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The Cost of the Troubles Study



Mapping Troubles-Related Deaths in Northern Ireland 1969-1994

Marie Therese Fay
Mike Morrissey
and
Marie Smyth

NSC

INCORE
*initiative on conflict
resolution & ethnicity*

back to NSC

THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED
5.8.98


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Creating Sanctuary is that rare, original, once-in-a-lifetime book
that could save lives. —Gloria Steinem

CREATING SANCTUARY

TOWARD
THE
EVOLUTION
OF SANE
SOCIETIES

SANDRA BLOOM

To Tipper Gore

THE PRESIDENT'S HOUSE
5848

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ary,

Creating Sanctuary

Toward the Evolution of Sane Societies

Sandra L. Bloom, M.D.

To Tipper Gore,
With warm regards
and best wishes,
Jandy B.

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New York and London

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Debi Schiff

Betty -
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5/8/98

Send to Scheduling?

Yes

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Ceremonials Division
Office of Protocol
U.S. Department of State

FAX

(202) 647-0708

TO:

Debbie Currie

FAX NO.

61210

FROM:

Elbi Schupp

PHONE:

647-2299

DATE:

5/7/98

NUMBER

2

OF PAGES: (Including cover sheet).

COMMENTS

BMC —

*I sent over an invitation —
I forgot to send this w/it! Thanks —*

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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

SERVING BEVERLY HILLS SINCE JULY 29, 1923

April 27, 1998

Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Clinton:

I am pleased to forward the attached invitation to you and Mrs. Clinton to attend our Diamond Jubilee Ball on Friday May 15, 1998 at the Regent Beverly Wilshire Hotel in Beverly Hills. The reception starts at 6:00 p.m. The black tie dinner is at 7:30 p.m.

We are honoring March Schwartz, Publisher of the Beverly Hills Courier as our 1998 Citizen of the Year. He has specifically asked that we extend this invitation to you. We will also be honoring Mr. Jerry Goldsmith, Academy Award winning composer, with the Will Rogers Memorial Award.

We would be honored and pleased if you can attend.

Respectfully,

Rolfe G. Arnhym
Executive Vice President/CEO

encl: Invitation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date

5/7

To: Craig Smith

From: The Staff Secretary

For appropriate
handling.

PhA

5/8/98

Send to Political

Yes _____

No _____

C.

Political
?

JUDY SMITH for CONGRESS

P.O. Box 1011 • Camden, AR 71711-1011
(870) 836-3473 • (870) 836-5445 Fax

98 MAY 8 AM 8:33

FAX COVER SHEET

TO: Attn: Jenny / Betty FAX #: (202) 456-6703

FROM: Hannah Vogler (870) 836-5445 - fax
Rep. Judy Smith for Congress (870) 836-3473 - tel

DATE: 5-7-98 #pgs (w/cover): 24

Remarks: Please call me if you have any
questions. I have attached
information about Judy for
you. Thanks!
Hannah

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JUDY SMITH for CONGRESS

P.O. Box 1011 • Camden, AR 71711-1011

(870) 836-3473 • (870) 836-5445 Fax

May 7, 1998

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500


Dear Mr. President:

As you know, I am the Democratic nominee for United States Congress from Arkansas' Fourth District where Jay Dickey is the Republican incumbent. I am a strong supporter of yours and I plan to be in the next Congressional class to help support you and the Democratic Party.

I am writing to let you know that I will be visiting Washington from May 11th to 13th to visit with Arkansans and others who will be supportive of our efforts to take back a Congressional seat for the Democratic Party this November. I know that you are very busy, but I am meeting with Bob Nash on Tuesday, May 12 at 5:00pm.

It means a lot to me and to the other Democratic candidates in Arkansas to know that you are supporting us. I know that I join these other candidates in pledging that we will not stop working to win Arkansas back in November.

Sincerely,



Rep. Judy Smith

JUDY SMITH for CONGRESS

P.O. Box 1011 • Camden, AR 71711-1011

(870) 836-3473 • (870) 836-5445 Fax

Biographical Information for Representative Judy Smith

Representative Judy Smith is serving her fourth term in the Arkansas General Assembly and represents portions of Ouachita, Columbia and Nevada Counties. She serves as Deputy Majority Leader in the Arkansas House of Representatives. She is vice-chair of the House Public Health, Welfare & Labor Committee and chairs its Human Service Subcommittee. She is also a member of the House Aging, Children and Youth, Legislative and Military Affairs Committee and its Children and Youth Subcommittee. She is a member of the House Legislative Audit Committee and the House Management Subcommittee.

Rep. Smith serves on the Human Services and Public Safety Committee of the Southern Legislative Conference and has served on the Children, Families and Health Committee of the National Conference of State Legislatures. She has been a Flemming Fellow with the Center for Policy Alternatives, and in 1992 was an American Council Of Young Political Leaders delegate to Japan.

Born in Louisiana and a graduate of Ville Platte High School, Smith holds a degree in Social Work from Grambling State University. She is a licensed social worker and is Executive Director of People of Concerned, Inc. in Camden.

Rep. Smith's community activities have included service as former chair of the Ouachita County Emergency Food & Shelter Board, as former vice-chair of the Camden Women's Crisis Center and as a coordinator for Arkansans For Drug Free Youth activities. She is a former member of the Arkansas Child Abuse Prevention Board and a founding member of the Sigma Beta Omega Chapter of Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. She currently serves on the Governor's Family Partnership, the Arkansas' Promise Planning Committee, and the Arkansas Human Development Board of Directors. Smith is also a member of the League of Women Voters, a PRIDE Parent to Parent Master Facilitator, and is a member of the DeSoto Area Council Board of Directors.

