

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Somalia Files (1993-1994): New Somalia Stuff [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: Global Affairs-Darragh, Sean				
Original OA/ID Number: 274				
Row: 35	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Re: [Somalia] (5 pages)	08/30/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Somalia: Encouraging the UN to Contract for Logistical Services (3 pages)	10/13/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	George Moose to the Secretary of State, re: Telephone Call to Boutros-Ghali on Somalia (3 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. talking points	Talking Points (2 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004a. cable	Re: [India-UN/UNOSOM II] (3 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)
004b. cable	Re: [Terrorism] (2 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)
005. note	Note from Sean Darragh to Richard Clarke (1 page)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. paper	US Force Presence Options (4 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: [United Nations Operations in Somalia] (3 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: Conference of Elders (3 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)
009. list	Taskers that are pending (1 page)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
010. memo	Translation of Memo from Italian Prime Minister Ciampi (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [2]

2012-0659-F

kc4109

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASED: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES _____

FROM _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS:

His Excellency
Bill Clinton,
President of the United States of America
Washington D.C. USA

Dear Mr president.

The Twelve political Movements namely SAMO, SDA, SDM, SNDU, SNF, SNM, SPM, SSDF, SSNM, USC and USF, would like to extend to you and, thorough you, the families of the valiant sons of the United States who came to Somalia to save lives, but instead lost theirs, our deep condolences.

Somalis are not blood thirsty people as is being seen on the television networks. We are a nation that practices Islam, a Religion that teaches tolerance, brotherhood and peace.

Mr. President,

The majority of the Somalis are ashamed of the atrocities and barbaric acts that are being committed by the SNA militia led by the power thirsty General Aideed against those who came to assist us.

In conjunction with the above, we would like, on behalf of the majority of the Somali people, to express to you and to the people and the government of the United States of America our deep gratitude for your sustained commitment and interest in solving the present crisis of Somalia. Your continued help and concern will remain an indelible mark in the hearts and the minds of the Somali people for generations to come.

The Twelve political Movements have stated time and time again that the majority of the Somali people are craving for peace, they are tired of war and would like to embark on the development of their country.

As called for, by the Addis Ababa Agreement, in most Regions of Somalia, significant progress is being made and life is returning to normal. Agriculture is flourishing, children attending school are increasing in number and hospitals are functioning normally, families are getting re-united and most part of the country goods and services are moving freely. These are achievements unthinkable nine months ago. Further more, the democratic political process is underway albeit slowed down by Aideed's terrorist attacks on UNOSOM.

Unosom has performed superbly in all regions except Mogadishu where Aideed has made life difficult for all concerned. UNOSOM's effort is highly appreciated by the Somali people and do understand that full speed movement towards reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country is slowed down by Aideed's

guerrilla tactics, who, taking advantage from the multinational forces' internal dissent, and the limitation posed by the rule of engagement, finds sufficient room for manoeuvre.

The Twelve political movements represent 98% of the Somali people firmly opposed to the re-introduction of terror, anarchy and dictatorship, and are determined to cooperate with the United Nations on the basis of Addis Abeba Conference and the Security Council's resolutions.

The Twelve political Movements and the Somali community as whole fully understand and share the concern of the United States of America to reappraise its policy. However, the presence of USA troops in Somalia is indispensable component of the peace and disarmament process.

Now that the United Nations and the International community have identified the sources of the Somali problems and the wishes of the majority of the Somali people, we hope United States Administration and the American people will not abandon the Somali people in their quest to restore peace and stability for the country.

Overwhelming majority of the Somali people have great faith in the people and the government of the United States of America for their role in saving Somalia from famine. While starvation and its consequences are subsiding the chances of reopening larger conflict between Aidid and other clans are becoming a distinct possibility, because the general is determined to acquire power through the barrel of the gun and the rest of the population, are vehemently opposed the restoration of dictatorship. In the absence of a workable formula we see little room for compromise with Gen. Aidid.

General Aidid will never subscribe to any government that will not bestow him, the scepter of power, he will therefore be disruptive to any and all peace-making endeavour.

UNOSOM's undertaking must not be underestimated in its long term consequences and far reaching implication. Repressed nationalism, economic competition and ethnic rivalry are globally replacing the ideological competition. In this world that power hungry generals are lurking in the woods, the International experiment in Somalia assumes a vital importance. While the success will doubtless quell any insane lust for power, its failure will fuel hope for triumphant come-back or convey the erroneous assumption that misdeed pays handsome dividends.

Mr. President,

For what Aidaad stands for could have far reaching consequences to the entire region of the Horn. Fundamentalism and drugs are spreading and putting deep roots into the Somali soil. A nation who has yet to recover from the scorches of clan warfare and famine cannot defend itself alone. We appeal to the United States, the only remaining super power, to assist Somalia overcome the odds against it.

Finally, Mr President, UNOSOM II has contributed remarkably in securing relative calm that permitted free passages of relief supplies to the most remote areas of the country where vulnerable and starving population were located. To sum up, the United States troops together with that of the other nationals have saved millions of Somali lives, and for that reason, our people owe to the people of the United States of America and the International community a debt of eternal gratitude.

Best Regards.

01. Somali African Muki Organization (SAMO).....
02. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA).....
03. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM).....
04. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU).....
05. Somali National Front (SNF).....
06. Somali National Union (SNU).....
07. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).....
08. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).....
09. United Somali Congress (USC).....
10. United Somali Party (USP).....
11. United Somali Front (USF).....
12. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM).....

19 October 1993

STATEMENT ON U.S. FORCES RETURNING FROM SOMALIA
(VERSION 1)

Today, President Clinton approved a request by Secretary of Defense Aspin to redeploy to the United States approximately 700 soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and other supporting elements currently deployed in support of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNCSOM). Secretary Aspin made the request because the capabilities provided by these U.S. Army Rangers are no longer needed.

U.S. Army Rangers performed two tasks in Somalia. The first was to pursue, arrest and detain individuals of the Somali National Alliance, as called for in UNSCR 837, believed responsible for the June 6 attack on Pakistani forces deployed with UNCSOM. The second was to provide a supplemental quick reaction capability in support of other U.S. and UNCSOM forces in Somalia.

The U.S. government, after consulting with the UNCSOM commander and the UN Special Envoy in Somalia, has decided to cease efforts to arrest and detain individuals under UNSCR 837. However, it remains determined to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on U.S. and other UNCSOM forces. Also, as announced by the President on October 7, additional U.S. forces are being deployed to Somalia to provide extra force protection capability and other support for UNCSOM II. The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operation Capable (MEU(SOC)), aboard the USS New Orleans and 22nd MEU(SOC), aboard the USS Guadalcanal, are now both in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia. These units will provide a Quick Reaction Force in support of other U.S. and UNCSOM forces. Other U.S. forces already in place or enroute to Somalia in accordance with the President's October 7 announcement will perform the tasks of:

- Protecting U.S. forces and logistics bases;
- Keeping roads and lines of communication open so that the United Nations' humanitarian effort may continue;
- Maintaining pressure on those who might seek to attack relief supplies or UN and U.S. troops;

DRAFT

19 October 1995

STATEMENT ON U.S. FORCES RETURNING FROM SOMALIA
(VERSION 2)

Today, President Clinton approved a request by Secretary of Defense Aspin to redeploy to the United States approximately 700 soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and other supporting elements currently deployed in support of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Secretary Aspin made the request because the capabilities provided by these U.S. Army Rangers are no longer needed.

