

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Somalia Files (1993-1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Darragh, Sean

Original OA/ID Number:

274

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	4	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	[Results of Aideed Demarche] (1 page)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Somalia Trust Fund: Response to Question from Japanese UN Perm Rep (3 pages)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Draft Cable, re: Somalia Trust Fund: Demarche to Japanese Government (1 page)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Somalia Trust Fund: Demarche to Japanese Government (2 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: Promoting Political Reconciliation in Somalia (4 pages)	09/01/1993	P1/b(1)
006. email	Richard Clarke to Richard Canas, Carlos Burgos, and Sean Darragh, re: Odds and Ends (1 page)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1)
007. report	Re: [Aideed Scenarios] (9 pages)	08/24/1993	P1/b(1)
008. list	Cables in Response to Letter from President/Secretary on UNOSOM II (3 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: U.S. Support for Pakistani Troops in Somalia (2 pages)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: Urgent Need to Review the Somali Justic Program Document and Make Commitments to the UN of Personnel and Equipment (6 pages)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
011. memo	Re: [Possible Export] (1 page)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

2012-0659-F

ke4110

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Historical Timeline of U.S. Troops in Somalia

- 12/9/92 - U.S. Troops Begin Deployment - 8,900 U.S. Troops
- 1/19/93 - Peak U.S. Troop Presence - 25,400 U.S. Troops
- 5/4/93 - U.N. Takes over from UNITAF
U.S. Troops Remain:
 - 4,000 TOTAL
 - (2,900 log/support)
 - (1,100 QRF)
- 6/5/93 - 24 Pakistanis killed
- 7/12/93 - Major U.N. Military Operation
(Aideed Comand & Control Facility)
Somalis/International Journalist killed
- 8/24/93 - 450 Rangers Deployed - QRF to ca. 1600
- 9/9/93 - Ambush of U.S./Pakistanis
(2 U.S. wounded)
- 9/21/93 - Aideed's Chief Lieutenant and Financier,
Osman Atto, captured/held by UNOSOM
- 9/25/93 - One Blackhawk downed
(3 U.S. killed)
- 10/3/93 - Most Recent Fighting
(12-14 U.S. killed)
(78 wounded)
(4 missing)
- 10/5/93 - Current U.S. Troop Strength
 - 4,600 TOTAL
 - (2,900 log/support)
 - (1,700 QRF)

RE-ENERGIZING THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN SOMALIA

Me
The U.N.'s perceived absorption in a military conflict with General Aideed has contributed to growing dissatisfaction with the Somalia situation. This frustration is widely shared. It grows out of sense that the U.N. lacks a clear strategy for implementing its ambitious goals within a reasonable period. In recent weeks, dissatisfaction with the present situation has prompted public disapproval of U.N. action from Italy, Germany, France, and the OAU, among others and strengthened calls for the early withdrawal of U.S. forces in the U.S. Congress.

We fully appreciate that finding a political solution is possible only so long as UNOSOM remains militarily strong. Nonetheless, it is important nonetheless that the U.N. move aggressively to demonstrate its appreciation of political realities in the U.S. and elsewhere. This paper offers several ideas the U.N. should consider publicizing and implementing on an urgent basis.

o Announce immediately plans to convene a political reconciliation conference in Somalia under U.N. and regional auspices.

-- The conference should have two purposes, re-energizing the moribund national reconciliation process started in March with the Addis Ababa agreement and speeding the local reconciliation process on which the U.N. already has made a solid start.

-- Participants should include the original signatories of the Addis accord, minus General Aideed. Representatives of his organization should be invited to take part, however. Representatives of the extant district councils and of areas where councils have yet to be formed also should be asked to participate.

• Formalize and Energize the Somalia Advisory Group. At the earliest opportunity, the U.N. should establish this group formally and give its formation the widest possible media coverage.

-- The U.N. should consult the group regularly and, when appropriate, encourage wide press coverage of its activities.

• Invite Foreign Ministers from Neighboring African Countries, plus Eritrea, to visit Somalia

-- As soon as possible, the Secretary General should invite the foreign ministers of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea to visit Somalia as a group to evaluate the progress of U.N. operations there and to offer suggestions for improvement.

← 6' →

- The group of ministers should meet with factional leaders to emphasize the importance of the proposed political reconciliation conference and the need to broaden its base. Although General Aideed should not be invited, the group of ministers should make clear that representatives of his organization and sub-clan would be welcome.

- The visit should receive appropriate media coverage.

o Further Use of the Ethiopian/Eritrean Channel

- Efforts by Presidents Meles and Issaias to secure General Aideed's voluntary departure from Somalia have not succeeded. However, the two leaders should receive every encouragement to remain personally engaged in this initiative.

- At the earliest opportunity, we believe the Secretary General should convey his continued support for the initiative to the Ethiopians and the Eritreans.

- In doing so, the Secretary General might argue that the recent detention of Osman Atto may well give General Aideed and his supporters reason to explore this proposal. Atto's detention highlights the vulnerability of Aideed and his senior lieutenants and, by not disclosing Atto's whereabouts or discussing the length of his detention, Aideed will possibly come to believe that his close associates are considering private arrangements with the U.N. disputed

o Proposal for an International Commission and Ceasefire

- General Aideed claimed in his August 30 letter to former President Carter that he has appealed on numerous occasions to the U.N. to appoint "an independent commission composed of internationally known statesmen, scholars, and jurists ... to investigate the events in Mogadishu since June 5 ..."

- The U.N. should test Aideed's sincerity by proposing publicly a modified version of this idea. A ten member commission should be established consisting of two representatives of from the Habr Gidr Council, one from the Somali National Council of the SNA, and the other seven chosen by the U.N.