Rep. Smith has received numerous awards and honors, most recently as one of the Top Ten Women in Arkansas by *Arkansas Business*, who also recognized her in 1995 and 1996 as one of the Top 100 Women in Arkansas. Among Smith's other awards are an Outstanding Community Service Award from the *Arkansas State Press*, a 1991 Outstanding Leadership Award from the Ouachita Ministerial Alliance, and a Legislator Award from the Arkansas School Counselor's Association. Smith was named a Top Ten Legislator by the *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* in 1993.

Rep. Judy Smith is married to Sylvester Smith, Jr., and has two sons. She is a member of the Greater St. Paul Baptist Church in Camden.

5-8-98

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20502

98 MAY 7 PM 7:30

Copied
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COS

May 7, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: REBECCA M. BLANK

Rebecca M. Blank

SUBJECT: Employment and Unemployment in April, Labor Department Release, Friday, 8:30 a.m.

* The unemployment rate fell 0.4 percentage point in April to 4.3 percent--the lowest rate since 1970. Markets had expected only about a 0.1 percentage point drop. The unemployment rates for black teenagers and for Hispanics were the lowest in the history of the series (which began in 1972-73).


Nonfarm payroll employment rose 262,000 in April after a 24,000 decline a month earlier. The April gain was in line with market expectations. The official measure of payroll jobs has increased by over 15.2 million since January 1993. Another 431,000 will be added by the annual benchmark revision, to be announced next month.

- Employment growth was strong in temporary help services, construction and retailing--industries that showed slower growth last month. Low mortgage rates and a strong stock market contributed to job gains in finance, insurance, and real estate. Rapid increases continued in computer and engineering services.
- The workweek declined sharply, an artifact of the unusual timing of the Easter holiday; an adjusted series will be published next month.


Average hourly earnings of production workers rose 0.3 percent in April, in line with market expectations. Over the past 12 months, this wage measure increased 4.4 percent, an acceleration from the 3.7 percent increase during the prior 12-month period.

This report indicates that the second quarter got off to a strong start.

NONFARM PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT
monthly change



CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE



5-8-98

Send to Burkhardt?

Yes

No

Doug
George

CBS Studio Facilities
4024 Radford Avenue
Building 5 - Room 102
Studio City
California 91604

98 MAY 8 09:107

April 26th, 1998

Dear Mr. President,

Earlier this year I sent you a letter on February 17th that was routed through Harry Thomason and then I believe that Harry had delivered it to Nancy Hernreich. The letter regarded my concern about the inadequate existing national stockpile of vaccines to be used in the event of a biological attack on the United States. I now realize after reading the New York Times article of April 26th how far out ahead of this issue you really are. Page 10 of the The Times states that "your personal interest has become a powerful force behind a series of secret Federal meetings." I think it's very important that the American people now know how concerned about this issue you really are and it's also very important that your concern is now finally being reported in the mainstream press.

I have read Preston's "The Cobra Event" but I have not read, Falkenrath's "America's Achilles Heel." I thought Preston's book was quite frightening. He also had an op-ed piece in The New York Times on April 21st which I'm sure you've read.

I was a little bit confused by the New York Times report of Thursday, April 23rd, regarding the testimony of Attorney General Reno and F.B.I. director Louis J. Freeh on the issue of biological warfare. Mr. Freeh was quoted as saying it was "a phenomenon which is of low probability..." Then he goes on to say that 80% of the 114 cases had been hoaxes with 20% resolved or found to be at least attempts. According to my calculations that amounts to 23 cases. I think that the tack that should be taken with this issue is - all it takes is one successful attack. It might be more appropriate if the F.B.I. would forget about quoting case-solving statistics regarding this issue and concentrate on reminding us that their Counter-Terrorism Unit is working round the clock in order to prevent even just one incident from happening.

A couple of other thoughts. According to the Washington Post article of Friday, April 24th, government counter-terrorism programs suffer from a lack of intelligence sharing. I'm sure someone is looking into the possibility for some form of security protected computer database to be set up so that all the overall governmental agencies following this issue to have access to this information.

With regard to the issue of informing the general populace of what kinds of individual civil defense efforts we could all make, would it also not be possible to set up a web site solely devoted to chemical and biological civil defense? Thus any American could sign on to and download various kinds of updated self-defense information regarding what each of us can do to help to protect ourselves should such a biological or chemical incident take place. There ought to be some kinds of initial safeguards that all of us could take in order to insure our chances of survival. By setting up a web site this information could be made available to all of us within a matter of weeks.

Also, maybe one should consider the need for some kind of chemical and biological civil defense instructional videos made that can be sent to schools, churches, national first aid associations and the like. These videos could present further background information on the threat, what's being done about it, what kinds of signs to look for, and what kinds of self-defense measures can be instituted on an individual basis.

Again, these may be actions that are already being implemented or considered so forgive me, if in my Joe Six-Pack way, if I'm being redundant.

As Robert Preston pointed out in his Times piece, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention remain largely uninvolved. He also reminds us that state and local public health surveillance needs to be beefed up. Of interest also was his point regarding the new fast and cheap way to make smallpox vaccine. But it needs approval by the Food and Drug Administration. And the fact that enough vaccine to protect the entire population could be stored in a building smaller than a garage. Again, I assume that all these issues are being analyzed and addressed.

