

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Latvia: Skrunda

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Norland, Richard

Original OA/ID Number:

2630

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
33	5	10	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Guntis Ulmanis, President of Latvia, to President Clinton [2 copies] (4 pages)	09/04/1998	P1/b(+) VZ 9/21/2023
002. report	Re: [Skrunda] (8 pages)	03/11/1998	P1/b(1)
003. notes	Handwritten notes (1 page)	ea. 1998	P1/b(+) VZ 9/21/2023
004a. email	Stephen Flanagan to William Courtney, et al., re: [Skrunda] (1 page)	02/04/1998	P1/b(1)
004b. cable	Re: [Report] (2 pages)	02/01/1998	P1/b(1)
004c. cable	Re: [Skrunda] (2 pages)	12/08/1997	P1/b(1)
005. report	Re: Nuclear Security and Proliferation [Atomic Energy Act] (4 pages)	09/26/1997	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
006. report	Re: [Missile Warning] (7 pages)	09/21/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Skrunda

2011-1037-F

ke2194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Latvijas Valsts prezidents

Riga, September 4, 1998

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

Mr. President,

Although we signed documents to formalize a partnership between Latvia and the United States in January of this year, our working partnership as presidents of our respective countries began many years earlier. It is my distinct pleasure to report to you the successful completion of one very important undertaking that was launched by our partnership in 1994.

The phased-array radar station in Skrunda, Latvia, was switched off on August 31st at 12:03 PM local time. The phase of dismantling will begin this week.

I am writing to you, Mr. President, to thank you for the critical role you played in bringing us to this historical moment. Thanks to your efforts, and those of our U.S. officials and experts, 1994 marked the culmination of talks between Latvia and Russia which led to the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces from Latvian territory.

The agreement on Skrunda was one of the most difficult compromises reached in the process of talks concerning troop withdrawal. Even at the time when the forces of the former Soviet Union were departing from many Eastern European countries, Latvia had to reach a decision to preserve a Russian Federation military facility on its soil.

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In this case, your support, as well as that of European statesmen and experts played a crucial role in arriving at a solution. Financial support from the United States, Sweden, and Finland made it possible to achieve a "full" withdrawal and to begin the process of cleaning up and reclaiming the land which had been part of the former military bases. We are particularly grateful to the United States for your generous assistance which brought about the dismantling of a major part of the Skrunda facility in 1994. On August 31, the last phase of this dismantlment project went into effect.

Latvian and Russian cooperation in accordance with *The Agreement on the Skrunda Phased Array Radar Station Legal Status and Temporary Functioning and Period of Dismantlement* is evidence that, in the context of a complex issue, a positive result is yielded when agreements are followed precisely.


In closing, I would like to underline the contribution of the OSCE and its member states, which were involved in fulfillment of the agreement and ensuring the inspection procedures, which in themselves were an essential part of the eventual realization of objectives.

Mr. President, please accept my deep gratitude for what you have done to help Russia and Latvia fulfill an agreement which is important for the stability of Europe and for the existence of cooperative relations in the Baltic Sea region. Throughout your term in office you have been a true friend of the Latvian people. Your friendship, leadership and vision has meant a great deal to our country, and continues to bring us important dividends.

Respectfully yours

Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Guntis Ulmanis", written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned to the right of the typed name and title.



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President of the Republic of Latvia

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EMBASSY OF LATVIA
4325 17th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20011
Tel. 202-726-8213 FAX: 202-726-6785

PRESS RELEASE
August 31st, 1998

Latvia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued the following press release on the Fulfilment of the Conditions of the "Agreement Between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation on the Legal Status of the Skrunda Radio-location Station During Its Temporary Functioning and Dismantling."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia considers the Agreement, signed April 30, 1994 between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation referring to the temporary functioning of the Skrunda Radio-location Station (RLS) in the territory of the Republic of Latvia to be a laborious compromise reached during the negotiations on "Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Latvia".

The signing of the Agreement was a political decision, providing four more years of functioning for Skrunda RLS, where Latvia has expressed its strong desire and support to establish constructive and stable neighbourly relations with the Russian Federation.

Latvia considers this particular Agreement and the other agreements signed in 1994, as a significant and historical period in the relationship between Latvia and Russia, facilitating stability and security in the Baltic Sea region and Europe.

Latvia highly appreciates the constructive manner of the Russian side, as well as the positive cooperation experience of the two states in fulfilling the conditions of the politically significant Agreement, and supports the standpoint which facilitates mutual confidence.

