

PODESTA
CITRON
FILES

chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 7/3/93

TO: DAVID GERGEN, GEORGE S.,
BOB RUBIN

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

THE CHAIRMAN

July 1, 1993

03 JUL 2 AM 11:15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LAURA D. TYSON

Yesterday in the G-7 briefing meeting on economic issues and again today at the lunch focusing on Japan with the CEOs, you correctly argued that what we are proposing in our bilateral talks with Japan will benefit Japan as well as the United States. I thought you might find the attached memo prepared by Alan Blinder for the U.S.-Japan negotiating team useful because it makes this case in somewhat more detail.

Attachment

June 10, 1993

WHY THE FRAMEWORK IS GOOD FOR JAPAN

1. Faster growth: The Americans are asking Japan to reduce its current account surplus. This comes very close to asking Japan to grow faster, especially if that growth is induced by fiscal expansion. But faster growth is just what Japan needs: with output well below the economy's potential and a substantial public sector budget surplus, Japan is in an ideal position to stimulate its economy without adding to inflationary pressures, thereby resolving both its internal and external balance problems.
2. Higher living standards: Based on superlative post-war economic performance, Japanese generations born after 1945 see less need than their elders to sacrifice their own material well-being for the sake of nation-building. But the 1991 MITI-Commerce study found that on average, manufactured goods cost 37 percent more in Japan than in the U.S., primarily because of higher prices paid for imports. Allowing more imports into Japan would help it become a "life-style superpower" by reducing domestic prices and expanding choices for consumers.
3. Cheaper intermediate goods: All countries import large amounts of intermediate goods, thereby lowering costs and making domestic industries more competitive. The MITI-Commerce study found the price of capital goods to be 17 percent higher in Japan than the US, while auto parts prices were 109 percent higher. Many Japanese industries would therefore benefit if protectionist barriers were lowered.
4. The virtues of import competition: Japan's marquee industries (e.g., autos and consumer electronics) do not fear foreign competition; they already lead the world. It is the relatively inefficient Japanese industries that clamor for protection. Many sectors of Japan's economy are extremely concentrated; for example, 3 manufacturers account for all of Japan's consumption of flat glass. Opening the economy to import competition shakes up lethargic industries, leading to lower prices, more choice, and greater efficiency. The revival of the American auto industry in the face of foreign competition is a case in point.
5. Fewer trade disputes: Japan and the United States seem to be locked in a never-ending series of trade disputes which threaten the bilateral relationship. If the two sides could agree on objective benchmark of progress, disputes concerning Japan's compliance would be easily resolved -- thereby getting the Americans off their backs.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 7/3/93

Sandy Berger, Tony Lake,
George S., Mark Gearan,
Dee Dee Myers, and
Dave Gergen & *Rubin*

NOTE FOR:

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐

Classified memo to the President from
Warren Christopher re Trip to Asia,
July 6-10, 1993, was sent to the above.

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

Chrow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 7/3/93

TO: GEORGE S.
DEE DEE MYERS

FROM: **JOHN D. PODESTA**
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4963

July 2, 1993 11 2 PM 10:46

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction to Your Statement on
Vietnam Policy

The reaction from the Hill to your statement today on Vietnam was very positive. In addition to the letter signed by 19 Members of Congress, the following Members released individual statements or letters in support of your decision on Vietnam:

Representative Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana
Senator John Kerry, D-Massachusetts
Senator John McCain, R-Arizona
Representative Pete Peterson, D-Florida
Representative Wayne Gilchrest, R-Maryland


Representative Peterson also will be going on radio this evening to endorse your announcement. Senator Kerry also is willing to appear on radio and/or television programs tonight and tomorrow. So far, there has been no visible reaction from the families.

We have invited Ann Mills Griffiths to accompany the delegation but she has not yet responded.

Attachment

Tab A Letters and statements from Members of Congress

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
David Gergen



Congress of the United States

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Friday, July 2, 1993

VIETNAM-ERA MEMBERS IN CONGRESS SUPPORT PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO APPROVE MULTINATIONAL LENDING TO VIETNAM

Members of Congress who are Vietnam-era veterans support President's Clinton decision to withdraw opposition to international loans to Vietnam.

A letter sent to the President this week by a bi-partisan group of House and Senate members recommended he take this step. The letter said further progress and cooperation on the POW-MIA issue was in jeopardy if the U.S. did not make a gesture to acknowledge the contributions of the Vietnamese.

The lawmakers said allowing Vietnam to reschedule its debt at the upcoming meeting of the IMF would be a strong signal that the United States recognizes Vietnam's efforts.

They said delaying action on the IMF issue would send out the wrong signal to the Vietnamese that the U.S. is not serious about advancing the process now in place between the two countries.

"We believe that (allowing Vietnam to reschedule its debt) is the next logical step in our efforts to get a full accounting of our missing servicemen in Southeast Asia," the letter stated.

Attached is a copy of the letter and a list of signees:

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20315

July 1, 1993

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are Vietnam-era veterans in Congress who are deeply concerned over your upcoming decision regarding the Vietnamese government's debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We believe that this could be the most critical decision our government makes in our efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue and we encourage you to make a timely decision to allow the Vietnamese to reschedule their debt.

On June 2, a bipartisan delegation of Senators, Representatives and members of national veterans organizations, led by Senator John Kerry, returned from a trip to Vietnam in which they sought answers to questions surrounding the POW/MIA issue. During their stay, the delegation met with our personnel with the Joint Task Force - Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and high-level officials from the Vietnamese government. After two days of intense discussion and meetings, the delegation came to the conclusion that there is now a country-to-country process in place that is making significant progress on many of our unresolved POW/MIA cases. We concur with this conclusion.

Yet, we believe that this process, and the cooperation and progress it represents, is in jeopardy if our nation does not make a gesture to acknowledge the contributions of the Vietnamese. If Vietnam is not given a signal by our government that it recognizes the significant contributions it is making, it may very well discontinue its efforts. The Vietnamese believe that they are cooperating with our requests to review documents, interview Vietnamese citizens and search the countryside. This is also the belief of our people on the ground in Vietnam. Major General Needham, Commander of the JTF-FA in Vietnam, and a decorated Vietnam veteran, emphasized his belief to the Kerry delegation that our nation needs to send a signal to the Vietnamese.


We believe that allowing Vietnam to reschedule its debt at the upcoming meeting of the IMF would be a strong signal that the United States recognizes Vietnam's efforts. Japan and France have indicated their willingness to assist the Vietnamese in paying their debt, yet both countries have withheld their support at the request of the United States. Our acquiescence to the French and Japanese proposal would allow this repayment to go through. And we should make this decision as swiftly as possible. We believe that any effort to delay action on this matter would be a strong


signal to the Vietnamese that we are not serious about advancing the process now in place between our two countries.


There is much at stake with this decision. At risk is the only process we now have to give the families of our POW/MIAs any answers on the fate of their loved ones. While we do not advocate normalization at this time, we believe that we must acknowledge Vietnam's efforts in order to keep the country-to-country process alive and maintain positive incentives to encourage continued cooperation.

We believe that this is the next logical step in our efforts to get a full accounting of our missing servicemen in Southeast Asia. We hope that you will consider this as you review the debt restructuring issue.

Sincerely,


JOHN F. KERRY
U.S. Senate



JOHN MCCAIN
U.S. Senate



JIM McDERMOTT



JACK REED



MIKE KRASS



JIM LECH



DOUGLAS "PETE" PETERSON
Member of Congress


DAVID E. BONIOR
Member of Congress


LANE EVANS
Member of Congress


JIM KOLBE
Member of Congress


DAVID SKAGGS
Member of Congress


LARRY L. ROCCO
Member of Congress

Wayne T. Gilbert

Boh T. Ruth

H. Martin Lancaster

Chris Drbol

Sonny Montgomery
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

Paul McAllen

Chuck Roll

For Immediate Release
Contact: Christopher Madison 225-4598

Hamilton Lauds Clinton Policy on Vietnam

Washington 7/2 — Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, D-Ind., chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, today released the following statement on President Clinton's policy announcement on Vietnam:

"I strongly support the President's decision to allow new international lending for Vietnam and to send high-level officials to Hanoi to discuss the issues which still divide our two countries. I hope that progress in accounting for U.S. Prisoners of War and Missing in Action will enable the President to let the U.S. embargo of Vietnam expire in September.