Finally, I think it would really most helpful and reassuring to the American people, if from time to time you could visit different segments of the governmental and private industries areas that devoting time and resources to chemical and biological civil defense. The American people need to not only read about your personal interest and efforts, but to also they need to see you out there visiting public health centers, paramedic stations, microbiology research labs, and the appropriate governmental agencies.

I'm glad to see that you have a high personal interest in this issue. I hope that somebody can look into The National Civil Defense Web Site issue and also the issue of instructional videos on what the average American can do to help protect oneself from this most unthinkable possibility.

I'm not a scientist or a think-tank professional, just a concerned citizen. If there's anything that I can do to help get this message out, like deliver pamphlets in my local neighborhood, or whatever, I'd be glad to help out.

Enough of my rambling.

Over and out.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Douglas Jackson', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Douglas Jackson

Cc:file

Bruce Lindsey

Rahm Emanuel

Filename:bc042698.doc

February 17th, 1998

Dear Mr. President,

Like most Americans I've been trying to follow some of the recent developments regarding American foreign policy and our relationship to Iraq, the Middle East and our allies. I read an article in December of last year in FOREIGN AFFAIRS by Richard Betts concerning "weapons of mass destruction." I'm sure you've already read the article but I've attached a copy of it just in case you haven't had a chance to look at it yet.

I had seen a picture in The New York Times in November of 1997 of the civil defense nerve gas attack drill that was run in New York City. After reading the Betts article I found myself feeling very uninformed regarding what kinds of civil defense plans are in place or are being put in place, should weapons of mass destruction be used on American soil. I suppose that it's very difficult for the most powerful nation in the world to admit to its own citizenry that there is a possibility and growing probability of such a horrible event taking place. I think we are deluding ourselves if we really think that it could never happen here. As the attack on the World Trade Centers and the event in Oklahoma City have shown us, the perpetrators of such actions can come both from outside our borders and from within them.

The ease of manufacturing and the portability of the basic elements to assemble a biological agent certainly lends credence to such an event happening within our borders in the very near future. The biological genie is out of the bottle and there's **no way** it's going to be put back inside. The tons and tons of biological and chemical agents that countries such as Iraq has pales in comparison to what one unstable, self-destructive bio-chem major could accomplish with, say 50 kilograms of a "nasty brew" thrown from just a moderately high building in New York City or Chicago or Salt Lake City.

Sometimes the best offense is a good defense. It might serve all of us well to start paying closer attention to our civil defense system. I mean we all sit around and laugh about the "duck and cover" films we used to see in grade school concerning how to prepare for a nuclear attack. Maybe we should all take a little bit more serious attitude toward what kinds of emergency procedures we can teach our citizens, procedures that might actually save some lives when we encounter the "first event." Maybe there are plans in place on how to handle the prospect of such a calamity? If there are, doesn't the American public have right to know what they might include? I suppose that there are those who would argue that to discuss such possibilities and probabilities would only serve to frighten the American people. They would say that it would not be the "politically correct" thing to do. Hello --- Earth to Washington --- Get real. I really think the American people need to be educated, over a proper period of time, as to what kinds of measures one can take, i.e., supplies, gas masks, other defensive measures, medicine and so on to prepare for such a possibility. People prepare for earthquakes, hurricanes and other kinds of natural disasters, so why not biological warfare? (I realize right now with everything happening in Iraq it would be inappropriate to raise this issue as your critics would have a virtual field day on the talk shows).

Yet, I do think that our government has a responsibility to insure that FEMA, or whatever agency would be tasked with handling something like this, has the appropriate amount of funding, planning and personnel. It's very important that we as a nation are in a position to properly and effectively assist those affected in this kind of emergency situation. I don't think that a lot of people are going to accept the "who would have thought" mindset.

Again, I think we all have to steadfastly face up to the impending possibility and probability of a biological event taken place on American soil, as horrifying as it is. It's not so much a matter of "if" this event is going to happen, but rather, a matter of "when." At that unfortunate moment in our history all eyes will be on Washington. We will be looking straight into the hearts and minds of the executive and legislative branches of our government. Hopefully, those two branches will have already openly and straightforwardly helped America prepare. Thus part of the issue becomes how many thousands of lives were saved from proper preparation, not just the hundreds or thousands that have been lost.

With regard to the current issues at hand in Iraq, I can only assume that the days ahead will be long and difficult. I don't think any of us can really imagine the kinds of pressures that you and your closest military and foreign policy advisors face on an hourly basis when you're confronted with the kinds of decisions your making right now. Nor do we properly appreciate all of the effort and the sacrifices that are made.

Everything in our technological and totally interconnected world is so light-speed immediate. The endless 24 hour news-cycle. I wonder sometimes how we really have time "to think" any more. It's like the information age has spawned a world in which there is only programmed "reactive thinking." At times, the man-machine relationship seems to be favoring the machine more than the man, the result more than the purpose, the mind more than the soul.

I remember one time when Senator Pryor and I took a trip to Blyethville Air Force Base to look at a B-52 bomber. This must have been somewhere around 1982. We climbed inside, got a briefing, crawled around---not a lot of room as I remember. I remember sitting in the navigator's seat and thinking about "Dr. Strangelove" and Slim Pickens riding the nuke down to Moscow or wherever it was. It was pretty surreal sitting there looking at the dials, the instruments, and the "go-code" box. At the end of the tour we walked underneath the plane to the bomb bay doors and looked up inside that empty cavern. It was such an eerie feeling. We really didn't know what to say to each other. There was kind of a nervous acknowledgement of the unimaginable destructive power that was lying in wait each time one of those planes went out on a mission to its "fail-safe" point. It is so hard to comprehend the thousands and thousands of those devices that the world has just lying in wait. We all have been so lucky---so very, very lucky.