As announced by the President on October 7, additional U.S. forces are being deployed to Somalia to provide extra force protection capability and other support for UNOSOM II. The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operation Capable (MEUSOC), aboard the USS New Orleans and 22nd MEUSOC, aboard the USS Guadalcanal, are now both in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia. These units will provide a Quick Reaction Force in support of other U.S. and UNOSOM forces, a task previously performed by the Ranger unit being redeployed. Other U.S. forces already in place or enroute to Somalia in accordance with the President's October 7 announcement will perform the tasks of:

- Protecting U.S. forces and logistics bases;
- Keeping roads and lines of communication open so that the United Nations' humanitarian effort may continue;
- Maintaining pressure on those who might seek to attack relief supplies or UN and U.S. troops;
- Making it possible for the Somalis to reach agreement among themselves to solve their problems.

Additional inquiries should be directed to the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Department of Defense.

DRAFT

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: KOE Date: 12/09/16

2012-0659-F

93 OCT 18 A8:47

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**

S/S #

*C*MESSAGE NO. 106980 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 3FROM: ROSS WILSON S/S 647-5302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO USUN NEW YORK: Somalia: Encouraging
the UN to contract for Logistical Services

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>NANCY SODERBERG</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WH SITRM</u>
	<u>[REDACTED]</u>		
	<u>KRISTIE KENNEY</u>		
	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
	<u>WARD CLARKE, R. info: DARRAH</u>		
	<u>RICE</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 10/18.S/S Officer: *RW*

ROSS WILSON

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

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Clinton Library

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EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND
SCHWEIZERISCHE BOTSCHAFT
AMBASSADE DE SUISSE

WASHINGTON D.C. 20008, October 12, 1993
2900 Cathedral Avenue N.W.
Telephone (202) 745-7900
Fax (202) 387-2564

Ref.:

T E L E F A X


Number of pages, incl. cover page : 2

To : Ms. Susan Rice
Director
National Security Council
Fax (202) 395-1199

Subject : David Vogelsanger

Sincerely,

b.o. David Vogelsanger


N. Courtin

DAVID VOGELSANGER

David Vogelsanger was born on September 16, 1954, in Zurich, Switzerland, where he also grew up. He graduated with a degree in history and political science in 1979 from the University of Zurich, from which he received his Ph.D. in 1986.

In 1980 he joined the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross and served as a delegate during the armed conflicts in Chad, Cambodia, Uganda, Angola, Lebanon and Iraq. In 1984-85 he was a consultant on humanitarian matters to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. Trained in the mountain infantry, he also serves as a technical officer on the Swiss Army staff.

David Vogelsanger joined the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in January 1987. He was initially assigned to the department in Bern and then the OECD delegation in Paris. He then returned to Bern, where he was the desk officer in charge of humanitarian affairs from 1989 to 1991 and coordinator for international drug matters from 1991 to 1993.

Since June 1993 he has been the political affairs officer at the Embassy of Switzerland in Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 1993

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

10:21 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm sorry I am a little late, but I just finally got through to Ambassador Oakley, and I wanted to have a chance to speak with him directly for a couple of minutes before I came out here.

I also spoke with Mrs. Durant this morning to congratulate her and to wish her well. Obviously, she is very happy. She has now had an extended conversation with her husband. And he is, as you know, in a U.N. field hospital in Mogadishu. But he will be going to Germany as soon as the doctors say that he can travel. And then, as soon as possible, he'll be back home with his family and his friends.

I welcome his release, and I want to express my deepest thanks to the African leaders who pressed hard for it and to Bob Oakley, the International Red Cross, and to the United Nations, to all who have worked on this for the last several days.

Over the past week, since the United States announced its intention to strengthen our forces in Somalia, as well as to revitalize the diplomatic initiative and send Bob Oakley back, we have seen some hopeful actions -- the release of Michael Durant and the Nigerian peacekeeper, the cessation of attacks on the United States and U.N. peacekeepers. That demonstrates that we are moving in the right direction and that we are making progress.

Our firm position on holding Durant's captors responsible for his well-being and demanding his release, I think, send a strong message that was obviously heard. Now, we have to maintain our commitment to finishing the job we started. It's not our job to rebuild Somalia's society or its political structure. The Somalis have to do that for themselves. And I welcome the help of the African leaders who have expressed their commitment to working with us and with them.

But we have to give them enough time to have a chance to do that, to have a chance not to see the situation revert to the way it was before the United States and the United Nations intervened to prevent the tragedy late last year.

I want to also emphasize that we made no deals to secure the release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. We had strong resolve, we showed that we were willing to support the resumption of the peace process, and we showed that we were determined to protect our soldiers and to react when appropriate by strengthening our position there. I think the policy was plainly right. But there was no deal.

If you have any questions, I'll be glad to try to answer them.

Q Mr. President, there's still a \$25,000 bounty on Mr. Aideed. Would you still like to see Mr. Aideed arrested? Do you

MORE

think that's appropriate? And do you think that the United Nations now should release Mr. Aideed's forces that it's captured recently?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the first question. The United States position is that we have a U.N. resolution which says that there must be some resolution of the unconscionable incident which started this whole thing, which was the murder of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers who were not there in battle, but were simply there, doing the job that we all went there to do -- the humanitarian mission. I think that it's very important to remember that.

It is further our position that we cannot afford to have any police work that we were asked to do as part of the U.N. mission be transformed into a military endeavor that, in effect, made many people believe that there was no longer a diplomatic initiative going on in Somalia. So there still has to be some resolution of that. We have a U.N. resolution, and we ought to pursue it. Now, there may be other ways to do it, and I am open to that.

As far as the release of any people concerned, that will obviously be up to the United Nations. But they have to consider what our obligations are with regard to the murder of the Pakistani peacekeepers. That's what started this whole thing.

Q Mr. President, isn't it pretty clear, though, that he must have -- Aideed must have been given some immunity from arrest, because he talked to reporters? He seems to be pretty available. You don't seem to be laying a glove on him. Have you called off the dogs?

THE PRESIDENT: There was no deal made, I can tell you that. We have taken account of the behavior of others on the ground there, and we will continue to do that. But for the next few days, we have to work through what the resolution will be of the U.N. requirement that got us all into the position we were in last week, which is that we have to have some means of resolving what happened to the Pakistanis, who were clearly not in anybody's combat, were just doing their jobs. And we have to do it.

Q Well, do you hold him responsible?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have to -- he offered, if you remember, an independent commission to look into that. The United Nations asked the United States to attempt to arrest him and to go out of our way not to hurt him while arresting him because he was suspected of being responsible. So if he's willing to have somebody that we can all trust look into that, then that's something I think that Mr. Oakley is certainly willing to entertain over there.

Q Mr. President, despite your success today, there's been a lot of criticism that U.S. foreign policy has been run in naive and somewhat disorganized way. What's your response to that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can tell you first of all, I've had people who were involved in the two previous administrations say that our national security decision-making process was at least as good as the two in the previous ones, perhaps better. Secondly, I think on the things that really -- the biggest issues affecting the future and the security of the United States, we have a good record.

We have done very well with Russia, the most important issue. We have set up a system that did not exist before we came to office to deal with the other republics of the former Soviet Union and to work on nuclear issues and other issues. I think we have done quite well with the Middle East peace process and with its aftermath. I think we have done well to establish the groundwork of a new basis of a relationship with Japan and with Asia generally. We have certainly put nonproliferation on a higher plane than it was there

MORE

before. I think we did very well. We had the most successful -- the United States had the most successful meeting of the G-7 in over a decade. That was clear. The first time in 10 years we were complimented instead of criticized, making real progress there.

