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Folder Title:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group]) [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Seaton, James

Original OA/ID Number:

1179

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32	3	10	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	PDD-49 (22 pages)	09/14/1996	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Todd Stern and Phil Caplan to the President, re: National Space Policy Directive (1 page)	09/13/1996	P1/b(1), P5
002b. memo	John Gibbons and Anthony Lake to the President, re: National Space Policy (2 pages)	08/05/1996	P1/b(1), P5
003a. email	James Seaton to Katherine Veit, re: FW: Gibbons/National Space Policy (2 pages)	06/18/1996	P1/b(1), P5
003b. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: [Gibbons] (2 pages)	06/25/1996	P1/b(1)
003c. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: [Responsibilities] (2 pages)	06/18/1996	P1/b(1)
003d. email	James Seaton to Kristen Cicio, re: Berger Weekly Lunch (1 page)	06/13/1996	P1/b(1)
003e. email	James Seaton to National Security Advisor, re: Gibbons/National Space Policy (1 page)	06/13/1996	P1/b(1)
003f. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: Space Policy (2 pages)	05/29/1996	P1/b(1)
003g. email	James Baker to James Seaton, re: [Discussion] (2 pages)	05/08/1996	P1/b(1), P5
003h. email	James Seaton to George Reed, re: Space Policy Meeting (1 page)	05/02/1996	P1/b(1), P5
003i. email	From James Seaton, re: Space Policy PDD (1 page)	02/28/1996	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

kel164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003j. email	James Seaton to James Baker, re: Space Policy PDD (1 page)	02/27/1996	P1/b(1), P5
003k. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: [Space Policy] (1 page)	02/10/1996	P1/b(1), P5
003l. memo	Jim Seaton to Robert Bell, re: National Space Policy (2 pages)	01/30/1996	P1/b(1)
003m. email	James B. Seaton to James E. Baker and Edward J. Appel at 4:00 PM. Subject: Space Policy (1 page)	12/10/1995	P5
003n. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: Space Policy Review (1 page)	11/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5
003o. cable	Re: USG Decisions (3 pages)	02/16/1996	P1/b(1)

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-- The civil space policy reflects the principles that define the "faster, better, cheaper" philosophy now instilled at NASA.

- The policy confirms our support for completion of the International Space Station and the important international partnership it embodies. The space station will be the means by which we determine the feasibility and desirability of further human space flight.
- The policy also underscores our commitment to moving forward with other priorities in the NASA budget, specifically : development of the next-generation reusable space transportation systems, the Earth Observing System and an aggressive long-term program of Mars discovery and exploration.
- Our Mars exploration program will be the foundation of our efforts to seek out evidence of possible past and present forms of life on the red planet.
- How we structure this program in light of the recent discovery and what steps we should take now will be the subject of the space summit the Vice President will convene later this year.
- It also provides a pathway for NASA to try things differently, particularly in relation to the private sector. The policy requires NASA to buy spacecraft from the private sector unless exempted by the Administrator. It also sets up a demonstration program for a "data buy" from the private sector. Our FY97 budget proposed \$50 million for this. It also directs the commercialization of TDRSS by 2005, something we think is compatible with our overall push to tap private sector capabilities.
- The policy underlines the continued importance of civil operational space-based Earth observations by assigning DoC/NOAA lead responsibility in this area.

NATIONAL SECURITY

- Reaffirms the critical role of space in preserving peace and supporting U.S. national security objectives.
- Establishes as key priorities, the need to improve our ability to support military operations worldwide, to monitor and respond to strategic military threats and to monitor arms control and nonproliferation agreements and activities.
- Directs greater coordination between DOD and Intelligence Community space activities and increased integration of space architectures.
- States that the U.S. will maintain capabilities for ensuring our use of, and access to, space.
- Directs the DCI to develop and apply advanced technologies to respond to changes in the threat and to support national intelligence priorities.

COMMERCIAL SECTOR

- The policy also continues the tradition of strong support for the development and expansion of commercial space programs. We recognize the important role that commercial space activities play in supporting U.S. economic competitiveness. For this reason the policy directs U.S.G.

agencies to provide stable and predictable U.S. commercial sector access to appropriate U.S. government space-related hardware, facilities, and data.

- The policy commits the U.S. government not to engage in space activities that preclude or deter commercial sector except for reasons of national security or public safety. It also directs USG to purchase space goods and services from the commercial sector when feasible and cost effective.
- It also seeks to encourage NASA and DoD to adopt common pricing practices for facilities, equipment and services. This will assist the commercial sector in planning and pricing their own goods and services.
- The policy restates the goal of achieving free and fair trade in commercial space launch services. The U.S. will implement a strategy for transitioning from negotiated trade in launch services towards a trade environment characterized by the free and open interaction of market economies.
- The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in coordination with OSTP and the NEC, will develop a strategy to define how we make the transition from a quota-based, managed trade environment to one characterized by free and fair trade.

INTERSECTOR

- Highlights the role of international cooperation in the implementation of U.S. space activities across several areas, including the International Space Station, Earth observations and for interoperability of civil research spacecraft.
- Consolidates U.S. government policy on earth observations in one place. To make the best use of federal resources, the policy directs agencies to coordinate and, where feasible, seek to consolidate earth observation capabilities.
- Directs U.S. agencies to work with the commercial sector and other national and international Earth observation system operators to define an integrated global observing strategy for civil applications.
- Commits agencies and departments to adhere to nonproliferation, export control, and technology transfer policies in implementing space activities.
- Directs U.S. government proposals for international cooperation in space nuclear technologies to be subject to interagency review. Prohibits the use of space nuclear reactors in low Earth orbit without the specific approval of the President.
- Directs NASA, DOD and the Intelligence Community to develop, in cooperation with the private sector, design guidelines for future government procurement of spacecraft and launch vehicles which minimize orbital debris. In addition, it directs the U.S. to take a leadership role in international fora to minimize orbital debris.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 19, 1996

Contact: (202) 456-6020

PRESIDENT CLINTON ISSUES NEW NATIONAL SPACE POLICY

The President today will announce a new national space policy that is the first post-Cold War assessment of American space goals and activities. The new policy commits the nation to a strong and stable program in space that addresses both U.S. civil and national security requirements, and will ensure America's role as the world's space leader.

The new policy, to be unveiled by Assistant to the President for Science and Technology John H. Gibbons, results from a year-long review undertaken by the National Science and Technology Council and the National Security Council. Among its key provisions:

- o **Within the civil space program**, the policy reaffirms a U.S. commitment to the International Space Station and to the next-generation of launch vehicle programs; it calls for an aggressive space science program including the sustained robotic exploration of Mars, sample return missions from celestial bodies within the solar system and a long-term program to identify and characterize planets around other stars; and maintains our current commitment to a long-term program of environmental monitoring from space.

- o **In the commercial sector**, the policy seeks to stimulate private-sector investment by committing the U.S. government to purchase commercially available goods and services, and by offering stable and predictable access to federal space-related hardware, facilities, and data. The policy also lays the groundwork for moving away from international launch quotas toward an international commercial environment characterized by free and fair trade in commercial launch services.

- o **For national security**, the policy directs closer coordination between Department of Defense and intelligence community activities related to space policy. It directs the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to improve the nation's ability to support military operations worldwide, to monitor and respond to strategic military threats, and to monitor arms control and nonproliferation agreements and activities.

On August 7, 1996 the President called for a bipartisan summit on the future of America's space program. The policy announced today is an important milestone in the preparation for the summit, and will serve as the blueprint for future efforts to maintain a balanced and robust national space effort. An unclassified summary of the Presidential Decision Directive implementing the policy is available.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

August 7, 1996

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
UPON DEPARTURE

The South Lawn

1:15 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. I'm glad to be joined by my science and technology adviser, Dr. Jack Gibbons, to make a few comments about today's announcement by NASA.

This is the product of years of exploration and months of intensive study by some of the world's most distinguished scientists. Like all discoveries, this one will and should continue to be reviewed, examined and scrutinized. It must be confirmed by other scientists. But clearly, the fact that something of this magnitude is being explored is another vindication of America's space program and our continuing support for it, even in these tough financial times. I am determined that the American space program will put its full intellectual power and technological prowess behind the search for further evidence of life on Mars.

First, I have asked Administrator Goldin to ensure that this finding is subject to a methodical process of further peer review and validation. Second, I have asked the Vice President to convene at the White House before the end of the year a bipartisan space summit on the future of America's space program. A significant purpose of this summit will be to discuss how America should pursue answers to the scientific questions raised by this finding. Third, we are committed to the aggressive plan we have put in place for robotic exploration of Mars. America's next unmanned mission to Mars is scheduled to lift off from the Kennedy Space Center in November. It will be followed by a second mission in December. I should tell you that the first mission is scheduled to land on Mars on July the 4th, 1997 -- Independence Day.

It is well worth contemplating how we reached this moment of discovery. More than 4 billion years ago this piece of rock was formed as a part of the original crust of Mars. After

billions of years it broke from the surface and began a 16 million year journey through space that would end here on Earth. It arrived in a meteor shower 13,000 years ago. And in 1984 an American scientist on an annual U.S. government mission to search for meteors on Antarctica picked it up and took it to be studied. Appropriately, it was the first rock to be picked up that year -- rock number 84001.

Today, rock 84001 speaks to us across all those billions of years and millions of miles. It speaks of the possibility of life. If this discovery is confirmed, it will surely be one of the most stunning insights into our universe that science has ever uncovered. Its implications are as far-reaching and awe-inspiring as can be imagined. Even as it promises answers to some of our oldest questions, it poses still others even more fundamental.

We will continue to listen closely to what it has to say as we continue the search for answers and for knowledge that is as old as humanity itself but essential to our people's future.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, Republicans right now are going through a wrenching abortion debate. At the same time, pro-choice advocates have created the pro-choice public education project, they're calling it. They say abortion rights are under a very grave danger. Would you agree with that assessment? And what do you think of the Republican's troubles?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, they are only under grave danger if the election results in a change in the occupant of the White House. But what I think about the -- I'd like to just compare it with what we did in the Democratic Party. Some of our pro-life members asked for a conscience clause in the Democratic platform. And I thought it was a good idea. I recommended it. The platform committee unanimously embraced it. And the Democratic Party was proud to do it. We believe this is a matter which should be left to private conscience. And we believe that people who have pro-life convictions should be respected.

What you see here in the Republican Party is more of the extremism that we saw manifested in their budget proposals, their environmental proposals, their opposition to sensible crime proposals in the previous two years. And it's lamentable. It's not good for the country. And I would just say that in this convention season, we would welcome thoughtful, moderate,

concerned Republicans, independents, to join our party this year and to help keep moving America forward and bringing America together.

Q You do not feel the rights are under grave danger at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, right now we have a Supreme Court decision and an administration committed to the pro-choice position and committing to doing whatever we can to keep the government out of that decision, but to take initiatives that would reduce the number of abortions in America, including the recent tax credit for adoption that we strongly supported that will be part of minimum wage bill when it comes to me for signature.

So I'm determined to protect those rights and to keep the government out of it. But it is fair to say that in this election that is one of the matters at issue. Yes, it is fair to say that.

Thank you.

Q Where did you get that tie?

THE PRESIDENT: It's an Olympic tie. I got it down at the Olympics. Do you want to trade? (Laughter.) Thanks.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

1:20 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Aboard The Bus On The Road To The 21st Century)

September 19, 1996

For Immediate Release

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN ADDRESS TO THE COMMUNITY OF TACOMA

Tacoma Dome
Tacoma, Washington

9:52 A.M. PDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you in the back.

AUDIENCE: Four more years! Four more years!

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you up there. Thank you very much. Well, I know that it's a little wet out here, and as I said last night, I've been coming to Washington for several years now, and it has never rained on me before. I feel that, finally, you have accepted me as one of your own. (Applause.)

I want to thank you for coming out in such large numbers, and I can tell that a little rain has not dampened your spirits. Are you ready to fight for the next six weeks and five days? (Applause.)

Thank you, Mr. Mayor. Thank you for your welcome and for your leadership. Congratulations on so many things you are doing here in Tacoma, but especially, from my point of view, congratulations on winning the President's Excellence Award for Exporting in 1994, and for keeping Tacoma and Washington open and reaching out to the rest of the world, not turning away from it. I hope you will continue to do that. (Applause.)

Thank you, Bridgett Woods, for getting up here and making that brave speech. There aren't many 16-year-old girls speaking to 28,000 people, and you did a fine job today. Thank you. God bless you. (Applause.)

Thank you, Norm Dicks, for being a great congressman and a great friend and a visionary leader, not only for the people of your district, for the people of this country.

POTVS on
Space Policy
p. 5

And thank you -- thank you so much, Adam Smith, for running for Congress. (Applause.) And thank you, Jeff Coopersmith, if you're here, for running for Congress. And I want you folks to send them there. Just remember -- just remember -- two years ago, just two years ago, our friends in the other party were crowing that Washington State had led the way in the Republican Revolution, that the people of Washington were dying to see our economic policies reversed and our crime policies reversed. They told you that we raised the income taxes of ordinary Americans; it wasn't true. And then they turned around and tried to raise the income taxes of 9 million of the hardest-working Americans in the country with kids and low incomes.

They told you that our economic plan was going to fail. Well, it's inconvenient for them, but 10.5 million jobs later, record new exports, record new businesses, record businesses owned by women and minorities -- (applause) -- 60 percent reduction in the deficit, the first time since before the Civil War the deficit's gone down in all four years of the administration. You now know that they were wrong in 1994. We were right. Send Adam Smith and Jeff Coopersmith to the Congress, and give Norm Dicks some help to move you forward and our country forward into the next century. (Applause.)

And thank you, Gary Locke, for your distinguished career in public service, for the fine and positive campaign you have run for Governor of the State of Washington. I want all of you to do what you can in the next few weeks to make sure that this fine man is the next governor. It is very important to your future, more and more responsibilities are devolving upon the state. The next governor of Washington will, among other things, have the responsibility of working with local communities to create an unprecedented number of new jobs for people we are trying to move from welfare to work in a way that supports families and supports children and does not walk away from our responsibilities to them. I think you know who will do a better job of that, and I hope you will help him win this election. (Applause.)

I want to thank the other officials who are here, but most of all, I want to tell you that you can't imagine what it's like to pull up in a bus and see 28,000 people in the morning, in Tacoma, standing in the rain. That's because you know that America is on the right track to the 21st century, and we intend to keep it on that track, and I want you to help us. (Applause.)