Well, enough of my rambling and wandering thoughts in this communication to you. I do hope that somehow down the road, your administration, along with Congress can come forward to the American people and address the need for a well-planned and well-funded civil defense program. Particularly, as we face the unfortunate prospect of a world more frightening and more threatening than anything Stanley Kubrick could ever have imagined.

For whatever it's worth, I think you've got a fine foreign policy team and as a citizen I appreciate all of the very positive things that you've done for this country and the vision that both you and Mrs. Clinton have offered this nation as we head into the 21st century.

On a personal request level, I was wondering if it would be possible for you to send me an autographed picture of you and Buddy.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'DJ', with a large, stylized flourish extending from the bottom right.

Douglas Jackson

The New Threat of Mass Destruction

Richard K. Betts

WHAT IF MCVEIGH HAD USED ANTHRAX?

DURING THE Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were the centerpiece of foreign policy. Nuclear arms hovered in the background of every major issue in East-West competition and alliance relations. The highest priorities of U.S. policy could almost all be linked in some way to the danger of World War III and the fear of millions of casualties in the American homeland.

Since the Cold War, other matters have displaced strategic concerns on the foreign policy agenda, and that agenda itself is now barely on the public's radar screen. Apart from defense policy professionals, few Americans still lose sleep over weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After all, what do normal people feel is the main relief provided by the end of the Cold War? It is that the danger of nuclear war is off their backs.

Yet today, WMD present more and different things to worry about than during the Cold War. For one, nuclear arms are no longer the only concern, as chemical and biological weapons have come to the fore. For another, there is less danger of complete annihilation, but more danger of mass destruction. Since the Cold War is over and American and Russian nuclear inventories are much smaller, there is less chance of an apocalyptic exchange of many thousands of weapons. But the probability that some smaller number of WMD will

RICHARD K. BETTS is Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.

[26]

The New Threat of Mass Destruction

be used is growing. Many of the standard strategies and ideas for coping with WMD threats are no longer as relevant as they were when Moscow was the main adversary. But new thinking has not yet congealed in as clear a form as the Cold War concepts of nuclear deterrence theory.

The new dangers have not been ignored inside the Beltway. "Counterproliferation" has become a cottage industry in the Pentagon and the intelligence community, and many worthwhile initiatives to cope with threats are under way. Some of the most important implications of the new era, however, have not yet registered on the public agenda. This in turn limits the inclination of politicians to push some appropriate programs. Even the defense establishment has directed its attention mainly toward countering threats WMD pose to U.S. military forces operating abroad rather than to the more worrisome danger that mass destruction will occur in the United States, killing large numbers of civilians.

The points to keep in mind about the new world of mass destruction are the following. First, the roles such weapons play in international conflict are changing. They no longer represent the technological frontier of warfare. Increasingly, they will be weapons of the weak—states or groups that militarily are at best second-class. The importance of the different types among them has also shifted. Biological weapons should now be the most serious concern, with nuclear weapons second and chemicals a distant third.

Second, the mainstays of Cold War security policy—deterrence and arms control—are not what they used to be. Some new threats may not be deterrable, and the role of arms control in dealing with WMD has been marginalized. In a few instances, continuing devotion to deterrence and arms control may have side effects that offset the benefits.

Third, some of the responses most likely to cope with the threats in novel ways will not find a warm welcome. The response that should now be the highest priority is one long ignored, opposed, or ridiculed: a serious civil defense program to blunt the effects of WMD if they are unleashed within the United States. Some of the most effective measures to prevent attacks within the United States may also challenge traditional civil liberties if pursued to the maximum. And the most troubling conclusion for foreign policy as a whole is that reducing the odds of attacks in the United States might require pulling back from involvement in some foreign

FOREIGN AFFAIRS January/February 1998

[27]

Richard K. Betts

conflicts. American activism to guarantee international stability is, paradoxically, the prime source of American vulnerability.

This was partly true in the Cold War, when the main danger that nuclear weapons might detonate on U.S. soil sprang from strategic engagement in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to deter attacks on U.S. allies. But engagement then assumed a direct link between regional stability and U.S. survival. The connection is less evident today, when there is no globally threatening superpower or transnational ideology to be contained—only an array of serious but entirely local disruptions. Today, as the only nation acting to police areas outside its own region, the United States makes itself a target for states or groups whose aspirations are frustrated by U.S. power.

FROM MODERN TO PRIMITIVE

WHEN NUCLEAR weapons were born, they represented the most advanced military applications of science, technology, and engineering. None but the great powers could hope to obtain them. By now, however, nuclear arms have been around for more than half a century, and chemical and biological weapons even longer. They are not just getting old. In the strategic terms most relevant to American security, they have become primitive. Once the military cutting edge of the strong, they have become the only hope for so-called rogue states or terrorists who want to contest American power. Why? Because the United States has developed overwhelming superiority in conventional military force—something it never thought it had against the Soviet Union.

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated the American advantage in a manner that stunned many abroad. Although the U.S. defense budget has plunged, other countries are not closing the gap. U.S. military spending remains more than triple that of any potentially hostile power and higher than the combined defense budgets of Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba.

