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RUSSIA

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS



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The mass public has tuned out. Major networks' coverage sticks close to home and news moguls give rulers what they want. But choice is only a few clicks away.
- The Unraveling of Japan Inc. *Michael Hirsh and E. Keith Henry* 11
High growth in postwar Japan depended on shared sacrifice. Today Japan's multinationals go wherever profits take them, while consumers demand more.

Essays

- China I: The Coming Conflict with America
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Many American policymakers and Sinologists believe that China will inevitably become nonideological, pragmatic, materialistic, and progressively freer in its culture and politics. Beijing, however, sees the United States not as a strategic partner but as the chief obstacle to its regional and global ambitions. Under cover of its current conciliatory mood, China acquires the wherewithal to back its aspirations regarding Taiwan and beyond with real power. America's number one objective in Asia must be to derail China's quest to become a 21st-century hegemon.
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There is no "China threat," not because China is a benign giant but because it is too weak to challenge the balance of power. China can damage U.S. interests, but it does not require containment. The most striking aspect of Chinese foreign policy is its effort to promote stability. Indeed, China is easier to deal with today than ever before. The United States needs a policy to contend with China's ability to destabilize Asia, not a

Russia's Illusory Ambitions

Sherman Garnett

LOSING A GRIP ON EURASIA

ALTHOUGH A children's story may seem an inappropriate analogy to describe Russian power, A. A. Milne's tale of the honey-seeking bear who wedges himself in a rabbit hole describes Moscow's strategic situation better than the usual hypotheses. Like the bear, Russia finds itself in a "great tightness," caught between its lofty ambitions and reduced capabilities. While the Russian bear struggles to extricate itself from its predicament, the consolidation of new states like Ukraine and Uzbekistan, the rise of China, and the ambitions of rim-land states finally freed from the constraints of the superpower rivalry and able to pursue genuinely autonomous foreign policies are transforming the rest of Eurasia. The result is likely to be a Eurasia defined less by Russian power than by competition to fill the vacuum that Russia's troubles have created.¹

Understanding the Eurasia to come requires an understanding of the constraints on Russian power. The legacy of czarist and especially Soviet power continues to affect Russia's role in the world. Many Russians cannot conceive of abandoning their country's tradition as a great power. Russia's neighbors are all too familiar with that tradition, and view current Russian actions through its prism. Western observers, even when sharply divided in their assessments of Russia's progress, still use a vocabulary that exaggerates the country's capabilities for constructive or destructive behavior. When discussing Russian power, everyone still tends to leap from tactical observations to strategic speculation. However appropriate this approach may have been for the

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U.S.S.R., which possessed formidable diplomatic and military instruments and a well-articulated set of national interests, it is singularly unsuited to today's Russia and broader Eurasian trends.

Russia is an inward-looking state. It has accomplished much in the past five years, but immense political and economic difficulties remain. Its military has conducted the largest strategic withdrawal in history. At this time of reduced capacity, Russia must confront the most significant transformation of its surrounding strategic environment in the past five centuries—the greatest change since the rise of Muscovy. The Russia that emerges and the Eurasia that forms around it will define the real dangers and opportunities of the next century.

POST-SOVIET SHACKLES

IN THE WAKE of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia faces economic, military, and political shortcomings that directly constrain its international role. In the short term, the country's problems and their solutions seem almost to conspire to limit Russian state power.

Russia's economy is half the size the Soviet Union's was in its final days, and has suffered five straight years of decline. GDP was six percent lower over the first eight months of 1996 than in the same period the year before. Between corruption and kickbacks, the recent presidential campaign exacerbated Russia's problem with tax collection, already running far behind anticipated revenues. Russia may experience real growth in 1997 or 1998, as many experts predict, but a boom is unlikely.

Even if Russia manages to sustain modest growth, restoring the fiscal foundation for a more ambitious foreign policy will take several years. Low birthrates and declining life expectancy project great demands on social services and hold down per capita income and savings rates. Borrowing abroad is likely to remain a feature of the Russian economy for decades. Natural resources, particularly energy, will remain the foothold for Russia's place in the world economy, but this sector, especially oil and gas, will require heavy capital investment

¹This article is drawn from a monograph written for the Scientific Applications International Corporation's seminar "Toward 2000: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. National Security," chaired by Dr. Lewis A. Dunn.

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to ensure continued supply. And the profound shift in the structure of the Russian economy must be considered. Massive amounts of wealth and property once under state control are now in private hands. This change alone significantly limits the state's ability to mobilize resources for foreign policy.

There are also military limits on Russian foreign policy. Russia remains a preeminent nuclear power, but the Soviet Union's ability to project great conventional power is in ruins. Whether measured by quantitative standards like the number of divisions, tanks, fighter aircraft, or ships at sea, or such qualitative factors as morale and fighting spirit, the Russian military is in crisis. While its performance in Chechnya does not mean the military would fight poorly in other circumstances, particularly if Russia faced a serious threat to its sovereignty, the shortcomings that the war in Chechnya has exposed—from poor morale to gross mismanagement—would surely affect any military operation conducted for at least the next decade.

The Russian military is a demoralized and ineffective fighting force. Last year its personnel received no salaries for four months. Perhaps as many as 100,000 officers lack adequate housing, and many facilities do not have the infrastructure to care for the families of servicemen. Infectious disease has spread dramatically. Widespread draft-dodging has left the military a conscript pool with poor qualifications and physical health. Corruption is rampant throughout the army. The military is short of food and fuel and has resorted to emergency supplies; in 1995 the army depleted 35 percent of its reserve food and fuel stocks. Soldiers in Chechnya wore sneakers and winter hats donated by Moscow's Minatop Bank. (Imagine the United States conducting Desert Storm with the help of Nike.) In October 1996 TASS, the state news agency, quoted Defense Minister Igor Rodionov warning that "because of the chronic shortage of funds, Russia's armed forces have reached the limit beyond which extremely undesirable and even uncontrollable processes may arise."

Basic personnel needs, conducting operations in conflicts like those in Chechnya and Tajikistan, and sustaining the nuclear forces that give Russia its international standing are likely to receive the lion's share of funds. Little will be left for desperately needed training, equipment, and the destruction of old and potentially dangerous munitions. The

military will undoubtedly view expensive arms control undertakings as an unwelcome burden. Little money or energy will be left for reform, which has consistently been put on the back burner. For this year

Russia suffers not from sinister centralization but from government disintegration.

and many to come, analysis of military reform will likely yield the same judgment President Yeltsin made regarding 1995, namely that "military reform [has] made virtually no headway in Russia."

Compounding Russia's economic and military decline is the political confusion and fragmentation that has overtaken the coun-

try. Yeltsin's reelection may have alleviated fears of a communist return to power, but it has not solved the state's basic weaknesses, particularly in foreign policy. In the past year alone, the foreign and defense ministers have been replaced and two national security advisers have departed. In a pattern that has become characteristic of the Russian security policy apparatus, two new structures for foreign policy oversight have been created and pronounced ineffective. Each change in the security council or presidential bodies in the security sphere has engendered a new wave of Western warnings about concentration of power over the army, the police, and security policy. But the cycle of decrees, new structures, and reforms is less a sign of a sinister centralization than of quite the opposite—government disintegration.

In the absence of effective central coordination, individual ministers make their own policy. The minister for atomic energy secures contracts with Iran and China and announces the need for new smaller atomic weapons. General Aleksandr Lebed's dramatic peace breakthrough in Chechnya in August 1996 occurred against the backdrop of constant confusion over who was authorized to carry out Chechen policy. The commander of Russian forces in Chechnya fought publicly with Lebed over whether Russia should concentrate on negotiating or recapture Grozny. The commander even claimed to have a presidential order calling for him to retake the Chechen capital, but Lebed insisted it was a forgery.

What should be strategic decisions about military intervention and sales of advanced weapons appear to be the province, first and foremost, of cabinet officers, local commanders, and factory man-

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agers. In May 1994, when U.S. officials questioned their Russian counterparts on the wisdom of selling nuclear reactors to Iran, it became clear that the initiative for the deal—and most of the information about it—was in the hands of Viktor Mikhailov, minister for atomic energy. Likewise, the initiative for selling China the latest, fully equipped su-27 fighter aircraft and the capacity to produce its own version of the plane reportedly came from the manufacturer. Russian field commanders and local forces have played a key role in spawning intervention in conflicts on the new borderlands. Russian forces, many of them local troops, were ultimately drawn into ongoing conflicts in Moldova, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan. The emerging pattern in nuclear technology transfers, arms sales, and military intervention on the periphery is one of initiatives by individual ministers or coalitions of local, ministerial, and industrial representatives, all without benefit of advance coordination. The Kremlin may decide to take advantage of these initiatives, ignore them, or provide them with ex post facto strategic justification, but it has lost the ability to set the strategic agenda.

Confusion at the center, coupled with the proliferation of decision-makers, has made it difficult for both Russians and outside analysts to state precisely what Russian policy is. Do arms sales to China signify growing strategic cooperation or a need to raise cash? Has the government abandoned its traditional nonproliferation concerns in Iran or is the Ministry for Atomic Energy acting on its own? Is Russia asserting its military control over the new borderlands or are local commanders acting without Moscow's consent? Whatever the explanation, the actions of ministers, commanders, and political coalitions are creating strategic imperatives and setting in motion policies that are difficult to reverse. While the worst excesses of this policy fragmentation cannot last forever, there is no sign yet that it is nearing an end.

POWER PROJECTIONS

BEYOND THE material constraints on Russian power, there remains an intellectual shackle that is hardest to quantify yet perhaps most binding. Russia's foreign policy community continues to suffer from a failure to keep policy ends consistent with available means. A rough

consensus has emerged in Russian foreign policy: the country's leading statesmen proclaim their purpose to be maintaining Russia's place in the world as a country to be reckoned with. As Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov has stated, "Russia was and remains a great power. And like any great power, its policy must be many-vectored and multifaceted." This consensus sees Russia's top foreign policy priority as deepening integrative trends in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The policy's advocates intend not to mire Russia close to home but rather to solidify Russia's place in the former U.S.S.R. and, so doing, build a foundation for restoring Russia as a great power beyond the "near abroad."

At the same time, the Russian foreign policy community has become increasingly skeptical about a productive partnership with Western countries. Some in the community, and not just those at the extremes, go so far as to claim that the West—the United States in particular—plans to undermine Russia's status and turn it into a source of raw materials for the developed world. A broad consensus opposes the enlargement of NATO. The West is also criticized for its "negative attitudes . . . toward integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States," as Primakov told Moscow's Institute of International Relations last June. The foreign minister even defined NATO expansion and Western skepticism regarding CIS integration as the "two main irritants" in Russia's ties with the West.

Though less a matter of the core consensus, partnership with China has also emerged on the agendas of many in the Russian foreign policy community. Few would go as far as the senior Russian diplomat who claimed that "the interests of Russia and China coincide in virtually every area," but President Yeltsin's April 1996 visit to Beijing has rekindled hopes in Moscow of sustaining what the latest national security statement calls a policy of "equal proximity" to all the major powers.

At the heart of these consensus and near-consensus views of Russia's interests and place in the world is no detailed plan for the maintenance and expansion of Russian power, but simply a call for its assertion. As Primakov has put it, "The international situation itself requires that Russia be not merely a historically great power, but a great power right now." Although they are acknowledged, Russia's

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limited capabilities are not considered an obstacle to an active world role; Russian policy, according to Primakov, is being carried out "by no means on the basis of current circumstances but on the basis of [Russia's] colossal potential." Russia's limited means for pursuing integration within the CIS are supposedly supplemented by an "objective desire" for integration among all CIS countries. The mutual history, interests, and advantage that Yeltsin described as "the tremendous blood relationship" between the states of the former U.S.S.R. is said to be stronger than the impulse for sovereignty. To many Russians, some form of integration or reintegration is "the only alternative which would permit a mutually acceptable solution to the rising economic, territorial, military, ethnic, and other problems."²

Bold though they may be, such assertions are more faith than strategy. Russia's diminished power and the complexity of the new political environment are virtually guaranteed to force decisions that are at odds with the current consensus. Russia cannot afford to follow through on the comprehensive plans it envisions for the former Soviet Union. The Russian military does not have the personnel to occupy the bases it covets, and there is not enough money to finance the customs unions, unified border guard, military bases, air defense systems, or currency unions now being considered. Furthermore, if Russia chooses to strengthen ties with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, it will constitute a model of integration unappealing to more independent states like Ukraine and Uzbekistan, thus encouraging their flight from the CIS. On the other hand, waiting to pursue a less demanding but more comprehensive community risks leaving the states of the former Soviet Union to the forces of separation and disintegration.

With all the constraints on Russian policy, the Caucasus and Central Asia might well appear attractive as "compensatory" fields of activity. The south is a belt of weak states like Tajikistan and Georgia, with little international support, vulnerable even to a greatly weakened Russia. These states were targets in the nineteenth century, when Russia's quest to control the Bosphorus Straits and Central Europe stalled. For those who urge the assertion of Russian power, the

²Sergei Karaganov, "Russian Imperialism: Real and Imaginary Threats," *Segodnya*, August 5, 1994.

logic of southward expansion seems impeccable. But such compensation carries its own penalties. Real suppression of numerous conflicts and sources of regional instability like the civil war in Tajikistan calls for a great increase in financial and military resources. Russia has pronounced all of them vital to its interests but is hardly prepared to mount an effective response to any of them. As Chechnya has demonstrated, there are no little wars, especially for Russia's broken military machine. Although Foreign Minister Primakov has made the new states of the former U.S.S.R. a much higher priority than did his predecessor, Andrei Kozyrev, his attention has yet to yield significant gains. The problem is not—and has never been—the personnel at the top. The true limits on Russian policy have been the constraints on Russian power and the reluctance of the new states.


SAYING NO TO NATO

BEYOND THE borders of the former Soviet Union, the constraints on Russian foreign policy are even greater. Issues like NATO expansion reveal the tension between ambitions and limitations. Absolute opposition to expansion remains the norm, even as NATO's Russian opponents prepare for the alliance's move into Central Europe. Below the surface of that consensus, Russia's limited options and resources for response have split the foreign policy establishment. NATO expansion forces a showdown over the real sources of conflict likely to threaten Russia. For some Russians, NATO expansion is a true military threat that requires a military response, including the deployment and upgrading of offensive conventional and even nuclear forces in Belarus and the Russian province of Kaliningrad on the Polish border. But those who fear NATO less than Russia's isolation claim that such a reaction would unravel Russia's ties with the West and squander scarce resources responding to a chimerical challenge. For very different reasons, both sides oppose NATO expansion, leaving little room for compromise. Their common opposition, however, does not amount to a united front. As Thomas L. Friedman wrote in the July 24, 1996, *New York Times*, with a decision on expansion imminent, the Russian consensus on NATO is a burden rather than an asset for the Kremlin—an important reason why Primakov and others have

already begun to test the waters of compromise. It is also an important reason why Russia will be unable to make a swift or effective exit from its current straits.

While NATO expansion calls Russia's role in Europe into question, China's economic power and demographic advantages along the Sino-Russian border will eventually expose Russia's serious vulnerabilities in its far Eastern regions and Central Asia. Russia's military weakness also raises doubts as to whether it can play peacekeeper among the border region's emerging nations and restless ethnic minorities. Sino-Russian conflict is not the inevitable result, but Russia must confront the reality of China's rise and its own decline. Current trends suggest a partnership that, if it can be maintained at all, will increasingly reserve for Russia the junior role.

Despite the assertiveness of its current consensus, the problem that Russian foreign policy will pose for the outside world is not the return of empire but the unpredictable consequences of weakness and overcommitment. Only in Russia's foreign policy community are the forces of integration and reassertion stronger than those of disintegration and withdrawal. A dangerous new paradigm for Russia is apparent, one that builds ambitions and commitments on foundations of sand. Weaknesses and resource constraints confuse foreign policy in the short term and complicate the reconstitution of Russian power over the long term. The solution offered by Moscow's current consensus—a policy that would restore Russia's status as a great power while building the territory of the former U.S.S.R. into



ARCHIVE PHOTOS

*On the Farm: Russia's new military,
Chulkovo, Russia, September 1996*

an integrated Russian-led political, economic, and security structure—only worsens the dilemma Moscow faces by delaying its encounter with its own limitations and the challenges of the new Eurasian geopolitical environment.

For the West, a weaker Russia is no easier to handle. Weakness fosters suspicion, not strategic cooperation, and contributes to a more rigid conception of foreign policy objectives. Weakness will make Russia's great power status and the righteousness of integration litmus tests for the leadership and the opposition alike, instead of matters for analysis and policy debate. A stronger, more confident Russia could afford to consider whether the borders of the former Soviet Union must in all cases be its strategic borders. It could explore concessions, even on such difficult issues as NATO expansion, because such concessions would not call into question its status as a great power and equal of Western powers. It is not clear that a stronger Russia would do either of these things, but it is clear that a weak Russia cannot.

EURASIA ON THE RISE

BY AND LARGE, Russian foreign policy regards central Eurasia, particularly the former U.S.S.R., as an area of traditional Russian interest and influence. But Eurasia is changing. The catalyst for that change is, of course, the Soviet Union's disintegration. But disintegration did more than contract and transform Russian power. It created new nation-states of diverse economic potential, political stability, cultural orientation, and military power, and it opened up the formerly closed core of the continent to increased influence from the rim. These two trends have the potential to alter, substantially and permanently, economic relations and the balance of power in the region and across the Eurasian landmass.

Russia must confront both the successes and failures among the new states of Eurasia. The clear potential for failure has received the bulk of the attention in Russia and the West. Many of these states were unprepared for independence, facing enormous economic and political challenges with few resources, weak or nonexistent state institutions, and inexperienced leaders. The continuing civil war in Tajik-

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istan and the backward-looking authoritarianism of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus are obvious examples of the problems these new states can pose.

Russia must also come to terms with the stronger among these states. Russian analysts have been too quick to spot potential Tajikistans everywhere in the CIS. After facing several crises of economic reform and state-building, Ukraine and Uzbekistan have pursued independence with substantial success. Other states free of armed conflict have been less successful, but they too harbor ambitions to remain independent. The desire for sovereignty is a stronger force than many observers in Moscow appreciate. With the strongest of these states, Russia must create

Russia must inevitably assume the burdens of creating and sustaining the CIS.

genuine state-to-state relations. Even a Russian policy that is successful within the CIS will have to deal with a division between those states dependent on Russia and those that are less active participants in, or even wholly outside, the structures of the CIS. This division is not simply a function of the growing pains of the CIS but a permanent trait of the economic and security environment of the former U.S.S.R.

If the region's strongest states opt for a more independent path, the CIS will be limited to failed and failing states and will fall far short of becoming a zone of genuine political and economic cooperation. Russia must inevitably assume the role of creating and sustaining the CIS. There can be no talk of burden-sharing nor of anything like an Eastern European equivalent of NATO or the European Union. Russia must come to terms with the diversity in its own backyard. There are advantages to having sovereign neighbors that can stand on their own two feet, particularly if, as in this case, none of them can mount a military or security threat without the aid of another power.

Another enduring change shaping Eurasia is its growing openness to the outside world. The economic links, transportation patterns, and cultural and linguistic orientations sustained by imperial domination are already being challenged by alternatives from China, South Asia, the Islamic world, and Europe. Russia will never be a marginal country for the new states of the former U.S.S.R., but even a revived Russia is unlikely to enjoy for long anything like its current advantages.

Wider options will spring from relations with the outside world. A dramatic reversal of the historical flow of power is already apparent in Eurasia as a whole. For the first time in decades, political, economic, and even military power is flowing from the outside into the heart of Eurasia. What happens on the rim and in China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey has an increasing impact in the center of the continent. The Soviet state effectively sealed itself off from the outside world. It attempted to influence the borderlands, but was rarely influenced by them. That pattern's reversal is of momentous significance in Eurasia and is likely to be a source of continuing shock to Russia.

Early in the next century, the projected growth of the economies of China and other Asian states will change world consumption patterns of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources, increasing the importance of sources of those commodities in Central Asia and Russia. Asian requirements will spur new transportation links, pipelines, and trade patterns. Through the opening of Central Asia and the former U.S.S.R., Asian economic and security issues could become tightly interwoven. Although still in its beginning stages and largely peripheral to Western interests, the opening and development of Central Asia could also provide a land connection between such vital areas as East Asia and the Persian Gulf. With its demographic imbalances, ethnic tensions, natural riches, and emerging states, the old Sino-Soviet land border, over 4,200 miles long, is perhaps the most geopolitically active region in the world.

A similar transformation of the states on Russia's western border could well occur with the expansion of the European Union, even if none of the new states of the former U.S.S.R. are immediate candidates for membership. If the Visegrad states become members, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, and even the Kaliningrad district of Russia will border countries integrated into Western Europe. The influence of such a market would be irresistible. The Baltic states make no secret of their desire to join the EU, and with its recent economic advances, Estonia's candidacy is being taken seriously. Similarly, given Ukraine's desire for links to the West and Poland's need for a stable and independent Ukraine, Polish-Ukrainian relations, like other bilateral and multilateral relations that exclude Russia, have greatly expanded and will continue to grow.

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With the prospect of NATO expansion, the security orientations of the states of Central Europe are also changing. Poland's inclusion in NATO would create Western interests in and increased interaction with the bordering Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine, although this is little understood in the West. Poland's security, and thus that of its allies, will be in large measure determined by the stability of its eastern neighbors. NATO and the most powerful Western states will gradually become more active in Eurasia as the alliance's new frontiers demand their attention. President Lushenka's recent steps toward establishing a Belarusian dictatorship, events that the West has largely deemed a Russian affair, could not so easily be left to Moscow were Belarus NATO's forward position. While increased Western activity in Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltics need not conflict with Russian interests, it will certainly be another sign of how the outside world has begun to shape lands that Russia has traditionally regarded as its exclusive domain.

SOUTH BY SOUTHWEST

As CHINESE power continues to grow, Russia must also accept and adjust to China's efforts to claim its place among the world's leading states. Although focused on Taiwan and the south, China will also bring considerable economic and demographic pressure to bear on Central Asia and the Russian Far East. The sheer size of the Chinese economy and the dynamism of its development are likely to be much more important factors in the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East than development plans from Moscow. If China undergoes an internal crisis that prevents it from becoming a true global power, its impact could be even greater; a weakened Russia would have to deal with the instability and chaos of an unstable China.

From the southwest, Islam will continue to influence states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as adjacent regions of Russia. The new Islamic states of the former U.S.S.R. will inevitably take their place in the Islamic world. Some Russian officials and commentators seem hysterical when describing this shift, as if the Islamic world were a monolithic fundamentalist block that the new

states of Central Asia would be unable or unwilling to resist. The truth is more complex. Although one cannot rule out an accession of factions with fundamentalist links and leanings in Tajikistan or elsewhere in Central Asia, the real outside influence is Islam itself. The states of Central Asia have been steeped for more than a century in Russian civilization. That influence, and its advantages for

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Moscow, must subside. It will linger longer and more vividly in states like Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have both entered into integration agreements with Russia, but even they will eventually become increasingly Islamic.

Along the rim of Eurasia, the end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry—and thus the withdrawal of Soviet aid and power and the downsizing of U.S. forces and commit-

ments—has left a vacuum for the region's states to fill. Both Russia and the United States must deal with the rise of the region's middle powers. While Moscow remains preoccupied with conflicts in the militarily weaker states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, those powers just beyond the borders of the former U.S.S.R. are modernizing their military forces with advanced conventional systems, long-range missiles, and even nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Conflicts between those powers could well include the threat or even the use of such weapons. Both the United States and Russia still view that threat through the eyes of their friends and former clients. Russia is content with its strong ties to India, Iraq, and Iran, and it worries about Turkey and Pakistan. For the United States, the dual menace of Iran and Iraq is paramount. Continuing to view the region as a struggle of proxies will prevent both Russia and the United States from addressing the problems likely to emerge there. The states on the Eurasian rim could well give rise to ambitious powers with significant military capabilities that would cast a shadow both inward, over the core of Eurasia, and outward, over sea-lanes vital to the United States. Unfortunately, Moscow and Washington have yet to explore the potential for strategic cooperation to avoid such dangers.

