their respective rights to independent action and decision-making.**
- **Russia will retain national control of its forces.**

IV. Consultation Mechanisms

1. **PJC/Ambassadorial level meets regularly (default is monthly, perhaps more frequently during early stages of the mission) to:**
 - **consult on KFOR OPLAN prior to NAC approval (consistent with process established by new Pol-Mil Framework for Partner Participation)**
 - **review and monitor progress toward accomplishing KFOR mission and objectives;**
 - **review changes to KFOR mission and objectives; Russian approval required only for those aspects that directly affect Russian troops.**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- review and consult on regular reports on military implementation to the UNSC]
 - this is an illustrative list of examples for consultation – would expect additional topics to be added
2. **Experts-level PJC (perhaps Policy Coordination Group) meets as needed – perhaps weekly or bi-weekly to discuss more detailed issues or address ad hoc issues as they arise, such as:**
- receive bi-monthly report from NMA's
 - assessing progress in implementing individual mission tasks (including establishing safe and secure environment, demilitarizing KLA, etc.);
 - soliciting Russian views on areas for improved coordination and communication between the civil mission and the security force, as appropriate and necessary;
 - assessing, clarifying and, as needed, recommending changes to broad political guidance for SACEUR and KFOR chain of command (as requested by SHAPE or identified by the NAC).
 - **Experts' work might include joint field assessments in Kosovo and consultations with KFOR elements to facilitate assessments. In this way, Russia could have direct access to KFOR field elements throughout Kosovo.**
 - could examine whether some smaller, or more informal set of staff consultations could substitute for formal experts' discussions.
3. **PJC Troika could be used to:**
- **discuss and review Russia's perspective and position on time-sensitive requests from KFOR chain of command for additional guidance, or clarification of existing guidance;**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- **consult informally on aspects of KFOR mission implementation when full-blown PJC is not warranted or impractical.**
4. **Informal consultations and coordination between SYG Solana and the Russian representative to the PJC, at their discretion and as they deemed useful and necessary.**
 5. **Russia would be able, both in determining the agenda for PJC meetings and via the "any other business" provision, to raise and provide NATO countries its views on any issue related to the security aspects of Kosovo implementation and KFOR's mission (except issues within the purview of the KFOR military chain of command).**

V. Timing

- **Any and all of the mechanisms outlined above could be activated as soon as Russia indicates an interest in doing so and an intention to contribute forces to KFOR.**
- **In that event, Russia would have the opportunity to be heavily involved in the conceptual and operational planning for KFOR.**

VI. Red Lines

- **The PJC would not directly provide guidance to NATO military authorities; that remains the sole prerogative of the NAC.**
- **Russia would be actively and frequently consulted regarding KFOR's mission. Its assessments of and recommendations on the force, particularly on the role of its forces, would be carefully considered by the NAC. It would not have a veto over NAC decisions concerning KFOR.**
- **None of the consultative arrangements outlined in this paper would violate the principles of unity of command; common mission/purpose; common rules of engagement; or impinge upon the ability of SACEUR/KFOR commander, in consultation with their respective Russian counterparts, to establish additional measures to ensure accomplishment of KFOR's mission.**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

- **NATO's consultations with Russia would not disadvantage other Partners participating in KFOR (though we must recognize that some of the consultative mechanisms employed will duplicate NATO's consultations with partners contributing to the force).**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, May 31, 1999 8:31 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Baker, James E.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Crowley, Philip J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Klein, Brian P.; Leavy, David C.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: YUGOSLAVIA-EUROPE-AHT

CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: Reuters
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 990531081833 R0313053

a1018

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-EUROPE-AHTISAARI

^EU agrees to send mediator to Belgrade

BRUSSELS, May 31 (Reuters) - European Union foreign ministers agreed on Monday on the principle of sending Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to Belgrade this week on a mission to try and secure peace in the Kosovo crisis.

Diplomats said the visit was "pretty likely" and could take place as early as Wednesday, following a meeting between Ahtisaari and the U.S. and Russian Balkans envoys Strobe Talbott and Viktor Chernomyrdin in Bonn on Tuesday.

Those talks would be followed by a meeting of the three envoys with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, they said.

Ahtisaari, the EU Balkans envoy, could then brief the 15-nation bloc's leaders at their two-day summit in Cologne, Germany, starting on Thursday, they added.

Diplomats said Ahtisaari would be expected to meet Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade in a bid to get him to translate into deeds his reported acceptance of a peace formula worked out by the eight big (G8) powers.

Ahtisaari's visit would be the first official EU contact with Milosevic since he was indicted last week by the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia on charges of war crimes for his role in allegedly orchestrating the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in Kosovo.

In a statement issued during regular consultations in Brussels, the ministers said they "expect Belgrade to translate its reported statements into a firm, unambiguous and verifiable commitment to accept the G8 principles and a UNSC (United Nations Security Council resolution)."

Four G8 countries -- Italy, France, Germany and Britain -- were represented at the EU talks.

The ministers also said they were open to a European Commission plan to propose a new kind of relationship to Balkan countries like Albania and Macedonia -- but also Croatia and Bosnia -- bearing the fallout of the crisis in neighbouring Yugoslavia.

RB-- 05/31/99 08:02:00

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Sunday, May 30, 1999 11:13 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.; Roberts, Michael W.; Saunders, Richard M.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY STROBE TALBOTT FOR REASONS

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 310302Z MAY 99
MSGTO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 1857
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 0742
TOR: 990530230902 M3884133

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 100742

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/09
TAGS: PREL, RS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV

CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY STROBE TALBOTT FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(C)~~ NIACT PRECEDENCE REQUIRED TO ENSURE DELIVERY AT OOB IN MOSCOW MAY 31. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. ~~(C)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR IGOR SERGEYEVICH:

AS WE AGREED WHEN WE TALKED ON SATURDAY, THE DAYS AHEAD ARE CRUCIAL. THE WEEK BEGINS, APPROPRIATELY, WITH A PHONE CALL BETWEEN OUR PRESIDENTS. THEN YOU AND I WILL TALK. WE ALL AWAIT VICTOR STEPANOVICH'S READ-OUT ON HIS FOURTH MISSION TO BELGRADE. WE ALSO HOPE THAT BY MID-WEEK, WE WILL HAVE FURTHER INDICATION OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP'S INTENTIONS BASED ON A JOINT CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI MISSION THERE. YOU RAISED WITH ME - AND, I KNOW, WITH OTHERS - THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE VICE PRESIDENT OR I SHOULD

COME TO BONN FOR THE TRILATERAL ON TUESDAY. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE MATTER CAREFULLY AND CONCLUDED THAT, FOR PURPOSES OF THE NEXT STEP IN THIS PROCESS, WE THINK STROBE SHOULD CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE U.S. YOU AND I CAN TALK MID-WEEK ABOUT OUR GETTING TOGETHER, EITHER BILATERALLY OR AT THE G-8 OR BOTH. AS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT, HE STANDS READY TO HELP AS APPROPRIATE - ONCE WE HAVE A FULLER PICTURE BASED ON THE COMING CRITICAL DAYS.

SINCERELY,

MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

(NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW)

END TEXT
ALBRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VL NARA, Date 12/14/2023

2008-0994 - F3

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, May 31, 1999 12:25 PM
To: Blinken, Antony J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Hurley, C. Michael; Pascual, Carlos E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: KOSOVO: MAY 31 MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 311600Z MAY 99
MSGTO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1600
ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2478
TOR: 990531121417 M3884410

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012478

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EMBASSY HELSINKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/09
TAGS: PREL, RS, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MAY 31 MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES F. COLLINS.
REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (S) I SAW FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND CURRENT RUSSIAN BALKAN ENVOY VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN IN THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 31 TO GET A READ-OUT ON HIS TRIP LAST WEEK TO BELGRADE AND TO LOOK AHEAD TO THIS COMING WEEK. CHERNOMYRDIN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A LOT OF DETAIL TO GIVE ME BECAUSE THE GOR HAD NOT YET DECIDED FOR ITSELF EXACTLY WHERE THINGS STAND AT THE MOMENT. I HAD REQUESTED AN EARLIER MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN, BUT COULD ONLY MEET WITH HIM ON THE 31ST BECAUSE HE ONLY BRIEFED YELTSIN THE DAY BEFORE. HE SAID HE WOULD SEE STEPASHIN AT AROUND 5:00 PM LOCAL TIME TODAY.