So I think that the people who say that because of what happened in Somalia last week have a pretty weak reed to stand on. And in terms of Haiti -- and maybe we can get to that -- there was -- when I took office, what we had was everybody in Haiti thinking about whether they could leave and come to the United States because they thought there was no way that anybody would ever stick up for the democratic process in Haiti; and the fact that two-thirds of the people voted for somebody to lead their country that was then ousted by the old regime. At least we have made an effort to try to change that. And I assure you that my determination there is as strong as ever.

So I think that -- it's easy to second-guess. When you get into something like Somalia, I think anybody who really thought about it at the time the decision was made, I supported it. I think it was the right thing to do. I think we went there for the right motives. But you had to know when we went there that there was -- that, a, that there was no way America was going to get out in January and because there was no political process in place there that could have given the Somalis a chance to survive; and, b, that there was every chance that someone, for their own reasons, at some point during this mission, might kill some peacekeepers, which would complicate the mission.

We are living in a new world. It's easy for people who don't have these responsibilities to use words like "naive" or this or that or the other thing. The truth is, we're living in a new and different world, and we've got to try to chart a course that is the right course for the United States to lead, while avoiding things that we cannot do, or things that impose cost in human and financial terms that are unacceptable for us. But I think that in this new world, we've made a pretty good beginning, and clearly on the things that affect us most.

Q Mr. President, you were very clear last week in saying that you did not want your reaction to events in Somalia to be the wrong signal to the world's thugs and bullies. I wonder, sir, if it occurs to you that the events of Haiti may indicate that that signal was sent anyway?

THE PRESIDENT: No. The problem we had in Haiti with the boat was that we sent 200 Seabees over there who were commissioned specifically to train military officers to do more work to rebuild the country. They were lightly armed, they were not in any way -- they were not peacekeepers or peacemakers.

I would remind you that the Governors Island agreement basically was an agreement among all the major parties in Haiti which clearly set forth the fact that they did not want other countries' forces or a U.N. force coming in there to provide law and order. They wanted French-speaking forces to come in and retrain the police force. They wanted French-speaking Canadians and the United States to come in and retrain the Army to rebuild the country.

So those people were simply not able or ever authorized to pursue any mission other than that. I was not about to put 200 American Seabees into a potentially dangerous situation for which they were neither trained nor armed to deal with at that moment. And I did not want to leave the boat in the harbor so that that became the symbol of the debate. I pulled the boat out of the harbor to emphasize that the Haitian parties themselves who were still there in Haiti are responsible for violating the Governors Island Agreement. We moved immediately to reimpose sanctions to include oil. We are

going to do some more things unilaterally in the next day or two. And I think that we still have a chance to get this done. Because the people who were there who don't want to give up power agreed to the Governors Island Agreement, and we're going to do our best to hold them to it.

Q You don't think that those thugs on the dock there in Haiti were encouraged by the events in Somalia, to try what they tried?

THE PRESIDENT: They may or may not have been, but they're going to be sadly disappointed. I think those people on the docks in Haiti were probably the hired hands of the elites that don't want democracy to come to Haiti. So I don't they had drawn any sophisticated interpretation from world events. But if they did, they ought to look at what else has happened in Somalia. Look at the way we have bolstered our forces. Look at the reports in the newspaper today.

What we've done in Somalia -- let me go back to that -- is consistent with our original mission. We did not go there to prove we could win military battles. No one seriously questions the fact that we could clean out that whole section of Mogadishu at minimum loss to ourselves if that's what we wanted to do.

The reports today say that 300 Somalis were killed and 700 more were wounded in the firefight that cost our people their lives last week. That is not our mission. We did not go there to do that. We cannot let a charge we got under a U.N. resolution to do some police work, which is essentially what it is, to arrest suspects turn into a military mission. But the people in Haiti would be sadly misguided if they think the United States has weakened its resolve to see that democracy -- the expressed will of two-thirds of the people of Haiti.

I noticed Congressman Kennedy on the television this morning saying that President Aristide won an election victory with a higher percentage of the vote than any leader in the Western Hemisphere. And he can't even get into office. We're going to try to change that.

Let me just make one other comment about Haiti. This is very important to me. In addition to President Aristide, there is a government that has been struggling mightily to function in Haiti, headed by Prime Minister Malval, a businessperson, a person who basically did not ask for the responsibilities that he has undertaken. I want to send a clear signal today, too, that the United States is very concerned about his ability to function and his personal safety and the safety of his government. That is very important to us. Malval is key to making this whole thing work. He is recognized as a stabilizing figure, as a person who will work with all sides, as a person who will be fair to everybody. And it would be again a grave error to underestimate the extent to which this country regards him as an important part of the ultimate solution.

Q Mr. President, I'd like to go back to what you said about Aided, because it appears that you've opened the door to leave him a way out this morning, when you said that we have to take into account what others did on the ground there. Do you think there's a possibility that Aided was not directly responsible for the attack on the Pakistani U.N. forces? And do you believe there's also a possibility that Aided could now become part of the political process and indeed may someday become president?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the questions somewhat separately. First of all, to take the second question. What happened over the last several weeks -- and let me back up and say -- I understood why the United States was thought to have the

only capacity to pursue the police function, once the Pakistanis were killed. But keep in mind what that function was. That function was to arrest people suspected of being involved in that, not to be judge and jury, not to say we know exactly what happened, not to find people guilty in advance.

So our young soldiers, at significant risk to themselves, went out of their way to capture people without killing them. As a consequence, however, because of the circumstances, as we all know, several of them lost their lives and hundreds of Somalis who were fighting them, either with weapons or by getting in their way, lost their lives.

Now, that never should have been allowed to supplant -- as I said at the United Nations, before this incident occurred -- that never should have been allowed to supplant the political process that was ongoing when we were in effective control up through last May.

So we had to start the political process again. We have no interest in keeping any clan or subclan or group of Somalis out of the political process affecting the future of their people. The clan structure seems to be the dominant structure in the country. It is not for the United States or for the United Nations to eliminate whole groups of people from having a role in Somalia's future. The Somalis must decide that with the help and guidance, I believe primarily, of the African states and leadership around them, first of all.

Secondly, with regard to the specific incident, what I want to do is to see the U.N. resolution honored. That is, we want to know that there is some effort, honest, unencumbered effort, to investigate what happened to those Pakistanis and to have some resolution of that, consistent with international law. We cannot expect the United Nations to go around the world, whether it's in Cambodia or Somalia, or any of the many other places we're involved in peacekeeping, and have people killed and have no resolution of it.

Aideed, himself, as you know, offered in a letter to President Carter to have a genuinely unbiased commission look into this and have evidence presented to it. The United Nations may choose to take a different course in this, but we should honor the resolution. That is, you asked me a question about Aideed, personally. I can't answer that. I can say that I believe in the strongest terms that the United States should continue to say, if you want us to be involved in peacekeeping, if peacekeepers get murdered doing their job, the way the Pakistanis did, and others, there has to be an effort to look into who did it and to hold those accountable.

If there is another way to do that, that's fine. What I said at the U.N., I will reiterate: The United States, being a police officer in Somalia, was turned into the waging of conflict and a highly personalized battle which undermined the political process. That is what was wrong, and that is what we have attempted to correct in the last few days.

Q Mr. President, your statement reassuring Prime Minister Malval of Haiti about his personal security raises the question, of course: Is there a threat to his personal security, and what happens if something happens to Prime Minister Malval?

THE PRESIDENT: If something happens to him, it would be a very difficult situation for the Haitians. It would make President Aristide's job more difficult, and it would further isolate the military and police authorities there, and the people who are sponsoring them from the international community. I hope that he is not in danger. I do not have any information that he is in imminent danger. He's continuing to function, but if you know how he works

down there, I mean, he has very limited security, he does a lot of work out of his home, he has not constructed a military apparatus around himself. He really is a good citizen serving his country, and he is a necessary part of the glue that would permit President Aristide to go back down there.