- General Aideed would be asked publicly to go into house arrest outside Somalia until the commission, which serves as a grand jury of sorts, completes its work.

3 of 3

-- Assuming there is sufficient evidence to try Aideed, the court proceedings should take place in Somalia when its court system is adequate. The U.N. should announce the proposal coupled with a demand that Aideed accept a complete ceasefire.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**

S/S #

'93 SEP 15 P2:07

105147MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 1FROM: TED ANDREWS AF/E X 74742 52
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Matrix on Results of
Aided Demarche

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Dick Clarke / Sean Derragh</u>	<u>5 395-1492</u>	<u>1</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: _____

CARUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: KDE Date: 2/19/162012-0689-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Unclassified



*Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Office of Peacekeeping
and Humanitarian Operations
(IO/PHO)*

Date Sent 10/01/93 Time _____ Pages 5 Plus Cover

To: SEAN DARRAGH Office: NSC

Fax Number: 395-1199 Phone Number: 395-1492

From: IO/PHO - Bob Loftis Office: IO/PHO

Fax: 202-647-4006 Phone: 647-2708

Comments:

SUBJECT: Somalia Resolution

Unclassified



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/26476
21 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

~~Draft~~ Resolution 865 (1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 755 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26317) of 17 August 1993,

Stressing the importance of continuing the peace process initiated by the Addis Ababa agreement and in this connection welcoming the efforts of African countries, the Organization of African Unity, in particular its Horn of Africa Standing Committee, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in cooperation with and in support of the United Nations, to promote national reconciliation in Somalia,

Stressing the commitment of the international community to help Somalia regain a normal, peaceful life, while recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Expressing its appreciation for the improvements in the overall situation, which have been achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), in particular, eradication of starvation, establishment of a large number of district councils, opening of schools and resumption by the Somali people in most areas of the country of their normal lives,

Recognizing the continuing need for broadbased consultations and consensus on basic principles to achieve national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions,

Calling upon all Somali parties, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve reconciliation, peace and security,

Recognising that the highest priority for UNOSOM II is to assist the people of Somalia in the furtherance of the national reconciliation process and to promote and advance the re-establishment of regional and national institutions and civil administration in the entire country, as set out in resolution 814 (1993),

Noting with great concern, despite the improvements in the overall situation in Somalia, continuing reports of violence in Mogadishu and the absence of law enforcement and judicial authorities and institutions in the country as a whole, and recalling the request to the Secretary-General in resolution 814 (1993) to assist in the re-establishment of the Somali police and the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order,

Convinced that the re-establishment of the Somali police, and judicial and penal systems, is critical for the restoration of security and stability in the country,

Gravely concerned at the continuation of armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II, and recalling its resolution 814 (1993) which emphasized the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

A

1. Welcomes the reports by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in resolution 814 (1993);

2. Commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and all the personnel of UNOSOM II, for their achievements in greatly improving the conditions of the Somali people and beginning the process of nation-building apparent in the restoration in much of the country of stable and secure conditions in stark contrast with the prior suffering caused by inter-clan conflict;

3. Condemns all attacks on UNOSOM II personnel and reaffirms that those who have committed or have ordered the commission of such criminal acts will be held individually responsible for them;

4. Affirms the importance it attaches to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995;

5. Requests, in that context, the Secretary-General to direct the urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities and to report thereon to the Council as soon as possible;

6. Urges the Secretary-General to re-double his efforts at the local, regional and national levels, including encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to continue the process of national reconciliation and political settlement, and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy;

7. Calls on all Member States to assist, in all ways possible, including the urgent full staffing of UNOSOM II civil positions, the Secretary-General, in conjunction with regional organizations, in his efforts to reconcile the parties and rebuild Somali political institutions;

8. Invites the Secretary-General to consult the countries of the region and regional organizations concerned on means of further reinvigorating the reconciliation process;

B

9. Approves the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in annex I to his report of 17 August 1993 (S/26317) relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems in accordance with resolution 814 (1993) and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps on an urgent and accelerated basis to implement them;

10. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to convene at the earliest possible date a meeting of Member States interested in supporting UNOSOM II in the re-establishment of the police, judicial and penal systems, for the purpose of determining specific requirements and identifying specific sources of support;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General to undertake actively and as a matter of great urgency an international recruiting programme for staffing the UNOSOM II Justice Division with police, judicial and penal system specialists;

12. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to maintain ^{AND UTILIZE} the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) and maintained in resolution 814 (1993) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems in addition to the establishment of the Somali police, other than for the cost of international staff;

13. Urges Member States, on an urgent basis, to contribute to that fund or otherwise to provide assistance for the re-establishment of the Somali

S/26476
English
Page 4

police, judicial and penal systems, including personnel, financial support, equipment and training to help attain the objectives outlined in annex I to the Secretary-General's report (S/26317);

14. Encourages the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure continuation of the current police, judicial and penal programme from October to the end of December 1993 until additional funding from Member States is forthcoming, and to make recommendations as appropriate to the General Assembly;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council fully informed on a regular basis on the implementation of this resolution;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'93 SEP 24 P3:17

B

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: KDE Date: 12/09/16

2012-0659-F

MESSAGE NO. **105734** CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 3
FROM: MAX ROBINSON S/S 7-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO USUN NEW YORK: SOMALIA TRUST FUND:
RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM JAPANESE UN PERM REP

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>NANCY SODERBERG</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WH SITRM</u>
	WILL TTON		
	<u>KRISTIE KENNEY</u>		
	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
<u>WARD</u>	<u>CLARKE R</u>	<u>RICE</u>	
	<u>DARRAH</u>	<u>WIEDENHANN</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 9/27

S/S Officer:

Max Robinson

MAX ROBINSON



CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002. cable	Re: Somalia Trust Fund: Response to Question from Japanese UN Perm Rep (3 pages)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 10/18/96

WASHFAX RECEIPT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2012-0659-F

'93 SEP 22 A9:22

B

S/S #

C

MESSAGE NO. 105569 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 3
FROM: Kirsten Solwiz ID/PHD 72708 5327 + cover
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DRAFT: Somalia Trust
Fund: Remittance to Japanese Govt.

