

OFFICE OF CABINET AFFAIRS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

**FAX**

TO: Gordon

DATE: 12/6

PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_

NO. OF PAGES 6  
(Including cover)

FAX: 703/ 695-0476

PRIORITY: Y N

FROM: Phil

PHONE: (202) 456-2572

FAX: (202) 456-6704

MESSAGE: \_\_\_\_\_

I understand the Adv Cmte will look  
at Green Run docs on the 14th. The attached came  
out of their committee meeting last ~~month~~ month in  
Spokane.

This old report says the excised portions do refer  
to "how and why" the experiments were conducted, not  
just the "collection" of data as we have spoken about.

Let's talk about this before next week -- we need  
to handle this right. Thanks

WILE M. SUGARMAN  
Secretary



EPS-89-146

STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES

Olympia, Washington 98504-0095

May 26, 1989

TO: Distribution  
FROM: Al Conklin *AC*  
SUBJECT: MY REVIEW OF THE CLASSIFIED GREEN RUN REPORT

As requested by Warren Bishop, our state representative on the Technical Steering Panel, I have reviewed the entire classified Green Run document to ensure that no information was deleted from the declassified version relevant to actual radionuclide releases or environmental contamination levels resulting from this experiment.

The segments deleted from the classified version related to specific information on why and how the experiment was conducted and who was involved in the experiment. The declassification of these deletions would not add information to the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project nor provide any other information relevant to the health of the public in the Pacific Northwest.

Interestingly enough, many pages were blank in the declassified document indicating that deletions may have been extensive. Such was not the case. Many of the original pages were simply left blank and were not deleted. I know this was the case since the document I reviewed was the original and included pencil marks and signatures from the original participants, authors.

I think this exercise was extremely useful, in that independent verification of information provided by the Department of Energy was possible. If I can ever be of service in this regard again, please let me know.

AC/db

Distribution:  
R. R. Mooney  
T. R. Strong  
Dan Silver  
Warren Bishop  
Carole Washburn

JULE M. SUGARMAN  
Secretary



STATE OF WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES

Olympia, Washington 98504-0095

REVIEW OF THE GREEN RUN DOCUMENT  
"DISSOLVING OF TWENTY DAY METAL AT HANFORD"  
HW 17381

Allen W. Conklin  
Office of Radiation Protection

May 8, 1989

Abstract

The recently declassified Green Run document revealed that previously estimated releases of I-131 (5050 Ci) were less than actual measured quantities reported in this document (7780 Ci); as were XE-133 levels (7900 Ci estimated compared to approximately 20,000 Ci measured). This discrepancy results in concern over other "calculated" releases reported for previous years.

It is also evident that this experiment went awry, with numerous errors, equipment failures, cross contamination of equipment and miscalculations.

The information contained in this declassified document demonstrates the continuing need for very active technical oversight by the Technical Steering Panel over the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project.

Discussion

On May 1, 1989, the U.S. Department of Energy declassified (with deletions) the Green Run document, titled "Dissolving of Twenty Day Metal at Hanford". This declassification was the result of a law suit and Freedom of Information Act request by the Spokane Spokesman-Review, The Oregonian, The Tri-City Herald and HEAL. I found out about the release on May 3 with almost simultaneous calls from the Spokane paper and HEAL. I immediately called U.S. DOE in Richland (DOE-RL), who also expressed surprise at the sudden release of the document. It had been handled at Headquarters, who had not warned the Richland office of the release. DOE-RL was expecting it eventually, but not this sudden. They agreed to Federal Express a copy to me, which I received on May 4. I also received a copy of a "Talking Points" paper dated

March 1986, which I had not previously seen. The Talking Points paper was intended as an explanation of the Green Run in lieu of the report, which was to remain classified.

The report outlined the preparations and actual experiment over December 2-3, 1949. Many segments of the report were deleted that explained exactly what the experiment was intended to accomplish; however, it was known that "The purpose of the 1949 experiment was related to the development of a monitoring methodology for intelligence efforts regarding the emerging Soviet nuclear program." Deletions also included selected individual's names in the acknowledgments section.