Keep in mind, Aristide gave these people amnesty. The truth is, a lot of them never thought he'd do it. I know -- there are people who have criticized Aristide, who say that, you know, maybe he's not really a political person, can't do this. All I know is that in our dealings with him, he has done what he said he would do. And I think they were disoriented by the fact that he issued the amnesty order when they didn't think he would. And I am genuinely concerned that the forces in Haiti -- let me back up and say -- they signed off on the Governors Island agreement because they realized that the sanctions were having a crushing blow on them. And in the end, they and the people who were funding a lot of their activities understood that it was going to cost them more to stay with the present course than to permit this transition to democracy.

And what we're trying to do now -- our policy clearly is to remind them of why they signed off in the first place in the most forceful terms and to make it absolutely clear that no one in the international community is going to walk away from our previous policy toward Haiti if they don't honor their commitments under that agreement.

Q Mr. President, would your experiences this month in Somalia and Haiti make you more cautious about sending American peacekeepers to Bosnia?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, my experiences in Somalia would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command with direct accountability to the United States here.

Now, to be fair, our troops in Somalia were under an American commander. And even though General Bir was the overall commander, it was clear always that General Hoar, here in the United States, was the commanding officer of General Montgomery. But because we got a general charge from the U.N. to try to arrest people suspected of being involved in the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, not every tactical decision had to be cleared here through General Hoar.

What I've made clear all along, the reason I've said that I thought that any Bosnian operation would have to be operated through NATO -- the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is an American general that talks every day to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that works in very clear cooperation with the other NATO forces. They have drilled together. They have trained together. They have trained together. They have worked together. It is a much more coherent military operation. And I would have a far higher level of confidence about not only the safety of our troops, but our ability to deal with that as a NATO operation. It's a whole different issue, Bosnia, but I would have much higher level of confidence there.

With the U.N. -- let me just say, to go back to the U.N. -- I still believe that U.N. peacekeeping is important. And I still believe that America can play a role in that. But when you're talking about resolving longstanding political disputes, the United States as the world's only superpower is no more able to do that for other people than we were 30 years ago, or 20 years ago.

That's why if you go back and look at Somalia, what's going to happen here, and compare it to what the U.N. did in Cambodia, where the U.N. went into Cambodia first of all with this

theory about what they had to do to or with the Khmer Rouge, and then they moved away from any kind of military approach and sent a lot of very brave peacekeepers, none of whom were Americans and some of whom lost their lives -- Japanese and others -- they worked through the politics of Cambodia by, in effect, creating a process in which the local people had to take responsibility for their own future. If we are going to do that kind of work, we ought to take the Cambodian model in Somalia and everywhere else.

Where we have to do peacekeeping, if we're going to do that in a unified command, even if the Americans are always under American forces, we have got to make the kind of changes in the United Nations that I advocated in my speech to the U.N. We have got to have that international peacekeeping apparatus far better organized than it is now. And if you go back to the U.N. speech, it receives little notice because of the momentary and important crises in Somalia and elsewhere. But the reorganization of the peacekeeping apparatus of the U.N. is an urgent mission because keep in mind, the U.N. peacekeepers with no American soldiers there are involved all over the world now, and they have done an awful lot of good work. But we plainly have to reorganize that and strengthen that. Got to go. Thank you.

Q Would you support the blockade in Haiti, President Clinton? Would you support a blockade?

THE PRESIDENT: I support strongly enforcing the sanctions and -- I want to answer that. I support strongly enforcing these sanctions -- strongly. And over the next few days we will be announcing the form in which the sanctions enforcement will take place.

Thank you.

Q Is that a yes or a no?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the word "blockade" is a term of art in international law, which is associated with a declaration of war, so I have to --

Q How about patrols?

THE PRESIDENT: I have to be careful in using that word, but I think that we have to enforce the sanctions.

END

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Edited by
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First Published 1993

ISBN 0-7069-7304-6

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Printed at Ram Printograph, Delhi-110051

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Democracy in Somalia

...We desperately need to invent new institutions at the translational level to which many decisions can be transferred. ...By transferring some decisions 'up' from the nation-state we can only make it possible to act affectively at the level where many of the most explosive problems lie but simultaneously reduce the decision burden on the overloaded centre - the nation-state. Decision division is essential. Pushing decisions up the scale is only half the task. It is also clearly necessary to move a vast amount of decision-making downwards from the centre.

Again the issue is not 'either/or' in character. It is not decentralization versus centralization in any absolute sense. The issue is, rational allocation of decision-making in a system that has overstressed centralization to the point at which new information flows are swamping the central decision-makers.

... It is not possible for a society to decentralize economic activity, communications and many other crucial processes without also, sooner or later, being compelled to decentralize government decision-making as well."

Applicability of these Ideas to Somalia

Luckily many of these features of functional democracy highlighted above in the model of 'Autonomous Democracy' and the concept of 'Semi-direct democracy', are not alien to the traditional Somali ethos. The Somali people have, in fact, been having these very features of democracy for thousands of years. They have for centuries been having traditional governments which did not interfere in the cultural and social set up and functioning of the people. Our nomadic people, who constitute more than half percent of our population, in fact, zealously preserve and guard these centuries-old traditions of democracy.

The Somali character is true to the spirit of this model of 'Autonomous Democracy'. The Somali traditions and history tell us that those rulers or governments which tried to ignore the Somali peoples' urges for democracy, autonomy, participation and upholding the self-respect of the common man, had been pulled down and finished by the proud and democratic Somalis. Therefore, resting on the bed-rock of our national character and ethos, we can, indeed, easily and nobly revive these features for the real salvation of the Somali people.

Let us crystallize some of the crucial matters in this very context. When we agree to implement these ideas of a reformed and really useful form of Democracy in Somalia, we have some very important, novel and meaningful suggestions to put into practice:

1. It is necessary to allow multi-party system in Somalia. All parties must be national in their character, principles and functioning. It will not only be futile but also harmful to allow so many parties which are merely based on petty or narrow tribal, local or regional considerations.

2. We must feel duty bound to enact an Election law soon which should clearly specify the exact procedures for forming political parties and for conducting elections to the National Parliament as well as to the local government and municipalities. This Law should be clearly worded so that it might not be changed, modified or misinterpreted by any one in any circumstance till the elections are peacefully, honestly and most democratically conducted and new Parliament meets.

3. A new Constitution for Somalia incorporating the essential features of 'Autonomous Democracy' highlighted above, should be prepared and passed by the National Parliament as its first priority commitment. Any amendment to any provision of the constitution so formed should be approved by the people, and not just by their representatives in the Parliament, as per the spirit of the concept of 'Semi-direct Democracy'.

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Let it be clarified that neither the Parliament itself nor the President himself should be empowered to make modifications in the Constitution; it should be necessary to ascertain the views of the Somali people through national referendum to bring about any significant changes in the Constitution. This will make all the Somali citizens fully aware of and participative in any vital political matters concerning their destiny. Such a provision in the new Constitution shall nip in the bud any attempt by any future leader or head of the State to become undemocratic or autocratic.

4. There is a need to have constitutional innovation in regard to the formation of the government at the centre. After the fair elections to the Parliament, a truly national government should be formed by inviting members from all the national parties and not just by the members of majority party. However, if any particular party does not wish to join the national government due to any reason, it should be free to do so. The names of members who should be invited by the President to join the national government will be nominated by the Central Committee of each national party in proportion to the number of seats won by it. The Chief of each party would be expected to decide these names in full consultation within the party, among the parties and with the Head of the State, so that all the Somali people may have the satisfaction of having, in fact, participated in the formation of the national government and no party or section of people may be left out with a feeling of alienation, rejection or dejection.