"The United States has several interests in Vietnam. The first is to secure the fullest possible accounting of our POWs and MIAs. The second is to bring about a constructive Vietnamese role in Southeast Asia, particularly in Cambodia. The third is to ensure that U.S. business can compete fairly in a market that has great, long-term potential for U.S. exports. The fourth is to promote human rights and political pluralism.

"The time has come to pursue our multiple interests in Vietnam through engagement and an enhanced presence in the country.

"Vietnam has complied with its obligations under the Paris Agreement on Cambodia, which has helped lay a foundation for peace in that troubled country. Vietnam has also cooperated with the United States in resolving a number of POW/MIA cases since 1991, providing access to documents, crash sites, and other sources of information.

"The action that the President has taken today is a significant step toward the normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations. The President's decision enhances U.S. political and economic interests, and provides Hanoi with incentive to cooperate further on POW/MIAs. The President has displayed both political courage and a clear understanding of the national interest. I urge support for his initiative."

##

JOHN KERRY
MASSACHUSETTS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

.....
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

July 2, 1993

Kerry Issues Statement On
President's Vietnam Announcement
.....

CONTACT: Larry Carpenter
202-224-2742

Sen. John Kerry today issued the following statement in reaction to the President's announcement on Vietnam:

"I think the President needs to act in the national interest of the United States of America, and the first interest we have is to guarantee the fullest possible accounting.

"I personally believe that by moving on the loans, the President greatly enhances our ability to get answers for our families. It is a good decision for the families and for the country, because it will facilitate the process of accountability of the MIA/POW issue.

"We have seen some very specific results on the POW/MIA accounting issue. We have gone from 196 cases where we knew nothing of what happened to our soldiers down to less than 92, where we now know the fate of what happened to those people. I personally have visited Vietnamese prisons, I've been in camps, I've been in their military headquarters, we've had interviews with their top military people, we've had access to their top prison people, we have countless documents we've received.

"No one can say those aren't results. Now for some people they may not get the result they personally want, and we all feel that agony. But the fact is, Vietnam is working side-by-side with our troops, in the field--in great danger, in many cases, where there is unexploded ordnance. And they are producing results.

"I believe Vietnam is doing an enormous amount to cooperate with us under the circumstances. Is there more to be done? Yes, there is more to be done. But, this action today will help facilitate our ability to do the 'more.' The President's action will help us move the accountability process. He is acting in the national interest, and I commend him for it. I think it is the right thing to do for the POWs and MIAs. It's the right thing to do, keeping faith with the people who fought with us and helped us in Vietnam. It's the right thing to do for our interest in the region strategically. It's the right thing for us to do in terms of our world leadership."



News from **John McCain**

U.S. Senator • Arizona

Contact: Scott Celley
(202) 224-2235
TDD: (202) 224-7132

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Friday, July 2, 1993

MCCAIN ANNOUNCES SUPPORT FOR CLINTON MOVE ON VIETNAM

(Washington, D.C.) -- Senator John McCain announced today his support for President Clinton's decision to allow Vietnam to resolve its outstanding debts to the International Monetary Fund. "This limited move," McCain observed, "is necessary to ensure that the accounting process for our POW/MIAs, which has been working very well lately, continues. I believe that progress in relations with Vietnam are in our national security interest."

Senator McCain recently returned from a Memorial Day trip to Vietnam. "During that trip I discussed in detail with Joint Task Force -- Full Accounting (JTF-FA) personnel the level of Vietnam's cooperation," McCain said. "Every American serviceman involved in the last two joint investigations in Vietnam reported complete Vietnamese cooperation in all facets of the investigations. Both General John Vessey, the President's Emissary to Vietnam for POW/MIA Affairs, and General Tom Needham, the Commander of JTF-FA, assured me that taking this step to encourage continued Vietnamese cooperation was necessary at this time."

Along with the Executive Director of the National League of Families of POW/MIAs, Anne Mills Griffith, Senator McCain was an early supporter of President Bush's "roadmap" policy to reward Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIAs and a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian conflict with gradual progress toward better relations. "Clearly, Vietnam has met its obligations under the provisions of the roadmap that warrant this particular move forward," McCain said.

Senator McCain concluded by saying that "further progress toward better relations will, of course, depend on continued Vietnamese cooperation. But I believe President Clinton has taken an important step today that will help to hasten the day when we have at last the fullest possible accounting for our POW/MIAs. It is a step fully consistent with the President's commitments to veterans and to the families of our POW/MIAs. I strongly commend him for it."

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PETE PETERSON
2D DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE
ON
APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND WATER
RESOURCES
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0902

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
426 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0902
(202) 225-5235
DISTRICT OFFICES:
930 THOMASVILLE ROAD, SUITE 101
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32303
(904) 581-3879
MARIANNA
(904) 528-7618
LAKE CITY
(904) 752-1088
30 WEST GOVERNMENT STREET
ROOM 203
PANAMA CITY, FL 32401
(904) 785-0812

For Immediate Release
July 2, 1993

Contact: Suzanne Farmer
Phone: 202/225-5235

PETERSON SUPPORTS U.S. POLICY CHANGE TOWARD VIETNAM

WASHINGTON--U.S. Congressman Pete Peterson, D-Marianna, expressed his strong support for President Clinton's announcement that the United States will drop opposition to a Japanese- and French-led proposition to refinance Vietnam's debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), allowing Vietnam access to international financing.

Peterson, who has traveled to Vietnam on fact-finding missions with two separate Congressional delegations over the past three years, said, "I applaud the efforts of the President to move to a closer relationship with Vietnam. I am particularly pleased that he has listened to the advice of those of us who have been deeply involved in the POW/MIA issue for many years. I am convinced that the removal of U.S. opposition to IMF loans for Vietnam will enhance efforts for getting the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIAs."

Peterson also said, "While I support this shift in policy of incremental improvement in our relations with Vietnam, I stop short of recommending normalization of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam at this time."



Congressman Wayne Gilchrest

MARYLAND'S FIRST DISTRICT

(202) 225-5311

July 2, 1993
For Immediate Release

Contact: Maria Kelly
(202) 225-5311

GILCHREST AGREES: Allow Vietnam to restructure its debts to help speed full accounting of American POW/MIAs cases.

WASHINGTON -- Congressman Wayne T. Gilchrest, R-MD, agreed with President Clinton's announcement Friday to lift U.S. opposition to a French-led proposal to refinance Vietnam's \$140 million debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The President announced that the U.S. would no longer object to other nations clearing Vietnam's arrears in the International Monetary Fund. The IMF will meet on July 14, 1993, at which time it is expected the subject of Vietnam's arrears will be taken up.

The President's decision means that Vietnam may proceed to clear its arrears, restructure its \$140 million debt, and then apply for additional international financing.

Congressman Gilchrest joined with 18 other Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senators, all Vietnam-era veterans, including Senators John F. Kerry, and John McCain, and Congressmen Pete Peterson (McCain and Peterson were both held as POWs for six years), David Skaggs, and Jim Kolbe, in writing to the President to encourage him to lift U.S. opposition to Vietnam clearing its debts with the IMF.

A bipartisan delegation of Senators, Representatives and members of national veterans organizations, led by Senator John Kerry, travelled to Vietnam in late May to further investigate questions about American POW/MIAs. The delegation met with U.S. personnel with the Joint Task Force- Full Accounting and high level officials from the Vietnamese government.