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>AVSC</u>	<u>Susan Rice</u>	<u>395</u>	<u>7310</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Pending JAS/OSD clearance.

S/S Officer: SE

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004. cable Re: Somalia Trust Fund: Demarche to Japanese Government (2 pages) 09/21/1993 P1/b(1)

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KOE Date: 12/09/16
2012-0659-F

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'93 SEP 22 P3 26

B

S/S #

C

MESSAGE NO. 105586 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 4

FROM: MAX ROBINSON S/S 7-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO USUN NEW YORK: PROMOTING POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION IN SOMALIA

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>NANCY SODERBERG</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WH SITRM</u>
	<u>██████████</u>		
	<u>KRISTIE KENNEY</u>		
	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
	<u>CLARKE, R. WARD</u>		
	<u>RICE</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: September 23

S/S Officer:

Max Robinson

MAX ROBINSON

CROSSHATCH

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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Richard Clarke to Richard Canas, Carlos Burgos, and Sean Darragh, re: Odds and Ends (1 page)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

2012-0659-F
kc4110

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. report	Re: [Aideed Scenarios] (9 pages)	08/24/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4110

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'93 SEP 26 P3:12

B

S/S #

C

MESSAGE NO. 105814 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 6
FROM: Zed Andrews AF/E 7-9742 5240
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Revised NON PAPER ON SOMALIA
FOR TARNOFF/WISNER/BERGER

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>JCS/J5</u>	<u>ADM F. BOWMAN</u>	<u>703 614 9413</u>	<u>2E977</u>
<u>OSD/ASD/50</u>	<u>AMB Stadtler</u>	<u>703 693 2896</u>	
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Richard Clarke</u>	<u>202 395-1492</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: URGENT

Clearance by 1200 hrs SEPT 27

WAS
sent
to NY!

S/S Officer: CCH

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 2109116
2012-0659-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: DOD/JCS - Admiral Bowman
DOD/OSD - Ambassador Stadtler
NSC - Richard Clarke
State/AF - Ambassador Moose
State/IO - John Brims
State/PM/ISO - Phil Suter
State/P - Bruce Thomas

From: AF/E - David Shinn

Subj: Revised Nonpaper on Somalia for Tarnoff/Berger/Wisner
Meeting on Monday with Kofi Annan

Sept. 26, 1993

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs asked Ted Andrews and me to come in Sunday to provide more detail and timeline information to the nonpaper on Somalia which will be presented to Kofi Annan on Monday, September 27. We understand there is a particular desire to impress upon the UN the need to make significant progress on the political front by October 15. We have, however, made no specific reference to this date as it would then appear that we are only trying to mollify Congress; rather than deal seriously with a real problem.

The revised paper is attached for your clearance. It must be sent by fax to New York by noon Monday. If we do not hear from you BEFORE noon Monday we will assume you have cleared. If there are any differences which can not be resolved by noon Monday, we will formulate the final paper in the clearest manner possible and note any significant differences.

Please try to confine your comments to significant, substantive points.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 12/09/16
2012-0659-F

drafted: AF/E - DH Shinn

SOMALIA: RE-ENERGIZING THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND
IMPROVING PUBLIC RELATIONS

The U.N.'s perceived absorption in a military conflict with General Aideed has contributed to growing dissatisfaction with the Somalia situation. This frustration is widely shared. It grows out of a sense that the U.N. lacks a clear strategy for implementing its ambitious goals within a reasonable period. In recent weeks, dissatisfaction with the present situation has prompted public disapproval of U.N. action from Italy, Germany, France, and the OAU, among others, and strengthened calls in the U.S. Congress for the early withdrawal of U.S. forces.

We fully appreciate that finding a political solution is possible only so long as UNOSOM remains militarily strong and firm in its resolve. Nonetheless, it is important that the U.N. move quickly and aggressively to demonstrate its appreciation of political realities in the U.S. and elsewhere. It has also become increasingly apparent that the U.N. needs to expand and improve now its public relations efforts in New York and Mogadishu. This paper offers several recommendations which we urge the U.N. to implement and, where appropriate, publicize on an urgent basis.

o Involve the Presidents of Ethiopia and Eritrea:

- Efforts by the emissaries of Presidents Meles and Issaias to secure General Aideed's voluntary departure from Somalia have not succeeded. The two leaders should become personally engaged in efforts to stop the fighting and create a climate which will permit political reconciliation.
- The Secretary General should contact both Presidents this week and invite them to visit Mogadishu as soon as possible for the purpose of assessing the situation on the ground, meeting with key Somalis, and then offering recommendations to the Secretary General.
- Meles and Issaias should be given maximum flexibility consistent with the broad guidelines of Security Council resolutions. This initiative should take precedence over the others in this paper, although we believe all of them can proceed concurrently.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 12/09/16
0012-0659-F

-- This does not foreclose the earlier Ethiopian/Eritrean initiative to obtain the voluntary departure of General Aideed from Somalia. Rather, it recognizes the reality that this effort may not succeed at the moment and underscores the urgency of ending the fighting in Mogadishu and returning the focus to political reconciliation. The effort by the Ethiopian/Eritrean emissaries to obtain the voluntary departure of Aideed should continue quietly behind the scenes.