The patriotic opposition forces and the opposition parties backing the recent Civil War in Somalia did not shed their precious blood for any one tribe or political party to become the dominant or majority party and then to run the government of the country and exploit the masses and ignore or harass those who did not support at the national polls.

Therefore, the idea of the formation of National Government inviting members from all the national parties should satisfy all the voters - no matter which particular party one has voted for. This will ensure a really healthy, congenial, stable and very strong government in Somalia, which will be responsible to the total population of the Somali people at all times. This idea will prevent all unnecessary bickerings, controversies, confrontations and coups and counter-coups which are detrimental to the peace, development, modernization and prosperity of the Somali nation.

This innovation is not aimed at suffocating or throttling any voice of dissent raised by any party or person. On all important matters concerning the national interest, any one belonging to any party or anyone despite his being a member of the government would be absolutely free to express his point of view or fair criticism, and the Head of the State, Prime Minister or the government as a whole will not mind his view of dissent. Since all debates in the Parliament and Ministerial meetings would be conducted in the most democratic manner and decisions taken through majority vote and all proceedings will be open to the press, radio, T.V. and spectators from the public, since we propose to do away with Official Secrets Act, only meaningful and constructive criticism can be possible, and the government would strive hard to prove its validity in the national interest. Any irresponsible, cliquish or mean-minded voice of dissent in the national government by any member or party would immediately expose the integrity and intentions of the concerned person to all the millions of Somali citizens at home and to the world at large. Public pressure of the democratically surcharged citizens would keep all the members of the national government sane and sensitive, representative and responsible in the real sense of the term.

If any matter cannot be decided by the government or Parliament convincingly, the President should be duty-bound to refer it to the Somali people at large - to the whole nation through referendum.

Development in Somalia

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5. It is clearly envisaged that regular President will be elected by the national parliament by a majority vote in favour of a candidate out of a number of candidates put up by the different political parties contesting the national elections.

6. After assuming his duties as President, he, in consultation with the chiefs of all the national parties which have won seats in the Parliament, will appoint the Prime Minister. The erstwhile convention of the Civil Democracy during 1960-69 in Somalia should be followed, for it was a very good thing for the unity of the Somali nation: namely, if the President elected is from Southern Somalia, the Prime Minister should be from the northern Somalia, and vice versa, and also the Prime Minister should not be from the same tribe of which the President is a member. This convention should be formalised in the Constitution itself so that it may not be broken by any one in future.

7. The Prime Minister shall consult the Chiefs and Secretaries of the political parties in order to decide two things:

- i) Allocation of the number of ministers who should be nominated by the respective parties in the Ministry;
- ii) Framing of the programme of the new government seeking consensus in consultation with the national parties.

Then the Prime Minister shall submit the list of the ministers of his government to the President for his approval and announcement.

These are the main things; other minute details pertaining to these and other related matters shall be developed by the framers of the new Constitution.

Need of the hour: Political Socialization of the People

What is required, therefore, at this juncture is that all people of Somalia should be subjected to an enlightened, open and healthy political socialization. It is our great national asset that the Somali people - nomads as well urbanites - are very vocal people. They are quick in understanding things and in forming their opinions and expressing them freely through their speech, proverbs, folklore and other media. Being a people in whose veins the blood of democracy has been flowing for thousands of years, they can very well understand and appreciate what sweeping and enlightening changes we plan to bring about in Somalia by adopting the most liberal, ultra - modern and functional model of 'Autonomous Democracy' as highlighted above.

Although the misrule of the over 30 years - 9 years of civil democracy from 1960 to 1969, and then 21 years of unabashed military despotism of Siad Barre followed by three years of civil war have wounded their psyche and self respect and ruined and completely shaken and demoralised them, yet freedom and equality are the two great ideals which the Somali conscience still craves for. We are confident of the support of all our people to re-establish the rule of law, the rule of democracy, the rule of the respect to human life and property and honour, the rule of the best ideals and traditions of the Somali society and culture and our Islamic heritage.

A massive programme of the political socialization of all our people - whether they are living in the villages, towns or cities or moving on their tradition nomadic routes, - whether they are men, women, children, youth, adults or old ones, - whether they are students, teachers workers, farmers, government servants, military men, businessmen, politicians or others, is the first and the foremost necessity, and we have to start it right now. The spark of democracy has to be unleashed right now, so that all the people now may seriously start realising what they have to do in this new era of peace and revival of healthy democracy in Somalia. Our people have now to understand and realise very seriously that:

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATEUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 12/09/16

2612-0659-F

SEP 31. P7:21

B

S/S #

106128

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 7FROM: DAVID SHINN AE/E 79742 5240
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Talking Pts for Sec Christopher +
Boutros Ghali

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NISC</u>	<u>Mr Richard Clarke</u>	<u>395-1492</u>	<u>302</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
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FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐REMARKS: TALKING Pts - AUSURGENT - DELIVER IMMEDIATELYS/S Officer: Hayden

~~SECRET~~

To: NSC - Richard Clarke
JCS - Skip Bowman
OSD - Jim Woods
S/P - Lionel Johnson
IO - John Brims
PM - Ted McNamara

October 1, 1993

From: AF/E - David Shinn

Subj: Clearance of Talking Points for Christopher-Boutros
Ghali Telephone Conversation on October 2

Attached are draft talking points for the proposed telephone call from Secretary Christopher to Secretary General Boutros Ghali responding to Boutros' letter of September 25 and the U.N. "Programme of Action." We will follow up the phone call with a letter from the Secretary to Boutros Ghali. As the telephone call may take place as soon as Saturday morning, we need a clearance by opening of business on Saturday.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA Date 12/09/16
2012-0659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	George Moose to the Secretary of State, re: Telephone Call to Boutros-Ghali on Somalia (3 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4109

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003b. talking points	Talking Points (2 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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Clinton Presidential Records
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ANNEX I

PROGRAMME OF ACTION

- 1. On 23 September the Secretary-General met with the World Bank to discuss Somalia's reconstruction.**
- 2. The Secretary-General will travel to the region in the middle of October.**
- 3. A meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Horn of Africa States, prior to Heads of State meeting; possibly in New York or Addis Ababa.**
- 4. A meeting of Horn of Africa States is being contemplated (at the head of State level) for 22-23 October in Addis Ababa. The Secretary-General will participate.**
- 5. On 22 October there will be an informal Meeting of the Somali Donors convened by the World Bank in Paris.**
- 6. A Humanitarian Conference on Relief and Rehabilitation for Somalia has been tentatively scheduled for 2-4 November in Addis Ababa.**
- 7. Efforts are being made to accelerate steps to establish an interim civil authority in Somalia. This is being pursued by Admiral Howe and Ambassador Kouyate on the ground.**
- 8. Good progress is being made on the establishment of the Somali National Police, as well as the reactivation of judicial and penal systems.**

THE WHITE HOUSE**Office of the Press Secretary****For Immediate Release****October 7, 1993****LIST OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
ATTENDING MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON SOMALIA**

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The following members of Congress are scheduled to meet at 9 A.M. this morning in the Roosevelt Room with the President, the Vice President, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher regarding U.S. policy in Somalia:

Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (ME)

Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (KS)

Sen. Robert Byrd (WV)

Sen. Wendell Ford (KY)

Sen. Alan Simpson (WY)

Sen. Sam Nunn (GA)

Sen. Strom Thurmond (SC)

Sen. Dennis DeConcini (AZ)