"The delegation came to the conclusion that a country-to-country process is in place that is making significant progress on many of the unresolved POW/MIA cases. This process is in jeopardy if the U.S. does not make a gesture to acknowledge the contributions of the Vietnamese."

"While we do not advocate normalization at this time" the letter read, "we believe that we must acknowledge Vietnam's efforts in order to keep the country-to-country process alive and maintain positive incentives to encourage continued cooperation. We believe that this is the next logical step in our efforts to get a full accounting of our missing servicemen in Southeast Asia."

The President also announced that he will send a delegation to Vietnam in July to press for further POW/MIA accounting and further progress that will be needed for any further steps in U.S. - Vietnam relations.

Congressman Gilchrest served in the U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam in a infantry platoon from 1966-67, and received a Purple Heart.

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 7/3/93

TO: DAVID GERGEN
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary


The attached has been forwarded
to the President.

THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506

03 JUL 3 P1:39

July 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MICHAEL KANTOR 
SUBJECT: URUGUAY ROUND MARKET ACCESS

The United States, EC, Japan and Canada have not yet reached agreement on a market access package for presentation to G-7 leaders in Tokyo. Meetings will continue at the subcabinet level on July 5; I will be meeting with my counterparts on July 6. The package has three elements: industrial access, services and agriculture. For purposes of the Summit, we have concentrated primarily on securing a detailed agreement on the outlines of the industrial access package.

The major outstanding issues are: U.S. textile and apparel tariffs, the EC offers on electronics and non-ferrous metals and Japan's contribution in distilled spirits and wood. The EC has pushed hard for 50% reductions of all U.S. textile and apparel tariffs at or above 15%. We have given the EC an offer that addresses everything of importance to the EC. It is my judgement that we have gone about as far as we can go politically on these items. Sir Leon Brittan is going to play out this negotiation further in Tokyo.

We may reach agreement at the Summit. This will not assure final success in Geneva given all the work remaining for the fall. It will, however, provide the needed breakthrough on the Round that has eluded all previous G-7 Summits where the Round has been the major economic issue. I do not believe that there is any disagreement between any of us on the U.S. team. We must be prepared to walk away from a package that does not advance the Round substantively in Geneva or jeopardizes our domestic objectives.

cc: Secretary Bentsen
Secretary Christopher
Tony Lake
Robert Rubin
Sandy Berger
Bo Cutter
Bob Fauver
Bo Cutter

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Chron

DATE: 7/3/93

TO: BILL GALSTON

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

For your information.



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

93 JUL 1 P5:50

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

June 30, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Lloyd Bentsen

SUBJECT:

Report on the Student Loan Marketing Association

The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, requires the Secretary of the Treasury to report the completion of the annual audit of the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) accounts to the President and to Congress. Sallie Mae is a stockholder-owned corporation created by Congress in 1972 as a secondary market for federally guaranteed student loans.

The attached Sallie Mae Annual Report includes financial statements for the year ended December 31, 1992, and an unqualified opinion by the certified public accounting firm of Ernst & Young. Net income after taxes for the year ended December 31, 1992, amounted to \$394 million, compared with \$345 million for the year ended December 31, 1991, or an increase of 14 percent. Total assets and total liabilities each showed an increase of 3 percent, to \$47 billion and \$45 billion, respectively. Sallie Mae's retained earnings at December 31, 1992, amounted to \$1.753 billion, up from \$1.465 billion at the end of the previous year. Sallie Mae's financial obligations are not obligations of the Federal Government. Sallie Mae, however, receives U.S. Government monies representing insurance proceeds on defaulted student loans. Sallie Mae's average student loan portfolio amounted to \$22.941 billion and \$20.694 billion for 1992 and 1991, respectively. During 1992, Sallie Mae received claims proceeds totaling \$1.02 billion, compared with \$1.2 billion the previous year. Thus, insurance proceeds represented 4.5 percent and 5.8 percent of Sallie Mae's average student loan portfolios for 1992 and 1991, respectively. Borrower defaults numbered 319,000 in 1992 and 382,000 in 1991.

The Higher Education Amendments of 1992 established capital requirements for Sallie Mae and gave the U.S. Department of the Treasury authority to monitor Sallie Mae's financial condition. At December 31, 1992, Sallie Mae's capital ratio was 2.53 percent, compared with an established minimum of 2 percent. As required by the Higher Education Act, this report is also being submitted to Congress. Also, a copy is being sent to the Secretary of Education, and to the Student Loan Marketing Association.

Attachment: Sallie Mae Annual Report

AS A SECONDARY MARKET,

SALLIE MAE COUNTS ITS BANK CLIENTS

IN THE HUNDREDS, AND ITS SCHOOL

CONSTITUENTS IN THE THOUSANDS —



BUT...

ITS ULTIMATE CUSTOMERS,

EDUCATION LOAN BORROWERS,

NUMBER IN THE MILLIONS.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 2, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL BURTON

FROM: JOHN PODESTA 
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND STAFF SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Weekend Coverage

As the people who are always around, we would like an exemption of the policy telling you we have coverage.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

original

7/2/93

DATE: _____

TO: DAVID GERGEN
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS
MARK GEARAN
DEE DEE MYERS

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

4907

WASHINGTON

93 JUL 2 A12:21

July 1, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
ROBERT RUBIN

SUBJECT: Military Base Closure Decision Memorandum

Purpose

To recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A approving the recommendations of the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and submit the Commission's report to Congress in accordance with P.L. 101-510.

Background

Congress passed legislation (P.L. 101-510) in 1990 to ensure that the process of closing and realigning military installations within the United States would be fair, nonpartisan and open to public scrutiny. The law established an independent Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review DoD recommendations during 1991, 1993 and 1995.

On March 12, 1993, Secretary Aspin forwarded the 1993 DoD recommendations to the Commission for review. The base closures and realignments that were recommended by Secretary Aspin were, by law, required to be based on the most recent force structure plan then in existence, i.e., the Bush Administration "base force" structure for fiscal years 1994 through 1999. As a result of coming adjustments to the force structure plan, a substantial number of base closures are likely to be required in 1995.

In conducting its independent and open review, the Commission, chaired by Jim Courter, held 17 hearings across the nation and visited over 125 military activities. The Commission held final deliberations on June 23-27 and reached their final recommendations by public vote during that period. We officially received the Commission's final report (Tab A) on July 1.

Analysis of Commission Recommendations

Since the time the Commission's recommendations were made public, DoD and White House staff have been reviewing the changes made by the Commission. We asked DoD to assess if any of the Commission's changes severely damage our military capability, cannot be implemented or create unacceptable cumulative economic impact in any community.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

During a June 30 meeting Secretary Aspin characterized the Commission's list as "90 percent common, more cautious with less job reduction impact." He stated that in his view the Commission's recommendations validated the DoD list, protected military concerns and confirmed the integrity of a difficult but necessary process. The Secretary confirmed these findings in his memo (Tab C). The Secretary also stated that General Powell certified his support of the Commission's recommendations.

Differences in the March 12 DoD and July 1 Commission recommendations are summarized below:

	<u>DoD</u>	<u>Commission</u>
Major Base Closures	31	28
Major Base Realignments	12	8
Small Bases Closed/Realigned	122	126
Net Military Employment Shift	24,252	21,000
Net DoD Civilian Employment Shift	57,140	42,000
Estimated Annual Savings (billions per year)	\$3.0	\$2.3

We believe the Commission's hearings and final deliberations were nonpartisan and professional, a view that has been widely expressed in the press. In several cases, the Commission's decisions actually improved on the DoD recommendations. While closing major bases in both San Francisco and Charleston, the Commission softened the blow by keeping a Navy supply center in Oakland and consolidating four naval electronics systems engineering centers in Charleston. The Commission's decision to leave two reserve units at Homestead Air Force Base will help rebuild that hurricane-ravaged community. And the Commission's decision to keep the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio was strongly supported by Secretary Babbitt, who sees this headquarters as the "anchor" of the office utilization plan he has developed for that area of this large real estate tract.