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RUSSIA'S RABBIT HOLE

FOR AT LEAST three centuries Russia has been a constant and decisive presence in European and Asian balances of power. In the past five decades, the Soviet Union, emergent as a superpower, was in a tug of war for diplomatic dominance. With that in mind, observers continue to focus on the potential for Russian strength rather than current Russian weakness. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the country's massive internal needs have constrained Russian power. Those constraints are not immutable. Economic growth will return. The fragmentation of the state can be overcome, and dilapidated armies can be restored. Even changes outside Russia may turn out to be less intrusive or corrosive of Russian power than current trends suggest, but they do circumscribe Russia's immediate choices and form the basis for any longer-term options for restoration.

In the short term, Russia can be neither a global partner nor a global menace. Its most sustained international efforts continue to be those closest to home, particularly on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. Even there, Russia's ambitions and commitments are out of keeping with its current capabilities. Constraints on the country's resources and the rise of a more complex external environment limit Moscow's ability to dominate the former U.S.S.R., but they do not rob Russia of the natural leverage it enjoys over its new neighbors as a result of its great size, natural wealth, and long-term potential. Russia would enjoy more options if its leaders modernized their views and embraced less direct forms of influence, including the whole arsenal of "soft power." There are considerable advantages for a state under Russia's current constraints in eschewing the economic and military obligations that extensive interference in the lives of its neighbors would entail. Some within the Russian leadership understand that, but others still see the former U.S.S.R. as an unambiguously Russian arena, a last bastion of the old-fashioned rule of the strong.

Even here, Russian power is limited. Neither Russia nor the rest of the world has adjusted to the shape of the new Eurasia, to the potential for the combination of excessive Russian ambitions and dwindling Russian capabilities to spark strategic surprises. With China emerging as a superpower, conflicts festering in Afghanistan and Tajikistan,

and relations within the CIS growing more diverse, the makings of such surprises dot Russia's periphery. In many places strategic initiative has shifted to China and the small and medium-sized states of the rimlands. These patterns of Eurasian power and diplomacy are still in their early stages. There are more surprises to come.

Both Russia and the West must now get the outlines of Eurasia's emerging security environment right. If the West misinterprets Russian foreign policy, mistaking today's more assertive and nationalist consensus for the return of the old Russia, it could prematurely end an era still marked by the virtual disappearance of the great strategic frictions that plagued U.S.-Soviet relations. The West could well wind up on a fruitless watch for the return of great Russia, allowing other challenges to the peace and stability of Eurasia to slip by. Russia too will suffer if it believes that the West—and not its own situation—is to blame for making Russia's traditional posture in its neighborhood and beyond unsustainable. Nor will adopting an anti-Western posture help address the emerging challenges Russia faces to the south and the east.

The Eurasia of the next century will yield an array of such challenges, and they will almost certainly be easier to address through U.S. and Western cooperation with Russia than in its absence. Mutual suspicions, unresolved differences, and unfulfilled promises now taint the basis for cooperation. The West bears some of the blame, but Russia must understand the strategic realities of its situation and act accordingly. Russia is a wedged bear in a great tightness, and its extraction is unlikely to be the stuff of children's tales. ②

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Power Failure

American Policy in the Caspian

—S. Frederick Starr—

A CARDINAL PRINCIPLE of U.S. policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been to foster the independence of the new states established on former Soviet territory. In Central Europe, U.S. policy goes further: In order to protect the sovereignty of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has championed the eastward expansion of NATO, in effect transforming what had been a Russian glacis against the West into a European glacis against Russia. Despite strong Russian objections, the U.S. government is pressing ahead with this.

Many debate whether such a course is either necessary or wise. Nearly lost amid these controversies, however, are the growing problems of sovereignty in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Consistent with its principles, the United States has made clear its support for the independence of the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and the three Caucasus republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). But whereas in Central Europe Washington barely acknowledges Russian sensibilities, in Central Asia and the Caucasus it indulges them to excess. As a result, U.S.

deeds fall short of its rhetorical support for the new countries of the region. Particularly in the crucial energy sector, U.S. actions are having the effect of undermining these countries' sovereignty.

Under both the Bush and Clinton administrations, policy toward this region has been largely derivative of other U.S. objectives, above all the desire to support the political and economic development of the new Russia and the concern to isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is understandable, given the centrality of these two countries to American interests as a whole. But the resulting policies have the effect of assigning excess influence on the area to Russia and, hence, of preventing the emergence of a natural balance of influence in the area among these countries' larger neighbors. The result is to weaken the independence of the new states on either side of the Caspian and to destabilize the region as a whole.

It is clearly time for a second look at U.S. policies, not least because much has changed since they were first put in place. Above all, the advanced industrial countries have come to appreciate the fact that Central Asia and Azerbaijan have oil—lots of oil—and huge amounts of natural gas. Suddenly, U.S. officials at every level, right up to and including the White House, are studying oil deals and pipeline routes and generally rushing to incorporate energy concerns into their action programs for the region.

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So far this has taken place with scant regard for the larger geopolitical issues at stake. Lacking this larger perspective, the United States is left not with a real policy toward the region but a mélange of corollaries of policies whose real focus is elsewhere. If the United States wants to live up to its professed concern for the sovereignties of these eight new states, it is time to rethink what it is doing there, as well as its policy toward Iran. For the status quo is bad for Central Asia and the Caucasus, bad for the development of democracy in Russia, and, arguably, bad for U.S. efforts to deal effectively with the regime in Tehran. There is still time to set things right. But not very much time, for once energy deals are sealed and pipeline routes settled, it will be much harder to adjust course.

Moscow's Relentless Pressure

THE VOLUME OF gas and oil involved in Central Asia and the Caucasus—referred to generically as the Caspian Basin—is potentially so vast that its importance extends far beyond the new governments' concerns for their own economic and political survival. Clearly, the region is fated to play a major role in all future planning on world energy supplies. More specifically, its resources are part of the key to relieving the overdependence of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan on just one source of supply, the tempestuous Persian Gulf, and all the troubles that go with it.

Estimates vary widely but they are all high. Together, Central Asia and Azerbaijan possess 7.5 trillion cubic meters of known reserves of natural gas and probable undiscovered reserves of 20 trillion cubic meters more. The known gas reserves of Turkmenistan alone are twice those of the North Sea and four times those of the Gulf of Mexico.¹ The lowest estimate of the region's known reserves of oil is twenty billion barrels. But Kazakhstan, whose Tengiz field is one of the largest anywhere, claims

twenty-two billion barrels of known reserves with a potential to rise to more than fifty billion barrels, while estimates of Turkmenistan's undiscovered reserves range up to thirty-seven billion barrels.²

While developed economies everywhere have an interest in securing a diversified supply of oil and gas, for Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia unencumbered access to markets is the key to their very survival as independent states. And on this point Russia has pursued a far more aggressive and threatening strategy than anyone has accused it of doing in Central Europe.

It is true, of course, as even the most hardened Russophobes concede, that Moscow lacks the ability to project real power beyond its borders through its military, nor is it soon likely to do so with the benign tools of industrial export, communications, or aid. Much "integrationist" sentiment in Moscow is mere bluster, the normal emanations of people adjusting to the realities of their post-imperial status. It is less threatening than what was heard from de Gaulle's Paris forty years ago or, for that matter, from London or Madrid in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The U.S. government has been wise to ignore it. But in the field of energy Russia is able to exert such powerful leverage over its southern neighbors as to jeopardize their ability to develop as sovereign entities. In this domain irredentist schemes have not

¹Jean Christophe Fugé, "The Gas Industry of the Southern FSU", *Gas in the CIS, 1996: A Special Report*, *The Petroleum Economist (TPE)*, p. 26; Robert O'Connor, Jr., "The Sleeping Giant of the Gas World?", *Gas in the CIS, 1996: A Special Report*, *TPE*, p. 28; see also, *Doing Business in Turkmenistan*, prepared by Chase Manhattan Bank for the State Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, 1996, pp. 23-4.

²Valera Belousov and Isabel Gorst, "Pipeline Problems Block Oil Sector Development", *TPE*, April 1996, p. 10; see also O'Connor, p. 28.

only been trumpeted by disgruntled chauvinists but actually implemented over the past several years. In energy Russia has reverted to the same hardball tactics employed by the Soviet government in the 1980s.

Moscow's policy is simplicity itself: First, it dictates that its southern neighbors must export all their oil and gas through Russian pipelines or, failing that, minimize the capacity of alternative lines and assure that Russian firms own a stake in them; second, it intrudes Russian firms into multinational energy consortia put together by Azerbaijan or the Central Asian states; third, it forces the Central Asians to allocate energy to CIS countries that do not pay their bills, thus assuring that a producer country like Turkmenistan remains poor; fourth, it claims or creates Central Asian debts to Russia and then forces payment in the form of shares in the region's refining and processing facilities as they are privatized; and, fifth, wherever possible it uses Western credits and investments in Russian firms to pay for these projects.

It is not possible in a short space to recount all the concrete steps that have been taken to implement this policy.³ Suffice it to say that Russia has done everything possible, short of actual invasion, to prevent Azerbaijan from exporting its Caspian oil through a pipeline to the Black Sea coast of Georgia. Additionally, Moscow has tried to foil alternative routes for transporting the oil, such as sending it out through an unused Iranian-Turkish pipeline, or even through a proposed Turkish pipeline ending in the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The latter project remains alive as of this writing, but its construction, which is by no means certain, lies in the future. Turkmenistan had also sought alternatives to Russian-owned pipelines for its gas exports to Europe. To disabuse leaders of that country of such notions, Moscow cut back Turkmenistan's promised deliveries to Europe by 20 percent and then for two years blocked deliveries to other parts of Europe. The Turkmens got the message.

No less striking is the manner in which

Moscow has attempted to bring Kazakhstan to heel. Russia's general approach to all development in the region has been to insist that the Caspian is a lake and not a sea, a formulation that would give Moscow veto power over all plans—notably those of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan—to exploit the Caspian's resources. Last December Moscow gained its objective that beyond a forty mile limit all resources would be exploited jointly by all littoral countries, effectively denying Azerbaijan control of some of its richest properties. While this debate grinds along in international meetings, Russia has used stronger methods against Almaty (as Alma Ata became known after independence), especially in its efforts to assure that oil from Kazakhstan's massive field at Tengiz be exported solely through Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. When Kazakhstan balked in 1994, Moscow simply closed the spigot on all Kazakh exports until that country, on the verge of civil breakdown, saw the error of its ways.

Meanwhile, Chevron, Kazakhstan's partner in the Tengiz project, seemed unwilling to play ball, so Moscow declared its Tengiz oil to be so filthy that it endangered the Russian pipeline and posed an environmental hazard—this, despite the fact that during Soviet times the Russians themselves had been shipping the same oil through the same line! Chevron obliged by building a new processing plant. When at this point Turkey protested (on environmental grounds) against a parade of Russian supertankers winding their way through the traffic-choked Bosphorus at Istanbul, the Russians responded by undertaking to build either a terminal at St. Petersburg, 1100 miles to the north, or a new pipeline across the Balkans. Such tactics eventually brought all parties to agreement on the Novorossiisk line. Celebrating Moscow's victory, Russia's deputy prime minister made the revealing declaration that the pipeline represented “an enormous step promoting the

³See Stephen Blank, “Central Asia”, *Middle East Quarterly* (June 1995), pp. 55-61.

integration of Russia and Kazakhstan."⁴ It also meant billions of dollars in tariffs for Russia's cash-strapped government.

This is nothing new, of course. As Thane Gustafson, an American analyst of Russian energy policies, has detailed, Moscow has "plundered" the resources of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for generations.⁵ Part of this plundering entailed locally raised funds to supplement Moscow's investment in southern oil fields. Whatever the locals were unable to pay was entered in the books as debt, and it is in part these old debts that give Russia leverage over Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan today. The huge Moscow gas cartel, Gazprom, wants to swap these debts for equity in Azerbaijan's privatizing energy firms, while Lukoil, the largest Russian oil company, has recently used the debt lever to angle for a stake in the major Kazakh refinery at Chimkent.

It was on behalf of Lukoil, too, that the Yeltsin government engaged in one of its roughest campaigns, namely to prevent Azerbaijan from signing with an international consortium of nine firms, four of them American, two British, one Norwegian, one Turkish, and none Russian. The consortium's initial goal was to develop Caspian oil fields and send the product to Europe by one of several proposed "southern" pipelines through Georgia or Turkey. To prevent the development of this route the Russians twisted the arm of Azerbaijan's President Abulfaz Elchibey. When this yielded no results they moved to unseat him. First, they cut off Azerbaijani oil exports, crippling the economy. Then, using Armenia as a surrogate, they put international pressure on Baku over the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, they looked the other way as old Soviet arms depots in the country were emptied into the hands of local warlords opposed to Elchibey. At length Elchibey fell, to be replaced by a former Soviet leader, Haidar Aliiev. And even though the consortium deal was eventually signed, the price had been raised to include the participation of Lukoil

and the temporary shelving of plans for alternative pipelines to the one through Russia. But Aliiev proved no pushover and Moscow has recently renewed its strong-arm tactics, including backing two attempted coups against him.

With billions at stake, the world of oil and gas giants is nowhere kind or gentle. The question arises whether these various incidents are merely the work of a few overzealous captains of Russia's new private industries or a real policy of government. All evidence points to the latter. Energy is both the largest and the least reformed sector of the Russian economy. Gazprom's 1993 privatization was so reluctant that the government still owns 40 percent of it, and the "private" directors insist on approving all sales of shares. Only in late 1995 did the oil industry begin to privatize, through the dubious process of selling shares to the major banks in exchange for loans. The sector as a whole has shown far more interest in rebuilding Soviet-style vertical cartels than in promoting efficiency or environmental consciousness.

These cartels remain inextricably bound up with the state. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin enriched himself as head of Gazprom while two of Yeltsin's main supporters today, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, both hold large stakes in banks that serve the energy industry. Gazprom's chief executive officer, Rem Vikharev, and Lukoil's president, Vagit Alekperov, both have easy access to the government. The minister of foreign affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, earned his spurs doing KGB work in Iraq at the time the USSR was searching for an opening to the Persian Gulf. In January 1990, it was Primakov, then chairman of the USSR's Council of the Union, who appeared

⁴Deputy Prime Minister Valeri Serov, BBC Monitoring, December 8, 1996.

⁵Thane Gustafson, *Crisis Amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy Under Brezhnev and Gorbachev* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 28.

in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku to tell the populace that the Red Army was occupying their city only to protect them; several hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded in the subsequent fighting.⁶

It is the lusterless but hard-driving members of this "energy-policy complex", far more than such colorful politicians as Moscow's bumptious Mayor Yuri Luzhkov or Duma member and buffoon Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who best embody Russia's neo-imperial strivings in the Caspian region. They are men of deeds rather than words and, unlike those who stand for elective office, they are little concerned with popularity or fame. Nor are they friends of democracy. Accustomed to viewing the exercise of power as a right, they consider the ballot box an unnecessary accoutrement and democratic oversight of their activities an inconvenience. Even though a few of them maintain high profiles, their ventures into foreign policy are all but unknown to most Russians.

But not to people in Central Asia or the Caucasus. There the very word "reintegration" conjures up dark images of Russia's energy-political complex. It is no secret in Ashgabat, Almaty, or Baku that Russia has forced the new governments into unequal energy deals and that opposition by local leaders is met with campaigns of economic and political destabilization. And since Russia's program to control Central Asia through its energy resources also affects Ukraine, these matters are well understood in Kiev and Lviv as well. When people in Almaty protested their declining living standard in December 1996, some blamed the situation on President Nursultan Nazarbaev's concessions to Moscow, while others blamed it on his failure to come to terms earlier. Clearly, Russia was trying to use its energy-based foreign policy to make itself once more the arbiter of their fate. No wonder that the prime minister of Uzbekistan recently declared that "further integration into the Commonwealth of

Independent States is counter to the economic interests of Uzbekistan."⁷

The American Role

WHAT HAS BEEN the response of the United States to all this? From the moment the states of the Caspian Basin gained independence, the United States has repeatedly pledged to support their sovereignty and their freedom to develop as democratic societies with free-market economies. While it is clear that many of the Russian initiatives described above directly threaten the achievement of these goals, the United States has failed thus far to produce an adequate response. It has endorsed the principle of diversity when it comes to pipelines and energy consortia, and it has opposed the Russian view that the Caspian is a lake, but beyond this its belated reactions and general policy biases have done more harm than good.

Foreign policy is never formed in a vacuum. In this instance the response of American policymakers has been shaped by at least five quite different considerations. First has been the reasonable assumption that priority must be given to the democratic transformation of Russia and the development of its economy. It has been assumed that successful change there would improve the prospects for the other fourteen former Soviet republics, while failure would come close to dooming them. Since oil is the heart of Russia's export economy and since many U.S. firms were interested in participating in the development of that sector, it looked as though America could do good and do well at the same time. Euphoria over Russia's energy sector eventually waned, thanks to

⁶Audrey L. Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), pp. 214-325.

⁷Utkur Sultanov, as reported by Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, and reported by BBC Monitoring, December 16, 1996.

capricious taxes, corruption, and rising nationalism. But the U.S. general commitment to a "Russia first" policy has remained.

Second, the U.S. government was woefully ignorant of Central Asia. Some officials, noting the absence there of a movement like Solidarity in Poland or of velvet revolutionaries as in Czechoslovakia, believed that the peoples of these former Soviet republics were not really interested in independence. Their communist elites may have been more interested in gaining a free hand within the Soviet system than in independence, but the same cannot be said of their peoples. Few in Washington knew that bands in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan waged guerrilla warfare against Soviet rule down to the 1940s; that one in ten Turkmens and Azeris and nearly half of the Kazakhs perished during collectivization and the purges; that nearly the entire population deftly resisted every communist assault on their culture for a century; or that in 1986 Kazakhs squared off against Soviet forces in Alma Ata and in 1990 Azerbaijan's Popular Front confronted the Red Army on the streets of Baku. Somehow, these peoples were still deemed less worthy of American solicitude than the Balts, let alone the Central Europeans.

Third, Americans convinced themselves that these peoples, overwhelmingly Muslim by heritage, were ripe targets for Islamic fundamentalism that would sweep into the region from Iran or Afghanistan. Wasn't the civil war in Tajikistan but a mild case of what might take place in Uzbekistan or Azerbaijan if the infection was not stopped at the old southern border of the USSR? Could not such a movement even place Russia in jeopardy, as politicians like Zhirinovsky and General Alexander Lebed warned?


In entertaining such speculations, U.S. policymakers, like their counterparts in Moscow, have become ardent champions of Samuel Huntington's notion of a "clash of civilizations." In following this line, Washington ignores the fact that most Central Asian Muslims are not Shi'a but Sunni, and of the

very traditionalist Hanafi school at that. True, Azeris are Shi'a, but they are Turkic and not Persian speakers, and thus less a prospect for proselytizing by Tehran than a perpetual cause for anxiety there, since Iran has a large and potentially volatile Azeri minority. Beyond this, the population of Central Asia is vastly better educated than any in the Muslim Middle East, and all the new post-Soviet governments there are staunchly secularist. Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov spoke on behalf of his citizens when he declared (in Israel, of all places) that he sought cooperation with Iran "in all spheres of economics, science, and culture but without permitting ideological expansion and the influence of Islamic forces."⁸ Despite dire, self-serving warnings from Moscow, fundamentalism is an insignificant force in Central Asia and will likely remain so.

Fourth, the United States has tied its own hands by taking sides in the festering dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though the United States is a land of immigrants, there are practically no Americans who trace their roots either to Central Asia or Azerbaijan. As a result, none of these countries has an effective lobby in Washington. By contrast, a large, wealthy, and well-organized Armenian lobby keeps up the pressure on any measure that might strengthen Turkey's role in the region, including the laying of pipelines through that country. And since Armenia charges Azerbaijan with aggression in Karabakh—even though Armenia currently occupies a fifth of Azerbaijan's territory—the Armenian lobby persuaded Congress to ban all help to the Baku government through the Freedom Support Act, at the same time taking steps to assure that per capita American aid to Armenia would be greater than for any other country except Israel.⁹

⁸*Azija*, 1994, no. 27, p. 2; quoted in *Central Asia in Transition*, Boris Rumer, ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 5.

⁹Michael Specter, "Drift to Dictatorship Clouds Armenia's Happiness", *New York Times*, January 3, 1997.



The fifth factor shaping the U.S. response to Moscow's muscular energy policies in the Caspian region is the priority it gives to maintaining the Iranian leg of its "dual containment" policy against Iran and Iraq. Khomeini's revolution and the American hostage crisis both occurred in 1979, but some of the strongest measures to contain Iran were taken much more recently, beginning with a trade boycott in 1987, a ban on weapons sales to Iran in 1992, and the punitive measures instituted in 1995 against European and other non-U.S. based firms that persisted in trading with Iran. By 1993, "dual containment" was interpreted to preclude Central Asians from exporting through Iran, even if their survival depended on it, and even though a glance at the map shows that several of the most obvious alternative pipeline routes from both sides of the Caspian traverse Iran. This is U.S. policy today, despite the fact that the United States itself continued to import Iranian oil through the first fourteen years of the Islamic Republic's existence.

These five factors have shaped America's response to the crisis in Central Asia. The policies of a democratic Russia in the region are assumed to be benign, so the Clinton administration has given Moscow a free hand there. U.S. policy holds that reintegration with Russia is acceptable so long as it is voluntary and peaceful, disregarding the possibility that economic coercion can force a country to heel without either the threat or use of force. The United States has gone so far as to insist that there is "no linkage" between Russian efforts to destabilize the Caucasus region and the revision of the Conventional Forces In Europe Treaty, even though a treaty revision could legitimize Russian forces being used for this purpose. Moreover, because the United States holds Russian pipelines to be preferable to Iranian ones, the Export Import Bank has extended credit to Russia for pipeline development without imposing any of the obvious conditions regarding free access to markets that might protect Central Asian or Azerbaijani sovereignty. Americans have also invested

heavily in the very Russian energy cartels whose strong-arm tactics are jeopardizing the sovereignty of the new Caspian states. Is this not, after all, the best alternative to the Islamic fundamentalism represented by Iran?

By comparison, U.S. support for pipeline routes through Turkey has been belated and, to date, ineffective. Even if the American-supported pipeline link from Azerbaijan through Georgia were to be opened, its capacity would still be so small as to allow only a modest part of Azerbaijan's production to reach markets through any but Russian channels. Consistent with its tilt in favor of both Armenia and Russia, the United States turns a deaf ear toward Azerbaijani complaints that Washington is forcing it into a corner.

And a very crowded corner it is. Kazakhstan has been driven there, as have Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Even though the latter two lack major energy resources, they are inevitably affected by policies that isolate them from one of their natural trading partners. The U.S. boycott of Iran has done far more than the Russian army's troops along the Tajik-Afghan border to perpetuate the Soviet Union's policy of isolating Central Asia, not only from Iran but from the outer world in general. Back in the 1980s Washington attempted unsuccessfully to punish Europeans for seeking to obtain Siberian gas through a Soviet pipeline traversing the most natural route across Russia and Ukraine. Now it is doing the same with regard to Caspian oil and gas. But this time it is the new states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan that are forced to pay the price. They are being held hostage to U.S. policy toward a third state, in this case Iran.

The Iranian Factor

IS THIS NOT a small price to pay if U.S. policy toward Iran leads to the establishment of a reasonable regime in Tehran, one that would cease meddling in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, stop trying to sabotage the Arab-Israeli peace process,

forego aspirations for nuclear and chemical weapons, abandon terrorism abroad, and champion human rights at home? Undoubtedly. But the profession of laudable ends in a loud voice does not automatically justify all actions that one might undertake to foster those ends. The choice between what Peter Rodman calls "co-optation or confrontation" must be made on the basis of evidence as to both the efficacy and the cost of a given policy.¹⁰ By either measure the Iranian part of "dual containment" is wanting.