o Establish an International Commission Linked to a Ceasefire:

- General Aideed claimed in his August 30 letter to former President Carter that he has appealed on numerous occasions to the U.N. "to appoint an independent commission composed of internationally known statesmen, scholars and jurists from different countries to investigate the events in Mogadishu since June 5, 1993 and to determine those who are responsible for the crimes committed. We have also repeatedly called on the U.N. to settle the conflict peacefully through dialogue but to no avail."
- The U.N. should test Aideed's sincerity by proposing publicly a modified version of this offer. The U.N. should announce by October 4 a proposal to establish a commission of inquiry which includes several Somalis, even members of Aideed's Habr Gidr sub-clan, and other recognized experts chosen by the U.N.
- The announcement of such a proposal also would counter criticism that the U.N. is determined to resolve its conflict with General Aideed through military means while he is willing to pursue a peaceful settlement.
- General Aideed would be expected to go into house arrest outside Somalia until the commission, which serves as a grand jury, completes its work.
- Establishment of the commission should be linked to Aideed's acceptance of a ceasefire.
- Aideed should be told that he has 5 days to accept the offer. During this period aggressive action against the S.N.A. would cease but UNOSOM would continue to conduct its regular security operations.
- After the U.N. has announced this offer publicly, and assuming Aideed agrees, every effort should be made to establish the commission, remove Aideed from Somalia, and put a ceasefire in effect before the end of October.

-3-

- Assuming the commission finds sufficient evidence to try Aideed, the court proceedings should take place in Somalia when its court system is adequate.
- The announcement of this proposal should be given maximum publicity.

o Announce Plans to Convene a Political Reconciliation Conference in Somalia:

- UNOSOM should announce by October 4 its intention to hold a political reconciliation conference to be held in Somalia under U.N. auspices with the support of neighboring countries and the O.A.U.
- The actual conference should be held by early November. This delay would enable the U.N. and UNOSOM staff to complete preparations for the October 22 World Bank-sponsored donor's conference in Paris, determine an appropriate venue in Somalia, make the necessary logistic and security arrangements, and name a high-ranking official to oversee the entire process.
- UNOSOM should revive immediately the working group which was drafting the text of the Transitional Charter. No progress has been made on the draft since Aideed's June 5 attack on Pakistani peacekeepers. The group should be reformed to complete this important document for presentation at the political reconciliation conference.
- The conference should have three primary purposes: (a) re-energizing the moribund national reconciliation process started in March with the Addis Ababa Agreement; (b) speeding the local reconciliation process on which the U.N. already has made a solid start with the creation of district councils; and (c) implementing the disarmament plan agreed to by the signatories of the Addis Ababa Agreement.
- Participants should include the original signatories of the Addis Ababa Agreement, minus General Aideed and Ahmed Omar Jess, who both have been egregious violators of the Agreement. Representatives of their organizations should be invited to take part, however. Representatives of the extant district councils should participate also.

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-4-

o Invite Foreign Ministers from Neighboring African Countries, Plus Eritrea, to Visit Somalia:

- The Secretary General should invite the foreign ministers of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea to visit Somalia as a group during the first half of October to evaluate the progress of U.N. operations there and to offer suggestions for improvement.
- The foreign ministers also should meet with factional leaders to emphasize the importance of the proposed political reconciliation conference and the need to include district council members in the conference. Although General Aideed and Jess should not be included, the group of ministers should make clear that representatives of their organizations and sub-clans would be welcome.
- The activities of this group need to be coordinated carefully with those proposed for Presidents Meles and Issaias. We see the foreign ministers playing a more public role with the focus on the political reconciliation conference and contacts with UNOSOM.
- Involving the four foreign ministers has the advantage of engaging Kenya and Djibouti -- two countries with major interests in the outcome in Somalia but which have been on the sidelines recently.
- The visit should receive appropriate media coverage.

o Formalize and Energize the Somalia Advisory Group:

- The U.N. should establish the Somalia Advisory Group formally by mid-October and give its formation the widest possible media coverage.
- The U.N. should consult the group biweekly and, when appropriate, encourage wide press coverage of its activities.
- Members of the Somalia Advisory Group should be encouraged to speak up publicly, preferably as a group, in support of UNOSOM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (SO) 09/26/93 15:27 NO. 1450023944 (10)
(treat as ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ until delivered to UN)

-5-

o Invigorate U.N. and UNOSOM Public Affairs Handling of the Operation in Somalia:

- The U.N. in New York should hold, effective immediately, a weekly press briefing on progress in Somalia to counter the negative information which is distorting the public's perception of events there.
- The U.N. should strengthen its public affairs staff in Somalia within a week and continue to hold daily briefings in Mogadishu.
- Following the departure of so many media representatives from Mogadishu to Nairobi, UNOSOM should arrange, effective immediately, weekly press briefings in the Kenyan capital.
- To overcome the impression that the military component of UNOSOM is dominated by the U.S., UNOSOM should immediately name a non-American, preferably an African, as the military press spokesman.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

C

'93 OCT 15 P2 06

S/S #

106873

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 43

FROM: Nathan Bluhm IDPH 172708 5323
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Status of Actions - Somalia

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Sean Darragh</u>	<u>395-1492</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: CC 14

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KDE Date: 2/10/11

2012-0659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. list	Cables in Response to Letter from President/Secretary on UNOSOM II (3 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4110

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

*This Material is classified*UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KOE Date: 08/09/16~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2012 OUSA-F

TO: Sean Darragh NSCFAX #: 202-395-1207TEL. #: 202-395-1492FROM: Valerie Belon State/Pm/ISO
(Name) (Office)