One decision by the Commission has been controversial. The Commission rejected the Air Force and DoD recommendation to make Plattsburgh Air Force Base in New York the East Coast "Air Mobility Center" and chose instead McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. This is the first time a major base not recommended by DoD for deactivation has been added by a Commission to the closure list. This decision was discussed in our June 30 meeting with Secretary Aspin. The Secretary did not believe this issue weighed heavily enough to warrant your rejection of the entire list.

The generally favorable press coverage to date is typified by the headline of a June 29 New York Times article: "A Mission Accomplished: In Deciding Which Military Bases to Close, Commission Was a Fortress Against Politics." Although you have received several letters from members of Congress urging you to reject the Commission's list (Senators Feinstein, Boxer, Moynihan, D'Amato, along with Governor Cuomo), Chairman Dellums, whose district in Oakland is hard hit, called the Commission's actions "thorough and professional" in a June 25 press release.

Employment Impacts

DoD estimates of base and state employment impacts which would occur with implementation of the Commission recommendations are detailed in the attachments of Secretary Aspin's memorandum at Tab C. The largest direct job losses occur in the San Francisco Bay Area (15,048 military and 14,162 civilian), and in Charleston, South Carolina (8,975 military and 6,226 civilian). The states with the greatest number of major base closures and realignments are shown below:

<u>State</u>	<u>Major Closures and Realignments</u>	<u>Total Major Installations</u>
California	8	67
Florida	4	24
Virginia	4	29
New York	3	16

The largest state employment impacts due to 1993 recommended closures are summarized below. Note that "Direct" employment shift counts military and DoD civilians.

<u>State</u>	<u>Government Direct Employment Shift</u>
California	29,683
Virginia	10,168
South Carolina	9,567
New York	9,354
Florida	12,578

The largest cumulative state employment shifts due to all three rounds from 1988 to 1993 are as follows:

<u>State</u>	<u>Government Direct Employment Shift</u>
California	78,488
Pennsylvania	13,035
Florida	14,750
South Carolina	8,136
Indiana	7,961

When compared against the number of DoD jobs in each state, the results are as shown below:

<u>State</u>	<u>Total DoD Employment</u>	<u>Total Employment Shift</u>	<u>Percent Reduction Total DoD Employment</u>
Tennessee	35,154	6,960	19.8
New York	57,683	9,354	16.2
Michigan	25,358	3,523	13.9
South Carolina	83,558	9,567	11.4
Florida	134,266	12,578	9.4

Note: California ranks below these states in percentage terms.

Mitigating Economic and Employment Impacts:

The process of closing, cleaning and disposing of bases announced on the 1988 and 1991 lists has been slow. Only 13 of the 42 major bases designated for closure in the 1988 and 1991 rounds are closed. The major barriers have been overcoming roadblocks in environmental cleanup and property disposal.

In accordance with your direction to move out aggressively to assist those communities and individuals adversely affected by base closures, the National Economic Council has been coordinating a DoD-led effort to accelerate economic reinvestment at closing bases. The NEC 5-point plan being recommended to you will be forwarded in a separate memo and, as summarized in Tab D, will:

1. Establish planning grants of up to \$1 million for each community.
2. Provide transition coordinators at each base.
3. Ensure rapid cleanup.
4. Develop expedited property disposal.
5. Target Federal assistance.

Other Commission Recommendations

In addition to the base closing recommendations the Commission also included in their report several other suggestions to improve the base closure and realignment process. The Commission recommended a "community-friendly" base reuse and disposal process, which our 5-point plan directly addresses. The Commission accepted DoD's new direction for consolidating Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) centers. The Commission made other recommendations on interservicing, depot capacity and other issues of interest. We find these suggestions helpful and recommend DoD examine them carefully prior to the 1995 round of base closures.

Next Steps in Base Closure Process

If you approve the Commission report and transmit it to Congress, lawmakers will have 45 days to enact a joint resolution of disapproval. Unless such a resolution clears both houses, the Commission's recommendations are adopted and must be implemented by the Secretary of Defense within six years. If you disapprove the Commission's recommendations in whole or in part, the Commission has until August 15 to submit another list. You must forward the revised recommendations to Congress by September 1, or the 1993 process comes to an end.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on our analysis, and in light of Secretary Aspin and General Powell's recommendations, we recommend that you approve the 1993 recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and that you forward the Commission's report containing these recommendations to Congress. Specifically, we recommend that:

- You sign the transmittal letter at Tab A and send the Commission's report to Congress.
- You sign the letter at Tab B notifying the Commission of your decision.
- You announce the NEC/DoD "5-Point Plan" for base economic redevelopment in conjunction with the announcement of your approval of the Commission's base closure recommendations.

Decision

Approve ()

Reject ()

Attachments

Tab A	President's Transmittal Memorandum to Congress with Attached 1993 Commission Report
Tab B	President's Notification to Commission
Tab C	DoD Recommendations and Analysis
Tab D	Summary of "5-Point" Base Redevelopment Plan

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith the report containing the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission pursuant to section 2903 of Public Law 101-510, 104 Stat. 1810, as amended.

I hereby certify that I approve all the recommendations contained in the Commission's report.

THE WHITE HOUSE,



**DEFENSE
BASE CLOSURE
AND
REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**1993
REPORT
TO THE
PRESIDENT**

TAB B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to Section 2903 of Public Law 101-510, as amended, I hereby notify the Commission that, by the enclosed copy of my message to the Congress, I have approved all the recommendations of the Commission as contained in the Commission's 1993 report.

Sincerely,

The Honorable James A. Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith the report containing the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission pursuant to section 2903 of Public Law 101-510, 104 Stat. 1810, as amended.

I hereby certify that I approve all the recommendations contained in the Commission's report.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

NOTE: PLEASE ENCLOSE SIGNED COPY
OF PRESIDENT'S TRANSMITTAL
MEMORANDUM TO CONGRESS (AT TAB A)

TAB C



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 1, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Les Aspin, The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Recommendations of the Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) Commission

The BRAC Commission has forwarded its recommendations to you; the list is enclosed. I have reviewed the report. There have been few changes from the list DOD submitted and the changes are sensible. What this means is that the military concerns have been protected in this base closure.

On the whole, the list is about 90 percent the same, as the DOD list but it is a more cautious list, one that does not close as many bases and has somewhat less job reduction impact. The difference between our proposals in March and the BRAC Commission action is summarized below:

	<u>DOD proposal</u>	<u>BRAC Recommendation</u>
<u>Major Base Closures</u>	31	28
<u>Major Base Realignments</u>	12	8
<u>Net Civilian jobs lost</u>	57,140	42,000
<u>Net Military jobs lost</u>	24,252	21,000

Closing bases is important. The consequences of not closing bases is that Defense Department resources will be diverted from the support of a ready military force to the maintenance of unneeded military installations. Our paramount concern must be that the tax dollars devoted to defense are spent in a way that maintains the force not the overhead.

You will recall that this is a bipartisan commission and was appointed by your predecessor. It has conducted a painful but necessary and fair process.

In addition, affected US communities will want to learn that we recently closed or reduced operations at 92 US military sites overseas. This brings to 840 the number of locations outside the United States where military operations have been curtailed or eliminated since 1990. We are closing foreign bases more quickly than domestic bases.

The Department of Defense, in cooperation with other concerned federal agencies, has developed a comprehensive plan to accelerate the productive economic reuse of bases that have been closed as a result of the 1993 and earlier BRAC Commissions. I am reporting the details of this plan in a separate memorandum.