I have said before, let me say again: We are living at a moment of enormous possibility. The young people in this

audience will have more chances to live out their dreams than any generation of Americans in history. If -- if we build a bridge to the 21st century that opens opportunity for all, expects responsibility from all, and is big enough, broad enough and strong enough for every American who is willing to work for it to go across, arm-in-arm, without regard to race or gender or income, or where you start out in life or condition of disability -- everybody should be able to go across the American bridge to the 21st century, and that's what I'm asking you to help us build. (Applause.)

My fellow Americans, there is a reason that the economy is better than it was four years ago. There is a reason the crime rate has gone down for four years in a row. There is a reason that the welfare rolls have gone down and the child support collections have gone up. There is a reason that the air is cleaner, our drinking water is protected, our food is going to be safer. There is a reason that the toxic waste dumps that we cleaned up in the last three years were greater than those cleaned up in the 12 years before we took office.

There is a reason that we were able to declare the Grand Cascade Escalante National Monument in Southern Utah yesterday, 1.7 million acres -- (applause) -- to save Yellowstone from a gold mine, to reach an historic agreement here in Washington State just two days ago to protect the Old Growth Forests of Washington and Oregon. (Applause.) To reach an agreement to restore the salmon in the Columbia River. This does not happen by accident. This happened because we replaced the old Washington politics of who can we blame and hot air with what are we going to do about it. Let's don't talk, let's roll up our sleeves, join hands and actually do something to help the American people make the most of their own lives and to move forward, and that is what we propose to do. (Applause.)

So I come here to Tacoma to ask you to help me build a bridge to the 21st century. A bridge that focuses first and foremost on making sure that every American has the chance to make the most of his or her own life, and that means world-class education. A bridge to the 21st century whereas, the Vice President said, we hook up every classroom and every library and every school in the United States to the Information Superhighway, to the Internet, to the World Wide Web, that we give all of our children, for the first time in history, whether they're in the poorest urban districts, the most remote mountain districts -- every single child at the first time in history will have access to the same information in the same time at the same

quality as the children in the richest schools of America. We have never done it before, we can do it now. Will you help us build that bridge to the 21st century? (Applause.)

I want to build a bridge to the 21st century where college is available to every American of any age who needs to go. (Applause.) We propose, first, to say people can save more in their individual retirement accounts, their IRAs, and then withdraw from it, tax-free, to pay for a college education. (Applause.)

Second, that we want at least two years of education after high school and, by the year 2000, to be just as universal as a high school diploma is today, and we propose to guarantee it by giving people a tax credit, a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the taxes for the typical costs of community college tuition in this country. (Applause.) And third, that we propose to give a tax deduction of up to \$10,000 a year for the costs of any college tuition -- undergraduate, graduate, for people who are young or middle-aged or old -- let's do that and build a bridge we can all walk across to the 21st century. Will you help us build that bridge?

AUDIENCE: Yes! (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: The second thing we have to do is to keep this economy growing. That means we do have to continue to bring the deficit down and balance the budget, because that means low interest rates, lower car payments, mortgage payments, lower payments for businesses who have to borrow money to create jobs, lower home payments. But we have to do it in a way that honors our obligations to each other and to our future. We don't have to wreck Medicare, turn our backs on Medicaid's responsibility to poor children, pregnant women, the elderly, families with members with disabilities. We do not have to gut the environment or reduce our investments in education and medical research and other research and technology areas.

Let me tell you, folks, Washington State has led the way in reaching out to the rest of the world with exports and in developing a diversified, high-tech economy. I'm very proud of the fact that, in this administration, we've concluded 200 trade agreements that's helped the people in Washington export everything from computer software, to airplanes, to Washington apples. I am proud of that. (Applause.) But we have to continue.

The University of Washington is the number one receiver of federal research money of any public university in the United States. We have to continue to invest there. (Applause.) And we also have to continue to invest in other forms of research and technology. And today, let me just say a special word about our space program. I expect most of you, like me, were thrilled to see the stunning pictures from space that came out early this morning as our Space Shuttle Atlantis linked up with the Russian Space Station Mir.

Our American hero, Shannon Lucid, greeted her American colleagues. What a wonderful person she seems to be. It's so impressive, the life that she's lived. (Applause.) We need to support that space exploration. And I want to tell you that, today, our administration will announce the results of a complete review of our space policy, the first new space policy since the end of the Cold War.

Let me tell you what we're going to do. First, we're going to continue to expand our knowledge of the universe. In December, we're going to launch a long-planned robotic mission to the surface of Mars. And, believe it or not, if you've seen the movie, it lands on Independence Day, 1997. (Applause.) We thought we would go visit them first and try to get around that blowing up the Capitol and the White House business. (Laughter and applause.) This will help us to determine whether and how and when we should send human missions there.

The second thing we're going to do, which is very important to the high-tech industries of the Pacific Northwest is to tear down the barriers that block the development of our space industry. Boeing recently announced an innovative proposal to work with Russia, Ukraine and Norway to launch satellites at sea. We're going to continue to move forward. We want to have free and fair trade among economies in space, and we can do that.

The third thing we're going to do is to make sure we use space to protect our national security, to maintain our freedom of movement, to monitor threats in compliance with our arms control treaties. All of this is very important, and I want to say a special word of thanks to the Vice President for his leadership in space and for the environment, in technology and for reinventing government; but especially today, to continue our leading role in space. (Applause.)

Now, folks, there is this huge debate going on in the country today, and I have to say that we need to be sensitive to

the real issues here. If you look at the budget, if you look at the education issue, if you look at the space issue, there's a huge debate: are we going to build a bridge to the future or a bridge to the past? Do we believe we have to work together to give each other the tools to make the most of our own lives, to build strong careers, strong families, strong communities and a strong country? Or, should we say you're on your own?

I think I know what you believe. I think you believe the First Lady was right -- it does take a village to raise a child, to build a community, to move a country forward.
(Applause.)

Let me say again, I want you to help governor-to-be Locke, and support us in building a bridge to the 21st century where we say to people who are going to be moved from welfare to work, we want to help you and support you to raise your children and to succeed at work, because that is what we want for all American families. And I have a plan to create a million new jobs to help move people from welfare to work. I want you to help me build that bridge to the 21st century. (Applause.)

I want you to support -- the Mayor mentioned it earlier -- the other big factor in the '94 elections that helped our friends in the opposition win so many seats here in Washington and throughout the country was their relentless assault on our anticrime legislation. They said it was just designed to take your guns away. They said that we had threatened the rights of hunters in Washington, and sportsmen and women in Washington State, and in my home state of Arkansas, to hunt and to have -- engage in other activities, and we weren't going to do anything to fight crime. And they scared a lot of people into voting for them in Washington and other places.

But they have a big problem in 1996. We've had two hunting seasons come and go since the last election, and there's not a single hunter in Washington State who is not still hunting with the same weapon he had in 1994. They didn't tell them the truth. (Applause.)

But we did take 19 deadly assault weapons off the street, and there were some people who couldn't get guns. Sixty thousand felons, fugitives and stalkers could not get handguns because of the Brady Bill. We were right, they were wrong. Send them a message in these races. Send them a message. (Applause.) And, by the way, I believe we ought to extend the Brady Bill. I don't believe people who beat up their spouses or their children should be able to get handguns, either. (Applause.)

I want to build a bridge to the 21st century that we can all walk across together. We ought to be supporting our families. Hillary and Tipper and the Vice President and I, in our different ways, we've tried hard to help families raise their kids and succeed at work. We've worked hard to protect our children from the dangers of advertising, distribution and sales of tobacco, we've worked hard to increase safe and drug-free schools programs, to support people at the community level who are doing everything they can to keep our young people out of trouble.

We've worked hard with the entertainment industry to put the V-chip in televisions and to get TV programs rated, and to bring more educational programming back to prime time television. We are working hard for the Family and Medical Leave Law, which has now given 12 million American families the chance to take a little time off from work for the birth of a baby or a parent's illness without losing their jobs. These are important. (Applause.) And if you give us four more years we want to expand family and medical leave to say you can have a little time off to go to a regular parent-teacher appointment, or a regular doctor's appointment with your children and still keep your job. It's been good for the economy. We have record numbers of new businesses, over 10 million jobs. It's good for America when people can succeed in taking care of their family members and succeed at work. (Applause.)

And, finally, let say, we have to continue our work to preserve our environment. There are still 10 million American children who live within four miles of a toxic waste dump. If you give us four more years we'll close 500 more so our kids will be growing up next to parks, not poison. Will you help us build that bridge to the 21st century? Will you ignore the rain for six more weeks and five more days and ask your friends and neighbors to support us and to build a bridge to the future?

AUDIENCE: Yes! (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Tacoma. Don't lose your energy. Don't lose your enthusiasm. Bear down. We need you. God bless you.

AUDIENCE: Four more years! Four more years!
(Applause.)

END

10:10 A.M. PDT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. email	James Seaton to Katherine Veit, re: FW: Gibbons/National Space Policy (2 pages)	06/18/1996	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: [Gibbons] (2 pages)	06/25/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: [Responsibilities] (2 pages)	06/18/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F
ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. email	James Seaton to Kristen Cicio, re: Berger Weekly Lunch (1 page)	06/13/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F
ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. email	James Seaton to National Security Advisor, re: Gibbons/National Space Policy (1 page)	06/13/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F
ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: Space Policy (2 pages)	05/29/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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Seaton, James B.

From: VanTassel, David S.
To: Seaton, James B.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Leary, William H.
Subject: RE: National Space Policy [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, May 15, 1996 9:06AM

Jim,

According to our records, the NSC has never released even in part the actual NSD 30 document. Perhaps DoD is referring to the portions of the document that were originally unclassified or to the unclassified fact sheet and appended information that was released when the policy was signed. I will put a copy of the fact sheet package in your mailbox. If we were to answer the pending FOIA requests today, we would likely, at the least, release the unclassified portions and whatever else could be construed as already released in the fact sheet package.

We have three unanswered FOIA requests, all from requesters who ask for all policy papers as a matter of routine, none of them having shown any particular interest in space policy. In the case mentioned by DoD, F92-1436, we referred NSD 30 to DoD, CIA, State, and NASA and asked them to make a recommendation to us concerning their interests before the NSC makes a final determination on release. None of the agencies has made any release recommendation yet.

From: Seaton, James B.
To: VanTassel, David S.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: National Space Policy [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, May 14, 1996 05:06 PM

Dave,

I just received another call from DoD regarding a FOIA request for NSD-30 (National Space Policy) -- case #F9201436. Apparently the DoD FOIA folks are sending the request back to you at this time. The person who called me said he was told that the NSC had previously declassified portions of NSD-30.

I talked to Bill Leary earlier today on this same subject. He mentioned that the last request to declassify portions of NSD-30 was in 1991-- and that request was denied. Could you please enlighten me where we stand on the status of declassification requests for NSD-30? We are nearing completion of the new National Space Policy and if things have already been declassified in the old policy it may impact how we classify things in the new PDD.

Thanks, Jim

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003g. email	James Baker to James Seaton, re: [Discussion] (2 pages)	05/08/1996	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003h. email	James Seaton to George Reed, re: Space Policy Meeting (1 page)	05/02/1996	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Seaton, James B.

From: Merchant, Brian T.
To: Baker, James E.; Leary, William H.; Seaton, James B.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: National Space Policy [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, April 12, 1996 5:29PM

I have no comments about issuance of an unclassified PDD/NSTC. However, I have several observations to make about the classified PDD. I strongly believe that a classified PDD should be issued as a NSC document and not as NSTC document.

My reasons follow: 1) it would be better for any PDD which recinds earlier NSC policy documents to be controlled by NSC, 2) classification and proper security procedures re access to classified information - - NSTC/PDDs seem to sent to all members w/o regard to agency equity or responsibility for topic of PDD. Eg, PDD/NSTC-6 on GPS was sent to NIH (and others) whose equity in Space Policy issues Does Not exist. This would be more true for classified PDD, ie, need-to-know as well as agency equity. 3) FOI requests and concerns. This may be a significant issue. Most of the staff and perhaps, the public seem not to be aware of the fact that THREE types of PDDs exist; NSC, NSTC and NEC. This has caused confusion when FOI requests for a PDD which IS not NSC document but is NSTC or NEC document. Example, recent PDD/NSTC-6 on GPS. 4) protection and proper access control - - NEC and NSTC use the same format as NSC. As you are aware, NSC follows certain procedures whenever a PDD is declassified and/or released. My experience is that NSTC and NEC procedures either Do Not exist or are very very basic. This may be significant, esp, if Congress seeks the PDD document - - What are their procedures on this issue?

In sum, I strongly believe that the classified PDD be NSC and the unclassified PDD be NSTC.

From: Seaton, James B.
To: Baker, James E.; Leary, William H.; Merchant, Brian T.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: National Space Policy [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, April 05, 1996 10:43 AM

We are nearing completion of a joint NSC/OSTP-chaired review of the national space policy, as directed by NSTC PRD-2. This policy supersedes various NSC and National Space Council directives -- NSD 30 (National Space Policy), NSD 46, National Space Policy 1 (NSPD-1), NSDD 257, and National Space Policy Directives 2,3,4,5, 6, and 7.

NSD 30 and NSPD-1 are the current national space policies. They were approved in 1989, with the unclassified NSPD having a wider audience than the classified NSD. I am uncomfortable with releasing the forthcoming space policy solely as an NSTC/PDD. The NSTC procedure is to release their PDDs to all members of the NSTC, regardless of the applicability of a policy to a particular agency. For example, NIH and Education are members of the NSTC and have no need to know about the national security dimensions of the national space policy. Several other agencies fall into the same category.

Is there anything that precludes us from doing an unclassified NSTC/PDD and a classified NSC PDD for the new national space policy? The NSC PDD would include all the elements of the NSTC PDD along with various classified passages/sections.

Please advise. Thanks, Jim

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003i. email	From James Seaton, re: Space Policy PDD (1 page)	02/28/1996	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F
ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003j. email	James Seaton to James Baker, re: Space Policy PDD (1 page)	02/27/1996	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F
ke1164

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003k. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: [Space Policy] (1 page)	02/10/1996	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F
ke1164

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0031. memo	Jim Seaton to Robert Bell, re: National Space Policy (2 pages)	01/30/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003m. email	James B. Seaton to James E. Baker and Edward J. Appel at 4:00 PM. Subject: Space Policy (1 page)	12/10/1995	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Seaton, James B.

From: Seaton, James B.
To: Appel, Edward J.; Baker, James E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Space Policy [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Sunday, December 10, 1995 4:00PM

Ed & Jamie:

Would you both be amenable/available to meet Monday afternoon at 3:00 pm to discuss the status of the ongoing Space Policy review? I am running into some difficulty between the Intelligence Community and DoD regarding proposed language. In some cases DoD will look at an area of disagreement as a policy difference, while the IC views it as a legal problem. (Without knowing enough of the details, my "gut" opinion is that it is primarily a visceral response on the part of the IC to "slow down" the DoD/IC space integration process.