LAST WEEK'S MEETING

2. (S) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT IN THE ALMOST 10 HOURS OF MEETINGS HE HAD IN BELGRADE MAY 28 WITH HIM, MILOSEVIC:

-- AGREED TO THE G-8 PRINCIPLES, SOMETHING CHERNOMYRDIN SAID HE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY DONE, AT LEAST NOT IN THEIR COMPLETE FORM, AS ADOPTED.

-- HAD "ABSOLUTELY NO REACTION" TO THE INDICTMENT AGAINST HIM BY THE ICTY.

-- DID NOT APPEAR DIFFERENT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY FROM THE PREVIOUS VISITS.

-- LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR DISCUSSION AND THAT THERE ARE STILL CHANCES FOR A RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

3. (S) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT THE SERB MILITARY, IN HIS VIEW, DID NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING IN ANY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 12/14/2023

2008-0994 - F3

TROUBLE. HE SAID THE ARMY IS NOT YET REALLY ACTIVE AND IS PREPARING ITSELF FOR "THE WORST." THEY TOLD HIM THAT THEY WILL BE READY TO KILL "TWO OR THREE ENEMIES FOR EVERY SERB KILLED" AND "TWO OR THREE FOR EVERY HOUSE DESTROYED." CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS FROM BELGRADE OF ANY NEW INFLEXIBILITIES REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE PROCESS.

THIS WEEK'S MEETINGS

4. (S) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID HIS CURRENT PLAN IS TO GO TO BONN TO MEET WITH AHTISAARI, SCHROEDER AND THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON TUESDAY, JUNE 1. HE THEN EXPECTS TO GO TO BELGRADE WITH AHTISAARI. I TOLD HIM I EXPECTED HIS U.S. INTERLOCUTOR TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY. I NOTED THAT STEPASHIN WOULD BE CALLING WASHINGTON TODAY AND THAT THE SECRETARY PLANNED TO SPEAK WITH IVANOV AS WELL. CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT GENERALS IVASHEV AND ZAVARZIN WOULD BE GOING AS PART OF THE RUSSIAN TEAM AND INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE MILITARY DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. OVERALL, HE WAS ADAMANT THAT THE "BIG ISSUES" NEED TO BE RESOLVED FIRST, AND THE MILITARY PEOPLE MUST WORK OUT THE NECESSARY DETAILS REGARDING NUMBERS AND SPECIFIC COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.

5. (S) LAYING OUT THE MAIN ISSUES OF CONTENTION THAT REMAINED AFTER LAST WEEK'S MEETINGS HERE -- WITHDRAWALS, THE MAKE-UP AND ORGANIZATION OF A SECURITY FORCE, AND THE UNSCR AND OVERALL UN RELATIONSHIP TO THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE -- I ASKED CHERNOMYRDIN IF HE SAW ANY NEW AREA COMING TO THE FORE IN BELGRADE THAT THE U.S. SHOULD COME TO BONN PREPARED TO ADDRESS IN DETAIL. CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT HE SAW NO SUCH NEW ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE SAW AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS AT THIS JUNCTURE AND THAT THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE CRITICAL. EMPHASIZING AGAIN THAT THE BIG ISSUES MUST BE TACKLED HE SAID THAT WE NEED NOW MORE THAN EVER TO AVOID AMBIGUITIES -- AMONG OURSELVES AND WITH MILOSEVIC.

6. (S) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT THE KLA WOULD BE A BIG PROBLEM FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. HE EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE KLA'S CURRENT ACTIVITY AMONG THE REFUGEES. ON REFUGEES, HE EXPRESSED THE GENERAL BELIEF THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THE YOUNGER REFUGEES WOULD NOT WANT TO RETURN TO KOSOVO. HE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF DOCUMENTATION FOR RETURNING REFUGEES AND SUGGESTED THAT, SINCE ALBANIA IS EVEN POORER THAN KOSOVO, THERE MIGHT BE ALBANIANS FROM ALBANIA TRYING TO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 012478

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EMBASSY HELSINKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/09

TAGS: PREL, RS, SR

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MAY 31 MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN

GO INTO KOSOVO WITH THE GENERAL REFUGEE POPULATION. (NOTE: IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF THIS WAS HIS IDEA OR IF THE SERBS HAD MENTIONED IT TO HIM. END NOTE.)

7. (S) COMMENT. CHERNOMYRDIN REALLY DID NOT GIVE ME A LOT, AND I SENSED THAT HE HAD NOT DONE THE NECESSARY TALKING WITH ALL THE PLAYERS HERE YET IN THE WAKE OF HIS FRIDAY TRIP TO BELGRADE. HE ENGAGED IN NO

POSTURING AND SEEMED VERY SERIOUS ABOUT HIS UPCOMING TRIP TO GERMANY AND THE FRY. HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT ENERGIZED TO TACKLE THE "BIG ISSUES" AND AT THE SAME TIME, ENGAGE IVASHEV AND THE RUSSIAN MILITARY ON SOME OF THE RELATED BUT MORE DETAILED QUESTIONS. HE DID NOT TRY TO SELL ME ON A "ZONAL" APPROACH AND IMPLIED THAT THAT KIND OF ARRANGEMENT AS WELL AS THE COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE WAS SEEN BY THE GOR (OR HIM) AS "DETAILS." REGARDING THE "CRITICALITY" OF THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, HE APPEARED TO BE IMPLYING THAT THE PROCESS IS NOW LEADING UP TO A MAKE-OR-BREAK POINT AT THE G-8 SUMMIT.

COLLINS

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Monday, May 31, 1999 11:37 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @KOSOVO; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject: Political Consultation Arrangements for Russian Participation in KFOR [CONFIDENTIAL]

Sandy - cc: Don

At 2:00, the JCS will brief you and MKA on ways to incorporate the Russians into KFOR from a military perspective. They are likely to propose an "SFOR-Plus" model, with special command arrangements for the Russian contribution.

In parallel, State has developed a framework for *political* consultations on KFOR operations. This mechanism relies on regular meetings of the PJC at ambassadorial and subordinate levels to consult on planning and operations, as well as use of the PJC Troika (SecGen, Russian amb, and one NATO amb) to discuss and review Russian's position on time-sensitive requests for guidance from the KFOR chain of command.

The political framework provides for PJC consultation, but not decision-making. As with SFOR, the NAC would retain the sole prerogative for providing guidance to KFOR, and Russia would not have a veto over NAC decisions.

The State framework, which is being cleared interagency, meets all of our concerns about unity of command and "NATO at the core". It is unlikely, however, to look attractive to Moscow, which will probably want greater assurance that its views will be taken into account.

As we did in Bosnia, I would recommend nailing down the military arrangements before negotiating the political arrangements. Otherwise likely disagreements on the political side could overturn what progress we've been able to achieve on the military side.

Carlos and Andrew agree.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0994-E3

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, May 31, 1999 9:52 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Baker, James E.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Crowley, Philip J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Klein, Brian P.; Leavy, David C.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: YUGOSLAVIA-G8
CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: Reuters
PREC: URGENT/SNAP
TOR: 990531094656 R0313292

a1256

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-G8 URGENT

^Yugoslavia confirms acceptance of G8 principles

BELGRADE, May 31 (Reuters) - Yugoslavia on Monday confirmed its acceptance of the principles laid down by the big power Group of Eight countries, the state news agency Tanjug said.

"In accordance with our consistent policy of peace and defence of freedoms, Yugoslavia has accepted the G8 principles and thinks a U.N. Security Council resolution, in accordance with the U.N. charter, should enable the transfer of the resolution of the crisis from the military to the political sphere," it said.

RB-- 05/31/99 09:31:00

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S # _____

8

'99 MAY 29 04:07

MESSAGE NO. 019530 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 1+48

FROM

Officer name	Office Symbol	Extension	Room #
Col John Bell	EUR/RPM/	647-3374	6513

TO

Agency	Officer name	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Greg Schulte	456-9102	
OVP	Leslie Davidson		
JCS/BTF	LTC Ben Allen	614-9431	

OSD/BTF COL GREG KAUFMAN 695-6539

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari Texts (Sat afternoon version, 3:40)

FOR

CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS

Latest version given to EUR DAS Jim Swigert. He will be making call to Jon Levitsky in Helsinki. He may tweak Chernomyrdin text in order to make it more acceptable to Russians which is problematic. U.S. desired text at bullets 6 and 10 is not now acceptable. He will indicate to Levitsky our red-line in the Ahtisaari text.

