

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia

Staff Office-Individual:

Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory

Original OA/ID Number:

1708

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
39	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [Record ID: 9806685] (3 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [pages 2 & 3 annotated] [Record ID: 9806685] (2 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [annotated] [Record ID: 9806685] (3 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [pages 1 & 2, annotated] [Record ID: 9806685] (2 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Samel Berger from Jack Covey. Subject: Bosnian Elections. [Record ID: 9805883] (2 pages)	08/21/1998	P1/b(1)
003. poster	The SFOR Mission: The Stabilization Force in Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	06/01/1998	P3/b(3)
004. poster	Duplicate copy of 003. (1 page)	06/01/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia

2008-0994-F

vz6229

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9805453
RECEIVED: 31 JUL 98 06

TO: RUBIN, R
RENO, J

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PEACEKEEPING

file:
Bosnia

PERSONS: GELBARD, R

SUBJECT: BOSNIAN ELECTIONS

ACTION: BERGER SGD LTRS

DUE DATE: 06 AUG 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 12/13/2003
2008-0994-F3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

B

DATE

9/14

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

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DOC 5 OF 5

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 COVEY	Z 98073106	PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 98080514	FOR INFORMATION
002 SCHULTE	Z 98081113	FOR FURTHER ACTION
003 BERGER	Z 98082614	FOR INFORMATION
003 SCHULTE	Z 98083108	FOR REDO
003	X 98083109	NOTED BY STEINBERG
003	Z 98091413	REOPEN / FOR FURTHER ACTION
004 BERGER	Z 98091413	FOR SIGNATURE
005	X 98091413	BERGER SGD LTRS

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
005	980914	RUBIN, R	ALBRIGHT, M
005	980914	RENO, J	GELBARD, R

TO: DAVIES

FROM: KENNEY, K

DOC DATE: 30 JUL 98
SOURCE REF: 9813203

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PEACEKEEPING

PERSONS: GELBARD, R

SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON MAKING BOSNIAN ELECTIONS SUCCESS CONSOLIDATING POST
ELECTION GAINS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 06 AUG 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: COVEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

~~FOR ACTION~~
~~COVEY~~

Schulte

FOR CONCURRENCE
HAWLEY
VON LIPSEY

FOR INFO
BANDLER
BOUCHARD
CLARKE
SCHWARTZ

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VL Date: 12/13/2013
2008-0494-73

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: _____ DOC 1 OF 1

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5453 REDO 2
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SMD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>9/5 G</u>	
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>9/5</u>	
Steinberg	<u>3</u>		
Berger	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>TRC 9/14</u>	<u>∅</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>6</u>	<u>9/14</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

98 SEP 4 am 7:37

Exec Sec Office has diskette yg

National Security Council
The White House

8/4/98
@ 9.05P

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5453
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>TMA</u> Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>KR 8/4</u>	
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>9/10</u>	<u>∅</u>
Records Mgt.			
<u>Schulte</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>A = comment</u> <u>SRB</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Recom telcall to Reno + Rubir re Bosnia Elections

98 AUG 4 am 7:49

Exec Sec Office has diskette no

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 14, 1998


Dear Bob:

With this year's elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina about to be complete, we are now beginning to focus our attention on a post-election strategy to further consolidate implementation of the Dayton Accords and thereby create the conditions for a reduction in our military presence. A fundamental component of our post-election strategy will be continued efforts to enhance public security through the reform and restructuring of the local police, judiciary and penal system.

Bob Gelbard, the President's Special Representative for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, has spoken to Ray Kelly about how Customs can contribute to this effort by helping to create a functioning customs service in Bosnia with enforcement capabilities. You have already seconded a senior Customs agent to the State Department to advise him and General Clark on this subject. I would ask that you now work with Bob to make experienced customs personnel available to the European Union's Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office in Bosnia and to consider other forms of possible support.

Without progress in improving public security in Bosnia and establishing the rule of law, it will be difficult to achieve progress in other aspects of Dayton, including the return of refugees to minority areas. Your support is therefore important to Dayton's success.