Much of what I've also encountered (from both communities) is a slavishness to redundant, self-serving (from an agency perspective) language that appears to lend little to a Presidential policy. I think we have finally succeeded in reigning-in some of that, but some remains. On a related note, I edited some of the IC's language regarding classification policies, and they dispute my edits on the grounds that the NSC and IC lawyers cleared on this language previously.

Monday I will be out of the office until 12:00, but anytime prior to my 6:00 Leon Fuerth meeting I am available (if 3:00 is bad for either of you). Thanks. Semper Fidelis, Jim

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003n. email	James Seaton to Robert Bell, re: Space Policy Review (1 page)	11/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

ke1164

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003o. cable	Re: USG Decisions (3 pages)	02/16/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy (Seaton, James)
OA/Box Number: 1179

FOLDER TITLE:

National Space Policy (95-96 IWG [Interagency Working Group] [1]

2008-0830-F

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PREC: ROUTINE CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED SSN: 9030 MSGID: M2101028

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FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2527

RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 6144

RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 5512

RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 3489

ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6114

RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2352

RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2704

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9128

INFO: RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4173

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASMDC 0663

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 1588

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 9025

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 6494

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 STATE 039030

GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

REFS: A) STATE 31567 B) MOSCOW 5407 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: REF A CONTAINED TALKING POINTS FOR POSTS TO DELIVER TO HOST GOVERNMENTS INFORMING THEM OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY'S FEBRUARY 16 ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISIONS MADE FOLLOWING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE U.S. **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE** (BMD) PROGRAM. PARA 3 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCING THE DECISION, AND PARA 4 CONTAINS THE PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY DOD. END SUMMARY.

2. ACTION REQUEST: ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON THE TEXT AND PRESS STATEMENT AS APPROPRIATE WITH HOST

TEXT AND PRESS STATEMENT AS APPROPRIATE WITH HOST
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PRESS.

-FOR MOSCOW: IN LIGHT OF RUSSIAN VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REF
B, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTTEL IN A FEW
DAYS. EMBASSY MAY WISH TO DEFER APPROACHING GOR OFFICIALS
REGARDING PARAS 3 AND 4 BELOW UNTIL SEPTTEL ARRIVES.

TEXT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DOD NEWS BRIEFING
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
SUBJECT: **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE** PROGRAM
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1996, 2:30 P.M.

(THE SUBJECT OF THIS MEDIA ACTIVITY IS THE **BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE** PROGRAM. SECRETARY PERRY IS JOINED BY:
DR. PAUL G. KAMINSKI, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY); GENERAL THOMAS S. MOORMAN,
JR., USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF; THT. GEN. MALCOLM R.
O'NEILL, USA, DIRECTOR, **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**
ORGANIZATION; DR. ASHTON CARTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY); AND JAN M. LODAL,
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY).)

MR. BACON: WELCOME TO OUR BRIEFING ON BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSES. WE HAVE, AS YOU CAN SEE, A STALWART TEAM TO
TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS, BUT WE'LL ONLY BE ANSWERING QUESTIONS
ON THIS PARTICULAR TOPIC, THE **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**
PROGRAM.

DR. PERRY WILL START OFF, AND HE'LL BE SUPPORTED BY DR.
KAMINSKI, WE HAVE GENERAL MOORMAN, THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE AIR FORCE HERE TALKING FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, GENERAL O'NEILL OF THE **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**
OFFICE. WE HAVE ASH CARTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, AND JAN LODAL, WHO IS THE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY.

DR. PERRY?

DR. PERRY: ALL OF OUR ADULT LIVES WE HAVE LIVED WITH A
DARK CLOUD HAVING OVER OUR HEAD, THREATENING THE
EXTINCTION OF ALL MANKIND WITH A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST. NOW
WITH THE END OF THE COLD WAR THAT CLOUD IS DRIFTING AWAY.
THE WHOLE WORLD BREATHES EASIER.

BUT THAT CLOUD IS NOT YET GONE. NUCLEAR POWERS STILL HOLD

BUT THAT CLOUD IS NOT YET GONE. NUCLEAR POWERS STILL HOLD THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ALONG WITH MANY HUNDREDS OF MISSILES TO DELIVER THEM. AND MANY NUCLEAR WANNA-BE COUNTRIES, SOME OF THEM ROGUE NATIONS TO WHICH THE CALCULUS OF DETERRENCE DOES NOT APPLY IN THE SAME WAY,

MANY OF THESE HAVE OBTAINED BALLISTIC MISSILES -- SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES -- AND ARE TRYING TO GET LONGER RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

CONSIDERING THE SITUATION, IT IS STILL TRUE TODAY WHAT ANDRE SAKHAROV SAID DURING THE COLD WAR, NAMELY THAT "REDUCING THE RISK OF ANNIHILATING HUMANITY IN A NUCLEAR WAR CARRIES AN ABSOLUTE PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 17 STATE 039030

GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**
PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

CONSIDERATIONS."

THAT WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF THIS BRIEFING TODAY -- WHAT WE CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT. WE'RE GOING TO TALK SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ONE COMPONENT OF THAT, WHAT WE DO TO MEET THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT.

I HAVE DESCRIBED THIS NOW IN TERMS OF THE THREAT TO THE THEATER AND TO THE UNITED STATES. THE THEATER FROM SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH POSE A THREAT TO OUR ALLIES AND TO OUR TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE THEATER, AND THEN THE LONGER RANGE MISSILES WHICH ARE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.

OUR STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THIS HAS THREE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS: PREVENTING AND REDUCING THE THREAT; DETERRING THE THREAT; OR DEFENDING AGAINST THE THREAT. WE'LL BE TALKING TODAY ABOUT DEFENDING AGAINST THE THREAT, BUT I WANTED TO PUT THIS INTO CONTEXT, BECAUSE WHEN WE THINK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM WE DO NOT THINK JUST OF DEFENSE; WE THINK OF THIS WHOLE COMPLEX STRATEGY.

FOR EXAMPLE, PREVENTING OR REDUCING THE THREAT IN THE THEATER, WE HAVE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA, THE INF TREATY, MTCR, EXPORT CONTROLS, ALL OF THESE WORK TOGETHER AS WAYS OF PREVENTING OR REDUCING THE THREAT. THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, REDUCED THROUGH THE START TREATY, THROUGH

UNITED STATES, REDUCED THROUGH THE START TREATY, THROUGH THE START II TREATY IF IT BECOMES RATIFIED IN RUSSIA, AND WE'VE HAD AN EXTENSIVE PROGRAM ON ACTUALLY DISMANTLING THE WARHEADS AND THE MISSILES THAT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST US IN A SO-CALLED COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE NUNN/LUGAR FUNDS. SO THIS IS OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES -- PREVENTING AND REDUCING THAT THREAT.

THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE IS DETERRENCE. IN THE CASE OF THE STRATEGIC MISSILES, THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES, OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES HAVE BEEN A BULWARK OF DETERRENCE FOR NOW THREE DECADES. THAT WILL CONTINUE. WE HAVE

SMALLER NUCLEAR FORCES NOW THAN WE DID A DECADE AGO, BUT THEY ARE STILL VERY POWERFUL AND QUITE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THIS DETERRENCE MISSION.

IN THE CASE OF THE THEATER FORCES, WE HAVE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES TO SERVE AS DETERRENTS, AND WE ALSO HAVE A COUNTER-PROLIFERATION FUNCTION IN THAT WE CAN HAVE SOME LEVEL OF DETERRENCE OF LIMITED NUCLEAR ATTACKS BY THE VERY POWER OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

NOW FINALLY, IF THESE TWO LINES OF DEFENSE DO NOT WORK, WE HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO DEFEND DIRECTLY AGAINST A THREAT. IN THE CASE OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM, WHICH WE WILL TALK ABOUT TODAY; AND THE THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE LOWER TIER AND UPPER TIER PROGRAM. WE'LL BE DISCUSSING THESE PROGRAMS TODAY.

THE FIRST ASPECT THEN IS DEFENDING AGAINST THE THREAT, WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THAT THREAT? THE THEATER THREAT, SHORT RANGE MISSILES, THAT THREAT IS HERE AND NOW. WE SAW IT DEMONSTRATED IN THE GULF WAR. BESIDES THE IRAQI MISSILES, WE KNOW THERE ARE MANY MISSILES IN MANY COUNTRIES. MORE THAN A THOUSAND, MANY THOUSANDS OF MISSILE ARE OUT THERE AND DEPLOYED TODAY IN THESE SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND AS MANY AS 30 DIFFERENT COUNTRIES -- SOME OF THESE QUITE HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES. BUT WE CONSIDER THIS THREAT, THIS THREAT IS HERE AND NOW, WIDELY DISBURSED, AND IT HAS TO BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.

IN ADDITION TO THAT, WE SEE A MEDIUM RANGE THREAT EMERGING. SOME ROGUE NATIONS ARE DEVELOPING THEIR OWN MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES, IN PARTICULAR NORTH KOREA DEVELOPING THE NO DONG MISSILE. SOME OTHER ROGUE NATIONS ARE BUYING THESE MISSILES OR TRYING TO BUY THEM. IRAN IS A CASE IN POINT THERE.

BESIDES THE MISSILES WITH THE CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS, WE
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 17 STATE 039030

GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**
PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

HAVE A THREAT TODAY FROM CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARHEADS. WE NOW KNOW WHAT WE SUSPECTED DURING DESERT
STORM, THAT IRAQ ALREADY AT THAT TIME HAD CHEMICAL
WARHEADS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PUT ON THE SCUD MISSILES.
IT'S AN INTERESTING CONSIDERATION AS TO WHY THEY DID NOT
USE THEM DURING THAT WAR, WHETHER OUR
COUNTER-PROLIFERATION WORKED, NAMELY THE VERY GREAT
CONVENTIONAL FORCES WE HAD SIMPLY OVERWHELMED THEM, OR
WHETHER THEY FEARED A RESPONSE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WHATEVER THE REASON, THEY WERE DETERRED FROM USING IT, BUT
WE DO KNOW THAT THAT CHEMICAL THREAT EXISTED.

WE BELIEVE THAT IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND LIBYA ALL HAVE
EXTENSIVE CHEMICAL WEAPON PROGRAMS.

IN ADDITION TO THAT, WE ANTICIPATE A NUCLEAR THREAT BEING
POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE. WE KNOW IN RETROSPECT THAT IRAQ
WAS VERY CLOSE TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON AT THE TIME THEY
STARTED THE GULF WAR -- FORTUNATELY, NOT ALL THE WAY
THERE. WE KNOW THAT NORTH KOREA WAS CLOSE LAST YEAR.
THAT PROGRAM IN NORTH KOREA IS NOW STOPPED BY THE
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT. AND WE KNOW THAT IRAN IS WORKING TO
ACHIEVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM, BUT WE BELIEVE THEY ARE
MANY YEARS AWAY. SO WE WILL KEEP A VERY CLOSE EYE ON THE
NUCLEAR POSSIBILITY. IT IS NOT NOW A THREAT THAT WE ARE
FACING FROM THE, IN THE CASE OF THE THEATER MISSILES, WITH
THESE SO-CALLED ROGUE NATIONS.

WE GO TO THE STRATEGIC MISSILES. ALL OF THE DECLARED
NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY FOR
DELIVERING THESE WEAPONS WITH STR] 7LES AND LONG RANGE
AIRCRAFT. NONE OF
THEM DO WE SEE AS A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THAT IS, WE DO NOT SEE AN INTENT THAT
GOES WITH THE CAPABILITY. ALL OF THEM WOULD FACE A
SIGNIFICANT U.S. DETERRENT SHOULD THAT SITUATION CHANGE.

WE DO NOT SEE A NEAR TERM THREAT FROM THE SO-CALLED ROGUE
NATIONS, BUT WE CANNOT BE COMPLACENT ABOUT THAT. SUCH A

NATIONS, BUT WE CANNOT BE COMPLACENT ABOUT THAT. SUCH A THREAT, THE THREAT OF LONG RANGE MISSILES FROM THESE ROGUE NATIONS, COULD EMERGE IN THE FUTURE. IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT THAT THREAT WOULD TAKE 15 YEARS TO DEVELOP, BUT THAT COULD BE ACCELERATED IF THESE NATIONS WERE CAPABLE OR WERE ABLE TO SUCCEED IN THEIR PROGRAMS TO TRY TO GET AN OUTSIDE ACQUISITION OF THIS CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, OUR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION AND OUR ANTI-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS ARE VERY IMPORTANT.

LET ME NOW BRIEFLY DISCUSS WHAT WE DO TO DEFEND AGAINST THESE THREATS. IF WE EVER HAVE TO DEFEND AGAINST THEM, THESE ARE THE DEFENSE SYSTEMS THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING. WE'VE GOT A LARGE NUMBER OF PROGRAMS. WE SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS A YEAR ON THESE PROGRAMS.

FIRST OF ALL, WE HAVE PROGRAMS ALREADY DEPLOYED. THE PATRIOT SYSTEM AND THE STANDARD MISSILE WHICH IS ON AEGIS ARE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING AGAINST SOME CLASSES OF BALLISTIC

MISSILES -- PARTICULARLY THE SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES. THEIR CAPABILITY IS LIMITED IN TERMS OF WHAT WE CALL THE FOOTPRINT, WHICH IS THE AREA THEY CAN COVER. THEY ARE VERY GOOD AT DEFENDING THEMSELVES AND A SMALL AREA AROUND THEM, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE MUCH WIDE AREA CAPABILITY.

THEREFORE, WE ARE DEVELOPING A NEW GENERATION OF SYSTEMS TO DEAL WITH THAT PROBLEM. IN THE CASE OF THE THEATER DEFENSE, THE PATRIOT III, SO-CALLED PAC-III AND THE NAVY AREA DEFENSE, ARE THE TWO IMMEDIATE SYSTEMS TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE THREAT. THEY HAVE A SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED AREA COVERAGE OVER THE PATRIOT AND OVER THE STANDARD MISSILE. BUT AS WE'LL DEVELOP IN THE BRIEFING, NOT AS MUCH AS THIS SO-CALLED UPPER TIER. THESE UPPER TIER SYSTEMS.

OUR EMPHASIS WILL BE ON THESE TWO PROGRAMS, OUR TIMING EMPHASIS, BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE THE THREAT IS HERE AND NOW AND IMMEDIATE. THIS IS WHERE WE HAVE TO GET THE RUBBER ON THE ROAD, TO EXPAND THE CAPABILITY WE NOW HAVE IN THE VERY UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 17 STATE 039030

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SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**
PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

LIMITED PATRIOT AND THE VERY LIMITED STANDARD MISSILE.

