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**Folder Title:**

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

**Staff Office-Individual:**

Global Affairs-Darragh, Sean

**Original OA/ID Number:**

274

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                        | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. paper               | Somalia (3 pages)                                                    | 09/02/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. memo                | Richard Moose to General Wesley Clark, re: [USLO Mogadishu] (1 page) | 07/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003a. report             | Re: [Aideed] (1 page)                                                | 07/16/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003b. report             | Re: [Africa] (1 page)                                                | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003c. report             | Re: [Israel/Somalia] (2 pages)                                       | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003d. report             | Situation Room Evening Summary (1 page)                              | 07/18/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004a. fax                | Fax Coversheet (1 page)                                              | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004b. cable              | Re: SNA Threatens U.S. Ambassador (3 pages)                          | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004c. cable              | Re: SNA Continues to Spread Anti-UNOSOM/U.S. Propaganda (3 pages)    | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005a. fax                | Fax Coversheet (1 page)                                              | 07/00/1994 | P3/b(3)     |
| 005b. report             | Re: [Ambush] (1 page)                                                | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005c. cable              | Re: Situation Report Number 26 (3 pages)                             | 07/18/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F

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### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005d. cable              | Re: SNA Leader Threatens U.S. and UNOSOM (2 pages)                                   | 07/12/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. paper               | Somalia Options Paper (8 pages)                                                      | 07/14/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007a. memo               | R. Rand Beers to Anthony Lake, re: Principals Committee Meeting on Somalia (3 pages) | 07/21/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007b. paper              | Principals Committee Discussion Paper on Somailia (4 pages)                          | 07/00/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

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Somenia  
File

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*And:  
Back  
whether we  
want him  
back*

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 28, 1993

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

The Cabinet Room

11:16 P.M. EDT

Q Mr. President, have you decided to change your strategy in Somalia, perhaps not go after General Aidid out of concern, perhaps because of congressional criticisms of the mission?

THE PRESIDENT: No. The United Nations strategy on the ground has not changed. But I have emphasized to them that every nation involved in that, from the beginning, was in it with the understanding that our first goal was to restore the conditions of normal life there -- to stop the killing, to stop the disease, to stop the famine; and that has been done -- with broad support among the Somali people, with the exception of that small portion in Mogadishu where General Aidid and his supporters are.

So the enforcement strategy did not change, but what I wanted to emphasize at the U.N. yesterday was that there has to be a political strategy that puts the affairs of Somalia back into the hands of Somalia; that gives every country, not just the United States, every country that comes into that operation the sense that they're rotating in and out, that there is a fixed date for their ultimate disengagement in Somalia, because there's so many other peacekeeping operations in the world that have to be considered, and that we owe that to all the nations we ask to participate in peacekeeping over the long run.

So there's been no change in the enforcement strategy, but I have tried to raise the visibility, or the urgency of getting the political track back on pace, because in the end, every peacekeeping mission, or every humanitarian mission has to have a date certain when its over, and you have to, in the end, turn the affairs of the country back over to the people who live there. We were not asked to go to Somalia to establish a protectorate or a trust relationship, or to run the country. That's not what we went for.

Q But do you have broader concerns about Bosnia? I mean, there's a similar problem there with not date certain, no exit strategy.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the -- in there, in that case, the United States is in a much better position to establish, I think, the standards and have some discipline now on the front end. To be fair, I think that everyone involved in Bosnia is perhaps more sensitive than was the case in the beginning of this Somali operation about the -- of it, the dangers of it, and the need to have a strict set of limitations and conditions before the involvement occurs.

Q Given the current situation in Somalia, Mr. President, how do you go about fixing a date certain for withdrawal?

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: I think one of the things we have to do is assess the conditions. Keep in mind, what we see every night reported now is a conflict between one Somali warlord who started this by murdering Pakistanis in a small portion of Mogadishu. It has very little to do with the whole rest of the country where tribal councils and village councils are beginning to govern the country where most of the people are living in peace with the conditions of normal life have returned. There are lot of things that need to be sorted through there. And I think that what you'll see in the next few weeks is a real effort by the United Nations to articulate a political strategy -- the country can be basically given back to the people who live there.

Q Do you think you'll be sending troops to Bosnia?

THE PRESIDENT: I've made it clear what I believe will happen.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

11:20 A.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 19, 1993

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON NAFTA

The Cabinet Room

10:45 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say, first of all, I'm glad to have this bipartisan House delegation here, the latest in a round several meetings on NAFTA. I want to begin by expressing my encouragement of today's housing numbers as well as the reports of increased business investment, which indicate that the economy is picking up. And I'm encouraged by that. And I know that all of us hope that that will work and that the lower interest rates and the declining deficit will help to support continued economic renewal.

But if America wants to grow more jobs, we're going to have to increase our exports. And therefore it is critical that we continue pushing and pass this trade agreement before the Congress goes home. And I'm here to -- hopeful we pick up a few more votes for the NAFTA agreement today and to discuss some of the outstanding issues on it with the members here. It's imperative -- we can have an economic recovery, but if we're going to create jobs, we're going to have increase exports. That's what wealthy countries have to do. And I hope we can do that here and pass NAFTA.

Q Mr. President, does the withdrawal of the Rangers from Somalia, sir, mean that you've given up on the search for Aideed?

THE PRESIDENT: No, it's means that we have 3,600 Marines coming in, many of whom have similar capacities who will be there. And it means that right now we are engaging in a political process to see how we can resolve our mission in Somalia and to do all the things the United Nations ordered to do, including working out a political solution and having a process by which the people who were responsible for killing the Pakistani soldiers -- that's what started all this -- that that investigation can proceed in and appropriate action can be taken. There may be another way to do that. So right now we're in a stand-down position. It does mean that a final decision's been made.

Q Mr. President, you have set a deadline on March 31st to get the troops out of Somalia. Do you have any contingency plans for Somalia at all?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we're doing what we agreed to do. We're pursuing negotiations to try to get a political solution. And I'm happy to say that if anything, as you probably noted in the paper today, we're able to fulfill our mission better now than we have been for the last few months. We're delivering the safety of the -- and our mission is going along as planned.

Q Mr. President, this is your sixth meeting with members of Congress on NAFTA. So far only three members have emerged

MORE

saying that they've shifted their position -- these meetings. Are you making the progress you need in order to ratify it and --

THE PRESIDENT: I think we are. I think -- a lot of people have said things to me privately that they haven't said yet in public. And I think the Congress is still waiting to see how we're going to work out some of these others issues, including the training programs -- a lot of the Democrats want to know -- and they're going to have a chance to vote on that. And we still have to work through the whole issue of how we deal with the fact that if we pass NAFTA, we have to reduce tariffs. And that's a \$2.5 billion tax on American consumers today, the tariffs are, that we will reduce. And under our budget laws, that has to be replacing -- so we have to work through that. There are still some practical things to work out.

I believe that a majority of the Congress today believes it's the right thing to do. So our question is whether we can persuade a majority to vote, do what they think is right. I think by the end of November we'll be able to do that.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Good question.

Q Mr. President, I don't know if you recognize the young man here. There is Sean Donahue, who introduced you, he says, at an event in New Hampshire.

THE PRESIDENT: He sure did. I recognize him.

MR. DONAHUE: Thank you, Mr. Vice President.

THE PRESIDENT: How did you -- why didn't they tell me you were coming today?

Q I came earlier this morning, and they said that we could come in here and the White House lawn event, so --

THE PRESIDENT: You're going to come to the lawn event, too?

MR. DONAHUE: Yes, I will.

THE PRESIDENT: Who have you got with you?

MR. DONAHUE: This is a friend of mine from New York. And she's just starting to get interested in politics. Her name is Karina Meckel.

THE PRESIDENT: I want you to know, this guy grilled me -- he's really good. Are you only staying a day or are you -- you'll probably have me up a tree -- (laughter) --

MR. DONAHUE: We're on a committee of kids to speak out to different politicians about the issues that are concerning us, sponsored by Nintendo.

THE PRESIDENT: Good for you. And I'll see you at the next event, too.

MR. DONAHUE: Definitely, Mr. President. Thank you.  
(Laughter.)

END

10:51 A.M. EDT



Q Mr. President, can you tell us what you think of Boris Yeltsin refusing to see Richard Nixon? Did you tell Richard Nixon it was okay with you if he met with former Vice President Ruskoy and the other opposition leaders?

THE PRESIDENT: I did, yes. He told me he wanted to do that because, as a nongovernment official, he felt that it was an appropriate thing for him to do, basically going to Russia on a fact-finding mission to listen to people who had views very different from not only the Russian government, from his own, and from my own. And he said he thought he was in a different position from me, for example; and I agreed that he was in a different position. So he said that's what he intended to do. And I told that was -- I would be interested in hearing his report when he got back.

Q What do you make of Boris Yeltsin refusing to see Richard Nixon as a result?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, you have to -- it's up to President Yeltsin whom he sees and doesn't see. I wish he would see him because I think they'd enjoy talking to one another. And I think Richard Nixon is basically quite sympathetic with the dilemmas faced by Boris Yeltsin and generally quite supportive of his administration. So I would hope that he will see him, but I don't think it's -- you know, it's not the end of the world.

Q Mr. President, how do you feel about the pull-out, now, of all the troops from Somalia?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first, I want to compliment our military people -- they are doing an excellent job. They've handled it very well. And I think -- as I have said all along, this was originally -- if you go back to 1992, this whole mission was billed as a humanitarian mission. And the first time President Bush spoke with me about it, he said he thought maybe they would be out before I was inaugurated, or by the end of January. And what we learned from that, of course, is that at least in the case of Somalia and many other cases, you can't have a humanitarian mission divorced from the political problems of the time. The people in Somalia were starving not because there was no food that could be given to them, they were starving because of the political and military conflicts consuming the country.

The United States, and then the United Nations, went in there to give the people of Somalia a chance not only to save lives, restore normalcy, end starvation, but to give them a chance to work out their own problems in a different way. And I think we have given them that chance. The American people have been very generous with their money and with their support. We have lost some of our most precious resources, our young people, in Somalia because of the nature of the conflict. And I think we have done our job there and then some. And I feel very --

Q But the civil war will resume there.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don't know that. I mean, they still -- that's up to them. There are civil wars in a lot of countries in this world that we have not made anything like the effort for we've made in Somalia. There's a civil war in Sudan, there's a civil war in Angola, there were lots of people killed in Burundi. That's just in Africa, never mind all these other places.

So we have made an extraordinary effort -- the United States has -- to help the people of Somalia. And the leaders there now have a choice to make. There are still United Nations forces there. They're still in a position to guarantee the availability of food and medicine and a more humane life. And they will have to decide whether they care more about that, and care more about their people and seeing their children healthy, or whether they want to let the country be consumed in war again. But they have to take some

responsibility now. The responsibility is shifting back to the leaders there on the ground. And they ought to work it out. They ought to prefer the life their people have had the last 14 months or so, 15 months, to what they had before. But it's up to them.

Q Mr. President, back on Russia, can you tell us about your conversation with Mr. Yeltsin? He seemed to suggest that you agreed with him on the Nixon visit. Did you talk with him about this?

THE PRESIDENT: With Mr. Yeltsin?

Q Did you talk with him or with anyone?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe -- I don't think Boris Yeltsin and I discussed President Nixon's visit. I don't believe we did. You know, I talked to him on a fairly regular basis, but I think the last time we talked we were talking about Bosnia, and I don't think we had a conversation about it.

But I did talk with Richard Nixon, President Nixon before he went there. And he raised this prospect of meeting with some of the opposition leaders. He said he thought it would be interesting. He wanted to get a feel for where they were and what kind of people they were. Again, he said he was not in the government of the United States, he was in a different position. And I said I had no -- he should meet with whomever he wanted and I'd be interested to hear his reports when he got back.

Q But you don't think it's a diplomatic insult for Richard Nixon to have seen other leaders -- opposition leaders?

THE PRESIDENT: No, because he's not in the government. You know, he's not even -- he's over there on a fact-finding mission and I -- as I said, Richard Nixon has been extremely supportive of this administration's Russia policy, which has been extremely supportive of President Yeltsin and his objectives. So I think he's been, in that sense, as an American citizen and a longtime expert on that area of the world, he's been very supportive of the objectives of President Yeltsin, and I think it should be seen in that light.