Sincerely,



Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Robert E. Rubin
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20220

cc: Secretary Albright

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)

Declassify on: September 4, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 12/13/2023
2008-0994-73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 14, 1998


Dear Janet:

With this year's elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina about to be complete, we are now beginning to focus our attention on a post-election strategy to further consolidate implementation of the Dayton Accords and thereby create the conditions for a reduction in our military presence. A fundamental component of our post-election strategy will be continued efforts to enhance public security through the reform and restructuring of the local police, judiciary and penal system.

Bob Gelbard, the President's Special Representative for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, has spoken to Louis Freeh about additional FBI support for restructuring the local police in Bosnia and increasing their ability to counter organized crime, corruption and drugs and arms trafficking. The FBI has sent several teams to Bosnia to conduct assessments, but has not yet moved beyond assessments to the provision of training and other forms of support. The FBI can play an important role in strengthening law enforcement capabilities in Bosnia, and I would ask that you work with Bob to determine what additional support can be provided.

Without progress in improving public security in Bosnia and establishing the rule of law, it will be difficult to achieve progress in other aspects of Dayton, including the return of refugees to minority areas. Your support is therefore important to Dayton's success.

Sincerely,



Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Janet Reno
The Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

cc: Secretary Albright

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b), (d)

Declassify on: September 4, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 12/13/2023
2008-0594-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5453 REDO2

September 4, 1998

*Send
copies of
letters to
Gelbard*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

In his July 29 letter to you on this subject, Bob Gelbard requested your support in securing assistance from the FBI, DEA and Customs in helping the restructured Bosnian police forces to combat organized crime. At Jim Steinberg's request, I have converted the talking points that we had proposed for telephone calls into letters for you to sign.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to Janet Reno and Bob Rubin.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Letters to the Attorney General

Tab II Proposed Letter to the Secretary of the Treasury

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (b,d)

Declassify On: 09/04/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 12/13/2013
2008-0994-f3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5453
REDO

August 25, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *GS*

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

Bob Gelbard's July 29 letter on this subject includes a range of activities that he is pursuing or intends to pursue. At this time, he has only asked for your help in securing assistance from the FBI, DEA and Customs in helping the restructured Bosnian police forces to combat organized crime.

RECOMMENDATION

That you telephone Janet Reno and Bob Rubin using the talking points at Tab II of the original package.

*Copy - dept
note for
SRB to
send*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify On: 08/25/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 112 NARA, Date 12/13/03
2008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1998

AUG 10 1998

*Greg/Arch -
please help
me to
prepare this
inventory so
I can focus on
most urgent/
helpful ideas
@*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

At the July 15 Principals meeting, you emphasized the need to make the Bosnian elections a success and to develop a sound post-elections strategy. The attached letter from Bob Gelbard describes actions by other agencies that would help. These include:

- direct elections support;
- pre-and post-election media initiatives;
- targeted assistance to support opposition candidates and refugee returns;
- additional Train and Equip funding;
- getting the Peace Corps into Bosnia;
- support for forest management;
- commercial visits;
- an Internet-based "Virtual University"; and
- additional support for police and customs reform.

With respect to the last item, Bob has asked for you to help secure assistance from the FBI, DEA and Customs in helping the restructured Bosnian police forces to combat organized crime. While the FBI conducted some initial assessments, no further support has been provided, largely because the agencies do not see this as a high priority.

Police reform and restructuring must be one of our highest priorities in consolidating Dayton. We therefore support Bob's request that you make calls to energize Justice and Treasury on this assistance. While Gelbard's memo recommended calls directly to Louis Freeh and Ray Kelly, we recommend (and Bob agrees) that you should call Janet Reno and Bob Rubin, to maintain proper channels.

Concurrence by: Chuck Allen, Fred Rosa *WR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you telephone Janet Reno and Bob Rubin using the talking points at Tab II.

Attachments

Tab I July 29 letter from Ambassador Gelbard
Tab II Talking Points



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

5453

July 30, 1998

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:07/24/03

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GLYN T. DAVIES
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a
Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

Please pass the attached memorandum from Ambassador Robert
Gelbard, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary
of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, to
Mr. Berger.