LIMITED PATRIOT AND THE VERY LIMITED STANDARD MISSILE.

THE UPPER TIER SYSTEMS, AS DR. KAMINSKI WILL DESCRIBE TO YOU, GIVE US A MUCH WIDER AREA OF COVERAGE, AND THEREFORE ARE CAPABLE OF NOT ONLY PROTECTING A WIDER AREA, BUT DEFENDING AGAINST MISSILES OF LONGER RANGE AS THEY BECOME DEVELOPED.

SO IN THE SEQUENCE OF DEVELOPMENTS, THESE WILL COME OUT FIRST, AND THE UPPER TIER WILL COME OUT LATER.

IN THE CASE OF DEFENSE OF U.S. TERRITORY, WE ARE EMERGING NOW FROM A TECHNOLOGY READINESS PROGRAM TO A DEPLOYMENT READINESS PROGRAM. DR. KAMINSKI WILL DESCRIBE THAT TO YOU. WE ARE MOVING IN THIS PROGRAM, WE'RE CHANGING THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM TO READY OURSELVES FOR A DEPLOYMENT DECISION IN THREE YEARS, AND HE WILL BRIEF YOU ON THE DETAILS OF WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO TO ACHIEVE THAT.

IN ADDITION TO ALL THESE PROGRAMS, WE WILL SUSTAIN A ROBUST TECHNOLOGY BASED PROGRAM THAT IS CAPABLE OF PREPARING OURSELVES FOR FUTURE THREATS AS THEY EMERGE.

THIS IS A COMPLEX AND EXPENSIVE SET OF PROGRAMS. IN THE LAST YEAR, THESE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED FROM TWO DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, THE CONGRESS HAS CRITICIZED THEM, SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, BECAUSE WE WERE

SPENDING TOO MUCH MONEY ON THEM, SOME BECAUSE WE WERE NOT SPENDING ENOUGH MONEY. SOME BECAUSE WE WERE MOVING THE PROGRAMS TOO QUICKLY. SOME BECAUSE WE'RE NOT MOVING THEM QUICKLY ENOUGH.

THE JROC, JOINT REQUIREMENTS COUNCIL, CRITICIZED THEM FROM TWO DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW. ONE, THEY SAID WE HAVE TOO MANY PROGRAMS AND WE'RE SPENDING TOO MUCH MONEY ON THEM. AND SECONDLY, WE WERE NOT FOCUSED SHARPLY ENOUGH IN DEALING WITH THE HERE AND NOW THREAT.

WITH ALL OF THIS CRITICISM, SOME OF IT QUITE (APPROPRIATE), WE DECIDED THAT WE NEEDED TO LOOK INTENSIVELY INTO THIS WHOLE SET OF PROGRAMS AND LOOK FOR A PROGRAM RESTRUCTURING.

WINSTON CHURCHILL ONCE SAID ABOUT AMERICANS, "THE BIGGER THE IDEA, THE MORE WHOLEHEARTEDLY AND OBSTINATELY DO THEY THROW THEMSELVES INTO MAKING IT A SUCCESS." IT IS AN ADMIRABLE CHARACTERISTIC, PROVIDED THE IDEA IS GOOD. THAT WAS THE ISSUE WE WERE LOOKING AT, WHICH WE ASKED DR. KAMINSKI TO LOOK AT IN THIS STUDY. WE WERE THROWING OURSELVES WHOLEHEARTEDLY AND OBSTINATELY INTO OUR **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE** PROGRAM. WE WANT TO BE SURE

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM. WE WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE IDEA IS GOOD -- NOT JUST IN GENERAL, BUT IN SPECIFICS -- SO THAT AS WE THROW OURSELVES INTO MAKING IT A SUCCESS, WE ARE MAKING A SUCCESS OF SOMETHING WHOSE IDEAS WE HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN.

I'M GOING TO ASK DR. KAMINSKI TO COME UP TO THE PODIUM NOW AND DESCRIBE TO YOU THE RESULTS OF HIS STUDY AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PROGRAMS THAT ARE GOING TO RESULT FROM THAT STUDY.

DR. KAMINSKI: I'VE BEEN INVOLVED NOW OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN THE REVIEW THAT SECRETARY PERRY DESCRIBED. AS HE SAID, ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS REVIEW WAS THE BELIEF EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL THAT OUR BMD PROGRAM WAS FUNDED AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN WERE OTHER HIGHER PRIORITY PRESSING MODERNIZATION OR RECAPITALIZATION NEEDS. WHEN I FINISH MY PRESENTATION, I'M GOING TO ASK GENERAL MOORMAN, WHO IS REPRESENTING THE JROC IN ADMIRAL OWENS' ABSENCE TODAY, TO GIVE YOU A LITTLE PROSCRIPTIVE LOOK BACK AT HOW WHERE WE'VE ENDED UP SEEMS TO FIT IN THAT OVERALL SCHEME OF PRIORITIES.

DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED WHAT I BELIEVE IS A MORE BALANCED PROGRAM, ONE THAT IS MORE AFFORDABLE, AND ONE WHICH IS MORE EASILY EXECUTED. IT IS ALSO BETTER MATCHED TO THE MISSILE THREATS THAT WE'LL BE UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 17 STATE 039030

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TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE** PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

FACING.

THIS NEW PLAN MAKES USE OF ALL OF THE FUNDS IN FY96 THAT WERE APPROPRIATED FOR MISSILE DEFENSE -- BOTH THE FUNDS THAT WERE REQUESTED BY THE PRESIDENT, AS WELL AS THE FUNDS THAT WERE ADDED BY THE CONGRESS.

IF I MIGHT HAVE THE FIRST CHART, PLEASE.

THIS REVIEW REAFFIRMED THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRIORITIES IN OUR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM. THE FIRST PRIORITY BEING TO DEFEND AGAINST THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CRUISE MISSILES. OF THIS FIRST PRIORITY, THE FIRST UNDERLYING

MISSILES. OF THIS FIRST PRIORITY, THE FIRST UNDERLYING PRIORITY IS TO FIELD SYSTEMS TO DEFEND AGAINST THE EXISTING SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES THAT ARE DEPLOYED IN THE THEATER. THIS IS OUR SO-CALLED TMD LOWER TIER SYSTEMS THAT I'LL TALK ABOUT MORE IN THE FUTURE.

THE NEXT PRIORITY WAS TO PROCEED AT A PRUDENT PACE TO ADD WIDE AREA DEFENSES AND DEFENSES AGAINST THE LONGER RANGE THEATER MISSILES AS THAT THREAT EMERGES. THIS IS THE SO-CALLED TMD UPPER TIER PROGRAM.

SECOND IN PRIORITY WAS TO DEVELOP A CAPABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST ICBMS AND CRUISE MISSILES WHICH MAY THREATEN THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE, THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL MISSILEDEFENSE PROGRAM.

FINALLY, DEVELOPING A ROBUST TECHNOLOGY BASE TO UNDERLIE THESE TWO PROGRAMS --- BOTH THE TMD PROGRAM AND THE NMD PROGRAM -- TO BE ABLE TO ADVANCE OUR CAPABILITY OVER TIME AS THE THREAT SYSTEMS MAY BECOME ADVANCED.

WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO NOW IS ILLUSTRATE THESE SYSTEMS AND HOW THEY FIT.

THIS FIRST CHART DESCRIBES THE SITUATION IN THE THEATER TODAY. WE HAVE TWO SYSTEMS THAT ARE FIELDDED. WE HAVE THE HAWK WHICH IS FIELDDED BY THE MARINE CORPS; AND THE PAC-IT, GEM SYSTEM. THE AREAS COVERED ON THIS CHART GIVE YOU SOME SENSE FOR THE SORT OF AREA COVERED OR PROTECTED BY THE SYSTEM. THE HAWK CAPABILITY IS VERY LIMITED, VERY THIN. THE PAC-IL CAPABILITY IS THE CAPABILITY THAT WAS USED IN DESERT STORM. THE GEM CAPABILITY, IN FACT, IS AN ENHANCEMENT OVER THAT BASIC PAC-IT CAPABILITY WHICH WE

HAVE NOW INCORPORATED ND FIELDDED. IT GIVES THE SYSTEM A MORE ROBUST CAPABILITY THAN THAT WHICH WE HAVE FIELDDED IN DESERT STORM, BUT STILL NOT A SUFFICIENTLY ROBUST CAPABILITY, IN OUR OPINION, TO DEAL WITH A DEPLOYED THREAT.

SO OUR FIRST PRIORITY IN THIS WHOLE PROGRAM IS TO ENHANCE THIS CAPABILITY OF OUR LOWER TIER SYSTEMS BEYOND THE CAPABILITY THAT WE NOW HAVE DEPLOYED, AND THAT'S SHOWN ON THE SECOND CHART.

THESE ARE THE TWO SYSTEMS THAT WE HAVE IN DEVELOPMENT NOW FOR OUR LOWER TIER CAPABILITY, AND I'VE DRAWN, AGAIN, THESE PROTECTION UMBRELLAS TO THE SAME SCALE I HAD DONE IN THE PREVIOUS CHART, TO GIVE YOU SOME FEEL FOR THE ENHANCED AREA COVERED BY THESE TWO SYSTEMS.

THE FIRST SYSTEM IS THE PAC-ILI, THE SYSTEM FIELDDED BY THE

THE FIRST SYSTEM IS THE PAC-ILI, THE SYSTEM FIELDIED BY THE ARMY, WHICH IS A MUCH MORE CAPABLE DERIVATIVE OF THE PAC-LI SYSTEM. IT, IN FACT, INVOLVES A DIFFERENT KILL MECHANISM. RATHER THAN AN EXPLODING WARHEAD, THIS IS A HIT-TO-KILL SYSTEM. I CAN'T REALLY ILLUSTRATE SUITABLE ON THIS DIAGRAM THE ENHANCED LETHALITY THAT GOES WITH IT. I CAN ONLY ILLUSTRATE THE ENHANCED AREA COVERAGE, BUT THE ENHANCED LETHALITY IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT.

ALSO SHOWN ON THE CHART IS THE NAVY AREA SYSTEM, PREVIOUSLY REFERRED TO AS THE NAVY LOWER TIER SYSTEM. THIS IS A CAPABILITY POSSESSED BY THE SM-2, BLOCK 4A MISSILE WHEN IT COMPLETES ITS DEVELOPMENT, THAT WOULD BE CARRIED ON AEGIS SHIPS. THIS CAPABILITY HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING MOBILE, THAT IS BEING ABLE TO BE DEPLOYED ON SHIP TO A THEATER.

NEITHER OF THESE PROGRAMS INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT TECHNICAL
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TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

RISK AT THIS POINT. WHAT'S AHEAD HERE IS AMATTER OF EXECUTION OF THE PROGRAMS TO COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT AND TO FIELD THESE TWO PROGRAMS, AND WHAT WE INTEND TO DO, AS I'LL DESCRIBE TO YOU IN OUR EXECUTION PROGRAM, IS TO ENSURE THAT WE HAVE A ROBUST PROGRAM TO PROCEED WITH BOTH OF THESE TO FIELD THIS CAPABILITY AND TO DO SO AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

OUR NEXT PRIORITY HERE ARE THE UPPER TIER SYSTEMS. THE FIRST ONE THAT I'VE ILLUSTRATED, AGAIN TO SCALE WITH THIS DIAGRAM, IS THE THAAD SYSTEM, THE THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

WHAT YOU SEE HERE IS A SUBSTANTIALLY EXTENDED AREA OF

COVERAGE. THIS COVERAGE IS SUITABLE TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR A GREATER DIVERSITY OR DISPERSION OF FORCES. ALSO PROVIDES A CAPABILITY TO PROTECT POPULATION CENTERS

THE PRINCIPAL ADDITION PROVIDED BY THIS CAPABILITY IS THE ABILITY TO DEAL WITH OUR LONGER RANGE THEATER MISSILE THREATS AS THEY BEGIN TO EVOLVE AND EMERGE OVER TIME. THIS ALSO PROVIDES US WITH WHAT I WOULD CALL A

THIS ALSO PROVIDES US WITH WHAT I WOULD CALL A SHOOT-LOOK-SHOOT CAPABILITY. THAT IS THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE MULTIPLE TIMES TO BE ABLE TO REDUCE LEAKAGE DOWN TO THE GROUND.

WE HAVE MADE A SIGNIFICANT ADJUSTMENT TO THIS PROGRAM, KEEPING ON TRACK OUR EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM, BUT WE ARE MAKING SOME OUT-YEAR ADJUSTMENTS THAT I'LL DESCRIBE IN A SUBSEQUENT SLIDE.

THE SYSTEM ADDED HERE IS THE NAVY THEATER-WIDE SYSTEM. THIS ADDS THE SAME GENERIC KIND OF CAPABILITY THAT I ILLUSTRATED EARLIER IN THE UPPER TIER THAAD SYSTEM, AGAIN PROVIDING LONGER RANGE OF COVERAGE AND A WIDER AREA PROTECTED. THIS OFFERS SOME DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES OR COMPLIMENTARY CAPABILITIES AS WELL, IN THAT IT WOULD BE ENVISIONED TO HAVE SOME ASCENT PHASE INTERCEPT CAPABILITY, AND ALSO THE CAPABILITY TO BE DEPLOYED ON AN AEGIS SHIP TO THE THEATER -- NOT DEPENDING UP ON A SYSTEM IN PLACE.

THIS IS THE LEAST MATURE OF ALL OF OUR SYSTEMS, NOT ONLY OF THE UPPER TIER, BUT ALL THE SYSTEMS TAKEN TOGETHER. WE WERE PROPOSING FUNDING THIS PROGRAM IN OUR '96 AND '97 BUDGETS AT A VERY LOW LEVEL FOR TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION WORK, ON THE ORDER OF ABOUT DOLLARS 30 MILLION PER YEAR.

LET ME DESCRIBE NOW WHERE WE'VE COME OUT IN OUR LOWER TIER APPROACH. OUR INTENT HERE IS TO BUILD ON EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIOR INVESTMENTS IN THE PROGRAMS THAT WE WILL BUILD ON. AS I SAID, GIVEN THAT THIS IS OUR FIRST PRIORITY, OUR INTEREST IS TO DEPLOY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

AS WE REVIEWED THE PATRIOT CAPABILITY, THE PAC-III SYSTEM, WHAT WE FOUND IS THAT THIS PROGRAM WAS NOT WHOLE. THERE WERE SOME FACT OF LIFE SLIPS IN THE SCHEDULE OF THE PROGRAM AND THE PROGRAM WAS NOT FUNDED AT A LEVEL COMMENSURATE WITH WHAT I JUST DESCRIBED AS OUR PRIORITY TO GET THE SYSTEM FIELDIED AND TO HAVE A ROBUST PROGRAM. SO WE ENDED UP ADDING ABOUT DOLLARS 300 MILLION TO THIS PROGRAM THROUGH THE FYDP TO MAKE THE PROGRAM WHOLE AND EXECUTABLE.