In sum, approval of this list does these positive things:

- It validates the list we submitted
- It does not increase, and it slightly decreases, job loss
- It confirms the integrity of a difficult, but necessary, process

I therefore recommend that you approve the report and forward it to Congress.

Enclosures

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Aspin", is written over a large, circular, hand-drawn mark. A thick horizontal line is drawn across the bottom of the signature.

1993 Base Closure Commission Recommendations July 1993

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- TAB 1 - Summary**
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by Base/State**
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by Base/State (SecDef vs Commission)**
- TAB 4 - State Employment Impacts of 1993
Commission Recommendations by State**
- TAB 5 - Cumulative Employment Impacts of 1988,
1991, and 1993 Actions by State**

TAB 1

BRAC 93 RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>SECDEF</u>		<u>COMMISSION</u>
31	Major bases closed	28
12	Major bases realigned	8
122	Small bases or activities closed, realigned, relocated or disestablished	126
15	Previously approved BRAC recommendations changed	14
24 K	Net military reductions	21 K
57 K	Net civilian reductions	42 K
\$7.3 B	One time cost to close	\$7.4 B
\$3.0 B	Annual savings	\$2.3 B
\$17.5 B	Net Present Value	\$16.0 B

TAB 2

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Commission BRAC 93 Closure and Realignment Recommendations Impacts by State

State Installation	SECDEF Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		Commission	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)	
		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	Action	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
ALABAMA														
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	Receive	0	0	30	567	30	567	Modified	0	415	0	0	0	(415)
FORT MCCLELLAN	Close	6,017	2,074	0	0	(6,017)	(2,074)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
REDSTONE ARSENAL	Redirect	0	1,245	0	0	0	(1,245)	Accepted	0	1,245	0	0	0	(1,245)
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, ANNISTON ARMY DEPO	Receive	0	0	0	166	0	166	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAVAL STATION, MOBILE	Close	524	126	0	0	(524)	(126)	Accepted	524	126	0	0	(524)	(126)
	Total	6,541	3,445	30	733	(6,511)	(2,712)		524	1,786	0	0	(524)	(1,786)
CALIFORNIA														
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY	None	0	0	0	0	0	0	Modified	0	300	0	0	0	(300)
DEF CONTR MGMT DIST, WEST	Receive	0	0	0	136	0	136	Accepted	0	0	0	136	0	136
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, OAKLAND NSC	Disestablish	4	270	0	0	(4)	(270)	Accepted	4	270	0	0	(4)	(270)
NCTS SAN DIEGO (DISA)	Disestablish	0	170	0	0	0	(170)	Modified	0	0	0	128	0	128
RPC McCLELLAN AFB (DISA)	Disestablish	0	169	0	0	0	(169)	Modified	0	0	0	101	0	101
BEALE AFB	Receive	0	0	0	243	0	243	Accepted	0	0	0	243	0	243
MARCH AFB	Realign	2,961	997	0	0	(2,961)	(997)	Accepted	2,961	997	0	0	(2,961)	(997)
McCLELLAN AFB	Redirect	0	243	0	0	0	(243)	Accepted	0	243	0	0	0	(243)
TRAVIS AFB	Receive	0	0	1,077	59	1,077	59	Rejected	0	0	1,046	59	1,046	59
MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD	Close	1,963	7,567	0	0	(1,963)	(7,567)	Accepted	1,963	7,567	0	0	(1,963)	(7,567)
MCAS 29 PALMS	Redirect	3,225	0	0	0	(3,225)	0	Accepted	3,225	0	0	0	(3,225)	0
MCAS, CAMP PENDLETON	Receive	0	0	949	0	949	0	Modified	0	0	941	0	941	0
MCAS, EL TORO	Close	5,689	979	0	0	(5,689)	(979)	Accepted	5,689	979	0	0	(5,689)	(979)
NASA AMES (NAS MOFFETT)	Receive	0	0	348	105	348	105	Modified	0	0	110	0	110	0
NAS, ALAMEDA	Close	10,586	556	0	0	(10,586)	(556)	Accepted	10,586	556	0	0	(10,586)	(556)
NAS, LEMOORE	Receive	0	0	4,629	317	4,629	317	Accepted	0	0	4,629	317	4,629	317
NAS, MIRAMAR	Receive	7,600	1,005	9,329	751	1,729	(254)	Accepted	7,600	1,005	9,329	751	1,729	(254)
NAS, NORTH ISLAND	Receive	0	0	3,982	47	3,982	47	Accepted	0	0	3,982	47	3,982	47
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, ALAMEDA	Close	376	2,672	0	0	(376)	(2,672)	Accepted	376	2,672	0	0	(376)	(2,672)
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, N. ISLAND	Receive	0	0	3	1,889	3	1,889	Accepted	0	0	3	1,889	3	1,889
NAVAL HOSPITAL, SAN DIEGO	Receive	0	0	622	59	622	59	Accepted	0	0	622	59	622	59
NAVAL HOSPITAL, OAKLAND	Close	1,472	809	0	0	(1,472)	(809)	Accepted	1,472	809	0	0	(1,472)	(809)
NAVAL PUBLIC WORKS CENTER, SF	Disestablish	10	1,834	0	0	(10)	(1,834)	Accepted	10	1,834	0	0	(10)	(1,834)
NAVAL STATION, SAN DIEGO	Receive	0	0	4,423	111	4,423	111	Modified	0	0	3,459	100	3,459	100
NAVAL STATION, TREASURE IS	Close	637	454	0	0	(637)	(454)	Accepted	637	454	0	0	(637)	(454)
NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER, OAKLAND	Close	2,374	948	0	0	(2,374)	(948)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAVAL TRAINING CENTER, SAN DIEGO	Close	5,186	402	0	0	(5,186)	(402)	Accepted	5,186	402	0	0	(5,186)	(402)
NAWC CHINA LAKE	Receive	0	0	65	202	65	202	Accepted	0	0	65	202	65	202
MCLB BARSTOW	None	0	0	0	0	0	0	Modified	0	104	0	0	0	(104)
	Total	42,083	19,075	25,427	3,919	(16,656)	(15,156)		39,709	18,192	24,186	4,032	(15,523)	(14,160)
COLORADO														
FORT CARSON	Redirect	238	105	0	0	(238)	(105)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	238	105	0	0	(238)	(105)		0	0	0	0	0	0
CONNECTICUT														
NAVAL SUB BASE, NEW LONDON	Realign	4,655	1,114	3,542	0	(1,113)	(1,114)	Modified	0	0	3,542	0	3,542	0
	Total	4,655	1,114	3,542	0	(1,113)	(1,114)		0	0	3,542	0	3,542	0
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA														
NCTS WASHINGTON	Disestablish	20	301	0	0	(20)	(301)	Accepted	20	301	0	0	(20)	(301)
MISC. NAVAL ACTIVITIES NCR	Realign	231	275	36	485	(195)	210	Accepted	231	275	36	485	(195)	210
NAVAL SECURITY STATION, WASHINGTON	Realign	510	636	0	0	(510)	(636)	Accepted	510	636	0	0	(510)	(636)
	Total	761	1,212	36	485	(725)	(727)		761	1,212	36	485	(725)	(727)

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Commission BRAC 93 Closure and Realignment Recommendations Impacts by State

