
Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

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NSC

Divider Title: _____

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Electronic Communications Systems (Electronic Mail)

All National Security Council employees have ongoing responsibilities to create, maintain, and preserve records of their activities pursuant to the Federal Records Act (44 U.S.C., Chapters 29, 31, and 33) or the Presidential Records Act (44 U.S.C., sections 2201-2207). This memorandum provides guidance for fulfilling these obligations as they apply to records created on electronic communications systems.

The National Archives has defined electronic communications systems as electronic mail systems, electronic conferences, and comparable systems with similar e-mail capabilities. Within the NSC, this definition (and the guidance in this memorandum) applies to the e-mail and calendar functions of the VAX All-in-One and CC:Mail systems (which includes All-in-1 word processing documents sent via e-mail) as well as the calendar function of the PROFS (OfficeVision) system.

The staff of the NSC create records electronically, including by the use of electronic communications systems. The NSC preserves electronic mail messages that are records by filing them electronically and transferring them to magnetic tape in a software-independent format for long term preservation. The NSC also preserves essential transmission data for these records electronically, including the name of the sender and each addressee, plus the date and exact time of transmission, which are recorded with the text of each message. "Read receipts" that identify when a message is "opened" by each addressee also are preserved whenever requested.

Successful implementation of this policy requires each NSC employee to do three things: (1) determine the record/nonrecord status of any e-mail message at the time of creation (or, for word processing documents, at the time of transmission), and (2) request read receipts whenever it is important to confirm the receipt of a message by a certain time, and (3) for the time being, ensure that read receipts are preserved by printing them, attaching them to the originating message, and sending them to Records Management for filing. All other tasks associated with the proper maintenance and disposition of e-mail records will be performed by the staff of Records Management and WHSSS or WHCA.

DETERMINING RECORD STATUS

Electronic mail documents in the NSC (like all other documentary materials) fall into one of two categories: records or nonrecord materials (which includes personal materials). The only records management judgment that NSC staff must make when using e-mail is to determine whether a message is record or nonrecord in nature. Traditionally, the NSC also has distinguished federal from Presidential records and filed them separately. The proper scope of that distinction is now in litigation. Until that question is resolved, we will retain copies of all record messages in a way that permits appropriate designation and filing of them at a later time by the staff of Records Management.

Federal or Presidential Records.

The Federal Records Act defines federal records as:

All books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States under federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data in them. (44 U.S.C. 3301)

Under this definition, federal records are documentary materials that satisfy two tests. First, the materials must have been created or received by agency personnel in connection with their official duties. Second, they must be appropriate for preservation as evidence of the agency's activities or because they contain information of value. Federal records may be in any physical form, including paper, film, and disk. The method used to record information may be manual, mechanical, photographic, electronic, or any combination of these or other technologies.

The Presidential Records Act defines Presidential records as:

documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, created or received by the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual in the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist the President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. (44 U.S.C. 2201(2))

Under this definition, Presidential records are documentary materials that meet three tests. First, the materials must have been created or received by the President, his immediate staff,

or a unit or individuals in the EOP whose function it is to advise and assist the President. Second, the materials must relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the President's constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties. Third, they must not be federal records, which are specifically excluded from coverage by the Presidential Records Act.

Nonrecord or Personal Materials.

Certain types of documentary materials created within the NSC are considered "nonrecord" because they are not "appropriate for preservation" as defined in the Federal Records Act or because they are excluded from the coverage of the Presidential Records Act. For this reason, some electronic messages do not need to be filed and preserved because they are so insubstantial that they do not warrant retention, or because they are duplicative, or because they are exclusively personal in nature. Examples of electronic mail documents that are nonrecord or personal materials are those related to the following:

- Reminders about leave plans (which are officially documented elsewhere)
- Reminders about meetings and appointments
- Routine office procedures, such as requests to clerical staff to order supplies
- Telephone messages (unless the message contains substantive information)
- Social or ceremonial functions during office hours
- Preliminary drafts of official, logged records sent to a secretary for final preparation (unless the draft reflects policy development)
- Exclusively personal matters, such as private political or professional activities

Monitoring Record Status Designations

To assist the NSC staff in making proper record status determinations, the staff of Records Management will periodically examine a sample of all electronic mail messages, including those designated as nonrecords. The purpose of the examination is to identify any problems in interpreting the official guidance for distinguishing between record and nonrecord materials. The first of these sample inspections will take place within the next month. The staff of Records Management will report their findings to me and recommend any needed changes in current guidance or procedures.

No copies of electronic mail documents (either electronic or paper) may be removed from the NSC unless they are determined to be exclusively personal materials. If a departing staff member wishes to retain such documents, the staff of the Information

Management and Disclosure Office must review the documents before authorizing their removal.

PRESERVING ELECTRONIC MAIL MESSAGES

To facilitate the preservation of e-mail messages that are records, you are asked to indicate whether the message is Record (R) or Nonrecord (N) each time you create a message. (For All-in-1 word processing documents, you must indicate (R) or (N) when you send the document.) You should make that determination by following the guidelines in this memorandum for identifying federal records, Presidential records, nonrecord materials, and personal materials (a personal message should be labeled nonrecord (N)). When in doubt, designate a message as a record.

If you designate a message as a record, a copy automatically will be routed to Records Management for incorporation into the appropriate records system. All messages in individual e-mail accounts will be purged from the All-in-One and CC:Mail systems after one month, with the exception of extra copies placed in your "personal folder" because they need to be retained more than one month for personal convenience.

Transmission and Receipt Data

All electronic mail messages contain certain "transmission data" regarding the sender, addressee(s), and transmission (date and exact time) of a document. Whenever you designate a message as a record, it is necessary to capture and preserve such transmission data and associate it with the appropriate message. All e-mail messages routed to Records Management as records will be filed electronically with the following transmission data included: the name of the sender and all recipients and the date and time of transmission.

Additionally, you must request a read receipt for record messages whenever such information is necessary for adequate and proper documentation of NSC activities. You should request read receipts whenever it is necessary to confirm that the addressee(s) has read a message by a certain time, such as when you assign tasks with a deadline or need concurrence by a definite time. To the extent feasible, WHSSS will reprogram All-in-1 to capture such read receipts electronically. However, until further notice, all users should continue to follow the instructions in Will Itoh's 5/27/93 memorandum for printing out read receipts whenever requested, attaching them to the originating message, and forwarding such materials to Records Management for filing.

PRESERVING CALENDARS

Calendars created on the NSC's e-mail systems (except those of the APNSA, DAPNSA, Staff Secretary, Executive Secretary, and Deputy Executive Secretary) are either personal materials or temporary records. Calendars are personal materials when they are shared only with a secretary. They are temporary records when they are shared more widely with other members of the NSC staff.

Personal calendars and shared calendars that contain no substantive information about NSC activities do not need to be printed and filed, and they should be deleted from your e-mail environment when no longer needed. Shared calendars that do contain substantive information about NSC activities must be printed out monthly, retained for two years, and then destroyed. The electronic calendars of the APNSA, the DAPNSA, the Staff Director, the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary, which are created on PROFS, must be printed out monthly and forwarded to Records Management for preservation.

* * *

This memorandum supersedes all previous guidance on electronic mail issued prior to January 6, 1993, as well as the instructions on Electronic Federal Records on page 6 of the May 8, 1993 memo on "Federal Records." I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of staff compliance with this guidance in order to ensure that the NSC fulfills its legal obligations regarding the creation and preservation of federal and/or Presidential records. If you have any questions about this guidance, please contact the Records Management Staff (7356) or the Office of the Legal Adviser (3854).

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MEMORANDUM FOR [WSSS]

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Electronic Mail Modifications

By [a specific date] you should begin to implement all procedures necessary to preserve all record e-mail messages on the NSC's electronic mail systems (All-in-1 and CC:Mail) electronically. Since all record e-mail messages for the Clinton Administration have been retained online, I assume that these procedures can be implemented within a few days, with one exception. I understand that capturing read receipts electronically in association with the originating message may require several months of additional reprogramming.

FROM: NSC
All e-mail users will continue to designate messages (including All-in-1 word processing documents) as records (R) or nonrecords (N), and all messages designated as records will continue to be routed electronically to Records Management. Any such data determined to be federal records will be proposed for permanent retention by the National Archives. Any such data determined to be Presidential records will be preserved permanently at the appropriate Presidential Library. To preserve the record messages and related data electronically, we need to accomplish the following for All-in-1 and CC:Mail:

1. Enable Records Management staff to designate the record messages as either federal or Presidential.
2. Retain EASY access to the sorted federal or Presidential messages in Information Management and Disclosure only, until the end of an administration. This access may be achieved by retaining the data online, or on easily useable optical disks, whichever is more practicable for you. In either case, it is my understanding that Records Management staff will be able to conduct keyword searches of all record messages.
3. At the end of an administration transfer the sorted record messages to separate magnetic tapes for federal or Presidential records and make one duplicate set of the federal tapes. These magnetic tapes must contain all transmission data associated with the messages as described below in No. 4, and they must conform to the requirements of NARA regulations at 36 CFR 1228.188 (copy attached at Tab I). One set of the federal tapes will be retained for the NSC's administrative use and one set will be stored and maintained for transfer to NARA according to the provisions of an approved records schedule.

4. Each record message must include the name of the sender and all addresses, plus the date and exact time of transmission. Additionally, for All-in-1 and any future e-mail system, we must develop a plan for preserving read receipt data electronically whenever it is requested by the sender. This read receipt data must be preserved in a way that easily associates the receipt information with the appropriate originating message. CC:Mail users will continue to print read receipts when requested as instructed in Will Itoh's 5/27/93 memorandum, since that system cannot be reconfigured to associate such data with the originating message electronically. All-in-1 users also will continue to follow those instructions until we implement procedures for capturing such read receipt data electronically.

5. Since we are preserving transmittal data in association with each record message for All-in-1, including the name of the sender and all addressees, the date and time of transmission, and read receipt data whenever requested, it is not necessary to preserve user directories, distribution lists, or logs of messages on the magnetic tapes. Records Management has drafted a records schedule provision that would authorize the deletion when no longer needed of any such data determined to be federal records. Since CC:Mail does not always print all addressee names on a distribution list, for that system you also must preserve all distribution lists so that the name of all addressees for record messages will be readily available.

6. All e-mail messages that are not routed to Records Management should be deleted after one month, with the exception of any messages filed in an individual user's "Personal" folder. These latter messages, which are nonrecord copies maintained solely for personal convenience, should be deleted whenever the staffer departs the NSC.

7. For the calendar function, you should delete all data whenever the staffer departs the NSC. For any such data determined to be federal records, their deletion is authorized by the provisions of GRS 23, Item 5.

8. For the cable traffic on All-in-1, Records Management has drafted a records schedule provision that would authorize the permanent retention of all cables directed to the attention of a specified NSC staffer. The draft schedule also would authorize the deletion "when no longer needed" of the remaining cable traffic in GESCAN. The newswires in GESCAN that are purchased from a commercial vendor constitute a nonrecord reference library, which should be deleted when no longer needed. Until NARA has approved our draft schedule, you should continue retaining a complete backup of all cable traffic sent to All-in-1.

9. User Set-Up Functions, which include changes in passwords, work locations, work hours, lock keyboard data, calendar and date formats, and log-in/log-out data, should be deleted when no longer needed for system administration. To the extent that any such data are determined to be federal records, their deletion is authorized by the provisions of GRS 20, Item 1c.

Records Management has drafted a records schedule for submission to the National Archives that would, for all data determined to be federal records, authorize the deletion of (1) data in individual e-mail accounts after one month or, in the case of data retained in personal folders, when the staffer departs the NSC; (2) user directories, distribution lists (for All-in-1 only), and logs of messages; and (3) calendar data. However, until we have a final determination about which NSC records are federal, you must continue the current practice of preserving backup tapes of the entire system.

If you have any questions, please contact Neal Wolin in the Legal Adviser's office at 3854.

Attachment

Tab I NARA Regulations

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(Proposed records schedule to be submitted to NARA regarding any records determined to be federal)

1. Electronic Mail, 1993--. Messages created and exchanged by the NSC staff electronically. The content of the messages ranges from the routine and personal to substantive exchanges about policy matters. The NSC e-mail systems require the user to designate messages that are records before sending a message. All messages designated as records are automatically routed to the Office of Records Management with related transmittal data for segregation into one of two categories: permanent federal records or permanent presidential records:

a. Substantive Messages. Messages, and related transmittal data, providing substantive information about agency activities such as the development of policy papers, interagency meetings, internal administrative matters, and legal cases. (For CC-Mail only, the related transmittal data must include all distribution lists, and updates, which provide the names of all addressees of record messages.)

Disposition. Permanent. Retain in an accessible electronic format until the end of an administration, then copy to tape. Transfer tapes to the National Archives 20 years after the end of the administration that created them.

b. Processing Files. Backup tapes and other extra copies of all data on the e-mail system, including substantive and nonrecord messages; user directories, distribution lists (except for CC:Mail), and logs of messages; and user set-up functions authorized for disposal under GRS 20, Item 1c.

Disposition. Destroy when no longer needed.

2. Electronic Cables and Newswires, 1989--. An electronic library of daily newswires and cables related to world events. The newswires consist of a standard commercial package furnished by AP, UPI, and Reuters, which constitutes a nonrecord reference library. No information is recorded about who looks at these newswires or when. The incoming cables originate with the Department of State, DoD, the CIA and the NSA. They are sent to the Situation Room for the attention of either (1) the President and his assistants in the West Wing, or (2) the NSC staff generally. Those created and received by the President, the APNSA, and the DAPNSA are retained permanently as Presidential records. The dispositions listed below apply to the remaining incoming cables that are sent electronically to All-in-1 for subsequent electronic distribution to the NSC staff and to the outgoing cables sent in the name of a member of the NSC staff.

a. Cables Sent to or From Specified Staff. A certain percentage of all incoming cable traffic is sent electronically to designated NSC staff according to predetermined subject criteria, and a small number of cables are sent from the Situation Room in the name of an NSC staff member. All such cables identify the sender and recipient(s) and the date of electronic submission.

Disposition. Permanent. Retain in an accessible electronic format until the end of an administration, then copy to tape. Transfer to the National Archives 20 years after the end of the administration that created them.

b. GESCAN Cables. Those cables not designated for an individual staffer, plus copies of the cables sent to a specified staffer (with the exception of a few highly sensitive cables) are stored in a database (GESCAN) that may be accessed by anyone on the NSC staff. No information is recorded about who looks at what data or when.

Disposition. Destroy when no longer needed.

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. LEARY

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Monitoring Electronic Mail

In order to identify and correct any problems in the NSC staff's identification of e-mail records, you should institute the following plan for monitoring a sample of electronic mail.

1. The staff of Records Management should examine a sample once annually. The first examination should be completed within one month following the issuance of written guidance to all staff.

2. The initial sample and the size of the subsequent samples should be determined by the Director of Records Management.

3. The selected staff should be notified prior to beginning the inspection that you will examine a sample of their previously created e-mail stored on the backup tapes.

4. WHSSS should print out the designated messages to facilitate the review by Records Management.

5. Records Management should tabulate the total number of messages examined in each account, the number of incorrect record designations, and the reasons for the incorrect designations. Records Management should prepare a report for the Executive Secretary summarizing and analyzing the findings and recommending any needed modifications in the guidance to staff. That report should be submitted to me within six weeks after issuance of written guidance to all staff.

NSC SETTLEMENT DRAFT

Distinguishing Between Federal and Presidential Records

The NSC will treat as federal records the formal statements of an Administration's national security policy; meeting notices, lists of attendees, agendas, options papers, summaries of conclusions, and minutes of interagency meetings (NSC, PC, DC, and IWG); and records that are sent or received from outside the White House. In addition, the NSC will treat as federal records those materials exchanged between NSC staff (not including those exchanged with the APNSA or DAPNSA) relating to such matters other than policy directives and meetings files. NSC federal records (including electronic records) include the following types of records:

- Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)
- Presidential Review Directives (PRD)
- Presidential Determinations (PD) and Executive Orders (EO)
- National Security Council Meetings (NSC)
- Principals Meetings (PC)
- Deputies Committee Meetings (DC)
- Interagency Working Group Meetings (IWG)
- Documents Originating Outside the White House Related to Sensitive Intelligence or Counterintelligence Activities
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Referrals
- Presidential Messages and Proclamations
- Aircraft Requests
- Agreements
- Foreign Travel Requests
- Approvals of Significant Military Exercises
- NSC Staff Speaking/Appointment Requests
- Documents Related to Lawsuits and Investigations Involving the NSC
- Requests for Access to Documents
- NSC Staff Correspondence

The NSC will treat as Presidential records those documentary materials created or received by or for the President, the APNSA, and the DAPNSA, and any related materials that are exchanged between NSC staff. NSC Presidential records (including electronic records) include the following types of records:

- Memoranda and Other Documents for or from the President, the APNSA, or the DAPNSA (including all intra-staff documents related to policy directives)
- Memoranda and Talking Points for the President, the APNSA, and the DAPNSA for Use in Meetings (including all intra-staff documents related to NSC, PC, DC, and IWG meetings)
- Presidential Memos of Conversation (MEMCONS)
- Presidential Memos of Telephone Conversations (TELCONS)
- Heads of State Visits (Briefing Books)
- Presidential Trip Preparations (Briefing Books)
- Presidential Speeches
- Correspondence With the President, the APNSA, and the DAPNSA

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OA

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PROPOSED OA ELECTRONICS RECORDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
FOR RECORDS CREATED USING
ELECTRONIC MAIL

This document describes the proposed electronic records management system that the Executive Office of the President (EOP) will implement to maintain an electronic repository of messages created using the electronic communications capability of the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system. It discusses general system concepts and delineates the steps that EOP will undertake until the final system implementation occurs. It further demonstrates the intent of the EOP to capture the content of electronic mail communications through changes proposed for the current OASIS ALL-IN-1 system and through the phased development of a separate electronic records management system that will facilitate preservation and retrieval of Federal records materials.

Background. The OASIS ALL-IN-1 system is an electronic messaging (e-mail) system that facilitates communication among the staff of the EOP. It was not designed by the vendor as a text search and retrieval system or for reporting against information requests. Rather, the e-mail system was designed to facilitate communications and to hold messages for brief periods to provide ready response to users with minimal degradation in system service. Therefore, it is not a records management system.

Some of the messages presently created using the OASIS ALL-IN-1 e-mail facility are Federal records as defined by the statutes and regulations; others are either Presidential records or nonrecord materials. To facilitate records management within EOP, the current practice is for users to print out messages that need to be preserved and file them with other related paper records in their file stations. These paper records are maintained and disposed of according to records retention schedules prescribed and approved by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). At the same time, the EOP Data Center saves backup tapes of all data residing on its direct access storage devices for use in recovering from system or drive failures. This latter medium, while it contains all messages, is not readily or easily searchable. Thus, the paper files are the

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central repository against which requests for information are processed at this time.

OA is currently undertaking a project to develop an electronic records management system to manage documents created using the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system. Once the new system becomes operational, records management and disposition will be performed for that system in accordance with directions provided from and approved by NARA. The following sections describe the general capabilities of the proposed electronic records management system and discuss the plan by which OA will implement it.

System Capabilities

The primary purpose of the electronic records management system being designed by OA is to provide an electronic medium to manage messages created or captured using the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system that constitute Federal or Presidential records. The new system will support effective and proper documentation of the policies and transactions of the EOP and will assist management in operating effectively and economically. The electronic records management system will address a number of functional requirements including:

- **Content of Messages** - The system will contain the text of messages and incorporated text attachments. For both Federal and Presidential records, it will capture transmission and receipt information including creator of the message, date and time of creation, addressees, and date and time each addressee received and accessed the message, when this information is available. The records will be stored in standard ASCII code to facilitate information search and retrieval.
- **Type of records** - Messages will be identified by record type code (record or nonrecord), with the default being record. The selection will be made by the creator of the message within the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system at the time the record is created. Only if the message is tagged as nonrecord, when the addressees read the message, they will have the

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opportunity to tag the communication as record. Nonrecord selections may be retained and periodically deleted as determined by previously established procedures.

- **Category of record** - Depending on the identity of the creator and the recipient/s of the record in the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system, the record will be tagged as either a Presidential or Federal record. Users could have the option of specifying the category and overriding the selection made automatically through the e-mail application.
- **Searchability of Records** - The records will be stored in a fashion to permit retrieval by text search software. Ideally a commercial, off-the-shelf package can accomplish this function and will be fully integrated into the system. Thus a request by date, name, search string, keywords or phrases may be prepared and executed. The output media (paper or electronic) will be determined by the volume of data produced in response to the request.
- **Retention of Records** - The system will be devised to store e-mail messages until the records management staff can assess the nature of Federal records contained within the system and develop records retention schedules for review and approval by NARA. No records will be deleted from the system unless an approved schedule has been received from NARA.

The System Development Process

EOP will use a standard, industry-wide system life-cycle methodology to develop this system. This process is composed of several stages including analysis, design, coding, testing and implementation.

The analysis stage is presently under way. As a first step, a document describing the functional and technical requirements for the system will be produced. The next step will be to examine alternative technical solutions that will meet the functional requirements, prepare a cost/benefit analysis for each of the

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alternatives, develop an estimate of cost and time to complete each alternative and suggest a solution.

During the first quarter of 1994, the recommended solution will be further expanded to include a schedule for completion showing tasks, milestones, time and cost estimates to completion. This will also include specific hardware and software configurations as well as functional design information for each software module needed. Design, coding, testing and implementation stages will follow. Target dates for the completion of each of these stages will be identified in the final deliverable report and cannot be identified at this time because the feasibility of possible solutions and the availability of resources are uncertain.

Interim Procedures. Currently, draft guidance exists that describes how users shall print records created using the e-mail system and file them in paper form within their file stations. This is contained in a directive entitled, The OASIS ALL-IN-1 Electronic Communication System and Federal Records Procedures.

The current OASIS ALL-IN-1 system is being modified at this time to permit the tagging of record type and record category on e-mail. This function will be implemented on a phased basis during the first quarter of 1994 so that performance impact on the e-mail system can be monitored to ensure the quality of system response to users. At the same time, the first-phase of a record management system will be ready for testing the acceptance of tagged e-mail communications. All available data related to e-mail communications will be incorporated into the complete electronic records management system when the new system is implemented.

Prior to the electronic records management system being fully implemented, the contents of the interim system will be reviewed by the records management staff through a separate procedure and system capability. This will permit the assessment and assurance that the e-mail communications are being properly tagged for future disposition schedules. This review will also indicate what concepts need reinforcement for future training of users in records management concepts.