AS WE HAD SOME FACTS OF LIFE SLIPS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROGRAM, WE ADJUSTED THE END POINT OF THE BMD PROGRAM IN CONCERT WITH THAT SO THAT WE DIDN'T TAKE ON A HIGHER RISK PROGRAM

WE ALSO LOOKED AT FIELDING THE SYSTEM. WE'D ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO FIELD NINE BATTALIONS OF THE SYSTEM. WE DECIDED, INSTEAD, TO PLAN ON FIELDING SIX BATTALIONS, AND TO HOLD IN RESERVE THE THREE ADDITIONAL. THOSE WOULD BE

TO HOLD IN RESERVE THE THREE ADDITIONAL. THOSE WOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE FOR A PROGRAM CALLED MEADS WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE TO YOU IN A LITTLE BIT. IT'S A PROGRAM THAT'S JUST BEGINNING AT THIS POINT.

WE ALSO MADE A DECISION TO IMPROVE THE ELECTRONICS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS SYSTEM SOMEWHAT OVER WHAT WAS IN THE BASELINE SYSTEM.

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TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**
PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

THE SECOND OF THE LOWER TIER PROGRAMS, THE NAVY AREA DEFENSE PROGRAMS, WE FOUND SOME OF THE SAME PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH TO A LESSER DEGREE. WE ENDED UP ADDING DOLLARS 150 MILLION TO THIS PROGRAM THROUGH THE FYDP, AGAIN, TO MAKE THE PROGRAM FULLY EXECUTABLE ON A MODERATE RISK PROFILE THATS CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRIORITY IN WANTING TO DEPLOY THE SYSTEM. THIS WILL MAINTAIN OUR BASE DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT SCHEDULES FOR THE PROGRAM. SO I WOULD SUMMARIZE BY SAYING THESE TWO PROGRAMS ARE WHOLE, AND THEY'RE CONSISTENT WITH OUR EMPHASIS ON ROBUST AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT.

IN OUR UPPER TIER SYSTEMS, THE MOST MATURE OF THESE SYSTEMS IS THE THAAD PROGRAM. WE WERE FUNDING THIS PROGRAM ON THE ORDER OF ABOUT DOLLARS 700 MILLION PER YEAR GOING INTO THIS REVIEW.

AS WE CONDUCTED THIS REVIEW, OUR ASSESSMENT WAS THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN PLACE THIS UOES CONCEPT AND SCHEDULE. UOES STANDS FOR USER OPERATIONAL EVALUATION SYSTEM. THIS PROVIDES US THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE A VERY LIMITED DEPLOYMENT, BUT EARLY ON WHERE IT'S NEEDED. THIS WOULD BE A DEPLOYMENT OF ABOUT 40 MISSILES AND TWO RADARS, WHICH COULD BE MAINTAINED EARLY IN THE THEATER.

WE MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO KEEP THAT PROGRAM ON TRACK BUT WE RESTRUCTURED THE SUBSEQUENT PROGRAM, TAKING ABOUT DOLLARS 2 BILLION OUT OF WHAT WAS A DOLLARS 5 BILLION PROGRAM THROUGH THE FYDP.

WHAT WE WILL BE DOING HERE IS TWO THINGS. ONE, IS DELAYING THE PRODUCTION RAMP-UP AND THE FULL UNIT EQUIPAGE, DELAYING THAT BY A LITTLE OVER TWO YEARS. THE SECOND THING WE WILL BE DOING, WE REALLY HAD TWO MAJOR

SECOND THING WE WILL BE DOING, WE REALLY HAD TWO MAJOR CONFIGURATIONS OF THE SYSTEM. WE HAD THE UOES CONFIGURATION, THE EARLY DEPLOYED CONFIGURATION, AND THEN WE HAD AN OBJECTIVE SYSTEM. THE OBJECTIVE SYSTEM HAD MANY ENHANCEMENTS INCORPORATED IN IT. WE APPLIED OUR COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE APPROACH HERE TO LOOK AT THOSE ENHANCEMENTS, WHAT THEY COST AND WHAT THEY BOUGHT US. WHAT WE ENDED UP WITH, WHICH WAS AN APPROACH THAT WENT ABOUT HALFWAY TOWARDS THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE SYSTEM, IT INCLUDED THINGS SUCH AS SEEKER AND RADAR IMPROVEMENTS, BUT IT DID NOT INCORPORATE ALL THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT WE WOULD HAVE HAD IN THE OBJECTIVE SYSTEM THAT WAS THE BASELINE.

SO WHAT WE HAVE ENDED UP WITH I DESCRIBE AS UOES-PLUS. THAT IS, IT'S AN ENHANCED SYSTEM OVER WHAT WOULD BE DEPLOYED INITIALLY, BUT NOT ENHANCED TO THE LEVEL THAT WAS IN THE BASELINE OBJECTIVE SYSTEM.

IN THE NAVY THEATER WIDE PROGRAM, WHAT WE HAVE COMMITTED TO DO HERE IS TO BEGIN CONCEPT DEFINITION STUDIES AND TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS TO BE ABLE TO PICK THE BEST SOLUTION. THIS IS A PROGRAM IN WHICH THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL ADD BY THE CONGRESS IN FY96. WE HAD FUNDED THIS PROGRAM AT DOLLARS 30 MILLION IN FY96, AND HAD PLANNED TO FUND IT AT DOLLARS 30 MILLION IN FY97. THE CONGRESSIONAL ADD IN FY96 WAS DOLLARS 170 MILLION. WE HAVE ELECTED TO SPEND THAT MONEY OVER TWO YEARS AND NOT BEGIN A FULL COMMITMENT TO THIS PROGRAM AT THAT RATE, BUT TO PROCEED WITH A MORE GENTLE RAMP-UP THAT WILL ALLOW US TO PROCEED TO A SYSTEM LEVEL INTERCEPT FLIGHT USING A COMBINATION OF THE AEGIS PLATFORM, THE STANDARD MISSILE LAUNCH AND PROPULSION VEHICLE, AND THE LEAP CONFIGURATION OF AN INTERCEPT VEHICLE. BUT AS I SAID IN THE FIRST BULLET, IN PARALLEL WE WILL BE DOING SOME CONCEPT DEFINITION STUDIES TO FIND OUT WHAT WE THINK IS THE BEST CONFIGURATION TO PROCEED WITH ON THIS PROGRAM.

WE HAVE MADE A SUBSTANTIAL ADD TO THIS PROGRAM, STARTING OUT AT A SLOW PACE, AS I INDICATED, BUT THROUGH THE FYDP, ABOUT A DOLLARS 600 MILLION ADD HAS BEEN MADE TO THIS PROGRAM FOR IT TO RAMP UP TO A SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL INVESTMENT. THE AVERAGE IS ABOUT DOLLARS 130 MILLION PER YEAR.

THE LAST OF THE LOWER TIER RELATED SYSTEM IS THE MEADS,

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TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

THE MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. I SHOW THIS SYSTEM LAST BECAUSE IT REALLY IS A DIFFERENT CHARACTER THAN THE OTHER SYSTEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PAC-ILI SYSTEM IS ORIENTED IN A PARTICULAR THREAT DIRECTION. THIS IS A SYSTEM THAT PROVIDES 360 DEGREES OF COVERAGE. THIS IS A HIGHLY MOBILE UNIT TO BE DEPLOYED WITH OUR FORWARD AND MANEUVERING FORCES. THE SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES CAPABILITY AGAINST TBMS AND CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER AIR-BREATHING THREATS AS WELL. THIS IS A PROGRAM THAT WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH IN COOPERATION WITH GERMANY, FRANCE, AND ITALY. WE ARE SOON TO SIGN AN MOU BEGINNING THIS PROGRAM. WE'VE SIGNED A STATEMENT OF INTENT TO BEGIN IT. WE'VE ADDED FUNDS TO THIS PROGRAM. IT'S AT THE RATE OF ABOUT DOLLARS 30 MILLION PER YEAR, TO TAKE US THROUGH A PROGRAM DEFINITION/VALIDATION PHASE THAT COMPLETES IN '99.

THIS IS A PROGRAM THAT WOULD REPLACE HAWK THAT I SHOWED ON THE FIRST SLIDE, AND ALSO WOULD ULTIMATELY REPLACE PATRIOT. AS I INDICATED, WE'RE HOLDING THREE OF THOSE PATRIOT BATTALIONS IN RESERVE WHICH WOULD BE FILLED WITH THIS MEADS SYSTEM WHEN DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED.

LET ME NOW SWITCH TO THE SECOND MAJOR PRIORITY, NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE.

HERE OUR INTENDED PROGRAM IS TO POSITION THE U.S. TO RESPOND TO A STRATEGIC MISSILE THREAT AS IT EMERGES. WE ARE NOT MAKING A COMMITMENT TO DEPLOY THE SYSTEM TODAY. WHAT WE ARE DOING, THOUGH, IS SHIFTING OUR EMPHASIS FROM A TECHNOLOGY TO A DEPLOYMENT READINESS. SECRETARY PERRY IN HIS TESTIMONY LAST YEAR DESCRIBED THIS SO-CALLED THREE PLUS THREE PROGRAM THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING.

WHAT WE'VE DONE HERE IS MADE A COMMITMENT TO THE FIRST THREE OF THE THREE PLUS THREE THAT SECRETARY PERRY DESCRIBED. SO WITHIN THESE THREE YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT, WHAT WE WOULD DO IS DEVELOP AND BEGIN TESTING OF THE ELEMENTS OF AN INITIAL NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. IF AFTER THREE YEARS WE SAW A THREAT SITUATION THAT WARRANTED A DEPLOYMENT, IN ANOTHER THREE YEARS THAT SYSTEM COULD BE DEPLOYED. SO FROM WHERE WE STAND TODAY, DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE SIX YEARS AWAY. IF A DECISION WERE MADE TO DEPLOY AFTER THE FIRST THREE YEARS, THAT LOC COULD BE ACHIEVED IN 2003.

WHAT WE WILL BE DOING HERE IS TAKING THE DOLLARS 370 MILLION THAT WAS ADDED BY THE CONGRESS IN FY96 AND

MILLION THAT WAS ADDED BY THE CONGRESS IN FY96 AND
SPEIYI

REASONABLE START-UP OF A PROGRAM THAT CAN BE SUSTAINED.
WE WILL BE SPENDING MORE EARLY IN THE FYDP AND LESS
LATER. WE EXPECT TO INCREASE OUR INVESTMENT BY DOLLARS
100 MILLION A YEAR IN BOTH '9V AND '98, AND ONCE THIS
DEVELOPMENT BASE IS BUILT UP, TO REDUCE OUR FUNDING BY A
COMMENSURATE AMOUNT IN THE OUT YEARS SO THE NET CHANGE TO
THE FYDP ENDS UP BEING ABOUT ZERO.

THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THAT I'M DESCRIBING, THIS THREE
YEAR PROGRAM, WILL BE A TREATY COMPLIANT PROGRAM. THE
SYSTEM COMPONENTS THAT ARE BEING DEVELOPED COULD EITHER
COMPLY WITH EXISTING TREATY LIMITS, OR IF THE THREAT
SITUATION WARRANTED -- AND I UNDERSCORE HERE THAT WE'RE
NOT MAKING ANY COMMITMENT TO A DEPLOYMENT. A DEPLOYMENT
DECISION OF ANY SORT IS CONDITIONED ON SEEING A THREAT
THAT WE BELIEVE WARRANTS THE EXPENDITURE OF DEPLOYMENT
FUNDS, BUT WE WOULD HAVE THE COMPONENTS AVAILABLE AS WELL,
IF THE THREAT SITUATION DEMANDED, TO ALLOW US TO DEPLOY
AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TREATY SHOULD
THEY BE REQUIRED BY THAT SPECIFIC THREAT SITUATION.

WE WILL PRESERVE THEREAFTER, THE CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY
WITHIN THREE YEARS, ENHANCING THE BASE FROM WHICH WE WOULD
MAKE THAT DEPLOYMENT DEPARTURE OVER TIME, CONTINUING IN
THIS PROCESS TO ADVANCE THE TECHNOLOGY, TO ADD ELEMENTS AS
REQUIRED, AND POSSIBLY, TO REDUCE DEPLOYMENT TIME LINES AS
THE SITUATION WARRANTED.

I THINK THIS PROGRAM IS BEST ILLUSTRATED BY THIS DIAGRAM.
WHAT WE HAVE COMMITTED TO FUND IS THIS YELLOW LINE, SO
WE'LL BE MOVING DOWN HERE IN A TRACK IN WHICH AFTER THREE
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SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

YEARS, '97, '98 AND '99, WE WILL HAVE THE OPTION TO MAKE A
DEPLOYMENT DECISION. IF THE THREAT WARRANTS MAKING THAT
DEPLOYMENT DECISION, THEN WE'LL MOVE OFF ON THIS GREEN
ARROW, AND IT WILL TAKE US THREE YEARS BEFORE THAT SYSTEM
IS DEPLOYED, SO THE FIRST DEPLOYMENT DATE WILL BE 2003.

I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE GREEN ARROWS HERE AREN'T
FUNDED. THERE'S NO MONEY IN THE BUDGET TO FUND THE

FUNDED. THERE'S NO MONEY IN THE BUDGET TO FUND THE EXECUTION OF THAT DEPLOYMENT. THOSE FUNDS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDED AT THE TIME THAT WE SEE THE NEED TO MAKE THAT DEPLOYMENT DECISION.

Q: HOW MUCH DOES THAT COST?

A: IT DEPENDS ON THE OPTION LOOKED AT. THE LOWEST PRICE OPTIONS ARE PROBABLY IN THE RANGE OF ABOUT DOLLARS 5 BILLION, AND THEY GO UP FROM THERE DEPENDING ON HOW ROBUST.