Supporters and critics of the policy concur on one point: that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is in deep trouble. Economic breakdown, a plummeting standard of living, and popular discontent have led to talk of "meltdown" and of the regime's "imploding."¹¹ Where observers disagree is on the causes and likely consequences of collapse. Supporters of the current U.S. policy attribute the emergency to a combination of utter inflexibility on the part of the mullahs and to America's resoluteness.¹² They insist that nothing has really changed since Khomeini's death in 1989 because no one in power really wants change. Evolution being out of the question, they argue that Washington is right to push for the regime's destruction, which some believe to be imminent. Critics see the Rafsanjani presidency as Thermidor, the end of the revolution's radical phase and the beginning of an accommodation with the national past and the broader world. They acknowledge the regime's oppressive enforcement of Islamic norms in daily life, but note that even in the area of women's rights there have been gains as well as losses, particularly in the ability to get jobs outside the home. Accordingly, the United States should move with the times and open up a dialogue with the new rulers.

A third position sides with the critics in acknowledging the extent of change introduced by Rafsanjani but does not deny the obvious continuation of many of the regime's most repellent practices, especially terrorism but also human rights abuses, nuclear adven-

turism, and spoiler policies on several important regional and international issues. This view holds that the proper analogy for Rafsanjani's rule is not Thermidor but *perestroika*, in which a new leader sets out to save the core of the regime—in this case Shi'i Islam—by introducing radical reforms (a kind of shock therapy) in the economy and polity.¹³ As in Gorbachev's Russia (which was Rafsanjani's obvious model in 1989), the reformer himself has one foot in the old camp. But this does not save him from being assaulted by diehard true believers, who from time to time succeed in forcing him to participate in their own retrograde deeds.

This analysis fits the facts better than either of the more extreme positions. It is inconvenient for U.S. policymakers, however, for it does not specify either imminent collapse or successful evolution as the inevitable outcome. Even if evolutionary change continues, it is likely that many elements of the Islamic Republic as it now exists might continue, albeit in diluted form. However, if the regime falls, this analysis suggests the possibility of a successor laying the blame squarely on Rafsanjani's *perestroika*. Turning away from today's tentative free-market measures and rejecting the growing separation of mosque and state, the successor could embrace some form of militarism and/or populist socialism that could lead to turmoil and

¹⁰Peter Rodman, "Co-opt or Confront Fundamentalism?" *Middle East Quarterly* (December 1994).

¹¹Franklin L. Lavin, "Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma", *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1996), p. 36; and Robin Wright, "Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes", *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1997).

¹²Patrick Clawson, *Iran's Challenge to the West: How, When and Why?* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993).

¹³Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran's Economy Under the Islamic Republic* (New York, London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1993), pp. 79-91.

other consequences even worse than what exists today in Iran. A too rosy reading of Russia's recent experience blinds one's eyes to these possibilities.

Whatever the validity of these observations, they highlight the extent to which U.S. policy toward Iran is now based on a single and bizarre assumption: that the apocalypse of total collapse in Iran will lead to a better outcome than an evolutionary process of change. By the by, one may question the morality of the United States trying to starve some forty million human beings into changing their form of government. But even if one is prepared to live with this, a serious question remains: What evidence is there that our policy is anything more than a gamble? Is it perhaps not really a policy at all, but a crusade?

Current U.S. policy has been calculated entirely in terms of possible benefits, without reference to costs. But there are costs aplenty. U.S. policy has driven a wedge between the United States and all the other advanced industrial nations, which not only recognize Iran but carry out substantial trade with it. Fully 60 percent of Iran's oil production still goes to Europe. The policy has isolated the United States from other countries as well. When Washington tried to prevent Russia from selling nuclear equipment to Iran, only Israel and Uzbekistan voted with the American representative at the United Nations. It is curious that even Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which have as much to lose as anyone from an aggressive Iran, have opened embassies there. They realize that the Gulf War strengthened Iran's position in the region, even if it may be imploding.

Meanwhile, even in its recently invigorated form, the policy is not working. When the United States issued its ban on the sale of arms Iran simply contracted with China for \$4.6 billion in military hardware. It is true that containment has taken a toll on the Iranian economy and has reduced the purchase of arms to a lower level than might otherwise have been the case. But does this accomplish anything beyond perpetuating

the paranoia and martyr complex that are the heart of that forlorn country's current affliction?

In the short term, too, America's attempt to isolate Iran is having a disastrous impact on Central Asia and Azerbaijan by denying to them the obvious outlet for their oil and gas and forcing them into Russia's arms. It has also encouraged Russia to exploit Iran's status as a victim of American hostility and for Iran to view Russia as a potential supplier of banned goods; no wonder that these traditional enemies recently signed a ten-year Treaty of Peace and Friendship with one another and are already using this new amity to gain a veto over Central Asian and Azerbaijani development in the Caspian, at the expense both of these nations and of Western firms.

In the longer term, the U.S. policy of isolating Iran has given Tehran and its neighbors on the Caspian every possible incentive to join forces and devise means of circumvention. Exploiting the commodity's fungibility, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have both signed agreements for Tehran to buy their oil and then export an equal amount of its own oil through its ports on the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean. The Iranians are also building a rail line from the Turkmen border to their southern port of Bandar Abbas, so that Turkmenistan can eventually export gas to Asia. Newly opened road and rail connections now link Central Asia to northern Iran and hence to the Middle East and Turkey.

All the Central Asian countries have joined Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey in the re-activated Economic Cooperation Organization, which aspires to become a free-trade zone embracing diverse Muslim countries. On December 21, 1996, Turkey signed an agreement with Iran to build a new pipeline from Iran to the Mediterranean over which Iranian and, eventually, Central Asian and Azerbaijani oil will flow to Europe. In the same month Kazakhstan teamed up with Iran to form a joint company for oil prospecting. Even Tajikistan has entered into a deal with Iranian businessmen

to build a major shopping center in its strife-torn capital of Dushanbe.

A Better Way

UNDER THESE circumstances, what should the United States do? The question is not whether to keep up the pressure on Iran, but how much pressure, where, and how.¹⁴ Surely, it makes sense to cool the rhetoric about "rogue regimes" and draw back from the "all or nothing" approach that has yielded such ambiguous results to date. It is also time to acknowledge that Iran has been a significant power in the region since the days of Cyrus the Great and is likely to remain so in the future, as will Turkey. And, above all, is it not always prudent to adjust policy to new realities? U.S. policy toward Iran was shaped in the late 1970s and 1980s, long before the eight states of Central Asia and the Caucasus even existed as independent entities.

Adjusting U.S. policy toward Iran is not the same as abandoning it. It does not mean acquiescing in the export of religious radicalism; still less does it deny the United States the power to retaliate against terrorism in whatever ways it deems appropriate. But it does require the United States to accept the possibility that the two decades it spent pretending that Islamic Iran either does not or should not exist have not produced the desired results, and that some form of regular dialogue is past due.

It took the United States thirty years to reach the same conclusion about Mao's China, but who today would deny that on balance the change was worth it? Few of the benefits of the new relationship with China were visible at first, but the United States forged ahead anyway. But will the Iranians play ball? No one should expect them to do so at first; after all, it took months of quiet diplomacy even to get the Chinese to play ping-pong, but the United States persisted. It is interesting to note in this regard that only months after the radical Taliban forces seized power in Afghanistan, the State Department encouraged other countries to "engage" with the mullahs of Kabul in

order to moderate their behavior.¹⁵ Why not try this step-by-step approach with Tehran?

By abandoning the all-or-nothing approach, the United States can continue to exert pressure on Iran while at the same time backing away from the policies that are so crippling to America's professed objectives in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Such a change could be translated into specific actions. For example, U.S. law is unclear whether American oil firms can participate in Caspian consortia in which an Iranian firm holds even a minority share. Why not approve such arrangements, since the alternative is for the Iranians or Russians to take a larger share? This already appears to be happening through the back door through the vehicle of presidential exemptions to the law of the land—as was the case, for example, with the TengizChevroil offset agreement between Kazakhstan and Iran. But it could, and should, become U.S. policy.

Beyond this, the United States could reaffirm strongly that its support for the sovereignty of the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan implies that those countries have access to multiple channels for exporting their oil and gas to world markets. We should drop our opposition to pipelines through Iran, and desist from punitive actions against countries and firms that finance and build them. We should also encourage the development of pipelines across Afghanistan to Pakistan, and even across China, which may in the long run become the primary market for Central Asian energy.

For the same reasons the United States should drop its opposition to the use or construction of Iranian-Turkish pipelines that might benefit these same countries, and should redouble its support for a new pipeline linking Azerbaijan with Turkey and the Mediterranean.

¹⁴Geoffrey Kemp, *Forever Enemies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994).

¹⁵John F. Burns and Steve LeVine, "How Afghans' Stern Rulers Took Hold", *New York Times*, December 31, 1996.

At the same time the United States must adopt a more even-handed policy with respect to Armenia and Azerbaijan, ideally by repealing the Azerbaijani sanctions that Congress appended to the Freedom Support Act of 1992. Failing that, President Clinton could lift punitive measures against Azerbaijan by issuing to Congress a "determination" that Azerbaijan has ceased all "offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh" (section 907), which is in fact the case. And as to Azerbaijan's continued blockade of territories claimed by Armenia, is this not a fit subject for negotiation, along with Armenia's seizure of whole regions of Azerbaijan and the enormous refugee problem that action has created?

Critics will be quick to point out that these measures will benefit Iran financially. Yes, they will; so be it. But the profits accruing from transport tariffs will not be enough to turn around Iran's failing economy, while the benefits to the long-term security of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and the rest of the region would be incalculable. These measures would give those countries leverage that they now lack in the exploitation of their most valuable products. They would enable these governments to maintain the balance among their powerful neighbors—Russia, Iran, and China—that is essential to their survival and to the regional tranquillity. And if the Caspian Basin does become the major energy exporter that most experts predict it to be, it will reduce the relative importance of the Persian Gulf and Iran's capacity to meddle there. That alone would be worth the cost of allowing Iran to participate in the export of Central Asian and Azerbaijani energy.

But would this not amount to inviting the Iranian wolf into the Central Asian henhouse? No, the metaphor misstates the case. The Central Asians are inoculated by religion, tradition, education, and secularist commitments against any Khomeini-type theocracy. Indeed, recent experience suggests that closer Iranian links with Central Asia and Azerbaijan will have at least as great an impact on backward Iran as on the more literate populations to the north. This is not surprising, for over the past

three thousand years Central Asia has more than held its own in its political, economic, and cultural interactions with Persia.

Finally, what about the objection that these policies are directed against Russia? Well, they are not. What is proposed here would simply level the playing field that U.S. policy has tilted strongly toward Russia and against the Central Asians' prospects for true independence. Russia has every right to compete for a role in the development of Central Asian energy resources, and its proximity gives it a certain advantage that the market may well affirm. But it has no right unilaterally to lay down the terms of that competition or to use strong-arm tactics to determine its outcome.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has aptly referred to the "irredentist impulses" that lurk in some quarters of the Moscow political world.¹⁶ Weak with respect to Central Europe and even the Baltic states, these impulses are alive and well among leaders of the Russian energy cartels and their allies within the government, and are directed against Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only if one equates these particularist interests with Russia as a whole can it be said that the proposed policies are anti-Russian.

More important, perhaps, are the implications of this energy-based irredentism for the prospects of reform in Russia. What is good for Gasprom, Lukoil, and Transneft is not necessarily good for Russia, let alone for its struggling democratic system and market pluralism. It is inappropriate for America to be telling the Russians that they cannot be ruled by an oligarchy if they so wish. But America should not be actively supporting what is one of the most powerful anti-democratic forces in the new Russia, let alone promoting its interests in such a way as to make the sovereignty of Russia's southern neighbors its hostage. Fortunately, the necessary correctives are readily at hand. □

¹⁶Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, speech at the fiftieth anniversary of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, October 29, 1996.

October 16, 1997



SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM

TO: The First Lady's Pre-Advance Team

FROM: A/DCM - John Ordway *JO*

Subject: Law on Religion and the First Lady's Schedule

President Yeltsin signed the law on "Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" on September 26. The law contains several controversial provisions which could lead to restrictions of the rights of religious confessions which have not existed in Russia for at least 15 years. These provisions may violate to the Russian Constitution and Russia's international commitments.

The law gives special status as "traditional religions" to the Russian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist religions. Other religious organizations sanctioned during the Soviet period will also maintain full rights and privileges. Associations active in Russia for less than 15 years face a yearly reregistration requirement and limits on their rights to distribute literature, invite foreign visitors, and conduct educational activities.

The law also requires legal residence as a precondition to exercising any right of religious freedom and permanent residence to form religious associations. Only citizens of the Russian Federation can act as founders of registered "organizations."

U.S. concerns with this law have been raised at the highest levels, including on several occasions by President Clinton as well as by Vice President Gore during his recent visit. The GOR has assured USG officials at the highest levels that the law will be implemented liberally and in a way that will not restrict religious freedoms. However, there is still concern that lower level officials will utilize the new law to suppress the activities of undesirable confessions. This is especially true in the regions, where local officials have traditionally implemented more restrictive requirements than those authorized by federal law. Newer religious confessions are also highly suspicious of "traditional" organizations (particularly the Russian Orthodox Church) which they view as staunch supporters of the new law.

The GOR is currently drafting regulations to implement the new law. Although it is not technically in effect, there have already been reports of officials abusing provisions of the law in Siberia. Since the First Lady's visit to Russia comes so soon after the passage and signature of the new law, we believe it is important that the issue of religious tolerance be raised during the visit. Indeed, not to do so risks calling attention to the omission of the issue from her agenda, and risks sending the wrong signal. For this reason, we think it would be timely and useful for the First Lady to schedule one or two religious events during her visit to Novosibirsk/Akademgorodok. We recommend a visit to one of the Orthodox sites (#1) and a short meeting with U.S. religious representatives (#2). These combined visits could be used to call attention to the U.S. commitment to religious tolerance and our continuing concerns about the impact of the new law.

A combined Orthodox/non-Orthodox event should not be totally ruled out, but it runs the risk of having the First Lady referee a shouting match. Separate events need not take up a lot of time; the Orthodox event could entail a short sit-down with the local Bishop on the margins of a short walking tour of one of the above churches (b or c are our preferences), and the non-Orthodox event could be a 30-45 minute event, either at Akademgorodok or the or at Sibir Hotel.

1) Orthodox Sites

- a) "Sunday Cathedral" - Headquarters of the Novosibirsk and Berdsk Russian Orthodox Diocese;
- b) "Center of Russia Church" - A miniature church built in Novosibirsk under the Tsars on the exact geographic center of the Russian Empire, it was destroyed by the Communists in 1925 and rebuilt in the early 1990's;
- c) "Wooden Church" - Built during perestroika by those returning to Orthodoxy, this wooden church is located in the woods of Akademgorodok.

2) "Christian Information Center" - An office/library opened by the Lutheran mission in the early 1990's, the center could serve as a venue for gathering representatives of American missionary organizations (approximately 65 different denominations) to meet the First Lady.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED



rehmosc @ usia.gov
11/06/97 05:26:00 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Julie E. Mason

cc:

Subject: Re: FLOTUS IN RUSSIA

Julie:

FYI: This is the media advisory I released in Moscow today to U.S. and third-country bureaus.

Regards,
Dick

U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE, AMERICAN EMBASSY MOSCOW
MEDIA ADVISORY
HRC-I HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON IN RUSSIA 11/6/97

NOTE: This is the first official advisory about the Clinton trip to Russia. Any subsequent advisories will be consecutively numbered.

If you have not already contacted us for accreditation, we must, repeat must, receive the following information by 0900 hours, Monday, November 10: Bureau, names of journalists, their passport numbers and MID accreditation numbers. THIS IS AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE. Send the information by fax (255-9766) or e-mail (ophmosc@usia.gov).

The White House released the following statement on 11/5/97:

WASHINGTON -- At the request of President Clinton and the State Department, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton will travel in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Ukraine November 10-18, 1997. The First Lady is traveling to this region to demonstrate the United States' support for these countries and their reform efforts, as she did on her recent travels to Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Mrs. Clinton will stress the critical requirements for a civil society, which include addressing the health needs of women and children, ensuring a strong education for all, protecting human rights, and expanding economic opportunity. Throughout the trip, the First Lady will visit U.S. Agency for International Development programs that highlight USAID's role in supporting democracy initiatives, health and education programs, and economic reform and private-sector development.

11/10-12 Almaty, Kazakstan
11/12 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
11/13-15 Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, Uzbekistan
11/15-16 Yekaterinburg, Russia
11/16 Novosibirsk, Russia

11/16-18 L'viv, Ukraine

NOTE: The media schedule has not yet been confirmed. As soon as we have any information, we will let you know.

NOTE: We do not have control room contact numbers in Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk. As soon as we know, we will let you know. If you need help in Yekaterinburg before you next hear from us, contact Public Affairs Officer Robert Post at the American Consulate-General, (3432)-56-4691.

REMINDER: White House media traveling with Mrs. Clinton will likely form the basis for any pools that will be required.

Richard Hoagland
Press Spokesman
956-4238

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Richard E. Hoagland
Press Spokesman
American Embassy Moscow
Tel. 7-095-956-4238 Fax 7-095-255-9766
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Julie E. Mason

11/05/97 02:52:03 PM

Record Type: Record

To: rehmosc @ usia.gov @ INET @ LNGTWY

cc:

Subject: Re: FLOTUS IN RUSSIA

Hi Dick. Please bear with me - this will be a long email. Please let me know if you didn't receive the schedule I emailed to you a few moments ago.

PRESS TRAVELING WITH MRS. CLINTON (11 total):

- 1) Krzysztof Burzynski - ABC crew - PP# AA5799027 (Poland)
- 2) Karla Davis - ABC talent - PP# 043688944 (US)
- 3) Jill Dougherty - CNN talent - PP# 015513011 (US)
- 4) Sara Harris - ABC tech - PP#Z6891463 (US, but obtained at US Embassy/Moscow)
- 5) Dean Hovell - ABC producer - PP# 015432201
- 6) Maxim Karmen - ABC crew - PP# 411303685 (Russia)
- 7) Laurie Kellman - AP writer - PP# 015737511 (US)
- 8) David Hume Kennerly - Newsweek photo - PP# 111402832
- 9) Suzanne Malveaux - NBC talent - PP# 015908637
- 10) Douglas Mills - AP photo - PP# 160008454
- 11) Arshad Mohammed - Reuters writer - PP# 016024771

Also, in Yekaterinburg we will be joined for the day by:

- 1) David Hoffman (Washington Post out of Moscow). I do not have his PP# but you can probably call the Post directly.
- 2) Viktor Korotaev (Reuters stringer). I do not have his vitals either but I believe he is a Russian citizen.

In Novosibirsk we will be joined for the day by Sergei Karpoukhine (Reuters photo). I don't have his vitals either.

(note: with the above three, they will be included in the traveling pool for the day as will be treated as if they are White House press)

TIMES OF PRESS EVENTS: (times are still tentative, as are events themselves)

Saturday 11/15

- | | |
|---------|---|
| 10:45am | Open Press Arraival at Airport |
| 11:30am | Tour of Bonum Center |
| 12:45pm | Town Hall hosted by Urals Women's Assoc. (at Urals Polytech. Univ.) |
| 2:15pm | Opening of USIA-sponsored traveling exhibit |
| 6:15pm | Opening Night Performance of Symphony (might do photo op - tentative) |

Sunday, 11/16

- | | |
|---------|--|
| 8:00am | Depart for Yekat. |
| 11:00am | Arrival in Yekat. (tentative open press) |
| 12:00pm | Tour of Ethnography Museum (we'll only have press if Mrs. Yeltsin insists) |
| 1:15pm | Speech at Akademgorodok |
| 6:50pm | Depart Yekat. (closed to the press) |

note: I am concerned about the technical details regarding the town hall. I hope it can work....
note: We will be looking for functionable phone lines (IDD) at the hotel in Yekat. And at Akademgorodok....

MULT BOX:

We will try to bring a mult box with us. For it to work properly, as you're probably aware, I'm told we need a 3-pin cable XLR (line level plus 4 DBM).

Hope this helps. - Julie

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

UKRAINE

Divider Title: _____

FOREIGN AFFAIRS



MAY/JUNE 1996
VOLUME 75, NUMBER 3

Comments

An Irish Policy Born in the U.S.A. *Joseph O'Grady*

2

Bill Clinton is the first U.S. president since Andrew Johnson to support the Irish strongly against Great Britain—in this case, over Northern Ireland. Born of competition for Irish-American votes, the policy has some declaring the end of the Anglo-American “special relationship.”

The Case for Mexico's Rescue

Bradford De Long, Christopher De Long, Sherman Robinson

8

The U.S.-led effort to revive the peso staved off a Great Depression in Mexico. The Mexican economy is turning the corner and paying off its debt to the United States. Mexico was not broke last year; it faced a liquidity crisis. Clinton's action ensured that economic reform in Mexico—and other developing nations—continues.

Essays

Workers and the World Economy *Ethan B. Kapstein*

16

Not everyone is a winner in the global economy. Unemployment is high in Europe and inequality is rising in the United States as growth proves disappointing and foreign competition drives wages down. While economists debate causes and officials fret over inflation, protectionism threatens world trade. Postwar policymakers, learning from the upheaval of the 1930s, struck a deal with workers. Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks would foster global commerce, and the International Monetary Fund and domestic public policy would make sure that everyone gained. Stagflation in the 1970s undermined this social contract. Policymakers today must abandon their fiscal stringency, or more unpleasant leaders may rise.

Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin

John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk

PRESERVING INDEPENDENCE

FIVE YEARS after independence, Ukraine watches the nationalist turn in neighboring Russia with unease bordering on alarm. Much of the Russian political spectrum, obsessed with reclaiming great power status and reuniting the former Soviet republics, recognizes that Ukraine is the key to its plans and openly espouses reabsorption. President Boris Yeltsin, instrumental in the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, has, in his quest for votes, adopted much of the nationalist agenda; he has dismissed his Western-oriented foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, cracked down on the rebellion in Chechnya, and pursued formal union with Belarus. Continued progress in Ukraine toward democracy and free markets will be more difficult no matter who triumphs in Russia's presidential election in June. A victory for Gennadi Zyuganov, the Communist Party boss and the leading presidential contender, would give Ukraine's communists a second wind and could well throw Ukraine back into the instability that preceded reform.

With a landmass equal to France, a population of 52 million, a location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, large agricultural and high-tech industries, and extensive natural resources, Ukraine is crucial for the stability of the continent, and uncertainty there would reverberate throughout Europe. An independent, democratic, and reform-oriented Ukraine can provide a model for Russia's development, prevent the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a political and military alliance under Moscow's control,

JOHN EDWIN MROZ is President of the Institute for EastWest Studies. OLEKSANDR PAVLIUK is a Program Associate in the Institute's European Security Program.

Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin

and promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe. The next year's events in Ukraine will determine whether the continent continues on its path toward integration or faces a new confrontational divide.

Regardless of the outcome of Russia's presidential contest, Ukraine has ample reason to suspect Moscow's long-term intentions. Russia has refused to negotiate the exact borders between the two states. The Duma has not annulled its 1993 resolution declaring Sevastopol a Russian city, nor has it canceled its order to review the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine. Most recently, it proclaimed illegal the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, many Russians believe that Ukraine's leaders, not its people, have been the impediment to closer relations, if not union, between the two countries.

But a majority of Ukrainians would not voluntarily agree to union with Russia. Ukrainians in the country's west have long associated domination by Moscow with political oppression and economic decline. Despite forces in eastern Ukraine that favor reintegration, nationalist sentiment has grown throughout the rest of the country. The prospect of again being a provincial outpost of Moscow does not appeal to Ukrainians, who contrast that scenario with improving conditions in neighboring countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Ukrainians in the eastern, Russified areas have demonstrated in the two elections since independence that they will vote for the candidate best able to improve their economic situation. Thus in 1991 a majority of the eastern region voted to secede from the Soviet Union because an independent Ukraine seemed to offer better economic opportunities, but in 1994 a majority, judging that the Russian economy had improved and was clearly in better shape than their own, opted for a candidate who endorsed closer ties with Russia. With few exceptions, reintegration with Russia is in the interests of neither the new Ukrainian political elite nor much of the commercial class. In a recent set of interviews, Ukrainian entrepreneurs, many of whom are personally pro-Russian, argued that Ukrainian sovereignty protects the country's emerging business community from the rich, powerful capitalists of Russia.