More to the point, there is no evidence that those countries' level of military professionalism is rising at a rate that would make them competitive even if they were to spend far more on their forces. Rolling along in what some see as a revolution in military affairs, American forces continue to make unmatched use of state-of-the-art

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Andrew J. Pierre, Editor

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weapons, surveillance and information systems, and the organizational and doctrinal flexibility for managing the integration of these complex innovations into "systems of systems" that is the key to modern military effectiveness. More than ever in military history, brains are brawn. Even if hostile countries somehow catch up in an arms race, their military organizations and cultures are unlikely to catch up in the competence race for management, technology assimilation, and combat command skills.

If it is infeasible for hostile states to counter the United States in conventional combat, it is even more daunting for smaller groups such as terrorists. If the United States is lucky, the various violent groups with grievances against the American government and society will continue to think up schemes using conventional explosives. Few terrorist groups have shown an interest in inflicting true mass destruction. Bombings or hostage seizures have generally threatened no more than a few hundred lives. Let us hope that this limitation has been due to a powerful underlying reason, rather than a simple lack of capability, and that the few exceptions do not become more typical.

There is no sure reason to bet on such restraint. Indeed, some have tried to use WMD, only to see them fizzle. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin nerve gas in Tokyo in 1995 but killed only a few people, and some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 laced their bomb with cyanide, which burned up in the explosion (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in the perpetrators' possession). Eventually such a group will prove less incompetent. If terrorists decide that they want to stun American policymakers by inflicting enormous damage, WMD become more attractive at the same time that they are becoming more accessible.

Finally, unchallenged military superiority has shifted the attention of the U.S. military establishment away from WMD. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were the bedrock of American war capabilities. They were the linchpin of defense debate, procurement programs, and arms control because the United States faced another superpower—

The primary risk is that enemies might trigger catastrophes in American cities.

one that conventional wisdom feared could best it in conventional warfare. Today, no one cares about the MX missile or B-1 bomber, and hardly anyone really cares about the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In a manner that could only have seemed ludicrous during the Cold War, proponents now rationalize the \$2 billion B-2 as a weapon for conventional war. Hardly anyone in the Pentagon is still interested in how the United States could use WMD for its own strategic purposes.

What military planners are interested in is how to keep adversaries from using WMD as an "asymmetric" means to counter U.S. conventional power, and how to protect U.S. ground and naval forces abroad from WMD attacks. This concern is all well and good, but it abets a drift of attention away from the main danger. The primary risk is not that enemies might lob some nuclear or chemical weapons at U.S. armored battalions or ships, awful as that would be. Rather, it is that they might attempt to punish the United States by triggering catastrophes in American cities.

CHOOSE YOUR WEAPONS WELL

UNTIL THE past decade, the issue was nuclear arms, period. Chemical weapons received some attention from specialists, but never made the priority list of presidents and cabinets. Biological weapons were almost forgotten after they were banned by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Chemical and biological arms have received more attention in the 1990s. The issues posed by the trio lumped under the umbrella of mass destruction differ, however. Most significantly, biological weapons have received less attention than the others but probably represent the greatest danger.

Chemical weapons have been noticed more in the past decade, especially since they were used by Iraq against Iranian troops in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and against Kurdish civilians in 1988. Chemicals are far more widely available than nuclear weapons because the technology required to produce them is far simpler, and large numbers of countries have undertaken chemical weapons programs. But chemical weapons are not really in the same class as other weapons of mass destruction, in the sense of ability to

inflict a huge number of civilian casualties in a single strike. For the tens of thousands of fatalities as in, say, the biggest strategic bombing raids of World War II, it would be very difficult logistically and operationally to deliver chemical weapons in necessary quantities over wide areas.

Nevertheless, much attention and effort have been lavished on a campaign to eradicate chemical weapons. This may be a good thing, but the side effects are not entirely benign. For one, banning chemicals means that for deterrence, nuclear weapons become even more important than they used to be. That is because a treaty cannot assuredly prevent hostile nations from deploying chemical weapons, while the United States has forsworn the option to retaliate in kind.

In the past, the United States had a no-first-use policy for chemical weapons but reserved the right to strike back with them if an enemy used them first. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force last April, requires the United States to destroy its stockpile, thus ending this option. The United States did the same with biological arms long ago, during the Nixon administration. Eliminating its own chemical and biological weapons practically precludes a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons, since they become the only WMD available for retaliation.

Would the United States follow through and use nuclear weapons against a country or group that had killed several thousand Americans with deadly chemicals? It is hard to imagine breaking the post-Nagasaki taboo in that situation. But schemes for conventional military retaliation would not suffice without detracting from the force of American deterrent threats. There would be a risk for the United States in setting a precedent that someone could use WMD against Americans without suffering similar destruction in return. Limiting the range of deterrent alternatives available to U.S. strategy will not necessarily cause deterrence to fail, but it will certainly not strengthen it.

The ostensible benefit of the CWC is that it will make chemical arms harder to acquire and every bit as illegal and stigmatized as biological weapons have been for a quarter-century. If it has that benefit, what effect

will the ban have on the choices of countries or groups who want some kind of WMD in any case, whether for purposes of deterrence, aggression, or revenge? At the margin, the ban will reduce the disincentives to acquiring biological weapons, since they will be no less illegal, no harder to obtain or conceal, and far more damaging than chemical weapons. If major reductions in the chemical threat produce even minor increases in the biological threat, it will be a bad trade.