WHAT WE WOULD INTEND TO DO IN THIS BASELINE PROGRAM IS TO CONTINUE TO ENHANCE OUR BASE, TO HAVE A MORE CAPABLE SET OF COMPONENTS AND SYSTEM CAPABILITIES, SO THAT IF WE DEPLOYED SOME TIME LATER ON, THE CAPABILITY WOULD BE ENHANCED. I'VE ILLUSTRATED THAT SCHEMATICALLY BY THE RELATIVE CAPABILITY AT THE BOTTOM. THERE IS AN ERROR ON THIS CHART. THIS YELLOW HERE SHOULD BE GREEN. EVERYTHING GREEN ON THIS CHART IS UNFUNDED. EVERYTHING YELLOW IS FUNDED IN THE PROGRAM. SO THE IDEA IS, IF WE MOVE QUICKLY IN RESPONSE TO A THREAT THAT WE SAW IN THREE YEARS, THE KIND OF CAPABILITY THAT WOULD BE FIELDDED IN 2003 WOULD BE A VERY LIMITED CAPABILITY. IT WOULD BE A VERY THIN CAPABILITY.

THE SCALE IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE RELATIVE CAPABILITY, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM, HOW ROBUST IT IS AGAINST THREATS. WHAT I'M TRYING TO ILLUSTRATE HERE IS IF THE DEPLOYMENT WERE MADE IN THE NEAR TERM IT WOULD BE A FAIRLY THIN CAPABILITY. AS TIME GOES ON AND WE CONTINUE TO ENHANCE THE BASE, THE CAPABILITY THAT WOULD BE ACHIEVED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO ENHANCE. THE ISSUE HERE IS THAT WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS TO BE IN A POSTURE TO BE THREE YEARS AWAY FROM DEPLOYMENT SO THAT WE CAN RESPOND TO ANY VISIBLE SIGNS OF THE EMERGENCE OF A THREAT. IT DOESN'T MAKE SENSE TO US TO MAKE A DEPLOYMENT DECISION IN ADVANCE OF THAT BECAUSE THE CAPABILITY THAT WOULD BE ACHIEVED WOULD BE LESSER. WHAT'S SENSIBLE TO DO IS TO CONTINUE TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITY SO THAT THE BASE YOU HAVE TO BUILD ON IS AN IMPROVED BASE, BUT YOU CAN EXIT FROM WHEN IT'S NEEDED. SO THAT THE CAPABILITY, WHEN IT'S DEPLOYED, IS THE BEST, MOST COST EFFECTIVE CAPABILITY THAT'S AVAILABLE AT THE TIME.

THE LAST ELEMENT OF THIS PROGRAM IS THE TECHNOLOGY BASE. TO CONTINUE TO ADVANCE OUR CAPABILITY TO COUNTER FUTURE AND POSSIBLY MORE DIFFICULT THREATS. THIS PROGRAM UNDERPINS BOTH THE TMD AND THE NMD PROGRAM. PARTICULAR COMPONENTS THAT WOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR EACH WOULD BE DISTINCT AND SEPARATE, AND BUT THE TECHNOLOGY THAT'S BEING DEVELOPED HAS A ROLE TO ENHANCE BOTH. IT WILL ALLOW US TO PROVIDE BLOCK UPGRADES TO BASELINE SYSTEMS THAT WERE

DEVELOPED, TO PERFORM TECH DEMOS SO WE CAN REDUCE RISK AND PROVIDE A PATH TO MORE SPEEDY TECHNOLOGY INSERTION, AND IT ALSO ADVANCES SOME OF OUR BASIC UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGIES TO PROVIDE A HEDGE AGAINST SURPRISES AS WE PROCEED.

WE WILL CONTINUE TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS THAT ARE UNDERWAY TODAY, CONCEPTS THAT WE WILL BE PROCEEDING WITH ARE UAV

AIRBORNE INTERCEPT BOOST PHASE CAPABILITY -- THIS IS A VERY LOW LEVEL FUNDING TECH DEMO KIND OF CAPABILITY TO THE TUNE OF ABOUT DOLLARS 10 MILLION PER YEAR.

THERE ARE OTHER PROGRAMS THAT WILL BE FUNDED AS WELL, ALTHOUGH THEY'RE NOT FUNDED AS PART OF THIS PROGRAM. A KEY EXAMPLE IS THE AIR FORCE AIRBORNE LASER SYSTEM. WE'RE ALSO FUNDING SOME SENSOR SYSTEMS THAT WILL PROVIDE A KEY COMPLIMENTARY BASE THAT WILL BE REQUIRED FOR CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE, TO BE ABLE TO LOOK BEYOND THE HORIZON.

WE WILL ALSO MAINTAIN OUR SPACE-BASED LASER EFFORT FOR POSSIBLE FAR TERM BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT SOLUTION. THIS WILL BE FUNDED AT THE RATE OF ABOUT DOLLARS 30 MILLION PER UNCLAS SECTION 10 OF 17 STATE 039030

GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE
YEAR.

IN SUMMARY, OUR BMD PRIORITIES END UP REMAINING AS THEY WERE IN THE PAST. THE FIRST PRIORITY, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT THAT EXISTS TODAY. SECOND, TO NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE. AND THIRD TO THE SUPPORTING, UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY BASE.

THE CHANGES THAT I'VE DESCRIBED TO YOU I BELIEVE RESPOND TO THE THREATS, TO THE PRIORITIES EXPRESSED BY THE JOINT STAFF, AND ALSO TO FACT OF LIFE CHANGES IN THE PROGRAM STATUS.

THE TMD PROGRAM THAT I DESCRIBED FULLY SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF INITIAL SYSTEMS FOR THE HIGH PRIORITY LOWER TIER SYSTEMS I DESCRIBED, AND PROVIDES US THE ABILITY TO DEPLOY UPPER TIER SYSTEMS IN RESPONSE TO THE THREAT, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDING FOR THOSE SYSTEMS.

OUR NMD SYSTEM IS TAKING ON THE FOCUS, MOVING FROM A TECHNOLOGY READINESS POSTURE TO A DEPLOYMENT READINESS

TECHNOLOGY READINESS POSTURE TO A DEPLOYMENT READINESS POSTURE -- PUTTING US THREE YEARS AWAY FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN INITIAL SYSTEM, ALLOWING THAT DECISION TO MARK DOWNSTREAM, AS I SHOWED YOU, IN THE YELLOW AREA, IN THE YELLOW ARROW.

THE LAST ELEMENT IS A TECHNOLOGY BASE WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO ADVANCE THE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES TO DEAL WITH FUTURE THREATS AS THEY DEVELOP.

I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE GENERAL MOORMAN UP TO THE PODIUM IN THE ABSENCE OF ADMIRAL OWENS TODAY. I'D LIKE TO GIVE HIM SOME SENSE OF THE JROC'S VIEW OF WHERE THESE OVERALL PRIORITIES HAVE COME OUT IN THE GRAND SCHEME OF THINGS.

GENERAL MOORMAN: THANK YOU, DR. KAMINSKI. GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

AS DR. KAMINSKI SAID, I'M TOM MOORMAN, I'M THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE, BUT TODAY I'M NOT GOING TO BE SPEAKING TO YOU AS THE VICE CHIEF, BUT RATHER REPRESENTING ADMIRAL PILL OWENS. I WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE JROC PERSPECTIVE OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE BECAUSE WE WENT THROUGH AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW IN THIS AREA.

PERHAPS IT'S APPROPRIATE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE JROC BEFOREHAND, TO PUT THIS COUNCIL INTO CONTEXT FOR YOU. THE JROC GREW OUT OF GOLDWATER/NICHOLS. IT BRINGS TOGETHER THE SERVICE VICE CHIEFS, AND IT IS CHAIRED BY THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

IT IS AN ACTIVITY THAT THE VICE CHIEFS SPEND SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 10 TO 15 HOURS A WEEK IN MEETINGS, REVIEWING JOINT CAPABILITIES. WHAT I MEAN BY THAT IS PROGRAMS LIKE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE; LIKE COMMAND AND CONTROL; LIKE STRIKE; LIKE GLOBAL MOBILITY TO ASSESS THE CAPABILITY OF OUR FORCES TO FIGHT TOGETHER JOINTLY.

ANOTHER THING WE DO IS WE KEEP TRACK OF THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS PROCESS. OUR INTENT THERE IS TO MAKE SURE THAT WE'RE VIGILANT, THAT WE DON'T HAVE REQUIREMENTS CREEP AND WE ARE IN THE FRONT END IDENTIFYING THE KIND OF NEW PROGRAMS WE WANT TO BUILD.

IN SPENDING THAT MUCH TIME ON THE WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, WE SEE A LOT OF CHALLENGES AHEAD OF US. THEY'RE CHALLENGES LIKE DUPLICATION. THEY'RE CHALLENGES IN TRYING TO ENSURE JOINTNESS AND INTEROPERABILITY.

PUT THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE, AND THE THING THAT DROVE THE LOOK AT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE WAS A NEED TO FREE UP MONEY FOR RECAPITALIZATION. YOU MAY HAVE HEARD GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI MENTION THE FACT THAT IT IS OUR GOAL TO HAVE DOLLARS 60 BILLION WORTH OF PROCUREMENT DOLLARS A YEAR TO RECAPITALIZE THE FORCE. THAT IS A MAJOR CHALLENGE.

WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS, IN THAT RECAPITALIZATION EFFORT, FUND THE HIGHEST PAYOFF, HIGHEST PRIORITY EFFORTS.
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GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

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SO WITH THAT AS A BACKGROUND AND THAT IN CONTEXT, THE JROC

REVIEWED THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE. INITIALLY, IT WAS AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW, AND I'LL COME BACK TO THE INTERACTION THAT UE HAD WITH THE ACQUISITION COMMUNITY AND DR. KAMINSKI'S STUDY. BUT AS DR. PERRY SAID, THE JROC HAD A VIEW THAT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE NEEDED A LOOK. ONE OF THE REASONS WAS THAT IT GREW OUT OF THE DESERT WAR, AND WE HAVE NOT FIELDIED ANYTHING SINCE THEN, SO WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE EMPHASIS WAS CONTINUED TO BE PLACED ON MISSILE DEFENSE.

WE ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE PROGRAM, AS DR. PERRY MENTIONED, WE THOUGHT THERE MAY BE PERHAPS TOO MANY PROGRAMS, AND THAT THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON THE NEAR TERM THREAT.

FINALLY, AND EVERY BIT AS SIGNIFICANTLY AS THE OTHER REASONS, IS WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE HAD HARMONIZED THE ARMY AND THE NAVY PROGRAMS, AND I'LL COME BACK TO THAT.

WE MET SEVERAL TIMES ON THIS SUBJECT, AND IN ADDITION TO THAT, WE ENLISTED THE COUNSEL OF RETIRED GENERAL OFFICERS FROM EVERY SERVICE. WE MADE SOME CONCLUSIONS THAT I'D LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU. THESE CONCLUSIONS WERE IN THE FORM OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE JROC COMMITTEE TO THE CHAIRMAN AND THE SERVICE CHIEFS. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE VERY MUCH THREAT DRIVEN.

ONE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS WAS TO ADD DOLLARS TO THE NEXT GENERATION ARMY SYSTEM -- PAC-ILI, AND THE NEXT GENERATION NAVY SYSTEM, NAVY LOWER TIER. THE REASON FOR THAT WAS TO ENSURE STABILITY AND VIABLE INSURANCE ON THOSE PROGRAMS TO

ENSURE THEY WOULD BE DELIVERED WHEN WE NEEDED THEM.

WE ALSO HARMONIZED THE TARGET SETS. WHAT I MEAN BY THAT IS, WE CONSIDERED BOTH THE ARMY AND THE NAVY PROGRAM TOGETHER AND THE CONCEPT OF SHARING THE MISSION. THIS ALLOWED US TO RECOMMEND A BUY OF FEWER MISSILES, THUS SAVING QUITE A BIT OF MONEY.

WE PLUSSED UP BATTLE MANAGEMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL WHICH WE BELIEVED HAD NOT GOTTEN SUFFICIENT EMPHASIS, AND WE DIRECTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN INTEGRATED JOINT ARCHITECTURE FOR THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS PRUDENT RISK TO SLOW DOWN THE THAAD PROGRAM, THE ARMY TPAAD PROGRAM AS WELL AS NAVY THEATER WIDE PROGRAM.

THUS, WE HAD A RECOMMENDATION IN OUR SLOWING DOWN WAS TO MOVE OUT THAAD FROM A 1998 SYSTEM FOR FIRST EQUIPPED UNIT, FROM 1998 TO 2002. WE ALSO RECOMMENDED ADDING MONEY TO

NAVY UPPER TIER.

TO MANAGE THE RISK, HOWEVER, WE KEPT MONEY AND KEPT SCHEDULE ON THE USER OPERATIONAL EVALUATION SYSTEM, UQES, SUCH THAT THAT SYSTEM WILL BE AVAILABLE, FIRST UNIT EQUIPPED WILL BE AVAILABLE IN A PROTOTYPE FORM IN 1998 WITH ONE BATTERY OF ABOUT 40 MISSILES. ONE UNIT.

PART AND PARCEL OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WAS THE CONSEQUENCE THAT WE NOW RECOMMEND THAT YOU REACH A DECISION POINT FOR THE UPPER TIER SYSTEM IN APPROXIMATELY THE 2002, 2003 TIME FRAME. AT THAT POINT WE'LL COME TO A DECISION POINT AND SHOULD HAVE THE REQUISITE TECHNOLOGY HAVING BEEN DEVELOPED TO DECIDE WHETHER TO GO AHEAD AND BUY EITHER A THAAD AND AN UPPER TIER, OR AN ARMY THAAD AND A MARINIZED THAAD, OR CONDUCT DISSIMILAR COMPETITION BETWEEN THE TWO.

AS IN DR. KAMINSKI'S STUDY, WE ALSO LOOKED AT OTHER CAPABILITIES IN ADDITION TO THESE MISSILE SYSTEMS. ONE OF THE THINGS WE PUT A LOT OF EMPHASIS ON WAS SOPHISTICATED STRIKE OPS. THE REASON FOR THAT IS THAT WHAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO DO, IF ALL THINGS WERE EQUAL, IS KILL THE MISSILE BEFORE IT EVER LAUNCHES. SO WE DECIDED TO RECOMMEND PUTTING MONEY AGAINST STRIKE SYSTEMS AND SENSOR SYSTEMS FOR ADVANCED STRIKE OPS.

AS DR. KAMINSKI MENTIONED, WE ALSO ENDORSE THE AIRBORNE
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GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

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PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

LASER PROGRAM THAT THE AIR FORCE IS RUNNING, BUT ENDORSED IT AS A TECHNOLOGY DEMO THAT WOULD BE COMPLETE SOMEWHERE AROUND THE TURN OF THE CENTURY. AND AT THAT POINT, WE WOULD JUDGE THE OVERALL UTILITY OF AN AIRBORNE LASER SYSTEM.