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The initial implementation of the records management system will include the electronic mail from OASIS, other internal mail systems, and external mail received by OASIS. Subsequent phases of this project will address additional data from other ALL-IN-1 features, including calendars and phone messaging, as appropriate.

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FUTURE DISPOSITION OF RECORDS MANAGED VIA THE OA ELECTRONIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:

A Methodology

Introduction

The Office of Administration (OA) of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) recognizes the importance and necessity of professional management of federal records. Thus, OA is developing an electronic records management system for messages created using an electronic messaging (e-mail) system. The life cycle of a record, as defined by National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), is being used in the system design process to make sure that the considerations made for disposition of records are appropriate. This involvement reflects good management practice, and is supported by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

In creating the new system and developing the supporting guidance and training for its use, OA acknowledges NARA as the authoritative source for oversight and guidance in records management and disposition. NARA appraises, evaluates, and approves disposition of federal records, provides assistance in records management program development, and acts as final caretaker of permanent records. The methodology described below for determining the disposition of records managed using the new records management system is based on the statutes, the implementing regulations, and the NARA publications, Managing Electronic Records and Disposition of Federal Records: A Records Management Handbook.

From a management perspective, there are many similarities between paper-based records and documents managed using an electronic records management system. For documents created or stored in either medium, OA and other EOP agencies need to follow standard, prescribed practices. Systematic definitions of records series or groupings must be established. These definitions are based on the functional activities of the agency as well as its recordkeeping practices. Where both an

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electronic records management system and a paper-based file system exist, the relationships between the same or similar information stored in each separate system must be identified and acknowledged.¹

Record Life Cycle Management

As with a computer-based system, both NARA and OMB have declared that a record has a life cycle. NARA defines this as:

"The management concept that records pass through three stages: creation, maintenance and use, and disposition."²

In support of this, OA will follow the processes and procedures established by NARA to manage the life cycle of all records within its scope of control, including OA records managed using the new electronic records management system.

Within this process, disposition plays a key role. It includes a review of the business functions and recordkeeping requirements of OA components. Once these have been defined, a review of OA records to identify and define the purpose of the various record series or groupings can be performed.

When the review process has been completed, the actual scheduling process will begin. Recommendations for retention and disposition of electronic mail messages stored in the records management system will be drafted by the component agency, based on the results of the preceding activities. Prior to forwarding to NARA, these proposals will be reviewed, organized and cleared internally within the component agency to be sure that agency information needs are being met. The recommendations will then

¹ Disposition of Federal Records: A Records Management Handbook, National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, D.C.), 1992, p.III-3.

² A Federal Records Management Glossary 1993. 2nd Ed. National Archives and Records Administration, Office of Records Administration, Agency Services Division. Washington, D.C., 1993, p.19.

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be sent to NARA for evaluation and approval. Only after agreement from NARA will either the General Records Schedules (GRS) be applied or Request for Records Disposition Authority (SF 115) be prepared. Prior to application of the GRS or submission of draft SF 115s to NARA, internal approval must be obtained from the appropriate records liaisons within each component agency. In certain specified cases, approval from an external source, such as GAO will also be sought at this stage.³ NARA will review, appraise, comment or provide guidance where necessary and approve all SF 115s before OA implements its disposition schedule.

For OA, implementation of the disposition schedules will include updating the OA directive entitled "The OASIS All-In-1 Electronic Communications System and Federal Records Procedures." At that time, the directive will be revised to address procedures for the transfer and management of records created using the e-mail system to the new records management system. This distribution of information will occur either concurrently or be immediately followed by employee training, primarily for records liaisons and others responsible for custody of files in component agencies. OA management and staff also will be briefed on the new procedures and disposition rules. Subsequent to training, the program for disposition of records stored and managed using the new records management system will begin. Within the first year, this implementation will be periodically reviewed to assure that the program is being properly executed. Thereafter, records schedules and the program will be reviewed annually by both OA and NARA.

³ Disposition of Federal Records: A Records Management Handbook, National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, D.C.), 1992, p. V-15.

Draft Interim Guidance

October 26, 1993 - D R A F T

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION DIRECTIVE

SUBJECT: The OASIS ALL-IN-1 Electronic Communication System and
Federal Records Procedures

Introduction

1. **Purpose.** To establish records management objectives and responsibilities for the creation, maintenance, use, and disposition of Federal records on the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system.
2. **Personnel Concerned.** All OASIS ALL-IN-1 users with federal records responsibilities.
3. **Directive or Bulletin Cancelled.** None; paragraph 7.b of LISD Directive .04-0, "Records Management Program," is replaced by this Directive.
4. **Authority.** 44 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33; 36 CFR Parts 1220, 1222, 1228, and 1234.
5. **Originator.** Information Management Division
6. **Review.** Annually, whenever substantive modifications to the ALL-IN-1 system are contemplated, before any new electronic communications systems are accessed by EOP agency users, and any new electronic records management systems are implemented.

[Director of the Office of Administration signature and date]

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OVERVIEW

1. Purpose.

To establish policy, responsibilities, guidelines, requirements, and procedures for the preservation of Federal records created and transmitted on the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system within the federal agencies of the Executive Office of the President.

This directive supersedes previous records management instructions on Federal records on electronic communications (e-mail) systems, in accordance with recent court opinions and orders.

The following guidance does not apply to Presidential records. Each EOP component that creates Presidential records has a continuing obligation to identify and separately maintain Presidential and Federal records. Memoranda providing guidance on Presidential records and Federal records were issued to White House and EOP staff by the White House on May 5, 1993.

2. Definitions.

Basic records management terms are defined in OA Directive LISD.04-0 (44 U.S.C. 3301). The definitions listed below are specific to the purpose of this directive.

- a. **Electronic Mail.** The process or result of sending and receiving messages in electronic form via remote computer terminals. (Federal Records Management Glossary, 1993, 2nd ed.)
- b. **Electronic Records.** This term includes numeric, graphics, and text information, which may be recorded on any medium capable of being read by a computer and which satisfies the definition of a Federal record in 44 U.S.C. 3301. This includes, but is not limited to, magnetic media, such as tapes and disks, and optical disks. (36 CFR 1234.1)
- c. **Electronic Records System.** This term means any information system that produces, manipulates, or stores Federal records by using a computer. (36 CFR 1234)

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- d. **Federal Records.** As defined in the law (44 U.S.C. 3301), Federal records are:

[A]ll books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data in them.

The phrase "regardless of physical form or characteristics" means that the records may be paper, film, disk, or any other physical type or form; and that the method used to record information may be manual, mechanical, photographic, electronic, or any combination of these or other technologies.

Federal records are documentary materials when they meet both of the following conditions:

- (1) They are made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of agency business; and
- (2) They are preserved or are appropriate for preservation as evidence of agency organization and activities or because of the value of the information they contain. (36 CFR 1222.34)

- e. **Presidential Records.** Documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, created or received by the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the EOP whose function is to advise and assist the President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. (44 USC 2201)

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- f. **Temporary Record.** Any record which has been determined by the archivist of the United States to have insufficient value (on basis of current standards) to warrant its preservation by the National Archives and Records Administration. This determination may take the form of:
 - (1) A series of records designated as disposable in an agency records disposition schedule approved by NARA (Standard Form 115, Request for Records Disposition Authority); or
 - (2) A series of records designated as disposable in a General Records Schedule. (36 CFR 1220.14)
- g. **Permanent Record.** Any Federal record that has been determined by NARA to have sufficient value to warrant its preservation in the National Archives. (36 CFR 1220.14)
- h. **Nonrecord Material.** U.S. Government-owned documentary materials, other than Presidential records, that do not meet the statutory definition of Federal records (44 U.S.C. 3301), or that have been excluded from coverage by the definition. Excluded materials are:
 - (1) Extra copies of documents preserved only for convenience of reference.
 - (2) Stocks of publications and of processed documents. However, each agency must create and maintain records sets of processed documents and publications, including annual and special reports, directives, special studies, brochures, pamphlets, books, handbooks, manuals, and posters.
 - (3) Library and museum materials made or acquired and preserved solely for reference or exhibition purposes.
- i. **Records Management.** The planning, controlling, directing, organizing, training, promoting, and other managerial activities involved with respect to records creation, records maintenance and use, and records disposition in order to achieve adequate and proper documentation of the policies and transactions of the Federal Government and effective and economical management of agency operation. (36 CFR 1220.14)

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- j. **Records Schedule.** A document describing and providing instructions for the disposition of Federal records. Its consists of one of the following:
 - (1) An SF 115, Request for Records Disposition Authority, that has been approved by NARA to authorize the disposition of Federal records;
 - (2) A General Records Schedule (GRS) issued by NARA; or
 - (3) A printed agency manual or directive containing the records descriptions and disposition instructions approved by NARA on one or more SF-115s or issued by NARA in the GRS. (36 CFR 1220.14)
- k. **General Records Schedules.** Schedules authorizing the disposal, after the lapse of specified periods of time, of records of a specified form or character common to several or all agencies if such records will not, at the end of the periods specified, have sufficient administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant their further preservation by the United States Government. (44 U.S.C. 3303a(d))
- l. **Electronic Records System.** Any information that is recorded in a form that only a computer can process and that satisfies the definition of a Federal Record as defined above in d.
- m. **Transmission and Receipt Data.**
 - (1) **Transmission Data.** Information in e-mail systems regarding the identities of sender and addressee(s), date and time messages were sent.
 - (2) **Receipt Data.** Information in e-mail systems regarding date and time of receipt of a message, and acknowledgement of receipt and/or access by addressee(s).
- n. **System Backups.** Copies on off-line media of software or data stored on direct access storage devices in a computer system to provide a means of recreating a system and its data in the event of unintentional loss of data or software.

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- o. **Records Liaison.** Individual designated to oversee records management procedures for the agency.

THE ELECTRONIC MESSAGING (E-MAIL) SYSTEM

3. Policy.

The official medium for maintaining Federal records created on OASIS ALL-IN-1 system in EOP agencies is hardcopy (paper). The ALL-IN-1 system at the present can not be used to store Federal records. The Electronic Messaging (EM) function on the All-IN-1 system is not designed to replace agencies' existing paper files. Consequently, e-mail users of the ALL-IN-1 system must follow the procedures specified below.

The Office of Administration is developing an electronic records management system for storage, retrieval and disposition of electronic messages that are determined to be Federal records. However, until certain programming, policy, and procedural matters are resolved, all users should follow the steps listed below to ensure that all e-mail documents that meet the definition of Federal records are printed according to these instructions and incorporated into official paper files.

4. Identifying E-Mail Documents That Are Federal Records.

- o E-mail messages (and attachments) are Federal records when they meet two conditions. They are made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of agency business; and, they are preserved or are appropriate for preservation as evidence of agency organization and activities or because of the value of the information they contain. (36 CFR 1222.34)
- o When determining whether e-mail messages are Federal records, keep in mind that multiple copies of documents may all be records if they are used for different purposes in the conduct of official business or filed in different files. More than one office may take action or otherwise use copies of a document. The copy would be a record in each of those offices.

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5. Preserving E-Mail Documents That Are Federal Records.

When the user determines that an incoming or outgoing e-mail message or FAX transmitted by the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system meets the criteria for Federal records, the user will:

- o Print the message and all attachments. The printed message shows the identity of the sender and the addressee(s), and the date and time the message was sent. The identity of remote addressees that are not otherwise evident (outside of OASIS) should be identified by annotating the message or attaching a list of addressees.
- o If the sender requested a "read receipt," he/she will either print the receipt and attach it to the printed message or annotate the printed message with the date and time each recipient accessed the message. Read receipts should be requested when adequate documentation is needed to verify that the message was accessed by the recipient.
- o Print the successful FAX confirmation message and attach it to the official file copy of the document that was sent. Annotate the confirmation message with the names of recipients.
- o Forward the printed message or file copy of the document that was FAXED to the appropriate individual for inclusion in the EOP agency's system of official files.

These actions must be taken even if the user chooses to copy or move messages for inclusion in personal paper or electronic files.

The folders feature in the e-mail system may only be used for the storage of personal materials, including convenience copies of Federal records. Personal e-mail messages should be kept separate from copies of agency e-mail records.

Examples of messages that are Federal records on e-mail are:

- o Notices concerning the use of leave, procurement of supplies, or personnel practices;
- o Budget-related messages summarizing agency expenditures;

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- o Messages relating to workers' compensation claims, contracts, or working conditions;
- o Messages that document policy development or significant decisions;
- o Substantive minutes or notes on the proceedings of meetings.

6. Nonrecord e-mail messages. Messages created on the e-mail system may contain transitory or nonsubstantive information that is not needed to provide a full account of agency policies, procedures, functions, and major activities. All nonrecord messages may be deleted by the users when no longer needed.

Examples of nonrecord messages on e-mail include:

- o Reminders of appointments and staff meetings;
- o Visitor appointment requests;
- o Dynamically changing online indices of messages titles;
- o Announcements of an employee's departure or retirement; invitations to office social functions;
- o Employees' copies of administrative notices such as those relating to blood drives, savings bond purchases, or the Combined Federal Campaign.

OASIS ALL-IN-1 FEATURES

7. Calendars.

The ALL-IN-1 system offers a calendar option to users as part of the Desk Management function. The calendar function allows users to schedule meetings with other users including recurring meetings, as well as to maintain their own official record of meetings, events, and other activities. Calendars may be displayed and printed by the day, week, or month. This function also provides users with the capability of maintaining a task or "to do" list.

Calendars and task lists created using this system may be Federal records if they meet the criteria explained in paragraphs 2d and 4 of this directive.

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- o Calendars that are used only as personal schedules may not be records, even if some of the entries listed are events or meetings that relate to officials duties. If the calendar was created solely for the personal convenience of the official (and is not shared with anyone beyond one's secretary or assistant) and his or her important meetings or scheduled activities are recorded elsewhere, the ALL-IN-1 calendar may be considered nonrecord, and may be updated, changed or deleted at the individual's discretion.
- o NARA has authorized disposal of all other individual and shared calendars determined by the creating agency to be Federal records according to the following conditions:
 - If the calendars contain substantive information relating to official activities, the substance of which has not been incorporated into official files, they must be kept for two years.
 - If the calendars document routine activities or any substantive information in them is also included in organized files, the user may change or delete information when it is no longer needed. (GRS 23, item 5)

8. Personnel Directories. The user directory provides a short-cut for entering the recipient's name on the "TO" line of the message. In addition, users have access to an EOP Directory that contains names of individuals, their organization affiliation, room number, and telephone numbers. There is also a separate feature that allows users to create their own personal address/telephone lists for ready reference and not for circulation. These directories are nonrecord.

9. Desk Management provides access to a calculator and displays the current time at locations throughout the world (World-Wide Time). This information is nonrecord reference material.

10. Telephone messaging and paging are available to users through either the electronic messaging or Desk Management menus. Just as with paper message slips, users should ensure that they produce official records documenting the substance of important messages or conversations for inclusion in agency files. The messages themselves are ordinarily not Federal Records.

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11. Information Management displays commercial and other non-agency informational materials such as the news and weather. This information is nonrecord reference material.

12. The Bulletin Board broadcasts special announcements to OASIS users, such as a schedule of classroom training, blood donation drives, and health insurance open seasons. The Suggestion Box allows users to recommend changes that would better meet user needs. This is nonrecord material and may be deleted under GRS 23, item 1.

13. The interactive training routines available on the system are not Federal records.

14. The User Set-Up functions of the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system which include changes in passwords, work locations, work hours, and calendar and date formats, as well as the log-in/log-out data and lock keyboard data, may be deleted under GRS 20, item 1(c).

15. System backup tapes can only be recycled with specific authorization from NARA. Any Federal records that remain on the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system, after the records and appropriate transmission data have been printed for filing in official recordkeeping systems, are subject to the disposition instructions in GRS 23, item 2.

RESPONSIBILITIES

16. The head of each EOP agency will:

- o Designate those high-level officials whose OASIS ALL-IN-1 calendars may be Federal records. Direct those designated high-level officials to ensure that their OASIS ALL-IN-1 calendars are printed at the end of each month and sent to the records liaison for inclusion in the agency's official file system.
- o Ensure that each agency employee receives training in Federal record responsibilities.
- o Direct the (ir division directors or equivalent) head of each agency component to instruct all users of the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system with Federal records responsibilities to:

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- Follow procedures in paragraph 5 of this directive when the e-mail message or FAX has been determined to be a Federal record.
- Instruct staff that it is not acceptable to transfer Federal records to their personal ALL-IN-1 folders until after they have printed out and filed the record copy along with its associated read receipt, if any.
- Ensure that staff are properly preserving all incoming and outgoing e-mail messages, as well as any read receipts requested.
- Request a representative segment of agency staff to print out samples of messages from their OASIS ALL-IN-1 files for review to determine if proper designations of record and nonrecord status have been made. This review should occur within the first 60 days of this directive and annually thereafter.
- Notify their office records liaison when employees need further training to fulfill their Federal records responsibilities.
- Conduct departure interviews with employees to assess whether they have properly printed out all Federal records for inclusion in official files.

17. The Information Management component of OA will:

- o Backup the OASIS ALL-IN-1 system as necessary. Recycle such back-up tapes according to authorized disposition schedules.
- o Consult with agency records officers whenever substantive modifications to the electronic communications system are contemplated.
- o Provide guidance and training to educate OASIS ALL-IN-1 users on records management procedures.

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

OMB

Divider Title: _____

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OMB Draft

(draft in progress, to be revised in accordance with guidance to be issued by OXOP Office of Administration)

Section 540-5.b. of the OMB Manual is amended to read as follows:

"b. Electronic mail may be used to convey "official records" information.

"(1) Whenever an employee creates or receives an electronic message, the employee shall determine whether the electronic message constitutes a "federal record" (as defined in Section 540-2.a) under the standards set forth in Section 540. If the employee determines that a created or received electronic message is a "federal record", then the employee shall print such created or received electronic message (and all attachments thereto) onto paper. On both the sender's and addressee's copies, the printed message shows the full identity of the sender and addressees (including names on established distribution lists), and the date and time the message was sent (this information is often referred to as "transmission data").

"(2) Just as there are instances in which it is critical to know when a paper document reaches its destination, there are instances in which it is critical to know when an electronic message reaches its destination. Accordingly, whenever an employee creates an electronic message that the employee has determined constitutes a federal record (as required by b(1)), the employee shall also determine whether to ask for a "read receipt" (which shows when the message has been accessed by each addressee) for the electronic message. The employee shall request a "read receipt" whenever a record of when an electronic message has been accessed is necessary for adequate and proper documentation of agency activities, or is necessary to ensure compliance with strict deadlines or to protect the financial, legal, and other rights of the Federal government. For example, bids on contracts, applications for employment, and documents submitted to a court or administrative board may have to be delivered no later than a precise date and time; in such situations, just as certified mail or date stamping is used to confirm delivery of the final product, a person would request a read-receipt to document the receipt of preliminary electronic messages relating to the preparation, review, clearance, and delivery of such a product. In those and similar situations when strict deadlines must be met, employees shall request read-receipts for electronic messages.

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"(3) Whenever an employee requests a "read receipt", pursuant to b(2), for an electronic message that the employee has created, the employee shall print onto paper the "read receipt" that is received from each addressee. The paper copy of each "read receipt" shall be kept together (by staple, paper clip, or otherwise) with the paper copy of the electronic message (and any attachments thereto) that is printed out pursuant to b(1).

"(4) The paper copy of the electronic message (and any attachments thereto) and any associated "read receipts", which are printed out pursuant to b(1) and b(3), shall be handled and disposed of appropriately, using the same procedures and standards that apply generally to the handling and disposition of federal records in paper format. These procedures and standards are set forth in Section 540.

SENT BY: Xerox Corporation 7720 100-720000 1 000000 1

00072500

[Discussions on other issues will be added in accordance with guidance to be issued by EXOP Office of Administration]

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DRAFT

OMB Draft ~~1,234,567~~ (draft in progress, to be revised in accordance with guidance to be issued by ~~XXXXXX~~ EXOP Office of Administration)

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- "(1) Whenever an employee creates or receives an electronic message, the employee shall determine whether the electronic message constitutes a "federal record" (as defined in Section 540-2.a) under the standards set forth in Section 540. If the employee determines that a created or received electronic message is a "federal record", then the employee shall print such created or received electronic message (and all attachments thereto) onto paper. On both the sender's and addressee's copies, the printed message shows the full identity of the sender and addressees (including names on established distribution lists), and the date and time the message was sent (this information is often referred to as "transmission data").
- "(2) Just as there are instances in which it is critical to know when a paper document reaches its destination, there are instances in which it is critical to know when an electronic message reaches its destination. Accordingly, whenever an employee creates an electronic message that the employee has determined constitutes a federal record (as required by b(1)), the employee shall also determine whether to ask for a "read receipt" (which shows when the message has been accessed by each addressee) for the electronic message. The employee shall request a "read receipt" whenever a record of when an electronic message has been accessed is necessary for adequate and proper documentation of agency activities, or is necessary to ensure compliance with strict deadlines, or to protect the financial, legal, and other rights of the Federal government. For example, bids on contracts, applications for employment, and documents submitted to a court or administrative board may have to be delivered no later than a precise date and time; in such situations, just as certified mail or date stamping is used to confirm delivery of the final product, a person would request a read-receipt to document the receipt of preliminary electronic messages relating to the preparation, review, clearance, and delivery of such a product. In those and similar situations when strict deadlines must be met, employees shall request read-receipts for electronic messages.

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"(4) The paper copy of the electronic message (and any attachments thereto) and any associated "read receipts", which are printed out pursuant to b(1) and b(3), shall be handled and disposed of appropriately, using the same procedures and standards that apply generally to the handling and disposition of federal records in paper format. These procedures and standards are set forth in Section 540.

[Discussions on other issues will be added in accordance with guidance to be issued by ~~XXXXXX~~ EXOP Office of Administration]

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This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

OSTP

Divider Title: _____

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MEMORANDUM

To: All Staff
From: John H. Gibbons
Subject: OSTP's Records Management Program

Our status as employees of the United States Government obligates us to maintain records that: 1) protect the legal rights of the Government and those affected by its actions; and 2) preserve a historical record of the actions of this agency. Content (i.e., documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decision, procedures and essential transactions of OSTP), not form (i.e., hard copy v. computer file), determines whether something is a Federal record.

In May 1993, the White House issued guidance on management of Federal and Presidential records (attached) that shall serve as OSTP's general guidance. In addition, OSTP has a records management manual (attached) that provides instruction on creation and maintenance of filing systems. Please see OSTP's records management officials if you have questions about any of these documents; the May 1993 guidance will take precedence in the case of conflicting guidance. Please note, however, that this memo and the guidance from the National Archives and Records Administration (attached) on which it is based supersede all previously issued guidance with regard to e-mail and online calendars.