FAX #: (202) 647-5145

TEL. #: 202-736-7743SUBJECT: Request your clearance ~~as soon~~ by noon todayif possible. Clearances can be called to meat 202-736-7743 or to Phil at State/Pm/ISO

Thanks VB

Number of Pages Transmitted in this Fax 3~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	Re: U.S. Support for Pakistani Troops in Somalia (2 pages)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4110

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WASHFAX RECEIPT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

C

'93 OCT 15 P12:50

MESSAGE NO. 106867 CLASSIFICATION CONF No. Pages 6
 FROM: V. Belon State/Pm/ISO X67743 7428
 (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOMALIA JUSTICE/POLICE PROGRAM

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Sean Darragh</u>	<u>202-395-1492</u>	<u>303</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: REQUEST YOUR CLEARANCE BY COB TODAY (FRIDAY) IF POSSIBLE.
CLEARANCE CAN BE CALLED TO ME AT 202-736-7743 IN
STATE/Pm/ISO. THANKS. VS

S/S Officer: _____



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 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: KDE Date: 2/29/16

2012-0659-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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010. cable	Re: Urgent Need to Review the Somali Justic Program Document and Make Commitments to the UN of Personnel and Equipment (6 pages)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4110

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RECORD #

FROM/LOCATION

1. Department of State / Julius B. Grant

TOR
241340Z/ly

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Sean Warragh

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

2012 SEP 21 AM 10:08
TELEHOUSE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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Initials: KDE Date: 12/09/16

2012-0659-F

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CLASSIFICATION



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs*This Material is classified*UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: VDE Date: 2109116

2012-0659-F

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~TO: Sean DarraghFAX #: 202/395-1207 (classified)TEL. #: 202/395-5066FROM: Julie GRANT PM/DRSA
(Name) (Office)FAX #: (202) 647-5145TEL. #: 202/736-4054

SUBJECT: _____

Number of Pages Transmitted in this Fax _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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011. memo	Re: [Possible Export] (1 page)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4110

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TALKING POINTS FOR MADELINE ALBRIGHT

1. The President and the people of the United States have supported the UN effort in Somalia for more than 14 months. Operations Provide Relief, Restore Hope/UNITAF, and UNOSOM II could not have occurred without U.S. participation.
2. The President and the U.S. people continue to support the UN effort in Somalia. We pay the largest share of the peacekeeping assessment (30.4%) and have contributed well over a billion dollars in unreimbursed military costs. U.S. troop contributions to UNOSOM II must, however, be drawn down if other important U.S. commitments are to be met.
3. The U.S. presently has some 2800 logistics support personnel under the operational control of the UN commander in Somalia. Since the start of UNOSOM II last May, we have consistently represented to the SYG that these personnel are a temporary, transitional arrangement until civilian contracts can be awarded by the UN to perform these functions.
4. As President Clinton announced last Thursday, 7 Oct 93, the time to withdraw that logistics force has arrived. The timetable for that force withdrawal is a reduction to 1400 by 31 Dec 93, with complete withdrawal by 31 March 1994. We will retain the QRF capability on the ground for the immediate future but it will eventually deploy off-shore then over-the-horizon.
5. The timetable for withdrawal of our logistics support personnel will be strictly observed and is not subject to revision. In order to replace the logistics functions currently being performed by these support personnel the UN must act now to minimize the impact on UNOSOM II operations. We see three basic options available to the UN:
 - a. logistic support provided by one or more of the other member States;
 - b. the UN awards contracts commercially for logistic support; or
 - c. through a Letter of Assist (LOA) issued under the U.S./UN 607 agreement the UN requests that the U.S. extend the current LOGCAP contract with Brown & Root and expand it to cover all areas of support now being provided by U.S. personnel until 31 Dec 1994.
6. In evaluating the above options, the UN should be mindful that military logistics capabilities of other member States of the size and complexity required to support UNOSOM II are extremely limited. In addition, the UN's efforts to secure third country logistic support have, to date, been unsuccessful.

7. Similarly, the UN's efforts at awarding commercial contracts for logistic support in Somalia have met with little success. This point is highlighted by the UN's inability to conclude the UNOSOM II rations contract.

8. We believe that the only alternative to assure uninterrupted logistic support to UNOSOM II is an LOA under the existing 607 agreement. Since May, the U.S. has been contracting with Brown & Root for logistic support on behalf of the UN under an existing LOA. All agree that the support provided has been satisfactory.

9. The U.S. would be willing to consider a request, on a reimbursable basis, from the UN under the existing 607 agreement to extend its existing contract with Brown and Root until 31 Dec 1994 and expand its scope to include all the logistic support requirements of UNOSOM II.

10. Informal contacts made with Brown & Root indicate a willingness and ability to handle this expanded mission. They have advised us that a six-week "ramp-up" is required to have all contractor personnel in place.

11. It is not our intention to prejudice or unduly influence your decision regarding logistic support to UNOSOM II. The time sensitivities involved, however, mandate that a decision be made as soon as possible.

TESTIMONY OF UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

PETER TARNOFF

BEFORE

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

OCTOBER 19, 1993

U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

I. INTRODUCTION

GOOD MORNING, MR. CHAIRMAN. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA.

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I WANT TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THIS EXPLANATION AND ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS. MY COLLEAGUE, WALTER SLOCOMBE FROM THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CAN ADDRESS YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE, SIZE AND PLAN FOR RETURN OF OUR MILITARY FORCES FROM SOMALIA.

II. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

OUR GOALS IN SOMALIA ARE HUMANITARIAN. WE SEEK TO SUPPORT UNOSOM IN ITS EFFORTS TO HELP THE SOMALI PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES IN FASHIONING A LASTING POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THEIR CIVIL CONFLICT, AND TO PRODUCE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT TO ENABLE THE FREE FLOW OF HUMANITARIAN AID.

WE BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT THESE GOALS ARE WORTHY, AND THAT THEY SERVE AMERICA'S INTERESTS. OUR COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS IS FIRM, BUT IT IS NOT OPEN ENDED. DESPITE THE INTENSE FOCUS ON SOUTH MOGADISHU, REMARKABLE PROGRESS TOWARDS ENDING THE FAMINE AND FOSTERING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL HAS BEEN MADE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE REINVIGORATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT, AND REPORTED TO CONGRESS ON OCTOBER 13, WILL PRESERVE THESE GAINS AND FULFILL U.S. OBJECTIVES BY MARCH 31, 1994.

III. THE U.S. ROLE/THE UN MISSION

IN DETERMINING OUR GOALS AND MISSIONS, WE HAVE DESCRIBED BOTH THE MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MISSION OF UNITED STATES FORCES. THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY THE 27 GOVERNMENTS WITH FORCES IN SOMALIA, HAS TAKEN ON A BROAD MISSION IN UNOSOM II -- TO HELP SOMALIA DEVELOP BASIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING A JUDICIARY AND POLICE FORCE SO SOMALIS CAN KEEP ORDER IN THEIR COUNTRY AND PREVENT A RETURN TO THE CHAOS AND FAMINE WHICH CAUSED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INTERVENE LAST YEAR.

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HAVING LED THE FIRST PHASE OF THE UN MISSION BY PROVIDING THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE FORCES FOR THE UNITAF OPERATION, THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO UNOSOM II NOW IS MORE LIMITED.

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- WE ARE PROVIDING AN INTERIM FORCE PROTECTION SUPPLEMENT, THE QUICK REACTION FORCE, TO UN FORCES TO DEAL WITH EMERGENCIES. ALL U.S. COMBAT FORCES ARE UNDER U.S. OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND ALL U.S. FORCES ARE UNDER U.S. COMMAND.
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IT HAS TWO PRIMARY COMPONENTS: FIRST, TEMPORARILY STRENGTHENING OUR MILITARY POSTURE SO WE FULFILL OUR TRANSITION ROLE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH; AND SECOND, REFOCUSING UNOSOM'S EFFORTS ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

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THIRD, THEY ARE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THOSE THAT THREATEN TO CUT OFF RELIEF ASSISTANCE AND ATTACK OUR PEOPLE.

FOURTH, OUR TROOPS, ALONG WITH FORCES FROM 30 OTHER COUNTRIES, WILL HELP TO RESTORE ORDER AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR SOMALIS TO WORK TOGETHER TO RESOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS.

THEY WILL PROTECT OUR FORCES, BUT ALSO PROTECT THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF OUR PRESENCE IN SOMALIA. WE MUST RECALL THAT THANKS TO THE U.S.-LED RELIEF EFFORT, STARVATION IN SOMALIA HAS VIRTUALLY CEASED AND LIFE IS RETURNING TO NORMAL IN MANY AREAS ALTHOUGH MILLIONS OF SOMALIS STILL DEPEND ON RELIEF SUPPLIES TO SURVIVE. CROPS ARE GROWING, TENS-OF-THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN ARE BEING INOCULATED, AND MARKETS ARE OPENING IN MOST OF THE COUNTRY.

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MR. CHAIRMAN, WE BELIEVE THE ONLY LASTING SOLUTION TO SOMALIA'S PROBLEMS IS A POLITICAL ONE. AS WE UNDERSTOOD WHEN WE SUPPORTED THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE, THERE MUST BE A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT ALLOWS SOMALIS TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO BEGIN TO REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY. THIS EMPHASIS WAS NEGLECTED DURING THE MILITARY EFFORT TO RESPOND TO THE BRUTAL ATTACK ON THE PAKISTANI PEACEKEEPERS LAST JUNE BUT THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE CORRECTION IS DESIGNED TO PUT THIS EFFORT FRONT AND CENTER. THE UN UNDERSTANDS OUR VIEW AND SUPPORTS OUR POSITION.

THE PROCESS OF REVIVING THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION BEGAN LAST WEEK. AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, WHO SERVED AS THE SPECIAL ENVOY TO SOMALIA FROM DECEMBER 1992 UNTIL MAY 1993, HAS TRAVELLED TO THE REGION AND CONSULTED WITH REGIONAL LEADERS. DURING THE OCTOBER 10-14 PERIOD, AMBASSADOR OAKLEY SPOKE TO PRESIDENT ISSAIAS OF ERITREA, OAU SECRETARY-GENERAL SALIM SALIM, ETHIOPIAN PRESIDENT MELES, AND HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH UNOSOM OFFICIALS AND SOMALIS REPRESENTING THE AIDEED AND ALI MAHDI FACTIONS IN MOGADISHU.

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PRESIDENTS MELES AND ISSAIAS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ARE WILLING TO ASSUME AN ACTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING TOGETHER THE DIFFERENT SOMALI FACTIONS AND OTHER REGIONAL LEADERS TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT.