Ukraine desires normal relations with Russia, but attempts to force it back under Moscow's thumb would further alienate its already

suspicious population. Aggressive Russian efforts might lead to civil war in Ukraine, accompanied by an overwhelming refugee crisis and ecological disasters.

MISSILES INTO PLOWS

SINCE WINNING election as president of Ukraine in 1994, Leonid D. Kuchma has focused on the single greatest security threat to Ukraine—the near-collapse of its economy. Kuchma has been surprisingly successful, and Ukraine now has a fighting chance of following the Central European countries' example and creating a viable market economy. He has also worked hard to bind Ukraine to Europe while maintaining normal relations with Russia. Kuchma's presidential campaign concentrated on closer ties with Russia and the introduction of Russian (his native language) as Ukraine's second official language, and thus his stress on economic reform and relations with Europe is astounding. Though a former director of the world's largest missile factory, Kuchma has convinced his countrymen to relinquish their nuclear weapons, creating goodwill with the West. Most important, he has turned out to be a staunch defender of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty.

Kuchma's persistence has brought financial stabilization within reach. Inflation in 1995 decreased to roughly 150 percent, an enormous improvement over the 4,000 percent hyperinflation of just two years before. Total trade volume in 1995 grew by 32 percent, as trade with the West rose by 40 percent. For the first time in 60 years, Ukraine exported grain, reminding the world that it once was, and can again become, the breadbasket of Europe.

By securing the support of many voters in western Ukraine who had originally been against him, Kuchma has bridged the gap between the country's Russian-populated eastern half and its more nationalist west, restoring unity to the country and dispelling the specter of instability. Any significant shift in the course of reform would ruin his coalition, restrain economic growth, and split the country once again. Mindful of such dangers, Kuchma and his able prime minister, Yevhen Marchuk, have pursued radical economic reforms vigorously, despite resistance from powerful groups more

interested in accumulating personal power and wealth than nation-building. The forces of opposition—the post-Soviet bureaucracy, the leftist-dominated parliament, the industrial and agricultural lobbies—have relentlessly attacked Kuchma and Marchuk's policies. Group and corporate interests often prevail in economic decisions, and corruption remains a serious problem, though less daunting than in Russia.

In 1995, following a pattern common to East European economies in transition, Ukraine's GDP declined, although at a lower rate than in past years. Total industrial production decreased by 11.5 percent and the production of consumer goods by 19.1 percent. Perhaps most disquieting was the sluggishness of privatization; less than 10 percent of the 8,000 targeted large and medium-size enterprises went into private hands in 1995. The government, which has been disappointingly indecisive in this regard, announced in March that it will speed up the privatization of 400 of these companies through international tender. Ukraine's difficulties in delivering on its commitments led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in January to postpone the fourth tranche of a standby loan.

Despite its size, agricultural potential, and key location, Ukraine has failed to attract major investors. Kuchma claims that the economy requires about \$40 billion in private investment, but it received only \$750 million between 1992 and 1995. He told New York investors last October that in 1994 direct foreign investment per capita was \$12 in Ukraine versus \$670 in Hungary, \$319 in the Czech Republic, \$298 in Estonia, and even \$27 in Russia. The country's confusing tax laws and its failure to allow private property have combined with its economic instability to scare away many investors. Meanwhile, internal sources of financing remain very limited. A significant portion of the new Ukrainian business elite is parasitic and reluctant to invest in the Ukrainian economy. If Ukraine is counting on increased Western financial assistance and investment, it must take the necessary steps, such as large-scale privatization, banking sector reform, and capital market development. Unless Western investors bring their capital to

President Leonid Kuchma has staunchly defended Ukraine's independence.

Ukraine, disappointment may lead ordinary Ukrainians—like their Russian fellows—to harbor anti-Western sentiments.

Ukraine's mixed economic performance has caused foreign investors to be cautious, but some remain optimistic because of the country's political stability and commitment to democracy. The international community has applauded Kiev for its handling of the Crimean secession, which for several years seemed sure to spark serious regional conflict. Kuchma and Yeltsin displayed true statesmanship in defusing a potentially violent eruption there last year. Similar leadership will be required to complete negotiations over the Black Sea fleet. While many CIS countries have retreated from democracy, Ukraine has compiled a solid track record, particularly in its treatment of its national minorities. It was the first member of the CIS to enjoy a peaceful, democratic transfer of presidential power. In its transition, Ukraine has avoided violence, and its army has not been dragged into domestic political quarrels, let alone projected its power beyond the country's borders. Despite heated debates and political tension, strong leadership and democratic compromise have characterized Ukraine's politics since Kuchma's election. The June 1995 Constitutional Agreement between the president and the parliament, for example, temporarily resolved a serious deadlock by regulating the division of power between the legislative and executive branches, while setting out a procedure for the adoption of a new constitution. Last fall Ukraine became the second CIS country, after Moldova, to be admitted to Europe's "democratic club," the Council of Europe.

Still, Ukraine is the only country in the former Soviet Union that has not adopted a new constitution since independence, and Kuchma's June deadline will prove tough to meet. Many observers expect him to prevail by the end of the year, but his constant battles with the leftist forces in parliament provide skeptics with enough evidence to adjudge the current political situation fragile. As coal miners strike and religious tensions fester, Kuchma's opponents can easily exploit social unrest. Most of Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy dilemmas stem from the nation's tenuous unity. Its size, cultural diversity, and weak tradition of statehood seriously complicate its transition.



WALKING A TIGHTROPE

KUCHMA'S FOREIGN policy aims to balance gradual but steady integration into Europe's political and economic structures with constructive, friendly relations with Russia. While many other Central European countries have declared their desire for admission into NATO, Ukraine has firmly committed itself to nonalignment. It has participated in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and now publicly seeks a special relationship with the alliance, parallel to that which Russia has demanded; it is a reluctant member of the CIS and has time and again refused to sign the 1992 Tashkent collective security agreement. Just as it has combated anti-Russian sentiment in its western region, the Ukrainian government has done its best to avoid anti-NATO paranoia, present in other CIS countries, in its eastern half.

Both Russia and the West have hailed Kuchma's success in persuading his country to abandon nuclear arms, even though many Ukrainians still view the decision as harmful to the country's long-term national security. Once the third-largest nuclear power and owner of the third-largest conventional force in Europe, Ukraine voluntarily transferred its tactical nuclear stocks to Russia in 1992 and started to remove and destroy its strategic nuclear weapons in 1994. Ukraine has already reduced its conventional forces from 800,000 to 500,000.

Internal economic weakness makes Ukraine susceptible to outside pressures and has complicated Kuchma's foreign policy. The prime example of this vulnerability is Ukraine's dependence on Russia for energy. Russia supplies 80 percent of Ukraine's gas, and Ukraine has accumulated an energy debt of \$4 billion, making energy Russia's most effective lever over the country. Gazprom, Russia's gas monopoly and a powerful lobby, has threatened to close the pipeline to Ukraine unless it pays its bill. At one point, in exchange for debt relief, Gazprom un-

Ukraine's foreign policy
tries to balance between
Russia and Europe.

successfully maneuvered for stakes of between 35 and 50 percent in 15 of Ukraine's most profitable and strategic national enterprises.

Reducing this dependence on Moscow has become Ukraine's top priority. It has made some progress toward this goal by commercializing its oil import business, re-

structuring its debt, and using IMF standby loans to pay its gas bills. But the energy problem still awaits a comprehensive solution, and Russia has objected to some of Ukraine's stopgap measures. Last February, for instance, Ukraine found itself on the edge of an energy collapse: coal miners' strikes coincided with Gazprom's decision to stop dealing with Ukraine's commercial gas importers and with Moscow's decision to disconnect Ukraine from its electricity system. Until the energy problem is addressed, Ukraine will remain a weak state, vulnerable to Russian pressure.

Opposed to Ukraine's independence in 1991 and preoccupied with Russia in 1992 and 1993, the West has since become a significant supporter of Ukraine and its transition to a market economy. While serving briefly as prime minister three years ago, Kuchma criticized Western policy, saying that "on the map of world leaders, Ukraine does not even exist. They are indifferent [to] whether Ukraine is independent or not." Ignored by the West, Ukrainian policymakers lacked the confidence to pursue difficult decisions on nuclear disarmament and economic reform, and the West's focus on Russia further aggravated Kiev's sense of insecurity and made Ukrainian-Russian relations even more tense. That initial delay in formulating a clear Western policy has been responsible in part for Ukraine's tortoise-like progress toward capitalism.

Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin

A discernible Western policy first emerged in 1994. Vladimir Zhirinovsky's strong showing in the Duma elections of December 1993 and Russia's subsequent great power posturing sent the first warning signals to the West. The election of Kuchma, then deemed pro-Russian, shocked the West out of its lethargy. Relations between the West and Ukraine have since improved substantially. Last summer British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind called Ukraine "a strategic pivot in Europe" that would determine the future prosperity and security of the continent. Even Russophile France has started to pay more attention to Ukraine. And American officials have stated that a free and independent Ukraine is "a vital strategic interest of the United States." Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its launching of economic reforms prompted security assurances and financial support from Western governments and international institutions. Western assistance, pushed largely by Canada, the United States, and Germany, made possible Kuchma's macroeconomic reforms.

The latest figures show that since Kuchma began his reform program in late 1994, the World Bank and the IMF have committed a total of \$3.4 billion in loans, \$1.5 billion of which is slated for 1996. This year the European Union (EU) will provide \$250 million, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development \$80 million, the United States \$170 million, and the Export-Import Bank of Japan \$180 million. Russia's rescheduling of \$3 billion of Ukraine's energy arrears is another reason for the improvement in Ukraine's economic situation.

Since 1992 American and German firms have invested the most in Ukraine, \$202.8 million and \$129.6 million respectively. The EU's support strategy for the country, adopted in November 1994, marked an important step. It included trade concessions, accelerated political dialogue, and a framework for industrial, financial, and scientific cooperation. Particularly important was the signing and implementation of the interim agreement that gave Ukraine most-favored-nation trading status with the EU. Significantly increasing Ukrainian exports to the EU, the agreement helps Ukraine avoid becoming shackled to the CIS, which accounted in 1995 for 55 percent of Ukraine's exports and 57 percent of its imports. Current plans would admit Ukraine to the EU's single market after 1998.

The Chernobyl nuclear reactor remains an irritant in relations between Ukraine and the Group of Seven industrialized nations. Ukraine's leaders believe that Western demands to close the plant ignore the social and political consequences of doing so without addressing Ukraine's overall energy situation. Nobody wishes to shut Chernobyl more than the Ukrainians, who will continue to suffer from the 1986 meltdown for many years to come. Yet by producing 40 percent of the country's energy, instead of their usual 25 percent, Chernobyl and the five other Ukrainian nuclear power plants prevented an energy crisis last winter. The recent memorandum of understanding between Ukraine and the Group of Seven may have diminished some of these misunderstandings; the memorandum stipulated the terms for decommissioning the Chernobyl nuclear station by 2000 but unfortunately did not discuss its funding.

STAYING THE COURSE

UKRAINE'S FUTURE lies within European structures, and the West should not slow this process. The West should adopt a double staircase approach—one for market reforms and one for political and security issues. Each Ukrainian step upward would be met by an appropriate and symmetrical step by the West. For example, were Ukraine to accelerate privatization and agricultural reform and further strengthen financial stabilization, Western institutions would expand assistance. Similarly, on the political level, Ukraine needs to resolve its constitutional stalemate. In return, the West would increase technical and financial support to the Ukrainian parliament and train larger numbers of Ukrainians for public administration and the judiciary.

The West can bolster Ukraine's security through strong, sustained economic support, with particular assistance in the energy sector. Under the leadership of the World Bank and the EU, Western and Ukrainian experts should develop an expanded energy strategy, beyond the EU's useful 1994 action plan for Chernobyl, which offered Ukraine a large aid package in exchange for timely closure of the flawed nuclear plant. Rationalizing Ukraine's oil refining capacity would by itself dramatically decrease the country's consumption; Ukraine loses some 40 percent of its crude during refining, but that

Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin

figure can easily be cut to as low as 2 percent. The construction of an oil port at Odessa, currently blocked by hard-line local officials, would open Ukraine to Middle Eastern oil. Technologies that convert coal into gas would also make a significant difference. Western experts could help Ukraine develop a contingency plan in case of an energy crisis. As Ukraine transforms its agriculture industry, converting its large state-run farms into a cooperative farming system, the West can make sure Ukraine avoids Bulgaria's error of splitting such farms into units too small for international marketing.

On the security side, while encouraging Kiev to cooperate extensively within the Partnership for Peace, NATO should negotiate a treaty that would guarantee Ukraine's neutrality. Given Ukraine's location and history, it must be a bridge, not a buffer, between Russia and Europe. Its market economy and democratic system could become a positive model for, and the single greatest influence on, Russia. Despite some antagonism, Russians regard Ukrainians as closer to them than any other nationality, except the Belarusians. Ukraine's failure would strengthen Russia's authoritarian tendencies and leave Europe substantially less secure.

Moscow must overcome its ambivalence about Ukraine and recognize how much the country can contribute to Russia's own development as well as to the stability of Europe. The economic and cultural ties between Ukraine and Russia are strong; the two countries enjoy a natural interdependence. Forty-six percent of Russian trade within the CIS goes to Ukraine, which is also the world's largest importer of Russian gas and oil. As democratic, free-market societies, these neighbors would soon enjoy a prosperity long denied their people. If Russia learns to live with Ukraine as an independent state, it will have overcome the most critical element behind several centuries of imperialism.

As for the rest of the former Soviet world, Ukraine increasingly determines whether the CIS remains a loose economic association or becomes a tight political and military confederation under Moscow's control. Ukraine leads the CIS nonaligned group, which also includes Moldova and Azerbaijan, in opposition to the creation of any supranational bodies or military and political mechanisms,

A democratic Ukraine
can serve as a model
for Russia.

and the CIS countries know that without Ukraine, a new Soviet Union is impossible. As Belarus merges with Russia, Ukraine's position becomes even more significant. While avoiding the institutionalization of the CIS as a security arrangement, Ukraine should pursue economic cooperation with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.

The independence of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the status of the other Central and East European countries. For the first time in modern history, these countries find themselves separated from Russia. An independent and democratic Ukraine between Russia and the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary lays the groundwork for stability in Eastern Europe by fostering lower perceptions of threat and a greater sense of security in Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest. A new iron curtain in Europe is impossible if Ukraine enjoys a positive relationship with both the West and Russia. The West should encourage Ukraine to cooperate more extensively with the Central and East European states and urge it to join the Central European Free Trade Agreement.

Support that treats Ukraine as important in its own right will bolster reform-minded decision-makers and political forces there. It will help assure the success of reform in Ukraine and make Ukraine a model for Russia and the rest of the CIS. Given its strategic position, an independent and healthy Ukraine will indeed be the linchpin of stability in post-communist Europe. ②

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001. email	To Mary Kruger from Julie E. Mason [Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	11/05/1997	b(6)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
Lissa Muscatine
OA/Box Number: 23216

FOLDER TITLE:

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Ukraine [binder] [3]

2015-0275-S
rc2105

RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Julie E. Mason

11/05/97 04:28:38 PM

Record Type: Record

To: kruger @ usis.kiev.ua @ inet

cc:

Subject: Re-Send

Hi Mary. Attached is the official advisory on the trip. Please distribute. We just put it out today. This is a long email, so please bear with me...

PRESS ON TRIP:

11 press will be traveling with us into Ukraine: 1 tv crew (producer, technician, soundman, cameraman), 3 talent (CNN's Jill Dougherty, ABC's Karla Davis, NBC's Suzanne Malveaux), 2 wire reporters (Reuters, AP), 1 wire photog (AP), 1 mag photog (Newsweek).

In addition, while in L'viv, a striger for Reuters (photog) will join the US pool. His name is Gleb Garanich and I believe he is based in Kiev, so he will not be traveling with us into Ukraine. I do not have his mode of transportation into L'viv but you can call Reuters in Kiev to find out.

Names, PP#s and credit card info of press:

Krzysztof Burzynski, ABC crew - (b)(6) [001]

PPN AA5799027 (Poland)

Karla Davis, ABC - (b)(6)

PPN 043688944

Jill Dougherty, CNN - (b)(6)

PPN 015513011

Sara Harris, ABC - (b)(6)

PPN Z6891463

Dean Hovell, ABC - (b)(6)

PPN 015432201

Maxim Karmen, ABC crew - (b)(6)

PPN 41 1303685 (Russia)

Laurie Kellman, AP - (b)(6)

PPN 015737511

David Hume Kennerly, Newsweek - (b)(6)

PPN 111402832

Suzanne Malveaux, NBC - (b)(6)

PPN 015908637

Douglas Mills, AP - (b)(6)

PPN 160008454

Arshad Mohammed, Reuters - (b)(6)

PPN016024771

CREDENTIALS:

Our US traveling press will be wearing laminated credentials. They won't be complete before our advance team leaves so I can't provide one with you ahead of time. You should create something for the local pool (saying something along the lines of "LOCAL POOL FOR VISIT OF FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON").

HOTEL ROOMS/FILING CENTER:

The press advance person (Oriella Ben Zvi) will work with you to reserve the rooms. We'll need one for each of the 11 traveling press, plus an equipment room (on a low floor). The rooms should be in each individual's name. As long as the press have IDD lines in their rooms there won't be a need for a press filing room, especially if the charge for installation of these IDD lines is large. Credit card numbers for room reservations are above. Please share with Oriella when she arrives.

EDITING ROOM: The network will want an editing room.

PRESS OFFICE: We will share the advance / staff office. No need for a separate office.

TRANSCRIBING: If there are resources available to transcribe, great. If not, we can get it transcribed when we return to DC since it is the last stop.

INTERPRETATION: You or whoever handles the sites should speak to Jaycee about translation. Re mult box, we are trying to get one to bring to me.

----- Forwarded by Julie E. Mason/WHO/EOP on 11/05/97 03:27 PM -----

● ● ● ●
● Julie E. Mason 11/05/97 12:50:18 PM

Record Type: Record

To: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message

cc:

Subject: Re-Send

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 5, 1997**

**CONTACT: MARSHA BERRY
STEVEN COHEN
JULIE MASON
202/456-2960**

**FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON'S TRIP TO KAZAKHSTAN,
KYRGYSTAN, UZBEKISTAN, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE
NOVEMBER 10 - 18, 1997**

WASHINGTON - - At the request of President Clinton and the State Department, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton will travel in Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Ukraine from November 10 - 18, 1997. The First Lady is traveling to

this region to demonstrate the United States' support for these countries and their reform efforts, as she did on her recent travels to Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Mrs. Clinton will stress the critical requirements for a civil society, which include: addressing the health needs of women and children, ensuring a strong education for all, protecting human rights, and expanding economic opportunity. Throughout the trip, the First Lady will visit U.S. Agency for International Development programs that highlight USAID's role in supporting democracy initiatives, health and education programs, and economic reform and private sector development.

Below are some highlights of the First Lady's upcoming trip:

Almaty, Kazakhstan (November 10 - 12)

- Ribbon cutting at the new Almaty Women's Wellness Center;
- Meet with Kazakhstan youth leaders;
- Deliver the keynote address at the Central Asian Conference on Women in Politics. In her remarks, Mrs. Clinton will focus on the important role women play in fostering democracy and a civil society in the Newly Independent States.

Bishkek, Kyrgystan (November 12)

- Discussion with women who have begun their own businesses after receiving microcredit through USAID-supported programs;

Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand, Uzbekistan (November 13 - 15)

- Attend opening of the Women's Wellness Center at Tashkent Medical Institute. The center, which is part of one of the largest medical facilities in Central Asia, is a recipient of equipment from Operation Provide Hope.
- Visits to Bukhara and Samarkand, two cities that are important religious centers along the famous Silk Road trading route. Both cities recently celebrated their 2500th anniversary and contain beautifully preserved historical sites.

Yekaterinburg, Russia (November 15 - 16)

- Town hall meeting sponsored by the Urals Women's Association;
- Tour a center for children with congenital defects that has a partnership with the American Association of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons;

Novosibirsk, Russia (November 16)

- Speech at the Akademgorodok that will focus on the importance of education in building democracy.

L'viv, Ukraine (November 16 - 18)

- Speech at the Opera House highlighting democracy building blocks and summarizing the major themes of the trip;
- Discussion at L'viv Oblast Clinical Hospital, which has a partnership with

Detroit's Henry Ford Hospital;

- Remarks at the Ghetto Monument, which honors Jews and other victims in
Lviv at the time of World War II.

EDITOR'S NOTES: The First Lady's schedule is subject to change. The First Lady's press office will release details of Mrs. Clinton's trip as they become available.

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Message Sent To: _____

November 5, 1997

Kruger@usis.kiev.ua

38044 213 2532
9138

FAX MESSAGE TO: WHITE HOUSE - Ms. Julie Mason

FROM: U.S. Embassy Kiev - Mary Kruger

SUBJECT: Support for Upcoming First Lady Visit

FAX

380 44 213 3386

Our office is excited about the upcoming visit and has already made a number of plans. Before we can go much further, though, we need guidance from you. Since talking by phone may be difficult given busy schedules, I have jotted down below the principal questions we have.

1. Official announcement of the trip:

We have not seen an official announcement of the trip yet. Will there be one? The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to coordinate announcements with us. Additionally we are unable to give specific answers to numerous queries from the local press. Can you tell us when to expect an announcement from the White House?

2. List of White House Traveling Press.

In order to coordinate accreditation with the Ukrainian government, order hotel sleeping rooms and facilitate entry into Ukraine, we need a list of journalists included in the White House traveling press corps. The type of information required is: full name, media affiliation, passport number and date/mode of arrival in Lviv. This last item is very important if people are arriving separately from the White House airplane but are considered part of the WH press corps.

3. Sample of trip credential:

Can you send a sample of the White House credential with the Advance Team for us to show to local Ukrainian counterparts for press and security? This will help to ensure that they recognize the credential on "game day."

4. Sleeping rooms:

How many will be needed and in what names? Will you send credit card numbers to assure reservations?

5. Direct dial telephones:

There are two alternatives for access to direct dial phones.

If journalists are given sleeping rooms on the renovated 5th or 6th floors of the hotel, they will have direct dial telephones on the pulse system in the room. We plan to install standard American phone jacks so that they can hook up a computer.

The second alternative is through a Filing Center. We preliminarily chose a location for a Filing Center during your pre-advance in a small dining room on the second floor. We have already arranged for 10 additional direct dial phone lines on the pulse system to be run to that location. They can be hooked up and used by the White House press.

Note: There no phones on the "tone" system in Ukraine. However our technical experts say that it is not difficult to get computer programs to work with pulse.

6. Filing center:

During the pre-advance Neel Lattimore preliminarily indicated that a Filing Center would be needed. Do you have any updated information? The rent of a small dining room for the purpose must yet be negotiated, but we believe the cost will be reasonable. We would set up the Filing Center with desks, electrical outlets and approximately 10 phone connections for the journalists, plus space for our office to lay out printed releases and backgrounders, to dispatch transportation and to give information on the city. We would have a FAX and xerox available.

Do you require American TV reception in the Filing Center? The hotel has a dish will be capable of receiving NBC news. It is not capable of receiving CNN.

7. TV network pool editing room.

Is this required? No network has been in touch with us, to request workspace. If this is needed, do the networks need access to the hotel roof or do they need a cable link to a roof antenna for uplink? Would feeds be pre-recorded? Is there any potential for a live feed?