State Installation	SECDEF Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		Commission Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)	
		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
FLORIDA														
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, JACKSONVILLE NSC	Receive	0	0	3	256	3	256	Accepted	0	0	3	256	3	256
NCTS PENSACOLA	Disestablish	0	184	0	0	0	(184)	Accepted	0	184	0	0	0	(184)
HOMESTEAD AFB	Close	3,865	912	0	0	(3,865)	(912)	Modified	3,860	136	0	0	(3,860)	(136)
MACDILL AFB	Receive	0	0	253	362	253	362	Accepted	0	0	253	362	253	362
PATRICK AFB	Receive	0	0	0	156	0	156	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAS, CECIL FIELD	Close	6,833	995	0	0	(6,833)	(995)	Accepted	6,833	995	0	0	(6,833)	(995)
NAS, JACKSONVILLE	Receive	0	0	152	77	152	77	Modified	0	0	147	77	147	77
NAS, PENSACOLA	Receive	19	150	8,926	670	8,907	520	Modified	19	150	7,665	670	7,646	520
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, JACKSONVILLE	Receive	0	0	204	1,683	204	1,683	Accepted	0	0	204	1,683	204	1,683
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, PENSACOLA	Close	297	3,107	0	0	(297)	(3,107)	Modified	297	3,390	0	0	(297)	(3,390)
NAVAL HOSPITAL, JACKSONVILLE	Receive	0	0	92	12	92	12	Accepted	0	0	92	12	92	12
NAVAL HOSPITAL, ORLANDO	Close	759	352	0	0	(759)	(352)	Accepted	759	352	0	0	(759)	(352)
NAVAL STATION, MAYPORT	Receive	0	0	2,138	8	2,138	8	Accepted	0	0	2,138	8	2,138	8
NAVAL TRAINING CENTER, ORLANDO	Close	8,727	753	0	0	(8,727)	(753)	Accepted	8,727	753	0	0	(8,727)	(753)
NSWC PANAMA CITY	Receive	0	0	7	300	7	300	Accepted	0	0	7	300	7	300
Total		20,500	6,453	11,775	3,524	(8,725)	(2,929)		20,495	5,960	10,509	3,368	(9,986)	(2,592)
GEORGIA														
NAS, ATLANTA	Receive	0	0	183	0	183	0	Accepted	0	0	183	0	183	0
NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE, KINGS BAY	Receive	0	0	4,754	47	4,754	47	Modified	0	0	1,884	2	1,884	2
Total		0	0	4,937	47	4,937	47		0	0	2,067	2	2,067	2
HAWAII														
MCAS, KANE OHE BAY	Receive	1,681	788	2,648	280	967	(508)	Accepted	1,681	788	2,648	280	967	(508)
NAS, BARBERS POINT	Close	3,534	618	0	0	(3,534)	(618)	Accepted	3,534	618	0	0	(3,534)	(618)
NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE, PEARL HARBOR	Receive	0	0	147	5	147	5	Accepted	0	0	147	5	147	5
Total		5,215	1,406	2,795	285	(2,420)	(1,121)		5,215	1,406	2,795	285	(2,420)	(1,121)
ILLINOIS														
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL (CECOM)	Receive	0	0	272	1,382	272	1,382	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL (OTHER)	Redirect	15	362	0	1,245	(15)	883	Accepted	15	362	0	1,245	(15)	883
DEF CONTR MGMT DIST, NO CENT	Disestablish	6	266	0	0	(6)	(266)	Accepted	6	266	0	0	(6)	(266)
O'HARE IAP ARS	Close	5	757	0	0	(5)	(757)	Accepted	5	757	0	0	(5)	(757)
ROCKFORD (OR OTHER LOCATION)	Receive	0	0	5	757	5	757	Accepted	0	0	5	757	5	757
NAS, GLENVIEW	Close	1,833	389	0	0	(1,833)	(389)	Accepted	1,833	389	0	0	(1,833)	(389)
NAVAL HOSPITAL, GREAT LAKES	Receive	0	0	632	58	632	58	Accepted	0	0	632	58	632	58
NAVAL TRNG CTR, GREAT LAKES	Receive	0	0	8,077	251	8,077	251	Accepted	0	0	8,077	251	8,077	251
Total		1,859	1,774	8,986	3,693	7,127	1,919		1,859	1,774	8,714	2,311	6,855	537
INDIANA														
DITSO INDIANAPOLIS IPC	Disestablish	1	197	0	0	(1)	(197)	Accepted	1	197	0	0	(1)	(197)
Total		1	197	0	0	(1)	(197)		1	197	0	0	(1)	(197)
KANSAS														
MCCONNELL AFB	Receive	0	0	263	11	263	11	Accepted	0	0	263	11	263	11
Total		0	0	263	11	263	11		0	0	263	11	263	11
LOUISIANA														
BARKSDALE AFB	Receive	513	59	1,292	65	779	6	Accepted	513	59	1,292	65	779	6
NAS, NEW ORLEANS	Receive	0	0	122	1	122	1	Modified	0	0	119	1	119	1

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Commission BRAC 93 Closure and Realignment Recommendations Impacts by State

State Installation	SECDEF Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		Commission Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)	
		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
	Total	513	59	1,414	66	901	7		513	59	1,411	66	898	7
MAINE														
NAS BRUNSWICK	Receive	0	0	128	0	128	0	Modified	0	0	10	0	10	0
	Total	0	0	128	0	128	0		0	0	10	0	10	0
MARYLAND														
FORT MEADE	Receive	0	0	486	160	486	160	Accepted	0	0	486	160	486	160
NAF WASHINGTON	Receive	0	0	142	27	142	27	Accepted	0	0	142	27	142	27
NESEC, ST. INIGOES	Close	33	2,786	0	0	(33)	(2,786)	Accepted	33	2,786	0	0	(33)	(2,786)
NSWC WHITE OAK	Receive	5	1,332	360	3,439	355	2,107	Accepted	5	1,332	360	3,439	355	2,107
NAWCAD PATUXENT RIVER	Receive	9	103	523	1,944	514	1,841	Modified	9	103	520	1,600	511	1,497
NSWC ANNAPOLIS	Disestablish	3	350	0	0	(3)	(350)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSWC INDIAN HEAD	Receive	0	11	0	265	0	254	Accepted?	0	11	0	265	0	254
	Total	50	4,582	1,511	5,835	1,461	1,253		47	4,232	1,508	5,491	1,461	1,259
MASSACHUSETTS														
DEF CONTRACT MGMT DIST, NE	Receive	0	0	0	183	0	183	Accepted	0	0	0	183	0	183
NAS, SOUTH WEYMOUTH	Close	653	365	0	0	(653)	(365)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	653	365	0	183	(653)	(182)		0	0	0	183	0	183
MICHIGAN														
DETROIT ARSENAL	Receive	0	0	4	162	4	162	Accepted	0	0	4	162	4	162
DLSC BATTLE CREEK	Disestablish	4	420	0	0	(4)	(420)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRMS BATTLE CREEK	Relocate	5	396	0	0	(5)	(396)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. I. SAWYER AFB	Close	2,354	788	0	0	(2,354)	(788)	Accepted	2,354	788	0	0	(2,354)	(788)
NAF DETROIT	Close	523	24	0	0	(523)	(24)	Accepted	523	24	0	0	(523)	(24)
	Total	2,866	1,628	4	162	(2,862)	(1,466)		2,877	812	4	162	(2,873)	(650)
MINNESOTA														
NAS, TWIN CITIES	Receive	0	0	230	0	230	0	Accepted	0	0	230	0	230	0
	Total	0	0	230	0	230	0		0	0	230	0	230	0
MISSISSIPPI														
NAS, MERIDIAN	Close	1,999	1,037	0	0	(1,999)	(1,037)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAVAL STATION, PASCAGOULA	Receive	0	0	465	3	465	3	Accepted	0	0	465	3	465	3
	Total	1,999	1,037	465	3	(1,534)	(1,034)		0	0	465	3	465	3
MISSOURI														
FORT LEONARD WOOD	Receive	0	0	5,742	220	5,742	220	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
DITSO KANSAS CITY IPC	Disestablish	56	70	0	0	(56)	(70)	Accepted	56	70	0	0	(56)	(70)
	Total	56	70	5,742	220	5,686	150		56	70	0	0	(56)	(70)
NEVADA														
NAS, FALLON	Receive	0	0	194	9	194	9	Accepted	0	0	194	9	194	9
	Total	0	0	194	9	194	9		0	0	194	9	194	9
NEW JERSEY														
FORT MONMOUTH	Realign	565	2,720	140	598	(425)	(2,122)	Modified	293	52	140	598	(153)	546
MCGUIRE AFB	Realign	3,289	374	0	0	(3,289)	(374)	Modified	0	0	1,503	121	1,503	121
NAWCAD TRENTON	Close	8	448	0	0	(8)	(448)	Accepted	8	448	0	0	(8)	(448)
	Total	3,862	3,542	140	598	(3,722)	(2,944)		301	500	1,643	719	1,342	219