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As we integrate e-mail and online calendars into our workplace, we must take care to preserve the Federal records transmitted through these systems. Please adhere to the following procedures when using e-mail or online calendars:

CC:Mail

Before transmitting a message on CC:Mail, determine whether it is a record (see attachments for definitions; note that in addition to the text, CC:Mail messages contain "transmission data" — e.g., name of sender, names of recipients, date and time of transmission — that are considered part of a record). If a CC:Mail message constitutes record material, include the Records Mailbox as a recipient ("addressee" or "cc"). Messages in this mailbox will be reviewed and managed by OSTP's records management officials, who will assume responsibility for segregating Federal and Presidential records, for determining the temporary or permanent status of records, and for conducting all searches for records transmitted to this mailbox. Once the message has been transmitted to the Records Mailbox, you may determine whether to store or delete it from your own mailbox.

The "Return Receipt" feature of our CC:Mail software can be used to great advantage, particularly as we substitute e-mail messages for telephone or

face-to-face communication. When it is important to the functions of OSTP to ensure receipt of a CC:Mail message (e.g., when you assign certain tasks with deadlines; when you give technical direction to a contractor), select the "Return Receipt" option. When the receipt is returned, forward the receipt to the Records Mailbox (where it will be associated with the original message by a records management official).

If you create distribution lists to transmit CC:Mail, print a hardcopy of each list when created or updated and send it to OSTP's records management official. The records management official will use these hardcopy lists to supplement information preserved in messages sent to the Records Mailbox. Staff may also request copies of the lists to supplement information preserved in messages printed to hardcopy and filed in the records management system.

Guidance from the National Archives and Records Administration requires OSTP's records management officials to review traffic on the system for compliance with this guidance. I expect all users of OSTP's LAN to cooperate with requests from a records management official to view the contents of their e-mail boxes, which will occur on an annual basis.

Note that this guidance applies only to use of CC:Mail on OSTP's LAN. Records created or transmitted on the OASIS e-mail system cannot be forwarded directly to OSTP's Records Mailbox. Therefore, you must print any message you receive or send that is a record, and associated transmission data, to hardcopy, at which point it should be entered into your Division's records stream for hardcopy. OSTP OASIS users should adhere to the guidance issued by the Office of Administration for that system.

OSTP Internet users should continue to follow the interim guidance issued for that system on June 11, 1993, until further notice.

Online Calendars

Online calendars maintained by or for the convenience of an individual employee of OSTP and not widely accessible to other staff are considered personal records. On the other hand, online calendars maintained by or for the Director or the Associate Directors of OSTP and widely accessible to individuals within OSTP are agency records. These calendars should be printed on a monthly basis and forwarded to the individual in charge of the Director's or the Division's Official File Station (see OSTP's records management officials if you are uncertain of this individual's identity). A list

of the individuals with authority to make changes to a calendar during the month immediately preceding the printout should be attached to the printout.

Any questions about records management in general or this guidance in particular should be directed to OSTP's records management officials (Barbara Ferguson and Vicki Spears) or to OSTP's General Counsel (Holly Gwin). These individuals will work with me, with the National Archives and Records Administration, and with the Office of Administration to ensure we have a records management program compliant with the law and as "user-friendly" as possible. They will be in touch with OSTP staff -- individually and collectively -- throughout the year to inform you of training opportunities, to identify any problems encountered in complying with OSTP's records management guidance, and to solicit your suggestions for improvements in the records management program.

I also expect each user of OSTP's LAN to attend all training sessions offered by the records management staff of the Office of Administration or the National Archives and Records Administration.

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MEMORANDUM

To: Barbara Ferguson
Vicki Spears

cc: Holly Gwin
David Hodge

From: John H. Gibbons

Subject: Management of records created or received in OSTP's CC:Mail system

As OSTP's records management officials, you know OSTP has introduced a new element in its records keeping system -- online storage of e-mail records. Under guidance issued today, OSTP staff are required to send e-mail records to a mailbox that will be centrally managed by you for the entire agency. The mailbox has been established, and now you will need to develop, in consultation with the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), procedures for: 1) determining the temporary or permanent status of e-mail records; 2) proper disposition of temporary records; 3) proper transmittal of permanent records to NARA; 4) conducting searches for e-mail records in response to staff or Freedom of Information Act requests; 5) associating distribution ("group") lists provided to you by system users with e-mail records stored in the system; and 6) monitoring staff compliance with the guidance.

I would like for you to develop a preliminary draft of these procedures as quickly as possible and by no later than [4 weeks from issuance of guidance to all staff]. You will need to consult with NARA and with the EOP's Office of Administration as well as other OSTP

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staff. Until the procedures are in place, do not delete any messages from the Records Mailbox.

In addition to developing these procedures, I would like for you to begin a review of OSTP's records management guidance and systems to: 1) ensure staff are adequately informed of their recordkeeping responsibilities; and 2) determine the feasibility of moving toward more online preservation of records. Clearly the procedures for managing e-mail take top priority, but I would like your attention to these other tasks as well over the next few months.

I appreciate your efforts in helping to develop the guidance for records management of e-mail and online calendars. I have confidence in your ability to develop records management procedures that will make our first efforts in electronic recordkeeping a positive experience for the OSTP staff.

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MEMORANDUM

To: All Staff
From: John H. Gibbons
Subject: Creation and Maintenance of Presidential Records

As you know, I hold two commissions in the White House: one as Director, OSTP; the other as Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. At times I act strictly in my capacity as Assistant to the President. You may occasionally be tasked to assist me in that capacity. These instances will likely be rare – the primary function of OSTP staff is to carry out the statutory obligations of the agency – and notification of a Presidential task will be specific.

Any documentary materials you receive or create in fulfilling such a task should not be filed in OSTP's record keeping system. The materials should be provided to my Confidential Assistant, who will segregate any records in the Presidential Records system maintained for my use as Assistant to the President. Access to these records will be controlled by my Confidential Assistant and my Special Assistant, who will be instructed to make the records available only for Presidential, rather than agency, purposes.

Any records filed in OSTP's record keeping system will be considered agency records, regardless of the context in which they originated. OSTP treats all e-mail records created or received through the CC:Mail software loaded on our LAN as Federal, rather than Presidential, records.

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

USTR

Divider Title: _____

Draft

MEMORANDUM TO ALL STAFF

FROM:

SUBJECT: USTR's Records Management Program

Our status as employees of the United States Government obligates us to maintain records that:

- 1) protect the legal rights of the Government and those affected by its actions; and
- 2) preserve an historical record of the actions of USTR.

Content, not form, determines whether something is a federal record. That means that documentation concerning the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures and essential transactions of USTR (the content) are federal records whether they are created or transmitted in paper copy or computer file (the form).

This memo sets forth USTR's policy for maintaining Federal records created electronically. USTR is committed to developing an electronic recordkeeping system for storage, retrieval and disposition of electronic messages that are determined to be Federal records. However at this time the system cannot be used to store Federal records so the official medium for maintaining Federal records created on e-mail or on-line calendars is hardcopy.

As soon as certain programming, policy and procedural matters are resolved, USTR will implement electronic record-keeping. Until that time all users should follow the steps listed below to ensure that all e-mail documents that meet the definition of Federal records are printed according to these instructions and incorporated into official paper files. Please note that this memo supersedes any earlier guidance with regard to e-mail and on-line calendars.

Identifying E-Mail Documents That are Federal Records

E-mail messages (and attachments) are Federal records when they meet two conditions:

1. They are made or received by an agency of the U.S. Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of agency business; and
2. They are preserved or are appropriate for preservation as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations or other activities of the agency or because of the value of the

information they contain.

When determining whether e-mail messages are Federal records, keep in mind that multiple copies of documents may all be records if they are used for different purposes in the conduct of official business or filed in different files. More than one office may take action or otherwise use copies of a document. The copy would be a record in each of those offices.

Preserving E-Mail Documents that are Federal Records

When you determine that an incoming or outgoing e-mail message meets the criteria for Federal records, you should:

- Print the message and all attachments. If the printed message does not show all the addressees by name, then you should attach a list of addressees or annotate the message with the names of all addressees. Attached are instructions on how to print e-mail.
- If you check to see if the e-mail message is received and read (for instance, when you set a deadline for response), then you should also print the screen with the information.
- File the printed message and all attachments in USTR's existing official files.

These actions must be taken even if you choose to copy or move messages for inclusion in personal paper or electronic files. The folders feature in the e-mail system may only be used for the storage of personal materials (or copies of Federal records).

Examples of messages that are Federal records on e-mail are:

- Notices concerning the use of leave, procurement of supplies or personnel practices;
- Messages that document policy developments or significant decisions;
- Messages relaying substantive minutes or notes on the proceedings of meetings;
- Messages conveying substantive comments on decision or information memos; and
- Requests for appointments.

Non-record e-mail messages include:

- Reminders of appointments and staff meetings;
- Announcements of an employee's departure or retirement;

invitations to official social functions; or

- Employee's copies of administrative notices such as elevator repairs, the Combined Federal Campaign or computer down time.

On-line Calendars

On-line calendars maintained by or for the convenience of an individual employee of USTR and not widely accessible to other staff are considered personal records. On the other hand, on-line calendars maintained by or for the USTR or DUSTRs and widely accessible to individual within USTR are agency records. These calendars should be printed on a monthly basis and filed with the senior officials' other files. A list of the individuals with authority to make changes to a calendar during the month immediately preceding the printout should be attached to the printout.

Monitoring Guidance

USTR will establish a program to monitor staff use of e-mail to determine if proper designations of record and nonrecord status have been made and records preserved. On an annual basis, a random sample of employees will be asked to print out samples of e-mail messages for review by the Records Management Officer.

Additional Guidance

Any questions about records management in general or this guidance in particular should be directed to USTR's records management official (Cathy Hofgren) or to USTR's Office of General Counsel (Laurie Sherman). We will be working with the National Archives and Records Administration and the EOP's Office of Administration to ensure that we have a records management program that complies with the law and is as "user-friendly" as possible. USTR's records management official will be in touch with USTR staff -- individually and collectively -- to inform you of training opportunities, identify any problems encountered in complying with USTR's records management guidance and solicit your suggestions for improvements in the records management program.

Draft

FEDERAL RECORDS INSTRUCTIONS ON PRINTING E-MAIL

STEPS TO PRESERVE FEDERAL RECORDS E-MAIL ALONG WITH ASSOCIATED TRANSMISSION DATA

After determining that an E-mail message you have sent is a
Federal Record:

- 10/18/93
- | | | |
|--|--|---|
| STEP 1: | Access you E-mail | If you are not already within it |
| STEP 2: | Press TAB key | This moves you from the inbox to the outbox |
| STEP 3: | Highlight message | Selects desired outgoing message |
| STEP 4: | Press 1 Read | Opens message to be read |
| STEP 5: | SHIFT + F7 | Accesses print options |
| STEP 6: | Select 1 Print | Sends message to printer |
| STEP 7: | Select 4 Information* | Accesses transmission and receipt information |
| <p>*At the end of each day, or as necessary, when adequate documentation is needed to verify that the message was accessed by the recipient.</p> | | |
| STEP 8: | SHIFT + F7 | Accesses print options |
| STEP 9: | Select 1 Print | |
| STEP 10: | Select F7 | To exit E-mail |
| STEP 11: | Pick up printed copy from the printer and file it in the appropriate subject file. | |

DRAFT



The National Security Archive

Documenting U.S. Foreign Policy

A Project of the Fund for Peace

October 29, 1993

TO: John Podesta, Office of the President
FROM: Sheryl Walter, General Counsel
RE: Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President
Examples of NSC documents currently available
under the FOIA

To assist in our discussion at this afternoon's meeting, I have assembled a sampling of National Security Council documents that are currently categorized as federal records and publicly available under the Freedom of Information Act. The PROFS notes in this sample have all been provided to plaintiffs under this case, and most, if not all, do not pertain to Iran-contra. The sample includes documents from NSC meetings and staff communications on a wide range of policy issues.

I have also prepared a printout of NSC documents in the Archive's collections to demonstrate the wide range of NSC materials now treated as federal records, many of which would, under the NSC's proposal presented to the plaintiffs earlier this week, be swept into the scope of presidential records. Please note that the printout deliberately excludes documents related to the Cuban missile crisis and Iran-contra, for which we have many additional declassified NSC documents. Starting on page 57 of the printout, the NSC documents listed are from the Carter and later administrations. If these materials had been considered presidential records, the 12 year period provided under the Presidential Records Act before documents are eligible for public release would not have expired for the Carter-era documents until last year, and Reagan and Bush NSC documents would still be secret.

If you would like copies of any of the documents on the printout or additional information, please don't hesitate to give me a call.

Attachments: Sample NSC declassified documents.
Printout of NSC documents in the collections
of the National Security Archive.

CG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSRCM --CPUA
 O: NSRCM --CPUA

12/19/83 08:45:19

Previously ~~Classified~~ Declassified/Released on 9-28-93
 under provisions of E.O. 12056 (F93-1403)
 by H. M. Shan, National Security Council

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
 SUBJECT: meeting times

UNCLASSIFIED

DOC 1

The iran-iraq nspg is on thursday, rather than wednesday as i reported this morning. the week's meeting schedule is as follows:

- tuesday, 12/20, 11-12: nsc meeting on compliance (cabinet room)
- thursday, 12/22, 11-12: nspg meeting on iran-iraq (room 208)
- friday, 12/23, 11-12: nspg meeting on central america (sitrm).

We are also planning a second nspg on central america on friday, 1/6/84, the same day that the kissinger commission reports to the president, with an eye toward developing an nsdd following the meetings. we are also requesting a second compliance nsc meeting for 1/9/84.

cc: NSJMP --CPUA

meeting times

CG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSRCM --CPUA
 O: NSRCM --CPUA

12/19/83 08:45:19

UNCLASSIFIED

dup
Doc 2

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
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cc: NSJMP --CPUA

meeting times

Doc 3

MSG FROM: NSPSS --CPUA TO: NSDBK --CPUA
 To: NSDBK --CPUA

02/17/87 11:04:44

PREVIOUSLY

9-16-92
 (F92-992)

NOTE FROM: Paul S. Stevens
 SUBJECT: Gates Confirmation Hearings

We shd get an update today on what commitments, if any, Gates makes on notification to Congress of covert actions. This issue undoubtedly will arise in connection with SSCI retreat and Carlucci should be prepared to respond. I am not comfortable with DCI-nominee being put in position of making a unilateral commitment, as suggested by press accounts, because the issue is one of the President's prerogatives under Constitution and laws. Those prerogatives cannot and shd not be bartered by nominee

in confirmation process. If President makes such a commitment, that's another question. Do you know whether that's being contemplated in connection with Gates hearings? If so, we shd get a crack at it.

Gates Confirmation Hearings

MSG FROM: NSEMM --CPUA TO: NSDBK --CPUA
 To: NSDBK --CPUA

02/18/87 09:13:09

6-29-93 **Doc 4**
 (F92-994)

NOTE FROM: ELAINE M. MITSLER
 SUBJECT: Reminder

Just a reminder that your paper your paper for the Gates meeting is due to the Executive Secretary's Office by 1500 today. Thanks.

cc: NSCLM --CPUA
 H Reminder

NSJAM --CPUA

12/19/86 18:53:31

MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TC: NSAGK --CPUA
 To: NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON

Subject: CRAZY GOING CNS IN COLOMBIA

*** Forwarding note from NSJT --CPUA 12/19/86 15:24 ***

To: NSRBM --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NSWRP --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL

NOTE FROM: Jackie Tillman

SUBJECT: CRAZY GOING CNS IN COLOMBIA

I was over at State late this morning and learned of a development about which you should be aware. My information is still sketchy-- well-respected, was in Medellin, Colombia and met with top narco Mafia family members--the Ochoa brothers, Leder, etc. He returned to the US

(b)(6) per STATE

(b)(7)(D) per FBI 5 1/2 lines

(c) (b)(1) per FBI 1 1/2 lines

(b)(7)(D) per FBI

Our Amb in Colombia found out about this last night and sent in a NODIS requesting that it be stopped. ARA asked Whitehead to raise with Gates at their luncheon today. Whitehead was also to speak to Meese about it. Obviously,

if you get my drift. After internal US gov't consultations are complete, we will speak to Colombian Pres Barco about this--and are considering a pre-emptive public disclosure of this development in an attempt to keep the narcos from going public with it first. I have not gotten a read out from the Whitehead Gates lunch. It's very bizarre stuff, and in light of current events, potentially damaging. Thought you should know about it.

Partially Declassified/Released on 6-29-
 under provisions of E.O. 12358
 by N. Menan, National Security Council
 (F92-989)

cc: NSWRP --CPUA

NSJRS --CPUA

cc: NSJT --CPUA

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTISOURCES
 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

(b)(7)(C)
 per
 FBI
 F

; CRAZY GOING CNS IN COLOMBIA

MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TC: NSAGK --CPUA

To: NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL

12/31/86 11:20:04

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON

Subject: Serious Espionage Case at Embassy Moscow

*** Forwarding note from NSKED --CPUA 12/30/86 18:56 ***

To: NSGSG --CPUA Colin L. Powell NSWRP --CPUA Colin L. Powell

NOTE FROM: Ken DeGraffenreid

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Serious Espionage Case at Embassy Moscow

CIA has just informed us about a serious espionage case that occurred at Embassy Moscow.

In recent days a Marine security guard assigned to American Embassy Vienna

(b)(1)(s)

voluntarily confessed [REDACTED] that while stationed at Embassy/Moscow as the result of a sexual relationship with a female Soviet FSN he had been recruited by her "uncle." The Soviets continued to meet him clandestinely in Vienna following his Moscow tour and it appears that he provided Top Secret documents, burn bags, and may have assisted the Soviets in planting audio devices within sensitive parts of the Embassy.

(b)(1)(s)

[REDACTED] surveilled a meet between the Soviet and the Marine, and have been able to identify the Soviet who also may be handling another American citizen spy. No further details on this aspect.

The Marine in question is an American Indian by the name of Lonetree. He is an alcoholic and is under military arrest in London. The Navy, who has fought bitterly with the Justice Department over recent espionage cases, plans to handle the criminal aspects as a court martial.

CIA believes this to be a very serious espionage case.

I recommend you discreetly alert the President to the basic fact of - because HPSCT and SSCI are to be briefed tomorrow, and they usually leak matters of this kind.

P.S. Concerning my own future, [REDACTED]

Regards - Ken

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

cc: NSWGH [REDACTED] CPUR

- Serious Espionage Case at Embassy Moscow

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Partially Declassified/Released on 6-29-93 F
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F92-989)
by N. Menon, National Security Council

Subject: Retaliation

cc: NHRBM --CPUA
JSPBT --CPUA
NSDGM --CPUA

ALTON G. KEEL

NSWRP
NSKED--CPUA
--CPUA

ALTON G. KEEL

(S)(b)(1)+(b)(3)

UNCLASSIFIED

Retaliation

MSG FROM: NSDGM --CPUA
TO: NSKAG --CPUA

TO: NSKAG --CPUA

01/15/87 12:30:22

R

[Doc 9]

NOTE FROM: David Major

SUBJECT: MEMO FOR FCC FROM DGM, NEED SOONEST TODAY--TOP SECRET
please type for fcc meeting with Gates tonight. thanksPartially Declassified/Released on 6-30-93
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F42-101)
by N. Menon, National Security CouncilTO: FCC
FROM DGM
SUBJECT: LONGTREE'S ESPIONAGE CASEAS YOU WILL REMEMBER MARTIN SGT LONGTREE HAS BEEN ARREST BY THE NAVAL
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE AND CHARGES WITH BEING A KGB AGENT WHILE A MARINE
GO TO IN MOSCOW AND VIENNA. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WE KNOW
ABOUT THIS CASE TO DATE AND THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS:

OASIS ASSESSMENT

IT APPEARS LONGTREE WAS RECRUITED BY THE KGB IN MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY 1986
AND CONTINUED TO WORK FOR THE KGB WHEN HE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM MOSCOW IN
MARCH 1986 VIENNA. HE CONTINUED TO WORK FOR THE KGB WHILE IN VIENNA, UNTIL
HIS LAST KNOWN MEETING WITH THE KGB IN VIENNA ON 12/14/86.THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE TO NATIONAL SECURITY HE DID IS STILL BEING EVALUATED
AT A MINIMUM IT IS SERIOUS BUT COULD BE VERY DAMAGING BUT NOT ANY WHERE
COMPARED TO THE DAMAGE OF THE WALKER OR PELTON CASE. OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT
IS BASED ON WHAT HE HAS CONFESSED TO
WHICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE DAMAGE HE COULD HAVE
DONE.

KNOWN INTELLIGENCE COMPROMISED BASED ON LONGTREE'S CONFESSIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

(S)(b)(1)+(b)(3)

(S) (b)(1) (b)(3)

A NUMBER OF PSN WORKING IN THE EMBASSY

-HE ADMITS MAKING A SURRUPTETIOSENTRY INTO THE COMMUNICATION ROOM IN VIENNA AND STEALING 3 TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS (THESE HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED TO DATE)
 -HE ADMITS STEALING ON BURN BAG CONTAINING ABOUT 120 SECRET DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MBFR (THESE HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED TO DATE)
 -HE ADMITS TO BEING TASKED TO IMPLANT LISTENING DEVICES IN THE AMBASSADORS OFFICES IN MOSCOW AND VIENNA BUT DENIES HAVING DONE SO.

WORST CASE DAMAGE LONGTREE COULD HAVE DONE

-HE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STEAL BURN BAGS CONTAINING STATE DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ON ALMOST A DAILY BASIS IN MOSCOW AND VIENNA.

-HE PERIODICALLY GUARDED A WAREHOUSE OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IN MOSCOW THAT CONTAINED ITEMS PLACED IN THE EMBASSY SECURE AREAS AND HE MAY HAVE ALLOWED KGB TECHNICAL TEAMS TO PLACE DEVICES IN THESE ITEMS (DESK, CHAIRS, ETC)

-HE COULD HAVE COMPROMISED THE COMMUNICATION CENTER ON A REGULAR BASIS.