8. WH Press Office.

During the pre-advance Neel Lattimore indicated that no separate room was needed for the White House Press Office staff. Does this still hold? I have been in touch with Press Advance Oriella Ben-Zvi, who plans to share office space with of the rest of the WH advance, but who could not speak for the White House Press Office staff who will accompany the First Lady.

9. Transcription of remarks.

Who will be responsible for transcribing the First Lady's remarks, including her speech? Will White House staff carry out these functions as they do for the President?

10. Interpretation of the First Lady's Speech.

We have investigated several options for facilitating interpretation and would like to know White House preferences. Will interpretation be consecutive or simultaneous? Simultaneous interpretation would presumably require headsets for those who wish to listen in Ukrainian. The Opera House seats approximately 1000; we expect to be able to locate a maximum of 300 headsets. A third option would be to distribute copies of a written Ukrainian translation, if the text is prepared in advance. Related to this, I have been asked to inquire about the length of the speech.

On the technical front, we assume that WHCA will provide a mult box. We do not have access to one here.

11. Local press interest:

We are receiving interview requests from the local Ukrainian press which we will prioritize and forward. The First Lady's visit will be a wonderful opportunity to focus Ukrainian attention on the positive aspects of cooperation between our counties, and we will be pleased to facilitate communication of this message through the Ukrainian press.

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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FACT SHEET

WASHINGTON, DC 20523 USAID PRESS OFFICE

Contact: Ernie Gobble

(202) 647-4274

#97- 89

November 7, 1997

USAID HOSPITAL PARTNERSHIPS PROGRAM

The purpose of this USAID funded partnership program is to support American health care institutions and systems in assisting their NIS counterparts through "peer to peer exchanges" to address significant mortality and morbidity issues; to improve health care organization; and to introduce market-oriented solutions to institutional delivery and finance problems. The American International Health Alliance (AIHA) currently supports forty-four health care partnerships: twenty-eight in eleven countries in the New Independent States (NIS) and seventeen in nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and is a model of collaborative USAID assistance in the region.

AIHA's largely voluntary partnership model relies upon extensive exchanges of health care professionals between partner institutions. To date, over 5,000 exchanges and 100,000 person hours have taken place with the NIS. U.S. physicians, nurses, administrators and technical personnel generously donate their time, effort, needed supplies and equipment to NIS partners, voluntarily contributing approximately \$70 million since 1992, over \$2 for every USAID dollar invested in the partnerships program. USAID has committed over \$58 million (since 1992) to NIS hospital partnerships.

As a direct result of partnership activities, demonstrable progress is being made in the quality of medical care and management:

- **Partnerships report improved quality and productivity**, citing statistics of reduced length of hospital stay, lower rates of hospital-acquired infections, increases in out-patient services, reductions in costly in-patient beds, and overall increases in the number of patients being treated.
- **Building Local Capacity:** Partnerships have created a cross-regional cadre of over 300 health care managers and trainers schooled in Western management skills and clinical techniques, with the confidence to lead future reforms.
- **Creating Lasting Relationships and Linkages:** Through the information initiative, which provides all NIS partners with access to the Internet, electronic mail, and modern western medical and management literature, USAID is attempting to counteract 70 years of Soviet isolation from Western medical research and management innovations. We have observed growing communication and dialogue both between US and NIS professionals and also inter-regionally in the NIS through information technology in telemedicine, distance learning, and e-mail information sharing.
- **Extending "Beyond Hospital Walls"** The program has expanded beyond individual institutions to address systemic health issues, including improving medical and nursing curricula; health care management training; workforce planning issues; infectious disease control and prevention of antimicrobial resistance; and healthy communities. AIHA initiatives in infection control, emergency services and neonatal resuscitation are being rolled out nationwide with support from several host country Ministries of Health.



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT **FACT SHEET**

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#97- 90

(202) 647-4274

November 7, 1997

USAID & ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN-TUCSON, ARIZONA PARTNERSHIP

(Tuesday, November 11 - Ribbon Cutting at Almaty Women's Wellness Center)

The USAID funded Almaty-Tucson Partnership is composed of a large group of Almaty health care institutions, including the Institute for Pediatrics and Children's Surgery, the Almaty City Emergency Hospital, the Almaty City Perinatal Center, and others. The U.S. partners are a coalition of eight hospitals, the public health department, and the medical university led by the Tucson Medical Center.

The Partnership focuses on:

- nursing reform (education and management)
- women's health (Women's Wellness Center)
- programs in toxicology, perinatology, leukemia and respiratory disease
- physician education in specialty areas
- infection control
- emergency medical services
- health care administration and management

Selected Program Outcomes

Infection Control: The Partnership and Almaty City Health Administration has created an in-service training for nurses in infection control. Nurses Trainers have trained 300 of their colleagues in infection control procedures and at 11 Almaty hospitals, trained nurses have been appointed as Head Nurses for Infection Control.

Nursing Reform: The role of nurses has changed significantly within the partnership, as nurses with new clinical and management skills are occupying leadership positions in hospitals. An expanded nursing curriculum (B.S. Nursing), has been approved by the Ministries of Health and Education, which will enable graduates to work under a new Nurse job classification, with higher pay and status, approved by the Ministry of Labor.

Women's Health: The partnership have developed a model comprehensive women's wellness center. This "one-stop shopping" approach will provide an integrated set of services (primary care, reproductive health, mental health and education in such topics as domestic violence and substance abuse) for women of all ages. The Women's Wellness Center will improve access to a **continuum of care** for women whose health needs have often been ignored and under-served.

EMS Center: The Almaty EMS Training Center has trained over 1000 ambulance team members trained thus far (including physicians, nurses and feldshers) in Almaty and Semipalatinsk to improve first-responder care. The first-ever 24-hour Poison Control Center has been created under the partnership.

Model Perinatal Center: The Model Perinatal Center has successfully implemented "rooming in" for babies with their mothers, reduced lengths of stay for both vaginal and cesarean deliveries, and has supported a breast-feeding program in which over 90 percent of the mothers are participating.



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FACT SHEET

WASHINGTON, DC 20523 USAID PRESS OFFICE

Contact: Ernie Gobble

(202) 647-4274

#97- 91

November 7, 1997

USAID & L'viv, UKRAINE-DETROIT, MICHIGAN PARTNERSHIP

(Monday, November 17 - Tour/Discussion at L'viv Oblast Clinical Hospital)

This USAID funded partnership is composed of Henry Ford Health System in Detroit, Michigan, the L'viv Oblast Clinical Hospital (LOCH), and the L'viv Medical Institute in L'viv, Ukraine.

The partnership focuses on:

- neonatology
- urology
- rheumatic fever
- emergency care
- nursing education
- hospital administration
- physician training in specialty areas

Selected Program Outcomes

Neonatology: The partners have established a **Level III Neonatal Intensive Care Unit** to meet the needs of critically ill and pre-term infants being transported to LOCH from throughout L'viv and the oblast. The hospital redesigned the 48-bed unit and established eight intensive care beds complete with cardio-respiratory monitoring, capability for providing mechanical ventilation, controlled intravenous therapy, central blood pressure monitoring and supportive treatment.

The partners developed: (1) a collaborative practice model for physicians and nurses, (2) quality assurance committee, and (3) expanded nursing skills, which will improve hospital efficiency and patient outcomes. A Michigan/Ukrainian citizens group provided infant transportation equipment, and recently Henry Ford worked with Ford EURO to donate an ambulance which will improve safe transport for pediatric emergencies for the entire oblast.

Training: The LOCH has opened the **Neonatal Resuscitation Training Center**, which has trained over 200 physicians, nurses, and midwives with basic life-saving resuscitation techniques. The Ministry of Health is supporting the expansion of the Neonatal Resuscitation Program nationally by way of a national resolution.

Urology: The partners have introduced modern surgical techniques in transurethral resection (TURP) of the prostate and bladder and in related infection control and nursing practices. These clinical skills have improved patient outcomes and reduced length of stay in the urology department.

Emergency Medical Services: The partners are improving in-hospital emergency care which enables more timely and effective treatment of the acutely ill patients the LOCH receives. The partnership has also provided training and equipment to help develop a regional poison control/toxicology center.



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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WASHINGTON, DC 20523 USAID PRESS OFFICE

Contact: Ernie Gobble

(202) 647-4274

#97- 92

November 7, 1997

USAID & TASHKENT, UZBEKISTAN-CHICAGO, ILLINOIS PARTNERSHIP

(Thursday, November 13 - Tour of Tashkent Women's Wellness Center)

The USAID funded Tashkent-Chicago Partnership is composed of the Second Tashkent State Medical Institute (TashMI II), one of the ten largest hospitals in the NIS, and the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) Medical Center.

The partnership focuses on:

- neonatology and perinatal medicine
- women's health
- hospital and clinic administration
- nursing and medical education
- general surgery and neurosurgery
- physician training in specialty areas

Selected Program Outcomes

Neonatology and Perinatal Medicine: Partnership efforts have resulted in tangible advances in the services and quality of care provided at TashMI II. There has been a steady decline in the number of infant and maternal deaths within the Institute's facilities. A new **neonatal intensive care unit (NICU)** was equipped and staffed by physicians trained at UIC, and substantial improvement has occurred in resuscitation techniques and the care of premature infants. The Ministry of Health is establishing a **high-risk pregnancy center** which will be the "Center of Excellence" in perinatal care for the country. The partnership has created the **Neonatal Resuscitation Training Center** at TashMI II, which trains physicians, nurses, and midwives throughout the region in simple, life-saving resuscitation techniques.

Women's Health: The partnership has developed a model comprehensive women's wellness center. This **"one-stop shopping"** approach will provide an integrated set of services (primary care, reproductive health, mental health and education in such topics as domestic violence and substance abuse) for women of all ages. The Women's Wellness Center will improve access to a **continuum of care** for women whose health needs have often been ignored and underserved.

Hospital Administration and Financial Reform: TashMI II has improved the financial standing of its hospital facilities by retiring nearly two-thirds of its beds, reducing average inpatient stays (from more than 18 days in 1992 to less than 10 days now), opening an outpatient unit (or day hospital), and shifting part of the patient base into outpatient care. As a result, costly inpatient services have been reduced, decreasing general overhead costs, while outpatient services have grown.

Nursing Reform: Within the Chronic Disease Hospital of TashMI II, nurses with updated clinical and management skills have been given primary responsibility for patient care and management of a unit (in a manner comparable to what is usual in the US).



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FACT SHEET

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Contact: Ernie Gibble

(202) 647-4274

#97-93

November 7, 1997

USAID and Women in Business

The Ural Women's Business Association

(Saturday, November 15 - NGO town Hall Mtg. hosted by Ural Women's Business Assoc.)

The Business Development Program funded by USAID and implemented by Deloitte & Touche was directly responsible for the creation of the Ural Women's Business Association. The Association, founded in 1993, addresses the problem of high unemployment among women in the Ural region. The activities of the Association focus on developing entrepreneurial skills, business opportunities and improving the business environment.

In 1995, the Ural Women's Association and the Yekaterinburg Business Support Center (BSC) organized a national conference that resulted in 27 Chapters of Women's business associations being established throughout the country. Now over 5000 members strong, the Confederation is a force in federal and business strategy decisions. The Confederation also promotes inter-regional ties and impacts international decisions on women's business support.

The Pervouralsk Association of Women in Business, one of the very active members of the Ural Women's Business Association, received a grant from the Eurasia Foundation in September 1995 to support the establishment of an Information Analytical System. This System provided training for women in business and NGOs, and provided advice and information services for women's businesses in the Pervouralskaya oblast and NGOs in the Sverdlovskaya oblast.

In Yekaterinburg, the BSC has also worked with the Pervouralsk Women's Business Association to consult with women at the "Vacancies in the Work Place" fair in November of 1995. As a result, three women started working with the BSC to further develop their business plans. In addition, the Yekaterinburg Business Development Program assisted a businesswoman with her effort to access funding from the EBRD in order to start a fresh pasta making business. This company is now very successful.



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FACT SHEET

WASHINGTON, DC 20523 USAID PRESS OFFICE

Contact: Ernie Gobble

#97-94

(202) 647-4274

November 7, 1997

USAID & FINCA FACTSHEET

*(Wednesday, November 12 - Bishkek - Roundtable Discussion w/FINCA members
& Tour of Market w/FINCA members)*

Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) Kyrgyzstan:

In 1994, USAID approved a \$6.2 million grant to FINCA to establish a microenterprise credit project in Kyrgyzstan. In two and one-half years of operations, FINCA Kyrgyzstan (F/K) has successfully implemented its international proprietary business technologies to help improve the lives of Kyrgyzstan's poor. To date, F/K has disbursed over US \$1 MM to approximately 15,000 individuals with a bad debt expense of less than US \$500. The project is operating in three Oblasts and has 100 national employees. During the period ending June 30, 1997, F/K reported an increase in the number of active Village Banks from 349 to 421 representing a net gain of 21%.

Over 85% of loan recipients have been women:

With the collapse of the Soviet system, many men lost their jobs. Families lost a comfortable lifestyle as food became expensive and scarce. Schools and medicine were no longer free. For some, self-employment became the only hope. With the help of FINCA, many women were able to obtain small working capital loans to buy rice, eggs, and other products which they could sell in the local bazaars. Through FINCA's village banking savings system, these women have increased their working capital and income. They can now purchase butter, sugar, and meat - luxuries they previously could not afford.

FINCA Worldwide:

Founded in 1984, The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) is a nonprofit, private voluntary organization. In 13 developing countries (Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Uganda, Malawi and Kyrgyzstan) as well as the U.S. (Washington, D.C. and Minnesota), FINCA Village Banking programs provide small loans, a savings program and technical support for the self-employed poor, helping them to work their own way out of poverty. FINCA's first major partnership with USAID was in El Salvador in 1989 when USAID provided \$10 million to FINCA to establish and build the CAM (Centro de Apoyo a la Microempresa). FINCA's average loan per borrower is only \$144, yet the accumulated savings of members exceed \$3.2 million.

A Village Banking group consists of 20 to 50 neighbors-usually 80% or more are women-who come together to guarantee one another's loans, to administer group lending and saving activities and to provide mutual support. By offering credit, not charity, to these women, FINCA enables them to start or improve their own small businesses, which provide a steady source of employment and income for themselves and their families. Throughout most of the world, working capital-the money needed to start or expand a business-is simply not available to the poor. During 1996, FINCA provided \$16,911,051 in working capital for 69,888 small businesses in 14 countries.



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FACT SHEET

WASHINGTON, DC 20523 USAID PRESS OFFICE

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#97- 95

November 7, 1997

"MEROS" Artisans' Association of Samarkand, Uzbekistan
(Friday, November 14 - Samarkand - Visit to Artisan's Development Center)

USAID funded Aid to Artisans (ATA) has helped MEROS (Heritage) grow to serve a diverse membership of more than 90 artisan entrepreneurs, including master craftsmen, female home producers, fashion designers, teachers, apprentices and unemployed professionals from other fields. Services include assistance with product design and marketing, business training, international networking and advocacy. One focus of attention has been the revival of ancient crafts such as paper making and the adaptation of traditional crafts to modern usage.

Located in the Samarkand Art and History Museum across the street from the Registan, MEROS displays the works of over sixty members of the Association. MEROS is a democratically governed, non-governmental organization formed in 1996 by a group of artisan who believed that by working together, they could begin to solve many of the problems facing them during the time of transition to a market economy.

The idea for an independent association was born when a small group of artisans found themselves threatened by authorities with the loss of electricity in their workshop if they attempted to market their crafts independently at an ATA craft sale in Tashkent. Craft production and sales were controlled by the state artisans' association, which retained exclusive market rights and set fixed prices on artisans work. It failed to market products aggressively or to represent more than a few select artisans.

Both groups attended the sale anyway and were rewarded when, after two days, their products sold in quantities that exceeded long-term levels achieved by the state. Encouraged by their success the Samarkand artisans immediately set about forming an independent marketing and business assistance association. They held community-wide meetings, drew up a charter, elected a board of directors and staff, and recruited members.

As of November, 1997, after two years of active work in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, ATA and NGO product development and marketing activities have generated over \$200k in direct, new, local sales for artisans, at a time when the majority of craftspeople, many of them female home producers and rural artisans, were earning an average income of less than \$25 a month. The artisans have recently begun to export products to U.S. and European wholesalers through ATA's representation at major gift and trade shows. To date, USAID has provided at total of \$176K to ATA in Uzbekistan.



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PRESS RELEASE

WASHINGTON, DC 20523 USAID PRESS OFFICE

Contact: Ernie Gible

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#97-96

November 11, 1997

First Lady Attends Ribbon-Cutting Ceremony for Almaty Women's Wellness Center

Almaty, Kazakhstan - First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, accompanied by the First Lady of Kazakhstan Sara Nazarbaeva, attended the official opening of the Almaty Women's Wellness Center. The USAID funded Almaty-Tucson (AZ) partnership is composed of a large group of Almaty health care institutions, including the Institute for Pediatrics and Children's Surgery, the Almaty City Emergency Hospital, the Almaty City Perinatal Center, and others. The U.S. partners are a coalition of eight hospitals, the public health department, and the medical university led by the Tucson Arizona Medical Center. The partnership is part of the USAID Hospital Partnership Program implemented by the American International Health Alliance (AIHA)

The Almaty center is a "joint-venture" made possible by significant local contributions. The Almaty City Health Administration, as its contribution to the partnership effort, has provided space at the Almaty Perinatal Center and undertaken significant renovations roughly equal in value to the U.S. contribution (Tucson and USAID/AIHA) in equipment and supplies of approximately \$100,000.

Unlike traditional family planning oriented programs, the Almaty Center focuses on the full spectrum of women's health issues. The center is not restricted to serving only the reproductive health needs of women, but includes general health services, screening and education and health promotion activities in areas ranging from prenatal care to menopause. As such, the Women's Wellness Center serves as a new model for healthcare delivery which reduces duplication and fragmentation of health services in order to provide better health care and easier access to services for a population group which has long been ignored or under-served.

The Center is designed as an adaptation of an ambulatory Western women's center and comprised of seven rooms: a registration and waiting area, two exam rooms, a procedure room, an office for the director, a separate office for nurses and midwives, and a health education classroom. In keeping with the partnership program's commitment to sustainable change, the Almaty City Health Administration is responsible for all operating costs of the Center. In its initial year, the Center is expected to see approximately 80 patients per week for services and a larger number through its educational programs.

Since 1992, USAID has committed over \$58 million to AIHA for the NIS hospital partnerships program. Partners have contributed in-kind time, equipment, and supplies valued at more than \$2 for each \$1 of U.S. Government funds.

USAID**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT****Overview of Programs in the New Independent States**

Economic Restructuring: Since the fall of communism, the NIS has undergone sweeping economic changes. USAID has contributed to the development of a market economy through programs in mass privatization, fiscal reform, enterprise development, the development of modern financial systems, and energy sector and environmental reform. The establishment of private property rights and the growth of entrepreneurship have given ordinary citizens a stake in the new economic system. With USAID assistance, most countries have made systemic changes such as creation of laws and institutions to support private business, as well as specific changes such as adopting international accounting principles and banking practices.

Democratic Transition: To these formerly authoritarian states, democratic governance is a critical and historic change. To promote citizen participation in a healthy civil society, USAID has helped install the machinery of free and fair elections, strengthened political parties, assisted the development of NGOs, and aided the growth and independence of public broadcast and print media. USAID is also assisting countries to strengthen the rule of law. USAID has helped draft constitutions (civil codes), train judges, prosecutors, and trial attorneys, and establish jury trial systems. In contrast to the highly centralized former Soviet Union, USAID is working to bring good government closer to the people by assisting in decentralization from the national to the local level and by helping mayors and municipal authorities improve basic governance and delivery of essential public services.

Social Stabilization: The path to a market democracy has necessarily brought about historic social change in the NIS. In several cases, the resulting social dislocation has been ignored or inadequately addressed. Unfortunately, some people have associated their social plight with reform and have used their newly acquired voting rights to elect politicians who adeptly exploit their fears. USAID is providing technical assistance to assist countries in strengthening their own social protection systems. For example, we are helping Russian and Ukrainian municipalities move towards market-based rents and maintenance fees which improve the quality of housing while freeing scarce municipal resources for targeted subsidies to the most vulnerable groups in society. USAID's reproductive health programs have increased contraceptive use and reduced abortion rates. In Central Asia, the USAID-sponsored Aral Sea initiative has fostered regional environmental cooperation and will ultimately provide potable water to over one million people. USAID has also provided emergency humanitarian assistance in areas suffering from civil strife, including Tajikistan and the Caucasus.

FY 1996 Funding = \$641 million

FY 1997 Funding = \$625 million

USAID's programs in the NIS are funded through the FREEDOM Support Act.

USAID Country Profile: The Kyrgyz Republic

July, 1997

Area: 76,642 sq. miles**Population:** 4.5M: 54% Kyrgyz, 28% Russian, 15% Uzbek, German/Other**Population by Age Group:** 0-14: 37%; 15-64: 57%; 65+: 6%.**Population Growth Rate:** .94%**Rural:** 62%, **Urban:** 38%, (1995) **Capital:** Bishkek**Life Expectancy at birth:** male, 63; female 72.1**Infant Mortality Rate:** 30 (deaths per 1000 before age 1)**Literacy:** 98%; **Per Capita Income:** \$700; PPP-\$1,800**Religion:** Predominately Islam (70%), Russian Orthodox**Language:** Kyrgyz and Russian**President:** Askar Akayev**Prime Minister:** Apas Jumagulov**Ambassador to U.S.:** Bakit Abdrisaev**OVERVIEW OF USAID PROGRAMS**

Economic Reform and Private Sector Development: The Kyrgyz Republic has made the strongest commitment of any country in the region to the privatization of state-owned assets. USAID assistance has resulted in the privatization of approximately 6280 enterprises, with the focus now on privatizing blue-chip state enterprises and developing Kyrgyzstan's capital markets. A stock exchange and a central depository have been established, and USAID is encouraging establishment of procurement laws and a monitoring agency. International Accounting Standards will be used in all KG enterprises beginning in January, 1998. These USAID supported activities will assist in the development of a market economy, and are further enhanced by USAID assistance in passage of a Foreign Investment Law, Procurement Law, Bankruptcy Law, and in furthering the KG application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). A Tax Law was adopted in 1996. A draft law on Municipal Finance has been completed. Assistance in micro enterprise accounts created 264 village banks with over 3000 members.

Democratic Institutions: Assistance has been provided in the creation of a legal infrastructure to encourage NGO development, rule of law, human rights, and citizen participation. Over 400 NGOs, have been trained by USAID programs throughout Kyrgyzstan. USAID assists the National Association of Local Self-Government through funding for seminars and publications. Training in election organization and a recent televised political candidate debate have also been supported by USAID. In addition, USAID has supported both a bar and judges' association, a strengthened parliament, and creation of a law library in Bishkek. Assistance to independent TV and radio stations includes news exchanges, documentary tape sharing, and training activities. Kyrgyzstan leads the Central Asian countries in development of democracy.

Social Transition: A broad based health program provides assistance through medical partnerships, women's reproductive health services, health care financing and service delivery, and infectious disease control. Assistance has also been provided in land, real estate, and finance. A unified system for registration of real estate will be expanded nationwide in FY98.

Fiscal Year 1996 = \$18.5 M

Fiscal Year 1997 = \$20.8 M

USAID Press Contact: Ernie Gibble 202.647.4274

USAID Country Profile: RUSSIAN FEDERATION

May, 1997

Size: Almost twice the size of the U.S. -- 6.6 million sq. miles
Natural Resources: 30% of the world's natural gas reserves, 20% of coal, 20% of gold, 6% of oil, abundant uranium, diamonds, copper, lead and silver, and one quarter of the world's forests
Population: 147 M (1996); 83% Russian, 17% other ethnic groups
Population by Age: 0-14, 23%; 15-24, 13%; 25-64 54%; 65+, 9%.
Population Growth Rate: 0.7% (1979-1989).
Rural: 26%, **Urban:** 74%, **Capital:** Moscow.
Per Capita Income: \$575 (1996). **Employed:** 44.6%
Religion: Predominately Russian Orthodox, Muslim
Language: Russian **Literacy:** 98%
Life Expectancy: ♂-59.6 yrs., ♀-72.7 yrs. (1996)
Infant Mortality: 19.4/1,000 live births (1987), 22.1/1000 (1980)



President: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin
Prime Minister: Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin
Foreign Minister: Yevgeni Maksimovich Primakov

Overview of USAID's Programs in Russia

Economic Reform and Private Sector Development: USAID is supporting Russia's transition from a state-controlled economy to a market system based on private property, competition and a functioning business sector. The success of this transition is important for sustained growth, increased employment and improved living standards. With the successful privatization of a large segment of Russian industry, attention turned to creating a legal and regulatory climate in which private business can evolve and to developing the grassroots training and business support organizations needed to stimulate local entrepreneurship. USAID activities foster the creation and growth of new, competitive businesses, promote fiscal reform, support the development of a modern financial sector, and promote the sustainable and non-polluting use of natural resources.