One simple fact should worry Americans more about biological than about nuclear or chemical arms: unlike either of the other two, biological weapons combine maximum destructiveness and easy availability. Nuclear arms have great killing capacity but are hard to get; chemical weapons are easy to get but lack such killing capacity; biological agents have both qualities. A 1993 study by the Office of Technology Assessment concluded that a single airplane delivering 100 kilograms of anthrax spores—a dormant phase of a bacillus that multiplies rapidly in the body, producing toxins and rapid hemorrhaging—by aerosol on a clear, calm night over the Washington, D.C., area could kill between one million and three million people, 300 times as many fatalities as if the plane had delivered sarin gas in amounts ten times larger.¹

Like chemical weapons but unlike nuclear weapons, biologicals are relatively easy to make. Innovations in biotechnology have obviated many of the old problems in handling and preserving biological agents, and many have been freely available for scientific research. Nuclear weapons are not likely to be the WMD of choice for non-state terrorist groups. They require huge investments and targetable infrastructure, and are subject to credible threats by the United States. An aggrieved group that decides it wants to kill huge numbers of Americans will find the mission easier to accomplish with anthrax than with a nuclear explosion.

Inside the Pentagon, concern about biological weapons has picked up tremendously in the past couple of years, but there is little serious attention to the problem elsewhere. This could be a good thing if nothing much can be done, since publicity might

¹U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 54.

only give enemies ideas. But it is a bad thing if it impedes efforts to take steps—such as civil defense—that could blunt nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.

DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL IN DECLINE

AN OLD vocabulary still dominates policy discussion of WMD. Rhetoric in the defense establishment falls back on the all-purpose strategic buzzword of the Cold War: deterrence. But deterrence now covers fewer of the threats the United States faces than it did during the Cold War.

The logic of deterrence is clearest when the issue is preventing unprovoked and unambiguous aggression, when the aggressor recognizes that it is the aggressor rather than the defender. Deterrence is less reliable when both sides in a conflict see each other as the aggressor. When the United States intervenes in messy Third World conflicts, the latter is often true. In such cases, the side that the United States wants to deter may see itself as trying to deter the United States. Such situations are ripe for miscalculation.

For the country that used to be the object of U.S. deterrence—Russia—the strategic burden has been reversed. Based on assumptions of Soviet conventional military superiority, U.S. strategy used to rely on the threat to escalate—to be the first to use nuclear weapons during a war—to deter attack by Soviet armored divisions. Today the tables have turned. There is no Warsaw Pact, Russia has half or less of the military potential of the Soviet Union, and its current conventional forces are in disarray, while NATO is expanding eastward. It is now Moscow that has the incentive to compensate for conventional weakness by placing heavier reliance on nuclear capabilities. The Russians adopted a nuclear no-first-use policy in the early 1980s, but renounced it after their precipitous post-Cold War decline.

Today Russia needs to be reassured, not deterred. The main danger from Russian WMD is leakage from vast stockpiles to anti-American groups elsewhere—the “loose nukes” problem. So long as the United States has no intention of attacking the Russians, their greater reliance on nuclear forces is not a problem. If the United States has an interest in reducing nuclear stockpiles, however, it is.

The traditional American approach—thinking in terms of its own deterrence strategies—provides no guidance. Indeed, noises some Americans still make about deterring the Russians compound the problem by reinforcing Moscow's alarm.

Similarly, U.S. conventional military superiority gives China an incentive to consider more reliance on an escalation strategy. The Chinese have a long-standing no-first-use policy but adopted it when

Deterrence requires knowledge of who has launched an attack.

their strategic doctrine was that of "people's war," which relied on mass mobilization and low-tech weaponry. Faith in that doctrine was severely shaken by the American performance in the Persian Gulf War. Again, the United States might assume that there is no problem as long as Beijing only wants to

deter and the United States does not want to attack. But how do these assumptions relate to the prospect of a war over Taiwan? That is a conflict that no one wants but that can hardly be ruled out in light of evolving tensions. If the United States decides openly to deter Beijing from attacking Taiwan, the old lore from the Cold War may be relevant. But if Washington continues to leave policy ambiguous, who will know who is deterring whom? Ambiguity is a recipe for confusion and miscalculation in a time of crisis. For all the upsurge of attention in the national security establishment to the prospect of conflict with China, there has been remarkably little discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in a Sino-American collision.

The main problem for deterrence, however, is that it still relies on the corpus of theory that undergirded Cold War policy, dominated by reliance on the threat of second-strike retaliation. But retaliation requires knowledge of who has launched an attack and the address at which they reside. These requirements are not a problem when the threat comes from a government, but they are if the enemy is anonymous. Today some groups may wish to punish the United States without taking credit for the action—a mass killing equivalent to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Moreover, the options the defense establishment favors have shifted over entirely from deterrence to preemption. The majority of those who dealt with nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War adamantly opposed developing first-

strike options. Today, scarcely anyone looks to that old logic when thinking about rogues or terrorists, and most hope to be able to mount a disarming action against any group with WMD.

Finally, eliminating chemical weapons trims some options for deterrence. Arms control restrictions on the instruments that can be used for deterrent threats are not necessarily the wrong policy, but they do work against maximizing deterrence. Overall, however, the problem with arms control is not that it does too much but that it now does relatively little.