Latvia is obliged to the donor states, the United States and Sweden in particular, international society and organisations for the enormous investment they have contributed while signing the Agreement and during its further fulfilment.

Latvia welcomes OSCE assistance in the fulfilment of the Agreement, including regular inspections, and considers them fundamental in the exact fulfilment of the obligations. On September 3 - 4, 1998 the OSCE inspection is to reaffirm the fact of switching off the Skrunda RLS.

Latvia expresses its confidence that the further fulfilment of the Agreement will be successful and precise, and that the dismantling of Skrunda RLS will secure new challenges for Latvian and Russian cooperation, furthermore becoming a significant issue for all member states of the OSCE.

Flanagan, Stephen J.

From: WHSR
Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 1998 10:18 AM
To: Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Witkowsky, Anne A.
Subject: SKRUNDA RADAR STATION QUIETLY SHUTS DOWN

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 011002Z SEP 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2157
ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA
PREC: PRIORITY
SSN: 2431
TOR: 980901101605 M3447524

////////////////////// DUPLICATE SECTION ////////////////////////

UNCLAS RIGA 002431

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THE WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC FLANAGAN

E.?N. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MARR, OSCE, RS, US, LG
SUBJECT: SKRUNDA RADAR STATION QUIETLY SHUTS DOWN

1. WITH LITTLE FANFARE OR CEREMONY, MISSILE-TRACKING OPERATIONS AT THE SKRUNDA RADAR STATION SHUT DOWN AS SCHEDULED ON AUGUST 31. ACCORDING TO OSCE SKRUNDA REPRESENTATIVE COLONEL JURGEN HUBSCHEN, THE LONG-AWAITED MOMENT PROVED ANTI-CLIMACTIC: AT 12:03 P.M., IN THE PRESENCE OF LATVIAN MFA REPRESENTATIVE EDGARS SKUJA, HUBSCHEN HIMSELF, AND A RUSSIAN MILITARY DELEGATION HEADED BY GENERAL ALEKSANDR KOZLOV REPRESENTING THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF, BASE COMMANDER NIKITIN THREW A SWITCH TURNING OFF THE BASE'S RADAR OPERATIONS. THE EVENT, HUBSCHEN COMMENTED, HAD ALL THE DRAMA OF "FLICKING OFF A LIGHT BULB." ACCORDING TO LATVIAN MFA COUNSELOR MARK DAYTON, WHO WAS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BIRKAVS AT A LATVIAN MONITORING STATION OUTSIDE THE BASE WHEN THE SHUTDOWN OCCURRED, "ONE MINUTE, THE SCREEN WAS FILLED WITH ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS; THE NEXT MINUTE, IT WAS BLANK."

2. THE LACK OF DRAMATICS NOTWITHSTANDING, LATVIAN OFFICIALS GREETED THE SHUTDOWN WITH A MIXTURE OF SATISFACTION AND RELIEF. IN A BRIEF STATEMENT, PRESIDENT ULMANIS PRAISED THE RUSSIANS FOR FULFILLING THE TERMS OF THE 1994 AGREEMENT TO CLOSE THE BASE. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SHUTDOWN, BIRKAVS TERMED AUGUST 31 "THE END OF WORLD WAR II" FOR LATVIA AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT "A NEW STAGE" IN LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS WOULD NOW BEGIN. HE LATER RELEASED A PRESS STATEMENT IN WHICH HE CREDITED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION - THE U.S., SWEDEN, THE OSCE, IN ADDITION TO LATVIA AND RUSSIA - FOR BRINGING ABOUT THE SUCCESSFUL RESULT. (SEE FULL TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 5.) NEITHER KOZLOV NOR THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION TOOK QUESTIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE. (FOR UNEXPLAINED REASONS, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR UDALTSOV AT THE LAST MINUTE CANCELLED PLANS TO ATTEND THE SHUTDOWN.

(#) OF THE EVENT IN BOTH THE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA WAS ON THE WHOLE STRAIGHTFORWARD, FACTUAL, AND DEVOID OF EDITORIAL COMMENT. THE ONLY SOUR NOTE WAS SOUNDED BY THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE PAPER ASM, WHICH CALLED THE CLOSING "A SAD DAY FOR RUSSIA."