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Commission BRAC 93 Closure and Realignment Recommendations Impacts by State

State Installation	SECDEF Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		Commission Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)	
		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
NEW YORK														
STEWART ANNEX	Receive	0	0	396	0	396	0							
GRIFFISS AFB	Realign	3,338	1,191	0	0	(3,338)	(1,191)	Accepted	0	0	396	0	396	0
PLATTSBURGH AFB	Receive	0	0	2,845	257	2,845	257	Accepted	3,338	1,191	0	0	(3,338)	(1,191)
FIRST MARINE CORPS DIST, GARDEN CITY	Realign	80	40	0	0	(80)	(40)	Modified	2,095	352	0	0	(2,095)	(352)
NAVAL STATION, STATEN ISLAND	Close	1,773	1,001	0	0	(1,773)	(1,001)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	5,171	2,232	3,241	257	(1,930)	(1,975)	Accepted	1,773	1,001	0	0	(1,773)	(1,001)
									7,206	2,544	396	0	(6,810)	(2,544)
NORTH CAROLINA														
MCAS, CHERRY POINT	Receive	0	0	3,350	66	3,350	66	Accepted	0	0	3,350	66	3,350	66
MCAS, NEW RIVER	Receive	0	0	207	0	207	0	Accepted	0	0	207	0	207	0
NADP, CHERRY POINT	Receive	0	0	314	1,573	314	1,573	Modified	0	0	314	1,692	314	1,692
	Total	0	0	3,871	1,639	3,871	1,639		0	0	3,871	1,758	3,871	1,758
NORTH DAKOTA														
GRAND FORKS AFB	Receive	609	23	929	33	320	10	Accepted	609	23	929	33	320	10
MINOT AFB	Receive	466	11	680	14	214	3	Accepted	466	11	680	14	214	3
	Total	1,075	34	1,609	47	534	13		1,075	34	1,609	47	534	13
OHIO														
DEF CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY CTR	Receive	0	0	94	2,935	94	2,935	Modified	0	0	93	2,500	93	2,500
DEF ELECTRONIC SUPPLY CTR	Close	93	2,804	0	0	(93)	(2,804)	Accepted	93	2,804	0	0	(93)	(2,804)
RPC WRIGHT-PATTERSON (DISA)	Receive	0	0	0	204	0	204	Accepted	0	0	0	204	0	204
NEWARK AFB	Close	92	1,760	0	0	(92)	(1,760)	Accepted	92	1,760	0	0	(92)	(1,760)
RICKENBACKER AGB	Receive	0	0	0	522	0	522	Accepted	0	0	0	522	0	522
RMBA CLEVELAND	None	0	0	0	0	0	0	Rejected	0	197	0	0	0	(197)
SPRINGFIELD BECKLEY MAP AGS	Realign	54	312	0	0	(54)	(312)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	Receive	0	522	54	560	54	38	Accepted	0	522	54	560	54	38
	Total	239	5,398	148	4,221	(91)	(1,177)		185	5,283	147	3,786	(38)	(1,497)
OKLAHOMA														
ALTUS AFB	Receive	0	0	668	38	668	38	Accepted	0	0	668	38	668	38
	Total	0	0	668	38	668	38		0	0	668	38	668	38
PENNSYLVANIA														
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	Realign	2	1,944	0	0	(2)	(1,944)	Modified	0	1,245	0	911	0	(334)
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	Redirect	0	0	15	362	15	362	Accepted	0	0	15	362	15	362
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	Receive	0	0	69	619	69	619	Modified	0	20	69	50	69	30
CLOTHING FACTORY DEFENSE	Close	2	1,235	0	0	(2)	(1,235)	Accepted	2	1,235	0	0	(2)	(1,235)
DEFENSE CONTRACT MGMT DIST	Disestablish	3	231	0	0	(3)	(231)	Accepted	3	231	0	0	(3)	(231)
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, LETTERKENNY	Disestablish	0	400	0	0	0	(400)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
DEFENSE DISTRIB. DEPOT, TOBYHANNA	Receive	0	0	0	169	0	169	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
DEFENSE DISTRIB. REGION EAST	Receive	0	0	67	4,176	67	4,176	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CTR	Relocate	26	1,846	0	0	(26)	(1,846)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER	Close	78	3,878	0	0	(78)	(3,878)	Modified	0	250	0	0	0	(250)
AIPC CHAMBERSBURGH (DISA)	Receive	0	0	0	139	0	139	Accepted	0	0	0	139	0	139
ASO PHILADELPHIA (DISA)	Disestablish	0	136	0	0	0	(136)	Accepted	0	136	0	0	0	(136)
IPC PHILADELPHIA (DISA)	Disestablish	0	143	0	0	0	(143)	Accepted	0	143	0	0	0	(143)
SPCC MECHANICSBURG (DISA)	Receive	0	0	0	177	0	177	Accepted	0	0	0	177	0	177
NAS, WILLOW GROVE	Receive	0	311	157	1	157	(310)	Modified	0	0	157	1	157	1
NAVY AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE	Close	65	2,351	0	0	(65)	(2,351)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSWC PHILADELPHIA	Receive	0	0	0	200	0	200	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
PHILADELPHIA NSY (PERA)	Disestablish	4	187	0	0	(4)	(187)	Accepted	4	187	0	0	(4)	(187)

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Commission BRAC 93 Closure and Realignment Recommendations Impacts by State