Democratic Institutions: USAID works with Russian counterparts at central, regional, and local levels to strengthen basic democratic systems in five key areas: elections and political parties, independent media, grassroots non-governmental organizations, the rule of law and local government. The Agency provides grants to non-governmental organizations to support the development of free labor unions, independent broadcast and print media, and an expanded political party system. USAID programs also support judicial reform through workshops, training and exchanges on a broad number of issues related to legal reform, including development of bar associations, updated legal education curriculum, and specific initiatives which enable Russians to address the pervasive problems of crime and corruption.

Social Sector Restructuring: USAID-supported activities are designed to demonstrate that adequate delivery of social services can be achieved in a market economy. USAID has focused principally on more effective ways of providing on housing and health care services, both of which are fundamental concerns for all Russians.

Fiscal Year 1996 = \$134.8 million


Fiscal Year 1997 = \$95.7 million

USAID Press Contact/Washington: Ernie Gibble 202.647.4274**USAID/Moscow:** Kathryn Sylvester, Public Information and Outreach (7-095-956-4281 ext. 2661)

USAID**Country Profile: Kazakhstan**

November, 1997

Area: 1,049,200 sq. mi.
 Capital: Almaty (expected to be moved to Akmola in 1997).
 Population: 16.9 m (1996); 41% Kazakh, 37% Russian
 Population by Age Group: 0-14: 30%; 15-64: 63%; 65 & over: 7%.
 Population Growth Rate: .1% (1994)
 Rural: 41%, Urban: 59%
 Life Expectancy at birth: male: 59; female: 70; average: 64 (1996)
 Infant Mortality Rate: 27/1,000
 Per Capita Income: \$1,330 (1995); PPP: \$3,010
 Ethnic Composition: Kazak, 42%; Russian, 37%; Ukrainian, 5%;
 German, 5%; Uzbek, 2%; Tatar, 2%; other, 7%
 Religion: Muslim, 47%; Russian Orthodox, 44%; Protestant, 2%;
 other 7%
 Language: Kazak 44%; Russian, 36%
 Literacy: 98%



President: Nursultan Nazarbaev
 Prime Minister: Nurlan Balgimbayev
 U.S. Ambassador: Bolat Nurgaliyev

OVERVIEW OF USAID PROGRAMS

Economic Reform and Private Sector Development: The USAID small-scale privatization program with the GOK was officially closed in August 1996, marking the end of a highly productive 3-year joint effort. The process will be completed by Kazakhstani professionals and other international donors. USAID is focusing on legal and regulatory reform, with emphasis on trade and investment, bankruptcy and general business law reform. Achievements to date include facilitating the redrafting of foreign investment legislation; guiding development of decrees to streamline business licensing requirements; assisting in developing the customs reform process, and, assisting the GOK in its efforts to WTO accession. USAID has played a pivotal role in establishing a Stock Exchange, improving banking management, and providing policy assistance with budget planning and implementation processes. A new modern tax code was adopted in July 1995. International Accounting Standards were adopted with USAID assistance. Pension Reform will be implemented in January 1998. The Central Asian American Enterprise Fund is established in Almaty and provides loans to speed the growth of private enterprise.

Democratic Institutions: USAID's program focuses on democratic processes which enhance civic participation and education, the flow of information, transparency and accountability in government, and dialogue between the government and non-government sectors. Small grant programs support local NGOs who seek improvement in the legal and regulatory environment, and in effecting social change and providing needed services. Assistance has been provided in establishing attorney associations, a Legal Information Center, and training for judges and parliamentarians. Assistance continues for independent TV through seminars on a variety of production and management topics.

Social Sector Restructuring. USAID health programs include health care financing and privatization of pharmacies, reproductive health, health demographic surveys, and vaccine support. A hospital partnership program with Arizona hospitals provides training and technical assistance in modern methods, practices, and management in health care. In housing, more than 4,400 homeowner associations have been formed representing over 95% of Kazakhstan's housing stock. Privatization of housing maintenance has strengthened municipal governments ability to deliver social services through the use of open tenders for services, cost recovery in utilities billing and targeting, rather than across the board, subsidies. Training programs, both in Kazakhstan and the U.S. provide further support.

Fiscal Year 1996 = \$33.5M

Fiscal Year 1997 = \$35.5 M

USAID Press Contact: Ernie Gibble 202.647.4274

USAID Country Profile: Uzbekistan

July, 1997

Population: 22.7 M, 71.4% Uzbek, 8.3% Russian, 4.7% Tajik, 4.1% Kazak, 2% Tatar, 8% Other
Area: 172,700 sq. mi., approx. one and one-half times size of Arizona
Population by Age Group: 0-14, 40%; 15-24 55%; 65+, 5% (1994)
Population Growth Rate: 1.76%
Rural: 41%, **Urban:** 59%, **Capital:** Tashkent
Per Capita Income: \$970 PPP, \$2,370
Religion: Sunni Muslim: 88%, Russian Orthodox: 9%, Other 3%
Language usage: 75% speak Uzbek, 33% speak Russian fluently (only 4.6% of ethnic Russians speak Uzbek fluently). Literacy (1994) 97%
Life Expectancy at birth: 70 years
Infant Mortality Rate: 30 (deaths per 1000 before age one)



President: Islam Karimov
Prime Minister: Utkur Sultanov
Ambassador to US: Sodiq Safaev

OVERVIEW OF USAID PROGRAMS

Economic Restructuring: USAID consultants continue to provide assistance in refining the Tax Code which will be implemented in January, 1998 which makes Uzbekistan the third country in the NIS to enact comprehensive tax reform legislation. USAID advisors have contributed to the new State Financial Procedures Law and companion Treasury Law expected to go to Parliament soon. New public and private pension laws are being drafted. Volunteers provide business-related assistance and training to private farmers and agribusinesses.

Democratic Transition: Technical support has been provided to the more than 300 local NGOs for management skills in developing sustainable programs for civic, social, and political development. USAID grantee, Aid-to-Artisans, has assisted with training artists to become successful NGOs. Success in developing independent judicial and advocate associations has sparked interest in a similar association for notaries. Court reform, court organization, and judicial reform are the topics of an ongoing series of lectures provided by USAID legal experts. USAID has funded the development of a law library in Tashkent, with further development and connection to rural resources centers part of the long-term plan. TV stations are provided the opportunity to study broadcast methods, news exchanges and programming documents. Both U.S.-based, and in-country training, support these activities through the Global training program. Results of a USAID-sponsored survey of voter opinion has recently been released to the government, press, NGO's and other interested groups in Uzbekistan.

Social Transition: USAID's program for women's health and family planning have resulted in fewer abortions, lower fertility rates and a knowledge of modern contraception methods on the parts of both partners and their doctors. Training continues for professionals in patient management and counseling and in modern contraceptive methods, as well as management and marketing for owners of the recently privatized pharmacies. Through the Tashkent-Chicago hospital partnership, a neonatal intensive care unit has been equipped, and physicians trained in management practices and outpatient care. A new immunization calendar for infants and young children has been adopted through USAID assistance. Progress is near completion for a reformed pension system, an area that has huge financial implications for the government and the population.

Fiscal Year 1996 = \$19.3 M

Fiscal Year 1997 = \$21.5 M

USAID Press Contact: Ernie Gible 202.647.4274

USAID**Country Profile: Ukraine**

October, 1997

Size: Approximately 240,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Texas)
Capital: Kiev
Population: 51.6 M (1995), 72% Ukraine, 22% Russian, 6% Others
Population by Age: 0-14, 21.4%; 15-64, 66.4%; 65+, 12.1% (1992)
Population Growth Rate: -0.1 (1990-1995)
GDP Per Capita: \$3,651 (1996), **Employed:** 60%
Rural: 32%, **Urban:** 68%
Religion: Ukrainian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant
Languages: 77% speak Russian & Ukrainian; 33% of Russians are fluent in Ukraine.
Life Expectancy: ♂-62 yrs., ♀-72 yrs. (1996), both sexes combined- 67 yrs. (1996)
Infant Mortality Rate: 13/1,000 live births (1996), 12.2/1,000 live births (1991), 16.6/1000 live births (1990).



President: Leonid Kuchma
Ambassador to the U.S.: Yuri Shcherbak

Overview of USAID's Programs in Ukraine

USAID's primary mission in Ukraine is to help the coalition of reformers to succeed in the fundamental restructuring of the country's economic and political system. USAID supports Ukraine's transition to a market economy based on privatization, capital markets development and economic restructuring, particularly in the areas of tax structure, banking, commercial law as well as trade and investment. Since agriculture is a significant sector of the Ukrainian economy, reactivating and transforming agriculture and the entire food production systems is a priority of USAID's assistance programs. In addition, USAID supports efforts made by the Government of Ukraine to promote the democratic reform process, and protect the most vulnerable members of the population during the economic transition.

Results in Ukraine With the Help of USAID-Funded Technical Assistance

1. More than 6,200 medium and large enterprises and 40,000 small enterprises have been privatized.
2. Two major tax reform laws, the drafting of which was supported by USAID, have been passed by Parliament.
3. USAID-funded farm service centers have helped increase yields on farms by more than 100 percent on more than one million hectares of land.
4. The Government of Ukraine was able to break the national monopoly in the power sector. There now exists 27 local electric distribution companies and 7 generation companies constituting a wholesale energy market functioning with prices set by market forces.
5. More than \$28 million in humanitarian assistance to hospitals, orphanages and boarding homes throughout Ukraine has been supplied by USAID programs.
6. Health care reform has helped improve surgical procedures and reduce costs of providing medical care, decreasing post-surgical hospital stays from 20 to 5 days.
7. USAID projects promote active participation of citizens in political decisionmaking. Political party activists have received training in campaign management and coalition-building, and have been supported in their efforts to participate in issues regarding the constitution and the drafting of new election laws.

Fiscal Year 1996 = \$225 million

Fiscal Year 1997 = \$225.1 million

USAID Press Contact: Ernie Gible 202.647.4274

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OX/ Health

Divider Title: _____



American International Health Alliance Women's Health Initiative

Background:

In June 1996, AIHA convened a Women's Health Task Force, comprised of women's health clinicians and educators associated with the AIHA partnership program to develop a model for the creation of comprehensive Women's Wellness Centers in twelve of its NIS partnerships. These Women's Wellness Centers build upon AIHA's network of 25 partnerships in the NIS, utilizing the existing programs, administrative structures, and professional relationships which have been developed by the partnerships in the areas of family planning, health education and clinical training in obstetrics and neonatal resuscitation.

In addition to addressing unmet health needs of women and adolescents, the Centers serve as a highly visible model for comprehensively addressing and managing the health care needs of women through an effective programmatic mix of health promotion, education, early diagnosis, treatment and follow up. The goal of each center is to structure services to prevent unintended pregnancies and abortions, poor pregnancy outcomes, sexually transmitted diseases and infertility, and unhealthy lifestyles across the continuum.

Each center is structuring its services to meet the needs of its target population, creating special adolescent outreach programs, discussion groups on the aging process and post-menopausal issues and/or crisis management workshops and counseling for victims of domestic violence. The three Ukrainian Centers are developing community outreach education programs, education in breast self-exam (BSE) and mammographic exams.

Clinic and resource management, the utilization of nurses as educators and administrators, patient-centered education and service, and the development of sustainable financing for each Center are program priorities. In addition, the Centers serve as a model for the integration of women's health services in primary care to avoid duplication and uneven distribution of health services. The program will thus create working models for replication in other service areas.

- * Each center was selected and reviewed by joint US-NIS assessment teams. The assessment teams evaluated existing services in the area of women's health, needs of the population, level of training of women's healthcare providers, and available resources and institutions to determine whether the Women's Wellness Center was appropriate and feasible in the proposed site. Each visit was recorded through an assessment checklist-report and reviewed by the AIHA Women's Health Task Force. In some cases, additional information was requested through and provided by the AIHA regional offices.

Activities and Accomplishments:

Teams of obstetricians, gynecologists, nurse educators, midwives and administrators from each of the twelve sites traveled to their US partner institution for clinical training in women's health services and client-based clinic management during Winter-Spring 1997.

On June 14, the first Women's Wellness Center opened in Chisinau, Moldova. The ribbon cutting ceremony was officiated by the Minister of Health, the Head of Chisinau City Health Administration, the Council of Ministers of Health for the NIS, and four AIHA representatives. Following the opening, the delegates from Hennepin County and their colleagues in Chisinau conducted childbirth education classes and a menopause seminar.

On June 18-23, AIHA sponsored a five-day Management Training Seminar in Moscow for the administrators and managers of the Women's Wellness Centers. The course curriculum was developed by a sub-set of the Women's Health Task Force and conducted by a four-person training team from Magee Womenscare International. The course included training and case studies in the area of organizational strategies, human resources, strategic budgeting, quality improvement and marketing and fundraising.

NIS clinicians and female patients from Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus participated in a Women's Wellness logo survey. Each client or clinician was presented with four logo choices and asked to select the one which best represented the common goals of the Women's Wellness Centers. Through this process, a logo was selected for use at the Women's Wellness Center and on all AIHA Women's Wellness Materials. The logo choice was announced at the Management Training Seminar in Moscow. Logo sheets and a computerized logo will be distributed to Center directors and US partner representatives at the Annual Conference in October.

On June 30, The Erebuni Medical Center's Women's Health Center conducted a Women's Conference to commemorate the enhancement of their center. The Center received recognition from the First Lady of Armenia and the Ministry of Health.

On July 10 & 11, representatives of the Women's Health partnerships convened in Indianapolis to share lessons learned and strategize for future openings and programs. On the second day of the meetings, AIHA and partner representatives met with representatives from *Eli Lilly's Center for Women's Health* to discuss collaboration in the area of menopause and post-menopause education and counseling, mental health awareness, screening and treatment and women's health research.

A computerized data-collection tool for use at the Women's Wellness Centers has been developed to track patient information. The data-collection tool was reviewed by a group of NIS and US women's health clinicians and administrators in Kiev in May 1997. Revisions were made and the data-collection tool was re-

assessed in Chisinau, Moldova in June. Following the June meeting, additional revisions were made based on input from US and NIS partners. The revised data-collection tool will be presented during AIHA's annual conference. Pilot testing of the data-collection tool will be conducted in Fall-Winter 1997.

Collaborative efforts with USAID and Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC):

In May 1997, two AIHA representatives participated in a USAID sponsored Dissemination Conference on Reproductive Health and Family Planning projects in Moscow, Russia. An AIHA representative presented the comprehensive Women's Wellness Center model and the implementation process. Several participants approached AIHA to inquire how to create their own Women's Wellness Center.

On May 8-9, AIHA representatives participated in a Coordination Meeting of USAID Contractors involved in Reproductive Health and Family Planning Programs. During the meeting, representatives shared progress reports and identified areas for collaboration. AIHA continued discussions with AVSC, JHPIEGHO and the Futures Group to coordinate efforts in Chisinau, Moldova and other sites within the NIS. In order to avoid duplicative efforts, the contractors and AIHA have agreed to share educational and outreach materials.

NIS and US women's health representatives will meet immediately following the AIHA Annual Conference on October 9th to discuss progress and issues related to their Women's Wellness Centers. The group will be addressed by experts from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention on topics such as STDs, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, Folic Acid and Micronutrient Malnutrition, Smoking Cessation, and Domestic Violence.

Future Activities:

The Kiev-Philadelphia partnership will conduct a Women's Health and Breast Care Workshop on October 16-17. Representatives from WestNIS regional Women's Wellness Centers will participate in the workshop. AIHA is working with the US-NIS Women's Consortium to develop a half-day seminar on domestic violence counseling and crisis intervention in conjunction with this workshop.

In October, equipment, medical supplies and educational materials will be sent to the Almaty and Tashkent Women's Wellness Centers. Both centers have been seeing patients for several months, but will celebrate their official openings following the installation of the equipment. US partners, local officials and AIHA representatives will celebrate with ribbon-cuttings in early November.

AIHA's Medical Partnership Program between the Kyrgyzstan and the University of Kansas Medical Center (KUMC), funded under a cooperative agreement with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was formed in October 1992. In addition to the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Health, the Kyrgyz partners are the Institute of Oncology and Radiology, the Institute of Obstetrics and Pediatrics and, since 1996, the Institute of Cardiology and Internal Medicine. Since the inception of the partnership, over 100 Kyrgyz physicians and nurses have visited KUMC, while over 70 US physicians, nurses and health administrators have traveled to Kyrgyzstan.

The general areas of focus for the partnership have been nurse education, introduction of family medicine, management training, pediatric oncology, laparoscopic surgery, prosthetics and orthotics, neonatology, respiratory disease, emergency and burn care, and continuing education.

Program Outcomes

Health Care Reform: In collaboration with the Ministry of Health, the partnership has focused on three main components of health care reform in Kyrgyzstan. These include nursing education, introduction of family practitioners/family medicine, and management training for nurses and health care administrators.

In order to reduce overhead costs and generate revenue, the Institute of Oncology and Radiology has decreased its number of beds by closing a hospital wing, renovating the facility and re-opening it as a hotel for relatives of patients. A private rehabilitation hospital in Bishkek was founded after studying the American health care system during a partnership visit.

Nursing Reform: The priority given to nurse education and the development of management skills represents a pioneering attempt by the partners and the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Health to upgrade health care delivery in the country by elevating the skills of nursing professionals. Senior nurses from throughout Kyrgyzstan have participated in intensive one- and two-month training programs at KUMC focusing on skills development and hospital administration. The partners developed the "Kyrgyzstan Nursing Administration Course," emphasizing management skills for nurse administrators. The nurses receive a general overview of the structure and function of the US health care system, especially the role of the nurse, nursing education, nurses' clinical skills, and the administrative structure of nursing in the hospital. The visiting nurses accompany nurse managers on the floors, visit nursing skills labs, and are introduced to the work of the Home Health Nurse, who provides health care in a home setting. In addition, they attend lectures on standards of patient care, infection control, and prevention.

New nurse administrator/manager positions have been created by the Ministry of Health and filled by these nurses in their respective institutions. Nurses have been hired in each oblast of the Republic to the newly-created position of senior nurse-administrator with a salary comparable to that of chief physicians. In addition, nurses have been invited to KUMC to participate in a train-the-trainers courses designed to prepare them to teach other nurses at the Bishkek School of Nursing. KUMC has donated equipment for five nursing laboratories at the School for this purpose.

In May 1995, the partners hosted a conference in Bishkek for chief nurses from each of the Central Asian Republics (CAR). Over 120 nurses participated in the CAR Leadership in Nursing" seminar, which specifically addressed management and administrative issues pertaining to the region. A

second nursing conference took place in Bishkek during September 1997. This conference was preceded by a "train-the-trainers" seminar for nurse educators at the Bishkek School of Nursing, using a new nursing textbook developed by the partners.

Neonatology: The partnership program has also focused on neonatal resuscitation of full-term normal weight infants. A series of seminars were conducted by KUMC specialists on thermal regulation, intubation, and general diagnostics. The program started in partnership hospitals in Bishkek; however, responding to requests from the Ministry of Health, the program has been expanded to include neonatologists from all over Bishkek. The US teams also traveled to Osh and repeated the training seminars in that city. Over 110 physicians from ten of the twelve birthing units in the Kyrgyz Republic were trained in a series of "train-the-trainers" courses to become instructors in neonatal resuscitation. Translated textbooks on neonatology were distributed to the participants to increase their knowledge base. The training in neonatal resuscitation conducted at multiple sites around Kyrgyzstan is having a significant impact on reducing morbidity and mortality. KUMC staff project infant deaths have been reduced by thirty percent as a result of the training across the republic.

Respiratory Diseases: The Partnership program has also focussed upon Respiratory Diseases. Three teams of Kyrgyz physicians traveled to KUMC to observe the American treatment of asthma and bronchial infections. Three pulmonologists traveled to Bishkek to conduct seminars and give lectures. Of interest to the American physicians were salt chambers and native herbs used in treatment of bronchial diseases in Kyrgyzstan.

Management Training: Partnership efforts, augmented by AIHA/AUPHA management training workshops, have given health care managers from Bishkek the opportunity to participate in a series of training seminars in diverse areas, such as grantsmanship, informed decision-making and financial management.

In an effort to establish model blood banks in Bishkek, partners have worked toward improving the administrative skills of blood bank directors. Their training will lead to greater efficacy and management of blood banking, including infection control. Specialists from US community blood banks traveled to Bishkek and Jalal Abad in December 1995 to assess the work of blood banks in Kyrgyzstan. The specialists made recommendations on donor recruitment, materials management, and standard operating procedures. They also donated and installed a computer with word processing, database and accounting software to Regional Blood Bank in Bishkek.

Pediatric Cancer Registry: Through several exchange visits, the KUMC and Kyrgyz partners have established an academic exchange program and a national pediatric cancer registry in Bishkek, which has allowed the partners to collect accurate cancer morbidity and mortality rates in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the partners have begun to conduct a comprehensive cancer screening and treatment project in the township of Malli-Say, which in 1993 was struck by an earthquake which reopened an abandoned mine and uncovered uranium waste. At the request of partners at the Institute of Oncology and Radiology, KUMC diagnostic teams examined residents for radiation-related illness, collected data, and treated patients. Together, the partners are analyzing the data to assist in the long-term treatment of victims of this disaster.

Laparoscopic Surgery: Surgeons from Kansas City demonstrated laparoscopic techniques at a conference of surgeons in Central Asia. They performed six operations at the Institute of Oncology and Radiology, using equipment donated by KUMC. In addition they presented two lectures: one for operating room nurses on the maintenance of laparoscopic equipment, the other for anesthesiologists on the use of resuscitation equipment.

Prosthetics/Orthotics: At the request of the Ministry of Health, the partnership took steps towards the establishment of a center for clinical training and production in prosthetics and orthopedics. One prosthetist and one orthotist traveled to Bishkek in the Fall of 1995 to review local prosthetic and orthopedic services and to study current medical practices related to prosthetic care. In addition, they visited the Bishkek prosthetic plant to evaluate the equipment and technology available. The specialists made recommendations to enhance education and improve the prosthetic rehabilitation of patients.

Catastrophic Emergency Care and Burn Care: Following a very successful two week program on emergency and burn care, the ministry asked the partners to repeat the seminar and expand the program to include the city of Osh and the firefighters and first responders in both cities. A team of physician, nurse, two therapists and an emergency technician traveled to Bishkek and Osh to teach two seminars and set up a comprehensive burn department at Hospital No. 4 in Bishkek and the Oblast Hospital in Osh. All supplies to set up these departments were donated by 20 hospitals in Kansas, cleaned and packaged by the firefighters and shipped by container from the State Department to Kyrgyzstan. The departments will be set up in such a way that they can function independently in the future.

Future Plans for the Partnership

Nursing reform through practical skills development will continue to be a major area of partnership focus. Plans are underway to upgrade the existing nursing skills laboratories, introduced to hospitals with partnership assistance. Discussions have also begun regarding the establishment of a masters degree program for nurses at the Medical Academy. They will also be conducting a seminar to train nurses to teach nurses.

The Partnership also plans to continue in it's efforts of supporting Catastrophic Emergency Care and Burn Care. They will continue to work on the two comprehensive burn care centers in Osh and Bishkek together with educating first responders. This program represents a nationwide effort in Kyrgyzstan and a statewide effort in Kansas.