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 12/14/2023
2008-0194-73

Belgrade Script: Part One (Chernomyrdin)

To move toward the resolution of the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on the following principles:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces.
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- An effective international security presence must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. All NATO countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security presence.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- ~~After the suspension of hostilities~~ verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and para-military forces, Belgrade authorities will plan for be allowed a small, agreed number of personnel in Kosovo to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with international civil and security presences
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

2

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- After the ~~suspension of military activity~~ beginning of verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and para-military forces on terms to be elaborated by President Ahtisaari, a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo. Such modalities would include:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule

Yugoslav/Serb Personnel in Kosovo

- Equipment associated with Yugoslav/Serb personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences

Belgrade Script: Part Two (Athisaari)

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression In Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with International civil mission and international security force
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the Implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. The discussion and achieving of this agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. Such modalities would include:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Timetable for their return
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will - be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.

Belgrade Script: Part One (Chernomyrdin)

To move toward the resolution of the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on the following principles:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces.
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- An effective international security presence must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. All NATO countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security presence.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After the verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and para-military forces, Belgrade authorities will be allowed a small, agreed number of personnel in Kosovo to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with international civil and security presences
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- After the beginning of verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and para-military forces on terms to be elaborated by President Ahtisaari, a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo. Such modalities would include:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule

Yugoslav/Serb Personnel in Kosovo

- Equipment associated with Yugoslav/Serb personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences

Belgrade Script: Part Two (Athisaari)

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and paramilitary forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with International civil mission and international security force
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the Implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. The discussion and achieving of this agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. Such modalities would include:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Timetable for their return
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will - be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, May 31, 1999 11:00 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Black, Steven K.; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brody, Richard J.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Elkind, Jonathan H.; Faranda, Regina D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Segal, Jack D.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Tedstrom, John E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt); Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: FEDERALREPUBLICOFYUGOS
CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: FBIS
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 990531095201 F0313300

F1130
FBIS S 130MAY31
UNCLAS 2Y

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: Milosevic Reiterates Acceptance of G8 Principles LD3105134099 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 May 99

[FBIS Translated Text]

The president of the republic, Slobodan Milosevic, today held a meeting with top state officials. They discussed the issues of importance for the peaceful political solution to the problem, as discussed during the talks between President Milosevic and senior officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia with Viktor Chernomyrdin, special envoy of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and his team.

It was said that the tabled proposals aimed to bring about the cessation of the aggression against Yugoslavia and re-establish of peace, and to pave the way for the political solution to the open issues in Kosovo-Metohija.

The importance was stressed of the view shared by the international community and our country that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] must be respected, and of the commitment that the autonomy of Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija] in Serbia would be drawn in such a way so as to safeguard the equality of all citizens and ethnic groups, which is the key to the political solution.

In line with our consistent policy of peace and defence of freedom, the FRY has accepted the G8 principles and believes that the UN Security Council, in line with the UN Charter, should now make it possible with its resolution to move the solution to the crisis from the military to the political track, which implies the return of the UN to its basic role of safeguarding peace and stability.

The return of refugees to their homes and the resolution to humanitarian problems caused by the incessant bombardment are a priority of state authorities. It was said that the FRY would make an active and direct contribution to finding a peaceful political solution, and to its consistent implementation, and thus ensure that the open issues are overcome successfully

The activities of the NATO aviation against civilian targets

words indistinct], such as in Varvarin and Surdulica, and other

grave crimes committed against humanity therefore deserve an even stronger condemnation. Massacres and crimes committed by the NATO aggressor on a daily basis are the most serious warning to the world [words indistinct] peace efforts.

It was also said during the meeting that the competent authorities, state companies and utilities had displayed a high degree of professionalism and dedication in dealing with the serious consequences of the air strikes, which were going on day and night, on facilities of vital importance to the population, and that they were making great effort to ensure the functioning of vital systems -- water supply, power supply, health care, provision of foodstuffs and basic economic activities in the country -- as much as possible. The employees and experts of

these services were praised for their great effort and achieved results.

Top state leadership also praised the unity of the armed forces and the people in the defence of the country, adding that the tasks in the state of war were being successfully carried out.

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ENDALL) 31 MAY 1351z FBIS NNNN
FBIS 05/31/99 09:36:00

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Monday, May 31, 1999 12:43 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @ADHOC KOSOVO; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @WHSR - WH Situation Room
Subject: FW: 5/31 MKA-Ivanov call readout [CONFIDENTIAL]

-----Original Message-----

From: Weiss, Andrew S.
Sent: Monday, May 31, 1999 12:36 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.
Subject: 5/31 MKA-Ivanov call readout [CONFIDENTIAL]

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY and JIM ASAP

Ivanov told MKA that the Russians have worked up a very serious proposal that will be presented tomorrow. "I didn't sleep for two nights working on it." He said today's phone call was very good, provides basis for a good discussion tomorrow.

MKA said that it's not so important what we do together, but where Milosevic is. Ivanov cut her off and said, regardless of what Milosevic agrees to do, Russia will stick to what we say we'll do.

MKA began to say that KFOR must be robust. Ivanov cut her off and said you'll see from our proposal that we don't want a disorganized force.

MKA began to talk about need for total withdrawal of FRY forces. Ivanov cut her off again and said, you'll see our proposal is serious.

Ivanov then put Primakov on the line. (MFA was hosting a farewell for him today.) Primo said he's going to Switzerland to give lecture and get medical treatment.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By vz NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0944 - ~~17~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Greg Schulte to Michael Hurley, Carlos Pascual, Andrew Weiss et al. Subject: Milosevic ready to accept NATO's demands? (1 page)	05/31/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]

2008-0994-F

vz6231

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Robert Bell, Daniel Benjamin et al. Subject: [Possible agreement] (3 pages)	05/29/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]

2008-0994-F
vz6231

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Saturday, May 29, 1999 9:38 AM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject: RUSSIA:MoreonYugoslavi
CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: FBIS
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 990529080251 F0304215

F9079
FBIS S 079MAY29
UNCLAS 3A

RUSSIA: More on Yugoslavia Agreeing to Russia Settlement Plan LD2905115499
Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in English 1140 GMT 29 May 99

[By Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

MOSCOW, May 29 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian president's Balkan envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin during his May 28 visit to Belgrade laid before the Yugoslav leadership a plan of settlement of the Balkan crisis.

An informed source in Moscow told Itar-Tass on Saturday that the plan envisions a halt to NATO's bombing, reduction of the Yugoslav army and police strength in Kosovo province and the start of a peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the United Nations.

The sources said the Yugoslav side "has fully agreed to the Russian draft of the plan".

Under the plan, contingents of troops of NATO states participating in the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia are to be deployed in Albania and Macedonia and to be tasked with sealing off the conflict region and keeping the Kosovo Liberation Army out of it, and with attending to humanitarian relief of Kosovo refugees.

Peacekeeping forces of NATO countries that stayed away from the air operations are to be introduced to the border area of Kosovo to reinforce border control and secure stability in areas in their charge.

Military contingents of neutral countries, including Russia and other CIS members, would be stationed in the remaining territory of Kosovo with the task of policing security and refugee return.

The plan calls for placing the general leadership of the peace operation on the United Nations Security Council, with a commander of peacekeeping forces to be appointed from a neutral country. A chief of staff could be a representative of a NATO country that took no part in the military action against Yugoslavia.

The source said Yugoslavia "has fully agreed to the Russian draft of the plan and expressed a readiness to go along with a number of additional concessions".

in particular, Belgrade could agree to the use of reconnaissance planes of NATO and Russia in control of its withdrawing its troops.

Besides, an expansion of the border area would be possible, as well as incorporation of elements of NATO's control system into staff bodies of the peacekeeping operation's command.

Overall, Russia-proposed plan and Yugoslavia's readiness for compromise solutions open a realistic way to settlement of the Balkan crisis with heed for stances of all concerned parties, the source said. [Description of Source: ITAR-TASS World Service - Main government information agency.]