Again, I can't speak to whatever the dynamics are in Russian domestic politics at this time and whether that is having any impact on President Yeltsin's decision. I can't speak to that. But all I'm saying is that I think that President Yeltsin should not assume that Richard Nixon is not friendly toward his administration and toward democracy and toward reform, because, quite the contrary, he has been a very strong supporter of our policy for the last year. And I wouldn't overreact to the fact that he met with some people who are in opposition to President Yeltsin.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, what advice do you have for top aides who are appearing before -- in federal court about Whitewater and --

THE PRESIDENT: Just the same advice I give everybody. Just tell them what happened, answer the questions and go on. Be very open.

Q Do you plan any other staff changes as a result of Whitewater, sir?

END

11:10 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

July 1, 1993

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE SPEAKER OF THE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND  
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

July 1, 1993

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

In my letter to you of June 10, 1993, regarding the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia, I reported on the deplorable June 5 attacks on United Nations Operation in Somalia forces (UNOSOM II) instigated by one of Somalia's factional leaders. I also reported to you that on June 6, 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 837, which strongly condemned the unprovoked June 5 attacks that left 23 Pakistani peacekeepers dead. In addition, the Security Council reemphasized the crucial importance of the disarmament of all Somali parties, and reaffirmed the Secretary General's authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter "to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks [of June 5], including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment."

Since that time, the United Nations has acted resolutely to restore order in Mogadishu and to protect U.N. forces. These actions have ensured that the world community's crucial humanitarian efforts in Somalia and the national reconciliation process in that country will continue to move forward. In view of these developments (in particular the role of U.S. Armed Forces in the recent U. -led activities in Somalia), and because of my desire that the Congress be kept fully informed regarding significant deployments of U.S. Armed Forces, I am providing this supplement to my earlier report.

In planning appropriate measures to respond to the violence and to implement the Security Council's mandate, the United Nations was able to draw upon the superb capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces that remained in Somalia following the transition to UNOSOM II. In addition to the logistics and other support personnel assigned to UNOSOM II, the Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) -- under U.S. operational control -- was available to assist UNOSOM II during emergencies. At the height of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operations, just over 25,000 U.S. Armed Forces personnel were deployed to Somalia. Consistent with U.S. policy objectives, the current smaller U.S. contribution of approximately 4,400 personnel reflects the increased participation by other U.N. Member States. United States Armed Forces played an extremely important role in the successful efforts of UNOSOM II to restore stability to the area and to enable U.N. humanitarian operations in Somalia to proceed. First, after determining that the

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leadership of one of Somalia's factions had planned and incited the June 5 attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, UNOSOM II initiated air and ground military operations in the early morning hours of June 12. Primary targets included weapons and ordnance caches and a radio facility that had been used to foment violence towards U.N. forces and opposition to implementation of the Security Council's humanitarian mandate in Somalia. United States fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft operating as part of the QRF, in support of UNOSOM II, destroyed or disabled those targets in a well-planned effort consistent with the Security Council's disarmament objectives and the mandate to restore security. United States forces sustained no casualties.

On June 17, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, acting pursuant to Security Council Resolution 837, ordered the arrest of General Mohammed Farah Aideed for alleged criminal acts against UNOSOM II peacekeeping forces on June 5. In addition, UNOSOM II forces conducted further coordinated ground and air operations designed to search, clear, and disarm the factional stronghold of General Aideed in south Mogadishu that posed a continuing threat to U.N. operations. Ground and aerial broadcasts warned civilians to leave the area. Targets included weapons and ammunition caches, command and control facilities, and defensive positions. Once again, the U.S. QRF, in support of UNOSOM II, conducted air attacks, followed by search and clearing operations on the ground by non-U.S. UNOSOM II military personnel. Only one U.S. military member sustained minor injury, although there were several deaths and a number of injuries among UNOSOM II forces from other nations due to resistance by militia units and sniper fire. Although Aideed has not yet been arrested, the June 17 operation accomplished the objective of securing Aideed's compound and neutralizing military capabilities that had posed a major obstacle to U.N. efforts to deliver humanitarian relief, facilitate political reconciliation, and promote national reconstruction.

We now see renewed opportunity for UNOSOM II to move forward steadily towards fulfillment of the humanitarian mandate of the Security Council that is shared by the world community. By countering the lawless, unprovoked violence against U.N. peacekeepers, the United Nations has gone far towards preserving the credibility and security of peacekeeping forces in Somalia and throughout the world. United States forces remain on guard along with those of our U.N. partners to counter any threats to the important U.N. mission in Somalia, should they arise.

As before, I remain committed to ensuring that the Congress is kept fully informed on U.S. peacekeeping contributions and the use of U.S. Armed Forces for these vital purposes. I look forward to continuing discussions and close cooperation with you on these and related issues.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

# # #

MAP-15-1394 15:42 WHITEHOUSE PRESS OFF  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Fort Drum, New York)

For Immediate Release

March 15, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES

Soldier's Gym  
Fort Drum, New York

6:02 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Those of you who can be seated. (Laughter.) Hello.

AUDIENCE: Hellooo!

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for the wonderful welcome. Thank you for this beautiful, beautifully decorated place of welcome. Thank you for letting the band play "Yakity Sax." That was an interesting little twist. (Laughter.) And thank you for letting me sit next to a distinguished soldier who was from my hometown -- our grandparents knew each other -- Command Sergeant Major Johnson, stand up. (Applause.)

You know, we were sitting back there talking, he was looking at me thinking, I don't know about you, Mr. President, but I've come a long way. (Laughter.)

I thank all of you for being here. I also want to acknowledge the presence in the audience today of the Lt. Governor of New York, Lt. Governor Stan Lundine, and Congressman John McCue from this district. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. (Applause.)

I also want to thank the eight couples that are here behind me and Major Tony Smart, who was sitting up there with me. The nine of them gathered over at General and Mrs. Meade's house a few moments ago to talk to me about what it was like to be in Somalia and what it was like to be the family members left behind. They represented you wonderfully well. I loved my time with them. And it must not have been all that easy for them to do, but they were terrific. I'd like for you to acknowledge them all. (Applause.)

I thank General Meade for his welcome and General Shali for his fine remarks.

You know, this is a great day, but it is March 15th and there's still a couple of feet of snow on the ground up here. (Applause.) When I heard -- I know that there are fair number of men and women in our Armed Forces who come from the southern part of the United States. (Applause.) When I realized you'd had 160 inches of snow, 26 days in January below zero, one day at 43 degrees below zero -- that's real temperature, not wind chill -- I'm surprised we have anybody who didn't go to Somalia. (Laughter.) I'm surprised anybody stayed behind. Some of the ladies who were meeting with me said that shoveling the snow was maybe a harder duty than their husbands had to endure.

But I'm glad to be here. I thank you for the hat. Look at my nice tie, here. It's your tie. (Applause.) I will wear it with pride.

It's also a privilege for me to welcome back "Triple Deuce" today. (Applause.) I say on behalf of all the American people, thank you, job well done and welcome home.

Fifteen months ago, our troops went to Somalia to help stop one of the great human tragedies of our time. Already 300,000 people -- many of them little children like those here in this audience -- had died of starvation and disease -- twice as many were in danger of dying very quickly. Relief supplies were rotting on the docks of Mogadishu, hostage to a small number of armed Somalis.

To help relieve this suffering, our nation acted. President Bush deployed 28,000 American troops in support of a United Nations humanitarian mission. It was after the election, I was coming in and I gave him my full support. Joining with other soldiers and relief workers from around the world, our troops helped restore hope and save hundreds of thousands from certain death.

This proud division, the same division that helped the citizens of Florida rebuild after Hurricane Andrew knows something about restoring hope. (Applause.) I saw some of you there, too.

Today in Somalia, the crops are growing, food and medicine are flowing. Roads, schools and clinics have reopened. No longer are thousands of children dying every day. Leaders are sitting down today at peace talks in Nairobi. You helped make all that possible. And by March 25th, a week ahead of schedule, the last American military units in Somalia will be heading back to their loved ones and home. (Applause.)

There are those who will say we have not done everything that could have been done because Somalia has not yet found an enduring peace; because factions continue to fight for advantage, indifferent to the deadly chaos they threatened to recreate. But never forget, because of your efforts and the efforts of so many others, the starvation has ended and the Somali people have been given a serious chance to build their own future.

That is all we or anyone else can provide. We cannot rebuild other people's societies. You have given them a chance to seize their own future. That is what we do in the United States, and that is what others must do as well. You have given them that chance, and for that, the world should be grateful to you. (Applause.)

Let me say that we must honor not only those who returned hail and healthy, but also those who came home wounded and those who did not return. I met in Walter Reed Hospital one of your numbers, Sergeant Chris Reid, a very brave and terribly impressive soldier who is still in the hospital nursing his wounds. And I know that our prayers, all of our prayers are with him.

Just yesterday an American AC-130 crashed off the coast of Kenya on its way to Somalia and several of the crew members perished. On behalf of all the American people, let me express our sympathy to the loved ones of those who were lost in that accident.

On Veterans Day I had the honor of meeting three other members of your great division -- Specialist Michael Carroll and Duane Bevitt and Lt. Colonel Egon Hawrylack. They came to the White House -- I thought I deserve a cheer for pronouncing his name right. (Applause.)

Let me tell you, they came to the White House, those three people, with some others who served there with a simple message. They said, we are proud of what we did. When most of

our troops came home last May, General Robert Johnson came to the White House and he said this about you and your colleagues who served in Somalia: "A lot of 18 and 19-year-old men and women in uniform," he said, "demonstrated discipline, good judgment, and a good deal of patience in performing a rather unique mission."

That is putting it mildly. People who were not there do not know how much patience was required on how many circumstances under difficult, difficult conditions. (Applause.) And General Johnson said, "I don't think any other country in the world could have done what we did." I say that is true and we are all proud of what you did.

In this new era, you all know that we may ask our military to undertake a range of missions -- fighting aggression in the Gulf, helping to contain the conflict in the Balkans, working to build a democratic peace in Europe through NATO's Partnership for Peace. But whatever the setting, our people in uniform carry the same message of strength and hope and freedom.

That's why our forces must always be the best trained, the best equipped, the best prepared in the world; and the people with the best spirit, the best morale and the deepest conviction. People like you. That is my commitment -- to keep you there and keep you strong. (Applause.)

I want to say one other word about the mission in Somalia. General Shalikashvili just described that work as a great victory as measured in the thousands and hundreds of thousands of children and men and women who are alive today. In that sense, the mission you undertook was without precedent. American soldiers did not go to Somalia to conquer, but on a mission of mercy; a mission accomplished; a mission to be proud of. Let history also record that here at Fort Drum and at other bases across our nation that it was not just the troops who earned their stripes, but the spouses, the families, the children, the civilian colleagues and the communities.

I want to say again, I am profoundly grateful to all the families and all the family support groups and all the civilians who made this possible. And these fine people behind me, who spent about an hour talking to me today taught me things and made me see things and understand things from your point of view that I could never have learned otherwise. I am in your debt, and I believe I will be a better President and a better Commander in Chief because of the time they spent to share your lives, your experiences and your hopes with me. I thank them for that, and I thank you for that. (Applause.)

Finally, let me say, if there are any debates still to be had about our mission in Somalia, let people have those debates with me. But let there be no debate about how you carried out the mission. You answered the call, you did your job, you served your country wonderfully well. More than that no one can ask. So to all the American men and women who have served with honor in this difficult and dangerous mission, I say you have shown the world what Americans are made of. Your nation is grateful, and your President is terribly, terribly proud of you.

Thank you. God bless you, and God bless America.  
(Applause.)

END

6:14 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

October 13, 1993

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the United Nations and the United States, approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

o We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.

o What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."

o We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would

more

(OVER)



send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON :

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
October 13, 1993.

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LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 1 STORY

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THE HARTFORD COURANT

March 6, 1994 Sunday, STATEWIDE

SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. C02

LENGTH: 627 words

HEADLINE: SOMALIA MISSION A SUCCESS

## BODY:

When the last American soldiers pull out of Somalia in three weeks, there may not be a departure ceremony. President Clinton probably will issue a statement saying that the United States has finished its peacekeeping work in that east African country.

Finished would be the wrong word. The United States tried its best.

The expected low-key withdrawal would be in marked contrast to the television cameras that greeted the U.S. peacekeepers on Dec. 9, 1992. Even Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, Somali's most powerful warlord, welcomed the Marines!

President George Bush committed the United States to participate in the U.N. peacekeeping effort, called Operation Restore Hope, because he and most Americans were moved by reports of mass starvation and anarchy. Some 300,000 Somalis had perished. U.N. officers warned that another 1 million people would die if food and medicine did not reach the country soon.

The Bush administration promised a short peacekeeping mission - three months at most, said Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The mission lasted 15 months.