Stephen D. Mill
Kristie A. Kenney */for*
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Memorandum from Ambassador Gelbard

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 12/13/2015
2008-0994-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Robert S. Gelbard, S/SR
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CALL
TO SECRETARY ROBERT RUBIN

- We both know importance of implementing the peace in Bosnia. Calling to ask for your support in having Customs get more engaged in Bosnia, as Bob Gelbard has discussed with Ray Kelly.
- I understand Treasury has seconded a senior Customs agent (Oscar Vera) to the State Department to advise him and General Clark on Customs enforcement issues.
- This type of interagency cooperation on Bosnia is critical to our success.
- As we have made progress on police reform and restructuring, we have begun to focus on other law enforcement challenges -- corruption and organized crime -- which will go to the heart, ultimately, of Bosnia's ability to consolidate truly democratic, functioning institutions.
- Developing a functioning customs service, with enforcement capabilities is a top priority. This effort is especially urgent as dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnian Croats is central to our ability to forge a truly strong Bosnia nation.
- It is critical that U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies take as active a role as possible in this process.
- In the past, Customs has made invaluable personnel contributions, through CAFAO, to this effort. The lack of U.S. participation now has slowed CAFAO's reform efforts, and reduced our ability to influence this process.
- I hope that you and Ray Kelly will consider, on an urgent basis, again detailing some officers to work in Bosnia on this critical effort.
- Creating effective law enforcement fundamental to our success in Bosnia. We need your help in this.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 08/04/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VJ NARA, Date 2/13/2023
2008-0994-73

CONFIDENTIAL

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CALL
TO ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO

- We both know importance of implementing the peace in Bosnia. Calling to ask for more support from FBI and other federal enforcement agencies in addressing public security and corruption in Bosnia.
- Bob Gelbard has discussed with Louis Freeh, but we have not yet moved beyond assessments.
- Police reform and restructuring has taken off in Bosnia, due to more pro-Dayton attitudes in Republika Srpska.
- We are at a critical juncture now. We have put in place the law enforcement structures -- including the equivalent of a federal police agency in the Federation.
- We now must ensure that the new, reformed police have needed training to deal with organized crime, corruption and drugs and arms trafficking.
- Our overall effort hinges on the ability of the Bosnians to ensure the security of their own citizens and their fragile, new institutions. Dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnia Croats is central to our ability to forge a stable peace.
- Essential to this success that FBI, as well as U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies, take a more active role in shaping Bosnia's approach to the rule of law.
- Creating effective law enforcement fundamental to our success in Bosnia. We need your help in this.
- I hope you will ask Louis Freeh to have the FBI fully support this effort, particularly by sending some experienced officers to work with police in both entities on trans-national crime issues.

Handwritten initials and scribbles:
2/13/2023
JL
8/13/2023

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 08/04/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VJ NARA, Date 12/13/2023
2008-0994-f3



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:07/29/03

TO: Samuel R. Berger

FROM: S/SR - Robert S. Gelbard *MS*

SUBJECT: Progress on Making the Bosnian Elections a Success; Consolidating Post-Election Gains

SUMMARY

You offered, during the July 15 Principals Committee meeting, to provide whatever was needed to make the Bosnian elections a success, and to enable us to move quickly to consolidate post-election gains. We have in train a significant level of election support designed to improve the prospects of pro-Dayton candidates, targeted particularly at Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Croats.

I have outlined below a series of actions and initiatives which would improve our ability to consolidate post-election gains, but which require support from other U.S. agencies, or greater political engagement. Your support in meeting these gaps would go a long way to making many of these proposals a reality, and thus to locking in the President's achievements in Bosnia.

Election Initiatives

We are implementing -- both through OSCE and USAID--a series of pre-election initiatives, including expanded campaign assistance to opposition parties, media assistance, voter education, public service announcements and mailings on the elections. We also plan, in the run-up to the elections, to devote some additional resources for small, local infrastructure and community development projects in Republika Srpska and Middle Bosnia that can be announced as a means of enhancing support for President Plavsic and Prime Minister Dodik, Bosnian Serb candidate for the tri-partite presidency Radisic, and President Zubak. An outline of these initiatives is attached (Tab 1).