THE TIMING THERE IS VERY IMPORTANT, BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW, IT FITS IN WITH THE UPPER TIER AND WITH ANOTHER PIECE OF THAT PUZZLE, BUT IN THIS CASE IT'S A PIECE THAT DEALS WITH BOOST PHASE AS OPPOSED TO TERMINAL OR MID-COURSE.

THE JROC, SWITCHING TO NMD, ENDORSED ADDING MONEY TO THE NMD PROGRAM. THAT PRIMARILY WAS TO PREPARE OURSELVES FOR THAT UNCERTAINTY AND REDUCE SOME OF THE PROGRAM RISK AND PROVIDE A HEDGE AGAINST THREATS THAT DR. KAMINSKI DESCRIBED TO YOU THAT ARE UNCERTT THIS TIME.

HAVING DONE ALL THIS, THIS WAS DOCUMENTED IN A LETTER FROM ALL THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE CHAIRMAN TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. IT PROVIDED AN INPUT TO DR. KAMINSKI'S STUDY,

AND OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS, BILL OWENS, REPRESENTING THE JROC, AND DR. KAMINSKI GOT TOGETHER, AND WE WERE VERY CLOSE TOGETHER, QUITE FRANKLY, IN OUR VIEW OF THIS PROGRAM AND THE PRIORITIES.

LET ME SUMMARIZE WHERE WE ARE FROM MY PERSPECTIVE. THE JROC REVIEWED THIS PROGRAM, PUT AN AWFUL LOT OF TIME REVIEWING THIS PROGRAM. WE REPRIORITIZED THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE. IN THE NEAR TERM WE BOUGHT INSURANCE BY PLUSSING UP PAC-ITI AND NAVY UPPER TIER. IN THE LONG TERM, WE BELIEVED WE MADE THE PROGRAM MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE THREAT. AND I THINK IF I WOULD CHARACTERIZE IT IN TERMS OF A COUPLE OF NOUNS, IT WOULD BE BALANCE AND PROPORTIONALITY. I THINK THAT'S WHAT WE BROUGHT TO IT.

IN DOLLARS AND CENTS, AS DR. KAMINSKI SAID, THE ULTIMATE RESULT WAS SAVING A LITTLE OVER DOLLARS 2 BILLION IN THE FYDP. I BELIEVE IT WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF NOT ONLY THE SERVICES WORKING TOGETHER IN THIS UNIQUE BODY CALLED THE JROC, BUT ALSO ONCE WE GOT A UNIFORM VIEW, AND EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF THE ACQUISITION AND REQUIREMENTS COMMUNITIES WORKING TOGETHER TO HANDLE A VERY VEXING PROBLEM.

THAT'S MY STATEMENT, AND I'D BE PLEASED ALONG WITH DR. KAMINSKI TO TAKE SOME QUESTIONS.

Q: CAN YOU TELL US WHAT YOU'RE GOING TO SPEND THE DOLLARS 2 BILLION IN SAVINGS ON?

DR. KAMINSKI: I CANNOT TELL YOU SPECIFICALLY, NO. BECAUSE THAT SAVINGS WILL BE SPREAD OVER A LOT OF DIFFERENT PROGRAMS. BUT THE PREMISE THAT WE HAD IN DOING THAT, OR ONE OF THE THINGS WE RECOMMENDED, THAT WHERE YOU ARE SAVING MONEY IN SERVICE SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, WE WOULD TRY TO RETURN MONEY TO THE SERVICES.

Q: SO THE MONEY GOES BACK TO THE SERVICES FOR THEM TO SPEND ON RECAPITALIZATION.

A: IN THE CASE WHERE IT IS A SERVICE PROGRAM. WHEN IT'S GENERAL O'NEILL'S MONEY, FOR EXAMPLE...

Q: I DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT'S GOING ON WITH SPACE BASED INTERCEPT. I THOUGHT THAT FROM THE POLICY PERSPECTIVE THAT THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WAS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY THAT YOU CONSIDERED IT ANOTHER TOP PRIORITY TO DESTROY ENEMY MISSILES OVER THEIR SPACE AND NOT OURS. WHAT HAS CHANGED THAT'S MADE YOU...

A: THE PRIORITY HASN'T CHANGED. THE AVAILABILITY OF

SOLUTIONS IS WHAT'S DRIVING OUR INVESTMENT. WE THINK THE AIR FORCE INVESTMENT IN THE TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM, IN THE ABL PROGRAM, IS A WISE INVESTMENT. ALONG WITH THAT, WE'RE JUST MAKING A SMALL SUPPLEMENTARY INVESTMENT IN A KINETIC KILL PROGRAM, WHICH IS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS, POTENTIALLY, THAN OTHER THINGS WE'VE LOOKED AT IN TERMS OF ITS ABILITY TO BE FORWARD DEPLOYED OVER A THEATER. BUT WHAT WE'RE DEALING WITH HERE IS AN ABSENCE OF GOOD, OTHER ROBUST SOLUTIONS.

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GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

I ALSO WANT TO COME BACK TO THE COMMENT GENERAL MOORMAN MADE ABOUT TAC OPERATIONS. THAT IS ANOTHER WAY TO ADDRESS THT PROBLEM.

Q: WHEN YOU SAY KILL VEHICLE, ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE TAC OPERATIONS OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT SOLUTIONS?

TAC OPERATIONS OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT SOLUTIONS?

A: THE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM I WAS TALKING ABOUT WAS A UAV-CARRIED KILL VEHICLE. IN ATTACK OPERATIONS WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A VARIETY OF FIXED WING, LAND-BASED, SYSTEMS LIKE ATACMS COULD PLAY IN THAT. BEING ABLE TO ATTACK WITH GROUND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEMS, AIR DELIVERED MUNITIONS. THE ISSUE THERE HAS TO DO WITH MORE OFTEN THE ASSOCIATED SURVILLANCE DEFINED THE THREAT SYSTEMS.

Q: DO YOU THINK THEY'RE STILL GOING TO FUND A SIX WING ATTACK OPTION?

A: WE'RE GOING TO FUND THE DOLLARS 10 MILLION A YEAR DEMONSTRATIVE PROGRAM THAT I DESCRIBED, THE UAV PROGRAM.

A: LET ME COMMENT QUICKLY ON THAT BECAUSE I MIGHT HAVE CONFUSED YOU. ON ABL, THAT IS FUNDED IN THE AIR FORCE, AND YOU'RE QUITE RIGHT, WE CONSIDER THAT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, AND YOUR COMMENT ABOUT BEING ABLE TO GET IT EARLY, AND THAT'S THE REASON FOR THAT. WE'VE GOT A LOT OF MONEY LEADING TOWARDS THAT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT, THE TECH DEMO AFTER THE TURN OF THE CENTURY.

THE SOPHISTICATED ATTACK OPS ARE GENERALLY FUNDED WITHIN THE AIRFRAMES OR THE SYSTEMS THAT WOULD USE THEM, FOR EXAMPLE. WE'RE LOOKING AT SENSORS AND WEAPONS, FOR EXAMPLE.

A: LET ME EXPLAIN ONE MORE PIECE OF THE STRATEGY. THE ABL HAS SOME KEY DEMONSTRATIONS COMING UP. WITHIN A YEAR OR SO THERE'S A KEY PROPAGATION DEMONSTRATION ASSOCIATED WITH PROPAGATING A SMALL BEAM OF ENERGY THROUGH AN AWFUL LOT OF ATMOSPHERE. WE'LL KNOW A LOT MORE ABOUT WHERE THAT PROGRAM IS HEADED WHEN WE COMPLETE THAT DEMONSTRATION IN A YEAR. WHAT WE WANTED TO HAVE IS A HEDGE. THAT LOOKS LIKE

OUR MOST PROMISING PROGRAM. WE'RE CARRYING THIS OTHER TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATOR AS A HEDGE, AS AN ALTERNATE MEANS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.

Q: I WANTED TO ASK ABOUT THE PATRIOT. YOU'RE ADDING DOLLARS 300 TO THE PAC-IT. DOES THAT RESULT IN THE SYSTEM BEING AVAILABLE EARLIER THAN IT OTHERWISE BE?

A: NO.

Q: WHEN IS IT GOING TO BE AVAILABLE?

A: THE FIRST UNIT EQUIPAGE FOR THE PATRIOT WILL BE IN FY99. THIS IS NOT ADVANCING THE DEPLOYMENT DATE. THIS IS REALLY DEALING WITH FACTS OF LIFE ADJUSTMENTS. THE PROGRAM WAS STARTED LATE. IT IS BEHIND SCHEDULE BY ABOUT FIVE OR SIX MONTHS AND THERE WERE SOME DISCONNECTS IN THE PROGRAM. SO WHAT WE WANTED TO DO WAS MAKE SURE THERE WAS AMPLE RESERVE AND AMPLE FUNDING IN THE PROGRAM TO MEET ITS MILESTONES, TO HAVE IT BE A STABLE, EXECUTABLE PROGRAM.

MILESTONES, TO HAVE IT BE A STABLE, EXECUTABLE PROGRAM.

Q: SO IT'S NOT GOING TO BE AVAILABLE ANY SOONER, AND FEWER BATTALIONS ARE GOING TO HAVE IT, AND YOU'RE SPENDING DOLLARS 300 MILLION MORE. THAT DOESN'T ADD UP.

A: THE ADDITIONAL BATTALION SAVINGS THAT WOULD COME FROM THOSE ARE COMING IN THE OUT YEARS. THEY'RE AT THE VERY END. WHAT WE'RE NOT DOING IS NOT BUYING SYSTEMS AT THE END.

Q: IN OTHER WORDS ALL NINE ARE EVENTUALLY GOING TO GET IN?

A: ALL NINE, ONLY SIX OF THE NINE ARE PLANNED TO BE FIELDIED WITH THE PAC-ILI. WE'RE HOLDING THREE IN RESERVE THAT COULD BE FIELDIED WITH THE MEADS. BUT WHAT I'M SAYING IS THE LAST THREE ARE COMING AT THE VERY END, AND I THINK ACTUALLY FALL OUT OF THE FYDP. YOU DON'T SEE THEM IN THE FYDP NUMBERS. THERE WILL BE A REDUCED MISSILE BUY IN THE OUT YEARS THAT GO BEYOND THE FYDP.

Q: WHAT YEAR IS THAT?

A: I DON'T KNOW WHAT YEAR THAT LAST BUY IS IN. WE CAN GET THAT, BUT IT'S OUT AT THE END OF THE FYDP.

Q: THE FYDP?

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GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

A: THE END OF THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PLAN. THE PLAN GOES FOR SIX YEARS STARTING WITH THE CURRENT BUDGET YEAR. THE NUMBERS I'VE BEEN QUOTING TO YOU ARE ALL FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PLAN BUDGET. I HAVEN'T TRIED TO TAKE ALL THESE TO PROGRAM COMPLETION. SO WHEN I'VE TALKED ABOUT ADDS OR PLUSSES, WHAT I'VE DONE IS SUMMED THE YEARS IN THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PLAN. THIS BUDGET YEAR OUT THROUGH 01.

Q: THE CURRENT FISCAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL WHICH WAS SIGNED INTO LAW LAST WEEKEND IDENTIFIED FOUR CORE PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE NAVY UPPER TIER AND THAAD AND IT SET SPECIFIC DEPLOYMENT DATES WHICH APPEAR TO BE MUCH SOONER THAN YOUR PROGRAM. HOW DO YOU SQUARE YOUR PROGRAM WITH THE CURRENT DEFENSE LAW?

A: OUR PROGRAM REPRESENTS OUR BEST EFFORTS AND OUR BEST BALANCING OF THE EXPENDITURES. IN SOME CASES, THOSE MILESTONES WOULD BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE EVEN WITH MORE FUNDING, GIVEN THE FACT OF LIFE WHERE THE

EVEN WITH MORE FUNDING, GIVEN THE FACT OF LIFE WHERE THE PROGRAM IS. IN OTHER CASES, THOSE MILESTONES COULD BE ACHIEVED WITH FUNDING BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE. IT'S CERTAINLY THE CONGRESS' OPTION IN OUR '97 PROGRAM OR OUT TO ADD THE FUNDING TO TRY TO GET TO THOSE MILESTONES.

Q: GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI YESTERDAY EXPRESSED SOME FRUSTRATION THAT FIVE YEARS AFTER THE GULF WAR WHEN THE LARGEST SINGLE GROUP OF CASUALTIES WAS CAUSED BY A MISSILE, WE DON'T HAVE ANY FIELDDED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND AS HE MENTIONED, THESE PROGRAMS HAVE SLIPPED. WHY IS THAT? WHY HASN'T THERE BEEN A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM FIELDDED, AND WHAT CAUSED THE SLIPPAGE?

A: THERE IS A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM FIELDDED, THE PAC-LI SYSTEM WHICH IS A THIN SYSTEM.

Q: IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AS AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEM AND IT'S VERY LIMITED.

A: YES, IT IS VERY LIMITED. THE GEM SYSTEM PROVIDES SOME ENHANCEMENT TO THAT. THE SYSTEM WE'RE DEVELOPING NOW... THESE SYSTEMS TAKE TIME. THEY'VE GOT TO BE TESTED...

LET ME JUST INDICATE FOR YOU THE SORT OF PROBLEMS THAT YOU RUN INTO. WHEN SYSTEMS ARE REACHING OUT A FEW HUNDRED MILES, IMAGINE THE COMPLEXITIES OF FINDING RANGES TO DO THOSE TESTS, TO WORK THROUGH THE CLEARANCE ISSUES. THESE ARE LARGE AND COMPLICATED PROGRAMS, AND IT ISN'T SIMPLY A MATTER TO FIELD THEM IN THE AIR. WE'RE MOVING OUT FULL BORE ON OUR PAC-ILI AND OUR SM2-BLOCK 4A PROGRAMS. THOSE PROGRAMS ARE NOT FUNDING LIMITED.

Q: IT SEEMS LIKE YOU REARRANGE ALL THE MARBLES IN HIS AIR DEFENSE KIT BAG, BUT YOU DIDN'T ACTUALLY TERMINATE ANY PROGRAMS. SO WAS THAT A CONSIDERATION, ACTUALLY TERMINATE PROGRAMS?

A: WHAT WE DID HERE WAS DELAY THE START OF A MAJOR PROGRAM. THAT IS THE KIND OF WRAP-UP THAT WOULD HAVE GONE

WITH A CONGRESSIONAL ADD TO THE NAVY THEATER WIDE SYSTEM, WOULD HAVE MADE A COMMITMENT TO A FULL BLOWN START OF A PROGRAM. SO IT DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU WANT TO CALL IT A CANCELLATION -- IN THIS CASE IT WAS DELAY OF A COMMITMENT TO ONE OF THOSE CORE PROGRAMS.