In spite of the deletions, much information was available outlining General Electric's (G.E.) planning and response. In my opinion, this report illustrates an experiment that went awry. The problems encountered during the Green Run included:

- \* planned and required meteorological conditions did not occur, resulting in the unplanned excessive spread of I-131 and Xe-133. The forecasts of cloud movement and deposition were wrong. It appears that G.E. did not want to dissolve the fuel at that time, but was encouraged to do so by the Air Force;
- \* monitoring equipment failed throughout the experiment;
- \* filtration installed in aircraft to protect the crew had to be shut down when passing through the plume so monitoring could be done, resulting in little actual protection;
- \* the loss of meteorological balloons intended for monitoring the release;
- \* apparently unanticipated problems with the terrain when tracking the plume;
- \* cross contamination of monitoring equipment and the lab, which was in the plume, hindering the evaluation of contaminated samples;
- \* and, most importantly, calculated releases of I-131 and Xe-133 were low by a factor of 2-3 below measured quantities.

The last bullet is of concern since it raises doubt over other "calculated" releases in previous years. Also of concern is the fact that these new release quantities were not encountered previously by U.S. DOE reviewers. Since this document was classified when other documents were released in 1986, DOE-RL released a "Talking Points" paper describing the Green Run. This paper stated that "the actual amount (of I-131) cannot be specifically calculated but would be no more than the estimated

5,034 curies". The classified Green Run document was referenced. The calculation verses measurement discrepancy apparently was not noted.

This paper also stated that "... for 1949 the release was not extraordinary and in fact did not significantly exceed the 'tolerance level' which had existed for I-131 during the previous four years...". This conflicts with both the earlier historical documents and the Green Run document, which illustrated contamination exceeding 4,000,000 pCi/kg, 20 times the tolerance level of 200,000 pCi/kg reported in other documents. The Green Run document reports that the tolerance level was only 9,000 pCi/kg. The reason for this latter discrepancy is not known.

It should be noted that reports of environmental contamination in the Green Run report do not disagree with that reported in other documents. This means that the Department of Social & Health Services' Preliminary Dose Assessment for that time period would not be altered because of this report, since our assessment was based on the environmental measurements, and not the source terms.

The reliability of any measurements in the field could not be assessed due to the "unknowns" involving equipment efficiencies and whether these were taken into consideration. The report does, however, state that "... results from individual analyses may vary by a factor of 3-4 due to uncertainties in sampling...". The efforts of the field teams appeared to adequately track the relative extent of the plume, in spite of these uncertainties, and the difficulties with the terrain.

Most of the exposure discussed in the document was to animal thyroids (birds and mammals), which exceeded tolerance levels up to 80 times, and workers, who received very little contamination to the thyroid. The animal exposures could be attributed to consumption of contaminated foods. There was virtually no discussion of exposure to the general population in this document.

The report also discusses a separation between the Xe-133 plume and I-131 plume, with G.E.'s belief that the farthest measurements from Hanford were primarily from Xe-133, at least in the early stages of the releases.

The military's involvement in this experiment was clear, in spite of deletions, with baseline aerial monitoring performed by the Air Force, the use of "weapons carriers" for field monitoring and the "compromise" between the Air Force and G.E. on the timing of the experiment.

### Conclusion

Most of the report is a technical discussion of the various aspects of the Green Run and radiological impact. In many

respects, there is little new information in that the offsite impact information is little different from the earlier documentation. There is virtually no new information on why the experiment was necessary. This aspect remains classified.

The most important information gleaned from this document includes the degree of difficulties and miscalculations and the discrepancy between calculated releases and measured releases. This discrepancy raises concern over the accuracy of other calculated values of releases reported in earlier declassified documents, and the potential impact on the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project now underway.

This concern can best be alleviated by careful onsite overview of the source term determination process in that project by the Technical Steering Panel.

Questions concerning this review may be directed to Allen W. Conklin at (206) 586-0254, or at Mail Stop LE-13, Office of Radiation Protection, Department of Social & Health Services, Olympia, WA 98504.

## SCHEDULING AND ADVANCE QUESTIONNAIRE/COMMENTS SHEET

Please take the time to fill out the following questionnaire/comments sheet. The information taken from this questionnaire will be used to develop a White House Advance Manual, to recruit additional advance staff, to design an advance seminar/school and, generally, to improve the quality of our advance operation. Your candid feedback is greatly appreciated. Where designated, please use the following rating system: 1 - poor, 3 - adequate, 5 - excellent. You may submit the questionnaire anonymously if you desire. Please return this information to Billy Webster at the White House Scheduling Office by mail or in person. Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions.