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 12/14/2013

2008-0444-F3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert S. Gelbard, S/SR
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)

In the post-election period, we will continue to use targeted assistance -- USAID high-impact projects and municipal infrastructure, and increased support for "Open Cities" minority refugee return efforts -- both to demonstrate that a vote for Dayton brings rapid, positive returns for a community, and to make clear to Dodik that our steadfast support has a price tag -- results on tough issues like refugee returns. We also plan to increase our support for broad educational exchanges and programs which will help foster a new generation of more democratic leaders.

We are studying our resources and the range of implementation priorities, and may ultimately seek your support for securing additional monies from outside the 150 account, if current budget levels prove inadequate. One area where we do need your support now, is in securing an additional \$10 million in drawdown authority from the Congress for the Train and Equip Program. Such funding will insure that the U.S. equipment provided to the Federation remains fully operational and that Bosnian Muslim and Croat leaders continue to see their future security tied to each other and the U.S. Equally as important, the continued consolidation of the Federation joint military is critical to isolating and marginalizing Bosnian Croat hard-liners.

BROADENED USG INVOLVEMENT

Peace Corps - Getting Peace Corps Volunteers into both the educational and small business development areas could provide a tremendous boost to our ability to reach out to young Bosnians of all ethnic groups and begin to influence a new generation of community leaders. To date, Peace Corps has ruled out starting a program due to security concerns. Diplomatic Security is prepared now to authorize the Peace Corps to operate in Sarajevo, and to look at other locations on a case-by-case basis. I just discussed this issue with Mark Gearan, who was positive about getting involved. Your encouragement would help engender a heightened sense of urgency on the part of the Peace Corps to move forward rapidly.

Law Enforcement Participation - To date, FBI has conducted three assessments of the organized crime threat in Bosnia as well as the local capabilities to combat the problem. Despite repeated commitments to be helpful, the FBI has so far declined -- on the basis of a lack of a specific threat to the United States which would involve the FBI and the security threat to its officers -- to send agents to Bosnia to work with the reformed, restructured police forces and the newly formed Federation police on combating organized crime. Both DEA and U.S. Customs should provide similar expertise but also have proved reticent. Ray Kelly was supportive of an earlier request for Customs to provide four officers to work with the European Union, Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO), but Customs has resisted.

Frankly, this will not happen unless you weigh in with Louis Freeh and Ray Kelly now to reinforce the priority the Administration places on this effort and secure their active participation. Talking points for your use are attached (Tabs 2, 3).

Forest Management - Bosnia's forests are one of its most important natural resources -- one that is rapidly being depleted by both poor management and illegal logging operations. The World Bank has a major loan in work in the Forestry sector, and we will seek the Department of Agriculture's cooperation in providing a senior advisor to work with the state and entity governments, and the Bank on a forestry management program and the design of a legal/enforcement regime to protect state-owned forests.

- NEMA already has conducted an imagery survey, at our request, mapping Bosnian deforestation -- a critical tool in launching an advisory program.
- The loss of potential state income from illegal logging is estimated to be very significant. As part of our broader effort to establish state and entity control over legitimate sources of revenue, we are developing a strategy to establish tighter border controls and to crack down on corruption throughout Bosnia which should benefit any forest management program.

HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Commerce/Privatization - The Department of Commerce has shown no real interest in Bosnia since Ron Brown's tragic plane crash. We intend to engage Dick Sklar in an effort to help organize this effort. We will seek your help in the near term in bringing Commerce on board with this strategy.

- The situation on the ground has improved markedly, both from a security and developmental standpoint.
- A range of different types of commercial visits, linked to recent progress made in both Republika Srpska and the Federation, could have a tremendous impact in terms of our ability to advance privatization.
- These visits, if timed to follow shortly after the elections, would highlight the clear payoff, in terms of international investment, for those leaders willing to implement Dayton.

Internet-based ``Virtual University'' - As part of an expanded focus on multi-ethnic, multi-cultural education in Bosnia, we are exploring with Bosnian academics the potential for developing an internet-based consortium of U.S. and possibly European partner universities with direct links to Bosnian Universities -- a

``virtual university.'' If the project can be fleshed out in the near term, we will seek your support, and that of the Vice President's office, in launching this initiative as a means of focusing attention on the importance of cultivating a new generation of leaders in Bosnia.