From the Limited Test Ban negotiations in the 1960s through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s, arms control treaties were central to managing WMD threats. Debates about whether particular agreements with Moscow were in the United States' interest were bitter because everyone believed that the results mattered. Today there is no consensus that treaties regulating armaments matter much. Among national security experts, the corps that pays close attention to START and Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations has shrunk. With the exception of the Chemical Weapons Convention, efforts to control WMD by treaty have become small potatoes. The biggest recent news in arms control has not been any negotiation to regulate WMD, but a campaign to ban land mines.

The United States' Cold War partner in arms control, Russia, has disarmed a great deal voluntarily. But despite standard rhetoric, the United States has not placed a high priority on convincing Moscow to divest itself of more of its nuclear weapons; the Clinton administration has chosen to promote NATO expansion, which pushes the Russians in the opposite direction.

The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty remains a hallowed institution, but it has nowhere new to go. It will not convert the problem countries that want to obtain WMD—unless, like Iraq and North Korea in the 1980s, they sign and accept the legal obligation and then simply cheat. The NPT regime will continue to impede access to fissile materials on the open market, but it will not do so in novel or more effective ways. And it does not address the problem of Russian "loose nukes" any better than the Russian and American governments do on their own.

CIVIL DEFENSE

DESPITE ALL the new limitations, deterrence remains an important aspect of strategy. There is not much the United States needs to do to keep up its deterrence capability, however, given the thousands of nuclear weapons and the conventional military superiority it has. Where capabilities are grossly underdeveloped, however, is the area of responses for coping should deterrence fail.

Enthusiasts for defensive capability, mostly proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative from the Reagan years, remain fixated on the least relevant form of it: high-tech active defenses to intercept ballistic missiles. There is still scant interest in what should now be the first priority: civil defense preparations to cope with uses of WMD within the United States. Active defenses against missiles would be expensive investments that might or might not work against a threat the United States probably will not face for years, but would do nothing against the threat it already faces. Civil defense measures are extremely cheap and could prove far more effective than they would have against a large-scale Soviet attack.

During the Cold War, debate about antimissile defense concerned whether it was technologically feasible or cost-effective and whether it would threaten the Soviets and ignite a spiraling arms race between offensive and defensive weapons. One need not refight the battles over SDI to see that the relevance to current WMD threats is tenuous. Iraq, Iran, or North Korea will not be able to deploy intercontinental missiles for years. Nor, if they are strategically cunning, should they want to. For the limited number of nuclear warheads these countries are likely to have, and especially for biological weapons, other means of delivery are more easily available. Alternatives to ballistic missiles include aircraft, ship-launched cruise missiles, and unconventional means, such as smuggling, at which the intelligence agencies of these countries have excelled. Non-state perpetrators like those who bombed the World Trade Center will choose clandestine means of necessity.

A ballistic missile defense system, whether it costs more or less than the \$60 billion the Congressional Budget Office recently estimated would be required for one limited option, will not counter these modes of attack. Indeed, if a larger part of the worry about WMD these days is about their use by terrorist states or groups, the odds are higher that

sometime, somewhere in the country, some of these weapons will go off, despite the best efforts to stop them. If that happens, the United States should have in place whatever measures can mitigate the consequences.

By the later phases of the Cold War it was hard to get people interested in civil defense against an all-out Soviet attack that could detonate thousands of high-yield nuclear weapons in U.S. population centers. To many, the lives that would have been saved seemed less salient than the many millions that would still have been lost. It should be easier to see the value of civil defense, however, in the context of more limited attacks, perhaps with only a few low-yield weapons. A host of minor measures can increase protection or recovery from biological, nuclear, or chemical effects. Examples are stockpiling or distribution of protective masks; equipment and training for decontamination; standby programs for mass vaccinations and emergency treatment with antibiotics; wider and deeper planning of emergency response procedures; and public education about hasty sheltering and emergency actions to reduce individual vulnerability.

Such programs would not make absorbing a WMD attack tolerable. But inadequacy is no excuse for neglecting actions that could reduce death and suffering, even if the difference in casualties is small. Civil defenses are especially worthwhile considering that they are extraordinarily cheap compared with regular military programs or active defense systems. Yet until recently, only half a billion dollars—less than two-tenths of one percent of the defense budget and less than \$2 a head for every American—went to chemical and biological defense, while nearly \$4 billion was spent annually on ballistic missile defense.² Why haven't policymakers attended to first things first—cheap programs that can cushion the effects of a disaster—before undertaking expensive programs that provide no assurance they will be able to prevent it?

One problem is conceptual inertia. The Cold War accustomed strategists to worrying about an enemy with thousands of WMD, rather than foes with a handful. For decades the question of strategic defense


²John F. Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1997, pp. 3-20.

was also posed as a debate between those who saw no alternative to relying on deterrence and those who hoped that an astrodome over the United States could replace deterrence with invulnerability. None of these hoary fixations address the most probable WMD threats in the post-Cold War world.

Opposition to Cold War civil defense programs underlies psychological aversion to them now. Opponents used to argue that civil defense was a dangerous illusion because it could do nothing significant to reduce the horror of an attack that would obliterate hundreds of cities, because it would promote a false sense of security, and because it could even be destabilizing and provoke attack in a crisis. Whether or not such arguments were valid then, they are not now. But both then and now, there has been a powerful reason that civil defense efforts have been unpopular: they alarm people. They remind them that their vulnerability to mass destruction is not a bad dream, not something that strategic schemes for deterrence, preemption, or interception are sure to solve.