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- GENERAL AIDEED'S MILITIA HAVE REMOVED A NUMBER OF THE BARRICADES ON ROADS IN SOUTH MOGADISHU. MOST IMPORTANT, AIDEED'S FORCES RELEASED UNCONDITIONALLY THE TWO UNOSOM DETAINEES THEY WERE HOLDING -- AMERICAN CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER DURANT AND NIGERIAN PRIVATE SHANKALI.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WE WILL ALSO ENSURE THAT THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE FOR THE MURDERED PEACEKEEPERS ARE SERVED AS WELL. WE ARE WORKING WITH UNOSOM, THROUGH AMBASSADOR OAKLEY, TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO COMPLETE THE NECESSARY INQUIRIES INTO THE EVENTS OF JUNE 5, 1993 IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. HOWEVER, UNOSOM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT JUSTICE IS DONE. IT IS NOT THE MISSION OF U.S. FORCES TO ACT AS A POLICE FORCE IN SOMALIA.

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THERE ARE SOME AMERICANS WHO BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SOMALIA IMMEDIATELY. WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE WRONG -- WRONG FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS AND WRONG FOR AMERICAN VALUES. WE BELIEVE OUR PLAN IS THE RIGHT ONE -- BECAUSE IT PROTECTS OUR PEOPLE, PRESERVES THE HUMANITARIAN GAINS OF TWO ADMINISTRATIONS AND PROJECTS AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AS IT SHOULD -- WITH AMERICA ACTING AS A RELIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE LEADER AND PARTNER. WE BELIEVE THE SENATE'S VOTE IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN.

- OUR PLAN PROTECTS U.S. FORCES THROUGH OUR ENHANCED DEPLOYMENT.
- BY ALLOWING A REASONABLE TIME FOR A POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRANSITION, WE CAN FULFILL OUR MISSION AND PRESERVE THE HUMANITARIAN GAINS OF TWO ADMINISTRATIONS. A PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE COLLAPSE OF THE UNOSOM MISSION AND DEVALUE THE BRAVE EFFORTS OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOMALIA TO DATE.

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VI. CONCLUSION

WE STARTED THIS MISSION, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, "FOR THE RIGHT REASONS, AND WE INTEND TO FINISH IT IN THE RIGHT WAY." THIS A COMMITMENT TO FINISH OUR MISSION RESPONSIBLY AND TO BRING OUR TROOPS HOME SAFELY AND ON TIME.

IN ORDER FOR OUR POLICY AND OUR SOLDIERS TO SUCCEED WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

LET US -- THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION -- WORK TOGETHER TO BRING OUR TROOPS HOME IN A WAY THAT HONORS OUR COMMITMENTS AND ACCOMPLISHES OUR IMPORTANT MISSION. WITH YOUR SUPPORT WE CAN REMOVE ALL OF OUR COMBAT TROOPS BY MARCH 31 AND LEAVE BEHIND A SOMALIA WHERE STARVATION HAS ENDED AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION CAN BE WELL ADVANCED.

THANK YOU.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AF/E, AF/RA, AF/EP

F A X C O V E R S H E E T

DATE: Oct 19 93 Page 1 of 10/2TO: Sean DarraghOFFICE: NSSPHONE: 395 1492 FAX ²⁰² 395 1199FROM: Ted AndrewsOFFICE: AF/EPHONE: 202 647 6453SUBJECT: Tarnoff Statement

COMMENTS: _____

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DRAFT 10/18/93 [3]

TESTIMONY OF UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
PETER TARNOFF
BEFORE
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OCTOBER 19, 1993
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PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

-- 9 --

-- THIRD, BY PLAYING A RESPONSIBLE, ALBEIT LIMITED, ROLE IN UNOSOM'S MISSION, WE SHOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT WE WILL PLAY OUR PART IN COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO RELIEVE HUMANITARIAN DISTRESS, AND HELP OTHERS TO DO THE SAME, BUT THAT OUR COMMITMENTS AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT OPEN ENDED.

VI. CONCLUSION

WE STARTED THIS MISSION, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, "FOR THE RIGHT REASONS, AND WE INTEND TO FINISH IT IN THE RIGHT WAY." THIS A COMMITMENT TO FINISH OUR MISSION RESPONSIBLY AND TO BRING OUR TROOPS HOME SAFELY AND ON TIME.

IN ORDER FOR OUR POLICY AND OUR SOLDIERS TO SUCCEED WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

LET US -- THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION -- WORK TOGETHER TO BRING OUR TROOPS HOME IN A WAY THAT HONORS OUR COMMITMENTS AND ACCOMPLISHES OUR IMPORTANT MISSION. WITH YOUR SUPPORT WE CAN REMOVE ALL OF OUR COMBAT TROOPS BY MARCH 31 AND LEAVE BEHIND A SOMALIA WHERE STARVATION HAS ENDED AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION CAN BE WELL ADVANCED.

THANK YOU.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

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DRAFTED: P - DLGOLDWYN/DSHINN 10/18/93 PSTAFF 3003 (7-1599)

CLEARED: H: RRBRADTKE/MCHAPMAN

AF:GMOOSE

STF:DSHINN

IO:RLOFTIS

P: BTHOMAS

PA:BFREEMAN

T:TBUCKLEY

PM:

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

CHRONOLOGY

1. UNSC RESOLUTION 775: August 28, 1992

Authorized the humanitarian mission to Somalia (UNOSOM I). Pakistani forces arrived with insufficient force in Mogadishu and immediately were pinned down in the airport by Aideed. The Pakistani contingent of approximately 500 men set up at the airport in Mogadishu and never succeeded in establishing security outside this area, and therefore relief supplies did not move.

2. UNSC RESOLUTION 794: December 3, 1992

Authorized a U.S.-led coalition (UNITAF) to operate under Chapter 7: the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief in Somalia. The U.S. put over 25,000 troops on the ground and established control over southern Somalia, including Mogadishu. The beginnings of a permissive environment were established and relief agencies were given the opportunity to stop rampant starvation.