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ENDALL) 29 MAY 1202z FBIS NNNN
FBIS 05/29/99 07:47:00

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Bonnie Broadwick to Andrew Weiss and White House Situation Room. (2 pages)	05/30/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]

2008-0994-F

vz6231

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.72)

10/2/2018 K3H

If Yeltsin says Milosevic is now ready to make the hard decision on his part, and the time has come for hard decisions on our part

- First, let me say how much I appreciate Russia's diplomatic efforts -- and yours in particular. This is a hard and important issue for both of us, not least because of its relevance to U.S.-Russian relations and my own relationship with you.
- Second, Viktor Stepanovich has obviously been doing hard work on your behalf. I'm very much looking forward to getting a full report from Strobe, who will meet with Viktor and Ahtisaari in Bonn on Tuesday.
- I hope Viktor and Ahtisaari will go to Belgrade together on Wednesday. That will give us a fresh reading on where Milosevic stands on the key issues.
- But let me be clear. Milosevic knows what he has to do to stop the bombing. We cannot eliminate any of the essential details that need to be nailed down to bring this conflict to an end.
- Think you and I should talk as soon as possible after Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari complete the mission.

If Yeltsin says, "We can't delay hard decisions any longer -- we've got to accelerate and upgrade this process right now. Enough stalling - enough going around in circles."

- Boris, I'm as determined as anyone to keep the diplomacy moving forward as quickly as possible. But there are a couple of points I hope you'll understand.
- First, I need the report from the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission as a basis for my own judgement about where Milosevic is.
- Second, the conditions I laid out for you back in mid-April still stand. The two most important of those conditions are, first, that NATO must be at the core of the peacekeeping

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

operation; this is essential to get the refugees back; it is important that other nations participate, too. Second, there can't be any armed Serbs still in Kosovo or we will just have a new civil war there.

- NATO cannot change these conditions for very simple reasons: anything short of these conditions will not lead to a lasting peace.

If Yeltsin says that Milosevic has already agreed to the G-8 principles, a NATO presence in Kosovo, and to withdraw his troops -- so stop the bombing

- I hope you're right about Milosevic's commitments. But the G-8 principles are general. This would not be the first time he's claimed to accept the G-8 principles or made promises to the international community and failed to follow through with important issues.
- Both details and actions here are critical. Let's see how the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission goes and what they find out.
- Essential that Milosevic agree to effective international security presence. That means NATO at the core, a unified command for the peacekeepers, and contributions from countries like Russia.
- That's the only way we can get an effective solution and not just empty promises that will fall apart.

If Yeltsin says, together we can end this thing, but you need to send the Vice President or the Secretary of State to Bonn on Tuesday, not Talbott

- First, you need to know that all important decisions will be mine.
- Al is deeply involved, as you know from the amount of time he spent with Viktor a month ago. He'll remain involved.
- Madeleine works every day on this problem, especially with Foreign Minister Ivanov. They talked on Saturday and will be talking again in a couple of hours. They're probably going to be meeting in the near future.
- For purposes of the Bonn meeting, I want Strobe to head our team. He speaks for me in this meeting. He has full

authority. You have my word. Al and I have relied on him on these matters since the very beginning of our partnership.

- What I need now, Boris, is a better sense of what Milosevic is prepared to do, and Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari are best able to do that together -- together they can pin Milosevic down on the details.
- The next step should be to get Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari and Strobe back together. The one after that is Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari go to Belgrade. Then, you and I should talk again.

If Yeltsin says that the U.S. keeps adding new conditions or hanging up the diplomacy on "details."

- We're sticking to the very same conditions I raised with you when we talked on April 25. This has been our bottom line in every discussion.
- Viktor and Strobe have spent many hours together, and I believe they've made progress. Let's instruct them to make more progress on Tuesday.

If Yeltsin calls for a UN-led force or a neutral commander for the peacekeeping force

- My core objectives are to allow the refugees to return, protect all the civilians of Kosovo - and that means the Serb minority, make sure there is humanitarian access, and provide autonomy for Kosovo while protecting Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
- You and I have gone over these objectives and we agree. The real issue is how to achieve them.
- That is why I have to insist on a international security force with NATO at the core. I have said before that the force does not have to have a NATO label. But NATO has to be there for the KLA to disarm and the refugees to return.
- We cannot risk another disaster with the UN at the helm like Somalia or the early days in Bosnia before you and I worked out a new approach at Hyde Park.

If Yeltsin rants about NATO's bombing, casualties, "politicization" of the Milosevic indictment, etc.

- You and I have talked about this before. Frankly, it disturbs me to hear you talk as though NATO is the root of the problem. Milosevic's brutality is the root of the problem.
- Russia and the U.S. worked together on a peaceful solution for 14 months before Milosevic made it impossible for me and our Allies to avoid use of force.
- I can't believe you'd let Milosevic wreck everything you've done to create cooperative relations between Russia on the one hand and the U.S., France, Germany, and Britain on the other.
- There's no question what Milosevic stands for: he's a Communist who wants to restore the Communist past in the Balkans - and to wreck your relations with the West. That's one of many reasons why we cannot let him succeed.

If he threatens to end Russia's diplomatic initiative

- I hope you don't, since I think Russia is playing a constructive role. I think any problem in the world is more likely to be solved if the U.S. and Russia are working cooperatively, even if we have some disagreements.
- But I know you'll make a decision based on Russian national interest, so I'll respect your decision whatever it is. But we want you engaged.
- Speaking for myself, I can promise you that the U.S. will keep working for an acceptable diplomatic solution - preferably with Russia.

If Yeltsin threatens not to come to Cologne or threatens that it will be a bad meeting

- Look, Boris. The G-8 exists because of you. And, for that matter, because of my vigorous support for creating the G-8 to demonstrate Russia's integration with the world's major democracies.
- You'll handle the meeting -- including your participation -- as you see fit.
- Let me tell you how I'll handle Cologne. If, together, we've been able to achieve a breakthrough on Kosovo on what all of us agree are acceptable terms, I'll lead the applause for you as a peacemaker.

- If, however, Milosevic is still holding out, and the military conflict is still under way, I'll use Cologne to highlight Russia's diplomacy and -- if Russia is still pursuing that diplomacy -- to concentrate our further efforts on getting a solution as soon as possible.

If Yeltsin suggests a common press line on the call.

- First, we should tell everyone that our personal representatives are meeting again on Tuesday in Bonn and will also meet with Chancellor Schroeder who holds the presidency of the EU and the G-8.
- Second, we should say that we both firmly committed to working together, along with our European partners, to find a diplomatic solution.
- Third, we stressed that Chernomyrdin's efforts are very important and that Russia is a key player on the diplomatic track.

ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS WITH STEPASHIN

Monday, May 31, 1999

- Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister. I'm delighted to hear from you. Please give my best wishes to your President.

[Pause for reply]

- You've taken on a huge job. It's important not just for Russia but for the world, and certainly for U.S.-Russian relations. I hope in the course of your work and mine, our paths will cross and, in due course, I hope you and Al Gore will be able to continue the bilateral commission.
- I know that in addition to all your other duties, you've been closely involved in supervising Russian diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
- We've heard from President Ahtisaari how impressed he was by his meeting with you last week.
- As President Yeltsin and I have discussed, the U.S. supports Russian diplomacy.
- As you know — and Boris and I have been candid about this, as well — Russia and the U.S. have got some pretty profound disagreements about how to deal with the Belgrade leadership.
- But we also have what I feel are some crucial common interests:
 - ⇒ We agree on the broad outlines of what a peace should look like;
 - ⇒ We're working together on getting the message to Milošević about what it will take to get the bombing stopped.
 - ⇒ We're working together on the composition of both a security force and an international civilian presence that would go into Kosovo to implement an agreement.
- I also wanted to stress one critical issue that I have asked Strobe to take up in Bonn — and that is how much of the diplomatic initiative that we have been working on will be accepted by President Milosevic.
 - We still don't know how Milosevic will respond. We need to think carefully about this, and be sure we have the right responses that keep the pressure on Milosevic to accept the views of the international community — regardless of what his initial reactions might be.
- Despite all the attention we have had to focus on Kosovo, I also want to make sure we do not forget other pressing issues in the bilateral relationship. We need to get U.S.-Russian relations on the right track of cooperation and mutual benefit.
- Anyway, Mr. Prime Minister, this is an important week, and you can be sure that I'll be following developments closely.