A fallout between Mr. Aidid and the United Nations turned the peacekeepers into combatants. He used women and children as human shields from behind which his gunmen fired at U.N. soldiers. There were too many American casualties. Today, the warlord appears to be stronger than ever, and the future of Somali remains precarious.

Still, the international force, led by the American contingent, did as decent a job as could be expected. The good has outweighed the bad. Food supplies and medicine began reaching Somalis soon after the U.S. peacekeepers landed. Starvation has ended. While the Somali warlords have yet to make peace among themselves, they are now talking with each other. Roads are being repaired and some clinics and schools are open. Regional councils have formed outside Mogadishu to provide rudimentary governmental services. In recent weeks, lawlessness has resurfaced in the capital, but the rest of the country continues to benefit from a semblance of peace.

The departure of the remaining 3,200 American troops (and another 7,700 Marines and sailors stationed offshore) will not end the U.N. presence in Somalia. Some 20,000 other peacekeepers will remain, most of them combat veterans from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Morocco and Zimbabwe. They are being supplied with sophisticated U.S. military hardware.

THE HARTFORD COURANT, March 6, 1994

Fifteen months after the Somalia operation began, we are not back to square one. There is more hope today than there was when some 5,000 children were dying daily.

Mr. Clinton, who inherited this foreign policy challenge from his predecessor, would be well advised to mark the withdrawal of American soldiers by inviting veterans of this humanitarian mission to a White House ceremony. They deserve to be honored as America's first peacekeepers in the post-communist era.

Rescue in Somalia exemplified the best of the so-called new international order. U.S. troops went to save the country not from communism but from disease and starvation. It's far simpler to land the Marines with guns blazing than to have them minister to skeletal children and emaciated adults.

Leaving Somalia in the hands of a stable government would have been more satisfying than seeing Mr. Aidid still holding sway in Mogadishu. The conflict did not lend itself to neat solutions, however.

Anarchy could still engulf Somalia, but it would not be the fault of American soldiers and their U.N. compatriots. The world organization can provide only a breathing spell and a helping hand. Eventually, the Somalis will have to build their own peace. The United Nations cannot do it for them.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 7, 1994

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Remarks Prepared for Delivery  
 Honorable Les Aspin  
 Secretary of Defense  
 CSIS  
 August 27, 1993

The President's decision to deploy an additional 400 U.S. troops to Somalia has focused renewed attention on the security aspect -- indeed on the U.S. military aspect -- of what is happening there. That focus is much too narrow. There is much more to what is happening in Somalia than the story of military conflict in Mogadishu. And if there is to be a solution to Somalia's problems, it must be much more than a military solution.

Somalia was a tragedy that touched America and the world. We went there to save a people and we succeeded. We are staying there to help those same people rebuild their nation. To understand how we intend to achieve this, let's briefly recall the circumstances that prompted this international outpouring.

By the early 1990s, Somalia had seen years of brutal civil war. Bloody fighting raged between warlords who used not only arms but also food and famine as weapons against each other and a helpless population. The result was chaos and lawlessness on a massive scale. Drought made the famine worse. An estimated 1,000 a day were dying. Nearly 800,000 refugees were forced into exile.

Official sources and voluntary relief organizations estimated that as many as half a million people, largely women and children, had perished by the end of 1992. Two million more -- a quarter of Somalia's population -- were at risk.

Somalia's political institutions had crumbled, its fragile economy was virtually destroyed, and its people were almost entirely dependent on outside assistance for their survival.

The chaos and violence blunted international donor relief efforts. Many of the organizations curtailed their operations or left entirely after their food convoys were attacked, their warehouses looted, and their personnel assaulted.

U.S. involvement in Somalia began in August of 1992 and has gone through three stages in the last year. The first lasted from August to December and focused on providing food. The United States first provided large amounts of food but soon found, as other donors did, that the chaos and lawlessness in the country prevented overland delivery. The U.S. military then joined in a military airlift -- Operation Provide

Relief -- to bring food into the heart of the country. From August 1992 until February 1993 more than 30,000 metric tons of urgently needed food and other relief supplies were delivered to Somalia, 70% by the United States.

It soon became clear, however, that air delivery of food would not be enough. Violence and theft still impeded -- in some cases prevented -- deliveries within the country. Better security was needed if food supplies were to reach starving Somalis.

When we helped transport a Pakistani battalion to protect the food convoys under U.N. auspices, the forces of Mohammed Farah Aided pinned the battalion down in the Mogadishu airport and conditions in Somalia worsened.

That ushered in the second stage -- the UNITAF stage -- of U.S. involvement that lasted from December of 1992 until May of 1993. The focus now was on providing security as well as food. The United States offered to lead a military effort to provide sufficient security to deal with the famine, and the United Nations accepted in Security Council Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992.

This stage of U.S. involvement would eventually see 26,000 U.S. troops in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. Those forces, along with 13,000 troops from twenty-one other countries, operated under the U.S.-led Unified Task Force, or UNITAF. UNITAF's 39,000 troops brought about a radical change in the Somali situation.

Sufficient order was restored to permit food to reach the needy through over a thousand feeding centers. Markets reopened and the first crops in many years were planted. By the Spring of 1993, chaos and banditry throughout much of Somalia had been greatly reduced.

To sum up, UNITAF had achieved its goal of improving the security situation and feeding the population in central and southern Somalia. What remained was the task of institutionalizing the gains -- preventing the country from backsliding into the chaos that had caused the famine in the first place.

The third stage -- the UNOSOM II stage -- began in May of 1993 and extends to the present. Its focus is to create conditions whereby the Somali people can rebuild their country. Under UNOSOM II the U.N. broadened its efforts under a new Security Council resolution, UNSCR 814, passed on March 26, 1993. It called for the U.N. to begin the work of rebuilding the government, reestablishing the essential elements of a national economy and developing an adequate system of justice and police to maintain order. As agreed, the United States quickly reduced our troop contingent of more than 25,000 to about 4,000.

So where are we now? Over the course of our involvement, our objectives fell

in four categories: food, security, economics and political rebuilding. How did we do?

On food, we have done very well. The food emergency that galvanized international efforts on behalf of the Somali people effectively is over. As a direct result of United Nations humanitarian effort, catastrophic mass starvation was averted.

This year's agricultural production was good. There are still pockets of hunger but reports we receive from Mogadishu say that there is more than enough food to feed the Somali people.

U.N. officials on the scene feel confident enough to bring the emergency food supply effort to a close. Emergency food deliveries are scheduled to end this month. On security, we have made progress. Banditry has been significantly reduced throughout Somalia and in some places eliminated. Somalia is generally peaceful except for south Mogadishu, which is a very significant exception as we shall see. But it is important to understand that -- compared to what existed when UNITAF arrived in December -- progress has been dramatic.

In south Mogadishu, the Aideed stronghold, we have a major challenge to the whole U.N. enterprise. I believe the current crisis there was initiated because Aideed's power base was being eroded politically and militarily by UNOSOM. It may be small comfort today, but our present difficulty is the result of our previous success. The danger now is that unless we return security to south Mogadishu, political chaos will follow the U.N. withdrawal. Other warlords will follow Aideed's example. Fighting between the warlords will ensue, which is what brought the famine to massive proportions in the first place. The danger is that the situation will return to what existed before the United States sent in the troops.

On economics and the political reconstitution of the country, some progress has been made but more work needs to be done. Some small shops are reopening, some schools and orphanages have reopened, and in central Somalia, former government employees are back on the job providing health and education services to the population. Overall, however, economic conditions remain dire and progress towards political reconciliation has been stalled by the deteriorating security situation in the southern part of the capital. More successful work is being done in the countryside, but greater effort must be devoted to push this along. From this we see that the current situation in Somalia is mixed, and that we have some pressing problems yet to deal with.

This afternoon I want to suggest how we might go about the next phase of work in Somalia. Put another way, what are the elements of the end game in Somalia for the international community? We had goals for UNOSOM I and they were not met. That prompted us to move to UNITAF. We had goals for UNITAF and they were met, creating the conditions for a turnover to UNOSOM II. How will we know when

## **UNOSOM II has succeeded?**

Our overall criteria for success should include progress in economic, political and security elements of the Somali problem. On security. Clearly, UNOSOM has to establish reasonable security in south Mogadishu, but it does not end there. Real progress must be made in reducing the heavy weapons in the hands of warlords and effective police forces must be created. The overall effect must be such that no group of armed Somalis should be able to take over the country by force to impose their political will and loot the markets.

On economics. The country should be sufficiently open and secure so that its markets are functioning, goods and services can flow and basic services like water and electricity are provided.

On political rebuilding. There should be a political process that reflects clan interests, regional interests, and the interests of the people of Somalia whatever their clan or region. The question remaining, of course, is how do we get from here to there? I'm going to propose here a series of specific action items that could bring real progress.

First, we should bring U.N. combined troop strength up to planned levels. The United States has recently added 400 more combat troops to its Quick Reaction Force. UNOSOM II, however, is approximately 5,000 troops short of its planned complement of 28,000. We fully expect others to do their share, as they have promised.

Second, additional efforts to set up a police force should begin immediately. Credible, neutral police forces in major population centers are critical to success in establishing security.

Third, we should continue removing heavy weapons from the militias and begin planning for implementation -- in conjunction with Somali police -- of a consistent weapons control policy. Such a policy will give those willing to cooperate some confidence that their enemies cannot rearm. The policy could begin in areas of the country where some disarmament success has been achieved.

Fourth, the United Nations must develop a detailed plan with concrete steps that will pull together its economic, political and security activities into an overall strategy. And it must provide adequate staff and budget to make progress on its political and economic objectives in Somalia.

Fifth, the United Nations should draw on the experience of its success in Cambodia to form a core group of nations to support and speed its work in Somalia. Such a group might consist of African countries as well as other members of the

United Nations that have a special interest in assisting in the political and economic reconstruction of the country.

Sixth, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity should act now to bring the parties back together on the peace track. They might use the promising model of two previous conferences on Somali national reconciliation held in Addis Ababa.

Those are concrete steps that could be taken now to put us on the path to success in Somalia. There is also another, related question that is closer to home for us. President Clinton has directed that U.S. forces remain long enough to complete their mission and no longer. The completion of the mission chiefly concerns security in Somalia.

For U.S. combat troops, I think there are three items on the checklist. First, the security issue in south Mogadishu must be settled. Second, we must make real progress toward taking the heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords. Third, there must be credible police forces in major population centers. When these three conditions are met, I believe we can remove the U.S. Quick Reaction Force from Mogadishu.

We can reduce U.S. logistics troops supporting other UNOSOM II forces when the security situation in Mogadishu permits larger scale hiring of civilian contract employees to provide the support functions.

When we consider Somalia just a year ago, we can be proud of what the United States has achieved, particularly our men and women in uniform. We should also take considerable interest in the success of the United Nations in Somalia. Without the United Nations as a first-rate peacekeeping and peace enforcing organization, we could be called upon to shoulder much more of the load. And we should also note that the most important element of any lasting solution in Somalia must be the Somali people. Just as the international community has invested greatly in creating conditions for political and economic growth in Somalia, so too must the people of Somalia invest themselves in the reconstruction of their own country.

In the meantime, President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia once again provide for its people. This is what the new world asks of American leadership and American partnership.

# # #



THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 7, 1993

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY  
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER,  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LES ASPIN  
AND ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH

The Briefing Room

5:59 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Good afternoon. You've just heard the President explain the reasons why American forces went to Somalia, what they have accomplished and the reasons why the forces will remain there.

From the standpoint of American foreign policy, the steadiness of purpose that the President showed is absolutely essential for the effective conduct of a foreign policy. Any less resolute a course would certainly have been damaging, and I am very pleased that this determined course has been set.

In a few minutes, Secretary Aspin will describe the military aspects, and Admiral Jeremiah will speak to an aspect of that as well. But first, I'd like to discuss our diplomatic strategy under the policy that the President laid down today.

We've been pressing the United Nations to refocus the Somalia operation on the political process of national reconciliation. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali will travel to the region later this month, and he has indicated that the U.N. will pursue rapid progress on the political track. At the same time, we're sending messages to 30 countries that contribute various kinds of support to the UNISOM effort, asking that they remain in the country until it's secure.

The United States has carried the heaviest part of the load in Somalia. We're now asking certain other countries to increase the number of their troops there to finish the job. We have also asked Ambassador Oakley, who served as Special Envoy to Somalia from December through March, to meet with leaders in the region to obtain their support for the political strategy. He is leaving for the region tonight. We've sent a message to President Meles of Ethiopia, asking him to help bring about an early cease-fire. We'll be working with President Meles to establish an independent international commission to investigate and resolve the issues stemming from the attacks on UNISOM and from the other acts of violence in Somalia.