- We are studying an initial proposal from Bosnia, and are consulting both with U.S. and Bosnian Universities about the feasibility, and potential scope of such a project. (This includes the technical capabilities -- phone lines and computer access -- of Bosnian Universities to participate.)
- We also will explore ways to link up potential corporate sponsors for such a program with Universities willing to participate.
- If successful, a ``Virtual University'' concept could serve as a model that could be replicated in Kosovo or elsewhere.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Planned/Ongoing Election Support
- Tab 2 - Talking points for call to Freeh
- Tab 3 - Talking points for call to Kelly

PLANNED/ONGOING ELECTION SUPPORT

Direct Elections Support

- Increased USAID support (through NDI) to campaign training and advisory activities for opposition parties in the Republika Srpska and among both ethnic groups in the Federation.
- Funding, through OSCE, for 22 opposition political parties.
- Production and distribution of over 3,000,000 elections-related pamphlets, flyers and posters.
- The organization of more than 100 public forums and round table discussions involving numerous political actors and parties,
- Production and ``no fee'' distribution of over 300,000 ``special elections related editions of area newspapers and magazines,
- Monitoring of Bosnian elections by 200+ Bosnian civil society organizations
- The Production and mailing of reform-backing mailings on candidates to 155,000 out-of-country voters.
- Additional funding to cover the costs of establishing more polling-station time to ensure a ``claims period'' -- an unplanned commitment designed to ensure recently returned refugees get the opportunity to vote.
- Support for Monitoring Coordinating Groups designed to monitor campaign activity and to handle complaints filed by political parties, coalitions and candidates.
- Funding to establish and upgrade existing reading rooms used by displaced persons with information on elections, candidates, etc.
- Support to OSCE voter education, political party training, resource assistance.
- Creation of special Bosnian Elections Internet web site.

Pre- and Post-Election Media Initiatives

- Production and airing of over 110 locally-produced, elections-related, TV and radio broadcasts involving more than 50 Bosnian and Serbian stations.
- The production and repeated airing of elections related public service announcements, infomercials and ``jingles'' for radio and television.
- Support for establishment of independent radio stations in Mostar, Zvornik and Livno.
- Support for the expansion of the Belgrade-based ``B-92'' radio network into Bosnia (involving some 15 Bosnia-based stations), and to purchase additional programming.
- Funding for expansion of independent TV Sky Sat and Montena in Montenegro
- Support for the Independent Journalists Association of the RS.

Targeted Assistance - Advance Opposition Candidates.

- Increased USAID funds (up to \$1.5 million) for community infrastructure or development projects that can be announced in conjunction with key candidates in the RS (Plavsic, Dodik, Radisic) and in Middle Bosnia (Zubak).

**TALKING POINTS FOR YOU CALL
TO LOUIS FREEH, DIRECTOR FBI**

- I understand you have discussed with Bob Gelbard the possibility of FBI getting more engaged in Bosnia, and have conducted a series of assessments of the situation.
- Police reform and restructuring have taken off with the political changes in the Bosnian Serb entity and their new willingness to cooperate with the UN International Police Task Force.
- We are at a critical juncture now. We have put in place the law enforcement structures -- including the equivalent of a federal police agency in the Federation.
- We now must ensure that these newly-minted, democratically-oriented police forces have the best possible advice and training to deal with the threats posed by organized crime, corruption and drugs and arms trafficking.
- Our overall effort in Bosnia -- and the ultimate ability of SFOR to withdraw -- hinges on the ability of the Bosnians to ensure the security of their own citizens and their fragile, new institutions.
- This effort is especially urgent as dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnian Croats is central to our ability to forge a truly strong Bosnian nation.
- It is critical that FBI, as well as U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies take a more active role in shaping Bosnia's approach to the rule of law. An up front investment will certainly save us countless time and resources if it helps consolidate the democratic reform of Bosnia's justice sector.
- Success in Bosnia remains a top priority for is administration. The President does not want to leave behind in Bosnia a lawless jungle--we need to leave law and order. We need your help in this.
- I hope FBI will get more directly involved, particularly by sending some experienced officers to work with police in both entities on trans-national crime issues.