Pause for reply

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Saturday, May 29, 1999 1:59 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers
Cc: @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject: RE: URGENT -- Schroeder/Ahtisaari/Cherno meeting in Berlin is off [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

URGENT -- PLEASE PASS TO JIM

Following may be relevant for call to Schroeder. Eric Edelman just called again. Markov (Cherno's side kick) called Steiner and suggested that the Tuesday trilat (Cherno-Ahti-ST) now take place in Bonn. Finns are trying to turn this off. Ahtisaari thinks that the Russians are sensing the panic in Europe and are trying to exploit it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Saturday, May 29, 1999 1:23 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers
Cc: @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject: Schroeder/Ahtisaari/Cherno meeting in Berlin is off [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

PLEASE PASS TO JIM ASAP

Eric Edelman called from Helsinki to say that Chernomyrdin has told Ahtisaari that he cannot agree to meet with Schroeder on Sunday in Berlin. Cherno said that he hasn't been able to get in to see Yeltsin and that he has more work to do in Moscow. The Tuesday trilat meeting in Helsinki (Cherno-Ahti-ST) is still on. Cherno did not provide much of a substantive update on his talks in Belgrade, other than to say "things had been very difficult, things are very complicated, all issues had been raised in Belgrade, and that more needs to be done."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0914-#3

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Friday, May 28, 1999 3:49 PM
To: Hachigian, Nina L.
Cc: Pascual, Carlos E.
Subject: Initial Press Line on Chernomyrdin Visit to Belgrade [UNCLASSIFIED]

- We have seen reports that Chernomyrdin was "very satisfied" with his talks today in Belgrade and that he hopes to return next week with President Ahtisaari.
- We have also heard the statement from Milosevic's office indicating that the FRY "accepts the basic principles of the G-8 and agrees with a resolution in accordance with the U.N. charter that would be brought by the UN Security Council."
- We of course welcome any progress that has been made in bringing Milosevic to accept the conditions necessary to achieve our objective of bringing the refugees home with security and self-government.
- Based on the G-8 principles, this includes the withdrawal of all Serb forces from Kosovo and the deployment of an international security force with NATO at its core.
- We look forward to hearing a report from Chernomyrdin on his visit.

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: WHSR
Sent: Friday, May 28, 1999 3:39 PM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Babbitt, James F.; Baker, James E.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Black, Steven K.; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brody, Richard J.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Crowley, Philip J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Elkind, Jonathan H.; Faranda, Regina D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Klein, Brian P.; Leavy, David C.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Naplan, Steven J.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Schwartz, Eric P.; Segal, Jack D.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Tedstrom, John E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt); Weiss, Andrew S.; Wippman, David
Subject: YUGOSLAVIA-RUSSIA
CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: Reuters
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 990528152617 R0298793

a3035

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-RUSSIA

^Russian envoy satisfied by talks with Milosevic

BELGRADE (Reuters) - Russian Kosovo envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin said he was "very satisfied" with talks he had in Belgrade with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia's Beta news agency reported Friday.

"Chernomyrdin said he was sure that he would return to Belgrade next week with (Finnish President and European envoy Martti) Ahtisaari," it said, citing comments made to Russian reporters at the airport before leaving Belgrade.

A statement from Milosevic's office read on state television said the international community had accepted the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and Belgrade had accepted principles agreed by the Group of Eight.

"The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepts the basic principles of the G-8 and agrees with a resolution in accordance with the U.N. charter that would be brought by the U.N. Security Council," it said.

Belgrade had previously indicated the principles were acceptable but noted they were very vague and said its attitude would depend on how they were interpreted.

They include a withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, the stationing of an international security presence and return of ethnic Albanian refugees to Kosovo, hundreds of thousands of whom have fled since NATO began bombing.

^REUTERS

RB-- 05/28/99 15:10:00

To: Paschal
From: Weiss

Copies to:

Leslie

Greg


Stuart

Jack

As discussed, Russian redraft of
Finnish paper; Hammer/Anvil paper;
Cherno-authored command structure. Pls.
pass to Greg & Leslie.

- 5 pages to follow -

*Cherno-authored
command structure*



Guarantees confirming basic principles of the Russia - NATO Founding Act

HAMMER & ANVIL STRATEGY

Paper used by Strobe

DEMANDS AND TALKS

Issues in the top two rows below NATO's conditions for cessation of all violence and all Belgrade should quickly agree to all these points and begin work to implement them. All these conditions are essential.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES (G-8 BONN STATEMENT)

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces.
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by UN, capable of guaranteeing achievement of common objectives.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the UNSC.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons/unimpeded access of humanitarian aid organizations.
- Political process towards establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government, taking full account of Rambouillet accords, principles of FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity, and UCK demilitarization.
- Comprehensive approach to economic development/stabilization of region.

Requirements:

- Milosevic must agree to above principles, and to withdraw from Kosovo the VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces deployed there.
- Belgrade may reintroduce and maintain in Kosovo, after cessation of hostilities, small number of personnel to liaise with presences; mark and clear minefields; maintain presence at Serb patrimonial sites and key border crossings.
- Belgrade must also agree to essential specifics below.

ESSENTIAL SPECIFICS ("Elaboration of Conditions" paper as augmented by Helsinki document)

Accept deployment of effective ISP with NATO at the core. This means NATO chain of command under political direction of NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners and other countries eligible to contribute. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to IFOR/SFOR model.

ISP must be authorized to establish safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. (Authorities and status of ISP same as IFOR/SFOR under Annex 1A of Dayton Peace Accords.)

Withdrawal means "all:" "all" means "all;" withdrawals from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia must be completed according to a precise and rapid timetable within a matter of days (e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defenses withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours). ISP moves in over the same period. Any return of MUP or VJ personnel, after appropriate vetting, will follow complete withdrawal according to a precise timetable.

Returning Serb presence will be subject to strict and enforceable numerical limits, and confined to narrowly defined functional roles and clear rules ("roles and rules"); No. 1 rule is that KFOR commander is arbiter and supervisor of any returning Serb presence.

Creation of Interim administration (as part of international civil mission) under which people of Kosovo enjoy substantial autonomy within FRY; interim administration to provide transitional administration until democratic self-governing institutions established.

Refugee returns to occur under supervision and direction of UNHCR in consultation with KFOR commander and Civil Presence Head.

Understanding that settlement negotiations between parties should not delay creation of democratic self-governing institutions.

Relevant issues (see below) to be resolved rapidly in a military-technical agreement.

DEMANDS AND TALKS

Issues below must be continued among (as appropriate) international community, Kosovo Albanians, and the FRY on the understanding that IFOR/SFOR presence will be reduced to minimum levels in accordance with the above or a similar military-technical agreement on military-technical issues.

military-technical agreement:

All withdrawal modalities for VJ/MUP and paramilitaries, including width of buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces must be withdrawn and precise and rapid timetable for withdrawals.

All post-withdrawal modalities for any returning FRY personnel.

- Accords.)
- Withdrawal means "all:" "all" means "all:" withdrawals from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia must be completed according to a precise and rapid timetable within a matter of days (e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defenses withdrawn outside 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours). ISP moves in over the same period. Any return of MUP or VJ personnel, after appropriate vetting, will follow complete withdrawal according to a precise timetable.
 - Returning Serb presence will be subject to strict and enforceable numerical limits, and confined to narrowly defined functional roles and clear rules ("roles and rules"); No. 1 rule is that KFOR commander is arbiter and supervisor of an returning Serb presence.
 - Creation of interim administration (as part of international civil mission) under which people of Kosovo enjoy substantive autonomy within FRY; interim administration to provide transitional administration until democratic self-governin institutions established.
 - Refugee returns to occur under supervision and direction of UNHCR in consultation with KFOR commander and Civ Presence Head.
 - Understanding that settlement negotiations between parties should not delay creation of democratic self-governin institutions.
 - Relevant Issues (see below) to be resolved rapidly in a military-technical agreement.

SUBSTANTIVE AND TECHNICAL

These issues must be resolved among (as appropriate) international community, Kosovo Albanians, and the FRY. The FRY reserves the right to resume military action in response to non-compliance with the above on a date to be determined by a mutually agreed military-technical agreement on militarily acceptable terms.

Military-technical agreement:

- All withdrawal modalities for VJ/MUP and paramilitaries, including width of buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces must be withdrawn and precise and rapid timetable for withdrawals.
- All post-withdrawal modalities for any returning FRY personnel, including:
 - Terms of reference for functional responsibilities.
 - Strict and enforceable limits on equipment associated with their presence.
 - Precise timetable for their return.
 - Clear delineation of their limited geographical areas of operation.
 - Clearly defined and enforceable rules governing their relationship to KFOR commander and Civil Presence Head.