WHAT WE DID ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE PROGRAMS WE HAD WERE FULLY FUNDED AND EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS. EVEN IN THE THAAD PROGRAM WHERE WE MADE AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE OUT YEARS, WE KEPT INTACT THE CRITICAL CORE OF THAT PROGRAM TO DELIVER THE UQES CAPABILITY. SO WHAT I DID NOT WANT TO DO IS WHAT I WILL DESCRIBE AS A

WHAT I DID NOT WANT TO DO IS WHAT I WILL DESCRIBE AS A SALAMI SLICE, OF CUTTING SOMETHING FROM EACH PROGRAM WITHOUT ANY EXPRESSION OF PRIORITIES. INSTEAD, WHAT WE DID WAS FULLY FUNDED THE PROGRAMS WE THOUGHT WERE IMPORTANT AND DEFERRED THE START OF THE RAMP-UP ON THE NTW SYSTEM.

Q: WHICH NATIONAL DEFENSE OPTION ARE YOU GOING TO PURSUE IN ORDER TO MEET YOUR THREE PLUS THREE?

A: WE'RE NOT COMMITTED TO A SPECIFIC DEPLOYMENT OPTION. WE WILL BE LOOKING AT MANY COMPONENTS AND TESTING THEM. THERE WILL BE SOME NECKING DOWN THAT WILL CONSTRAIN THE OPTIONS THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO US. IT'S TOO SOON FOR ME TO UNCLAS SECTION 15 OF 17 STATE 039030

QQQQ
GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

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TELL YOU WHERE THAT WOULD BE CONSTRAINED TO AT THE MOMENT.

Q: DO YOU EXPECT THE 40 THAADs TO BE AVAILABLE FOR SOUTH KOREA TO MEET GENERAL LUCK'S REQUEST? IF A DECISION HASN'T BEEN MADE, IS THERE SOME IDEA THAT THAT IS HOW YOU WOULD MEET GENERAL LUCK'S REQUEST?

A: THAT'S CERTAINLY AN OPTION. I DON'T GET TO DECIDE THAT. MY JOB IS TO DEVELOP THEM AND HAVE THEM AVAILABLE AND THE CINCS' PRIORITY SYSTEM WILL DECIDE WHERE THEY GET DISTRIBUTED. THAT CERTAINLY LOOKS LIKE A PLACE WHERE THEY MIGHT BE USED.

Q: THAT IS HOW THEY'RE SET UP THEN. THEY'RE NOT EXPERIMENTAL AND THEY HAVE TO STAY AT AN EXPERIMENTAL BASE. THEY COULD BE SENT TO...

A: NO. THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT. BUT UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS A DEMVAL SYSTEM OR A PROTOTYPE SYSTEM. IT WOULDN'T BE FULLY SUPPORTED WITH LOGISTICS, FOR EXAMPLE.

Q: BUT IT DEFINITELY WOULD BE A FACTOR IN SATISFYING THE CINC' 5 REQUIREMENT.

A: YOU'RE QUITE RIGHT.

Q: I'M NOT QUITE SURE HOW YOU GET THE DOLLARS 2 BILLION SAVINGS. YOU TAKE DOLLARS 2 BILLION OUT OF THAAD, BUT YOU'RE PLUSING UP A BUNCH OF PROGRAMS. WHEN I DO MY MATH, IT FALLS SHORT OF DOLLARS 2 BILLION. WHAT ARE YOUR TOTAL SAVINGS?

TOTAL SAVINGS?

A: THE TOTAL ARE... ACTUALLY IT'S ABOUT DOLLARS 2.5 BILLION WHEN I COUNT ALL THE PROGRAMS, I THINK.

Q: THAT'S THE MONEY YOU SAVE PAST THE FYDP?

A: THROUGH THE FYDP. ALL THE NUMBERS THAT I'M GIVING YOU CUT OFF AT THE FYDP.

A: ONE OF THE(LARGE EXPENDITURES WAS FOR AN ADVANCED CAPABILITY THAT WE PUT IN STARTING IN '98. THERE WAS DOLLARS 1.171 BILLION IN THAT ADVANCE CAPABILITY. IF YOU LOOK AT THE MONEYS THAT WERE PUT IN THE NAVY THEATER WIDE AND INTO MEADS, THAT ADDS UP TO ABOUT 600 AND SOMETHING. SO OUT OF THAT LINE ALONE THERE WAS ABOUT DOLLARS 500 MILLION THAT COULD BE CALLED PART OF THIS DOLLARS 2 BILLION SAVINGS.

A: THIS ADVANCE CAPABILITY WAS A WEDGE TO BE ALLOCATED TO PROGRAMS AS WE NECKED DOWN. WE HADN'T DONE THE NECKING DOWN LAST YEAR.

Q: CAN YOU PUT A NUMBER ON THE BM-C3I PLUS-UP? AND WILL ANY OF THAT GO TOWARDS IMPROVING CURRENTLY FIELDDED SYSTEMS? I KNOW GENERAL PEAY OVER AT CENTCOM HAS IN THE PAST SAID THAT THAT CAPABILITY ISN'T QUITE WHAT IT SHOULD BE OVER IN THE GULF.

A: I CAN'T GIVE YOU ONE NUMBER FOR THE BM-C31 PLUS-UP. SOME OF IT IS IN COMMUNICATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCUREMENT OF SYSTEMS LIKE CEC, IN JTIDS FOR BETTER COMMUNICATIONS. THERE IS SOME INCREASE IN BOTH OF THOSE ACCOUNTS.

SOME WORK WE'RE DOING HERE IS IN IMPROVING OUR SENSOR BASE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE'RE STARTING AN EARLY ACTD PROGRAM TO GET A SENSOR SYSTEM UP IN THE AIR WHERE IT CAN SEE AN EXTENDED HORIZON. THIS IS AN AEROSTAT PROGRAM THAT WILL BE DONE. SO THERE'S SEVERAL DIFFERENT INITIATIVES. I HAVE NOT COLLECTED THEM DOWN TO GIVE YOU ONE NUMBER.

Q: HOW ABOUT CURRENTLY FIELDDED SYSTEMS?

A: ASK THE QUESTION AGAIN, I'M SORRY.

Q: IS IT INCLUDED? SYSTEMS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED?

A: LIKE PAC-TI?

Q: LIKE PAC-LI.

A: YES. AS A MATTER OF FACT, SOME OF THE WORK WE'RE DOING, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH CEC WOULD ENHANCE DEPLOYED NAVY SYSTEMS, AND YES, THERE ARE SOME OTHER ENHANCEMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.

A: THERE ARE ALSO FUNDS OUTSIDE (INAUDIBLE) THAT IS GOING TO HELP THIS PROBLEM. HE MENTIONED CEC, BUT I ALSO WOULD

TO HELP THIS PROBLEM. HE MENTIONED CEC, BUT I ALSO WOULD SAY A MAJOR PLUS-UP IN JTIDS, IN LINK 16, TO MAKE US MUCH UNCLAS SECTION 16 OF 17 STATE 039030

GENEVA FOR SCC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MCAP

SUBJECT: USG DECISIONS ON **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

PROGRAM: TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND PRESS RELEASE

MORE INTEROPERABLE. THAT'S ONE OF THOSE THINGS THAT THE JROC HAS PUSHED VERY HARD ON AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS FION HERE. THE REVIEW I'VE BEEN REPORTING ON HAS TO DO WITH THE FUNDS IN THE BMDO ACCOUNT. SO THINGS ARE HAPPENING OUTSIDE OF THESE ACCOUNTS IN OTHER ENHANCEMENTS WE LOOKED AT, BUT I WASN'T REPORTING THOSE FINANCIAL FIGURES TO YOU.

PRESS: THANK YOU.

END TEXT OF PRESS CONFERENCE.

PRESS STATEMENT

4. BEGIN TEXT:

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 16, 1996

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY TODAY ANNOUNCED THE RESULTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SIX MONTH STUDY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE** PROGRAM. THE GOAL OF THE PROGRAM REVIEW WAS TO ENSURE THE DEPARTMENT FIELDS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MISSILE DEFENSE AT AN AFFORDABLE PRICE IN TIME TO BEAT EMERGING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS.

THE PROGRAM REVIEW RESULTS CONCENTRATE ON THE HERE AND NOW THREAT OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CRUISE MISSILES AGAINST OUR FORWARD DEPLOYED TROOPS AND BASES. THE REVIEW ALSO STARTS A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT READINESS PROGRAM TO PREPARE US TO FACE POSSIBLE FUTURE STRATEGIC THREATS. THE REVIEW COMMITS TO SPENDING ABOUT DOLLARS 14 BILLION OVER THE FUTURE YEAR DEFENSE PLAN.

THE BMD PROGRAM WAS REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE ADVANCES,

TECHNOLOGY AND THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE ADVANCES, EVOLVING THREATS, FORCE PROJECTION NEEDS, CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SPENDING AND MODERNIZATION PRIORITIES, AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

THE REVIEW RECOMMENDED BUILDING ON EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIOR INVESTMENT TO DEPLOY LOWER-TIER (DEFENSE OF SMALL AREAS OR CRITICAL ASSETS WITH INTERCEPTS WITHIN THE EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE) MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE REVIEW WOULD ADD ABOUT DOLLARS 450 MILLION THROUGH THE FYDP TO THE PATRIOT PAC-3 AND NAVY AREA DEFENSE (LOWER-TIER) SYSTEMS. THIS ACTION WILL ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE ABILITY TO DEFEAT SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES.

ADDITIONALLY, THE REVIEW WOULD ADD ABOUT DOLLARS 85 MILLION THROUGH THE FYDP FOR THE MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM UNDERTAKEN WITH ITALY, FRANCE AND GERMANY THAT WILL PROVIDE LIMITED AREA DEFENSE FOR MANEUVER FORCES.

UPPER-TIER (DEFENSE OVER WIDE AREAS, WITH INTERCEPTS WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE) MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS WILL ALSO BE RESTRUCTURED. SECRETARY PERRY STRESSED THAT THE UPPER-TIER PROGRAMS ADD IMPORTANT CAPABILITY. THEY PROVIDE POPULATION AND AREA DEFENSE, BETTER DEAL WITH LONGER-RANGE THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MISSILES THAT LOWER-TIER SYSTEMS MUST ENGAGE. THE REVIEW RECOMMENDED CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF UPPER-TIER SYSTEMS BUT WOULD REDUCE OVERALL PROGRAM COSTS, WOULD MINIMIZE SCHEDULE AND TECHNICAL RISK AND WOULD MATCH THE SYSTEMS DEPLOYMENT WITH PROJECTED THREATS.

THE ARMY'S THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE PROGRAM, THE MOST MATURE UPPER-TIER SYSTEM WOULD MAINTAIN ITS ORIGINAL USER OPERATIONAL EVALUATION SYSTEM CONCEPT (A LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS CAPABILITY) AND SCHEDULE, BUT THE PROGRAM WOULD BE RESTRUCTURED TO REDUCE RISK. CURRENTLY UNCLAS SECTION 17 OF 17 STATE 039030

GENEVA FOR SCC

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PROJECTED TO COST DOLLARS 4.7 BILLION THROUGH THE FYDP, THE RESTRUCTURED PROGRAM WOULD BE BUDGETED AT ABOUT DOLLARS 3 BILLION THROUGH THE FYDP

DOLLARS 3 BILLION THROUGH THE FYDP

THE NAVY THEATER WIDE PROGRAM WOULD RECEIVE AN INCREASE OF ABOUT DOLLARS 600 MILLION THROUGH THE FYDP. THIS PLUS UP WOULD ENABLE THE NAVY TO START CONCEPT DEFINITION STUDIES AND TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS TO CONFIRM THE BEST INTERCEPTOR SOLUTION. THE INCREASE WOULD ALSO ALLOW THE NAVY TO PROCEED IN PARALLEL TO A SYSTEM-LEVEL INTERCEPT

FLIGHT WITH THE AEGIS/STANDARD MISSILE/LEAP CONFIGURATION.

THE PROGRAM REVIEW'S APPROACH TO NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE WOULD POSITION THE U.S. TO RESPOND TO THE STRATEGIC MISSILE THREAT AS IT EMERGES. THE EMPHASIS OF THE PROGRAM WOULD BE SHIFTED FROM A TECHNOLOGY READINESS TO A DEPLOYMENT READINESS PROGRAM, BUT THERE WOULD BE NO DECISION TO DEPLOY A NMD SYSTEM AT THIS TIME. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM WOULD COMPLY WITH THE ANTI BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY. IF A NMD SYSTEM IS DEPLOYED IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO COMPLIANCE REVIEW.

THE PROGRAM WOULD BE INCREASED BY ABOUT DOLLARS 200 MILLION OVER THE FYDP IN FISCAL YEARS 1997 AND 1998 TO ENABLE THE U.S. TO DEVELOP WITHIN THREE YEARS, ELEMENTS OF AN INITIAL NMD SYSTEM, THAT COULD BE DEPLOYED WITHIN THREE YEARS OF A DEPLOYMENT DECISION. THE REVIEW'S APPROACH WOULD PRESERVE THEREAFTER A CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY WITHIN THREE YEARS, WHILE ALLOWING THE U.S. TO CONTINUE THE ADVANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, ADD NEW ELEMENTS TO THE SYSTEM AND POSSIBLY REDUCE DEPLOYMENT TIMELINES.

THE BMD TECHNOLOGY BASE IS SEEN AS THE KEY TO COUNTERING FUTURE, MORE DIFFICULT THREATS. THE REVIEW RECOMMENDED CONTINUING TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS SUCH AS CONCEPTS FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE/AIRBORNE INTERCEPTOR BOOST-PHASE INTERCEPT CAPABILITY AS WELL AS THE AIR FORCE'S AIRBORNE LASER DEMONSTRATION.

"I HAVE NO HIGHER OBLIGATION AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAN TO PROTECT OUR FORCES AND OUR TERRITORY, SAID SECRETARY PERRY. THIS PROGRAM RESPONDS TO THREATS AS THEY DEVELOP, COMBINES CURRENT AND EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY TO FACE TODAY'S THREAT AND WILL ENABLE US TO DEVELOP NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO FACE TOMORROW'S THREAT FROM LONGER RANGE MISSILES.

END TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT.

TALBOTT

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SIT: ANDREASEN BELL CULLIN FAIRFAX FETIG HARRIS JOHNSON NSC PONEMAN
SAMORE SCHUKER SEATON SESTAK WITKOWSKY