We're also sending messages to the leaders of Eritrea, Kenya and Djibouti, asking for their help in achieving a political settlement in Somalia. We're asking the organization African Unity to take an active role in bringing together the different factions in Somalia. We've solicited the support of Egyptian President Mubarak, who is this year President of the OAU. We'll be sending a similar message to the OAU Secretary General Salim Salim.

The United States intends to work with -- particularly closely with President Meles, the OAU and the Somalis to try to arrange a Somali leadership conference as soon as possible. Almost a

MORE

year ago when the United States responded heroically to the question of mass starvation on Somalia; now, we, together with the United Nations, neighboring countries and the OAU must work urgently to help the Somalis find a settlement to the problem and to mobilize the humanitarian rescue.

We're looking to the African leaders to help us find an African solution to an African problem. We're going to be relying heavily on such leaders as President Meles, President Issaias and others in the region to help fashion a solution to the problem, which goes along with the military track that Secretary Aspin and General Jeremiah will be talking about. As I look back, one of the things that happened over the last several months is that we focused very heavily on the military track, and we lost focus on the political track. We're now asking the U.N. to refocus on the political track and to try to seek a national reconciliation in Somalia so that that country can get on with its life and well-being.

Secretary Aspin.

SECRETARY ASPIN: Thank you, Chris. Let me just do a brief statement, and then let me talk a little bit about the military deployments, and then turn it over to Admiral Jeremiah, who has also got some information on the deployments.

First, I want to say that the American men and women that we have sent to Somalia have performed their mission with unmatched distinction. They represent the very best that this nation has to offer. There are no words to describe our pride in the bravery they demonstrated under fire, our agony over the loss of their precious lives and the suffering of our wounded and detained. There are, however, words available to send a clear message to those who are illegally detaining an American serviceman. The message to Mr. Aided is this: Do not underestimate American resolve. Do not think that any harm you do to our servicemen will be forgotten by me, the President, or by the American people. We intend to have our man back. And we hold you personally responsible for his safety.

Besides that statement, let me just say a few words about the situation as far as the military deployments goes. First, the numbers. After this deployment has been completed, and including the people that are already in country, the total number of American servicemen in Somalia will be in the order of 7,100 people. In addition to that, there will be an offshore Marine presence which will total 3,600. So that's the numbers that are relevant. There is an on-shore presence that will go from -- roughly, what is it now, 4,500, 4,800 -- up to 7,100, and the number will be augmented by an offshore Marine presence which may be added to the number in country of another 3,600.

In addition to that, there will, of course, be a naval presence in the area, but none of them will be on shore in Somalia. In particular, of course, there is the Aircraft Carrier Lincoln -- Abraham Lincoln, is coming into the area, and that adds about 6,000 people on board that ship all by themselves.

What this added capability will allow is three things: First, it will allow moving the QRF to its old mission. The QRF, as you remember, was essentially designed to be a quick reaction force if somebody got in trouble somewhere in the fighting within all of Somalia. The QRF was a quick reaction force to reinforce somebody, somewhere in Somalia. What happened, though, unfortunately, is the drawdown of the U.S. forces, the QRF got involved in day-to-day operations in Mogadishu. This added military presence will allow the QRF to go back to its originally designed mission as a quick reaction force.

Second, we will be adding almost a second QRF in the offshore Marines. The Marines will add another capability that can be inserted at a particular time with a particular mission, and that would add to the capability. So there's almost a second QRF available on the offshore.

The final thing that it does is, it allows -- this capability here includes some air power that we did not have before. In particular, there are going to be four AC-130 gunships, and there are going to be the aircraft off of the carrier Abraham Lincoln, which are available for air strikes in the area.

Those are the capabilities. It will allow the United States military to conduct the mission as described in the President's speech, it will allow a greater presence. It is thought that it will be a force multiplier, because with more American presence and more American activity, we believe the allies will also show more activity. So I think it'll be a force multiplier. It will, I think, have an impact on the security situation in Mogadishu. And the hope which is behind all of this, is essentially to bring about the political agenda which we're laying out.

The military mission here is in support of the political agenda. The military mission is in support of the political agenda. There is -- to carry out a military solution to this problem would require a number of people and a number -- amount of time and an amount of commitment of money, which is beyond all reasonable expectations. We are putting our efforts into a political solution here, but we have military component which supports that political process.

Let me now call upon Dave Jeremiah and ask him -- we'll have some questions in a minute. Let me ask Dave Jeremiah for his statement.

ADMIRAL JEREMIAH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I thought it would be useful to put some texture on some of these terms that we've thrown around -- the logistic support group and the QRF. When the American forces went into Somalia last December, Marines went ashore, were subsequently joined by soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division in Mogadishu, and fanned out across the depth and range of Somalia -- southern Somalia -- with the objective of restoring order and of permitting the transportation of food to famished people throughout this country. That was done.

At the same time, we had allies who came in and supported that effort under UNITAF. Over time, we stabilized the situation in Somalia, and it came time with the introduction of additional troops, and with a stable situation and a secure situation and to move out and bring back American soldiers, the 20,000 that the President referred to earlier -- 20,000 soldiers and Marines. They were replaced by soldiers from other countries. Those countries are listed up here in the boxes. Koreans, Nigerians, Kuwaitis, people from the UAE, Botswana, Norway -- a host of nations. Many of those nations do not have the ability to handle the logistics to supply them in places like Gelilasi and Bilet Wen and Odur. In order to do that, the United States came out as part of the continuing effort that the President referred to, to give the Somali people a chance. We agreed to provide the logistics network to support these folks.

I've been in Odur. It's a long way from nowhere. It's a pretty scary place if you're out there all by yourself and a bunch of folks come running up to you with a technical -- a bunch of these teenage thugs come up and start to overrun a 20- or 30-man outpost. Thus, the quick reaction force that allowed us to fly helicopter-borne American troops quickly to the scene and reinforce a post or an outpost in the even that we had that kind of thuggery going on. We have not had the occasion to do it, our allies who are

in that area have been very successful in carrying it out. But the requirement remain in the logistic support force -- the logistic command to support this whole United Nations effort, those two elements were our contribution to the United Nations mission to continue the effort in Somalia to let this nation have a chance to survive as a nation.

Now, let me turn to the other chart and simply show you the range of forces and how we draw forces into a particular situation around the globe. Every day that we have dealt with crises over the last three-and-a-half years that I've been the Vice Chairman we have brought to bear the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States: the 10th Mountain Division from New York, the 24 Mechanized Division from Georgia. We brought some forces in from the Mediterranean where we had the Marines deployed on Navy amphibious ships. We brought in some Air Force AC-130s, and you can see the composition, the numbers of people and the organizations that they represent. We brought the nuclear powered carrier Lincoln down from the Persian Gulf in order to provide the firepower that the Secretary mentioned. And we brought the amphibious forces -- the Marine amphibious forces embarked on amphibious ships just off Malaysia, they're en route as well.

So we have drawn a total force of on the order of 20,000 people together to carry out this mission in Somalia to support the political objectives that Secretary Christopher and Secretary Aspin mentioned, and that the President of the United States placed upon us as we discussed this current problem. Thank you.

Q Admiral Jeremiah, do you think this is this enough? Do you think there are enough folks going in here to protect Americans?

ADMIRAL JEREMIAH: On the ground in Mogadishu today there are on the order of 16,000 to 18,000 troops from Allied nations -- the Pakistanis, the Malaysians have contributed to the action on Sunday, a number of other -- the Egyptians, forces from the UAE, Nepalese will soon be there. There are a number of nations, and I don't want to offend them by omitting one, but there are a number of nations there. They have contributed, with our support, to protect our troops. In their logistics function this will go well, and I think we have the necessary troops on the ground to do our function and to protect our forces on the ground. But I'll tell you that if there is a problem, there is but I'll tell you that if there is a problem, there is enormous fire power in ways that are quite different than anything that the people who oppose the U.N. effort in Somalia have not seen before, except when we first put troops on the ground in Somalia, here and in the amphibious forces offshore.

Plus, there are people that they are familiar with. They've seen some of the troops in the 10th Mountain Division. They've seen the Marines. There are a lot of people in Somalia who owe their lives to those forces, and I think it will be a help.

Q Secretary Christopher, could you answer the question, what happens on April 1st if there is not a political structure in place in Somalia to really maintain the government there and the food operation? Will the United States pull out by then, anyway?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The President said there was no assurance of success. We're putting in place a plan that we think maximizes the opportunity for success on the political track. But there is no assurance of success and the commitment the President gave for the withdrawal of virtually all of our troops by that time is one that will be met.

Q Will the Marine force -- 3,600 Marines -- will they remain off the coast after the other troops, the inland troops have been withdrawn? Is that the plan?

SECRETARY ASPIN: No, they would be part of the withdrawal -- I don't think it's worked out, the timing of all of this. We hope that part of the 7,100 can be removed before March 31st deadline. I would expect the Marines to stay there until the end, but I don't expect them to be there beyond that.

Q Recently, we understand that Secretary Powell, on behalf of General Montgomery in Mogadishu, has requested armor and that you had turned it down. Is that true? And if so, why, sir?

SECRETARY ASPIN: Let me tell you that the decision as to deploy any troops anywhere in the world is the job of the Secretary of Defense, and that's the job that I carry out. General Montgomery had made a request that for some additional armor of four tanks and about fourteen Bradley fighting vehicles, plus some artillery. He made that request. General Hoar looked at the proposal. He scrubbed it, took out the artillery part and sent the proposal forward.

General Powell and I discussed it on several occasions. I found that the views in the Pentagon were kind of mixed on the issue as to whether we ought to grant that. And I think they were mixed for good reason. We were, at that time, talking about a withdrawal of our presence in Somalia. We were beginning to think in terms of our withdrawal of our presence. This was about the end of September.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY ASPIN: Let me finish, if I might. The finish the end of withdrawal -- the end of -- we're already thinking about withdrawing it, the forces, and trying to reduce our presence. This would have been a great additional presence. In addition, it would have been a very visible part of it. In addition, we were already looking at the possibility, also, of deploying forces to Bosnia. We had just increased the forces in Somalia less, about a month earlier with the Rangers.

All in all, the decision was deferred at the time that it came to my attention. I did not -- the presentation of that data was -- the presentation of the need for that mission was in protecting the logistics supply lines.

Q What was the roster?

SECRETARY ASPIN: Let me finish, please, Wolf. Hold it. It was to protect the logistics supply lines. We did not think of it in terms of any use as a possible rescue operation as we saw it might have been used on Sunday. Had I known -- if I could please, just let me finish this statement.

Q Let me know when you finish.

SECRETARY ASPIN: I'll let you know.

Q -- wave a handkerchief?

SECRETARY ASPIN: I'll wave a handkerchief. Had I known at that time what I knew after the events of Sunday, I would have made a very different decision. I saw that it could have been used very usefully after the events on Sunday. As I say, this is my decision, somebody has to make the decision. This is the decision that I get paid for, and I made the decision as best I could with the information and the knowledge that I had at the time.

Q Secretary Christopher, will the leadership conference that you spoke of involve Mr. Aideed? Who will the cease-fire be arranged with in the country of Somalia? How does he factor in this nation building that you have now embarked on?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: That will be up to President Meles and the other African leaders in the region. We'll leave it to them as to how they want to organize the conference of those in Somalia. I think it's particularly appropriate that that decision be taken by the leaders in the region.

With respect to General Aideed, let me remind you what the President said. The President said that we would try to depersonalize the situation, but nevertheless, we would keep the pressure on any of those who would interrupt the humanitarian supplies or otherwise cause trouble for the United Nations forces there.

General Aideed will not be the principle focus of our activities in the future but we certainly don't rule anything out in the context of keeping the pressure on anyone who would interfere with the humanitarian efforts, or the U.S. troops or any of the UNISOM troops.

Q Mr. Aspin, there are some Republican members of Congress, including Senator D'Amato of New York, are suggesting that you resign because of that decision. What is your intention?

SECRETARY ASPIN: Not to resign.

Q I'd like to ask if you know how many American troops are being held by the forces of Farah Aideed?

SECRETARY ASPIN: It really wouldn't serve a good purpose for me to try to identify anything further than the fact that we know that one American serviceman is being held. And beyond that, I think it's unwise for me to try to give any precision to the number who might be held as detainees.