Other arrangements:

- Establishment of international police force with executive authority to create, train, and equip multiethnic local police forces
- Modalities of KLA demilitarization.

Russian Redraft of Fin

To stop the NATO military operation and resolve the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on the following principles:

Paper

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and para-military forces.
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security presence with the participation of NATO countries must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

*5/28 8:00am
(now being reworked by Finns again.)*

Ch. 7

- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

Ramb?

- An agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian security personnel may remain in Kosovo to perform the following functions:

- liaison with international civil and security presences
- marking/clearing minefields
- maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
- maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern

Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.

- After agreement on the above ^{by whom?} and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of remaining personnel. Such modalities would include:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule

[differenze]


Remaining Personnel

- Time to be function?
- Equipment associated with remaining personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences

ISF + G2
m 35.202

NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security presence. NATO units would be under NATO command.

→ Not NATO case

<p>'99 MAY 28 03:22</p>	<p align="center">WASHFAX RECEIPT Department of State</p> <p align="center">B</p> <p>S/S #</p>	
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MESSAGE NO 019500 CLASSIFICATION Confidential NO. PAGES

FROM: Paadeu State
(Officer Name) (Office Symbol) (Extension) (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Script for Belgrade

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	EXTENSION	ROOM NO.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Schulte</u>		
<u>OSD</u>	<u>USDP Slocum/Kaufman</u>		
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Col Davidson</u>		
<u>OVP</u>	<u>Davidson</u>		

FOR: Clearance Information Per Request Comment

REMARKS: Pls provide comments to part one by 1700
Provide comments to John Bell, RPM
adds/deletes in the Russian text are by Akisari.

S/S Officer: RPM-647-3374

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 28, 1999

TO: S/SA - Ambassador Pardew

FROM: S/P - Jon Levitsky *JL*

SUBJECT: Attached Notional Chernomyrdin "Hammer and Anvil"
Script for ASAP Review

Please find attached for interagency review a notional script for use by Chernomyrdin in a joint trip to Belgrade with President Ahtisaari as a part of the "hammer and anvil" strategy. Jim Swigert tells me he gave you a heads up that this would be on the way. The script has been approved by President Ahtisaari and the Deputy Secretary. I am also attaching for reference the script that President Ahtisaari intends to use on such a trip. (This script has already been reviewed by the interagency and was distributed in Moscow by the Finns yesterday.) Request that you coordinate interagency review of the notional Chernomyrdin script by COB Washington on Friday if possible, Noon on Saturday at the latest. Any comments or changes will have to be vetted and coordinated with Ahtisaari. Timing necessary to permit delivery in Moscow on Monday morning after Ahtisaari consultation, assuming Ahtisaari decides to go ahead with this approach after getting read out from Chernomyrdin of word from Belgrade. You can reach me through ops here in Helsinki over the weekend. Thanks for the help, and sorry for the quick turnaround.

To avoid any uncertainty in Washington, a few words on the purpose of the papers. The concept, as the Deputy Secretary has laid it out for Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari, is as follows. Chernomyrdin would use the first script to go as far as he can in support of NATO positions without crossing Russia's redlines. Ahtisaari would then use the second script to make the critical points on which we have not reached agreement with the Russians. (The bold type in the Ahtisaari script identifies those issues that are not covered by the Chernomyrdin script, and which it will be especially important for Ahtisaari to emphasize.) The two would agree not to undermine each other in the discussion.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By VZ NARA, Date 12/14/2023

2008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The first (Chernomyrdin) script is a modified version of a document that the Russians passed to us yesterday after reviewing the Ahtisaari script. Changes to the Russian original are shown in the text. The Russian paper directly contradicts a number of key U.S. positions (e.g., NATO core and "all out"). This modified version aims to push the Russians as far as they are likely to go in our direction, while making the rest of the text ambiguous and not directly contrary to our positions.

If used, this script will represent Russia's position rather than that of the USG. It therefore does not seek to encompass all of our bottom lines. Some of the packaging - at President Ahtisaari's specific request -- is also probably not what we would choose, although he is not seeking to water down our substantive positions. Please ask the interagency to focus its review accordingly on ensuring that the script does not cross U.S. red-lines or contradict the positions to be stated by President Ahtisaari.

NSC requests clearance by Schulte/Pascual. Please also get a chop from S/P - Halperin/O'Brien. Thanks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Russian Paper of 5/26/99 Belgrade Script: Part One (Chernomyrdin)

To ~~stop the NATO military operation and resolve~~ move toward the resolution of the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on the following principles:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and para-military forces.
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The An effective international security presence with the participation of NATO countries must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. All NATO countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security presence.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After the suspension of hostilities, Belgrade authorities will plan for a small, agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian security personnel ~~may remain~~ in Kosovo to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with international civil and security presences
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings

- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- ~~After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a~~ the suspension of military activity on terms to be elaborated by President Miliszeri, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of remaining Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo. Such modalities would include:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule

Remaining Yugoslav/Serb Personnel in Kosovo

- Equipment associated with ~~remaining~~ Yugoslav/Serb personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences

~~NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security presence. NATO units will be under NATO command.~~

Belgrade Script: Part Two (Athisaari)

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the following functions:
 - liaison with international civil mission and international security force
 - marking/clearing minefields
 - maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
 - maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account

of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
- **After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. Such modalities would include:**

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn

Returning Personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
- **Timetable for their return**
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
- Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil mission

It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Friday, May 28, 1999 8:17 AM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject: RE: Strobe Update [CONFIDENTIAL]

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM -- Time Sensitive

Update as of 8:00 am (EDT) on Friday

- Ambassador Edelman and Lyvytsky met today with Ahtisaari to again discuss the game plan for a possible trip to Belgrade. After further thought, Ahtisaari backed away from his insistence (e-mail below) on a unified script Ahtisaari/Cherno script.
- Proposal now is to review two scripts which are still being worked in Helsinki:
 - (1) a new version, edited by the Finns, of a *Russian redraft of the paper Ahtisaari gave Cherno on Thursday*. I know this is confusing. This is the paper that combined the G-8 principles and NATO conditions, but (as Strobe put it) the Finns adapted to their music. The Russians then watered down key elements. The Finns are adding back essential points with the help of Lyvytsky and Edelman. This would be the script for Cherno.
 - (2) The original Finn script would be delivered by Ahtisaari, but with added emphasis given to some of the key NATO points since these items would be watered down in the Cherno script.
- Lyvytsky will send these scripts back for overnight review. Do not know if they will be sent to Greg or Dobbins.
- Ahtisaari will call Cherno tonight or Saturday morning to see how the trip went. If it went reasonably, then Ahtisaari will forward the two proposed scripts to Cherno as early as Saturday or Sunday. If the trip went poorly, Ahtisaari may hold off forwarding the scripts for a few days.
- Plan is still for a trilateral meeting on Tuesday, and for Ahtisaari and Cherno to go to Belgrade on Wednesday.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 1999 7:08 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject: Strobe Update [CONFIDENTIAL]

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM

I'm told that Strobe talked to Sandy with a readout on the latest developments; the following is probably less than you already know (but as much as I know).

As I understand from Andrew, Strobe and Ahtisaari met again after they met with Schroeder. Ahtisaari had two requests. (1) Rather than pursue the hammer and anvil strategy, that they work with Chernomyrdin on a common script to reduce the risk of disagreement. (2) That Cherno, Ahtisaari and Strobe meet again next Tuesday in Helsinki

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 2023/12/14
2006-0814 - #3

to work on the script and hold open the prospect for a Chernobyl/Ahtisaari trip to Belgrade on Wednesday. I understand that Strobe agreed to meet in Helsinki.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report #3 (Moscow-Bonn) (4 pages)	05/27/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709

FOLDER TITLE:

Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]

2008-0994-F

vz6231

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 2:31 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject: Update from Moscow {CONFIDENTIAL}

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM -- TIME SENSITIVE

Understand that Strobe is trying to call Sandy or Jim, so you may already have more detail than I have below. Key points:

- Chernomyrdin and Athisaari have decided that they will not go to Belgrade tomorrow given the news about Milosevic's indictment.
- The first half of the trilateral meeting revisited old circular arguments about Serb force withdrawal, ISF, allegations of constantly adding new conditions. Stepashin then called Chernomyrdin with news of the indictment. Chernomyrdin came back to the room very negative, reiterating his previous line that Russia will not deliver NATO's ultimatum.
- Depending on how the dust settles from the indictment, Athisaari held open the prospect of a trip to Belgrade before next Wednesday's EU summit, allowing him to report to the summit the results of the trip. While not stated, Athisaari will obviously be concerned about meeting with an indicted war criminal.
- Strobe has reluctantly agreed to another trilateral meeting tomorrow at 10:00. That will be on the wires momentarily.
- Athisaari to Bonn tomorrow. Strobe may accompany. No Strobe meeting with Stepashin.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0954-F

Schulte, Gregory L.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 1:46 PM
To: Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: FW: NODIS from Albright to Ivanov [CONFIDENTIAL]

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VL NARA, Date 12/14/2013
2008-0944-F3

-----Original Message-----

From: Tarver, J. Sean
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 1:29 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.
Subject: NODIS from Albright to Ivanov [CONFIDENTIAL]

Sir,

Here is the NODIS cable you requested.