3. WITH THE SWITCH OFF COMPLETE, ATTENTION (#) SEPTEMBER 3-4 VISIT OF AN OSCE INSPECTION TEAM, WHICH WILL OFFICIALLY CONFIRM THAT THE BASE HAS CEASED OPERATING. THE RUSSIAN MILITARY WILL THEN HAVE EIGHTEEN MONTHS, UNTIL FEBRUARY 2000, TO DISMANTLE THE FACILITY. DURING THIS PERIOD, THEY ARE TO DRAWDOWN PERSONNEL TO A SMALL GROUP OF EXPERTS, WHO WILL OVERSEE THE DISMANTLEMENT, AND TO WITHDRAW OR DISPOSE OF UNNEEDED EQUIPMENT. A LATVIAN-RUSSIAN JOINT VENTURE CONSTRUCTION FIRM WILL CARRY OUT THE ACTUAL WORK OF DEMOLITION.

4. COMMENT: THE LATVIANS' SENSE OF RELIEF AT SKRUNDA'S CLOSURE IS PALPABLE. IN VIEW OF THE CHILLY RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW AT PRESENT, THEY REMAINED UNCERTAIN UNTIL THE VERY LAST MOMENT AS TO WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD ADHERE TO THE SCHEDULE CONTAINED IN THE 1994 AGREEMENT OR APPEAL FOR A LAST MINUTE DELAY. ANY POSTPONEMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE CAUSED MAJOR POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES HERE. WITH THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN FULL SWING, AND NATIONALIST FEELING RUNNING HIGH WITH THE REFERENDUM ON CITIZENSHIP LOOMING, NEITHER THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT NOR ANY VIABLE POLITICAL PARTY COULD HAVE AGREED TO KEEPING THE BASE OPEN AND SURVIVED. THE FACT THAT THE SHUTDOWN OCCURRED IN THE SYSTEMATIC AND ORDERLY FASHION ENVISIONED IN THE AGREEMENT ALLOWS LATVIA TO AVOID YET ANOTHER CONTROVERSY WITH ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOR - AND THAT IS GOOD NEWS FOR A COUNTRY BADLY IN NEED OF SOME. END COMMENT.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF MFA STATEMENT (AS RECEIVED): PRESS RELEASE ON THE FULFILLMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE "AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON LEGAL STATUS OF SKRUNDA RADIO-LOCATION STATION DURING ITS TEMPORARY FUNCTIONING AND DISMANTLING."

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF LATVIA CONSIDERS THE AGREEMENT, SIGNED APRIL 30, 1994 BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION REFERRING TO THE TEMPORARY FUNCTIONING OF SKRUNDA RADIO-LOCATION STATION (RLS) IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA, WAS A LABORIOUS COMPROMISE REACHED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON "WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA."

THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT WAS A POLITICAL DECISION, PROVIDING FOUR MORE YEARS OF FUNCTIONING FOR SKRUNDA RLS, WHERE LATVIA HAS EXPRESSED ITS STRONG DESIRE AND SUPPORT TO ESTABLISH CONSTRUCTIVE AND STABLE GOOD-NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

LATVIA CONSIDERS THIS PARTICULAR AGREEMENT AND OTHER AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN 1994, AS SIGNIFICANT AND HISTORICAL PERIOD IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LATVIA AND RUSSIA, FACILITATING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION AND EUROPE.

LATVIA HIGHLY APPRECIATES THE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER OF RUSSIAN SIDE, AS WELL AS THE POSITIVE COOPERATION

EXPERIENCE OF THE TWO STATES, FULFILLING THE CONDITIONS OF THE POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT, AND SUPPORTS THE STANDPOINT WHICH FACILITATES MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

LATVIA IS OBLIGED TO THE DONOR STATES, THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN IN PARTICULAR, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR ENORMOUS INVESTMENT THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED WHILE SIGNING THE AGREEMENT AND DURING ITS FURTHER FULFILMENT.

LATVIA WELCOMES THE OSCE ASSISTANCE IN THE FULFILMENT OF THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE REGULAR INSPECTIONS, AND CONSIDERS THEM FUNDAMENTAL IN THE EXACT FULFILMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS. ON SEPTEMBER 3-4, 1998 THE OSCE INSPECTION IS TO REAFFIRM THE FACT OF SWITCHING OFF THE SKRUNDA RLS.