### ADVANCE OFFICE

1) In general and specific terms, what do you feel is your greatest challenge or frustration when doing advance for the White House?

2) How would you characterize your contacts with the advance office? In particular, were you given enough advance notice when asked to do a trip? was obtaining a visa/passport a simple and efficient process? And what would you do to improve communication with the advance office?

3) Would an "advance seminar/school" be helpful? And if so, what are your ideas on program, timing, and scope of such a seminar?

4) Is the staffing of your teams adequate - does the number and level of staff fit with the events on the schedule? And please evaluate the current structure of the advance teams in general - does this structure work? are there clear lines of communications both on the team and in communicating with the White House?

5) How have you felt about the direction you have received from your leads? Can and how can this communication be improved?

6) Please give the names, addresses, and phone numbers of people whom you know interested in doing advance for the White House, people either with or without previous advance experience.

TRAVEL OFFICE

Please rate the service you receive from the White House Travel office including?

Ease of ticketing \_\_\_\_

Weekend service \_\_\_\_

Phone service and courteousness of personnel \_\_\_\_

Ground transportation, i.e., are there enough vehicles assigned to the team, are there enough vouchers, etc. \_\_\_\_

Hotel accommodations, i.e., is the hotel close to the event site, reservations, are all the advance staff on the same floor? \_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ADMINISTRATIVE

1) Do you understand the process by which your per diem is calculated? Do you feel it is processed in an efficient and timely manner? How can you be better served in this process?

2) Do you have difficulties finding funding for events and what in your opinion can be done to facilitate this process?

3) Do you, in a timely manner, send thank you notes? Do you send a list to the advance office of those people who helped you on a trip so they may be thanked and added to a database? And do you feel this process is being used to its greatest benefit? If not, how can it be improved upon?

EVENT RELATED

1) What sort of political information, local or otherwise, do you need initially and during a trip? Are your questions prior to departure answered in an efficient and informative manner? What can be done to better assist you in making those contacts or retrieving the necessary information?

2) Politically what should be done following a trip to ensure that anyone from the Administration can always return to that town/city and the same people can be contacted? i.e., thank you notes, occasional contacts, etc.

3) Do you feel that you receive the overall support from the White House which you need to do your job?

4) Do you feel when you are assigned to an event/s that you have all the "message" or "goal" information regarding that event/s? What specific assistance would be helpful?

Page 4, advance questionnaire

5) Do you feel you have too much/the right amount/too little discretion in making decisions about events on the road? How would you change it?

6) Do you feel you have adequate opportunity to provide feedback after a trip? If not, what type of forum or avenue would you suggest to accomplish this?

COMMENTS

Please use the space below (or any attachments) to submit whatever comments regarding the scheduling and advance operation.

(OPTIONAL)

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

Phone (H) \_\_\_\_\_ (O) \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you very much.



**ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS**  
1726 M STREET, N.W., SUITE 600  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Col. Claud Bailey (DOD), Mr. Harold Gracey (VA), Mr. Richard Pell (VA), Dr. Gordon Soper (DOD), Ms. Joan Ma-Pierre (DNA)

**From:** Dan Guttman, Don Weightman, Denise Holmes

**Date:** October 13, 1994

**Re:** DNA Document HRE-0672

We have recently received a document from DNA (Document HRE-0672) which may be of relevance to VA's search for materials related to the "confidential" Atomic Medicine Division and that, in any event, may raise questions about the nature of files kept on those exposed to atomic blasts. (We appreciate DNA's provision of this, and further documents.) A copy of that document, including its attachments, is appended.

By way of background, at the onset of the Committee's work, VA provided two documents which relate to the 1947 creation of an atomic research unit within VA. According to a 1952 report by Dr. George Lyon, then Assistant Chief Medical Director for Research and Education, General Paul Hawley in the fall of 1946 "became deeply concerned about the problems that atomic energy might create for the Veteran Administration due to the fact that the Armed Services was so actively engaged in matters of atomic energy." Lyon's report states that in mid-1947 Hawley began to explore these problems (further identified as veterans' service-related disability claims) with representatives of the Manhattan District.