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL SSN: 6275MSGID: M38770290AACZYUW RUEHCAA6275 1451106-
CCCC--RHEHAAX. ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK O 251104Z MAY 99 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC FM: SECSTATE
WASHDC TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: ///

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 096275

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/24/09

TAGS: PREL, RS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV

CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY STROBE TALBOTT FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (C) NIACT PRECEDENCE REQUIRED TO ENSURE DELIVERY AT OOB IN
MOSCOW ON MAY 25. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV AT
THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. (C) BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR IGOR SERGEYEVICH:

I AM WRITING TO OFFER SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT STROBE'S
FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL
IF YOU WOULD RECEIVE HIM SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL TO
REVIEW HOW YOU SEE THE IMMENSE AND IMPORTANT CHALLENGE WE
ARE WORKING ON TOGETHER. HE WILL, AS HE DID LAST WEEK AND

THE WEEK BEFORE, STAY IN TOUCH WITH YOU DURING HIS STAY,
INCLUDING AFTER HE JOINED VICTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT
AHTISAARI FOR THEIR FOLLOW-UP TRILATERAL ON WEDNESDAY.

I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS I STRESSED LAST WEEK IN
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY AND AS I SAID THIS PAST WEEKEND IN
SEVERAL PUBLIC APPEARANCES, THAT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN
A POSITIVE FACTOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO BRING A
LASTING, STABLE AND JUST PEACE TO THE BALKANS. AT THE
HEART (I'M TEMPTED TO SAY, AT THE CORE) OF U.S.-RUSSIAN
DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION HAS BEEN THE WORK YOU AND I HAVE
DONE TOGETHER. THAT IS ONE OF MANY REASONS I WAS GRATIFIED
WHEN STROBE SENT WORD TO ME LAST FRIDAY THAT PRIME MINISTER
STEPASHIN HAD ASKED YOU TO REMAIN AT YOUR POST.

WE ARE MOVING INTO WHAT COULD BE A CRITICAL PERIOD. I
GATHER THAT VICTOR STEPANOVICH IS CONSIDERING TAKING
ANOTHER TRIP TO BELGRADE ON THURSDAY. AS I UNDERSTAND FROM
TALKING TO PRESIDENT AHTISAARI EARLIER TODAY, HE WILL

DECIDE, BASED ON THAT SAME MEETING, WHETHER TO ACCOMPANY VICTOR STEPANOVICH. STROBE WILL REPORT BACK TO ME SO THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON AND I CAN DETERMINE OUR VIEW AND PUBLIC POSTURE WITH REGARD TO A JOINT TRIP.

THE STANDARD WE WILL USE WILL BE SIMPLE: WILL A JOINT TRIP SERVE TO CLARIFY, IN MILOSEVIC'S MIND, WHAT HE MUST DO IN ORDER FOR THERE TO BE A SUSPENSION IN AIR STRIKES AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DETERMINATION TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS - NAMELY, A PHASE IN WHICH NATO MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE IN SUSPENSION (THEIR RESUMPTION REMAINS A "SWORD OF DAMOCLES") WHILE FOUR OTHER THINGS ARE OCCURRING:

- THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL MUP, VJ AND PARAMILITARY FORCES;
- THE DEPLOYMENT INTO KOSOVO OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE;
- THE RETURN TO KOSOVO OF THE REFUGEES AND THE RETURN TO THEIR HOMES OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS;
- THE ESTABLISHMENT IN KOSOVO OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL MISSION, TO PROVIDE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION WHILE CREATING DEMOCRATIC, SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS;

FOR US TO ENTER THAT PHASE, BELGRADE MUST ACCEPT NATO'S FIVE CONDITIONS AND BEGIN VERIFIABLE WITHDRAWALS.

AS I SEE OUR WORK TOGETHER OVER THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS, SINCE OUR MEETING IN OSLO, IT HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON ONE OBJECTIVE ABOVE ALL OTHERS: TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM CLARITY AND AGREEMENT ON THE VARIOUS CONDITIONS AND ON WHAT THOSE CONDITIONS MEAN IN PRACTICE. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE U.S. ON VARIOUS ISSUES. BUT I THINK WE'VE BEEN MAKING STEADY PROGRESS IN NARROWING THOSE DIFFERENCES. STROBE'S ASSIGNMENT THIS WEEK IS TO TRY TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES FURTHER, IF POSSIBLE TO THE POINT WHERE THE U.S. CAN SUPPORT A JOINT CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI MISSION TO BELGRADE. WE WANT TO DO SO, SINCE THE MISSION COULD SERVE TWO POSITIVE PURPOSES: IT COULD INCREASE THE CHANCES THAT MILOSEVIC WILL INDEED TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO SUSPEND THE BOMBING; AND IT COULD CONSOLIDATE RUSSIA'S KEY ROLE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE, WHICH WE CONSIDER AN IMPORTANT GOAL, GIVEN THE ROLE RUSSIA HAS PLAYED IN THE PAST AND THE ONE WE HOPE IT WILL PLAY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE.

HOWEVER, I MUST, IN ALL CANDOR, ALSO STRESS A CONCERN - AND A FIRM PRINCIPLE THAT WILL GOVERN THE PRESIDENT'S AND MY RESPONSE TO WHAT HAPPENS IN MOSCOW THIS WEEK. ANY AMBIGUITY OR IMPRECISION WITH REGARD TO WHAT THE CONDITIONS MUST MEAN IN PRACTICE WILL ENCOURAGE MILOSEVIC TO HOLD OUT IN THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT HE CAN GET A "BETTER DEAL." THE RESULT WILL BE TO PROLONG THE CONFLICT, SINCE NATO WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE THE BOMBING.

IN MY VIEW, A CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI INITIATIVE CAN HELP HASTEN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND A SUSPENSION OF BOMBING ONLY IF THERE IS MAXIMUM CLARITY BETWEEN US - AND WITH MILOSEVIC - NOT JUST ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES, SUCH AS THOSE WE WROTE INTO THE BONN G-8 STATEMENT, BUT ON WHAT I WOULD CALL THE ESSENTIAL SPECIFICS. THOSE INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT FOR ALL VJ, M-UP AND PARAMILITARIES TO COME OUT. ONLY AFTER THEIR WITHDRAWAL WILL SOME FRY PERSONNEL BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO PERFORM SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS UNDER THE DIRECT SUPERVISION OF THE KFOR COMMANDER.

YOU TOLD ME ON THE PHONE LAST WEEK THAT YOU FELT THAT THE U.S. WAS ADDING CONDITIONS. THAT IS SIMPLY NOT CORRECT. WHAT WE ARE DOING - PROPERLY AND NECESSARILY, I BELIEVE - IS PRESSING FOR GREATER PRECISION BETWEEN US ON WHAT THE

WORDS THAT WE ARE USING MEAN IN PRACTICE, SO THAT UNDERSTANDINGS LIKE THOSE WE REACHED IN RAMBOUILLET, OSLO AND BONN - AND THAT WE HAVE ENSHRINED IN DOCUMENTS LIKE THE

G-8 MINISTERIAL STATEMENT - DO NOT TURN INTO DANGEROUS, EVEN CATASTROPHIC MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN KOSOVO, THUS JEOPARDIZING THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION AND THE LIVES OF THE PEACEKEEPERS.