LONGTREE'S RECRUITMENT

HE WAS NOT BLACKMAILED. IN 9/85 HE MET A 26 ATTRACTIVE FEMALE SOVIET NATIONALS WHO WORKED IN THE CUSTOMS SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. THIS WAS FACILITATED BECAUSE THE FEMALE SOVIET NATIONALS WERE INVITED TO MARINE PARTIES HELD IN THE EMBASSY. THEY BEGAN A SECRET SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HER IN JANUARY 1986 USING HER APARTMENT. (A NUMBER OF THE OTHER MARINES KNEW OF THIS BUT DID NOT REPORT IT, DESPITE THE FACT IT WAS A VIOLATION OF REGULATIONS). IN JANUARY 1986 SHE INTRODUCED HIM TO HER "UNCLE" IN A SAFEHOUSE. DURING THE SECOND MEETING WITH THE UNCLE SASHA (EITHER A CO-OPTED OR OFFICER OF THE KGB/SCD) HE WAS ASKED FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WHICH LONGTREE PROVIDED. THE FEMALE PARTICIPATED IN THESE MEETINGS WITH THE KGB IN MOSCOW. (SHE WAS FIRED BY THE EMBASSY IN 12/85 FOR POOR WORK PERFORMANCE, AND IS REPORTED TO BE CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE IRISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW). LONGTREE WAS NOT BLACKMAILED IN ANY MANNER. WHEN HE WAS TRANSFERRED TO VIENNA, SASHA CONTINUED TO MEET LONGTREE IN VIENNA FROM JUNE 1986 UNTIL DECEMBER 14, 1986. THEY HAD NUMEROUS MEETINGS DURING WHICH PERIOD LONGTREE ADMITS RECEIVING \$3500.

MOTIVATION

LONGTREE ADMITS DOING THIS BECAUSE HE LIKED THE INTRIGUE, WAS FLATTERED THE KGB WAS INTERESTED IN HIM, AND FOR REVENGE AGAINST THE US BECAUSE OF INJUSTICES COMMITTED AGAINST THE INDIANS IN THE PAST 100 YEARS (HE IS AN AMERICAN INDIAN)

TRIST

UNLIKE OTHER CASES WE HAVE SEEN IN THE PAST THE KGB CONTINUED TO OFFER LONGTREE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFECT OPENLY, WHICH MAY INDICATE HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF DOING SOMETHING FOR THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW THE KGB

UNCLASSIFIED

(D)(1)

(b)(1) &
(b)(3)

CC: NSDBK --CPUA
NSDGM --CPUA

NSVMC --CFUA

) MEMO FOR FCC FROM DGM, NEED SOONEST TODAY-TOP SECRET

F

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Doc 1

02/02/87 09:42:26

MSG FROM: NSWT --CPUA TO: NSREL --CPUA
 To: NSREL --CPUA NSLPB --CPUA
 NSSSES --CPUA

NOTE FROM: William Tobey
 SUBJECT: Attendance

Declassified on 6-30-93
 under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F92-874)
 by N. Menan, National Security Council

The front office has invited
 VP
 Shultz
 Cap
 Gates
 Regan
 Nitze
 Rowny

CB asked about inviting OMB and Powell said not to. No invitation to DOE, others, e.g. Baker and Meese. UNODIE CB will leave the list as it is, as that was the instruction from Powell.

(Attendance

MSG FROM: NSREL --CPUA TO: NSWT --CPUA 01/24/87 18:46:02
 To: NSGSG --CPUA Colin L. Powell NSWP --CPUA Colin L. Powell

NOTE FROM: ROBERT E. LINHARD
 SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON HOW TO PROCEED ON SDI AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
 GENERAL,

I PROMISED THAT I WOULD GET BACK TO YOU TODAY WITH A RECOMMENDATION ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED ON BOTH THE SDI AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. I AM CONTINUING TO REFINES THIS PLAN, BUT HERE IS HOW I WOULD LIKE TO PRESS FORWARD.

SDI:

- 23 JAN -- WE DID SUBMIT TODAY A PAPER WHICH LAYS OUT THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SDI BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S WEEKEND READING AS PLANNED.
- SHULTZ, NITZE, HOLMES ET AL WERE BRIEFED TODAY BY ABRAHAMSON AND PERLE AS PLANNED. WE GOT A DEBRIEF ON THE SESSION FROM OSD.
- 25 JAN -- ON MONDAY WE WILL HAVE THE REGULAR SDI MEDIA MEETING AT 2PM IN ROOM 208. I WILL TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE EXPERT LEVEL OF THE SYSTEM TO KEEP THE ENSUING DISCUSSION "OBJECTIVE" IN ALL AGENCIES.
- WE WILL ALSO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE SDI ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT AND THE SDI REPORT TO CONGRESS.
- 26 JAN -- I WILL MEET WITH NUNN AND WARNER TO BRIEF THEM ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION, BUT TRY TO MAKE SOME INROADS ON SDI WITH NUNN.
- I ALSO PLAN TO SIT DOWN WITH RICHARD PERLE ON THURSDAY AND SEE IF WE AGREE ON THE STATE OF PLAY AND ON THE PROPER PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES.
- 27 JAN -- WILL TRY TO GET A MORE COMPLETE BRIEFING FROM ABRAHAMSON ON THE SURVIVABILITY ISSUE.
- WILL MEET WITH NITZE TO DISCUSS COST EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND SMOKE OUT HIS VIEWS ON THE LEGALLY CORRECT INTERPRETATION ISSUE.
- WE HAVE ASKED OSD TO ENSURE THAT GATES (CIA) AND ROWNEY ARE BRIEFED BY COB WEDNESDAY.
- 28 JAN -- IF MAX RETURNS FROM GENEVA, I WILL TRY TO HAVE HIM COME IN AND DISCUSS BOTH SDI AND ARMS CONTROL WITH ME ON THURSDAY. HE WILL BE (I BELIEVE) THE KEY INFLUENCE ON SHULTZ ON THESE ISSUES (NOT NITZE).
- NITZE AND PERLE WILL LEAVE TOWN FOR WERKUNDE IN MUNICH AND BE OUT OF

Declassified on 6-30-93
 under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F92-874)
 by N. Menan, National Security Council

SECRET

SECRET

- POCKET UNTIL THURSDAY 3 FEB.
- 29 JAN -- ASSUMING AN NSPG ON 3 FEB, WE WILL SUBMIT THE STANDARD PRESIDENTIAL MEETING MEMO BY COB FRIDAY.
- HAVE ENCOURAGED OSD TO HAVE CAP MEET WITH MAX KAMPELMAN ON FRIDAY IF POSSIBLE BOTH TO GET A DEBRIEF FROM MAX AND TO LOBBY MAX ON OSD'S VIEWS OF THE SDI ISSUE.
- 30 JAN -- SHULTZ WILL MEET AGAIN WITH OSD STAFF TO RECEIVE THE ANSWERS TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS THAT HE ASKED THIS SATURDAY.
- WE WILL SUBMIT THE SUGGESTED TALKERS FOR FCC AND THE PRESIDENT'S USE AT THE 3 FEB NSPG.
- 2 FEB -- WOULD ENCOURAGE A PRIVATE BREAKFAST OR LUNCH WITH FCC, CAP, SHULTZ AND PERHAPS CROWE ON MONDAY. PURPOSE WOULD BE TO HAVE ONE FINAL DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES ON THE 3 FEB NSPG AGENDA PRIOR TO TUESDAY.
- WE WOULD SUBMIT A DECISION PACKAGE FOR FCC'S REVIEW AND USE AFTER THE NSPG ON TUESDAY. THIS WOULD INCLUDE:
1. A MEMO TO THE PRES
 2. A DRAFT NSDD
 3. A PLAN FOR THE SCHEDULE OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS (LEADING TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 15 FEB) WHICH ADDRESSES ALLIED CONSULTATION AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS.
- 3 FEB -- NSPG FRAMED TO ADDRESS THE SDI ISSUES -- BUT ALSO THE RELATED ISSUE OF THE SOVIET (AND SHULTZ) PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING THE DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUE IN GENEVA.
- AFTER THE NSPG, FCC SENDS THE DECISION PACKAGE TO THE PRESIDENT.
- 4 FEB -- WE RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND EXECUTE THE PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

ARMS CONTROL:

- 23 JAN -- CIA HAS NOW PROVIDED THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE "GRIP 01" PAPER WHICH DESCRIBES THE INTEL COMMUNITIES VIEWS OF WHAT TO EXPECT IN SUBSTANCE FROM THE SOVIETS FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.
- 25 JAN -- THE GRIP 01 PAPER WILL BE CIRCULATED IN THE ARMS CONTROL SUPPORT GROUP (ACSG) FOR THEIR FINAL REVIEW.
- STATE IS DRAFTING A 3-4 PAGE PRESENTATION OF THEIR DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL, THE EVALUATION OF WHICH WILL BE ONE OF THE TWO MAIN PURPOSES OF GRIP 02.
- 26 JAN -- ACSG WILL MEET TO BLESS GRIP 01 AND APPROVE IT FOR SUBMISSION TO THE CABINET LEVEL FOR THEIR INFORMATIONAL READING. IT WILL ALSO BEGIN DRAFTING OF GRIP 02. THIS PAPER WILL BE INTENDED TO EVALUATE HOW THE US SHOULD REACT TO THE POSSIBILITIES Laid OUT IN GRIP 01. IN REALITY, IT WILL FOCUS ON TWO MAIN ISSUES:
1. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL STATE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK, AND
 2. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARMS CONTROL PATH WE ARE NOW ON (I.E., PAPERS BEING DRAFTED IN GENEVA, LEADING TO A FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AT WHICH THE ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED, WITH AN EYE ON A SUMMIT AT WHICH AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE COULD BE REACHED). ** THIS IS A CRITICALLY NEEDED ASSESSMENT! **
- 7 JAN -- 1ST FULL DRAFT OF GRIP 02 CIRCULATED TO ACSG FOR CRITICAL REVIEW.
- WILL DISCUSS GRIP 02 PAPER WITH RICHARD PERLE AND PAUL NITZE.
- 8 JAN -- ACSG TO DISCUSS GRIP 02 AND PREPARE FOR 2ND DRAFT.
- WILL DISCUSS GRIP 02 PAPER WITH MAX.
- 2ND DRAFT OF GRIP 02 PAPER DISTRIBUTED BY COB THURSDAY.
- 9 JAN -- FINAL WORKING DRAFT OF GRIP 02 PAPER DEVELOPED AND CIRCULATED.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 30 JAN — FINAL DRAFT OF GRIP 02 PAPER DISTRIBUTED TO ACSG TO BE PROVIDED TO CABINET PRINCIPALS FOR THEIR WEEKEND READING (PRIOR TO THE NSPG ON 3 FEB).
- 2 FEB -- DISCUSSION OF GRIP 02 WITHIN NSC WITH FCC PRIOR TO 3 FEB NSPG. IF APPROPRIATE, WE CAN WEAVE THE EVALUATION OF THE STATE DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL INTO THE FLOW OF THE 3 FEB NSPG DISCUSSION. IF NOT READY FOR DISCUSSION BY THAT POINT, WE CAN REQUEST A SEPARATE MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE THAT WE FACE THREE MAJOR ISSUES OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS:

1. SDI -- AND ESPECIALLY THE DECISION TO RESTRUCTURE THE SDI PROGRAM TO THE LEGALLY CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY;
2. DEFENSE AND SPACE -- THE TIMELY EVALUATION BY ALL AGENCIES OF THE NEW PROPOSAL IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA SUBMITTED BY SECSTATE TO THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK (AND AN IDEA THE SOVIETS WILL PUSH IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS FROM THEIR DIRECTION); AND
3. PROCESS -- MAKING A CONSCIOUS DECISION WHETHER WE WANT TO ALLOW THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS THAT WE ARE NOW ON (I.E., PAPERS IN GENEVA TO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN MOSCOW TO SUMMIT IN DC) TO PROCEED ALONG THE CURRENT PATH -- OR PROVIDE SOME ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES TO MINIMIZE OUR RISKS ON THAT PATH.

WHILE INTERRELATED, WE WOULD USE OSD BRIEFINGS AND INFORMAL CONTACTS TO SET THE STAGE FOR AN NSPG ON 3 FEB ON ISSUE 1, WHILE USING THE ARMS CONTROL SUPPORT GROUP TO WORK 2 AND 3 SO THAT THEY TOO ARE READY ABOUT THE SAME TIME. WE CAN THEN CHOOSE IF WE WANT TO TRY TO KILL AT LEAST ISSUES 1 AND 2 AT THE SAME NSPG (THE ISSUES ARE DIRECTLY RELATED), OR USE THE 3 FEB NSPG TO WORK ISSUE 1 DIRECTLY AND SET US UP FOR A SECOND NSPG SHORTLY THEREAFTER ON ISSUES 2 AND 3.

SOBRY FOR THE LENGTH OF THIS. WOULD LIKE YOUR FEEDBACK. AS THEY SAY IN THE NAVY UNODIR (UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED) I WILL PROCEED ALONG THE PATH OUTLINED ABOVE.

CC: NSSBS --CFUA
 NSDAM --CFUA
 NSFWE --CFUA
 NSWT --CFUA
 NSGSG --CFUA

NSSFK --CFUA
 NSLFB --CFUA
 NSWAC --CFUA
 NSREL --CFUA
 NSWER --CFUA

bTHOUGHTS ON HOW TO PROCEED ON SDI AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SCRIPT/VF E2.0: DEVICE 1403W6 CHASE MONO

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Doc 101
2d
22

REUNION FROM EVENING SUMMARY March 27, 1986

Partially Declassified/Released on 7-6-93
under provisions of E.O. 12358 (F42-1162)
by N. Nienan, National Security Council

SOVIET UNION/EUROPE

USSR-US-LIBYA: Secretary Gorbachev lashed out at American "neoglobalism" in general and policy toward Libya in particular...offered Libya no more than political support; did not link US actions toward Libya to the summit or to Soviet-American relations in general. ~~(X)~~ Moscow 5229

(b)(1) +
(b)(3)
(S)

(b)(1) +
(b)(3)
(S)

ROMANIA-LIBYA-US: Official Romanian statement supports Libyan territorial claims in Gulf of Sidra, and condemns "attacks carried out by the American Sixth Fleet against objectives on Libyan territory." ~~(X)~~ Bucharest 2148

SWITZERLAND-PHILIPPINES: Swiss Federal Council decision to freeze Marcos' assets replaced by official directive of Federal Banking Commission that carries same effect...Swiss officials now wonder whether US contemplates similar freeze. ~~(X)~~ Bern 1843

AFRICA EAST/SOUTH ASIA

ISRAEL I BAHON: Israeli jets today struck two Palestinian camps near Sidon...extent of damage and loss of life unknown...retaliation for earlier Lebanese cross-border rocket attack which injured four Israeli civilians. First injuries from cross-border attack in over three years. Arafat claimed responsibility for rocket attack. ~~(X)~~ FBIS 0518, 0518, 1442; CIL AIR, 27 March

ISRAEL EGYPT: No progress made in latest talks between Israel and Egypt on issue of arbitration over Golan and resumption of formalized relations between the two countries. ~~(X)~~ FBIS 1444

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CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

(s) (b)(1) + (b)(3)
UNCLASSIFIED

ATIN AMERICA

PARAGUAY-HONDURAS: Fighting between Sandinistas and Contras as ceased...HUMAN indicates 40-45 RPF troops killed, while ontras have incurred 35 losses.

(b)(1)

(s)

OLIVIA: Today, an explosion occurred on Embassy rooftop, battering windows but causing no injuries. Unidentified attackers threw stick of dynamite onto Chancery Building. ~~127~~ La az 2610; FBIS 0923, 1018

BAZIL-LIBYA-IRAN: Official government source reports Libya interested in \$2 billion Brazilian arms purchase...Brazil studying matter from political point of view, expected not to approve sale. Iranian Ambassador

(b)(1) + (b)(3)

(s)

ERU: Last night, terrorists used explosives to attack Soviet Embassy in Lima, without causing any casualties. No claims of responsibility yet. Today, Soviets denied being the target of a terrorist attack. ~~127~~ FBIS 093, 1401

SIA

HELLENES: Access to Soudic Bay remains blocked by strikers while Clark Air Base main and side gates barricaded by workers...all US personnel living off base ordered to remain at home...communist party members identified with strikers. ~~127~~ NO Intel. Notes, 27 Mar; Reuters 1334

FRICA

HAD: President Haile leaves today for Brazzaville for OAU-sponsored meeting where he may meet GUNT President Goukouni...Habre advisors said that trip is "friendly working visit" with Congo chief of state Sassou-Nguesso. ~~127~~ Ndjamena 1600

UDAN: Senior Egyptian official believes Libya's military involvement has split Sudanese military and could prompt coup by radicals or conservatives...stresses Libya and Ethiopia continue to share strategic goal of destabilizing Sudan. ~~127~~ Cairo 7481

UNISIA: Arab League Ministerial ended yesterday...adopted strong resolution condemning US military actions in Gulf of

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3: NSCLTMOO Q16MI000 W1 WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

dra, announced passage of a pro forma resolution on Iran-Iraq
r, and called for holding Arab summit "to restore Arab unity."
X Tunis 3060

PUBLICATION ROOM NOT March 27, 1986

BYRON SITUATION AS OF 1600 EDT

BYRON FORCE: Libyan naval activity remains virtually nonexistent
during this reporting period. No units have been observed
strolling in the Gulf of Sidra, outside of local waters.

Ar defense sectors remain at heightened state of readiness;
second S-5 site under construction; first site damaged.

VIET FORCES: Soviet status of naval forces is unchanged.
their ships continue routine surveillance operations of US ships.

US FORCES: Battle force of PACIFIC, CENTRAL SEA, and SOUTH COAST
executed disengagement operations. Surface Action Group (SAG)
comprised of SEACONTEROG, SEACON, and SEACON exited exercise area
and are now all north of 33-20N. No US ships presently below
2-30N line.

POLITICAL REACTION: Turkey's own interests preclude criticism
of the US moves. Senior Egyptian State Security officials
applaud US determination to confront Qadhafi militarily.
Mauritania and Burkina reiterate call for a search for peaceful
solution. India expresses grave concerns over Gulf exercises.

SCRIPT/VS A2.0: DEVICE 1403W6 CHLAS MONO

Doc 2f

SITUATION ROOM EVENING SUMMARY

UNCLASSIFIED

April 2, 1986

SECRET

Partially Declassified/Released on 7-6-93
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F42-1162)
by K. Martin, National Security Council

TELEVISION

TWA-BOMBING: According to press, the Arab Revolutionary
Cells al-Kassam, a previously unknown Palestinian group, has
claimed responsibility for placing a bomb aboard TWA flight 840.
A fifth passenger may have died as a result of today's explosion.
Greek authorities are holding five suspects for questioning in
connection with the incident.

(b)(1) +
(b)(3)

[REDACTED] Fed, and State telecons;

(c)

OWN; FBIS 127

SOVIET UNION/EUROPE

[REDACTED]

(b)(1) +
(b)(3)

(S)

USSR-US: First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko publicly
commented US plans to supply Stinger missiles to insurgents in
Afghanistan and Angola are creating serious negative reactions
in Moscow...indicated he would not exclude possibility that
direct diplomatic contact be made with US on this issue.

(b)(1) +
(b)(3)

(S)

TURKEY: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(S)

INDONESIA/SOUTH ASIA

LIBYA-REVIEW-THREATISM: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(S)

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
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[REDACTED] (S) (b)(1)

BINCH-UK: Beirut press reported two additional British persons reportedly kidnaped in Beirut...Lebanese police said the two men are a professor at American University at Beirut and a teacher in a private school, both last seen on 28 March. The two may be the same individuals who were in the custody of Syrian Relations office in Damascus. (S) Beirut 1695; J21 157

GHANESIA: [REDACTED] (S) (b)(1)

IN AMERICA

NICARAGUA-ARGENTINA: President Ortega early this week requested Argentina take lead in setting up a "peace keeping force" along the Nicaragua-Honduran border. According to Embassy Buenos Aires, President Alfonsin is considering proposal but did not indicate it would be on the agenda at this weekend's Contadora meeting in Panama. (S) Buenos Aires 2874

JORDON-LIBY: [REDACTED] (S) (b)(1) + (b)(3)

ELI

PHILIPPINES: Former South Vietnamese Prime Minister and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky currently on "world tour" seeking a country that might provide exile for Marcos. [REDACTED] Ky and Marcos are close acquaintances. Meanwhile, 1,000 striking Filipino workers blocked main gates at Subic despite yesterday's announced settlement of 12 day strike. (S) (b)(1)

ITALY: Industry and Technology Minister today said although Canberra will not participate in EOI, it will permit private

Australian firms to take part in SDI research.

(b)(1) +
(b)(3)

(S)

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc 24

TRIP/VP #2.0: DVT 1403W6 CHAN MONG

DEBATE ROOM EVENING SUMMARY

March 23, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED

AVIATION/UNION/ALGERIA

ALGERIA: Embassy Moscow reports President Bendjedid signed three agreements with Soviets on political consultation, economic and scientific/technical cooperation during his visit to Moscow. No evidence that Bendjedid's visit led to any dramatic development in Soviet-Algerian relations. Moscow 5324

LIBYA: Soviet official announced the Soviet Union and Libya have dropped plans to sign a friendship treaty...said both countries see no need strengthening relations by legal acts. Enter 4065

USSR: Highly dubious information suggests 300 Soviets may have been killed during US air strike, according to Moscow DEDAC. Source said high number of casualties caused by Soviet's trying to repair radar unit. Source expressed doubts about information. When Attache questioned MFA official, he denied there were casualties at Curt.