**TALKING POINTS FOR YOU CALL TO RAY KELLY
DIRECTOR FOR ENFORCEMENT, TREASURY DEPARTMENT**

- I understand you have discussed with Bob Gelbard the possibility of Customs getting more engaged in Bosnia, and that you have seconded a senior Customs agent (Oscar Vera) to the State Department to advise him and General Clark on Customs enforcement issues.
- This type of interagency cooperation on Bosnia is critical to our success.
- As we have made progress on police reform and restructuring, we have begun to focus on other law enforcement challenges -- corruption and organized crime -- which will go to the heart, ultimately, of Bosnia's ability to consolidate truly democratic, functioning institutions.
- Developing a functioning customs service, with enforcement capabilities is a top priority. This effort is especially urgent as dismantling organized crime and other corruption networks between Croatia and the Bosnian Croats is central to our ability to forge a truly strong Bosnian nation.
- It is critical that U.S. Customs and our other federal enforcement agencies take as active a role as possible in this process.
- In the past, Customs has made invaluable personnel contributions, through CAFAO, to this effort. The lack of U.S. participation now has slowed CAFAO's reform efforts, and reduced our ability to influence this process.
- I hope that you will consider, on an urgent basis, again detailing some officers to work in Bosnia on this critical effort.
- Success in Bosnia remains a top priority for is administration. The President does not want to leave behind in Bosnia a lawless jungle--we need to leave law and order. We need your help in this.

TO: BERGER

FROM: HURLEY
SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 30 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BOSNIAN ELECTIONS RESULTS & WAY AHEAD

ACTION: OBE PER HURLEY DUE DATE: 05 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
HURLEY
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 12/14/2023
2008-0994-F3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSDMK DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001 HURLEY
001 BERGER
001 HURLEY
001

Z 98100513 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98100813 FOR FURTHER ACTION
Z 98100813 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98101321 FOR REDO
X 98110310 OBE PER HURLEY

National Security Council
The White House

10/13/98
1413
1130 AM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6685 redo
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 5 A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>S 10/7</u>	<u>done</u>
Kerrick	<u>copy</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature] 10/13</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Hurley</u>	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>A = SRB notes</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

REDO

COMMENTS: memo to Pres on Bosnian elections & the way ahead.

'98 OCT 7 PM 5:20

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

OBE

National Security Council
The White House

10/1/98
3:20

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6085
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM FRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG R A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>K</u> Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>10/1/98</u>	<u>2/1</u>
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(P) 10/11</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>(TS) 10/29</u>	<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Memo to POTUS re
Bosnian Elections

98 OCT 1 PM 3:20

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Reda

September 30, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GREGORY L. SCHULTE *GLS*

FROM: C. MICHAEL HURLEY *CH*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Bosnian Elections and The Way Ahead

*→ Michael/Breg
thinks on elections,
more thoughtful on
way ahead:*

Attached is a memorandum to the President on the results of the recent Bosnian Elections and a description of our post-election agenda for shaping the outcome.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

*What are our objectives
to next year / too?
What is our strategy?
What resources will
we require?
What dangers lurk
ahead?
What is trajectory /
touch marks for
our draw down?*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VZ* NARA, Date *12/14/2023*
2008-0994-F3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [Record ID: 9806685] (3 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia

2008-0994-F
vz6229

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [pages 2 & 3 annotated] [Record ID: 9806685] (2 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia

2008-0994-F
vz6229

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [annotated] [Record ID: 9806685] (3 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia

2008-0994-F
vz6229

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Bosnian Election Results and the Way Ahead [pages 1 & 2, annotated] [Record ID: 9806685] (2 pages)	10/07/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia

2008-0994-F
vz6229

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: BERGER

FROM: COVEY

DOC DATE: 21 AUG 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

HUMAN RIGHTS

*File
Bosnia*

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BOSNIA ELECTIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 27 AUG 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: COVEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHULTE

**UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS**

Initials: VZ Date: 12/14/2023

2004-0994-F3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 98082410 FOR INFORMATION
X 98091515 NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

National Security Council
The White House

8/22/98
@ 11:55pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5803
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (3) A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 8/12</u>	<u>(R) me</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>(R)</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>(R) 8/31</u>	<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SR

COMMENTS: Bosnia Elections

98 AUG 21 PM 8:06

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For Samel Berger from Jack Covey. Subject: Bosnian Elections. [Record ID: 9805883] (2 pages)	08/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia

2008-0994-F

vz6229

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. poster	The SFOR Mission: The Stabilization Force in Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	06/01/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1708

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia

2008-0994-F

vz6229

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE
SFOR
MISSION
The Stabilization Force in Bosnia



MIRIAM SAPIRO < 33 - 33 >
DIRECTOR FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SOCIETY
DECEMBER

 A Joint Intelligence Report  **0011**


Information available as of 1 June 1998 was used in this report.

This paper was prepared by CIA and DIA members of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief of the Balkan Task Force on [redacted] secure.

(b)(3)

THE SFOR MISSION

The Stabilization Force in Bosnia



The Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR)

Since December 1995, a NATO-led international force has been deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement military aspects of the Dayton Peace accords. SFOR and the Implementation Force (IFOR), its predecessor, have played a key role in bringing peace to the Balkan region by discouraging a return to arms.

Building on Success

The NATO-led IFOR/SFOR mission is the world's longest running peace enforcement operation.

IFOR, which replaced the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping force in 1995, was charged primarily with preventing a resumption of hostilities, enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton accord by separating warring parties and ensuring that heavy weapons were placed in cantonments.


IFOR transitioned to SFOR in December 1996. SFOR's mission was similar to IFOR, except that it was focused primarily on creating an environment in Bosnia that would permit civilian implementation to proceed, eventually allowing the withdrawal of international troops reflecting the continuing importance of Bosnian peace enforcement. In February 1998, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to renew the mandate of SFOR. SFOR's mission after June 1998 will remain the same, although the number of troops is scheduled to drop from 34,000 to 28,000. A new unit, the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), will enhance SFOR's ability to promote public order. It will operate under the command of the SFOR Commander (COMSFOR) and will use SFOR's rules of engagement. It can provide support to UN police in Bosnia but will not perform police functions itself.

Conditions for Withdrawal


Rather than set an arbitrary end date, the NAC extended SFOR until certain benchmarks indicating progress toward establishing a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia are met. NATO allies, in conjunction with non-NATO contributing nations, agreed that these benchmarks will be used to determine progressive reductions in the size and profile of SFOR. These benchmarks will include:

- Maintenance of a cease-fire.
- Weapons remain in cantonments.
- Police and judicial reform.
- Establishment of joint institutions.
- Media reform.
- Electoral reforms and democratization.
- Minority returns and freedom of movement.
- Resolution of the Breko issue.
- Progress and cooperation in bringing war criminals to justice.
- Free market reform and an IMF program in place.


SFOR Chain of Command




SFOR Troop Deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 June 1998



SFOR Troops Outside Bosnia



Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Opstina, 1991 Census



Military Terrain of Yugoslavia



Bosnia: Return of Displaced Persons and Refugee Repatriation

Because almost 1.5 million Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain without permanent homes, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has designated 1998 to be the year of minority returns and has set a goal of 140,000 to 220,000 minority returns by yearend.


• More than 2.2 million Bosnians—more than half of the 1991 population—either fled or were ethnically cleansed from their homes during the war. Despite the provisions of Dayton's Annex VII for the return of all those who were displaced, some 800,000 remain internally displaced while about 700,000 remain in asylum countries, most in Western Europe.

• Some 200,000 internally displaced Bosnians have returned to their prewar homes since Dayton—nearly all to areas where their ethnic group comprises a majority and most returning immediately after the signing of the Dayton accords. This number is offset, however, by another 100,000 being displaced from their homes after Dayton, including at least 70,000 Serbs from the Sarajevo suburbs.