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AIHA's Medical Partnership Program between Millard Fillmore Health Systems and the SUNY Buffalo School of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences in Buffalo, New York, and L'viv Clinical Railway Hospital and L'viv Perinatal Center in L'viv, Ukraine, funded under a cooperative agreement with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has existed since April 1993.

The partnership emphasizes obstetrics and gynecology, infection control, ophthalmology, resource center development, hospital administration, and laparoscopic surgery.

Program Outcomes

Obstetrics and Gynecology/Surgery: Implementation of prenatal screening and diagnostic ultrasound has enabled the partners to better identify high-risk pregnancies and, ultimately, improve fetal outcomes at the L'viv Perinatal Center. They have also introduced the utilization of the vaginal probe with ultrasound for prenatal diagnosis. Training in the primary care of women has also been conducted, combined with specific efforts in the reduction of low birth weight infants and their care. Between 1992 and 1995 the number of complications due to infections decreased in both the maternity and the gynecology units. In the maternity unit it has decreased by 2.8 times and in the gynecology unit it has been reduced by a factor of 3.8.

The mid-year report in 1996 revealed a number of statistics regarding strides that have been made in the Perinatal Center. The average length of stay in the maternity unit decreased from 13.6 days in 1995 to 11.2 days in 1996. The average length of stay in the gynecology unit was reduced from 5.8 days in 1995 to 5.4 days in 1996. In addition, the length of stay for a woman after a normal delivery was reduced to 3 days. Perinatal mortality rates were decreased from 27 percent in 1995 to 26 percent in 1996. Intra-natal mortality rates were reduced from 15.5 percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 1996. The mortality rate of full-term infants was also lowered in 1996 to 2 percent from a rate of 3 percent in 1995.

The L'viv Perinatal Center has begun performing the following new diagnostic procedures: hysteroscopy, amniocentesis, and ultrasound examination with the use of a transvaginal meter. The following treatments and procedures have also been introduced at the Center: laparoscopy cystectomy, laparoscopy tubectomy, LAVH, laparoscopic surgical sterilization, minilaparotomy, and prolongation of pregnancy despite premature release of amniotic fluid.

The Perinatal Center has begun providing laboratory examinations on an out-patient basis prior to surgery, and treating women with gynecological diseases. A short procedure unit was opened at the Center, in addition to a neonatal intensive care unit and a prenatal diagnostics unit.

Infection Control: Both NIS partner hospitals have implemented infection control programs including Universal Precautions, improved cleaning, disinfection and sterilization techniques, and prophylactic vaccination of health care providers against Hepatitis B and diphtheria. As a result, the incidence of nosocomial infections at L'viv Perinatal Center has been reduced by 15 percent. The position of Infection Control Officer has been added at Railway Hospital. This individual has responsibility for hospital-wide infection control and the quality improvement program. Nurses continue to be trained in Body Substance Isolation and Universal Precautions. Statistics at Railway

Hospital show that both hospital personnel contact with patients' blood and hospital infections between patients have been significantly reduced. The overall length of stay at Railway Hospital has been decreased by 2 days.

Ophthalmology: At Railway Hospital, extensive hands-on training in early detection of myopia and cataracts has led to a 40 percent increase in early detection and an estimated 20 percent decrease in vision related disabilities. Treatment was changed from intra-capsular to extra-capsular techniques, and over 125 patients received extracapsular implants with correctly fitted lenses to restore full vision. Training has continued in the areas of extra- and intra-capsular lens implementation surgery as well as phaco-emulsification. To date over fifty phaco-emulsification procedures have been performed. New diagnostic tools have helped to identify over 2600 patients with cataracts and over 800 patients with glaucoma. Surgery has been indicated and performed for ninety-two of the glaucoma patients.

Resource Center Development: Librarians from the L'viv Scientific Library have received training in Buffalo to increase their knowledge of computers and the use of bibliographic materials. They have studied the hospital library system and its support of patient care and have been trained in special search techniques on new equipment that they now have in L'viv. They plan to implement a computerized bibliographic system stored in two databases at the Resource Center. The partners have successfully translated "Prologue in Obstetrics" and disseminated educational materials to a vast audience. Reference materials and textbooks have been transferred to the L'viv partners for establishment of a medical reference library.

Hospital Administration: Billing and collection procedures and cost containment strategies have been implemented at both L'viv hospital sites. The role and responsibilities of the Infection Control Officer were developed to include the management of infection control data and statistics.

In February 1996, a cost accounting department was opened at the Railway Hospital. The hospital now provides services for which they receive payment. Revenues from these services total over \$5,000 per month. The hospital anticipates that within five years they will transition to a completely fee-for-service institution.

Laparoscopic Surgery: Laparoscopic training has been conducted in three stages: research and study of the techniques, observation of the techniques, and, lastly, using a laparoscopic trainer under the supervision of a US trainer. Physicians have observed and studied the following surgeries: laparoscopic cholecystectomy, appendectomy, herniorrhaphy, colon resection, and Nissen fundoplication. A new laparoscopic surgery department was opened at Railway Hospital in February, 1996; the department is staffed by physicians and nurses who were trained in Buffalo. A new laparoscopic technique, double combined extirpation of uterine tissue, was introduced at the Perinatal Center in 1996. Statistics that were received in June 1997 from Railway Hospital indicate that 1603 laparoscopic GI procedures have been performed using the equipment and techniques learned from US Partners. Eight GI endoscopists have also been trained and have begun performing laparoscopic gynecologic surgeries at Railway Hospital.

Future Plans for the Partnership

A comprehensive approach to women's health and breast cancer screening will be fully implemented, enabling the L'viv partners to provide screening programs for breast, cervical, and uterine carcinomas, as well as to offer appropriate treatment interventions. Mammography procedures will be standardized and an educational outreach program will be developed, including instruction in Breast Self Exam. Pap smear testing and staining will be standardized using the Bethesda Classification method. Basic birth control services will be provided in an outpatient clinic. Outpatient treatment of cervical dysplasia, including colposcopy and cryotherapy will be provided on an outpatient basis.

An NICU will be developed at the Perinatal Center and personnel will be trained in the treatment of premature newborns with respiratory illness. A birthing room and "Birthing Center" will be created at the Perinatal Center.

The partners will develop a preventative maintenance program. Equipment will be evaluated for potential maintenance. The partners will work together to assure the proper functioning of laparoscopic, ophthalmologic and laboratory equipment.

The partnership will work in the area of nursing continuing education program by enhancing collaboration on nursing school curriculum. They will also assist with the development of the Nursing Learning Resource Center.

Training will be conducted in advanced laparoscopic techniques and gynecological laparoscopy at both hospitals. Gastrointestinal and ENT laparoscopy will also be developed at Railway Hospital.

The computer network will be expanded and the potential for dial-in access from both hospitals will be evaluated. Additional training in the use of biomedical databases will be provided.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

Internal Transcript

March 28, 1997

REMARKS BY THE FIRST LADY

Nile Center
Kampala, Uganda

MRS. CLINTON: Thank you very much, Mrs. Museveni, for your kind remarks and your gracious hospitality and for your friendship as you accompany me through this wonderful visit that I have enjoyed here in Uganda. Madame Vice President, ministers, members of Parliament, ambassadors, commissioners, distinguished guests -- it seems fitting that we gather on Good Friday here in this great (inaudible) center because this is the day that Christians around the world know marks the passage of sorrow and despair to hope and renewal. (Applause.)

And that is also the journey that Uganda and so many other countries in Africa have taken in the last 10 years. Just over two weeks ago I stood at a podium like this in the United States State Department and spoke about why I was coming to Africa. The President and Secretary of State had asked me to come to Africa in order to highlight Africa's economic and democratic renewal.

I wanted to come to remind Americans of the importance of our partnership with Africa -- (applause) -- to underscore how America's modest contributions in foreign aid yield enormous results. I wanted to help our country understand the importance of investing in the people of Africa. I wanted to make sure that my country understood what was happening in your country and throughout so many of the countries in Africa as you are growing and trading and strengthening democracy.

I also knew that Africa had a positive story to tell --(applause) -- one that Americans could learn from. All across Africa individuals like yourselves and communities are coming together, forging bold and creative solutions at the grass-roots level and at the highest reaches of government. Today I can report that this trip has exceeded even my most optimistic expectations. (Applause.)

Starting in Senegal and going on to South Africa and Zimbabwe and Tanzania and now Uganda, I have been privileged to meet Africa's leaders and to see Africa's renewal firsthand.

Nowhere has Africa's progress been more impressive than in the building of democracy. Until very recently, as you know so well, there were only five democracies on this great continent. In the last six years that number has jumped to 23. But democracy is not just about one election; it is about free and fair elections that are repeated successfully. It is also about other essential processes and institutions: a functioning parliament, an independent judiciary. It is about political parties, a free press, and the basic rights of assembly and association.

Now that we have seen democracy emerge strongly in this country, on this continent, the question for all of us who care about the future of democracy in Africa includes what can be done to sustain and deepen this democratic transformation. What is needed to ensure that new democracies take root and prosper. How can we spur other nations to make the transition to sustainable democracy. To thrive, a democracy depends on many essential elements, some of which (inaudible).

It should be obvious, but often isn't, that the health of a democracy also depends fundamentally on empowering and enabling average citizens to participate fully in the decisions that touch their lives. It depends, in short, on what you are doing here in Uganda. The efforts I have seen here and the other countries I have visited are essential to building a vibrant democracy.

Now, what are some of those elements and what have I seen, and, particularly, what have I learned here in Uganda? First, a vibrant democracy requires that all women become full participants in their society. (Applause.) As the Vice President and Mrs. Museveni has said before, for too long in too many places, both in Africa and around the world, women have lived on the outskirts of opportunity. Yet we know we cannot build the kind of future we want for ourselves and our children without the contributions of women.

Over the last two weeks, I have been privileged to see women shaping their own destinies and the destinies of their countries -- building homes on a worn patch of land in Capetown; learning to manage a health clinic in a village in Senegal; working to reform the laws affecting property ownership and inheritance rights in Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Women are playing a greater role than ever here in Uganda. Women's rights are now enshrined in your constitution and I congratulate you. (Applause.) Women in Uganda have been welcomed into the government at the highest levels.

As President Museveni has rightfully said, women form more than half of our society, so you'd be hurting yourself if you left behind six of every 10 people. To your wise President, whom I enjoyed meeting first in Washington a few months ago and then again last evening, I would simply add: you wouldn't just be hurting yourself, you would not be living in a democracy, because a democracy without women's full participation is a contradiction in terms. Only with women's rights, the fullness of human rights are respected. When women begin to experience the authority over themselves that is the bedrock of the democratic experience, only then can they begin to experience the consciousness of full citizenship and the action that inspires.

Moreover, women will not flourish and neither will democracy if women continue to be undervalued inside and outside of the home. I'm often told by economists and others who look at what makes up the economy of countries that the work women do does not count. And I often respond -- when I think of the women gathering fire wood, fetching water, raising children, doctoring family members, keeping communities together -- I often think to myself, if women stopped working inside and outside the home tomorrow, the economy of the world would stop working. (Applause.)

But women constitute 70 percent of the world's poor, and so we have not done enough yet to liberate the economic potential of women the world over. Women must be assured the respect their work deserves, inside and outside the home. And they must be assured the opportunity to earn a decent income and become economically self-sufficient. When women are able to contribute to their own economic self-sufficiency, their husbands and children prosper, and their communities prosper as well.

But if more than the half citizens on this earth are underpaid, uneducated, under-represented, fed less, fed worse, not heard, threatened by violence in their own homes and on the streets of their communities, we cannot sustain the democratic values and way of life we have come to cherish.

What I have seen here in Uganda is that from your President all the way through the teachers in the primary school I visited, the workers in the AIDS information center, the women in the bank that is run by FINCA, I have seen that the people of Uganda understand that women will be a necessary part of building this nation's future. And that is a very important recognition indeed. (Applause.)

It is also true that a vibrant democracy requires investing in the education and health care of the people. That means we are willing to make a commitment to the future. I saw that for myself this morning. At the primary school, I heard how teachers as part of a national effort are getting better training. I saw new and creative learning materials in the hands of children. And in the energy-filled classrooms that we visited, I saw the results of your government's promise of free and expanded primary education.

While this commitment has put tremendous pressures on your schools, it has provided infinite hope for your people. Two million new students have registered nationwide for school. In the school I visited, the enrollment has nearly doubled. (Applause.)

I was also very pleased to see at Seguku school that you value education of girls as much as the education of boys. In other places I have visited around the world, that has not been the case. But we now know, based on both research that has been done, as well as first-hand personal observation by many people involved in government and politics and development around the world, that the single most important investment any nation can make for building a very prosperous democratic future is in the education of girls and women.

In country after country, the benefits of educating women go far beyond the school house. They turn up in stronger families, better nutrition, and higher wages. They also result in stronger democracies because, by telling girls that if they work hard and make the grade they too can have a rightful place in society, we are supporting the most important of democratic ideals -- the belief that every citizen, regardless of where that man or woman comes from, who their parents might be, what kind of village or family they call home -- that that person is entitled to his or her rightful share of personal, political, economic, and civic power.

So teaching people to read and write is essential, as is investing in health and addressing public health challenges. I have seen many programs in my visits that focus on trying to expand health care access to citizens. But I was very impressed by what I saw today. Uganda's world-leading efforts to educate its people against HIV and AIDS is a clear demonstration of your country's commitment from the highest levels to help.

At the AIDS Information Center, I learned that the center has already served more than 320,000 families and is part of a broader campaign to slow the spread of HIV and AIDS, and one in which the government, starting with your President, has assumed an important responsibility. Because your President refused to ignore HIV-AIDS and instead championed openness toward this terrible disease, you have seen positive results. (Applause.)

I know I have seen the results of the public information campaign on the more than a dozen billboards I have seen since I landed at the airport yesterday. You have made an all-out effort. There is still much to be done. The Minister of Health was eloquent in our meeting this morning in pointing out that there are many challenges ahead -- not only with HIV-AIDS, but with malaria, diarrhea, and many other diseases. But as a result of Uganda's commitment to fighting HIV-AIDS, Uganda is the only country in Africa where the rate of new HIV infections is actually decreasing. (Applause.)

As the (inaudible) group sang to me this morning, Ugandans are fighting to ensure that AIDS cannot win. And the United States is committed to helping you with that fight. (Applause.)

Other countries in Africa are tackling various health problems. In Zimbabwe, I saw a commitment, also on the national level, to family planning, to giving woman the knowledge that they needed to determine for themselves how many children they want to have and when they want to have them. As a result of Zimbabwe's cutting-edge family planning clinics, fertility rates are falling and contraceptive use is high. Infant mortality rates are low for the simple reason that healthier women are having healthier babies. So there is progress in health and education in those countries committed to improving the conditions of life of their people.

And by doing so, we are recognizing that a vibrant democracy requires that every citizen be given the opportunity to participate fully in the economic life of their countries. It is hard to be a full economic participant if one is not educated, if one is not healthy. But I think one can participate in the economy, then one can raise one's own standard of living and, by doing so, raise the standards of living of one's country.

Africa has been making tremendous progress to this end. Last year, 30 African countries reported positive economic growth, and Uganda was one of them. I know you are proud of your surging economy. An economy that had been destroyed by decades of war now registers the stunning growth rate of 8 percent a year.

And it is not only at the level of big business, investment, and trade that we are seeing this kind of growth rate in Uganda; I saw it for myself when I visited the FINCA village bank today. That bank provides modest loans to about 4,000 women, helping them to start small businesses. I visited similar programs in Zimbabwe and Tanzania. In each country, these lending institutions are helping to stabilize democracy because they assure women and men the opportunity to earn a decent income. They help families and communities become self-sufficient.

I have also been impressed by the economic reforms carried out by your government that have encouraged Ugandan farmers to increase their agricultural production. Hundreds of new farmers have not only bolstered your economy through exports but they have brought you true security. In the last five years, child malnutrition rates in Uganda has dropped by 20 percent. That is a remarkable accomplishment.

When you expand economic opportunity, you do much reinforce democracy because people feel that they have a stake in the future of their country.

Uganda is also reinvesting new revenues in better social investments for people such as health and education. So the cycle of hope repeats itself, enriching successive generations.

A vibrant democracy also requires citizens to take personal and collective responsibility for creating a civil society. Civil society means that we call on all elements -- individuals, community groups, houses of worship, businesses, academia, government -- to take responsibility for the common good.

And again, I have seen that happening on my trip. In Senegal, I watched as villagers acted out a drama about the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. There and in Tanzania, in a village outside of Arusha, I saw community groups coming together to work on ways of improving the common good. I've also today met with a remarkable group of Rwandan women working to rebuild their country. I was privileged to hear how they're working to heal their country from the experience of genocide, to ease the great sufferings of women and children in the refugee crisis they have endured. They described to me how they are growing together in associations to better their lives.

I was moved by what they told me, and I know how much Uganda has supported refugees and supported the Rwandan reconstruction, and I assured them that all of us would stand with them in their efforts to reconcile and rebuild their torn society. We know from our own experience -- (applause) -- in the United States, where we have been working at democracy for more than 200 years, that democracy requires patience, hard work, flexibility, and the acceptance of inherent human imperfection.

Not only does democracy ask each of us to take responsibility and to do our share, it also asks us to count on others -- people whose views you may never agree with; people from different religions and ethnic groups and tribes; people who hold ideas you may never understand. But democracy asks that we trust and rely on people unlike ourselves. With democracy, there is no day off. For democracy depends on the internalization of these values in people's hearts and minds.

Finally, we believe that a vital democracy requires Africa's friends and partners to make a contribution to Africa's democratic transformation. The United States intends to continue its partnership with Africa in its efforts to deepen and strengthen democracy. We can do this by supporting programs such as the ones I saw today -- efforts to allow women to take their rightful place at every table, efforts to educate all Africa's people, efforts to see to it that everyone has access to good health care, efforts to ensure that women as well as men have access to credit so they can participate in Africa's growing economies. These are the tools of opportunity, and these are the tools that will help sustain democracy.

I am proud of the role that America has played in African renewal. I wish the American people could see for themselves what I have seen, what is happening in Africa today. They would see that a modest contribution in United States aid to Africa, less than one-tenth of one percent of our budget, yields extraordinary returns. Aid from the United States helps train teachers, supports AIDS prevention, sparks microenterprise development, keeps family planning centers open, helps to strengthen democratic institutions.

I'm also pleased that American assistance creates the conditions of self-sustained economic growth. Assistance goes hand in hand with private investment. I've had the opportunity to see American companies do well themselves, and doing well for the countries of this continent. I know that President Clinton is eager to work in Congress to find new and effective ways to support Africa through a balanced approach that involves a continuing developing partnership and an expanding role with trade and investment. We believe this approach will enable African countries to achieve their goals of greater self-reliance and full integration into the global economy.

As President Museveni told me last evening, he looks forward to a time when America's relationship with Uganda is based on investment, trade, and tourism. I am mindful that there are other threats to Africa's fragile democracies that require our concern and vigilance. That is why the United States attaches such high importance to its collaboration with regional leaders and organizations in seeking to resolve conflicts that threaten economic and democratic progress. That is why the United States is eager to support African efforts to enhance their capacity to respond to crises, such as the African Crisis Response Force. And that is why we seek to strengthen measures to protect us all from new threats to security and welfare of democracies everywhere, such as crime, narcotics trafficking, and international terrorism.

And my husband asked me to make clear his commitment on another issue. He asked me to tell you that he will come to Africa during his second term as President. (Applause.) We will have much to show him based on my own remarkable visit. I have been very privileged to learn what is happening here. And as I prepare to return home, it is with the hope that this trip may reflect the growing consciousness in the minds of the people of Africa and America that, despite the wide ocean between us, we are neighbors on this shared earth. We cannot, if we ever could, any longer live without each other. And we have much to learn from each other. In our relationship, there must no longer be an "us" or a "them" but only a "we," a "we" committed to -- (applause.)

Yesterday, I was in a place in Tanzania, the Oldavai Gorge, where many of the discoveries about our ancient ancestors have company from. And it was very clear to me as I walked through that gorge with the archaeologists and anthropologists, that we -- black, white, brown, of every religion, of every corner of the globe -- we come from the same place. We share a common home. We are part of a larger family. And if we stop for a minute to think about what we have learned about the origins of humankind, we know that we come from Africa. (Applause.) The message embedded in that rock is that we must recognize both our common past and our common future, and we must never let respect for any human being be eroded. We must make the dignity of every single person our governing principle.

Tomorrow I will end my trip to Africa in a place that is just beginning -- Eritrea -- a new country founded on timeless ideals. And I hope that its story, like that of Africa, will be one of constant renewal. One cannot come to Africa, and particularly one cannot come to Uganda today, without being moved by the faces of the people -- people who lined the streets, greet me as Mrs. Museveni and I came from the airport, the people who were out on the streets this morning, the people who were out on the streets this morning, the faces of those I saw at the school, at the center, at the village (inaudible).

The Vice President is correct that my visit has been much too short. I have not been in a home for a meal. I have not been in many other places in this beautiful country outside Kampala. And I will look forward to opportunities to return when I can see more of the natural beauty -- (applause.) But I have seen enough to convince me that you have a commitment to a future that transcends all the divisions and the differences of the past. (Applause.) And I can see that most clearly in the faces of your children.

As I stood in the classroom at the primary school and the teacher proudly told me that she had 30 boys and 44 girls -- a brave woman to teach 74 8-year-olds -- I heard in her voice what I love to hear. I heard love and commitment, I heard determination, and then I saw on the faces of those boys and girls that they were loved, they were valued. There were adults -- not just parents, but teachers and political leaders and businessmen and women and others in Uganda who believe in them.

And if you believe in a child and you set high expectations for a child, you are more likely to see that child reach and grow. What Uganda is doing is setting those high expectations. I thank you for what you have shown me. But more than that, I thank you for the example you

are setting and what you are giving every day to your children so that they, too, will join the children in America to build the kind of future that all of us want them to have. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END

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**Int'l O&S Day Remarks
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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 12, 1997

REMARKS BY THE FIRST LADY
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY

Dean Acheson Auditorium
The State Department

MRS. CLINTON: We are gathered today to celebrate International Women's Day in the heart of the State Department. And we do, as Americans, have much to celebrate, starting with a Secretary of State who, yes, broke a barrier by virtue of her own gender, but who much more importantly is committed to defending the rights not just of Americans but of citizens around the world regardless of gender.

Not only has Madeleine Albright broken many a glass ceiling, she has brokered many a peace. Not only has she opened many doors, she has opened many minds. And since she mentioned it, I would say that in my last conversation with Mrs. Roosevelt -- (laughter) -- she told me how pleased she was that her husband had appointed the first woman to the Cabinet in United States history, and how pleased she was that my husband had appointed the first woman Secretary of State. (Applause.)

I thank Secretary Albright for her leadership, her courage and, on a personal note, her friendship. And I am delighted that she has agreed to serve as the new chair for the President's Interagency Council on Women, ably assisted on the issues by Teresa Loar and Tim Wirth and others of you here.

We all know that countless responsibilities face our new Secretary of State and all of us. Our foreign policy does not lack for challenges. We must continue to reduce weapons of mass destruction. We must realize the century's dream of a wholly united, democratic and peaceful Europe. We must work to capture new opportunities in Asia, to seize opportunities for peace in the Middle East and other areas that are strategic not only to the United States but to the entire globe. We must work with our partners in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere to build an inclusive and expanding global economy. We must safeguard our people from the threats of terrorism, extremism, international crime, drugs, and environmental degradation.

While all of these require our attention and commitment, today I have come to advance a simple idea. That is the seamless inclusion of girls' and women's needs in American foreign policy. Despite the work they do, the families they raise, the communities they hold together, too many of the world's women, particularly in developing nations, live on the outskirts of opportunity and equality. But let me be clear: This challenge is not confined to the developing world. We still have plenty of work to do here in the United States and in other advanced economies of the world to ensure that women have a full stake in democracy. One goal in every country should be to see that all citizens, regardless of race or gender or ethnicity or religion, have a full place at their society's table.