(b)(1) +
(S) (b)(3)

USSR: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(C)

RUSS-US: [REDACTED]

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RUSS: [REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

AFRICA EAST/SOUTH ASIA

LIBYA-TERRORISM:

[REDACTED]

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(S)

[REDACTED]

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(b)(3)
(TS)

SAHARA-OS:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(S)

LEBANON: Voice of Lebanon reports a bundle of dynamite exploded at American Center Building in Beirut today...special forces of leader Al-Fukhtar claimed responsibility. No other information available. (U) FEIS NC291933

LATIN AMERICA

[REDACTED]

(b)(1) + (b)(3)
(SC)

NICARAGUA-HONDURAS:

[REDACTED]

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137

—N: GK:

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(S)

THAILAND: Retirement of Anit by Prime Minister Prem has shored
discipline and promoted unity in army. Prem's desire to
assert control over army probably motivating factor in de-
cisiveness. Asserting civilian control over military contributes
strengthening constitutional democracy and democratic institu-
tions. (S) Bangkok 5937 RDBIC

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc 2h

SCRIPT/VE 22.0: DEVICE 1403W6 CHARS MONO

Partially Declassified/Released on 7-6-93
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by R. Mienan, National Security Council (F92-1162)

SITUATION ROOM MORNING SUMMARY

UNCLASSIFIED

29 March 1986

SOVIET UNION/EUROPE

ITALY: Rome court today issued its verdict on the papal assassination plot trial...all defendants acquitted for insufficient proof except for Ali Agca, who was sentenced to one year for possession of a pistol. (U) Rome 8105


GERMANY-US: In Thursday meeting with Secretary Shultz, Papandreaou underlined importance of creating a positive climate for improving our bilateral relations...emphasized resolution of Turkish and Cypriot questions, agreed on formulas for beginning US bases negotiations by end of 1986 and a Papandreaou visit to Washington next year if basing discussions go well. (U) Secto 5070

USSR-US-NICARAGUA: US allegation of Nicaraguan incursion into Honduras has received little reporting in Soviet Union, and what is reported is highly critical of US...Soviets are saying US is lying about incursion, and insists Nicaraguans are innocent of any wrong doing. (U) Moscow 5259

FRANCE: Bombs exploded in France last night...nine simultaneously in Marseilles, three in Nice, two in Aix-en-Provence...several buildings damaged, two injuries, no claim of responsibility. (U) UPI 153, State Terrorism Task Force Telecon

ITALY-US: An American serviceman shot at but not hurt near his home in Catania, Sicily. Police suspect incident is criminally related, not act of terrorism. (U) Reuter 95, State Terrorism Task Force Telecon

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA



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(b)(3)

(TSC)

(C) (b)(1)

PAKISTAN:

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

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62 B ST 235

372

THAILAND: During Assistant Secretary Sigur's 28 March meeting with Prime Minister Prem, several issues were raised including Farm Act, security, bilateral with Soviets, and situation in Philippines. Prem desires same high priority for Cambodia as Afghanistan has in US/Soviet talks, and is concerned Farm Act will prove detrimental to Thailand's needs. ~~107~~ Bangkok 5976, 5977

ASTIN AMERICA

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AFRICA

11-22-68

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(TSC)

UDAN:

[REDACTED]

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Doc 21

WIPV/VB R2.0: DEVICE 140346 THREE MONO

Partially Declassified/Released on 7-6-93
under provisions of E.O. 12358 (F42-1162)
by N. Menon, National Security Council

SITUATION ROOM MORNING SUMMARY

March 31, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED NATION/EUROPE

USE- US: State Department concludes Gorbachev's nuclear moratorium proposal announced Saturday is attempt to lay groundwork for resumption of Soviet testing program...fact that proposal was made publicly, not privately, indicates propaganda exercise. Will to meet President Reagan in Europe is not an attempt to back out of summit in US. Clarification of intentions expected when Gorbachev meets with President on 9 April. (S) State 98353

ITALY- US:

[REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1)

GREECE- US: Prime Minister Papandreu told his cabinet and armed forces chiefs that discussions with Secretary Shultz were "constructive" and "positive"...said Greece looked forward to cooperating with US on equal footing. (S) Athens 6103

AFRICA/SOUTH ASIA

EGYPT-JR-LIBYA: Egyptian newspaper today reported that Egypt had rejected three US requests since last July for joint military action against Libya...alludes to US delegations which traveled to Cairo to present proposals. (S) AP 66

ARABIA- US-LIBYA:

[REDACTED] (S)

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LIBYA-SOUTH-TRANSFORTH:

[REDACTED] (S)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
TOP SECRET CODEWORD

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ISRAEL-EGYPT-US:

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ASIA

PHILIPPINES-US: Strike continues at Subic and Clark. Gates still blocked at Subic, but many Filipino civilian employees at Clark returned to work today. Joint labor committee to meet tomorrow. (C) Manila 117

PHILIPPINES-NEW ZEALAND: President Aquino accepted invitation from visiting Prime Minister Lange to visit New Zealand. Lange gave Aquino \$500,000 in direct aid... reiterated stand on port access. Aquino repeated that Manila will respect US bases treaty until 1991 expiration. (U) FBIS 1102

INDONESIA-US:

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AFRICA

SUDAN-US-EGYPT: Responding to US criticism of Libyan military assistance, Sudanese Defense Minister yesterday said Washington has no right to interfere in Sudanese-Libyan relations.


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7-6-93
(F92-1162)
by H. Hansen, National Security Council

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Doc 3

MSG FROM: NEWT --CPUA

TO: NSREL --CPUA

Fo: NSREL --CPUA

NSLFB --CPUA

02/02/87 09:42:2

NOTE FROM: William Tobey

SUBJECT: Attendance

Declassified/Released on 6-30-93
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F92-874)
by N. Meran, National Security Council

The front office has invited

VP

Shultz

Cap

Gates

Regan

Nitze

Bowen

CB asked about inviting CMB and Powell said not to. No invitation to DOE, others, e.g., Baker and Meese. UNODIR CB will leave the list as it is, as that was the instruction from Powell.

(Attendance

MSG FROM: NSWP --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA
 : NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER

11/25/86 13:40:32

Doc 36

MSG FROM: William M. Cockell

SUBJECT: JCRC Testimony

All Crowe's testimony this morning was statesmanlike and responsible, with no surprises. On Reykjavik, he anticipated the most contentious issues in his opening statement, which indicated the JCS had been fully involved in the pre-meeting preparations. In this regard, he noted that "the security consultative mechanisms in the government are richer and much more pervasive than are often given credit for in the media." He noted that he had his representative, John Moellerling, at Reykjavik and that "unprecedented progress" was made there in narrowing differences between the sides. With regard to the US positions tabled, he commented that the President has an obligation not only to be cautious in such matters, "but to seize opportunities when they arise." The whole arms control dialog "has taken a significant and historic step forward as a result," he concluded. On the zero ballistic missiles option, he noted that needs to be looked at very carefully, and there are some potential problems. The Joint Staff is conducting a thorough study to ensure we can maintain deterrence in a 10 year draw down to zero ballistics. Sam Nunn and John Warner were at the hearing, in addition to Aspin and several other House members. Warner recalled that the DOD Reorganization Act made provision for direct access to the President by any JCS member who feels strongly about an issue. He asked whether any of the Chiefs had wanted to see the President on arms control issues and was told that none had. On Iran, he noted he had not been in the loop and knew little about it. The conclusion Bill received accolades from members for his frankness and the quality of his testimony. Nunn's interventions, incidentally, had the same sort of shrillness to them that has characterized much of his public speaking on Administration policy over the last month or so.

MSG FROM: NSFBM --CPUA

NSLGR --CPUA

ALTON G. KEBL

SUBJECT: JCRC Testimony

MSG FROM: NSWP --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA

11/25/86 13:56:28

TO: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER

Doc 37

NOTE FROM: BOB PARSON

SUBJECT: Resignation

*** Forwarding note from NSBTC --CPUA 11/25/86 11:04 ***

TO: NSFBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWP --CPUA

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: RICHARD T. CHILDRESS

SUBJECT: Resignation

In my 5 1/2 years here, I have seen inspiring acts of loyalty to one of the greatest Presidents this country has ever elected. Your action is the most inspiring yet. It amazes me that those that are the most loyal, the most dedicated always seem to take the hit. Yet, perhaps it is not amazing because the most loyal put the protection of the country and the President above self.

Although not involved with the Tran project, I read your WSJ piece and I believe in hindsight, what was attempted will be recognized as bold and done with foresight. I personally will miss you, your calm, wise counsel and your support. Your example will be in my mind as I continue here and elsewhere.

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

Subject: Payoff for the USSR's Debt Strategy

*** Forwarding note from SULLIVAN--VAXA 10/ 9/86 15:21 ***

00000630

FILE: NOTE OFSLOGf1 DO WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

Declassified on 7-7-93
under provisions of E.O. 12958 (F92-186)
by M. Meran, National Security Council

To: NSOLN --CPUA

Subject: Payoff for the USSR's Debt Strategy
d i g i t a l

I N T E R O F F I C E M E M O R A N D U M

Date: 9-Oct-1986 01:51p EDT
From: Scott Sullivan
SULLIVAN
Dept:
Tel No: 6919

TO: See Below

Subject: Payoff for the USSR's Debt Strategy

Why have West German commercial banks begun reducing their exposure in Latin America, while boosting their lending to the USSR?

As a result of the recent debt refinancing agreement with Mexico, the three major West German commercial banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank) reportedly see an unrewarding future in the LDCs. At the same time, they are turning their attention to Eastern Europe where returns are more certain. Commerzbank, for example, plans to cash in on the USSR's huge borrowing needs by soon floating a major loan package of between 1.5 and 2.0 DM. Economist Jan Vanous predicts that the USSR is likely to become one of the world's largest sovereign borrowers by 1990, adding anywhere from \$20 to \$30 billion to its gross debt. Conversely, voluntary commercial bank lending to most high-debt LDCs has all but dried up--a state of affairs likely to remain unchanged throughout the decade. US direct investment in Latin America is also on the decline.

What opportunities does this confer upon the USSR to expand its influence in Latin America at US expense?

In the broadest terms, the survival of democracy in Latin American countries will be linked to the economic benefits which their governments can provide. A severe cutback in the flow of commercial bank lending and foreign direct investment from developed nations will erode the economic and political stability of the high-debt LDCs.

The Soviets may perceive that their greatest opportunities lie in improving relations with Mexico and Peru. For the first time since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1924, a Soviet foreign minister has paid an official visit to Mexico. Although Shevardnadze seems to have achieved little of substance, it was agreed that President de la Madrid and General Secretary Gorbachev would exchange reciprocal visits. In Peru, President Garcia has locked himself into a posture of confrontation with the IMF and the commercial banks. The Soviets may be able to expand their influence with offers of assistance. There is some evidence that the Soviets tack Peru in preference to Nicaragua as the host for the next NAM meeting. This would tie in with the USSR's international economic strategy, since Peru could provide more effective leadership than either Nicaragua or Cuba for the Soviet-sponsored

FILR: NOT? OFSLOGf1 DO WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

PAGE 00207

debt repudiation campaign.

What benefits do the Soviets gain by broadening their financial relationships ties with Western Europe and Japan?

There is a high degree of complementarity between the economies of the USSR and close US allies. The USSR is resource-rich but poor in investment capital and technology. Western Europe and Japan, on the other hand, generally lack raw materials (particularly energy) but are desperately seeking outlets for surplus capital. Through expanded trade, the USSR is able to gain greater influence over the foreign policies of our allies, and is better able to compete against the US in the development of strategic defenses.

Distribution:

TO: Stephen Danzansky	(DANZANSKY)
TO: Raymond Burghardt	(BURGHARDT)
TO: Tyrus Cobb	(COBB)
TO: Peter Fodman	(FODMAN)
TO: Oliver North	(NORTH)
CC: Ron St. Martin	(SIMARTIN)
CC: Alan Thomas	(THOMAS)
CC: Thomas N. Harvey	(HARVEY THOMAS)

cc: NSCPC --CPUA

\$2payoff for the USSR's Debt Strategy

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

Subject: impact of [REDACTED]

For yr use.

*** Forwarding note from NSHAT

--CPUA

04/28/86 16:15 ***

00000384

Partially Declassified/Released on

under provisions of E.O. 12356

by M. Menon, National Security Council

7-15-93

(F92-786)

FILE: NOTE OFSLOGEL DO WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

PAGE 00141

To: NSRBH --CPUR

DONALD FORIHER

NSW62

--CPUA

DONALD FORIHER

NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher

SUBJECT: impact of [REDACTED]

(S)(b)(1)

i spoke with bob gates re analysis of economic impact of [REDACTED] and ability of libyans to offset imports/exports/foreign exchange earnings. bob commented that whitehead had called earlier in the day to ask them to examine our ability to monitor tanker traffic from libya to european ports. apparently, some europeans suggested to whitehead last week that rather than putting an embargo on libyan oil, european port authorities be instructed to refuse permission for tankers that call in libyan ports to dock in european ports. at the moment, 2-5 tankers per day carry oil from libya to european ports. on the [REDACTED] analysis, bob will try to have it midweek.

(S)(b)(1)

(S)(b)(1)

CC: NSVHC --CPUR

NSCLN --CPUR

NSJRS --CPUR

impact of [REDACTED]

(S)(b)(1)

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CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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04/07/86 10:58:07

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~~SECRET~~

00000279

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

Subject: Paper for JMP for 4/9 Shultz meeting on overseas staffing
Please print for me w/ cc to Craig.

*** Forwarding note from NSWRP --CPUA

04/07/86 09:34 ***

Declassified/Released on

7-8-93

under provisions of E.O. 12958

by N. Menan, National Security Council

(F92-786)

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON

SUBJECT: Paper for JMP for 4/9 Shultz meeting on overseas staffing

FROM: NOTV OPSLOG#1 DO WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

PAGE 00107

State will send over a Platt/Poindexter, today, if possible. Shultz' TPs will ask for all present to agree to appoint a senior official to work with State (i.e., State leadership) to agree on overseas staffing levels in light of terrorism threat (VP's IF Report) and Gramm/Rudman. State memo will also ask for Presidential dropby (chances are probably not great) during the meeting. State S/S said would not be a request for an NSDD or formal SIG to be convened. Told them that those questions might be asked, including working groups to be set up to deal with sub-issues, if there was Cabinet agreement to proceed. State is not citing a Presidential decision document giving it leadership on the issue of overseas staffing, but relying on SecState's responsibility in foreign affairs.

Understand Craig is working on this - please pass to him. Thanks.

cc: NSABM --CPUA

• Paper for JMP for 4/9 Shultz meeting on overseas staffing

F

To: NSCPC --CPUA

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

Subject: Americans dissappeared in Cyprus in 74

*** Forwarding note from NSPRS --CPUA 09/29/86 08:46 ***

To: NSRBM --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 09/27/86 15:46

NOTE FROM: Peter Schmer

Subject: Americans dissappeared in Cyprus in 74

I didn't know about it until the other day when a group of Greek-Americans raised it with Peter Rodman. It is an old case dating to the 1974 Cyprus events, as you note. The Greek-Cypriot family, who apparently live both in Cyprus and Michigan, refuse to accept that their son is dead. No body has ever been recovered. The family has been in frequent contact with our Embassy in

FILE: NOTE CFELOG1 DO WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

Nicosia and State. State has made representations to both the Turkish govt and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Within the last 10 days Denktash, the Turkish-Cypriot leader met with the boy's father here in Washington. State believes the meeting went reasonably well but the boy's father refused Denktash's offer to give him a full report which would have suggested that all evidence points to his son being dead. Instead the father got a commitment from Denktash to again review all the evidence available in Cyprus. State will contact Bloomfield to ensure that he has all the latest info. Cases like this --like the MTIs and Missing in Argentina-- tend to go on and on. And there are those who exploit them for political purpose.

CC: NSOLN --CPUA

NSWFF --CPUA

CC: NSRLR --CPUA

Americans dissappeared in Cyprus in 74

00000586

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Under provisions of E.O. 12958 (F92-786)
by N. Menon, National Security Council

PAGE 00194

F

MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJRS --CPUA
To: NSJF7 --CPUA

05/05/86 22:37:31

*** Reply to note of 05/05/86 18:26

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~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

Subject: Tokyo summit statement on terrorism

Fine with me. Though what we may want to do instead is have the Soviets expand
their reactor capability in Libya.

Tokyo summit statement on terrorism

00000432

3
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under provisions of E.O. 12958 (F92-786)
by N. Menon, National Security Council

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UNCLASSIFIED

00000295

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

Subject: Demarche from Amb Klestil

please print this for my use

*** Forwarding note from NSRBH --CPUA

04/15/86 14:07 ***

To: NSOLN --CPUA

NOTE FROM: ROD E. MCDANIEL

Subject: Demarche from Amb Klestil

??

*** Forwarding note from NSTC --CPUA

04/15/86 13:26 ***

To: NSRBH --CPUA

Partially Declassified/Released on 7-6-93
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F92-786)
by M. Menon, National Security Council

FILE: NOTE OPSLOG#1 DO WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

PAGE 00114

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb

SUBJECT: Demarche from Amb Klestil

1. Austrian Ambassador Tom Klestil called late this morning to express serious concern over an unclassified report issued by our Embassy indicating that the LPB in Vienna planned to stage a terrorist incident in Vienna April 17.

[REDACTED] this information had NOT been communicated at all to the Austrian Government.

(S) (b)(1)

2. Jack and I have checked this out, and, unfortunately, it is true. The information was made public as part of our release last night following the President's speech, and was distributed by Embassy Vienna.

3. This info was not shared with the GOA, through any channel.

(S) (b)(1)

(S) (b)(1)

(S) (b)(1)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

5. [REDACTED]

(S) (b)(1)

6. We can understand the need for holding information close to the vest on impending military actions. However, it is less clear why an intelligence report of an impending terrorist attack in Vienna was not relayed to the Interior Ministry. [REDACTED]

(S) (b)(1)

[REDACTED] However, if this info was so sensitive that we could not share it, then why are we releasing it publicly? Is anyone in the political bureaus at State (FUR) coordinating these things? FUR promises a full report later today.

(S) (b)(1)

cc: NSJFM --CFUA

NSKED --CFUA

NSRBM --CFUA

NSPRS --CFUA

NSOLN --CFUA

NSWEP --CFUA

DONALD FORTIER

DONALD FORTIER

? Demarche from 1mb Klestil

F

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING:

DATE:

1/2/80

SUBJECT:

Iran

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:

Mr. A. Denis Clift

State:

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Dep Sec Warren Christopher

Mr. David Newsom

OSD:

Secretary Harold Brown

Dep Sec W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

DCI:

Mr. Frank Carlucci

JCS:

Admiral Thomas Hayward

Lt General John Pustay

White House:

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC:

Captain Gary Sick

Colonel William Odom

Mr. Marshall Brement

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by S. Tuley, National Security Council

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(17)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 2, 1980

MEMO FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: GARY SICK *μ*

SUBJECT: SCC Checklist

Iran Review (separate memo to you) *ZB HAS SEEN*

1. Diplomatic/Economic Options

- UN Sanctions.
- Drawdown of Foreign Personnel in Tehran.
- Boycott of Iranian Products.
- Break Relations.

(b)(1)

Afghanistan Review

1. Warren Christopher Report
2. Do we take the issue to the UN?
3. Pakistan Arms Supply. Tom Thornton says there is a State letter for the President to Zia which requires a prior decision about the Symington Amendment.

Partial Review Requested on *3-17-93*
11/17/93 by S. G. [illegible] [illegible]
by S. G. [illegible] [illegible]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20458

April 11, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: *4* SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: NSC/Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq

SIGNED

Attached is a memorandum for agencies announcing the April 16 NSC/Deputies Committee meeting, and providing a proposed agenda.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Counterparts
Tab A Agenda

10/13/92
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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

20458

April 12, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. EMILY L. WALKER
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOSEPH S. CASPER
Director of Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff


MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: NSC/Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq (S)

There will be a meeting of the NSC/Deputies Committee on Monday, April 16, at 3:00 p.m.* in the White House Situation Room to discuss U.S. policy options for Iraq based on recommendations from the April 12 Policy Coordinating Committee meeting. An agenda for the meeting is attached. (S)

Please notify my office of your agency's participants (principal plus one) for this meeting. (U)

Declassified on 10/13/92
under authority of E.O. 12228
by U.S. Marine National Security Council


William F. Sittmann
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

cc: Andy Card -

*Please note change in time

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20458

THE NSC/DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: April 16, 1990
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

IRAQ

Agenda

- | | | |
|------|---|--------------|
| I. | Intelligence Update | CIA |
| II. | Review of U.S.-Iraqi Programs and
Policy Options | State |
| III. | Summary | Robert Gates |

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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532-61-458



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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DISCUSSION PAPER FOR IRAQ PCC:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IRAQ: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Summary: This paper summarizes the current problem with Iraq and current export controls. It then presents a proposal for a package of new export controls built on the work of other nations. In essence, the idea is to create a Country Group X for countries that have used or threatened to use chemical or biological weapons since (date to be determined). Iraq would be the first nation on the list. The export controls in Country Group X would be targeted on the chemical industry and are narrow in scope, but have a basis for international support.

Also in the paper is a plan of action asking the PCC to task the CBW Licensing Working Group (Chaired by State/EB) to develop a final draft of the proposal within 14 days.

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What Further Action is Possible?

It is possible to expand Foreign Policy Controls on Iraq through use of Section 6 of the EAA. Further, existing contracts could be severed under Section 6 if the President determined there had been a breach of the peace.

Considerations:

- If we expand controls, they should be a "targeted package," aimed at the chemical industry, the specific problem sector;
- As much as possible, the controls should be effective, not simply symbolic;
- Where possible, controls should take into account measures already enacted by other nations. This will help build a foundation of international support;
- Denial of all national security control items is probably too broad and ineffective (due to foreign availability and its effect on innocent sectors).
- Denial of all products (pvc pipes, floppy disks, etc) to the chemical industry is too broad (due to foreign availability)

Suggested Option:

Expand chemical controls along the following lines:

Create a Country Group X for countries that have used or threatened to use chemical or biological weapons since (date to be determined). Iraq would be the first nation on the list, perhaps also Libya, Iran, Syria.

- (a) Require a license for national security controlled equipment to chemical manufacturing facilities;
- (b) Require a license for the export of chemical manufacturing equipment, using existing lists from Germany and Canada as preliminary discussion models, as well as the watch list of the Australian Group.
- (c) Require a license for the export of chemical manufacturing technical data, using German concepts as models.
- (d) Make it unlawful for a US citizen to engage in activities with Iraqi chemical industries when there is a reasonable expectation that the enterprise will be used for chemical warfare;

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(e) After developing our own list of what needs to be controlled; but before amending the regulations, approach the Australian Group members and encourage them to expand their existing equipment controls or warning lists so as to require licenses to countries who have threatened or used chemical weapons within the given time frame.

Note: Some countries may be reluctant to impose export licensing regulations; however, may be willing to use their good offices with industry to inhibit such sales.

Pros and Cons

- The Australia Group has already agreed that equipment sales are a problem and thus agreed on voluntary guidelines (warning lists) for such sales;
- Germany and Canada are major suppliers of equipment, so using their controls as models will mean our controls are not purely symbolic; but will have international support;
- Japan, Italy and the Netherlands and other nations regularly consult with their industry on equipment controls and in certain cases have warning lists. This move may encourage them to extend their efforts to control lists, at least to nations who actually threaten or use chemical weapons.
- The target of these controls is very narrow, hence impact on US industry will be slight;
- Other manufacturing nations do not control this equipment, so foreign availability is still a problem;
- Some of the equipment being proposed for control may be quite general to civil manufacturing, so for the controls to be effective, the producers of this equipment should be as much as possible limited to the western industrial powers.