Sen. John Warner (VA)

Sen. Paul Simon (IL)

Sen. James Jeffords (VT)

Sen. Claiborne Pell (RI)

Sen. Mark Hatfield (OR)

Sen. Daniel Inouye (HI)

Sen. Ted Stevens (AK)

Sen. Patrick Leahy (VT)

Sen. Mitch McConnell (KY)

House Speaker Thomas Foley (WA)

Rep. Richard Gephardt (MO)

House Minority Leader Robert Michel (IL)

Rep. David Bonior (MI)

Rep. Newt Gingrich (GA)

Rep. Ron Dellums (CA)

Rep. Floyd Spence (SC)

Rep. Dan Glickman (KS)

Rep. Larry Combest (TX)

Rep. Lee Hamilton (IN)

Rep. Ben Gilman (NY)

Rep. John Murtha (PA)

Rep. Joseph McDade (PA)

Rep. David Obey (WI)

Rep. Bob Livingston (LA)

Rep. Harry Johnston (FL)

Rep. Dan Burton (IN)

-30-30-30-

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Talking Points on Somalia for Congressional Calls

- As you know, the President met with the Congressional leadership today and outlined steps the U.S. is taking in the wake of the events of the last few days in Somalia.
- The President, at the outset said that we cannot walk away from this job before it's done right, that we have people all over the world doing important tasks in dangerous places, and we cannot allow potential enemies to think that they can get us to change our policies simply by attacking our people.
- Our mission in Somalia is the same today as it was when we went to Somalia 10 months ago: to help establish a secure environment in which the UN and relief workers could alleviate famine and anarchy and in which a political solution could be created to give the Somalis a reasonable chance to prevent a return to the conditions that led us to intercede.
- In most of Somalia, we have achieved that mission, but there is one area of Mogadishu where some elements have engaged in a violent attempt to prevent us from completing that mission.
- Our commitment is not open ended but we must do our best to finish our mission before we leave. And we must assure we have the right forces to keep our troops safe while we accomplish this mission.
- To assure that our people in Somalia are protected, the President is sending 1700 additional Army combat personnel with 104 armored vehicles to Somalia and 2 Marine Amphibious Groups (3600 combat Marines) and the aircraft carrier Lincoln to stand by off-shore.
- We have also sent messages through a variety of channels to those who may be holding American soldiers, making clear that they will be held accountable for the well being of any Americans they are holding.
- To help accelerate efforts to achieve a political solution, the President is sending Ambassador Bob Oakley, who has ably served two Administrations, to Somalia.
- Finally, all of our forces, with the possible exception of some support personnel, will be out of Somalia not later than March 31, 1994.
- The President will be speaking to the American people later today about our involvement in Somalia.

UNITED
NATIONS

Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/25389
6 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

837(1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993) of 25 March 1993

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 June 1993,

Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal attacks,

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the people of Somalia in re-establishing conditions of normal life,

Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in order to help the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries due to years of civil strife in that country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including movements and factions,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

S/25493

English

Page 2

Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,

Recalling the statement made by its President on 31 March 1993 (S/25493) concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife and committed to consider promptly measures appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions,

Taking note of the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-General on 6 June 1993,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);
2. Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;
3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993, and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;
4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25169, annex III);
5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;
6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to enquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;

S/25002

English

Page 3

7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 26,000 men, all ranks, as well as equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report (S/25354);

8. Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its mandate;

9. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its adoption;

10. Resides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

2

S/RES/794 (1992)
3 December 1992

RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th meeting,
on 3 December 1992

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992,

Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response,

Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Noting the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Organisation of African Unity, and in particular the proposal made by its Chairman at the forty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly for the organization of an international conference on Somalia, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other regional agencies and arrangements to promote reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to address the humanitarian needs of the people of that country,

Commending the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organisations and of non-governmental organizations and of States to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

3

Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including reports of violence and threats of violence against personnel participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief consignments and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities; and impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population,

Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing in humanitarian relief supplies, and attacks on the Pakistani UNOSOM contingent in Mogadishu,

Taking note with appreciation of the letters of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1992 (S/24859) and of 29 November 1992 (S/24868),

Sharing the Secretary-General's assessment that the situation in Somalia is intolerable and that it has become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia, and that UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the tragedy in Somalia,

Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992),

Noting the offer by Member States aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible,

Determined further to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote these objectives,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country,

1. Reaffirms its demand that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities, maintain a cease-fire throughout the country, and cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below in order to promote the process of relief distribution, reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

/...

④

2. Demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organisations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia;

3. Also demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorisation given in paragraph 10 below;

4. Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law including from actions such as those described above;

5. Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

6. Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests him to keep the Council informed and to make such recommendations as may be appropriate for the fulfilment of its mandate where conditions permit;

7. Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;

8. Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment;

9. Welcomes also offers by other Member States to participate in that operation;

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;

(5)

11. Calls on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with paragraph 10 above and requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to the States or operations concerned;

12. Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above;

13. Requests the Secretary-General and the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces;

14. Decides to appoint an ad hoc commission composed of members of the Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution;

15. Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the Field Headquarters of the unified command;

16. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, calls upon States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

17. Requests all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions;

18. Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;

20. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

EDIT

TALKING POINTS FOR SENATOR MITCHELL

-- THE UNOSOM MISSION HAS LARGELY BEEN SUCCESSFUL ON THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE. HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL TRACK HAS DRAGGED A BIT. THE ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO MOVE THE PROCESS IN THIS DIRECTION.

-- BOTH THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS AGREE THAT IT IS TIME TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS TO PASS RESPONSIBILITY BACK TO THE SOMALI PEOPLE. THE UN IS IN SOMALIA TO PROVIDE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY, AND CANNOT STAY IN SOMALIA FOREVER.

-- THE SOMALI PEOPLE MUST BEGIN TO STEP FORWARD AND ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNING SOMALIA AGAIN. WE WILL BE THERE TO HELP THEM, BUT THEY MUST STEP FORWARD.

-- THE USG MUST MOVE TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT ENSURES THAT SOMALIA DOESN'T SLIP BACK INTO CHAOS THE MOMENT THAT THE UN WITHDRAWS.

-- THE UN IS WORKING TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY SUPPORTS THIS GOAL.

-- THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS CLEARLY COMMITTED TO REINVIGORATING POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN SOMALIA AND HAS PRESSED THE UN TO PURSUE THE POLITICAL PROCESS MORE AGGRESSIVELY

-- THE UN HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED 30 REGIONAL AND DISTRICT COUNCILS AND WILL SOON HAVE 60 FORMED. THE UN HAS ALSO HELD TWO POLITICAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCES AND IS TRYING TO PROMOTE A THIRD. THE ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY SUPPORTS THIS IDEA.

-- LETS NOT FORGET THAT ^{4.8}85% OF SOMALIA HAS RETURNED TO VIRTUAL NORMALCY AND THAT THERE ~~IS~~ ONLY PROBLEMS IN SOUTH MOGADISHU. ALSO KEEP IN MIND THAT STARVATION HAS VIRTUALLY BEEN ELIMINATED AND THE CIVIL WAR THAT RAVAGED THE COUNTRY HAS ALL BUT STOPPED.

-- THE US AND UN HAVE ACHIEVED A GREAT DEAL IN SOMALIA. THOUSANDS OF SOMALIS ARE ALIVE TODAY BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

-- IF WE WERE TO LEAVE NOW, THE UN OPERATION WOULD COLLAPSE. ANARCHY AND FAMINE WOULD RETURN.