Lyon's report states that in the fall of 1947, VA created a Central Advisory Committee on Radioisotopes. "The Advisory Committee was given the name, 'Central Advisory Committee on Radioisotopes,' as it was not desired at this time to publicize the fact that the Veterans



Administration might have any problems in connection with alleged service related disability claims." According to Lyons report, this Committee recommended 1) establishment of an Atomic Medicine Division within VA; 2) establishment of a Radioisotope Section (within the Division) to implement the Radioisotope program, and 3) "that for the time being, the existence of an Atomic Medicine Division be classified as 'confidential,' and that publicity be given instead to the Radioisotope Program." The Lyon report states that "General Hawley took affirmative actions on these recommendations."

VA Secretary Jesse Brown has expressed his commitment to search for information that would explain the activities (such as they might have been) of any "confidential" (or secret, in the lay sense) component of the Atomic Medicine Division. We understand that the search is continuing.

HRE-0672 includes an August 8, 1952 letter from Major General Loper to Dr. Lyon. The letter states, in part:

This activity has received information that the Army Field Forces is proposing to eliminate the requirement for maintaining detailed statistical records of radiological exposures received by Army personnel.

This requirement was originally conceived as being necessary to protect the government's interest in case any large number of veterans should attempt to bring suit against the government based on a real or imagined exposure to nuclear radiations during an atomic war. Although the Army Field Forces is the only organization which is now preparing to eliminate this requirement, it is possible that the Navy and Air Force may propose similar action in the future.

The letter has an addendum which notes, in part, "[i]t is requested that the Security Division determine whether the addressee [presumably Dr. Lyon] has proper clearance."

In addition the August 8, 1952 letter, HRE--0672 contains seemingly related memoranda, which are dated December 1952.

The above raised a number of questions, including:

1. What was the "requirement" that is referred to in the second paragraph of the August 8, 1952? For example, was it a formal requirement, stated in an order or directive? Is there any documentation of the requirement?
2. What documentation, or other information, is there about the conception of the "requirement," as referred to in the second paragraph of the August 8, 1952 letter?
3. What were the Army Field Forces files, as referred to in the August 8, 1952 letter? Were they ever secret (or confidential, etc.)? If they ever existed, are they still existence?

Similarly, what were the Navy and Air Force files referred to, and are they still in existence?

4. Is there any documentation, or other data, which might tell us why the August 8, 1952 letter was "confidential"?
5. Is there any notion of where "confidential" material received by VA (particularly Dr. Lyon) in 1952 a) would have been kept at the time of receipt? b) is presently located?
6. What was the "Failla Panel," as referred to in the December 10, 1952 Memo for the Chief, AFSWP, and is there any surviving documentation of its work?
7. The December 10 Memo refers, at "4", to an "impression that the Army Field Forces have stated, with the concurrence of the Surgeon General, that they do not require detailed statistical records of radiological exposure of Army Personnel under combat conditions. This represents policy at variance with...Army Training Circular 33...but it is representative of current AFF doctrine." Is there any documentation that shows the requirements, statements, and/or concurrences referred to?
8. Is there any further surviving documentation related to the 1952 VA/DOD exchanges?

The intent of this memorandum is not to broaden the search, but to make sure that all efforts are made to track down matters of relevance to the Atomic Medicine Division, in particular, and matters that may still be secret (or, at least, in a cloudy mist) in general. As usual, we look forward to your assistance in helping the Committee find what information can be found about these matters.

FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : (1) Capt Dawson *KD/sas*  
 (2) Adm Parker *Cur*

DATE: 12 Dec 52

FROM : Capt Hinners

SUBJECT: 1. In answer to Admiral Parker's query on the routing slip, attached hereto are:

- (a) Copy of AFSWP's original letter of 8 Aug 52.
- (b) My memo of 9 Dec 52 to Chief, Medical Branch asking for a clarification of the last paragraph of the VA letter.
- (c) Colonel McDonnell's reply of 10 Dec 52 which covers these points and recommends that further action be deferred until after discussion at two Panel meetings scheduled for 7-9 Jan 53.

2. In the meantime, we have informally advised our Army O-3 contact in this matter (Col Scott) of the preliminary stand taken by the VA to guard against any premature unilateral action on the part of the Army.