Q Secretary Christopher, could you please explain to us what it is that you said to these other nations? As the President is announcing that we're getting out on March 31st, you said you've sent letters asking them to stay. Why should they stay if we're leaving?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, Mary, one good reason for them to stay is that we've done the heavy lifting up to this point. We had 28,000 troops in there at the beginning, we conducted a major humanitarian operation which was highly successful. I think it's time for the burden to be shared with others. But the President is determined that we'll have the maximum opportunity for others to participate in this endeavor, and that's why we're staying, that's why we're not leaving immediately. We want to leave in a responsible and prudent way.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that you're going to keep the pressure up on people who would interfere in future operations, but the United Nations Security Council has put out an arrest order on General Aideed. Are we now going to ignore that in an effort to depersonalize this?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: We certainly won't ignore the arrest order. As I say, if we have opportunities, we don't rule out anything. Thank you very much.

## OPINION USA

# U.S. made a difference in Somalia

**The mission had its share of mistakes, but don't overlook the lives that were saved, says a major general who served there.**

We will learn a lot from our involvement in Somalia as we look back at what went right and what went wrong. As is our nature, we will focus on the things that could have gone better. That's OK, since we want to get them right for future commitments that may lie ahead.

But let's not overlook the positive aspects of Somalia; we owe that to the Americans who gave their lives in that effort and to the Somalis to whom we have given hope and a chance to come back from anarchy, starvation and chaos.

We know that hundreds of thousands of Somalis are alive today because we came to help.

We know that we went with no ulterior motives, just to help.

We know that we caused clans and political factions to start talking instead of automat-

ically resorting to their guns to resolve all problems.

We know that we stepped up to the leadership role for pulling the efforts of 30 nations together in some meaningful attempt to contribute.

We know that our military demonstrated the willingness to feed, heal and protect those in need despite the risk and complexity of the mission.


We know that after tragedy struck we didn't quit; we still had the courage and commitment to offer one more chance.

From a military perspective, we learned a little more about leading and participating in complicated coalition operations. We learned a little more about coordinating the political, humanitarian and security dimensions. We learned a little more about diverse cultures and the need to understand people who are different.

We learned a lot about the hope and promise our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines can bring. We learned a lot about the sacrifice our civilian counterparts from our other government agencies and private voluntary organizations are willing to make as they work by our sides sharing the dangers and discomforts. They



By A.C. Zinni, a Marine major general who served as director of operations of the unified task force in Somalia.



By Web Bryant, USA TODAY

also came to bring relief and to help Somalis along the road to recovery and self-determination.

We all made some mistakes, but we did far more good than will be realized since a few heartbreaking tragedies can overshadow months of hard work, sacrifice and steady progress.

To me, Somalia will always

be the thousands of thankful faces at the feeding centers, the smiling little children wearing bright yellow Marine T-shirts sent by relatives of our troops from the United States, the orphans who sang in thanksgiving to the servicemen who rebuilt their orphanage and brought them books and food, and the Somali friends I made who seriously wanted, and were thank-

ful for, the opportunity to recover from the horror that they had lived through.

No matter what happens in Somalia and no matter what the cynics and critics write, the feeling of satisfaction and pride I have in witnessing what Americans were willing to give of themselves so that the far less fortunate could have a chance to live — to live free from pain, want, and fear — will always stay with me.

I am proud that my government and my leaders were willing to share our great wealth, to share our spirit and to share our hope.

We knew it was not without risk and we knew we could make mistakes, but, if we did, they were mistakes of the heart or mistakes of trying to do too much too soon.

On a continent where outsiders always seemed to come to exploit or to enslave, we came only to help.

History will show we tried, we opened the door to hope, we stopped the suffering and dying and we gave the Somalis the opportunity.

That will be the legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice there.

Somalia saw America's heart and America's youth at their best. I hope Somalia can prosper from that.

Trust me, it made a difference.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 1993

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

10:21 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm sorry I am a little late, but I just finally got through to Ambassador Oakley, and I wanted to have a chance to speak with him directly for a couple of minutes before I came out here.

I also spoke with Mrs. Durant this morning to congratulate her and to wish her well. Obviously, she is very happy. She has now had an extended conversation with her husband. And he is, as you know, in a U.N. field hospital in Mogadishu. But he will be going to Germany as soon as the doctors say that he can travel. And then, as soon as possible, he'll be back home with his family and his friends.

I welcome his release, and I want to express my deepest thanks to the African leaders who pressed hard for it and to Bob Oakley, the International Red Cross, and to the United Nations, to all who have worked on this for the last several days.

Over the past week, since the United States announced its intention to strengthen our forces in Somalia, as well as to revitalize the diplomatic initiative and send Bob Oakley back, we have seen some hopeful actions -- the release of Michael Durant and the Nigerian peacekeeper, the cessation of attacks on the United States and U.N. peacekeepers. That demonstrates that we are moving in the right direction and that we are making progress.

Our firm position on holding Durant's captors responsible for his well-being and demanding his release, I think, send a strong message that was obviously heard. Now, we have to maintain our commitment to finishing the job we started. It's not our job to rebuild Somalia's society or its political structure. The Somalis have to do that for themselves. And I welcome the help of the African leaders who have expressed their commitment to working with us and with them.

But we have to give them enough time to have a chance to do that, to have a chance not to see the situation revert to the way it was before the United States and the United Nations intervened to prevent the tragedy late last year.

I want to also emphasize that we made no deals to secure the release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. We had strong resolve, we showed that we were willing to support the resumption of the peace process, and we showed that we were determined to protect our soldiers and to react when appropriate by strengthening our position there. I think the policy was plainly right. But there was no deal.

If you have any questions, I'll be glad to try to answer them.

Q Mr. President, there's still a \$25,000 bounty on Mr. Aideed. Would you still like to see Mr. Aideed arrested? Do you

MORE



think that's appropriate? And do you think that the United Nations now should release Mr. Aideed's forces that it's captured recently?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the first question. The United States position is that we have a U.N. resolution which says that there must be some resolution of the unconscionable incident which started this whole thing, which was the murder of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers who were not there in battle, but were simply there, doing the job that we all went there to do -- the humanitarian mission. I think that it's very important to remember that.

It is further our position that we cannot afford to have any police work that we were asked to do as part of the U.N. mission be transformed into a military endeavor that, in effect, made many people believe that there was no longer a diplomatic initiative going on in Somalia. So there still has to be some resolution of that. We have a U.N. resolution, and we ought to pursue it. Now, there may be other ways to do it, and I am open to that.

As far as the release of any people concerned, that will obviously be up to the United Nations. But they have to consider what our obligations are with regard to the murder of the Pakistani peacekeepers. That's what started this whole thing.

Q Mr. President, isn't it pretty clear, though, that he must have -- Aideed must have been given some immunity from arrest, because he talked to reporters? He seems to be pretty available. You don't seem to be laying a glove on him. Have you called off the dogs?

THE PRESIDENT: There was no deal made, I can tell you that. We have taken account of the behavior of others on the ground there, and we will continue to do that. But for the next few days, we have to work through what the resolution will be of the U.N. requirement that got us all into the position we were in last week, which is that we have to have some means of resolving what happened to the Pakistanis, who were clearly not in anybody's combat, were just doing their jobs. And we have to do it.

Q Well, do you hold him responsible?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have to -- he offered, if you remember, an independent commission to look into that. The United Nations asked the United States to attempt to arrest him and to go out of our way not to hurt him while arresting him because he was suspected of being responsible. So if he's willing to have somebody that we can all trust look into that, then that's something I think that Mr. Oakley is certainly willing to entertain over there.

Q Mr. President, despite your success today, there's been a lot of criticism that U.S. foreign policy has been run in naive and somewhat disorganized way. What's your response to that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can tell you first of all, I've had people who were involved in the two previous administrations say that our national security decision-making process was at least as good as the two in the previous ones, perhaps better. Secondly, I think on the things that really -- the biggest issues affecting the future and the security of the United States, we have a good record.

We have done very well with Russia, the most important issue. We have set up a system that did not exist before we came to office to deal with the other republics of the former Soviet Union and to work on nuclear issues and other issues. I think we have done quite well with the Middle East peace process and with its aftermath. I think we have done well to establish the groundwork of a new basis of a relationship with Japan and with Asia generally. We have certainly put nonproliferation on a higher plane than it was there

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before. I think we did very well. We had the most successful -- the United States had the most successful meeting of the G-7 in over a decade. That was clear. The first time in 10 years we were complimented instead of criticized, making real progress there.

So I think that the people who say that because of what happened in Somalia last week have a pretty weak reed to stand on. And in terms of Haiti -- and maybe we can get to that -- there was -- when I took office, what we had was everybody in Haiti thinking about whether they could leave and come to the United States because they thought there was no way that anybody would ever stick up for the democratic process in Haiti; and the fact that two-thirds of the people voted for somebody to lead their country that was then ousted by the old regime. At least we have made an effort to try to change that. And I assure you that my determination there is as strong as ever.

So I think that -- it's easy to second-guess. When you get into something like Somalia, I think anybody who really thought about it at the time the decision was made, I supported it. I think it was the right thing to do. I think we went there for the right motives. But you had to know when we went there that there was -- that, a, that there was no way America was going to get out in January and because there was no political process in place there that could have given the Somalis a chance to survive; and, b, that there was every chance that someone, for their own reasons, at some point during this mission, might kill some peacekeepers, which would complicate the mission.

We are living in a new world. It's easy for people who don't have these responsibilities to use words like "naive" or this or that or the other thing. The truth is, we're living in a new and different world, and we've got to try to chart a course that is the right course for the United States to lead, while avoiding things that we cannot do, or things that impose cost in human and financial terms that are unacceptable for us. But I think that in this new world, we've made a pretty good beginning, and clearly on the things that affect us most.

Q Mr. President, you were very clear last week in saying that you did not want your reaction to events in Somalia to be the wrong signal to the world's thugs and bullies. I wonder, sir, if it occurs to you that the events of Haiti may indicate that that signal was sent anyway?

THE PRESIDENT: No. The problem we had in Haiti with the boat was that we sent 200 Seabees over there who were commissioned specifically to train military officers to do more work to rebuild the country. They were lightly armed, they were not in any way -- they were not peacekeepers or peacemakers.

I would remind you that the Governors Island agreement basically was an agreement among all the major parties in Haiti which clearly set forth the fact that they did not want other countries' forces or a U.N. force coming in there to provide law and order. They wanted French-speaking forces to come in and retrain the police force. They wanted French-speaking Canadians and the United States to come in and retrain the Army to rebuild the country.

So those people were simply not able or ever authorized to pursue any mission other than that. I was not about to put 200 American Seabees into a potentially dangerous situation for which they were neither trained nor armed to deal with at that moment. And I did not want to leave the boat in the harbor so that that became the symbol of the debate. I pulled the boat out of the harbor to emphasize that the Haitian parties themselves who were still there in Haiti are responsible for violating the Governors Island Agreement. We moved immediately to reimpose sanctions to include oil. We are

going to do some more things unilaterally in the next day or two. And I think that we still have a chance to get this done. Because the people who were there who don't want to give up power agreed to the Governors Island Agreement, and we're going to do our best to hold them to it.

Q You don't think that those thugs on the dock there in Haiti were encouraged by the events in Somalia, to try what they tried?

THE PRESIDENT: They may or may not have been, but they're going to be sadly disappointed. I think those people on the docks in Haiti were probably the hired hands of the elites that don't want democracy to come to Haiti. So I don't they had drawn any sophisticated interpretation from world events. But if they did, they ought to look at what else has happened in Somalia. Look at the way we have bolstered our forces. Look at the reports in the newspaper today.

What we've done in Somalia -- let me go back to that -- is consistent with our original mission. We did not go there to prove we could win military battles. No one seriously questions the fact that we could clean out that whole section of Mogadishu at minimum loss to ourselves if that's what we wanted to do. ✓

The reports today say that 300 Somalis were killed and 700 more were wounded in the firefight that cost our people their lives last week. That is not our mission. We did not go there to do that. We cannot let a charge we got under a U.N. resolution to do some police work, which is essentially what it is, to arrest suspects turn into a military mission. But the people in Haiti would be sadly misguided if they think the United States has weakened its resolve to see that democracy -- the expressed will of two-thirds of the people of Haiti. ✓

I noticed Congressman Kennedy on the television this morning saying that President Aristide won an election victory with a higher percentage of the vote than any leader in the Western Hemisphere. And he can't even get into office. We're going to try to change that.

Let me just make one other comment about Haiti. This is very important to me. In addition to President Aristide, there is a government that has been struggling mightily to function in Haiti, headed by Prime Minister Malval, a businessperson, a person who basically did not ask for the responsibilities that he has undertaken. I want to send a clear signal today, too, that the United States is very concerned about his ability to function and his personal safety and the safety of his government. That is very important to us. Malval is key to making this whole thing work. He is recognized as a stabilizing figure, as a person who will work with all sides, as a person who will be fair to everybody. And it would be again a grave error to underestimate the extent to which this country regards him as an important part of the ultimate solution.