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How to proceed from here

-- The PCC should task the Chemical-Biological Licensing Working Group (LWG) (Chaired by State/EB) to set up an interagency technical task force that will recommend to the PCC specifically what controls should be imposed. (The LWG normally reports to the PCC on Non-Proliferation on US domestic CBW export controls.)

-- The LWG should be asked to complete its work in two weeks.

-- Once the PCC has received the recommendations of the LWG and decided on what controls ought to be, the Australian Group members (and other appropriate nations) should be approached with a view towards gaining their support along the same lines. (note: these controls would only effect exports to nations listed in Country Group X)

-- After completion of the bilateral effort, the USG would take into account the reactions of the other governments and then take whatever appropriate regulatory action is needed

Instructions to the LWG

By April 27:

Craft a list of chemical industry equipment and technology that is useful in the production of chemical warfare agents. (the equipment need not be limited to CW production);

As much as is practical, choose items already under control by other governments, especially members of the Australia Group; (Canadian and German lists may be useful)

Except when a compelling reason can be presented, do not recommend for control equipment or technology that is so widely available that export controls would be meaningless, except as a symbol.

Cite what regulations or laws would have to amended or created.

Suggest arguments to be used with friendly governments in order to convince them to take similar measures.

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1990

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. CARNES LORD

Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

MR. ROBERT KIMMITT

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Department of State

MR. CHARLES DALLARA

Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
Department of Treasury

MR. PAUL WOLFCOWITZ

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense

MR. DENNIS KLOSKE

Under Secretary for Export Administration
Department of Commerce

MR. RICHARD T. CROWDER

Under Secretary for International Affairs
and Commodity Programs
Department of Agriculture

MR. RICHARD J. KERR

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence AgencyADMIRAL DAVID E. JEREMIAHAssistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of StaffSUBJECT: NSC/Deputies Committee Review of PCC Paper
on Iraq ~~SECRET~~

In response to the NSC/Deputies Committee meeting of April 16, the PCC has prepared an options paper on Iraq (Tab A), listing all U.S. economic and political programs that might be used to respond to recent Iraqi actions and statements. Based on your consideration of the options outlined in the PCC paper, I would like to have your agency's position on options for those programs

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Declassified/Released on

5/27/92

under provisions of E.O. 12356

by S. Tiley, National Security Council

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) for which your agency is responsible or in which you have a direct interest by noon Wednesday, May 23. ~~del~~

If you have any further questions, the NSC point of contact is Ms. Sandra Charles, 395-3552. ~~del~~


Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A PCC Paper

) UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Set: **Nicaragua 2** Fiche No.: **Unpublished**
Memorandum 1 page(s)
Change in Administrative Status of Latin American Public Diplomacy

Set: **Afghanistan** Fiche No.: **Unpublished**
Secret 3 page(s)
[Policy Issues]

Set: **Afghanistan** Fiche No.: **Unpublished**
Secret 2 page(s)
Security Framework for Southwest Asia

Set: **Afghanistan** Fiche No.: **Unpublished**
Memorandum 4 page(s)
[Security Framework for the Persian Gulf]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished**
Top Secret Statement of Policy 9 page(s)
United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe [Extremely
Unclear Copy of the Document; Does Not Include Important Information for
Indexing]

Set: **National Security Decision Documents** Fiche No.: **Unpublished**
NSA Policy Paper 2 page(s)
Summary of National Civil Defense Policy

Set: **Intelligence Policy** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1948/02/13
Memorandum 2 page(s)
Survey Group Terms of Reference I: Survey of the Central Intelligence Agency
[authorization for survey of CIA; includes authorizing NSC resolution of
11/13/1948.]

Set: **Intelligence Policy** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1948/03/17
2 page(s)
Survey Group Terms of Reference II: Survey of the Central Intelligence Agency

Set: **National Security Decision Documents** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1948/11/23
Top Secret Report fNSC 20/4 15 page(s)
U.S. Objectives with respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S.
Security

Set: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00056** 1949/03/14
Secret Report 6 page(s)
Custody of Atomic Weapons

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: IR00211 1949/07/21
op Secret Report #772 7 page(s)
Report of the National Security Council on the Position of the United States
with Respect to Iran

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00058 1949/10/10
op Secret Memorandum 9 page(s)
Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security
Council on the Proposed Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program [Cover Sheet
Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00062 1950/01/17
Secret Memorandum 18 page(s)
Nonconventional Weapons [Cover Sheet Attached]

et: **Chemical and Biological Warfare** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1950/01/26
Secret Memorandum 18 page(s)
Nonconventional Weapons [Draft Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00066 1950/10/02
op Secret Memorandum 8 page(s)
[Expansion of Production of Fissionable Material--Special Committee's
Recommendations to the President]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00067 1950/10/09
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Expansion of the Fissionable Material Production Capacity

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00068 1950/10/27
op Secret Memorandum 7 page(s)
[Recommendation for an Underground Nuclear Test]

et: **Philippines** Fiche No.: PH00002 1950/11/09
Non-Classified Policy Paper 11 page(s)
Report to the President by the National Security Council on the Position of
the United States with respect to the Philippines

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00072 1950/12/05
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Presidential Approval for the Transfer of Custody of Eleven Non-Nuclear
Components of Atomic Bombs for Storage in the U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt
CVB-42]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00074 1951/01/31
Top Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
[Objectives of Atomic Weapons Tests at Eniwetok Proving Ground--Operation
Greenhouse]

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: IR00231 1951/03/14
Top Secret Report #107 0 page(s)
Draft Statement of Policy on Iran, March 14, 1951

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00079 1951/05/07
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Custody Transfer of Non-Nuclear Components of Atomic Bombs from the AEC to
Storage on the U.S.S. Midway]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00080 1951/05/08
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Storage of Non-Nuclear Components of Atomic Bombs in CVB Class Carriers

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00081 1951/06/04
Top Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
[Recommendation That President Truman Approve the Change in Plans for Operation
Windstorm; Enclosure Attached]

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: IR00243 1951/06/27
Top Secret Statement of Policy #107/2 0 page(s)
The Position of the United States with respect to Iran

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: IR00242 1951/06/27
Confidential Note 1 page(s)
ISC Dictation [Adoption of Iran Paper as Amended]

et: **Intelligence Policy** Fiche No.: IP00030 1951/12/13
[Classification Excised] Memorandum 1 page(s)
Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1952/02/20
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Test to Determine Air Blast Effects of Atomic Weapons (Operation TUMBLER)

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1952/04/16
Top Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
United States Objectives and Policies with Regard to the Arab States and Israel
[Cover Memo and JCS Views on NSC 129, Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00098 1952/05/20
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[National Security Council Special Committee on Atomic Energy Recommends the
Expansion of the Atomic Energy Program]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00106 1952/07/03
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Overseas Storage of Atomic Weapons]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00107 1952/07/03
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Transfer of Twelve Non-Nuclear Components of Atomic Bombs from the Atomic
Energy Commission to the Department of Defense]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00108 1952/07/18
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Consideration of the Transfer of Additional Nuclear Weapons to Meet
Requirements for Deployment]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00109 1952/07/22
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Overseas Storage of Atomic Weapons]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1952/09/30
op Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
[Reclassification of Two Documents on Atomic Weapons--Two Documents Attached]

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: IR00298 1952/11/20
op Secret Report #136/1 1 page(s)
[United States Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran]

et: **Intelligence Policy** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/02/06
op Secret Briefing Paper 8 page(s)
[Briefing of Approved U.S. National Security Objectives, Policies and Programs with
Respect to the USSR (NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2 and NSC 135/3)]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/02/06
op Secret Briefing Paper 8 page(s)
[Briefing of Approved U.S. National Security Objectives, Policies and Programs with
Respect to the USSR (NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2 and NSC 135/3) [Informal Condensation of
NSC 20/4, 68/2, 135/3, and 141 for Discussion Purposes]]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00118 1953/04/23
Top Secret Memorandum 14 page(s)
Discussion at 140th Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, April 2, 1953

et: **Tactical Nuclear Forces in Europe** Fiche No.: NP00119 1953/05/08
Secret Internal Paper 6 page(s)
[Portions of NSC 151/2 on Policy of Public Candor on Nuclear Weapons]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/06/02
Top Secret Memorandum 8 page(s)
Discussion at the 147th Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, June 1, 1953 [Secretary Dulles' Trip to the Near East and South Asia]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/06/18
Top Secret Minutes 3 page(s)
Minutes of the 150th Meeting of the National Security Council [Meeting held on 6/18/1953; Lines Excised Are Not Relevant to Soviet Flashpoints]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/06/24
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
United States Policies and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States
Refers to NSC Action 817 and NSC 143/1]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/06/24
Top Secret Summary Summary of PSB D-45 4 page(s)
Summary of PSB D-45, June 22, 1953, "Interim U.S. Psychological Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe" [Cover Memorandum from George A. Morgan to James S. Lay Attached; Heavily Excised; Refers to NSC Action No. 17-e]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/06/26
Confidential Action Memorandum 1 page(s)
U.S. Actions Regarding the Near East [President Approves Program for Training Saudi Arabian Air Officers]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/06/29
Top Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States [Cover Memo to Report of Same Title; with Cover Sheet]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1953/07/14
Top Secret Report 155/1 20 page(s)
Report to the National Security Council by The Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00121 1953/09/01
op Secret Report 31 page(s)
possibility of a New United States Disarmament Proposal in the Eighth General
Assembly

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00135 1953/12/04
op Secret Report 47 page(s)
Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: IR00316 1954/01/02
op Secret Report #5402 page(s)
United States Policy toward Iran

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00150 1954/01/04
op Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Policy regarding Use of Nuclear Weapons

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: IR00317 1954/01/14
op Secret Memorandum of Conversation page(s)
Discussion at the 180th Meeting of NSC

et: **National Security Decision Documents** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1954/01/26
op Secret Report Annex to 5406 26 page(s)
United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00153 1954/03/18
on-Classified Letter 2 page(s)
[Coordination of Activities Promoting Atoms for Peace Program]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1954/05/17
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Proposal for an International Moratorium on Future Tests of Nuclear Weapons

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00158 1954/05/28
op Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at 199th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 27,
1954

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00159 1954/06/04
Memorandum 2 page(s)
Robert S. Allen Article on Nuclear Matters [Article Attached]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC00005** 1954/06/08
op Secret Memorandum 11 page(s)
SC 5404/1 (Berlin), Approved by the President on January 25, 1954 [Progress
Report on NSC 5404/1 Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00161** 1954/06/23
op Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 203rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday,
June 23, 1954 [International Moratorium on Future Tests of Atomic Weapons]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00164** 1954/07/06
Memorandum 1 page(s)
Status of Draft Legislation in West Germany for Future Control of Atomic Energy
Matters

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1954/07/06
op Secret Memorandum 27 page(s)
United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Middle East [Cover
Memorandum; Amendments, Supplement and Staff Study Relating to NSC 155/1]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1954/07/12
Secret Memorandum 12 page(s)
Memorandum for All Holders of Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, Subject,
United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, " Dated
July 6, 1954 [Complete Revision of Financial Appendix in NSC 155/1]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1954/07/14
op Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East [Cover
Memorandum; JCS Views on Drafts of NSC 155/1 Attached]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1954/07/23
op Secret Report 5428 45 page(s)
United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00166** 1954/08/13
Secret Policy Paper 17 page(s)
Cooperation with Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00169** 1954/09/08
Secret List 8 page(s)
Check Lists for Agenda Items 1, 2, and 3--OCB Working Group on Nuclear Energy
Projects and Related Information Programs, Meeting Number 6, September 9, 1954,
11 a.m., Room 7258, New State

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1954/09/08
Confidential Agenda 1 page(s)
Agenda for the OCB Working Group on Nuclear Energy Projects and Related
Information Programs, September 9, 1954, 11 a.m., Room 7258 New State
Bldg.

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00170** 1954/09/09
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Meeting of OCB Working Group on Coordination of Nuclear Energy Projects and
Related Information Programs, Thursday, September 9, 1954, 11 a.m., Room 7258
New State Bldg.

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00171** 1954/09/16
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Questions for AEC

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00172** 1954/09/23
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy [Latin American Atomic Energy Programs]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00179** 1954/11/01
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Working Group on Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs
Including NSC 5431/1)

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00180** 1954/11/01
Secret Report 8 page(s)
Progress Report of the OCB on Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information
Programs (Including 5431/1) for the Period March 10-October 15, 1954, as
Required by Terms of Reference Dated May 12, 1954

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1954/11/04
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[French Reactions to Proposed U.S. Atomic Policy]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC000006** 1955/01/07
Top Secret Report 15 page(s)
Progress Report on U.S. Policy on Berlin by the Operations Coordinating Board
Regarding NSC 5404/1)

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1955/01/24
Secret Agenda 1 page(s)
National Security Council Agenda [For the 234th Meeting on 01/27/1955]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1955/01/27
Top Secret Minutes 5 page(s)
Minutes of the 234th Meeting of the National Security Council [Meeting Held on 1/27/1955; Heavily Excised]

Set: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00193** 1955/03/14
Top Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Policy regarding Use of Nuclear Weapons

Set: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00195** 1955/03/28
Top Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Memorandum on Further Nuclear Weapons Tests

Set: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1955/04/07
Top Secret Report 7 page(s)
Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Persian Gulf by the Operations Coordinating Board [Cover, Transmittal Memorandum, and Progress Report on NSC 5428 Covering Period from July 1, 1954 through April 1, 1955]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1955/04/21
Top Secret Report 12 page(s)
Economic Defense Policy With Respect to Trade with the Communist Bloc [Preceded by Memos from Joseph Dodge and James Lay]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1955/04/27
Top Secret Background Paper 2 page(s)
Background Brief on the Interim CFEP Report on East-West Trade

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1955/05/03
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Economic Defense Policy With Respect to Trade with the Communist Bloc [Missing Attachment of JCS views on Interim Report]

Set: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00203** 1955/05/26
Top Secret Report 18 page(s)
Volume III--Reproduction of Charts Used in Presentation of May 26, 1955: Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament

Set: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00202** 1955/05/26
Top Secret Report 36 page(s)
Volume I: Progress Report--Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00206 1955/06/23
op Secret Report 15 page(s)
S. Policy on Control of Armaments [Volume IV, Progress Report on Proposed
Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament and Cover Sheet
Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00208 1955/06/28
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
S. Policy on Control of Armaments [Attached JCS Comments Withheld]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00209 1955/07/01
op Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)
Discussion at the 253rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June
30, 1955

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00213 1955/09/23
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Beryllium Purchase Contract with the Government of India]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1955/09/30
op Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites (NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1)
"The Planning Coordination Group Requests that the Chairman of the Operations
Coordinating Board Recommend to the National Security Council that the NSC
Planning Board Review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in the Light of and Subsequent to
Revision of NSC 5505/1"; Memos from Elmer B. Staats to James S. Lay and James S.
Lay to the National Security Council Attached; Refers to NSC Action 1349-c,
Letter of 03/23/1955 from the Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board,
and OCB Meetings on 08/10/1955 and 09/21/1955]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00214 1955/10/07
op Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
October 6, 1955

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1955/10/10
op Secret Report 10 page(s)
Progress Report on the Near East (NSC 5428): "United States Objectives and
Policies with Respect to the Near East" [Draft of NSC Progress Report Includes
Report and Financial Annex Covering Period from April 7, 1955 to October 7,
1955]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1955/10/11
op Secret Memorandum 17 page(s)
Detailed Development of Major Actions Relating to the Near East (NSC 5428) from
April 17, 1955 through October 7, 1955 [Transmittal Memorandum and OCB Draft
Subject Paper]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00216 1955/10/14
op Secret Memorandum 8 page(s)
Discussion at 261st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 3, 1955

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00218 1955/11/01
op Secret Report 13 page(s)
Volume V: Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419) [Attachments Not Included]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1955/11/02
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East [Memorandum Justifying NSC Members of President's Approval of Supplementary Statement of Policy; Cover Memo Only, Materials Mentioned Are Not Attached]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1955/11/02
op Secret Report 14 page(s)
Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East by the Operations Coordinating Board [Cover, Control Form, Transmittal Memo, and Report with Financial Annex Covering Period from April 7, 1955 to November 2, 1955]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00227 1955/12/23
op Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 22, 1955

et: **Intelligence Policy** Fiche No.: IP00653 1955/12/28
op Secret Action Memorandum 1497 1 page(s)
Abolition of the Planning Coordination Group

et: **Intelligence Policy** Fiche No.: IP00656 1955/12/28
op Secret Directive 5412/2 6 page(s)
Covert Operations [Elimination of CIA Operations Coordinating Board Role in Coordinating or Receiving Prior Notice of Covert Operations]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/01/13
op Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 272nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 12, 1956

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00232 1956/01/13
op Secret Report 15 page(s)
Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419) [Cover Sheet and Attachments Included]

et: Intelligence Policy Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/01/20
Top Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities [Outline
of National Security Council Analysis of Comments from Agencies and Departments
Affected by the Hoover Commission Report]

et: Iran Revolution Fiche No.: IR00336 1956/02/09
Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation page(s)
Memorandum of Discussion at NSC Meeting

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00244 1956/02/09
Top Secret Memorandum 10 page(s)
Memorandum of 275th Meeting of the National Security Council, 4
p.m.--Tuesday--February 7, 1956

et: Intelligence Policy Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/02/17
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne to Andrew J. Goodpaster regarding Their
Previous Conversation]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/03/16
Top Secret Agenda 4 page(s)
[NSC Agenda for 280th Meeting, March 22, 1956; Discussion of U.S. Policy Toward
Soviet Satellites and Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite
Vulnerabilities]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/03/19
Top Secret 2 page(s)
United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe AND
Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities [Draft NSC Action;
Refers to NSC 174, NSC 5505/1, and Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
Subject: "Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites," Dated 10/20/1955]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/03/19
Top Secret Letter 1 page(s)
[Letter of Invitation to Attend the National Security Council's 280th Meeting
on 03/22/1956; Attached Agenda of Meeting (Missing) is NSA2 R 62439]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/03/20
Top Secret 2 page(s)
United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe AND
Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities [Draft NSC Action;
Refers to NSC 174, NSC 5505/1, and Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
Subject: "Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites," Dated 10/20/1955;
Cover Memorandum by James S. Lay Attached]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/03/22
op Secret Minutes 3 page(s)
minutes of the 280th Meeting of the National Security Council [Meeting Held on 3/22/1956]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/03/23
op Secret Memorandum 15 page(s)
discussion at the 280th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 22, 1956 [United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe: NSC 174, USSR 20th Party Congress]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/04/12
Secret Agenda 7 page(s)
[NSC Agenda for 282nd Meeting, April 19, 1956; Discussion of Trade with Soviet Union and Eastern Europe]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/04/18
Secret Report 26 page(s)
Progress Report (April 18, 1956) on United States Policy on Soviet and Satellite Effectors (NSC 86/1) [Memorandum for James S. Lay from Elmer B. Staats Attached]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/04/26
op Secret Minutes 5 page(s)
minutes of the 282nd Meeting of the National Security Council [Meeting Held on 4/26/1956]

et: Persian Gulf Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/02
Secret Memorandum 8 page(s)
Immediate U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact [Cover Memorandum and Draft Statement Regarding Adherence to the Baghdad Pact, with Text of Baghdad Pact included]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC00021 1956/05/17
op Secret Report 9 page(s)
Progress Report on United States Policy toward Berlin (NSC 5404/1) by the Operations Coordinating Board

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/17
op Secret Memorandum 7 page(s)
Progress Report on United States Policy toward Berlin (NSC 5404/1) [Cover Letter signed Signed by Elmer B. Staats Attached]

et: Persian Gulf Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/17
op Secret Report 15 page(s)
Progress Report (May 17, 1956) on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428) by the Operations Coordinating Board [Cover,

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/17
op Secret Report 11 page(s)
Progress Report on United States Policy Relating to East Germany (NSC 174)
Includes Cover Letter from Elmer Staats]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/17
Secret Report 5 page(s)
Report of OCB Special Working Group on Stalinism [Three Attachments to Report
Recorded Separately; Contained in P Paper 77]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/18
op Secret Memorandum 24 page(s)
Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May
7, 1956 [United States Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors: NSC 86/1]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/25
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Report of OCB Special Working Group on Stalinism [Mentions a Report by OCB on
the Subject "to Coordinate Actions Taken to Exploit the Current Soviet Campaign
Against Stalin"; Contained in P Paper 77]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/25
op Secret Cover Memorandum 1 page(s)
Progress Report on East Germany (NSC 174)

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/05/28
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
U.S. Policy Guidance and Actions Taken to Exploit the Anti-Stalin Campaign
Mentions a Report by OCB on the Subject "to Coordinate Actions Taken to Exploit
the Current Soviet Campaign Against Stalin"; Contained in P Paper 77]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/06/01
op Secret Memorandum 9 page(s)
Discussion at the 286th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May
1, 1956 [Regarding 20th Party Congress]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/06/07
op Secret Statement of Policy 15 page(s)
United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe [Draft
Statement of Policy; Cover Letter by James S. Lay to the NSC Planning Board
Attached; Refers to NSC 174, NSC Action 1530-b, and the Record of the Planning
Board Meeting on 03/19/1956]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00261 1956/06/12
on-Classified Memorandum 2 page(s)
Tokyo Press Conference of Brookhaven Scientists [Progress of Asian Countries in
Atomic Energy Programs; New York Times Clipping Attached]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: NP00263; BC00022 1956/06/14
ecret Memorandum 4 page(s)
U.S. Policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany, U.S. Policy toward Berlin,
and U.S. Policy toward East Germany [Joint Chiefs of Staff Views Enclosed]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00265 1956/06/18
op Secret Memorandum 22 page(s)
Discussion at the 288th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, June
5, 1956

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/06/22
op Secret Statement of Policy 14 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe [Draft Statement of
Policy; Cover Letter by James S. Lay to the NSC Planning Board Attached;
Refers to NSC 174, NSC Action 1530-b, Planning Board Memo on 06/07/1956, and
Record of Meeting of Planning Board on 06/18/1956; Updated Version of NSA2 R
2616]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/06/27
op Secret Report 48 page(s)
NSC Staff Study on United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern
Europe [Cover Letter from James S. Lay to the NSC Planning Board Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/07/09
ecret Agenda 1 page(s)
[NSC Agenda for 290th Meeting, July 12, 1956; Concerns U.S. Policy Toward the
Soviet Satellites; NSC 5608 and Annex; NSC Action No 1530-b; NSC 5505/1]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/07/12
ecret Minutes 3 page(s)
Minutes of the 290th Meeting of the National Security Council held in the
Cabinet Room of the White House on Thursday, July 12, 1956, at 9:00 a.m.
Concerns U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites; NSC 5608 and Annex; NSC
Action No 1530-b; NSC 5505/1]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/07/13
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday July
12, 1956 [US Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe: NSC 5608]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/07/27