*Rec'y,**RAH*

3 attachments  
 as stated above

R.A. HINNERS  
 Capt, USN  
 Chief, Weapons Defense Division

*Attachment 2*

DNL1940883075

INFORMATION CONTAINED

## AFSWP HOUSING AND CONTROL SHEET

Security Information

NOTE: This Routing and Control Sheet will remain attached to this communication until all action required is completed. After action has been completed it will be filed in the Adjutant General's Office.

| TO:                          | INITIALS          | DATE  | FOR                                                                                                                              | DATE RECEIVED | CONTROL NUMBER |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| 2 CHIEF, AFSWP               | <i>[initials]</i> | 12/2  | APPROVAL                                                                                                                         | 12/4          | 12868          |
| DEPUTY CHIEF, USAF           |                   |       | COMMENT                                                                                                                          |               |                |
| 3a DEPUTY CHIEF, USN         | <i>[initials]</i> | 12/5  | CONCURRENCE                                                                                                                      | FILE NUMBER   | SUSPENSE DATE  |
| 1 CHIEF STAFF                | <i>[initials]</i> | 12/4  | INFORMATION                                                                                                                      | 700           | 12/18/52       |
| DCS/OPERATIONS               |                   |       | NECESSARY ACTION                                                                                                                 |               |                |
| CHIEF, PLANS AND RQMTS       |                   |       | NOTE AND FORWARD                                                                                                                 |               |                |
| CHIEF, OPNS AND ING          |                   |       | NOTE AND RETURN                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| DCS/ADMINISTRATION           |                   |       | COORDINATION                                                                                                                     |               |                |
| CHIEF, SECURITY              |                   |       | FILE IN AGO                                                                                                                      |               |                |
| CHIEF, PERSONNEL             |                   |       | SIGNATURE                                                                                                                        |               |                |
| CHIEF, LOGISTICS             |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| 3 DCS/TECHNICAL SERVICES     | <i>[initials]</i> | 12/5  | FROM:                                                                                                                            | DATE          |                |
| CHIEF, WPMS DEV              |                   |       | Veterans Administration                                                                                                          | 12/2          |                |
| CHIEF, WPMS EFFECTS          |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| 4 CHIEF, WPMS DEFENSE        | <i>[initials]</i> | 12/2  |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| CHIEF, WPMS TEST             |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| 7 ADJUTANT GENERAL           | <i>[initials]</i> | 12/23 | SUBJECT OR SUMMARY OF THE COMMUNICATION                                                                                          |               |                |
| INSPECTOR GENERAL            |                   |       | The maintenance of detailed statistical records of radiological exposures received by pers serving within the Armed Forces, etc. |               |                |
| SPECIAL ASST TO CHIEF, AFSWP |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| HISTORIAN                    |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| SURGEON                      |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| 5 DCS Tech Services          | <i>[initials]</i> | 12/2  |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| 6 Chief Staff                |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |
| 8 Chief, AFSWP               |                   |       |                                                                                                                                  |               |                |

REMARKS

Sensible approach. *[initials]*

DF  
 given with the Co. Cyrene Co. 10 m. noted *[initials]*  
 Done

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS

Date: 8/14/95

CONFIDENTIAL  
 Security Information

copy pulsed (suspense)

Security Information

SWPDF-2

8 August 1952

The Administrator  
Veterans Administration  
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Dr. George M. Lyon

Dear Sir:

This activity has received information that the Army Field Forces is proposing to eliminate the requirement for maintaining detailed statistical records of radiological exposures received by Army personnel.

This requirement was originally conceived as being necessary to protect the government's interest in case any large number of veterans should attempt to bring suit against the government based on a real or imagined exposure to nuclear radiations during an atomic war. Although the Army Field Forces is the only organization which is now proposing to eliminate this requirement, it is possible that the Navy and Air Force may propose similar action in the future.

It is not intended that this will change the present policy as regards health protection measures presently in use at isotope laboratories, atomic tests, etc.

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, in its capacity as a coordinating agency in matters pertaining to atomic warfare, requests that the Administrator, Veterans Administration state his policy as regards the need for the keeping of such records, in order that the three Armed Services may be advised.

/s/ HERBERT B. LOPER  
Major General, USA  
Chief, AFSWP

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS

Date: 8/16/94

CONFIDENTIAL  
Security

~~Security Information~~

SWPDF-2

8 Aug 52

The Administrator  
Veterans Administration  
Wash 25, D. C.