Q Mr. President, I'd like to go back to what you said about Aideed, because it appears that you've opened the door to leave him a way out this morning, when you said that we have to take into account what others did on the ground there. Do you think there's a possibility that Aideed was not directly responsible for the attack on the Pakistani U.N. forces? And do you believe there's also a possibility that Aideed could now become part of the political process and indeed may someday become president?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the questions somewhat separately. First of all, to take the second question. What happened over the last several weeks -- and let me back up and say -- I understood why the United States was thought to have the

before. I think we did very well. We had the most successful -- the United States had the most successful meeting of the G-7 in over a decade. That was clear. The first time in 10 years we were complimented instead of criticized, making real progress there.

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only capacity to pursue the police function, once the Pakistanis were killed. But keep in mind what that function was. That function was to arrest people suspected of being involved in that, not to be judge and jury, not to say we know exactly what happened, not to find people guilty in advance.

So our young soldiers, at significant risk to themselves, went out of their way to capture people without killing them. As a consequence, however, because of the circumstances, as we all know, several of them lost their lives and hundreds of Somalis who were fighting them, either with weapons or by getting in their way, lost their lives.

Now, that never should have been allowed to supplant -- as I said at the United Nations, before this incident occurred -- that never should have been allowed to supplant the political process that was ongoing when we were in effective control up through last May.

So we had to start the political process again. We have no interest in keeping any clan or subclan or group of Somalis out of the political process affecting the future of their people. The clan structure seems to be the dominant structure in the country. It is not for the United States or for the United Nations to eliminate whole groups of people from having a role in Somalia's future. The Somalis must decide that with the help and guidance, I believe primarily, of the African states and leadership around them, first of all.

Secondly, with regard to the specific incident, what I want to do is to see the U.N. resolution honored. That is, we want to know that there is some effort, honest, unencumbered effort, to investigate what happened to those Pakistanis and to have some resolution of that, consistent with international law. We cannot expect the United Nations to go around the world, whether it's in Cambodia or Somalia, or any of the many other places we're involved in peacekeeping, and have people killed and have no resolution of it.

Aideed, himself, as you know, offered in a letter to President Carter to have a genuinely unbiased commission look into this and have evidence presented to it. The United Nations may choose to take a different course in this, but we should honor the resolution. That is, you asked me a question about Aideed, personally. I can't answer that. I can say that I believe in the strongest terms that the United States should continue to say, if you want us to be involved in peacekeeping, if peacekeepers get murdered doing their job, the way the Pakistanis did, and others, there has to be an effort to look into who did it and to hold those accountable.

If there is another way to do that, that's fine. What I said at the U.N., I will reiterate: The United States, being a police officer in Somalia, was turned into the waging of conflict and a highly personalized battle which undermined the political process. That is what was wrong, and that is what we have attempted to correct in the last few days.

Q Mr. President, your statement reassuring Prime Minister Malval of Haiti about his personal security raises the question, of course: Is there a threat to his personal security, and what happens if something happens to Prime Minister Malval?

THE PRESIDENT: If something happens to him, it would be a very difficult situation for the Haitians. It would make President Aristide's job more difficult, and it would further isolate the military and police authorities there, and the people who are sponsoring them from the international community. I hope that he is not in danger. I do not have any information that he is in imminent danger. He's continuing to function, but if you know how he works

down there, I mean, he has very limited security, he does a lot of work out of his home, he has not constructed a military apparatus around himself. He really is a good citizen serving his country, and he is a necessary part of the glue that would permit President Aristide to go back down there.

Keep in mind, Aristide gave these people amnesty. The truth is, a lot of them never thought he'd do it. I know -- there are people who have criticized Aristide, who say that, you know, maybe he's not really a political person, can't do this. All I know is that in our dealings with him, he has done what he said he would do. And I think they were disoriented by the fact that he issued the amnesty order when they didn't think he would. And I am genuinely concerned that the forces in Haiti -- let me back up and say -- they signed off on the Governors Island agreement because they realized that the sanctions were having a crushing blow on them. And in the end, they and the people who were funding a lot of their activities understood that it was going to cost them more to stay with the present course than to permit this transition to democracy.

And what we're trying to do now -- our policy clearly is to remind them of why they signed off in the first place in the most forceful terms and to make it absolutely clear that no one in the international community is going to walk away from our previous policy toward Haiti if they don't honor their commitments under that agreement.

Q Mr. President, would your experiences this month in Somalia and Haiti make you more cautious about sending American peacekeepers to Bosnia?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, my experiences in Somalia would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command with direct accountability to the United States here.

Now, to be fair, our troops in Somalia were under an American commander. And even though General Bir was the overall commander, it was clear always that General Hoar, here in the United States, was the commanding officer of General Montgomery. But because we got a general charge from the U.N. to try to arrest people suspected of being involved in the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, not every tactical decision had to be cleared here through General Hoar.

What I've made clear all along, the reason I've said that I thought that any Bosnian operation would have to be operated through NATO -- the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is an American general that talks every day to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that works in very clear cooperation with the other NATO forces. They have drilled together. They have trained together. They have trained together. They have worked together. It is a much more coherent military operation. And I would have a far higher level of confidence about not only the safety of our troops, but our ability to deal with that as a NATO operation. It's a whole different issue, Bosnia, but I would have much higher level of confidence there.

With the U.N. -- let me just say, to go back to the U.N. -- I still believe that U.N. peacekeeping is important. And I still believe that America can play a role in that. But when you're talking about resolving longstanding political disputes, the United States as the world's only superpower is no more able to do that for other people than we were 30 years ago, or 20 years ago.

That's why if you go back and look at Somalia, what's going to happen here, and compare it to what the U.N. did in Cambodia, where the U.N. went into Cambodia first of all with this



only capacity to pursue the police function, once the Pakistanis were killed. But keep in mind what that function was. That function was to arrest people suspected of being involved in that, not to be judge and jury, not to say we know exactly what happened, not to find people guilty in advance.

So our young soldiers, at significant risk to themselves, went out of their way to capture people without killing them. As a consequence, however, because of the circumstances, as we all know, several of them lost their lives and hundreds of Somalis who were fighting them, either with weapons or by getting in their way, lost their lives.

Now, that never should have been allowed to supplant -- as I said at the United Nations, before this incident occurred -- that never should have been allowed to supplant the political process that was ongoing when we were in effective control up through last May.

So we had to start the political process again. We have no interest in keeping any clan or subclan or group of Somalis out of the political process affecting the future of their people. The clan structure seems to be the dominant structure in the country. It is not for the United States or for the United Nations to eliminate whole groups of people from having a role in Somalia's future. The Somalis must decide that with the help and guidance, I believe primarily, of the African states and leadership around them, first of all.

Secondly, with regard to the specific incident, what I want to do is to see the U.N. resolution honored. That is, we want to know that there is some effort, honest, unencumbered effort, to investigate what happened to those Pakistanis and to have some resolution of that, consistent with international law. We cannot expect the United Nations to go around the world, whether it's in Cambodia or Somalia, or any of the many other places we're involved in peacekeeping, and have people killed and have no resolution of it.

Aideed, himself, as you know, offered in a letter to President Carter to have a genuinely unbiased commission look into this and have evidence presented to it. The United Nations may choose to take a different course in this, but we should honor the resolution. That is, you asked me a question about Aideed, personally. I can't answer that. I can say that I believe in the strongest terms that the United States should continue to say, if you want us to be involved in peacekeeping, if peacekeepers get murdered doing their job, the way the Pakistanis did, and others, there has to be an effort to look into who did it and to hold those accountable.

If there is another way to do that, that's fine. What I said at the U.N., I will reiterate: The United States, being a police officer in Somalia, was turned into the waging of conflict and a highly personalized battle which undermined the political process. That is what was wrong, and that is what we have attempted to correct in the last few days.

Q Mr. President, your statement reassuring Prime Minister Malval of Haiti about his personal security raises the question, of course: Is there a threat to his personal security, and what happens if something happens to Prime Minister Malval?

THE PRESIDENT: If something happens to him, it would be a very difficult situation for the Haitians. It would make President Aristide's job more difficult, and it would further isolate the military and police authorities there, and the people who are sponsoring them from the international community. I hope that he is not in danger. I do not have any information that he is in imminent danger. He's continuing to function, but if you know how he works



theory about what they had to do to or with the Khmer Rouge, and then they moved away from any kind of military approach and sent a lot of very brave peacekeepers, none of whom were Americans and some of whom lost their lives -- Japanese and others -- they worked through the politics of Cambodia by, in effect, creating a process in which the local people had to take responsibility for their own future. If we are going to do that kind of work, we ought to take the Cambodian model in Somalia and everywhere else.

Where we have to do peacekeeping, if we're going to do that in a unified command, even if the Americans are always under American forces, we have got to make the kind of changes in the United Nations that I advocated in my speech to the U.N. We have got to have that international peacekeeping apparatus far better organized than it is now. And if you go back to the U.N. speech, it receives little notice because of the momentary and important crises in Somalia and elsewhere. But the reorganization of the peacekeeping apparatus of the U.N. is an urgent mission because keep in mind, the U.N. peacekeepers with no American soldiers there are involved all over the world now, and they have done an awful lot of good work. But we plainly have to reorganize that and strengthen that. Got to go. Thank you.

Q Would you support the blockade in Haiti, President Clinton? Would you support a blockade?

THE PRESIDENT: I support strongly enforcing the sanctions and -- I want to answer that. I support strongly enforcing these sanctions -- strongly. And over the next few days we will be announcing the form in which the sanctions enforcement will take place.

Thank you.

Q Is that a yes or a no?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the word "blockade" is a term of art in international law, which is associated with a declaration of war, so I have to --

Q How about patrols?

THE PRESIDENT: I have to be careful in using that word, but I think that we have to enforce the sanctions.

END

10:44 A.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 6, 1993

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
AT SIGNING OF THE HATCH ACT OF 1993

East Room

3:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. This is a very happy day for me. I've had lots of discussion with Senator Glenn about this bill. Bill Clay is happy as a lark. This has put 30 years on his life today. (Laughter.) And the Vice President and I had occasion to talk about this quite a lot during the reinventing government effort. I have some remarks I want to make, but I hope you will forgive me if just for a moment, since this is my opportunity to speak to the national press and to the American people as well as to speak to you, I make a brief statement about Somalia.

Today I have had two serious meetings with my national security advisors, along with the meeting we had last night, to discuss the future course of the United States in Somalia.

Our forces went there last year under the previous administration on an extraordinary human mission: 350,000 Somalis had starved because anarchy and famine and disease had prevailed. Today we are completing the job of establishing security in Somalia that will not only permit those who are now living to enjoy the immediate fruits of our common efforts with our allies in the United Nations, but also to prevent that terrible crisis from occurring as soon as we are gone. It is essential that we conclude our mission in Somalia, but that we do it with firmness and steadiness of purpose.

I want to emphasize that tomorrow I will be consulting with congressional leaders in both parties and with others, and then I will report to you and to the American people. But this much I want to say today. Our men and women in Somalia, including any held captive, deserve our full support. They went there to do something almost unique in human history. We are anxious to conclude our role there honorably, but we do not want to see a reversion to the absolute chaos and the terrible misery which existed before.

I think the American people and I hope the Congress will be satisfied that we have assessed our position accurately and that we have a good policy to pursue. I will discuss that with them tomorrow, as I said, and then I will be back to the American people and the press as soon as that is done. (Applause.)

Let me say this is something of special importance to me today. When I was a 32 year-old freshman governor, in my first year one of the first bills I sponsored in my legislature was a bill repealing restrictions on political activities by state employees in my state. A bill that, very much like the Hatch Act, had stayed on in its present form because it was needed in a former time when, I'm a little embarrassed to say, state employees decades ago would mysteriously turn up with increases in welfare checks right before the election. Well, that hasn't happened in a long time in my state, or in any other. And so we changed the law. And I can honestly say in all the years since, not a single solitary soul ever lodged a single solitary complaint against any of our public employees for being good citizens.

MORE

Today, we put an end to a vexing contradiction in America's public life with a solution, I hasten to add, looking at the members of Congress who are here, that is neither Democratic nor Republican, but American in nature. And I thank the members of both parties who supported this important reform.