• Another 200,000 refugees from abroad have repatriated to Bosnia since Dayton, mostly Muslims returning to Federation areas controlled by their own ethnic group. Most of those remaining in Europe are from Serb-held areas and will be more difficult to repatriate to their home areas.

Returning refugees and internally displaced persons to their former homes in minority areas is a key ingredient for lasting peace in Bosnia. All three ethnic groups have opposed accepting returns in key areas. Returns have often sparked violence against returnees from the current residents of the local community, who are often displaced themselves. Local police, with the support of the International Police Task Force, are the first line of defense against hostilities associated with returns, but SFOR has been called on to quell the violence on a number of occasions.

Areas of Probable Refugee Return Violence in 1998



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RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE
SFOR
MISSION

The Stabilization Force in Bosnia



 *A Joint Intelligence Report* 

Information available as of 1 June 1998 was used in this report.

This paper was prepared by CIA and DIA members of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief of the Balkan Task Force on [redacted] secure.

(b)(3)

THE SFOR MISSION

The Stabilization Force in Bosnia



The Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR)

Since December 1995, a NATO-led international force has been deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. SFOR and the Implementation Force (IFOR), its predecessor, have played a key role in bringing peace to the Balkan region by discouraging a return to arms.

Building on Success

The NATO-led IFOR/SFOR mission is the world's longest running peace enforcement operation.

• IFOR, which replaced the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping force in 1995, was changed primarily with preventing a resumption of hostilities, enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton accord by separating warring parties and ensuring that heavy weapons were placed in cantonments.

• IFOR transitioned to SFOR in December 1996. SFOR's mission was similar to IFOR, except that it was focused primarily on creating an environment in Bosnia that would permit civilian implementation to proceed, eventually allowing the withdrawal of international troops.


Reflecting the continuing importance of Bosnian peace enforcement, in February 1998, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to renew the mandate of SFOR. SFOR's mission after June 1998 will remain the same, although the number of troops is scheduled to drop from 34,000 to 28,000. A new unit, the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), will enhance SFOR's ability to promote public order. It will operate under the command of the SFOR commander (COMSFOR) and will use SFOR's rules of engagement. It can provide support to UN police in Bosnia but will not perform police functions itself.

Conditions for Withdrawal

Rather than set an arbitrary end date, the NAC extended SFOR until certain benchmarks indicating progress toward establishing a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia are met. NATO allies, in conjunction with non-NATO contributing nations, agreed that these benchmarks will be used to determine progressive reductions in the size and profile of SFOR. These benchmarks include:

- Maintenance of a cease-fire.
- Weapons remain in cantonments.
- Police and judicial reform.
- Establishment of joint institutions.
- Media reform.
- Electoral reforms and democratization.
- Minority returns and freedom of movement.
- Resolution of the Breko issue.
- Progress and cooperation in bringing war criminals to justice.
- Free market reform and an IMF program in place.


SFOR Chain of Command




SFOR Troop Deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 June 1998



Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Opstina, 1991 Census



Military Terrain of Yugoslavia



Bosnia: Return of Displaced Persons and Refugee Repatriation

Because almost 1.5 million Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain without permanent homes, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has designated 1998 to be the year of returns and has set a goal of 140,000 to 220,000 minority returns by year-end.

• More than 2.2 million Bosnians—more than half of the 1991 population—either fled or were ethnically cleansed from their homes during the war. Despite the provisions of Dayton's Annex VII for the return of all those who were displaced, some 800,000 remain internally displaced while about 700,000 remain in asylum countries, most in Western Europe.

• Some 200,000 internally displaced Bosnians have returned to their prewar homes since Dayton—nearly all to areas where their ethnic group comprises a majority and most returning immediately after the signing of the Dayton accords. This number is offset, however, by another 100,000 being displaced from their homes after Dayton, including at least 70,000 Serbs from the Sarajevo suburbs.

• Another 200,000 refugees from abroad have repatriated to Bosnia since Dayton, mostly Muslims returning to Federation areas controlled by their own ethnic group. Most of those remaining in Europe are from Serb-held areas and will be more difficult to repatriate to their home areas.

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