Attention: Dr. George M. Lyon

/s/ HERBERT B. LOPER  
Major General, USA  
Chief, AFSWP

M/R: The AFSWP has received informal advice that the VA agrees that no detailed statistical records are required. (Telcon LCol McDonnell to Dr. George M. Lyon, VA). This ltr is intended to obtain a formal statement of this policy for the record. It is requested that the Security Div determine whether the addressee has proper clearance. The notification referred to in the 1st para of this ltr was contained in OCAFF ltr ATDEV-4 413.6/49(C) (4 Jun 51) of 23 May 52 to AG/S, G-4, Dept of Army.

SWPDF

SWPSC

SWPSV

SWPAD

~~Security Information~~

Security Information

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECTP. O. BOX 1818  
WASHINGTON 13, D. C.ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
THE CHIEF, ARMED FORCES  
SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

10 December 1952

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, WEAPONS DEFENSE DIVISION

SUBJECT: VA Letter to General Loper of 2 December 1952 on  
Armed Forces Film Badge Requirements

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 9 December on the same subject, and to the attached subject correspondence.

2. In accordance with our discussions, I talked with Dr. George Lyon on 9 December 1952, for the purpose of discussion of the letter from the Administrator of the Veterans Affairs to General Loper regarding the VA need for complete dosimetry records. The following information was obtained:

a. The VA does approve of the policy of the Armed Forces in keeping detailed statistical records of radiological exposures during laboratory operations or atomic tests.

b. The VA feels that a continuation of this procedure for "combat conditions" would be desirable in the adjudication of veteran claims for damage attributed to ionizing radiation exposure, but they propose (as indicated in the second page of General Gray's letter) that there will be a conference between representatives of the AFSWP and the VA before this requirement is laid before the Services.

3. Accordingly, it is recommended that action to implement the discussions of 1b supra be withheld until after the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare meeting on 7, 8, and 9 January, and the concurrent meeting of the Failla Panel on 7 and 8 January. The Failla Panel will be informed of the status of the negotiations between the AFSWP and the VA on this matter. Discussion of this subject is to be presented before the JPMAN and comments of this panel will be invited. After these panel meetings the AFSWP should invite the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to participate in preliminary discussions on the subject "Veterans Administration Requirement for Maintenance of Detailed Radiation Exposure Records for Military Personnel in Wartime Operations".

\*"The subject" refers to dosimetry within the Armed Forces with no specific reference to the VA or negotiations between AFSWP and VA.

Security Information

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS

9 December 1952

SWPDF-0

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Medical Branch, Weapons Defense Division

SUBJECT: Letter of 2 Dec 52 from Veterans Administration Concerning  
Armed Forces Policy on Records of Radiological Exposures

1. With reference to our discussion of yesterday afternoon, upon re-reading the subject letter again this morning, I find that I am more uncertain than ever as to what is really meant by the last paragraph. Please try to find out by telephone from Dr. Lyon:

- a. When the Veterans Administration urges "that no change in present policies and practices within the Armed Forces be made", does this mean that, for the time being, the VA does feel that all the Armed Services should continue to maintain detailed statistical records of radiological exposures, under wartime as well as peacetime conditions?
- b. Is the wording of the second page of Mr. Gray's letter intended to be a polite request for AFSWP to take the initiative in bringing these various parties together, or does the VA intend to do so?

2. In connection with the above questions, you will note that our letter of 8 August 1952 did not say that the Army had eliminated this procedure; it merely stated that the Army had eliminated this to eliminate the requirement. I understand that final promulgation of this elimination has not yet been made by the Army. If the VA letter means that they would view this with considerable alarm, are we not obligated to bring this to the attention of the Army at once, and thus avoid possible later confusion or complaint on this point? This might even affect the Army's final decision in this matter. I assume that this would merely mean holding off final Army action until the "careful study of this matter" proposed by the VA could be made.

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS

Date: 8/12/94

*R. A. HINNERS*  
R. A. HINNERS  
CAPT., USN  
Chief, Weapons Defense Division

CONFIDENTIAL  
Security Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Security Information

4. It is my impression that the Army Field Forces have stated, with the concurrence of the Surgeon General, that they do not require detailed statistical records of radiological exposures for Army personnel under combat conditions. This represents policy at variance with information contained in paragraph 5e of Department of the Army Training Circular 33, dated 5 November 1952, but it is representative of current AFF doctrine.

GMM/mlj

*GMM McDonnel*

G. M. McDONNEL  
Lieutenant Colonel, MC  
Chief, Medical Branch