Amb. Oakley (on behalf of the U.S.) managed to convince local Somali warlords to permit the introduction of U.S. forces without challenge through a combination of threats and the opportunity to participate in Somalia's political future. In addition, the U.S. and UN representative in Somalia initiated efforts at building a political process.

UNITAF began to initiate a grass roots political process following U.S. entry in December. In January, the first Addis Ababa Conference of faction leaders, including Aideed, agreed to cease-fire and disarmament. Private markets began to return and replanting of crops started. UNITAF patrolled heavily and set up strong points in Mogadishu to ensure a secure environment. In March, the second Addis Conference added regional council representatives and called for an elected Transitional National Council. During this period Aideed began to feel marginalized and politically threatened by the emerging democratic process.

3. UNSC RESOLUTION 814: May 4, 1993

Authorized UNOSOM II. The U.S. mission had been to protect relief organizations; to create "a secure environment for humanitarian operations." The new UN mission included security for relief operations but formalized as part of the UN mandate ongoing efforts at disarmament, the political process of rebuilding a government along the lines of Addis II, refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction. As U.S. forces withdrew, UNOSOM forces were under strength and with few armored vehicles. They were not able to maintain the active patrols or continuous presence in Mogadishu's neighborhoods. The U.S. maintained a logistical unit to support UNOSOM and a Quick Reaction Force to be used in emergencies. The QRF was to have left in August and the 3000 person logistics unit to drop to 1400 by January 94, with complete withdrawal no later than the end of 1994.

Aideed became increasingly marginalized by the open UNOSOM sponsored political process which moved away from recognizing war lords to participatory district councils.

4. JUNE 5, 1993:

For the first time since U.S. forces arrived, Aideed breaks the cease-fire, ambushing Pakistani forces; 24 are killed. Until then, Aideed had been one partner of the UN in its operations and a faction leader recognized by the Addis Conference.

5. UNSC Resolution 837: June 6, 1993

Authorized the investigation into the events that lead to the deaths of 24 Pakistanis and the arrest of those determined to be responsible, i.e. in effect, adding Aideed's arrest to the UNOSOM mission.

6. July 12, 1993:

U.S. forces at UN request, attack Aideed strongholds with AC-130 gunships and Cobra attack helicopters, to destroy heavy weapons he had introduced in violation of the Addis Ababa I agreement of January.

This is the first time that the QRF was used in an offensive role. During this period, skirmishes between Aideed forces and UN contingents increase. The U.S. QRF becomes increasingly used in Mogadishu to keep the peace. Efforts by the UN to seize Aideed are unsuccessful. The UN repeatedly requests that U.S. special forces capability be introduced to seize Aideed.

7. August 8, 1993:

Four U.S. soldiers killed by detonated mine on road patrol in Mogadishu by Aideed forces. Attacks on UNOSOM patrols (by mines) and UNOSOM compound (by mortar) increase.

8. August 24, 1993:

To enhance capability of UNOSOM to capture Aideed and halt his intensifying assaults, the U.S. sends 400 U.S. Special Forces (Rangers) to Somalia to assist in capturing Aideed.

9. UNSC RESOLUTION 865: September 21, 1993

Authorized the formation of the Somali police force and penal and judicial systems. The U.S. has allocated \$6 million to assist in reestablish a Somali judiciary and \$2 million (plus equipment) to reestablish police. Germans, Dutch, Italians, and Japanese also have pledged funds for these efforts, which have been delayed in the UN. Also urged that political dialogue be initiated with all factions within Somalia to foster a political solution.

10. October 4, 1993:

Rangers go after top Aideed lieutenants identified as being in the Olympic Hotel. Seize 24. Helicopters in that operation are

hit exiting area, with 2 falling in Aideed neighborhood where they are surrounded by hostile forces. U.S., Pakistani and Malaysian forces go to crash site, where they are pinned down, with further extensive casualties.

Historical Timeline of U.S. Troops in Somalia

12/9/92 - U.S. Troops Begin Deployment - 8,900 U.S. Troops

1/19/93 - Peak U.S. Troop Presence - 25,400 U.S. Troops

5/4/93 - U.N. Takes over from UNITAF
U.S. Troops Remain: - 4,000 TOTAL
- (2,900 log/support)
- (1,100 QRF)

6/5/93 - 24 Pakistanis killed

7/12/93 - Major U.N. Military Operation
(Aideed Comand & Control Facility)
Somalis/International Journalist killed

8/24/93 - 450 Rangers Deployed - QRF to ca. 1600

9/9/93 - Ambush of U.S./Pakistanis
(2 U.S. wounded)

9/21/93 - Aideed's Chief Lieutenant and Financier,
Osman Atto, captured/held by UNOSOM

9/25/93 - One Blackhawk downed
(3 U.S. killed)

10/3/93 - Most Recent Fighting
(12-14 U.S. killed)
(78 wounded)
(4 missing)

10/5/93 - Current U.S. Troop Strength - 4,600 TOTAL
- (2,900 log/support)
- (1,700 QRF)

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3. UNSC RESOLUTION 814: March 26, 1993

Authorized UNOSOM II. The U.S. mission had been to protect relief organizations; to create "a secure environment for humanitarian operations." The new UN mission included security for relief operations but formalized as part of the UN mandate ongoing efforts at disarmament, the political process of rebuilding a government along the lines of Addis II, refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction. As U.S. forces handed-off to the UN in late April, UNOSOM forces were under strength and with few armored vehicles. They were not able to maintain the active patrols or continuous presence in Mogadishu's neighborhoods. The U.S. maintained a logistical unit to support UNOSOM and a Quick Reaction Force to be used in emergencies. The QRF was to have left in August and the 3000 person logistics unit to drop to 1400 by January 94, with complete withdrawal no later than the end of 1994.

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