Civil defense can limit damage but not minimize it. For example, some opponents may be able to develop biological agents that circumvent available vaccines and antibiotics. (Those with marginal technical capabilities, however, might be stopped by blocking the easier options.) Which is worse—the limitations of defenses, or having to answer for failure to try? The moment that WMD are used somewhere in a manner that produces tens of thousands of fatalities, there will be hysterical outbursts of all sorts. One of them will surely be, “Why didn’t the government prepare us for this?” It is not in the long-term interest of political leaders to indulge popular aversion. If public resistance under current circumstances prevents widespread distribution, stockpiling, and instruction in the use of defensive equipment or medical services, the least that should be done is to optimize plans and preparations to rapidly implement such activities when the first crisis ignites demand.

As threats of terrorism using WMD are taken more seriously, interest will grow in preemptive defense measures—the most obvious of which is intensified intelligence collection. Where this involves targeting groups within the United States that might seem to be potential breeding grounds for terrorists (for example, supporters of Palestinian militants, home-grown militias or cults, or radicals with ties to Iran, Iraq, or Libya), controversies will arise over constitutional limits on invasion of



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*Better safe than sarin: New York City
conducts a nerve gas attack drill, November 9, 1997*

privacy or search and seizure. So long as the WMD danger remains hypothetical, such controversies will not be easily resolved. They have not come to the fore so far because U.S. law enforcement has been unbelievably lucky in apprehending terrorists. The group arrested in 1993 for planning to bomb the Lincoln Tunnel happened to be infiltrated by an informer, and Timothy McVeigh happened to be picked up in 1995 for driving without a license plate. Those who fear compromising civil liberties with permissive standards for government snooping should consider what is likely to happen once such luck runs out and it proves impossible to identify perpetrators. Suppose a secretive radical Islamic group launches a biological attack, kills 100,000 people, and announces that it will do the same thing again if its terms are not met. (The probability of such a scenario may not be high, but it can no longer be consigned to science fiction.) In that case, it is hardly unthinkable that

Richard K. Betts

a panicked legal system would roll over and treat Arab-Americans as it did the Japanese-Americans who were herded into concentration camps after Pearl Harbor. Stretching limits on domestic surveillance to reduce the chances of facing such choices could be the lesser evil.

IS RETREAT THE BEST DEFENSE?

NO PROGRAMS aimed at controlling adversaries' capabilities can eliminate the dangers. One risk is that in the more fluid politics of the post-Cold War world, the United States could stumble into an unanticipated crisis with Russia or China. There are no well-established rules of the game to brake a spiraling conflict over the Baltic states or Taiwan, as there were in the superpower competition after the Cuban missile crisis. The second danger is that some angry group that blames the United States for its problems may decide to coerce Americans, or simply exact vengeance, by inflicting devastation on them where they live.

If steps to deal with the problem in terms of capabilities are limited, can anything be done to address intentions—the incentives of any foreign power or group to lash out at the United States? There are few answers to this question that do not compromise the fundamental strategic activism and internationalist thrust of U.S. foreign policy over the past half-century. That is because the best way to keep people from believing that the United States is responsible for their problems is to avoid involvement in their conflicts.

Ever since the Munich agreement and Pearl Harbor, with only a brief interruption during the decade after the Tet offensive, there has been a consensus that if Americans did not draw their defense perimeter far forward and confront foreign troubles in their early stages, those troubles would come to them at home. But because the United States is now the only superpower and weapons of mass destruction have become more accessible, American intervention in troubled areas is not so much a way to fend off such threats as it is what stirs them up.


Will U.S. involvement in unstable situations around the former U.S.S.R. head off conflict with Moscow or generate it? Will making NATO bigger and moving it to Russia's doorstep deter Russian pressure on Ukraine and the Baltics or provoke it? With Russia and China, there is less chance that either will set out to conquer Europe or Asia

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than that they will try to restore old sovereignties and security zones by reincorporating new states of the former Soviet Union or the province of Taiwan. None of this means that NATO expansion or support for Taiwan's autonomy will cause nuclear war. It does mean that to whatever extent American activism increases those countries' incentives to rely on WMD while intensifying political friction between them and Washington, it is counterproductive.

The other main danger is the ire of smaller states or religious and cultural groups that see the United States as an evil force blocking their legitimate aspirations. It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified for so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam. Cold War triumph magnified the problem. U.S. military and cultural hegemony—the basic threats to radicals seeking to challenge the status quo—are directly linked to the imputation of American responsibility for maintaining world order. Playing Globocop feeds the urge of aggrieved groups to strike back.

Is this a brief for isolationism? No. It is too late to turn off foreign resentments by retreating, even if that were an acceptable course. Alienated groups and governments would not stop blaming Washington for their problems. In addition, there is more to foreign policy than dampening incentives to hurt the United States. It is not automatically sensible to stop pursuing other interests for the sake of uncertain reductions in a threat of uncertain probability. Security is not all of a piece, and survival is only part of security.

But it is no longer prudent to assume that important security interests complement each other as they did during the Cold War. The interest at the very core—protecting the American homeland from attack—may now often be in conflict with security more broadly conceived and with the interests that mandate promoting American political values, economic interdependence, social Westernization, and stability in regions beyond Western Europe and the Americas. The United States should not give up all its broader political interests, but it should tread cautiously in areas—especially the Middle East—where broader interests grate against the core imperative of preventing mass destruction within America's borders. ☪