-- US FORCES CAN AND SHOULD BE DRAWN DOWN AS THE POLITICAL PROCESS MOVES AHEAD, SECURITY IMPROVES, POLICE ARE CREATED, AND OTHER TROOPS ARRIVE.

-- BUT THE US CAN NOT ABANDON THE UN, OUR COALITION PARTNERS FROM 24 COUNTRIES, OR THE SOMALI PEOPLE.

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004a. cable	Re: [India-UN/UNOSOM II] (3 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)
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004b. cable	Re: [Terrorism] (2 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: LAKE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 29 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
UN

DEFENSE POLICY
MEDIA

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS

HOAGLAND, JIM

SUBJECT: PRES QUESTIONS ON ARTICLE FM WASHINGTON POST / DEAD OR ALIVE IN
SOMALIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 04 OCT 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
CLARKE

FOR CONCURRENCE
BEERS
BELL
HAHN
RICE
STEINBERG
WARD

FOR INFO
INDYK

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

Boy - I like him but doesn't
say how B-Gave the
US could do it - How does
the think they could?

TODAY I LIKE THIS BUT DON'T SAY THAT'S THE WAY
WE COULD DO IT - HOW DOES
THINK THEY COULD?

STAFFING

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WASHINGTON POST

Jim Hoagland

Dead or Alive in Somalia

NEW YORK—When American citizen Ion Perdicaris was kidnapped by Berber chieftain Raisuli in Morocco, Theodore Roosevelt dispatched this message: Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead. The American was promptly released.

It is impossible to imagine Bill Clinton being either that terse or that categorical. Nor could he afford to be. Today, Raisuli might lob a chemical warhead at a rescue party. He would certainly have in his arsenal recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenades powerful enough to stop U.S. tanks and helicopters, as Somalia's Mohamed Farah Aideded does.

Because the United States and the Soviet Union foolishly showed high-tech weaponry on bloody-thirsty regimes and bandit groups posing as ideological adversaries throughout the Cold War, no American president can now be as succinct and as immediately successful as TR was in 1904.

Aideded's challenge to American forces operating in Somalia is more than an outrage. It is a sign of the times.

Aideded forces have blown up four U.S. soldiers with mines and over the weekend killed three others by shoot-

"Aideded is a thoroughly rotten villain but not a terribly important one for the world's only superpower."

ing down their helicopter in Mogadishu. Total fatalities in the U.N. force the Americans serve with have reached 56 since June.

Clinton administration strategists underestimated how much things have changed, along with Aideded's determination and the sophistication of his band's weaponry. Aideded came out shooting rather than accepting ultimatums to cooperate in a political redesign for Somalia that would eliminate his power. He has also ignored demands that he surrender to be tried for his crimes. No Raisuli he.

What began 10 months ago as a benign effort by 28,000 American soldiers to feed starving children has mushroomed into a small war between Aideded and United Nations peacekeepers, who rely on American firepower for their offensive capability.

Each new atrocity makes it more

difficult for the Clinton administration to extricate the remaining 5,000 U.S. soldiers from Somalia as promised, even as the new deaths create public pressure on Clinton to withdraw. As U.S. casualties mount, Pentagon and other officials grimly say we cannot cut and run and leave Aideded unopposed.

Most of us can share that sentiment. America's deed should be avenged, for moral and practical reasons. America's future support for multinational peace missions—including in Bosnia—will be dramatically undermined if local warlords can knock off GIs with impunity.

That reality should lead Clinton to switch tracks now. Instead of dispatching Rangers and other special forces to hunt down Aideded, which deepens U.S. involvement and risks even more casualties, U.S. policy makers should reflect on the Perdicaris-Raisuli history.

Aideded is a thoroughly rotten villain

but not a terribly important one for the world's only superpower. The American attention he gets builds him, or his successor within his clan army, into a national symbol of resistance. It turns him into a tool for more important anti-American forces like Iran or Sudan, ever alert for new opportunities to pull Uncle Sam's beard.

It is time to shrink and clarify America's goals in Somalia, which cannot serve as a model for democracy in Africa without a massive U.S. commitment, one that Clinton is in no position to make. This fight should no longer be cast as a U.S. vendetta against one Somali warlord.

Although the Perdicaris-Raisuli story has been often told, a key detail is usually omitted. Roosevelt did not send his verbal thunderbolt to the bandit. He sent it to the sultan of Morocco. It was up to the sultan to deliver one alive American or one dead bandit. The sultan got Raisuli to back off.

The closest thing to a sultan for Somalia is U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who pushed for the expansion of the mission from humanitarian relief to political reconstruc-

tion when the United Nations took over from American commanders in March.

U.S. troops (and U.S. civilian officials working for Boutros-Ghali) should take themselves off the Aideded hunt. This would prove that Washington's protestations that this is not a U.S.-Aideded battle are genuine. It would also force the United Nations, which has been willing to let the United States carry the burden of opposing Aideded almost since he pulled up or shut up.

Will Boutros-Ghali and the political leaders and military contingents of the other U.N. members in Somalia then commit the resources needed to bring Aideded to justice? If the answer is no, the United States should understand what that says about the United Nations' weakness compared with its ambitious goals. America then should cease its participation in the Somali operation.

Clinton's speech to the General Assembly yesterday failed to reflect America's growing misgivings about Somalia. While it would not have the ring of TR's one-liner, there is a brief ultimatum that Clinton should deliver: The United Nations must do more to bring Aideded to justice or its hopes for greater American help in peace-keeping will wind up dead.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1993 THE WASHINGTON POST

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05570

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. note	Note from Sean Darragh to Richard Clarke (1 page)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4109

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	US Force Presence Options (4 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AF/E, AF/RA, AF/EP

F A X C O V E R S H E E T

DATE: ~~Sept 30~~ Oct 1 93 Page 1 of 6TO: Sean DarraghOFFICE: NSCPHONE: 395 1492 FAX 395 1199FROM: Ted AndrewsOFFICE: AF/EPHONE: 647 9742 / 6453 (direct)SUBJECT: UN Res 865 on Somalia

COMMENTS: _____

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

UNITED
NATIONS

S



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/26476
21 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

~~Resolution~~ Resolution 365 (1993)The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 753 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26317) of 17 August 1993,

Stressing the importance of continuing the peace process initiated by the Addis Ababa agreement and in this connection welcoming the efforts of African countries, the Organization of African Unity, in particular its Horn of Africa Standing Committee, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in cooperation with and in support of the United Nations, to promote national reconciliation in Somalia,

Stressing the commitment of the international community to help Somalia regain a normal, peaceful life, while recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Expressing its appreciation for the improvements in the overall situation, which have been achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), in particular, eradication of starvation, establishment of a large number of district councils, opening of schools and resumption by the Somali people in most areas of the country of their normal lives,

Recognizing the continuing need for broadbased consultations and consensus on basic principles to achieve national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions,

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PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

S/26476
English
Page 2

Calling upon all Somali parties, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve reconciliation, peace and security,

Recognizing that the highest priority for UNOSOM II is to assist the people of Somalia in the furtherance of the national reconciliation process and to promote and advance the re-establishment of regional and national institutions and civil administration in the entire country, as set out in resolution 814 (1993),

Noting with great concern, despite the improvements in the overall situation in Somalia, continuing reports of violence in Moyadishu and the absence of law enforcement and judicial authorities and institutions in the country as a whole, and regalling the request to the Secretary-General in resolution 814 (1993) to assist in the re-establishment of the Somali police and the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order,

Convinced that the re-establishment of the Somali police, and judicial and penal systems, is critical for the restoration of security and stability in the country,

Gravely concerned at the continuation of armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II, and recalling its resolution 814 (1993) which emphasized the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

A

1. Welcomes the reports by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in resolution 814 (1993);
2. Commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and all the personnel of UNOSOM II, for their achievements in greatly improving the conditions of the Somali people and beginning the process of nation-building apparent in the restoration in much of the country of stable and secure conditions in stark contrast with the prior suffering caused by inter-clan conflict;
3. Condemns all attacks on UNOSOM II personnel and reaffirms that those who have committed or have ordered the commission of such criminal acts will be held individually responsible for them;
4. Affirms the importance it attaches to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995;

/...