We've been supporting democracy throughout the world. We've been standing up for Boris Yeltsin in the tight he's been in and cheering when he prevailed, and cheering when he reaffirmed his determination to have elections. But here in our own country, millions of our own citizens have been denied one of the most basic democratic rights, the right to participate in the political process, because of conditions that haven't existed for a very long time.

The original purpose of the Hatch Act was to protect federal employees and other citizens from coming under improper political pressure. But now our federal work force is the product of merit system, not patronage. We have laws to protect our citizens against coercion and intimidation. We have guarantees that the administration of federal laws must be fair and impartial. We have an exceedingly vigilant press, and people more than eager to talk to them whenever they have been abused, or think they have. (Laughter.)

The conditions which once gave rise to the Hatch Act as it was before this reform bill passed are no longer present and they cannot justify the continued muzzling of millions of American citizens. (Applause.)

The Federal Employees Political Activities Act, which I'm about to sign, will permit federal employees and postal workers on their own time to manage campaigns, raise funds, to hold positions within political parties. Still, there will be some reasonable restrictions. They wouldn't be able to run for partisan political office themselves, for example, and there will be some new responsibilities, which I applaud the federal employees' unions for embracing and supporting.

While we restore political rights to these millions of citizens, we also hold them to high standards at the federal workplace, where the business of our nation is done will still be strictly off limits to partisan political activity. Workers on the job won't even be allowed to wear political campaign buttons. At the same time, the reforms will maintain restrictions on the activities of workers in the most sensitive positions -- in law enforcement and national security.

Because we regard good ethics as the basis of good government, this reform strengthens criminal penalties for anyone convicted of abusing his or her position. And because we want our federal workers to be responsible to display an integrity worthy of the public service they reform, this reform includes a provision that allows the garnishment of federal pay to repay private debt. That's been done in the private sector for many years. And just as we now treat federal employees like private citizens in their political activities, there's no reason federal workers should get special protection for privately unpaid bills and obligations. (Applause.)

Ultimately, I believe, as Senator Glenn said, that this reform of the Hatch Act will mean more responsible, more satisfied, happier and more productive federal workers. When we extend the political rights of any group of Americans, we extend the political rights of all Americans. And we deepen the meaning of our own democracy.

Congress has done a lot of work on that just in the last eight months since I've been President. We've passed the Motor Voter Bill, which expands the franchise to people who have difficulty

registering to vote. (Applause.) Thanks to the Vice President, we have a plan that will radically change the way government operates. It will give rank-and-file federal employees more meaningful jobs, more say over their work, and enable us to do more with less and increase the confidence taxpayers have in the work we do around here.

Serious proposals on campaign finance reform and on lobbying reform have already passed the United States Senate and are now being acted on in the House of Representatives. There is a serious commitment in this Congress to try to deal with the continuing imperfections in our democracy. And I applaud them for it.

Aristotle once said that liberty and equality are best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. Working together, we're closing in on that goal. And now, when I sign this bill, three million more Americans will have a chance to share in their beloved government to the utmost.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

(The bill is signed.)

END

3:10 P.M. EDT

For Release Only by the  
Senate Armed Services Committee

**SSD**

**STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. MONTGOMERY**

**FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

**OPERATION IN SOMALIA II**

**FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES SOMALIA**

**BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**12 MAY 1994**

For Release Only by the  
Senate Armed Services Committee

THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOU HERE TODAY. I RECENTLY RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER SERVING 13 MONTHS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA, COMMONLY CALLED UNOSOM II, AS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE UNOSOM II MILITARY FORCE, AND AS COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES FORCES SOMALIA.

WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I THINK THE BEST MESSAGE I CAN GIVE YOU TODAY IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ONE I GAVE UPON MY RETURN TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE ON MARCH 28. IT IS AN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WE DID AND HOW WELL WE DID IT.

LET ME BEGIN BY SAYING THAT I KNOW YOU ARE AS IMMENSELY PROUD OF HOW WELL THE MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES PERFORMED IN SOMALIA AS I AM. THEY OPERATED THERE UNDER THE HARSHTEST CONDITIONS, MUCH OF THE TIME IN COMBAT, AND OVERCAME ADVERSITY DAY IN AND DAY OUT. I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL DOZEN MARINES SERVING IN SOMALIA PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE UNITED STATES LIAISON OFFICE. WE WISH THEM A SAFE RETURN SOON.

WE ARE ALL MINDFUL TODAY THAT A NUMBER OF OUR COMRADES DID NOT LIVE TO COME HOME AND THAT MANY RETURNED WITH WOUNDS. WE GRIEVE FOR THOSE BRAVE MEN -- SOLDIERS, AIRMEN AND MARINES -- WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES IN SELFLESS SACRIFICE TO OUR NATION. THESE MEN WILL LIVE ON IN OUR HEARTS AND IN OUR MEMORIES SO LONG AS EACH OF US LIVES. WE WILL ALWAYS HONOR THEM AND OUR NATION MUST ALWAYS HONOR THEM FOR THEIR INCREDIBLE BRAVERY AND SACRIFICE.

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WE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE THE TREMENDOUS SUPPORT WE RECEIVED FROM FAMILIES, FRIENDS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO STOOD FIRMLY BEHIND US, WHO WROTE TO US, AND SENT MANY GIFTS OF ENCOURAGEMENT. OUR FAMILIES, TOO, FACED ADVERSITY IN OUR ABSENCE AND WE OWE THEM OUR DEEPEST THANKS.

MOST OF US, IT'S SAFE TO SAY, LEFT SOMALIA WITH MIXED EMOTIONS, BUT WE ARE PROUD OF WHAT WE ACCOMPLISHED -- AND WE ACCOMPLISHED A LOT. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOMALIS ARE ALIVE TODAY THROUGH THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF ALL WHO SERVED THERE UNDER UNOSOM II AND THE UNIFIED TASK FORCE THAT PRECEDED US. AMERICA'S SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN PERFORMED WELL UNDER THE UNITED NATION'S FIRST CHAPTER SEVEN PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSION AND SHOWED THE INCREDIBLE COMPASSION TO THE SOMALI PEOPLE THAT THE WORLD HAS COME TO KNOW AS AMERICA'S HALLMARK.

DESPITE THE UNPREDICTABLE AND DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT, AMERICA'S SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN IN SOMALIA BUILT AND REPAIRED ORPHANAGES AND ROADS; DISTRIBUTED FOOD, WATER AND SCHOOL SUPPLIES AND BOOKS; TAUGHT CLASSES TO SOMALI CHILDREN; AND TREATED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF SOMALI PATIENTS WHO FLOCKED TO THE HEALTH-CARE CENTERS WE ESTABLISHED. THIS WAS THE STORY YOU RARELY READ ABOUT, BUT IT HAPPENED ALMOST DAILY.

BY DOING THESE THINGS, OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES LEARNED FIRST HAND THE TRUTH OF THE SAYING THAT PEACEKEEPING IS NO JOB FOR A SOLDIER, BUT ONLY A SOLDIER CAN DO IT. AND THEY, ALONG WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS, DID IT EXTREMELY WELL.

3

THE IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER IS THIS: THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN, ALONG WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS FROM 28 NATIONS OVER THE PAST 20 MONTHS, HAVE GIVEN THE SOMALI PEOPLE A CHANCE TO RECOVER FROM A DISASTROUS CIVIL WAR AND A TERRIBLE FAMINE. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOMALIS ARE ALIVE TODAY BECAUSE WE CAME TO THEIR RESCUE. WE HAVE GIVEN THEM A CHANCE TO BUILD A NEW FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES.

THERE IS STILL MUCH TO DO AND THE UNITED NATIONS COALITION WILL CONTINUE TO HELP. BUT THE FUTURE OF SOMALIA IS CLEARLY IN THE HANDS OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE. THAT IS THE BOTTOM LINE OF WHAT WE'VE DONE THERE. WE HAVE GIVEN THE SOMALI PEOPLE ANOTHER CHANCE. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THAT CHANCE IS SOLELY UP TO THEM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS FOR ME TODAY, BUT I ALSO KNOW THERE IS SPECIFIC INTEREST IN THE RATIONALE BEHIND MY REQUEST FOR ARMOR IN THE SEPTEMBER TIME FRAME.

IN AUGUST, WE EXPERIENCED AN INCREASE IN THE OPTEMPO OF MILITIA ATTACKS AND IN THE NATURE OF THESE ATTACKS. SPECIFICALLY, WE SAW THE USE OF MINES FOR THE FIRST TIME WHICH RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF OUR FOUR MILITARY POLICEMEN AND IN AN INCREASE IN THE USE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. I WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF THE LIGHT, TRUCK-MOUNTED FORCES, BOTH LOGISTIC AND QUICK REACTION FORCE.



4

THE CLEAR INTENT BEHIND MY REQUEST WAS TO IMPROVE MY ABILITY TO PROTECT THE ENTIRE FORCE AND TO BE ABLE TO REACH OUT AND ASSIST ANY ELEMENT OR BASE IN TROUBLE. WHILE THIS REQUEST WAS NOT MADE EXPLICITLY FOR TASK FORCE RANGER'S SUPPORT, IT IMPLICITLY INCLUDED THE QUICK REACTION FORCE'S ABILITY TO BACK UP TASK FORCE RANGER SHOULD THAT BE REQUIRED.

WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE WHAT DIFFERENCE THIS ARMOR WOULD HAVE MADE HAD IT BEEN AVAILABLE. IT IS MY OPINION THAT, HAD IT BEEN AVAILABLE, IT WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE TIME IT TOOK TO REACH TASK FORCE RANGER. THE M1-A1 TANK WOULD HAVE BEEN INVULNERABLE TO ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADE FIRE OF THE TYPE USED BY THE MILITIA, AND THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLES WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS VULNERABLE THAN THE MALAYSIAN VEHICLES. THIS FORCE WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED FIRE POWER AND SPEED.

THERE IS A MISPERCEPTION THAT TASK FORCE RANGER'S CASUALTIES MOUNTED WHILE THEY WERE IN THE DEFENSIVE POSITION AROUND THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT. IN FACT, THAT IS NOT THE CASE. THE RANGERS' CASUALTIES WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FEWER. BUT THE RELIEF FORCE HAD TO FIGHT ITS WAY IN AND IT IS POSSIBLE THEY MAY HAVE HAD FEWER CASUALTIES.

OF COURSE, NO MATTER HOW IMPORTANT THIS BATTLE WAS TO THE UNITED STATES, THE WHOLE OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IS MUCH BROADER THAN THIS BATTLE. THE STORY OF U.S. FORCES IS, I FIRMLY BELIEVE, A POSITIVE ONE.

5

WE ARE PROUD OF OUR SERVICE TO AND WITH THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN SOMALIA. I HAVE EXPRESSED MY GREAT ADMIRATION AND BEST WISHES TO ALL WHO SERVED. NO COMMAND, NO COMMANDER, HAS EVER BEEN BETTER SERVED.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO WORKING THROUGH OUR LESSONS LEARNED TO PROVIDE FUTURE U.S. MISSIONS THE BENEFIT OF OUR EXPERIENCE. TO THIS END, WE HAVE JUST CONVENED A SPECIAL WORK GROUP OF THE KEY PARTICIPANTS AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE IN CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA, THIS WEEK. WE WILL COMPLETE OUR WORK BY MONTH'S END AND PROVIDE OUR DETAILED AFTER-ACTION COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JOINT STAFF. WE ARE DETERMINED TO LEARN BETTER WAYS WHERE POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND SECURITY OF FUTURE MISSIONS AND TO HELP THE U.N. AS IT WORKS TO IMPROVE ITS OWN CAPABILITIES.

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOU HERE THIS MORNING. I AM NOW PREPARED TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

### Questions for Tony Lake on Somalia

1. Why did the Clinton Administration approve and pursue (albeit through the U.N.) a nation-building mandate in Somalia that the Bush Administration had consciously rejected? Did any high level Administration officials believe the U.N. was capable of succeeding at such a role in Somalia, and, if so, on what evidence?

2. Was the U.S. and U.N. June 1993 decision to go after Aidid made in full consciousness that we were thereby becoming belligerents and focussing on a military solution for a political problem? (Shades of Viet-Nam?) Or was it basically a direct reaction to Aidid's attack on the U.N. which seemed to require a response to avoid the U.N.'s appearing as a "paper tiger"?

3. President Clinton has said he thought he'd changed U.S. policy in Somalia in September 1993 and couldn't figure out how the fatal Ranger attacks in October could have happened. Had he really changed the policy? And, if so, how did the attacks happen?