LATVIA EXPRESSES ITS CONFIDENCE THAT THE FURTHER FULFILMENT OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE SUCCESSFUL AND PRECISE, AND THE DEMANTILING OF SKRUNDA RLS WILL SECURE THE NEW CHALLENGES FOR LATVIAN AND RUSSIAN COOPERATION, FURTHERMORE BECOMING SIGNIFICANT ISSUE FOR ALL THE MEMBER STATES OF THE OSCE.

END TEXT.

WITHERS

Flanagan, Stephen J.

To: *Dominic Leader*

736-4170

From: Andraesen, Steven P.
Sent: Friday, August 21, 1998 10:31 AM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Flanagan, Stephen J.
Subject: Moscow Preview...Maybe [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

FAX

Suggests Yeltsin may propose an "SSBN-free zone" in the North Atlantic to compensate for the loss of the Skrunda radar...

RUSSIA: Yeltsin May Broach ABM System 'Hole' With Clinton MM2008142398
Moscow Izvestiya in Russian 21 Aug 98 p 1

"Fact and Comment" column by Viktor Litovkin: "Hole in Russia's Shield"; first paragraph is unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been decided that **as of 1 September this year, the day that U.S. President Bill Clinton begins his visit to our country, the Russian "Dnepr" missile attack early warning station located on the outskirts of the Latvian city of Skrunda will cease operating.**

The Skrunda "Dnepr," like its confreres at Mukhachevo and Sevastopol in Ukraine, in Azerbaijan, and at Gabal and Balkhash in Kazakhstan, and also the more powerful "Daryal" missile attack early warning stations near Murmansk, in Olenegorsk, and near Pechora and Irkutsk, constitute one of the fundamental parts of the Russian radar system for tracking American strategic missiles. Their zone of responsibility used to include practically the whole of North America and a good part of the North Atlantic and the Pacific. And when a missile was launched from U.S. territory or from an American submarine, the people at the General Staff's central command center would know within seconds where it was headed and precisely when it would come down on land or water.

Now a very substantial sector of the Atlantic, from the shores of Britain to Greenland -- an area with a radius of 2,500 kilometers from Skrunda -- cannot be seen by our tracking stations, sharply reducing the confidence of the military, and also the Kremlin, that an attack will not be made on us from that area.

As our newspaper has learned, Russia's military and political leadership has repeatedly requested Latvia through diplomatic channels to extend the lease on the "Dnepr" station in Skrunda for at least another two years until the new Daryal station being built near Baranovichi has been commissioned. But Riga's response to Moscow has always been a categorical "no!"

Our diplomats and generals have also put such requests to the United States: You are now friendly with Latvia, so influence them, they would say, because our tranquillity is also very much to your benefit. But Washington has not accommodated us or it too was unsuccessful. **Nor would the Americans commit themselves to not conducting combat standby duty with their strategic submarines in Atlantic waters that we cannot monitor. Which also has not increased the Russian missile defense forces' self-confidence.**

It cannot be ruled out that during Bill Clinton's visit to Moscow Boris Yeltsin will again initiate a conversation with him about Washington's obligations not to conduct combat standby duty in the North Atlantic. But everything rests on what we will be able to offer the U.S. president in exchange. The Yeltsin administration has not been able to get the State Duma to even ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). So how can we now ask the United States for new security concessions?!

Meanwhile the closure of the Skrunde station has compelled Russia to "hang" additional reconnaissance satellites over the

North Atlantic. They are also part of our missile attack warning system. But only the space-based part. Without a ground component it is nevertheless still defective. Albeit not too conspicuously to the normal eye, maybe.

[Description of Source: Izvestiya -- One of Russia's most prominent dailies, now controlled by Vladimir Potanin's Onexsimbank.]

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Media: Programming

- ✓ NO license on cable TV
- ✓ Independent stations.

World Bank / EBRD

✓
✓
World Bank NGO

- ✓ NGO engaged

CASTs

- ✓ County assistance strategies

✓
Continuation of Contract Study

① Engage in region

② Work on problems

✓ Action Plan

③

✓

✓

NGOs

✓ ~~USAID~~ ~~USAID~~

✓ Ideas show how assist change

✓
✓ USAID

✓

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. cable	Re: [Skrunda] (2 pages)	12/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Skrunda

2011-1037-F
ke2194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	Re: Nuclear Security and Proliferation [Atomic Energy Act] (4 pages)	09/26/1997	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Skrunda

2011-1037-F
ke2194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006. report	Re: [Missile Warning] (7 pages)	09/21/1998	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Skrunda

2011-1037-F
ke2194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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