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

S/26476
English
Page 3

5. Requests, in that context, the Secretary-General to direct the urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities and to report thereon to the Council as soon as possible;

6. Urges the Secretary-General to re-double his efforts at the local, regional and national levels, including encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to continue the process of national reconciliation and political settlement, and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy;

7. Calls on all Member States to assist, in all ways possible, including the urgent full staffing of UNOSOM II civil positions, the Secretary-General, in conjunction with regional organizations, in his efforts to reconcile the parties and rebuild Somali political institutions;

8. Invites the Secretary-General to consult the countries of the region and regional organizations concerned on means of further reinvigorating the reconciliation process;

B

9. Approves the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in annex I to his report of 17 August 1993 (S/26317) relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems in accordance with resolution 814 (1993) and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps on an urgent and accelerated basis to implement them;

10. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to convene at the earliest possible date a meeting of Member States interested in supporting UNOSOM II in the re-establishment of the police, judicial and penal systems, for the purpose of determining specific requirements and identifying specific sources of support;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General to undertake actively and as a matter of great urgency an international recruiting programme for staffing the UNOSOM II Justice Division with police, judicial and penal system specialists;

12. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to maintain the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) and maintained in resolution 814 (1993) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems in addition to the establishment of the Somali police, other than for the cost of international staff;

13. Urges Member States, on an urgent basis, to contribute to that fund or otherwise to provide assistance for the re-establishment of the Somali

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

S/26476
English
Page 4

police, judicial and penal systems, including personnel, financial support, equipment and training to help attain the objectives outlined in annex I to the Secretary-General's report (S/26317);

14. Encourages the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure continuation of the current police, judicial and penal programme from October to the end of December 1993 until additional funding from Member States is forthcoming, and to make recommendations as appropriate to the General Assembly;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council fully informed on a regular basis on the implementation of this resolution;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Resolutions on Somalia:

733, January 23, 1992²: Undertakes humanitarian assistance, urges political reconciliation and establishes arms embargo.

746, March 17, 1992: Focusses on humanitarian relief.

751, April 24, 1992: Establishes UNOSOM with 50 observers and a security force, and endorses a Special Representative of the Secretary General. Establishes a sanctions committee to monitor the arms embargo. Urges further humanitarian assistance.

767, July 27, 1992: Authorizes "other measures", in the absence of cooperation, for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

775, August 28, 1992: Authorizes increases in UNOSOM strength (to 3,500) and in airlift operations.

794, December 3, 1992: Welcomes the US operation (UNITAF), under Chapter 7, to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. Calls on other states to provide forces for the operation. Establishes Somalia trust fund.

814, March 26, 1993: Establishes UNOSOM II, with a mandate through October 31, 1993. Emphasizes the role of the UN in Somalia to reestablish law and order, assist in providing humanitarian aid, and promote political reconciliation. Requests the Secretary General to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia. Holds individuals responsible for breaches of international humanitarian law.

837, June 6, 1993: Condemns the June 5 attack on UNOSOM. Reemphasizes the importance of the early disarmament of all Somali parties. Reaffirms that the Secretary General has authority to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the June 5 attack, including arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment.

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Summaries for
Sandy.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	Re: [United Nations Operations in Somalia] (3 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Darragh, Sean)
OA/Box Number: 274

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): New Somalia Stuff [2]

2012-0659-F
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008. cable	Re: Conference of Elders (3 pages)	10/01/1993	P1/b(1)

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009. list	Taskers that are pending (1 page)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**Bureau for Africa****Office of the Deputy Assistant Administrator****(AFR/DAA)****FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET**

TO: Sean Darragh**OFFICE: NSC****VOICE: FAX: 202-395-1199**

FROM: Richard A. Cobb**VOICE: 202-647-9244****FAX: 202-647-7621**

Total pages including cover sheet:**COMMENTS:****HERE IS AN UP-DATE ON THE STATUS OF AID ACTIONS RE SOMALIA...**

Rahle
8/31/93

**SOMALIA DEPUTIES COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP
STATUS OF A.I.D. ACTIONS**

Re-establishment of the Judicial System

Grant of \$6 Million to UNOSOM - A.I.D. is working with State to draft necessary documentation. We expect to have the complete package drafted by the end of the week.

Announcement of U.S. Contribution - A cable was sent on August 28 to UN/NY and donor countries announcing the U.S. contribution of \$6 million.

Secondments to UNOSOM - To better plan and manage support to the judicial system, we are working to identify experts who could be seconded to UNOSOM's judicial division. This is part of a broader effort to identify qualified personnel to staff vacant positions in UNOSOM.

Presidential Waiver

The waiver package is being drafted. We expect to have it ready for clearances by this Friday.

Flexible Funds Available for Regional Allocation

We will be working with UNOSOM over the next few weeks to define needs, priorities and donor mechanisms to provide a flexible source of funds which can be programmed at the regional level. One readily available source for these funds is local currency generated by the on-going monetization of U.S. donated food. These funds already are being used to support small, labor intensive activities which are implemented largely by indigenous groups. We are shifting increased responsibility for programming these funds to the regions.

Longer-Term Planning

- Donors agreed on July 9, 1993, on a collaborative effort to plan for the recovery of Somalia;
- World Bank was charged with responsibility for coordinating preparation of a planning framework under the UNOSOM umbrella;
- This planning effort is to ensure that needs are prioritized and resources coordinated.

- The fundamental objective is to support the process of political reconciliation and economic recovery;
- Several donor organizations expressed an interest in developing particular parts of the longer term plan;
- For example, A.I.D. is taking lead on financial markets and food security; UNICEF on health; Germany's aid organization, on water supply and sanitation; the World Bank is doing the overall macroeconomic framework;
- Emphasis will be given in the planning document to regions such as Lower Shabelle, Northeast, Hiran and Bay;
- Detailed outlines of all the parts of the planning document are due at World Bank by September 15, 1993;
- A.I.D. is urging World Bank to hold an informal meeting of participating donor countries in the next three to four weeks to review the detailed outline and resolve issues;
- A formal meeting of donors will be held October 22, 1993, to review the preliminary conclusions, priorities and gaps in the planning framework and to discuss implementation and funding of reconstruction activities;
- The detailed plan with funding requirements is to be completed in December 1993;
- The British Overseas Development Authority has seconded Catrina Laing as head of the planning unit in the UNOSOM Humanitarian Division in Mogadishu. Ms. Laing will interface with the World Bank on the longer term planning effort. AID field staff are working with UNOSOM and UNDP to identify staff for the planning unit and other offices of the Humanitarian Division.

Susan
F-11



The Ambassador

This may involve

Chauli's
F-11

Embassy of Italy
Washington

September 22, 1993

Dear Jennone,

As per our telephone conversation of today, it is my pleasure to convey an unofficial translation of the memorandum from Italian Prime Minister Ciampi concerning Somalia and a renewed political initiative in that country.

With the sentiments of my highest regard.

Yours truly

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Boris Biancheri".

Boris Biancheri

Jennone R. Walker
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for European Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20506

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010. memo	Translation of Memo from Italian Prime Minister Ciampi (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.