4. If PDD 25 had been in place in, say, late 1990, what would the U.S. Government have done differently in Somalia? In particular, and with the benefit of hindsight, what might you wish had been done differently since January 20, 1993?

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. paper               | Somalia (3 pages) | 09/02/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
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### **RESTRICTION CODES**

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TO: LAKE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 28 JUL 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA  
MEDIA

TERRORISM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES QUESTIONS RE NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE RE RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 01 AUG 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

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DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

# The Mafia Takes Over

By Nikolai Zlobin

Nikolai Zlobin is visiting professor of history and political science at The American University. This article was prepared with the assistance of Timothy Scott.

WASHINGTON  
One morning in April, my wife called to tell me that our apartment in Moscow had been robbed. Everything was taken, including threadbare clothing and wedding rings. Just the day before, my wife had returned from America with many expensive things — a video recorder, a camera, clothing and jewelry.

There is no doubt that her trip from Sheremetyevo International Airport to our apartment was followed by professional. Most serious crimes in Russia now appear to be masterminded in this way, and the situation seems increasingly hopeless. While the police were making a list of our stolen possessions, they were called three times about murders in the vicinity. They were in no hurry to respond.

Human nature is such that even hearing every day about crime and corruption, we can still think, "This doesn't concern me." Most Americans, reading reports from Russia about political murders, theft, explosions on the streets are not really moved. But we should all be concerned because Russia's future may be at stake.

As if in Dante's Inferno, Russian crime appears to be organized into three large circles.

The first is characterized by street fighting and gangsterism. Russians run up against such crime nearly every day. According to a survey this year by Public Opinion, a Russian polling organization, 91 percent of Muscovites experience fear in their daily lives, while every third resident of the capital has been in a life-threatening situation within the past year.

The victories of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party and of the Communists in last December's parliamentary elections were not surprising. Mr. Zhirinovskiy's contention that social problems must be dealt with by force is welcomed by many, who fondly recall safe streets and homes during the period of Communist rule.

The second circle of crime is made up of well-organized groups who run higher than street robberies and burglaries. They trade in arms, narcotics, and raw materials like plutonium and copper at home and abroad. These groups are not interested in economic and political stability. Anarchy is the key to their success. They want nothing more than a fast return on their investments.

These operators often employ the common criminals of the first circle. They also buy the support of low- to middle-rank officials, who as a rule have good relations with the police. Although organized crime isn't monolithic and clashes between various groups occur, a common language of thieves exists among the new business entrepreneurs, the traditional criminal world and the bureaucracy.

Is it possible to end this escalation of crime? How? More and more people believe that the solution may involve a third circle of criminals — a network of shady rolling entrepreneurs — often referred to as the Russian mafia — in league with corrupt officials who are genuinely interested in evolution toward democracy and a free market economy. It might sometimes employ the tactics of the other two,

their goals are very different.

Unlike members of the first two criminal circles, corrupt politicians and entrepreneurs are not interested in haphazard plundering of their country. Rather, they want to create an organized system from which they can control events and thus be in a strong position in the long run.

One principle of Stalin's hold on power was to replace regional leaders every two to three years. But Moscow no longer has that power; regional authorities now understand that their strength lies in their own

and media organizations have all infiltrated in this way.

Many fear that one or the other of the various mafia factions will soon gain access to nuclear weapons, a possibility that is greatly strengthened by the continuing decline of the central Government's control. In fact, they may already be close to doing so. Last week, Germany's national police agency confirmed that a small amount of weapons-grade plutonium seized in May near the Swiss border came from Russia.

In case Boris Yeltsin's team cannot control the situation, which is entirely possible, the United States should not rule out direct contact with those who could — the corrupt politicians who have the real power and regional support. In spite of their criminal connections, these politicians could be said to legitimately represent their regions and speak for the interests of their constituents. The U.S. would be unwise to restrict its lines of communication to the Kremlin.

Most Russians want continuing steps toward democracy and a market economy. They worry that to preserve his power President Yeltsin may move away from democracy and install a strict authoritarian regime. If he is not successful in consolidating power, he could break with the Constitution and turn authority over to the army.

But even the military leaders might well prove unable to put things back in order and would begin to look for a civilian government to whom they could return power. Again the question would remain, Who is able to control the situation, a situation that will undoubtedly become worse?

The fact is that in many ways control in Russia has already shifted to the new criminal network, which has replaced the old Communist structure. After a transition, as the new leaders and entrepreneurs establish

themselves, they would presumably have less and less need for violent tactics and more investment in controlling anarchy. Paradoxically, this network could eventually stabilize society and reduce street crime and help make a place for Russia in the new world order and in the international business community.

Russians are used to firm control from the top. If domination by a mafia bureaucracy offered a return to the relative order enjoyed by under the Communist rule, many would embrace it.

As for the Yeltsin Government, it has not been able to protect me from criminals, nor punish them, nor compensate me for my losses. It now be able to count on my continued support and respect?

## Crime bosses and corrupt leaders promise stability in Russia.

constituencies, and they depend on locally influential groups, including the mafia. Even intelligence and law enforcement agencies find themselves dependent on the cooperation of the local mafia-connected elite. Increasingly, Russia's political system is a democracy only insofar as it represents the interests of this elite.

When it comes to control of individual companies, the crime bosses' methods are simple but effective. They approach the director of a large business and suggest a more manageable and productive system that will provide everyone with certain guaranteed economic returns. For the director, these proposals may mean unbearable operating conditions, refusal of credit, delays in supply, workplace accidents, missing payrolls — even death. Banking, transportation

Leon / Platin / Kulture  
- Fascinating  
- Shows how  
modern today  
Be

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
7/27/94

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1994

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                        | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002. memo                | Richard Moose to General Wesley Clark, re: [USLO Mogadishu] (1 page) | 07/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE         | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003a. report             | Re: [Aideed] (1 page) | 07/16/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003b. report             | Re: [Africa] (1 page) | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
kc4118

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003c. report             | Re: [Israel/Somalia] (2 pages) | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

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National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
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| 003d. report             | Situation Room Evening Summary (1 page) | 07/18/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004a. fax                | Fax Coversheet (1 page) | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                               | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004b. cable              | Re: SNA Threatens U.S. Ambassador (3 pages) | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
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Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

### RESTRICTION CODES

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|--------------------------|---------------|------|-------------|

|             |                                                                   |            |         |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| 004c. cable | Re: SNA Continues to Spread Anti-UNOSOM/U.S. Propaganda (3 pages) | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1) |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------|

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

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## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005a. fax                | Fax Coversheet (1 page) | 07/00/1994 | P3/b(3)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

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| 005b. report             | Re: [Ambush] (1 page) | 07/19/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F

ke4118

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FIVE

RURDEEA/COMLANTAREA COGARD NEW YORK NY//AI//  
RUE J/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EUR/WE//  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PASS TO AID FOR DAVID DALTON//  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR/WECA//  
RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU  
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN//ECON//  
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN//S&T//  
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J-2//  
RUEPAMH/DIR OPERATIONS GROUP CARISLE BKS PA  
RUEPNUL/CDRUSACAC FT LEAVENWORTH KS//FBIS//  
RUESDA/FBIS ABIDJAN IV  
RUETIAV/MPC FT GEO G MEADE MD  
RUGAID/USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE  
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOA//  
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOAM//  
RUFPSA/7275ABG SAN VITO DEI NORMANNI AS IT//PA//  
RUFQBB/US SURVEY SEC SHAPE BE  
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
RUFTAKN/CINC INTEL SUPPORT ELEMENT HEIDELBERG GE  
RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC  
RUWANGC/COMPACAREA COGARD ALAMEDA CA//PI//  
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UNCLAS 8XX/LD

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SERIAL: BR1907071294

**BODY:**

PASS: COPY TO GIG TOT  
PASS: ATTN WIRE SELECT

COUNTRY: **SOMALIA**

SUBJ: ITALIAN, NEW ZEALAND UN OFFICERS FREED

REF: LD1807203294 ROME RAI TELEVIDEO TELETXT ITALIAN 182007 --  
ITALIAN, NEW ZEALAND OFFICERS HELD HOSTAGE BY ARMED GROUP

SOURCE: ROME ANSAMAIL DATABASE IN ENGLISH 0528 GMT 19 JUL 94  
TEXT:

///((UNATTRIBUTED ARTICLE: "**SOMALIA**: ITALIANS, NEW ZEALANDER,  
MALAYSIANS FREED"))

((TEXT)) (ANSA) **MOGADISHU**, JULY 19 -- THREE ITALIAN AND ONE NEW  
ZEALAND OFFICER ATTACHED TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES IN  
**SOMALIA**, KIDNAPPED NEAR CHECKPOINT PASTA IN NORTHERN **MOGADISHU**  
YESTERDAY, WERE RELEASED BY THEIR REBEL CAPTORS EARLY THIS MORNING  
ALONG WITH SEVEN MALAYSIAN ESCORT SOLDIERS, ITALIAN OFFICIALS SAID.  
THE FOUR OFFICERS WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED IN THE ATTACK, WHEN  
**SOMALI** REBELS OF THE HABR GHIDIR CLAN OPENED FIRE AT AROUND 1700  
LOCAL ON A UNOSOM 2 ((UN OPERATION IN **SOMALIA**)) CONVOY, KILLING TWO

UNCLASSIFIED

Page:

MALAYSIAN BODYGUARDS AND WOUNDING FOUR OTHERS.

THREE OF THE FOUR WOUNDED MALAYSIANS ARE REPORTED IN SERIOUS CONDITION AT THE PAKISTANI MILITARY HOSPITAL IN MOGADISHU. THREE MALAYSIANS ARE UNHARMED.

THE THREE ITALIANS ARE COLONEL FULVIO VEZZALINI AND CAPTAINS FERDINANDO SALVATI AND EMILIO SEN. VEZZALINI IS WOUNDED IN THE RIGHT ARM, AND SALVATI IN THE SHOULDER AND FLANK. SEN HAS A SLIGHT INJURY TO THE FACE. THE NEW ZEALAND OFFICER HAS AN INJURED ELBOW.

THE KIDNAPPERS KEPT VARIOUS PERSONAL ARTICLES, WEAPONS, AND THE THREE TOYOTA ARMoured JEEPS IN WHICH THE 13 UN SOLDIERS WERE TRAVELLING.

"THEY ASKED US IF WE WERE AMERICANS," SAID ONE OF THE ITALIAN OFFICERS. "WHEN THEY REALISED WE WERE ITALIANS THEY TREATED US WELL, ASKED US A LOT OF QUESTIONS, AND THEN RECEIVED AN ORDER TO RELEASE US."

NO NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE TO SECURE THE RELEASE, WHICH TOOK PLACE AT AROUND 0100 LOCAL.

ADMIN:

(ENDALL) 190526 HELLEMANS/SM 19/0712Z JUL WC 242

END OF MESSAGE

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                            | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005c. cable              | Re: Situation Report Number 26 (3 pages) | 07/18/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
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| 005d. cable              | Re: SNA Leader Threatens U.S. and UNOSOM (2 pages) | 07/12/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)  
OA/Box Number: 274

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
ke4118

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WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1994 JUL 9 AM 8:58 **URGENT**

AFAIRS

D A T A F A X

TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

*File Somalia*

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ NUMBER OF PAGES: C+8

HANDLING RESTRICTIONS:

NODIS: \_\_\_\_\_ EXD'S: \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_

HANDLING PRIORITY:

ROUTINE: \_\_\_\_\_ URGENT: XX IMMEDIATE: XX

FROM: LOFTIS/KANNE IO/PHO  
(NAME) (OFFICE SYMBOL) (EXT.) (ROOM #) 1

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CORRECT SOMALIA  
OPTIONS PAPER

| TO:           | DELIVER TO:       | EXT.:         | ROOM NUMBER |
|---------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1. <u>NSC</u> | <u>SUSAN RICE</u> | <u>X 7310</u> | _____       |
| 2. _____      | _____             | _____         | _____       |
| 3. _____      | _____             | _____         | _____       |
| 4. _____      | _____             | _____         | _____       |
| 5. _____      | _____             | _____         | _____       |

REMARKS: Please call office upon receipt

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KOE Date: 12/22/16

2012-0659-F

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| 006. paper               | Somalia Options Paper (8 pages) | 07/14/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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OA/Box Number: 274

### FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [2]

2012-0659-F  
kc4118

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|            |                                                                                         |            |         |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| 007a. memo | R. Rand Beers to Anthony Lake, re: Principals Committee Meeting on<br>Somalia (3 pages) | 07/21/1994 | P1/b(1) |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------|

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| 007b. paper              | Principals Committee Discussion Paper on Somalia (4 pages) | 07/00/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

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