LET ME RETURN TO A POSITIVE POINT: FROM STROBE'S REPORT LAST WEEK, IT SOUNDS AS THOUGH MR. CHERNOMYRDIN MAY HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN PERSUADING MILOSEVIC TO ACCEPT FORCES FROM NATO COUNTRIES INSIDE OF KOSOVO AS PART OF THE SECURITY PRESENCE. THAT WOULD BE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD STILL LEAVE MILOSEVIC WELL SHY OF THE LINE HE MUST CROSS IF THE BOMBING IS TO BE SUSPENDED. ONLY IF THE SECURITY FORCE HAS NATO AT ITS CORE WILL IT BE "EFFECTIVE"; ONLY THEN WILL IT BE ABLE TO:

- ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT;
- ATTRACT HOME PEACEFUL ALBANIAN REFUGEES;
- PROTECT ETHNIC SERB CIVILIANS;
- DETER AND DEAL WITH VIOLENT ELEMENTS AMONG BOTH THE ETHNIC SERBS AND ALBANIANS;
- ENSURE MAXIMUM SAFETY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS IN KOSOVO, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN;
- PROTECT THE LIMITED NUMBER OF FRY PERSONNEL WHO WILL, AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE VJ, MUP AND PARAMILITARIES, RETURN TO PERFORM CERTAIN SPECIFIED FUNCTIONS AND DEMONSTRATE FRY SOVEREIGNTY.

THE SECURITY FORCE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH NONE OF THOSE DAUNTING TASKS IF IT WERE A FORMAL, BLUE-HELMETED UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, WITH RUSSIAN TROOPS UNDER DIRECT RUSSIAN CONTROL ALL THE WAY UP THE CHAIN AND THE WHOLE OPERATION UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL - AN ARRANGEMENT THAT IS DOUBLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO BE ACCEPT OR BE PART OF THE MEETINGS LAST WEEK, ESPECIALLY THE CONVERSATION YOU HAD WITH STROBE ON FRIDAY AND HIS SUBSEQUENT ONE WITH VICTOR STEPANOVICH, UNDERSCORED THE NEED FOR GREATER CLARITY ON BOTH OUR PARTS. AS WE UNDERSTAND WHAT WE HEARD, RUSSIA IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT NATO-COUNTRIES-AT-THE-CORE, BUT IT IS NOT CURRENTLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT NATO AS AN ORGANIZATION PLAYING THE "CORE" ROLE IN THE SECURITY FORCE. I GATHER THAT MEANS THAT THE IFOR/SFOR MODEL, EVEN IN SOME NEW VARIANT, WILL NOT WORK IN KOSOVO.

THAT POSITION RAISES A REAL QUESTION OF WHETHER, EVEN IF RUSSIA CONTINUES TO PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A

PEACE THAT MEETS THE STIPULATED CONDITIONS, RUSSIA WILL FEEL ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE THAT FOLLOWS. IF NOT, IT WOULD BE A SHAME.

THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF STROBE'S TEAM, GENERALS FOGLESONG AND CASEY, WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF SECRETARY COHEN AND GENERALS SHELTON AND RALSTON, HAVE SPENT THE WEEKEND AND TODAY WORKING HARD. WHEN THEY GET TO MOSCOW, THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO RE-ENGAGE WITH YOUR SIDE ON THESE ISSUES. AS I SEE IT, THIS KNOTTY PROBLEM HAS TWO DIMENSIONS - THE FIRST THAT WE SHOULD TRY, IF POSSIBLE, TO RESOLVE THIS WEEK, THE SECOND THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO RESOLVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

THE IMMEDIATE TASK IS WHAT NATO INSISTS BELGRADE MUST ACCEPT AND AGREE AS A CONDITION FOR SUSPENSION OF BOMBING. IF A CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI TRIP IS GOING TO ACCELERATE THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY WHEN THE BOMBS STOP FALLING, IT MUST LEAVE MILOSEVIC WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING THAT NATO IS

NOT GOING TO BE JUST INSIDE KOSOVO, ON THE GROUND - IT IS GOING TO BE LEADING THE OPERATION IN COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER NON-NATO TROOP CONTRIBUTORS.

LET ME REITERATE TWO IMPORTANT QUALIFIERS THAT YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED BEFORE:

FIRST, NATO-AT-THE-CORE DOES NOT MEAN A NATO-ONLY KFOR. NON-NATO COUNTRIES - RUSSIA, FINLAND, UKRAINE, SWEDEN AND OTHERS - WILL BE THERE-TOO, ALL WORKING HARMONIOUSLY AND EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER. AND OUR NATO-AT-THE-CORE CONDITION DOES NOT PREJUDGE WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE BETWEEN KFOR AND THE UN. NOR DOES IT REQUIRE THAT NATO'S NAME BE IN THE DESIGNATION OF THE FORCE OR IN A CHAPTER VII UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

SECOND, HOW EXACTLY KFOR IS ORGANIZED AND DEPLOYED - ITS SIZE, COMPOSITION, STRENGTH, COMMAND STRUCTURE, RULE-OF-ENGAGEMENT - ARE MATTERS FOR THE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO WORK OUT AMONG THEMSELVES. THE KEY POINT THAT MILOSEVIC MUST UNDERSTAND IS THAT HE WILL NOT HAVE A VETO OVER HOW THOSE ISSUES ARE RESOLVED, EITHER BEFORE SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OR DURING THE SUSPENSION.

AS I GATHER YOU TOLD STROBE ON FRIDAY, "IF BELGRADE ACCEPTS NATO, THAT'S UP TO BELGRADE." WE AGREE. BUT IF BELGRADE DOES NOT ACCEPT NATO - AND IF IT DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT

IT MUST ACCEPT OUR DEFINITION OF NATO-AT-THE-CORE - IT MUST ACCEPT THE INESCAPABLE, NON-NEGOTIABLE FACT THAT THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. OUR HOPE, THEREFORE, IS THAT BELGRADE WILL SEE IT IN ITS OWN INTERESTS TO ACCEPT NATO AT THE CORE OF SECURITY PRESENCE.

ONLY IF VICTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT AHTISAARI AGREE ON A WAY OF HANDLING THIS ISSUE IN BELGRADE SATISFACTORILY - I.E., IN A WAY THAT GETS THE MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE HOST AND THAT DOES NOT OCCASION CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE TWO GUESTS - CAN WE, THE U.S., SUPPORT THEIR JOINT MISSION.

BUT THAT DOES NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE VICTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT AHTISAARI TO ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION WITH MILOSEVIC ON THE EXACT COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE SECURITY PRESENCE. IN FACT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THEM TO DO SO, SINCE THE COMMAND STRUCTURE IS NOT HIS BUSINESS. IT IS, OF COURSE, VERY MUCH OUR BUSINESS, RUSSIA'S AND THE U.S.'S - AND URGENT BUSINESS INDEED.

SO THE QUESTION, IGOR, IS WHETHER WE CAN FIND A WAY, ACCEPTABLE BOTH TO RUSSIA AND NATO, OF RECONCILING TWO REQUIREMENTS. OURS IS THAT NATO BE, IN A MILITARILY MEANINGFUL (AND EFFECTIVE) WAY, "AT THE CORE" OF KFOR - I.E., IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES UNITY OF COMMAND (ALL TROOPS IN KOSOVO UNDER A SINGLE COMMANDER);-YOUR REQUIREMENT, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IS THAT RUSSIA'S OWN FORCES NOT SERVE DIRECTLY UNDER NATO AS SUCH.

IN THIS REGARD, THERE ARE REAL, PRACTICAL LIMITS TO HOW IMAGINATIVE WE CAN BE, SINCE THERE ARE LIFE-OR-DEATH ISSUES OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND FORCE-PROTECTION INVOLVED. AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, TOWARD THE END OF STROBE'S FRIDAY MEETING WITH VICTOR STEPANOVICH, AMBASSADOR IVANOVSKY AND OTHERS ON FRIDAY, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATION CHARTS THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION IN KOSOVO IN WAYS INTENDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE RUSSIAN NEEDS AND SENSITIVITIES.

STROBE AND HIS TEAM ARE COMING PREPARED TO RESUME DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHERS.

NATURALLY, IGOR, I STAND READY TO TALK TO YOU AT ANY TIME
AS THIS IMPORTANT WEEK UNFOLDS.

SINCERELY,

MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

(NO-SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW)

END TEXT

ALBRIGHT

DIST: <^DIST>

SIT: PASCUAL WEISS

SIT: NODIS