Unclassified Memorandum 1 page(s)

Working Groups That Have Not Met in Last Two Months

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/08/07

Top Secret Background Paper 2 page(s)

U.S. Policy Covering the Suez Situation [Extracts from NSC Policy Papers;
Prepared by Bromley Smith]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/08/31

Secret Agenda 1 page(s)

[NSC Agenda for 296th Meeting, September 6, 1956; Concerns U.S. Policy Toward
East Germany]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/08/31

Top Secret Minutes 4 page(s)

[NSC Agenda for 296th Meeting, September 6, 1956; Concerns U.S. Policy Toward
East Germany]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/05

Secret Operation Guidelines 7 page(s)

Guidance for the Implementation of NSC Action 1550 [Cover Sheet by James S. Lay
Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/08

Secret Agenda 1 page(s)

National Security Council Agenda [300th Meeting Postponed until October 12, 1956
Per 10/10/1956 Memo; Subjects include "The Suez Canal Situation"]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/10

Unclassified Briefing Memorandum 1 page(s)

Draft Briefing Note for October 12 Council Meeting [Relates Specifically to NSC
Action 1550, which the President Approved on 05/08/1956]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/12

Top Secret Minutes 2 page(s)

Minutes of the 300th Meeting of the National Security Council [Meeting Held on
October 12, 1956; Discussion of the "Suez Canal Situation"]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/15

Unclassified Report 2 page(s)

Divergent Satellite Attitudes Toward the USSR

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/22
Top Secret Agenda 1 page(s)
National Security Council Agenda [For Meeting 301 on 10/26/1956]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/26
Top Secret Minutes 3 page(s)
Minutes of the 301st Meeting of the National Security Council [For Meeting on October 26, 1956]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/26
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Discussion at the 301st Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, October 26, 1956 [Events in Hungary and Middle East, Review of US Aid Programs]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/10/29
Top Secret Agenda 1 page(s)
National Security Council Agenda [For 302nd Meeting on November 1, 1956]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/01
Top Secret Minutes 2 page(s)
Minutes of the 302nd Meeting of the National Security Council [For 302nd Meeting on November 1, 1956; Mentions NSC 5616]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/01
Top Secret Memorandum 15 page(s)
Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 1, 1956 [Brief Analysis of Hungarian Situation, Detailed Discussion on Middle East Crisis]

Set: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/02
For Official Use Only Memorandum 2 page(s)
Outline Plan of Operations for Germany [Cover Sheet Attached]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/06
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
U. S. Policy with Respect to the Hostilities in the Near East [Refers to NSC 1428 and NSCA 1627; Relates to NSC Meeting 302]

Set: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/06
Confidential Information Memorandum 1 page(s)
Ad Hoc Meeting on Disaster Relief to Hungary

et: **Persian Gulf Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/09**
op Secret Memorandum 18 page(s)
Discussion at the 303rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
November 8, 1956 [Excised Summary of Meeting Regarding Oil and Suez Crisis]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/09**
op Secret Memorandum 18 page(s)
Discussion at the 303rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
November 8, 1956 [Developments in Hungary, Middle East; European Oil Supply]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/13**
Secret Agenda 2 page(s)
National Security Agenda [Refers to NSC 5616/1]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/15**
op Secret Minutes 4 page(s)
Minutes of the 304th Meeting of the National Security Council [Refers to NSC
5616/1; Key Lines Excised]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/16**
op Secret Memorandum 19 page(s)
Discussion at the 304th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
November 15, 1956 [US Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary: NSC
5616, Developments in Middle East and Eastern Europe]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/18**
Unclassified Memorandum 1 page(s)
Special Film Showing: "Hungary Fights for Freedom" Wednesday, November 21 -
2:15 PM

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00280 1956/11/21**
op Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Meeting with the President on the Presentation of a Report on the Human Effects
of Nuclear Weapons Development

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/21**
For Official Use Only Memorandum 1 page(s)
Consideration of an Increased U.S. Quota of Hungarian Refugees

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1956/11/21**
Secret Minutes page(s)
[Extract From OCB Minutes Regarding Hungarian Refugee Problem]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/21

ecret Minutes 1 page(s)

[Extract from OCB Minutes Re. Hungarian Refugees, Creation of Refugee Coordinator]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/27

onfidential Memorandum 2 page(s)

ummary of a Briefing of the OCB Interdepartmental Escapee Committee on 27 November by Mr. Tyler Thompson, Coordinator of Hungarian Refugee Policies and Activities, State Department.

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/28

ecret Minutes 1 page(s)

estern Europe and the USSR (NSC 5608/1, 5506/1, 5502/1)

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/30

op Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)

iscussion at the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, November 30, 1956 [Meeting Focuses Primarily on Oil and Suez]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/30

ecret Minutes 3 page(s)

[Minutes of Operations Control Board Meeting of November 28, 1956]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/11/30

op Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)

iscussion at the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, November 30, 1956

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1956/12/28

op Secret Memorandum 25 page(s)

rogress Report on the Near East (NSC 5428) [Cover Memo; December 22, 1956
rogress Report on the Near East (NSC 5428), Covering the Period from May 18, 1956 through December 22, 1956, Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/01/09

ecret Minutes 1 page(s)

ther Business [Extract from OCB Minutes re. Hungarian Refugees, Assistance to Austria]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/01/11

op Secret Memorandum 11 page(s)

iscussion at the 309th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, January 11, 1957 [Ballistic Missiles and Balance of Power]

et: **Persian Gulf Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/01/24**

op Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)

discussion at the 310th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 24, 1957 [Extract of NSC Meeting Summary; Near East Issues]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/01/24**

op Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)

discussion at the 310th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 24, 1957 [United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East: NSC 5428, Brief Mentions of Hungarian "terror" and Polish Elections]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/01/25**

onfidential Memorandum 5 page(s)

rief of Statement made by Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Deputy Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, at OCB Meeting, Wednesday, January 23, 1957

et: **Intelligence Policy Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/02/22**

op Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)

discussion at the 313th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 21, 1957 [Situation in Poland]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/02/22**

op Secret Memorandum 15 page(s)

discussion at the 313th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday [U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland: NSC 5616/2, U.S. Policy On Defectors, Escapees, and Refugees from Communist Areas: NSC 86/1]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00290 1957/02/27**

ecret Outline 6 page(s)

utline Plan of Operations with Respect to India and Nepal

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/03/07**

op Secret Memorandum 19 page(s)

discussion at the 315th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, March 6, 1957 [U.S. Policy on Defectors: NSC 86/1, U.S. Economic Security]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/03/15**

op Secret Memorandum 10 page(s)

discussion at the 316th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 24, 1957 [Includes Brief Discussion of situation in Hungary and Poland]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00300 1957/04/04**

ecret Memorandum 1 page(s)

Timing of Nuclear Test Announcements

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00302 1957/04/09
Secret Position Paper 3 page(s)
Proposed OCB Position on Public Announcements regarding Deployment of Atomic
Weapons [Enclosure Entitled "Proposed OCB Recommendation on Redefinition of NSC
Decision No. 1631 (November 14, 1956)"]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00303 1957/04/10
Secret Memorandum of Conversation 2 page(s)
Ad Hoc Working Group on Publicity concerning Overseas Deployment of
Nuclear-Capable Weapons

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00305 1957/04/22
Secret Report 38 page(s)
Joint Progress Report (State Department and AEC) on Implementation of NSC
507/2--"Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" [Cover Sheet to OCB Board Assistants
Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/05/23
Top Secret Memorandum 21 page(s)
Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May
2, 1958 [U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe:
SC 5608/1]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/06/21
Top Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 327th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June
10, 1957 [Includes Brief Mention of UN Committee on Hungarian Uprisings]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/07/05
Top Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 329th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday,
July 3, 1957 [Meeting Summary Includes Brief Discussion of Middle East Issues]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/08/07
Secret Report 5428 27 page(s)
Progress Report (August 7, 1957) on United States Objectives and Policies with
Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428) by the Operations Coordinating Board

et: **National Security Decision Documents** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1957/08/23
Secret Report SC 5719/1 32 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: MS00499 1957/10/11
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security [Statement by the
President Entitled "Summary of Important Facts in the Development by the United
States of an Earth Satellite" Included]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/11/12
op Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Terms of Reference for Net Evaluation Subcommittee in 1958 and Following [Cover Letter Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/11/19
Secret Letter 1 page(s)
[The Review of the Papers on Yugoslav Policy, the Satellites Policy, and Interim Policy on Poland and Hungary Will Be Held at the Meeting on 01/03/1958]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/11/20
Secret Report 17 page(s)
Progress Report on Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe [Includes Cover Letter from Elmer Staats to James Lay; Refers to NSC 5608/1 and 5616/2]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00361** 1957/11/22
Confidential Report 90 page(s)
SC 5725: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00363; BC00044** 1957/12/02
Confidential Report 6 page(s)
Report of Meeting Held in State Department, Friday, November 29, from 3:30 to 4:15 p.m.

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/12/11
Secret Report 21 page(s)
Progress Report on U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and Refugees From Communist Areas (NSC 5706/2) [Includes 12/16/57 Cover Letter from Elmer Staats]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00366** 1957/12/13
Top Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)
Discussion at the 348th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 12, 1957

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/12/16
Secret Agenda 2 page(s)
National Security Council Agenda [For 349th Meeting on December 23, 1957; Refers to NSC 5608/1, NSC 5616/2, and NSC 5706/2]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1957/12/23
Top Secret Minutes 4 page(s)
Minutes of the 349th Meeting of the National Security Council [Meeting Held on December 23, 1956; Refers to NSC 5601, NSC 5608/1, NSC 5616/2, and NSC 5706/2]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/01/07

Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation 20 page(s)
Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday,
January 6, 1958 [Discussion of Disarmament and Gaither Committee Report]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/01/22

Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Review of Policy Papers NSC 5608/1, NSC 5616/2, and NSC 5601, and the Supplement
and Annex to NSC 160/1 [Cover Memo from Marion W. Boggs to the NSC Planning
Board Attached; Refers to Many Other NSC Reports]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/01/23

Top Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday,
January 23, 1958 [Priorities for Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Programs]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/01/27

Confidential Memorandum 7 page(s)
Assessment of the Situation in Rumania [Includes 2/10/58 Memo from Marion Boggs
Attaching Cover Memo from Robert Thayer to Dulles]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/01/31

Top Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Discussion at the 353rd Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday,
January 30, 1958 [Discussion of Ballistic Missile Program]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC00089 1958/02/07

Top Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Discussion at the 354th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
February 6, 1958 [Approval of NSC 5803 regarding U.S. Policy toward Germany]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/02/28

Top Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
February 27, 1958 [Gaither Report Recommendations]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/03/05

Secret Policy Paper 30 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Countries in Eastern Europe [Two Drafts
Included, One from Furnas; Preceded by 3/15/58 Cover Memo from Marion Boggs]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/03/14

Secret Policy Paper 30 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Countries in Eastern Europe [Two Drafts
Included of Draft "Country" Statements on Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Rumania; Related to Consideration of 3/5/58 Draft of Regional Policy
Statement; Preceded by 3/14/58 Cover Memo from Marion Boggs]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/03/19
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Europe [Attaching Memo by the
efense Member Mansfield D. Sprague]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/03/26
ecret Policy Paper 36 page(s)
S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Countries in Eastern Europe [Draft
olicy Statement; Preceded by 3/26/58 Cover Memo from Marion Boggs; Annex A on
atellite Order of Battle and Annex B on Baltics Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00403** 1958/03/27
op Secret Report 20 page(s)
eport of NSC Ad Hoc Working Group on the Technical Feasibility of a Cessation
f Nuclear Testing

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/03/28
op Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
asic National Security Policy [Outline of U.S. National Strategy]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **NP00406** 1958/04/04
op Secret Memorandum 9 page(s)
iscussion at the 361st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
ril 3, 1958 [Missile and Nuclear Test Bans; "Fail Safe" Procedures]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/04/15
op Secret Report 5 page(s)
SC 5810: Basic National Security Policy (selected pages)

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/04/25
op Secret Memorandum 11 page(s)
iscussion at the 363rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
ril 24, 1958 [Status of IRBM and ICBM Development Programs]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/04/28
ecret Policy Paper 8 page(s)
S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Countries in Eastern Europe [Exceprts
rom Draft Policy Statement; Preceded by 4/28/58 Cover Memo from Marion Boggs]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/04/30
ecret Policy Paper 20 page(s)
S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe [Exceprts from
raft Policy Statement; Preceded by 4/30/58 Cover Memo from Marion Boggs]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC00115** 1958/05/02
Top Secret Memorandum 21 page(s)
Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 1, 1958

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/05/05
Top Secret Policy Paper 11 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe [Revised Policy Guidance] Prepared by Planning Board, Attaching Annex B]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/05/06
Top Secret Policy Paper 31 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe [Revised General Considerations] Prepared by Board Assistants; Preceded by 5/7/58 Memo from Marion Boggs]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/05/09
Top Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 1, 1958 [U.S. - U.S.S.R. Missile Developments]

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: **MS00502** 1958/05/19
Top Secret Policy Paper 2 page(s)
NSC Paper on Space

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/05/29
Top Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Discussion at the 367th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 29, 1958 [Review of Fail-Safe Procedures]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC00140** 1958/06/20
Top Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 19, 1958 [Discussion of U.S. Policy toward Germany (NSC 5803, NSC Action No. 1858)]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/06/20
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 19, 1958 [U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe: NSC 5811]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/07/05
Top Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Discussion at the 371st NSC Meeting on Thursday, July 3, 1958 [Priorities for Ballistic Missile and Satellite Programs]

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/07/09

Secret Report 22 page(s)
Operations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and Refugees From Communist Areas (NSC 5706/2) [Includes 07/14/58 Cover Letter from Amer Staats]

et: Persian Gulf Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/07/24

Top Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Statement by George V. Allen, Director, U.S. Information Agency, at the National Security Council, July 24, 1958 [Director Allen Reports U.S. Policy in Lebanon Does Not Have International Support and Urges Flexibility toward Arabs; Excised, Incomplete Document]

et: Persian Gulf Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/07/29

Top Secret Memorandum 14 page(s)
[Illegible] [Excised Memorandum Updating Long-Range Middle East Policy]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: NP00456 1958/08/14

Secret Summary 2 page(s)
Summary of Meeting Held in the State Department from 4:00 to 6:20 p.m. on August 3 [Proposed Revision of the U.S. Position on the First Phase of Disarmament]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/08/14

Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Disarmament Working Group Meeting [Summary of State and Defense Departments Positions on Nuclear Test Bans]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/08/26

Secret Memorandum 29 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/08/28

Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 378th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, August 27, 1958 [Discussion of Geneva Technical Conference on Nuclear Testing]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: Unpublished 1958/09/25

Top Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Discussion at the 380th Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday, September 25, 1958

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC00257 1958/11/13

Top Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Discussion at the 386th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 13, 1958

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/12/08
op Secret Memorandum of Conversation 18 page(s)
Discussion at the 389th Meeting of the National Security Council, Saturday,
December 6, 1958 [Discussion of FY 1960 Military Budget and Status of Missile
Program]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/12/10
Secret Report 14 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia [Includes 12/16/58 Cover Letter from Roy
Malbourne; Includes Annex by CIA on Sino-Soviet Bloc Activities in Yugoslavia]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC00496** 1958/12/11
op Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
December 11, 1958

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00500** 1958/12/23
op Secret Memorandum 8 page(s)
Discussion at the 392nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday,
December 23, 1958

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1958/12/23
op Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Discussion at the 392nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday,
December 23, 1958 [Excised Extract, with December 22 Briefing Note on Extract of
SC 5820/1, "U.S. Policy toward Iraq," Attached]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/01/07
op Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Discussion Paper on U.S. Policy in the Event of War Initiated by the Sino-Soviet
Bloc [Cover Memo Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/01/07
Secret Report 11 page(s)
Operations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy toward the Soviet-Dominated
Regions in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1) [Mentions Other NSC Reports and Policies;
Covers Period from 5/24/1958 to 1/7/1959; Approximately 25 Sensitive Lines
Deleted]

et: **South Africa** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/01/20
Secret Memorandum 25 page(s)
Operations Coordinating Board Report on Africa South of the Sahara (NSC 5818)
Approved by the President--August 26, 1958--Period Covered: from: March 20,
1958 Through: Jan. 14, 1959

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/01/21
ecret Report 20 page(s)
perations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and
efugees From Communist Areas (NSC 5706/2) [Includes 01/27/58 Cover Letter from
romley Smith]

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: **IR00367** 1959/01/22
op Secret Memorandum 0 page(s)
iscussion at NSC Meeting

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC00655** 1959/01/22
op Secret Memorandum 11 page(s)
iscussion at the 394th NSC Meeting, Thursday, January 22, 1959

et: **Chemical and Biological Warfare** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/02/10
ecret Intelligence Report 1 page(s)
oviet Chemical Warfare Research Confirmed

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/02/11
ecret Report 17 page(s)
perations Coordinating Board Report (February 11, 1959) on U.S. Policy toward
oland (NSC 5808/1) [Cover Letter for James S. Lay from Bromley Smith Attached;
eport Covers the Period from 4/16/1958 to 2/11/1959; NSC 5808/1 "Has Been
ound to Be Consistent with" NSC 5810/1]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC00763** 1959/02/12
op Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
iscussion at the 396th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
ebruary 12, 1959

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC00890** 1959/03/05
op Secret Minutes 6 page(s)
otes of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council in the
resident's Office Immediately Following the Regular NSC Meeting on March 5,
959

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **BC00949** 1959/03/12
op Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)
iscussion at the 399th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
arch 12, 1959 [Discussion of U.S. Policy in Event of War]

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: **MS00509** 1959/03/18
ecret Report 27 page(s)
perations Plan for Outer Space

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01049** 1959/03/26
Top Secret Memorandum 12 page(s)
Discussion at the 400th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
March 26, 1959 [Excerpts from Meeting Notes; Briefing Note on Long Range NATO
and Related European Regional Problems Attached]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01203** 1959/04/23
Top Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)
Discussion at the Special Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
April 23, 1959

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01228** 1959/04/28
Top Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Studies of Military and Non-Military Counter-Measures in the Berlin Crisis

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01256** 1959/05/08
Top Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 405th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May
8, 1959

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/05/13
Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 406th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May
13, 1959 [Establishment of Priorities for Ballistic Missile and Space Programs]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01293** 1959/05/21
Top Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Discussion at the 407th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May
21, 1959

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/05/23
Non-Classified Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Andrew Goodpaster is Informed That He Should Give a Copy of a Report to the
President]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01311** 1959/05/28
Top Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Discussion at the 408th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May
28, 1959

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/06/25
Top Secret Memorandum 23 page(s)
Discussion at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June
5, 1959 [Discussion of NSC 5810/1 on "Basic National Security Policy"]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/06/30

op Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)

SC Net Evaluation Subcommittee [Criteria for Membership in Net Evaluation Subcommittee]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/07/01

op Secret Presidential Directive 5908 3 page(s)

Comparative Evaluations Group [Report Establishes Comparative Evaluations Group to Assess US and USSR Capabilities]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/07/09

op Secret Memorandum of Conversation 14 page(s)

Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council [Discussion of Basic National Security Policy]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/07/15

Secret Report 6 page(s)

Operations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1) [Cover Letter Attached; Covers Period from 5/24/1958 to 7/15/1959; Mentions NSC Policy 5810/1;]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/07/15

Secret Report 6 page(s)

Operations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and Refugees From Communist Areas (NSC 5706/2) [Includes 07/15/59 Cover Letter from Romney Smith]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/07/16

op Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)

Discussion at the 413th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 16, 1959

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/07/30

op Secret Memorandum 17 page(s)

Discussion at the 415th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 30, 1959 [Discussion of Basic National Security Policy]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/08/26

op Secret Memorandum of Conversation 2 page(s)

Discussion at the 417th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, August 18, 1959

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/10/02

op Secret Memorandum page(s)

Discussion at the 420th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 1, 1959 [Discussion of Basic National Security Policy]

et: **South Africa** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/10/12
ecret Memorandum 4 page(s)
erations Coordinating Board Report (September 30, 1959) on U.S. Policy Toward
frica South of the Sahara Prior to Calender Year 1960 (NSC 5818)

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00597** 1959/10/28
ecret Briefing Paper 3 page(s)
riefing Note for NSC Meeting, 10/29/59--France

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00599** 1959/10/29
op Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)
22nd NSC Meeting, Thursday, October 29, 1959

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/11/05
op Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
iscussion at the 423rd Meeting of the National Security Council [Report by
cCone on U.S. Atomic Energy Program]Yign Policy]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/11/09
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
resentation of the 1959 Net Evaluation Subcommittee Report

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/11/11
op Secret Memorandum 13 page(s)
iscussion at the 424th NSC Meeting Wednesday, November 11, 1959 [NATO Defense
osture]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/11/25
op Secret Memorandum 15 page(s)
iscussion at the 425th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday,
ovember 25, 1959 [Military Options for 1961 Briefing Notes Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00603** 1959/12/03
ecret Memorandum 1 page(s)
isclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries [NSC 151/2 Rescinded]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1959/12/10
op Secret Memorandum 8 page(s)
iscussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
ecember 10, 1959 [Discussion of Proposals to Ban Testing of ICBMs]

et: **Iran Revolution** Fiche No.: **IR00379** 1959/12/11
ecret Report 7 page(s)
eport on Iran (NSC 5821/1) [Cover Letter Attached]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/01/04
Classification Unknown Memorandum 3 page(s)
Meeting of Special Committee on Iraq [Heavily Excised Memorandum of Record of
December 28, 1959 NSC Staff Meeting on Intervention in Iraq; Names of CIA
Participants Deleted]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/01/07
Top Secret Memorandum 7 page(s)
Proposed Ban on Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/01/13
Top Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Meeting of Special Committee on Iraq [Heavily Excised Memorandum of Record of
January 12 NSC Staff Meeting on Intervention in Iraq; Entire Page, Names of CIA
Participants Deleted]

et: **South Africa** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/01/19
Secret Memorandum 26 page(s)
U.S. Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00619** 1960/01/26
Confidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
The Pros and Cons of Increased Nuclear Sharing with the Allies (Including
Possible Changes in Legislation)

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: **MS00523** 1960/01/28
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Memorandum for All Holders of NSC 5520 [Amendment and Adoption of Statement in
SC 5918 regarding "U.S. Policy on Outer Space"]

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: **MS00525** 1960/01/29
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Memorandum for All Holders of NSC 5814/1 [Report by NASC on "U.S. Policy on
Outer Space"; Supersedes NSC 5814]

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: **MS00524** 1960/01/29
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
U.S. Policy on Outer Space