If you'll forgive just a slight diversion -- yesterday I was in Arkansas. I visited people who had been hit by a terrible tornado in the morning. Even before that disaster struck, these were people already working overtime to build good lives, to reach their aspirations. The full benefits of American society were still a long way away for them. After this tornado, all that they had worked for, all they had hoped for seems lost.

Later that day I spoke at an event that helps raise funds to send single parents, primarily women, to college or vocational school. I heard stories from five women who told us what it had meant that their society, in the form of those who had raised these funds, reached out and told them that they could make something of their own lives, they could go to college, they could support themselves and their children. They had heard the message that is even still too often conveyed in America: that they weren't worth very much, that nobody really cared too much about them.

As one young woman said, five years ago I was in a battered women's shelter in Fayetteville, Arkansas. I had nothing. I not only didn't have a car, I didn't have a driver's license, and my face looked as though it had been run over by a truck. All of a sudden there were people there who convinced me that I could make something of myself and care for my nine-month-old son. I thought to myself, how can these people believe in me, that I could go to college, that I could support myself? How could these people care about me when my own husband didn't care about me?

Those stories, as I heard them, reminded me of stories that I have heard around the world. As women in Bangladesh or India or Nicaragua or Chile stood up and told me what it meant to them to have someone believe that they, too, could make a living for their family; that the skills they had would be valued in the marketplace; that their children, especially their daughters, could have a better life. The women last night were helped to return to school. And today they are citizens of the United States in the fullest sense of that word.

Whatever disparities of wealth exist in our country and around the world means that people are left by the side of the road, detoured off the Information Highway, unable to take advantage of democracy's opportunities. What America must do for its own sake, as well as for the sake of its leadership in the world we are in today and that we are entering tomorrow, is to promote democracy and civil society in every nation, so that all citizens -- every man, woman, and child -- can live up to their God-given potential.

But one may ask, well, it's fine for me to care about the women of Arkansas, but why should I or any American care about women in developing countries and around the world? Why should women, as Secretary Albright just eloquently explained, be a concern of ours and our foreign policy here in the United States? Well, what the Secretary said and what this administration believes is that if half of the world's citizens are undervalued, underpaid, undereducated, underrepresented, fed less, fed worse, not heard, put down, we cannot sustain the democratic values and the way of life we have come to cherish.

If as a nation Americans care about opening foreign markets for American goods and services, if we care about making our country secure in the face of new threats, if we care about widening the circle of peace and prosperity, then we must address the conditions and circumstances of the world's women.

You in this room know better than anyone else that our world is in a time of great transformation, heralding ever more democracies, leading, we hope, to ever more peace. But the great promise of this time is not without its challenges. Global competition, the information revolution, the rapid pace of change all create pressures on every society, from governments down to families. And these pressures pose unavoidable questions for us as we approach the 21st century. How do we figure out ways to balance individual and community rights and responsibilities? How do parents raise children in the face of the influences of the mass media and consumer culture? What do we make of what seems to be a conflict in many instances between personal identity and the work available in an age of globalization and high technology? What about the roles of women in society? How will people preserve their ethnic pride and value their national citizenship? And how will nations protect their sovereignty while cooperating regionally and globally with others?

Thinking about these questions and how a free nation like ours will respond to them, we may need to be reminded that democracy is not just about legally protected rights, elections, or free market economies. It is about the internalization of democratic values in people's hearts and minds. It is about how, in the absence of either hot or cold wars, democracy is rooted in people's everyday lives.

Given the changes that are going on around us, we can no longer gauge our interests around the world solely through power blocs and vast arsenals. Across the globe, here at home, at the end of the Cold War, we have been free to focus on issues that edge right up to our own front doors. How do we educate our children? How do we ensure that families have proper health care? How do we ensure that democracies and free markets produce citizens, not just consumers?

I have said before that at this time of challenge around the globe, we know we will continue to cope with what is often thought of as the traditional balance of power among countries. But I would also argue that we must now add to that balance of power equation, often called *realpolitik*, the idea that real-life *politik* may be just as intimately connected with whether or not democracies survive and flourish.

These issues that we speak of today should not be considered women's issues. But certainly it is fair to say that women often, by necessity, become the world's experts on the hazards and vicissitudes of life. And they, therefore, often understand and appreciate more clearly that they have a vested interest in ensuring that their societies and governments address these real-life challenges.

I have seen for myself on continent after continent the solutions that women are forging -- new mothers in Jogjakarta, Indonesia, who gather every week to learn about family planning and better nutrition for their children; doctors and nurses in Belarus and Ukraine who are caring for the children of Chernobyl; women from Santiago to San Diego who are working on issues as diverse as education, crime, and the environment. These issues are central to our global democratic interests. For what distinguishes democracy is fair and genuine participation in every aspect of life.

It should be too obvious to point out, but unfortunately it isn't, that giving women a stronger voice and fuller say over their futures is intimately related to the health of democracies because women are the majority in most countries and the world over.

America's credo should ring clearly: A democracy without the full participation of women is a contradiction in terms. To reach its full potential, it must include all of its citizens. Clearly, whether we succeed in strengthening democratic values around the world is of special consequence to women, who in our country and elsewhere are still striving to attain, and even define their rightful place in government, the economy, and civil society, and to claim their rightful share of personal, political, economic and civic power.

Raising the status of women and girls and investing in their potential means insuring that they have the tools of opportunity available to them. Education, health care, credit and jobs, legal protections and the right to participate fully in the political life of their countries. And that is why the United States must continue its bipartisan tradition of supporting initiatives that move our world closer to these goals.

Today, more than 600 million women worldwide are denied the opportunity of an education. Women make up two-thirds of those who can neither read nor write. Yet the single most important investment any developing nation can make is in the education of girls and women. We are discovering that in country after country the benefits of educating women go far beyond the classroom and the schoolhouse. They go to stronger families, better health, nutrition, wages, and levels of political participation.

I have seen how the support of the United States for the education of women and girls worldwide is paying off. I have seen how similar social investments, also many supported by the United States, can make a difference in countries as diverse as Brazil, the Philippines, Nepal, and Pakistan.

Certainly, as I travel around the world and as many of you do likewise, we have seen with our own eyes that investing in girls and women helps to transform communities which in turn can transform societies. Women will not flourish and neither will democracy if they continue to be undervalued inside and outside the home.

I have had many experts in economic development around the world say to me that women's work is not part of the economies of countries, that women do not participate in the economic markets of countries. And yet I have seen with my own eyes as I've traveled through urban areas and remote rural ones that women are bearing often the bulk of the load of the work that must be done -- to plant crops, to harvest them, to make it possible for small enterprises to flourish in market stalls. So I know that women are working. Their contributions may not be counted in the gross domestic product of their societies, but they are of value. If all the women in the world tomorrow said they would not work outside the home, the economies of every country would collapse. And it is time -- (applause) -- it is time that we honored and counted the contributions that women make, both in the home and outside.

Investing in women also means investing in their health and, in turn, in the health of their families. I am especially pleased that the United States has provided assistance through the United States Agency for International Development to assure that women, children, and families have access to a full spectrum of low-cost, high-yield health care services -- from safe birthing kits for expectant mothers, to basic immunizations for infants, to oral rehydration therapy to treat children suffering from diarrhea.

I want to say a special word about family planning and its importance in this larger effort. Family planning is fundamental to letting women take responsibility for themselves and their children. Right now, however, roughly 100 million women worldwide cannot get or are not using family planning services because they are poor, uneducated, or do not have access to care. Some 20 million women will seek unsafe abortions. Of these women, some may become disabled for life, some will have other health problems, but fundamentally, the rate of unsafe abortions is in itself a tragedy. High abortion rates do not represent women's equality; they represent a failure on all our parts to help women prevent unwanted pregnancies in the first place. If we really care about reducing abortions and fostering strong families, we must not back away from America's commitment to family planning efforts overseas. (Applause.)

If we really care about making women equal partners in societies the world over, we must do everything in our power to fight violence against women, whether it is a hidden crime of domestic abuse or a blatant tactic of war.

No single social investment is a panacea for women or for developing countries. Nor should every just cause of the world be America's to embrace.

But I do believe that as long as discrimination and inequities persist in a broad-scale way against women, a stable, prosperous world will be far from a reality.

Taken together, our investments in social development are vital to strengthening free market interests, spreading our democratic ideal and enhancing our security.

Over time, America has learned that our ideals and interests cannot be divorced from the political, economic and social cross-currents swirling around us. I hope we have also learned that engagement with the world represents opportunities at home as well as obligations abroad.

Let me just give you one modest example. I spoke recently at a conference sponsored by USAID called Lessons Without Borders. At the conference, Baltimore's Mayor, Kurt Schmoke, told how government leaders from his city had gone to Africa to learn about simple, low-cost strategies used on that continent to encourage parents to immunize their children. Now similar programs are in place in Baltimore, with community clinics, a vaccination van, door-to-door visits and the resulting higher immunizations rates for children under three.

We can learn from our neighbors around the world. And many of the lessons we can learn, we will find, are lessons that have been helped to be taught by our own foreign policy engagement -- less than one percent of our budget, yet countless lives can be improved and we can improve lives here at home.

Before I close, I want to say a word about my forthcoming trip to Africa. I was very honored to be asked to make this trip because I think that America's engagement in the world must include an engagement with sub-Saharan Africa. Contemporary history is a story that citizens and countries are writing. And there is a new story that must be told. Every region is contributing its own chapter.

Africa has a remarkable story if we will only pay attention to it. It is moving toward democracy. In the last six years, the number of democracies have jumped from five to 23. Africa is growing economically, moving from suffocating state-controlled economies to open markets that can give full life and scope to human endeavor.

Last year, 30 countries reported positive economic growth. Africa is beginning to forge a new relationship with the United States -- one based not just on aid but on shared ideals, mutual responsibilities, integration into the world economy, and partnerships designed to resolve conflicts and to meet common challenges. To be sure, many of the African democracies are new and therefore fragile. Hope remains tenuous. Too much of the continent continues to be riven by disease, malnutrition, poverty, injustice, corruption, perilous conflicts and their terrible aftermath, refugee crises that trap women and children especially in lives that go from bad to worse.

And yet -- and yet, in spite of these challenges, for the first time, we can say that, at this moment in history, there are in Africa grounds for far more hope than despair. And with the support of the United States, we can solidify that hope.

I will be privileged to visit Senegal, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda and Eritrea. And I am pleased that so many of the ambassadors from those countries and other countries in Africa are with us today.

I hope to witness first hand and to highlight each country's efforts to build democracy and a strong civil society. I will focus particularly on grassroots initiatives and on efforts that affect women and children.

I hope this trip will give the American people a renewed sense of the importance of our commitment to Africa. I hope it will lay out exactly why we must do our utmost to support democracy and social investment in Africa and to strengthen Africa's place in the community of nations.

And I hope it will show that American engagement must be measured not just in aid dollars or humanitarian efforts in the wake of tragedy and crisis, but in the democratic values we reinforce, in the human rights we defend, and in the conflicts we help resolve preventively.

There are, to be sure, issues of America's national security at stake. Instability in Africa, whether it is rooted in war, in terrorism, in organized crime, in disease, in environmental degradation or poverty, it touches us too.

There are also economic issues at stake. Right now, the United States holds only 7 percent of the African market of 600 million people. By forging stronger economic ties with Africa, we will do much to secure the prosperity of our own people as well.

But finally, our greatest reasons for engagement with Africa are built on a positive foundation. Africa is on the move, with a new generation of leaders, the fresh air of political reform, and thriving multi-ethnic societies.

As we look at the future for America's engagement around the world, we can see that wherever we help to seed the ground for democracy, wherever we reach out to people out of mutual respect to help them help themselves, wherever we understand clearly that in this time of interdependence and interconnection that we all have a stake in the success of the other, we will make progress together. Whether it comes to assisting and working with our friends in the new democracies in Africa, or understanding the importance of our commitment to women and girls, America's interests are at stake.

But far more importantly, America's values are at stake. If we act upon those values, we will help to lead the world into the kind of new future we envision as possible for our children and all the children around the globe.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END

STANS BRIEFING

integrity, economic situation
protect sovereignty of former Soviet states - US ROLE, GOAL
strong Am support played role in success,

Uzbek - lowest success

Ukr - had only election w/ free transfer of power

NGOs - illuminate govt processes.

- enhance public accountability

Kaz - largest state in Central Asia

16.9 pop. 35% ethnic Russians,
most Russians live in north.

Issue - break Russia?

big oil reserves

Kyrg - small country

4. million pop.

low natl resources - cotton, wool, gold

75% muslim

relatively free press

Uzbek - cotton king

80% Uzbek - very homogenous

23.7 million

Samarkand & Bukhara -

2 of oldest cities in Central Asia - old silk road.
Muslim abode,

Russia 147. million pop. ($\frac{1}{2}$ of former USSR pop.)
elected officials in local govt in NOV + Yekat
Yek in oblast Sverdlovsk
NOV in obl. NOV.

Yekat. - Romanov

Ukr. 50.9 pop
Lviv dates back to 6th c.
Part of Poland until WW2 (Lviv)
had high Jewish pop.
① of Catholicism

♂ - used to be polygamy, ♂ veiled.
Soviet imposed educ
1-2% ~~at~~ at beg. of USSR, quickly rose

See article by U & London - ♂ in Central Asia
decision to accept Islam resurgence to keep family intact

violence 15,000 deaths of wives by husbands (94)
(30,000 total!)

Russia, Ukr - high abortion rate (as b. control)

Adoption

- 1 million homeles
- .5 million orphans

Morningstar

Assistance -

humanitarian - in Bishkek (others?) planes w/ aid

long term engagement

\$770 m. from Congress (Partnership for Freedom

Contract - ① if we want to help growth -

② trying to create relationships thru exs to help them make the transformation. Emph. long term.

③ democr/human rights. It is in their interest to become integrated in global economy to improve h.r.

Our engagement/friendship is imp't to both them + us.

themes of assistance

① role of ~~the~~ in civil society

② role of ① as entrepreneurs

③ concern for or + children's health

aid latrines

finca

mtg w/ prom woman

} examples.

We're supporting their efforts to help themselves.

Yekaterina - "Pittsburgh in '50s"

NN.

See examples of at local/regional level - educ. exch. opps.

AIHA?

- renew part for ^{such a review} get summary to ^{member Clinton Admin.} SOROS
- get map of region
- fax Nelson
- advisory

engagement w/ the west.

TRIP THEMES - First visit to these regions by ^{such a review} member Clinton Admin.
Support for emerging democracies - see role of women
* visit health center (♂, children)
cultural center (Samarkand, Bukhara)
assistance, as partners with these nations, - get data.

[* partner with U.S. universities, medical centers]

building of democr institution

Support transformation to free market economy
Come & have been @, not visible yet. She will encourage to keep this up.

tying of children, health issues to overall growth. Emph the necessity, the symbiotic relationship.

? compare to Eastern Europe trip in advisory??

TRAINING, not just aid (\$)

education

Soros - funded updating text
Science (\$100m.)
basic health
- most to NGOs

*

10/24/97

THRU: RUSS HARDESTY

TO: KATY BUTTON

FM: JOHN POST

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON FIRST LADY TRIP TO NIS

1. ALMATY, KAZAKSTAN- We have shipped one large box of medicines and supplies that will be staged at the Women's Wellness Center for Mrs. Clinton to hand over to the director. John Post will travel to Almaty to prepare all details. A listing of the DoD medicines is attached in addition to a listing of Partnership/AIHA supplies that will be delivered to the hospital. ✓

2. BISHKEK & OSH, KYRGYZSTAN- CitiHOPE conducted a survey to determine needs. They are responsible for assembling an assistance package for the Bishkek area. Heart to Heart is assembling a package for Osh. Russ Hardesty will provide a detailed listing at your update meeting on 10/29. Russ will have details of the hospitals designated to receive these supplies. Embassy has been requested to discuss this project with the preadvance team to see how something could fit into an event with FLOTUS. We suggested possible site--AIHA partnership hospitals, either the Institute of Obstetrics and Gynecology or the Institute of Oncology and Radiology. Jim Smith will be able to shed some light on their projects. Per your request, we are supporting Americorps in transporting 5 pallets of childrens clothing to Bishkek and 2 pallets to Osh. This material will be distributed by Peace Corps personnel in Kyrgyzstan. We understand the Peace Corps is arranging all details associated with this donation. ✓

3. TASHKENT, UZBEKISTAN- It is envisioned that the First Lady will participate in the opening of the Women's Wellness Center at Tashmii II, the AIHA Partnership hospital with the University of Illinois at Chicago medical school. A listing of supplies that will be staged at this center is attached. In addition, selected DoD equipment such as exam tables and stainless steel medical cabinets will be available for turnover. John Post will make sure everything is in place for the turnover. Mrs. Clinton recently participated in our 500th Airlift/Operation Provide Hope mission at Andrews Air Force Base. In all, \$22 million in medicines and medical equipment/supplies were delivered in June. DoD excess medical equipment, donated equipment from the University of Illinois medical school and equipment purchased through AIHA will be available for display at the Women's Wellness Center. ✓

4. NOVOSIBIRSK, RUSSIA- We had envisioned that some medicines would go on the FLOTUS aircraft. A decision was made to NOT include the medicines based on the possibility that this would embarrass Mrs. Yeltsin. Heart to Heart is continuing to plan on conducting a humanitarian mission to Novosibirsk next spring but it will not be announced by the First Lady.

5. YEKATERINBURG, RUSSIA- S/NISC is not involved with any donations for this visit.

6. L'VIV, UKRAINE- Children of Chernobyl has committed to providing medicines and medical equipment/supplies and an ambulance for this project. Most of the cargo is destined for the L'viv Regional Childrens Pediatric center. We were told that it includes neonatal resuciation equipment, medicines and medical supplies and an ambulance, all approved for import by the Ukranian Ministry of Health. Russ Hardesty will provide a listing to you at the meeting on 10/29. Another suggestion- AIHA has a very successful partnership between Henry Ford Health System in Detroit and the L'viv Oblast Clinical Hospital- a neonatology resucitation training center. Two medical professionals from the L'viv partnership are currently in Detroit for training. We have arranged for them to carry a donation of medicines and supplies that will be available for the First Lady to hand off during her visit. A copy of the inventory is attached. Jim Smith can provide more details concerning this Partnership on 10/29. The CCRF cargo is tentatively scheduled to arrive L'viv on 6 November. We are including 5 pallets of cold weather clothing and relief supplies being organized by Congresswoman Kaptur from Ohio. The items will be distributed by Peace Corps volunteers near L'viv. AHewitt is coordinating. ✓





BIOGRAPHY OF FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Hillary Rodham Clinton served as First Lady of Arkansas for twelve years. During that time, she worked as a full-time partner of a law firm, chaired an education committee that set public school standards in Arkansas, managed a home, and cared for her husband and child. On many occasions, Hillary Clinton has spoken about the need "to find the right balance in our lives." For her, the elements of that balance are family, work, and public service.

Hillary Diane Rodham was born in Chicago, Illinois, on October 26, 1947, daughter of Dorothy Rodham and the late Hugh Rodham. She and her two younger brothers grew up in Park Ridge, Illinois, as a close-knit family. An excellent student, she was also a Girl Scout and a member of the local Methodist youth group. Hillary enjoyed sports and was always interested in politics.

She entered Wellesley College in 1965. Graduating with high honors, she then enrolled in Yale Law School, where she served on the Board of Editors of the *Yale Review of Law and Social Action*. There she met Bill Clinton, a fellow student. While at Yale, she developed her strong concern for protecting the interests of children and their families.

In 1973, Hillary became a staff attorney for the Children's Defense Fund. A year later, she joined the Impeachment Inquiry staff of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives to work on the Watergate impeachment proceedings.

Hillary left Washington and "followed her heart to Arkansas." She married Bill Clinton in 1975. The couple both taught on the law faculty of the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. Their daughter, Chelsea, was born in 1980.

As First Lady of Arkansas, Hillary continued to work tirelessly on behalf of children and families. In addition to chairing the Arkansas Education Standards Committee, she founded the Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families. She introduced a pioneering program called Arkansas' Home Instruction Program for Preschool Youth, which trains parents to work with their children in preschool preparedness and literacy. Hillary also served on the board of the Arkansas Children's Hospital. In recognition of her professional and personal accomplishments, Hillary was named Arkansas Woman of the Year in 1983 and Arkansas Mother of the Year in 1984.

Upon taking office, the President made health care one of his highest priorities. He appointed the First Lady to head his Task Force on National Health Care Reform. Like her predecessors, Hillary Rodham Clinton brings to the role of First Lady of the United States her own special talents, experience, style, and interests.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 7, 1997

EXCERPTS BY THE FIRST LADY AT BLUE RIBBON SCHOOLS EVENT REGARDING UPCOMING TRIP TO CENTRAL ASIA, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE

MRS. CLINTON: I also want to say a word about another important test we face as a nation. And that is a test of international leadership. Because, after all, we are educating our children in today's world not merely to be citizens of their community or even their state, but to understand that as citizens of the United States they will face global challenges and they, as well as all of us, will determine whether or not American leadership remains strong.

On Sunday, at the request of the President and the Secretary of State, I will travel to Central Asia, to the country of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. I will then go on to Soviet Russia and Ukraine. The point of this trip is straightforward -- to strengthen the young, but already strong, ties between our countries and to share ideas and experiences about ethnic and religious tolerance, to try to talk about democracy and how important it is to be nurtured.

Just imagine, only six years ago the countries I will be visiting lived under stifling Soviet rule. And now they are newly independent states. We at the United States are working with these countries to foster free and fair elections, to build strong democratic institutions, to help them live with an open and inquiring press, to reform their education systems and cherish civil society. We are also hoping to assist them in moving from being part of the world's biggest state-based economy to a free market.

Now, these countries and the regions I will visit have come a very long way. The private sector, for example, now commands more than 50 percent of the economy. And I hope on our trip to highlight the efforts each has made to build democracy and to make the kind of changes that are necessary to give every person an opportunity to live up to the fullest of his or her God-given promise. I particularly will stress the importance of women and children -- their education, their health care, their safety -- and the other necessities of life that we often take for granted here in the United States.

I hope that this will be one more example of why it is significant that the United States continue to lead and to demonstrate by example how important democracy is. Education both in our country and in countries such as the ones I will be visiting is absolutely key to how well we, and particularly our children, will live together in the future.

In some of the countries I will visit they are still using textbooks from the former Soviet regime. They don't have the money to rewrite them. In some of the countries that I will visit, their education system has just collapsed under the weight of all the changes and the economic pressures they are confronting. In some of the countries I will visit, girls who have not traditionally been valued have been taken out of school, now that there's no enforcement of compulsory education, and they are being put to work early or married off early and being deprived of a chance to get an education.

So I will see both the positive of what is occurring and do everything I can to promote that. And I will see some of the challenges that are faced. And I will return home, I am sure, as I always do when I am privileged to make these visits, more and more grateful for where I was born and raised, more appreciative of the blessings that we have -- but also concerned that we continue to build on our strength as a nation, that we never back up or give up on the American ideals and particularly on our belief that education is the key for so many of our people to achieve a better life for themselves and their families.

It will be an interesting visit for me, because it will provoke, as it always does, thoughts about what we have to do to make sure we fulfill our obligations to our children in the next century.

I want to thank you for showing us the way. I want to encourage you to continue to share your experiences, your ideas, with as many of your colleagues as possible. And I want to implore you to raise your voices for the simple idea that any and every child can learn, that any and every school -- public, private, parochial -- can be transformed into a blue ribbon school; that what we must do now is put into action what we have learned about what works. And if we do that, then I'm convinced America's best years lie ahead.

Thank you so very much. (Applause.)

END

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 7, 1997

EXCERPTS BY THE FIRST LADY AT BLUE RIBBON SCHOOLS EVENT REGARDING UPCOMING TRIP TO CENTRAL ASIA, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE

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Thank you so very much. (Applause.)

END