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/02/10
Top Secret Summary 1 page(s)
Polaris [Statements on POLARIS Program at NSC Meetings]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/03/09
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
uclear Elements of the United States Disarmament Policy [Conditions for a
toff of Fissionable Materials Production Stipulated by Special Meeting of
ational Security Council]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/03/23
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
S. Strategic Striking Force

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/03/25
ecret Report 7 page(s)
ited States Strategic Striking Forces [Description of US Strategic Striking
rces; Cover Memo Attached]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/04/06
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
ited States Strategic Striking Force

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC01874 1960/04/21
Memorandum 1 page(s)
aterials on Preparation for Summit Meeting

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00644 1960/04/25
ecret Memorandum 1 page(s)
enda for Planning Board Meeting on Tuesday, April 26, 1960

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/04/26
nclassified Report 1 page(s)
lanning Board Questions Net Evaluation Presentation

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/04/27
op Secret Report 1 page(s)
Net Evaluation Subcommittee Report For 1959

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/05/04
ecret Paper 1 page(s)
riefing Note for the NSC Meeting 5/5/60: History of US and USSR Long-Range
issile Development

et: Military Use of Space Fiche No.: MS00630 1960/05/20
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
[Placing Reconnaissance Satellite "at the Service" of the United Nations]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: BC01915 1960/05/25
op Secret Memorandum 21 page(s)
Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, May
4, 1960

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: MS00632 1960/06/15
onfidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Placing Reconnaissance Satellites "at the Service" of the United Nations]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/07/27
ecret Report 5 page(s)
Report on Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1)

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/07/27
ecret Report 5 page(s)
Report on Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1)

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/07/27
ecret Report 7 page(s)
Operations Coordinating Board Report (July 27, 1960) on U.S. Policy Toward the
Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1) [Covers the Period from
7/15/1959 through 07/27/1960; Refers to NSC Action 2215-c; Relates to NSA2 R
2160; Cover Memorandum from Bromley Smith Bromley Smith to James S. Lay
Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/08/04
ecret Memorandum 1 page(s)
CB Report on Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811/1)

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/08/15
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Geneva Negotiations on Nuclear Testing [Summary of a Meeting with the President
on August 12, 1960]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1960/08/16
op Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Discussion at the 455th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, August
2, 1960 [Update on Geneva Test Ban Talks]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00668 1960/08/23
op Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
Increased Nuclear Sharing with the Allies [Annex Only Attached]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/09/14
ecret Report 13 page(s)
erations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and
fugees From Communist Areas (NSC 5706/2) [Includes 09/15/60 Cover Letter from
dgeay B. Knight]

et: **Persian Gulf** Fiche No.: **IR00394** 1960/09/21
op Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
iscussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday,
eptember 21, 1960

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01954** 1960/09/21
op Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
iscussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday,
eptember 21, 1960

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/09/22
ecret Briefing Paper 2 page(s)
perational Capability of the POLARIS Program [Draft NSC Action Attached]

et: **Chemical and Biological Warfare** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/10/26
onfidential Briefing Paper 4 page(s)
W Detection and Identification

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01962** 1960/11/02
ecret Report 5 page(s)
.S. Policy toward Germany (NSC 5803) [Cover Sheet Attached]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00694** 1960/11/09
op Secret Briefing Paper 4 page(s)
ATO in the 1960s

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00698** 1960/11/16
op Secret Briefing Note 11 page(s)
ATO in the 1960's

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **NP00700** 1960/11/17
op Secret Record of Actions 8 page(s)
[NATO in the 1960s and Significant Events Affecting U.S. Security]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/11/25
onfidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
ncreased Sharing with Selected Allies of Scientific Information Relating to
ilitary Research and Development, and Its Application

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC01976** 1960/12/02
op Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Discussion at the 468th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
December 1, 1960 [Discussion of U.S. Policy toward Germany]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/12/02
op Secret Memorandum 19 page(s)
Discussion at the 468th meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
December 1, 1960 [NATO in the 1960s: Nuclear Sharing Plans]

et: **Chemical and Biological Warfare** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/12/05
Confidential Briefing Paper 3 page(s)
CW Detection and Identification

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/12/14
op Secret Report 6021 6 page(s)
Missiles and Military Space Programs [Priorities for ICBM, IRBM, and Satellite
Programs]

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1960/12/28
Confidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
Increased Sharing with Selected Allies of Scientific Information Relating to
Military Research and Development, and Its Application

et: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/01/12
op Secret Record of Actions 1 page(s)
Scope of Operational Capability of the Polaris Program; Codification of U.S.
Policy on Arms Control and U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/01/12
op Secret Memorandum 10 page(s)
Draft Record of Actions: 474th NSC Meeting (1/12/61) [Decisions on Continuation
of Polaris Program, Disarmament Proposals, and Fallout Shelter Program]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/01/18
op Secret Report 6108 6 page(s)
SC 6108. Certain Aspects of Missile and Space Programs [Priorities for Achieving
Operational Capabilities of Ballistic missiles and Satellites]

et: **Military Use of Space** Fiche No.: **MS00641** 1961/01/28
Classification Unknown Letter 1 page(s)
["Thank You" Note for Memorandum on the SAMOS Project]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/01/30
op Secret Memorandum 11 page(s)
ne FY 1962 Budget -- Issues Relating to the U.S. Military Program [Cover Memo
or Attached Statement of Issues Relating to the FY 1962 Military Budget]

et: **National Security Decision Documents** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/02/09
nclassified Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Announcement regarding Loan Arrangement]

et: **Soviet Flashpoints** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/02/16
or Official Use Only Memorandum 2 page(s)
xpansion of Exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

et: **National Security Decision Documents** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/02/21
nclassified National Security Action Memorandum 1 page(s)
[President Kennedy Requests Answers to Questions regarding the Embargo on
ruits, Vegetables and Other Commodities Imported into the U.S. From Cuba]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/02/21
op Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
ome Issues Relating to a Fallout Shelter Program [Attachment on "Recent NSC
onsideration of Civil Defense"]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/02/27
nclassified Letter 2 page(s)
[Encloses "Washington Star" Article on Nuclear Strategy Proposals Made by Rusk]

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC02005** 1961/03/10
onfidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
eople to See on Berlin/Germany Problem

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/03/13
ecret Memorandum 4 page(s)
efense Message [Discussion of Changes in the Eisenhower Military Budget and
U.S. Military Posture, Including Need for Non-nuclear Options]

et: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: **Unpublished** 1961/04/06
op Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
ACEUR Procedures for Ordering Use of Nuclear Weapons

et: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: **BC02046** 1961/05/17
ecret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Berlin Crisis Should Have a Direct Effect on the Fiscal Year 1963 Department
of Defense Submission on Conventional Forces; Memorandum Not Included]

at: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/05/19
ecret Record of Actions 1 page(s)
ilitary Considerations Involved in the Resumption of Nuclear Testing

at: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation** Fiche No.: NP00774 1961/05/24
ecret Record of Actions 1 page(s)
ilitary Considerations Involved in the Resumption of Nuclear Testing

at: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: BC02071 1961/06/01
Memorandum 9 page(s)
egotiable Positions on the Berlin Question

at: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/06/09
on-Classified Memorandum 1 page(s)
[New Proposal for Meeting the Current Problem in Paris is Presented]

at: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/06/14
ecret Memorandum WH S&T Cont. No. S1258 2 page(s)
omments on 31 May Draft Disarmament Proposal

at: **Nuclear History** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/06/16
ecret Memorandum 8 page(s)
rguments Which Militate Against Resumption of Nuclear Tests

at: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/06/27
on-Classified List 1 page(s)
nvitees in Addition to the Statutory Members and Advisers for the 486th Meeting
o be Held on Thursday, June 29, 1961

at: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/06/27
ecret Agenda 1 page(s)
agenda for the Meeting to be Held in the Cabinet Room of the White House on
ursday, June 29, 1961, at 3:30 p.m.

at: **Intelligence Policy** Fiche No.: IP00657 1961/06/28
lassification Unknown National Security Action Memorandum 57 2 page(s)
esponsibility for Paramilitary Operations

at: **Berlin Crisis** Fiche No.: BC02119 1961/06/29
ecret Memorandum 1 page(s)
iscussion at NSC Meeting June 29, 1961 [Discussion of Acheson Report on Berlin]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02123 1961/06/30
Secret Record of Actions 2431-2433 1 page(s)
Record of Actions by the National Security Council at Its Four Hundred and
Eighty-Sixth Meeting Held on June 29, 1961 (Approved by the President June 30,
1961)

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02132 1961/07/03
Memorandum 2 page(s)
Conversation with General Taylor, July 3, 1961, 1:30 p.m.

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02131 1961/07/03
Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Military Response in Berlin Could Be All-Out Nuclear as Envisioned in SIOP 62]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02137 1961/07/05
Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Time for Bipartisan Consultation on Berlin?]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02143 1961/07/07
Memorandum 6 page(s)
Berlin Crisis and Civil Defense

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02161 1961/07/12
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Briefing for Thursday NSC Meeting

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/07/18
Secret Agenda 3 page(s)
Agenda for the Meeting to be Held in the Cabinet Room of the White House on
Wednesday, July 19, 1961 at 4:00 p.m. [List of Invitees Attached]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02194 1961/07/19
Top Secret Record of Actions 3 page(s)
National Security Council Meeting, July 19, 1961 [Summary of Decisions Taken by
President Kennedy relating to Berlin]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02202 1961/07/20
Top Secret Record of Actions 2435 1 page(s)
Record of Actions by the National Security Council at Its Four Hundred and
Eighty-Eighth Meeting Held on July 19, 1961 (Approved by the President on July
20, 1961): Berlin [Summary of Decision Taken by President Kennedy relating to
Berlin]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02201 1961/07/20
Secret Record of Actions 2434 1 page(s)
Record of Actions by the National Security Council at Its Four Hundred and
Eighty-Seventh Meeting Held on July 13, 1961 (Approved by the President on July
20, 1961)

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/07/25
Confidential Memorandum 2 page(s)
What Next on Nuclear Testing

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02234 1961/07/29
Secret Cable 324 5 page(s)
[John McCloy Recounts Discussion with Khrushchev on the Soviet Position on
Berlin]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02235 1961/07/29
Confidential Cable 325 2 page(s)
[John McCloy's Desire to Stop in France to Discuss the Khrushchev Visit with
ATO Representatives]

et: Iran Revolution Fiche No.: IR00420 1961/08/07
Memorandum 0 page(s)

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/08/14
Non-Classified Personal Notes 1 page(s)
[Kaysen Presents Military Options Paper]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/08/15
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Intelligence Aspects of Nuclear Testing [National Security Action Memorandum No.
9]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02336 1961/08/17
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Observations on Brandt Letter and a Reply]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02337 1961/08/17
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Suggestions for Boosting Morale on Both Sides of the Berlin Line]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02387 1961/08/22
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Problem of Maintaining Morale as West Berliners Come to Realize That Berlin
Has Been Definitely Split]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02386 1961/08/22
or Official Use Only Memorandum 12 page(s)
[Thoughts on Berlin]

et: National Security Decision Documents Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/08/23
Unclassified Memorandum 1 page(s)
NSAM No. 74 [Regarding the Inclusion of NSAM 74 into the Series]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02476 1961/09/14
Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Question as to Whether Four Divisions from the National Guard Should Be Called
Up]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00808 1961/10/06
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
List of Subjects of Interest to Staff

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00812 1961/11/02
Top Secret Minutes 4 page(s)
Notes on National Security Council Meeting--2 November 1961

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/12/09
Top Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
[Kaysen Recommends Reductions in the Minuteman Force Levels Proposed by
McNamara; McNamara Memo Attached]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02650 1961/12/19
Top Secret Minutes 3 page(s)
Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, 19 December 1961

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1961/12/19
Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Resumption of Nuclear Testing [Raskin Argues Against Resumption on Moral and
Strategic Grounds]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00824 1962/01/23
Non-Classified Letter 1 page(s)
[India and Disarmament Possibilities]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00830 1962/02/02
Secret Record of Actions 2 page(s)
National Security Council Standing Group Meeting February 2, 1962 [Dispersal of
Nuclear Weapons and Agreements of Soviet Underground Nuclear Tests]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00829 1962/02/02
op Secret Minutes 11 page(s)
minutes of Meeting on the Status of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Tests--February 2, 1962

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/02/08
on-Classified Memorandum 2 page(s)
raining Objectives to Combat Subversive Insurgency

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/02/08
Classification Excised] Memorandum 2 page(s)
raining Objectives to Combat Subversive Insurgency

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00835 1962/02/16
ecret Record of Actions 3 page(s)
ational Security Council Standing Group Meeting, February 16, 1962 [Discussion
f Dispersal of Nuclear Testing]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00840 1962/02/27
op Secret Minutes 7 page(s)
otes on National Security Council Meeting--10:00 a.m., February 27, 1962

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00845 1962/03/02
ecret Record of Actions 2 page(s)
ational Security Council Standing Group Meeting, March 2, 1962 [Discussion of
he Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00852 1962/03/09
ecret Agenda 1 page(s)
ational Security Council Standing Group Meeting, Friday, March 9, 1962--2:30
a.m.

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00853 1962/03/09
ecret Record of Actions 2 page(s)
ational Security Council, Standing Group Meeting, March 9, 1962 [Dispersal of
uclear Weapons, U.S.-Belgian Nuclear Agreement, and U.S. Military Sales to
rance]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02743 1962/03/20
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
he Soviet's "General Principles" on the Berlin Issue (SECTO 66)

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/03/22
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
[Recent actions taken by the Special Group (Counterinsurgency)]

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/03/23
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI), 22 March 1962

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02754 1962/03/26
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
The Kohler-Semenov Conversations [sic]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02758 1962/03/28
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Post-Mortem on Soviet Chaff Drops in the Berlin Air Corridors

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/04/05
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI), 5 April 1962

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/04/12
Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI), 12 April 1962

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00867 1962/04/18
Top Secret Minutes 2 page(s)
Notes on National Security Council Meeting--Wednesday, April 18, 1962--12:15
a.m.

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00868 1962/04/18
Secret Record of Actions 2 page(s)
Nuclear Atmosphere Test Series, 1962

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/04/19
Secret Memorandum 3 page(s)
Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI), 19 April 1962

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/05/04
Non-Classified Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Background Information for the President's Talk with Fritz Erler]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02794 1962/05/10
or Official Use Only Memorandum 3 page(s)
erman Views of the Latest Fracas [Comments from West German Press and Radio
tached]

et: Berlin Crisis Fiche No.: BC02815 1962/06/19
or Official Use Only Memorandum 1 page(s)
nushchev's Speech in Bucharest

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/07/09
op Secret Minutes 1 page(s)
ummary Minutes of 501st NSC Meeting [Soviet Long-Range Attack Capabilities]

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/08/02
ecret Memorandum 3 page(s)
inutes for Meeting of Special Group (CI) 2 p.m., Thursday, 2 August 1962

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/08/09
ecret Memorandum 3 page(s)
inutes for Meeting of Special Group (CI) 2 p.m., Thursday, 9 August 1962

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/08/16
ecret Memorandum 3 page(s)
inutes for Meeting of Special Group (CI) 2 p.m., Thursday, 16 August 1962

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/08/23
ecret Memorandum 3 page(s)
inutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI) 2 p.m., Thursday, 23 August 1962

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/08/29
ecret Memorandum 1 page(s)
equest for Highest National Priority for Project DEFENDER

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/08/30
ecret Memorandum 2 page(s)
inutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI)

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/09/13
ecret Memorandum 3 page(s)
inutes of the Meeting of the Special Group (CI) 2 p.m., Thursday, 13 September
962

et: National Security Decision Documents Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/09/17
Secret National Security Action Memorandum No. 186 1 page(s)
Countries under the Cognizance of the Special Group (CI)

et: National Security Decision Documents Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/09/28
Secret National Security Action Memorandum 1 page(s)
Presidential Meeting on Laos, September 28, 1962

et: National Security Decision Documents Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/10/05
Confidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
SAM No. 194

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/11/14
Top Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
[Comments on McNamara's Defense Budget Memorandum and Recommends Delay in
Inuteman Buildup]

et: National Security Decision Documents Fiche No.: Unpublished 1962/12/14
Secret National Security Action Memorandum 1 page(s)
U.S. Policy toward Yugoslavia

et: Soviet Flashpoints Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/01/05
Secret Memorandum 5 page(s)
National Security Action Memorandum No. 212 Includes reports on Effects of
Cancellation of MFN Benefits to Yugoslavia and Poland; and Trade Information: Poland
and Yugoslavia

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/01/12
Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Special Group for Counterinsurgency [Memorandum attached]

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/01/16
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
Future Role of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency)

et: Low-Intensity Conflict Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/05/20
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Special Group (CI) [update of morning meeting]

et: Intelligence Policy Fiche No.: IP00026 1963/05/25
Secret List 8 page(s)
National Intelligence Estimates [List of National Intelligence Estimates
published from January 1960 through 1962]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00034 1963/07/13
Classification Unknown Memorandum 1 page(s)
Missile Tracking Station in South Africa

et: Military Use of Space Fiche No.: MS00541 1963/07/17
Classification Unknown Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Work of the Special Committee Set Up under NSAM 156]

et: National Security Decision Documents Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/07/18
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
National Security Action Memorandum 254 [Request for an Assessment of Soviet
Advancement in the Area of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00051 1963/08/02
Classification Unknown Memorandum 1 page(s)
Memo for the President [Draft Guidance for Governor Stevenson on U.S. Position
on the South African Issue in the U.N. Security Council]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00073 1963/08/16
Classification Unknown Memorandum 2 page(s)
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy [Outstanding African Items: Secondary Boycott Move
Against South Africa]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/09/04
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
[JCS Memo on the Test Ban Treaty is "Guilty...of Over-Simplification"]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00081 1963/09/12
Secret Memorandum 12 page(s)
[Memorandum Recommended for President's Weekend Reading Entitled "U.S. and
South African Economic Leverage on Each Other" Is Included]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/09/12
Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation 12 page(s)
Summary Record of National Security Council Meeting, September 12, 1963, 11:00
AM -- Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee [Transcript of discussion
Attached]

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/09/12
Unclassified List 1 page(s)
Attendance List for the 517th Meeting Held on Thursday, September 12, 1963, at
1:00 A.M. In the Cabinet Room of the White House

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00096 1963/10/23
Confidential Memorandum 6 page(s)
[South African and Portuguese-African Issues in the U.N. Security Council
during November 1963; Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum Entitled "African
Reactions to U.S. Positions and Security Council Debates on Portuguese
Territories and South Africa" Is Attached]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00099 1963/10/29
Secret Memorandum 4 page(s)
[South African Issues in the U.N. Security Council and United States Policy
Options]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00102 1963/11/01
Classification Unknown Memorandum 2 page(s)
Crosby's South Africa Study

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/11/26
Confidential Memorandum 2 page(s)
South Africa in the Security Council [Discussion concerning the African U.N.
Members Proposal for an Oil Embargo against South Africa]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/11/26
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
[Regarding Proposal to Hold NSC Standing Group Meeting to Review U.S. Policy on
South Africa and the Portuguese African Territories]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1963/11/29
Secret Memorandum page(s)
[Regarding NSC Standing Group Meeting to Review U.S. Policy on South Africa and
the Portuguese African Territories]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00117 1963/12/05
Confidential Memorandum 2 page(s)
[South African Government's Objection to the Appointment of Ulrich Haynes, a
Young African American, as a Desk Officer for South West Africa and the High
Commission Territories]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/03/10
Secret Memorandum 54 page(s)
Briefing to NSC Standing Group: South Africa and South West Africa.

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/03/10
Secret Briefing Paper page(s)
Contingency Study--Decisive Action in the 17th Session of the UN General
Assembly to Enforce Respect for the Mandate of South West Africa

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/03/13
Secret Briefing Paper 4 page(s)
Steps to be Taken by NASA and DOD to Reduce Dependence on Republic of South Africa (Attachment)

et: Nuclear History Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/03/14
Top Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Release Procedures for Nuclear Weapons Assigned (Excised)

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/04/16
Memorandum 4 page(s)
[South African Revonia Trial]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/06/02
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
South Africa [U.S. Set in Motion Steps to Increase Its Flexibility in Dealing with South Africa While at the same time Persuading South Africa to Comply with CJ Decision]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP00985 1964/07/23
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Notes on the National Security Council Meeting, June 16, 1964

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00190 1964/07/29
Secret Memorandum 2 page(s)
Briefing Memorandum--Lewis Douglas on South Africa

et: South Africa Fiche No.: NP00989; SA00198 1964/08/17
Confidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
[U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with South Africa; Purchase of an Allis-Chalmers Experimental Reactor by South Africa]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00208 1964/09/18
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Lockheed Aircraft Sales to South Africa

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00213 1964/09/22
Secret Memorandum 6 page(s)
Proposed Lockheed Sale to South Africa

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00214 1964/09/23
Secret Memorandum 1 page(s)
Further to the Lockheed-South Africa Problem

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00217 1964/09/28
Confidential Memorandum 2 page(s)
Lockheed Sale to South Africa

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/09/29
Limited Official Use Memorandum 1 page(s)
Memorandum For The President: Harry Oppenheimer [Meeting with Oppenheimer]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00219 1964/10/01
Limited Official Use Memorandum of Conversation 2 page(s)
Lockheed Sale to South Africa [MemCon between Vernon A. Johnson, Vice President,
Eastern Region, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and William H. Brubeck, White
House]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: Unpublished 1964/11/20
Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Regarding Harold Langmead Taylor Taswell as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of South Africa to the United States]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP01064 1964/12/07
Secret Minutes 5 page(s)
Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Discussion, First
Meeting--December 1, 1964, Room 303, Executive Office Building, 10:00 a.m.-6:20
a.m.

et: Tactical Nuclear Forces in Europe Fiche No.: NP01073 1964/12/10
Unclassified Memorandum 4 page(s)
LG's [Roswell L. Gilpatrick's] Notes on 12/9/64 Discussion with Messrs. Dean and
McCloy on Problems of Europe and NATO [Cover Sheet Attached]

et: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fiche No.: NP01104 1965/01/21
Secret Report 22 page(s)
Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation [Supporting
papers for the Task Force and Major Issues Relating to the Discussion of Nuclear
Proliferation Attached]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00249 1965/03/04
Confidential Memorandum 1 page(s)
[Regarding a Request for a Meeting with McGeorge Bundy by George Houser of the
American Committee on Africa to Discuss the Coming National Conference "South
African Crisis and American Action" to Be Held in Washington, March 21-23, 1965]

et: South Africa Fiche No.: SA00251 1965/03/12
Confidential Letter 1 page(s)
[Regarding Ambassador Satterthwaite's Views on South Africa]