State Installation	SECDEF Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		Commission Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)	
		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER														
	Receive	2	10	124	1,913	122	1,903	Rejected	2	10	62	296	60	286
	Total	182	12,672	432	7,756	250	(4,916)		11	3,457	303	1,936	292	(1,521)
RHODE ISLAND														
NAVAL EDUCATION & TRAINING CTR	Realign	830	3	20	305	(810)	302	Accepted	830	3	20	305	(810)	302
NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CTR	Receive	0	0	2	504	2	504	Accepted	0	0	2	504	2	504
	Total	830	3	22	809	(808)	806		830	3	22	809	(808)	806
SOUTH CAROLINA														
FORT JACKSON	Receive	0	0	293	52	293	52	Accepted	0	0	293	52	293	52
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, CHARLESTON	Disestablish	5	202	0	0	(5)	(202)	Accepted	5	202	0	0	(5)	(202)
CHARLESTON AFB	Redirect	253	37	0	0	(253)	(37)	Accepted	253	37	0	0	(253)	(37)
SHAW AFB	Receive	0	0	258	5	258	5	Accepted	0	0	258	5	258	5
CHARLESTON NAVAL SHIPYARD	Close	74	4,837	0	0	(74)	(4,837)	Accepted	74	4,837	0	0	(74)	(4,837)
MCAS, BEAUFORT	Receive	0	0	111	0	111	0	Accepted	0	0	111	0	111	0
NESEC CHARLESTON	Close	3	1,885	0	0	(3)	(1,885)	Rejected	0	0	74	4,377	74	4,377
NAVAL HOSPITAL, BEAUFORT	Receive	0	0	683	119	683	119	Modified	0	0	465	83	464	83
NAVAL HOSPITAL, CHARLESTON	Close	682	647	0	0	(682)	(647)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAVAL STATION, CHARLESTON	Close	8,634	1,194	0	0	(8,634)	(1,194)	Accepted	8,634	1,194	0	0	(8,634)	(1,194)
NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER, CHARLESTON	Disestablish	26	408	0	0	(26)	(408)	Modified	9	39	0	0	(9)	(39)
	Total	9,677	9,210	1,345	176	(8,332)	(9,034)		8,975	6,309	1,201	4,517	(7,775)	(1,792)
SOUTH DAKOTA														
ELLSWORTH AFB	Receive	263	11	503	10	240	(1)	Accepted	263	11	503	10	240	(1)
	Total	263	11	503	10	240	(1)		263	11	503	10	240	(1)
TENNESSEE														
NAS, MEMPHIS	Realign	8,041	1,376	1,331	1,126	(6,710)	(250)	Accepted	8,041	1,376	1,331	1,126	(6,710)	(250)
	Total	8,041	1,376	1,331	1,126	(6,710)	(250)		8,041	1,376	1,331	1,126	(6,710)	(250)
TEXAS														
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	Receive	0	0	0	737	0	737	Modified	0	174	0	653	0	479
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, RED RIVER ARMY DEPO	Receive	0	0	2	240	2	240	Accepted	0	0	2	240	2	240
BERGSTROM AFB	Redirect	0	625	0	0	0	(625)	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
CARSWELL AFB	Receive	0	0	1,657	589	1,657	589	Modified	0	0	1,657	275	1,657	275
LACKLAND AFB	Receive	0	0	129	22	129	22	Accepted	0	0	129	22	129	22
SHEPPARD AFB	Redirect	135	15	0	0	(135)	(15)	Accepted	135	15	0	0	(135)	(15)
NAS, CORPUS CHRISTI	Receive	0	0	176	19	176	19	Accepted	0	0	176	19	176	19
NAS, DALLAS	Close	1,374	268	0	0	(1,374)	(268)	Accepted	1,374	268	0	0	(1,374)	(268)
NAS, KINGSVILLE	Receive	0	0	174	73	174	73	Rejected	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAVAL STATION, INGLESIDE	Receive	0	0	396	7	396	7	Accepted	0	0	396	7	396	7
	Total	1,509	908	2,534	1,687	1,025	779		1,509	457	2,360	1,216	851	759
UTAH														
TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	Realign	16	1,942	0	0	(16)	(1,942)	Accepted	16	1,942	0	0	(16)	(1,942)
DEF. DIST. DEPOT TOOELE	Disestablish	1	230	0	0	(1)	(230)	Accepted	1	230	0	0	(1)	(230)
IPC OGDEN (DISA)	Disestablish	1	114	0	0	(1)	(114)	Accepted	1	114	0	0	(1)	(114)
OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER	None	0	0	0	0	0	0	Modified	0	116	0	0	0	(116)
	Total	18	2,286	0	0	(18)	(2,286)		18	2,402	0	0	(18)	(2,402)
VIRGINIA														
FORT BELVOIR	Realign	4	455	28	28	24	(427)	Accepted	4	455	28	28	24	(427)
VINT HILL FARMS STATION	Close	407	1,472	0	0	(407)	(1,472)	Accepted	407	1,472	0	0	(407)	(1,472)

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Commission BRAC 93 Closure and Realignment Recommendations Impacts by State

State Installation	SECDEF Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		Commission Action	OUT		IN		NET GAIN/(LOSS)	
		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV		MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
7TH COMMUNICATIONS GROUP	Disestablish	108	41	0	0	(108)	(41)	Accepted	108	41	0	0	(108)	(41)
PC RICHMOND (DISA)	Disestablish	0	261	0	0	0	(261)	Accepted	0	261	0	0	0	(261)
VCTS NORFOLK (DISA)	Disestablish	0	122	0	0	0	(122)	Accepted	0	122	0	0	0	(122)
VSC NORFOLK (DISA)	Disestablish	0	125	0	0	0	(125)	Accepted	0	125	0	0	0	(125)
BUREAU OF PERSONNEL	Relocate	1,070	924	0	0	(1,070)	(924)	Accepted	1,070	924	0	0	(1,070)	(924)
FLEET COMBAT TRAINING CTR, LANT	Receive	22	73	970	199	948	126	Accepted	22	73	970	199	948	126
NAS, NORFOLK	Receive	0	0	49	423	49	423	Accepted	0	0	49	423	49	423
NAS, OCEANA	Receive	0	0	2,597	42	2,597	42	Accepted	0	0	2,597	42	2,597	42
NAV SEC GRU ACT (NAVMASSO)	Relocate	221	431	0	0	(221)	(431)	Modified	221	431	0	0	(221)	(431)
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND	Relocate	543	3,128	0	0	(543)	(3,128)	Accepted	543	3,128	0	0	(543)	(3,128)
NAVAL AMPHIB BASE, LITTLE CREEK	Receive	0	0	262	4	262	4	Accepted	0	0	262	4	262	4
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, NORFOLK	Close	104	4,295	0	0	(104)	(4,295)	Accepted	104	4,295	0	0	(104)	(4,295)
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING CMD	Relocate	36	485	0	0	(36)	(485)	Accepted	36	485	0	0	(36)	(485)
NAVAL HOSPITAL, PORTSMOUTH	Receive	0	0	603	59	603	59	Accepted	0	0	603	59	603	59
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND	Relocate	360	3,439	0	0	(360)	(3,439)	Accepted	360	3,439	0	0	(360)	(3,439)
NAVAL STATION, NORFOLK	Receive	0	14	4,621	92	4,621	78	Modified	0	14	4,364	90	4,364	78
NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND	Relocate	89	291	0	0	(89)	(291)	Accepted	89	291	0	0	(89)	(291)
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER	Receive	0	0	5	175	5	175	Accepted	0	0	5	175	5	175
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION, YORKTOWN	Realign	7	205	117	14	110	(191)	Rejected	7	205	0	0	(7)	(205)
NAVMAC	Disestablish	96	108	0	0	(96)	(108)	Accepted	96	108	0	0	(96)	(108)
NAVSEACYSSENGST (NUWC)	Disestablish	4	1,407	0	0	(4)	(1,407)	Accepted	4	1,407	0	0	(4)	(1,407)
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD	Receive	0	16	228	1,139	228	1,123	Accepted	0	16	228	1,139	228	1,123
VESEC PORTSMOUTH, VA	None	0	0	0	0			Modified	5	1,410	0	0	(5)	(1,410)
SUPSHIP PORTSMOUTH	Receive	0	0	5	340	5	340	Accepted	0	0	5	340	5	340
	Total	3,071	17,292	9,485	2,515	6,414	(14,777)		3,076	18,702	9,111	2,499	6,035	(16,203)
WASHINGTON														
FAIRCHILD AFB	Redirect	1,181	98	0	0	(1,181)	(98)	Accepted	1,181	98	0	0	(1,181)	(98)
NAS, WHIDBEY ISLAND	Receive	0	0	1,026	13	1,026	13	Accepted	0	0	1,026	13	1,026	13
NAVAL HOSPITAL, BREMERTON	Receive	0	0	154	31	154	31	Accepted	0	0	154	31	154	31
NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE, BANGOR	Receive	0	0	400	660	400	660	Accepted	0	0	400	660	400	660
PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD	Receive	1	173	4,644	7	4,643	(166)	Modified	1	173	3,301	0	3,300	(173)
	Total	1,182	271	6,224	711	5,042	440		1,182	271	4,881	704	3,699	433
WEST VIRGINIA														
NAVAL AIR FACILITY, MARTINSBURG	Receive	0	0	108	19	108	19	Rejected/Clos	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	108	19	108	19		0	0	0	0	0	0
MIDWAY ISLAND														
NAF MIDWAY	Close	7	160	0	0	(7)	(160)	Accepted	7	160	0	0	(7)	(160)
	Total	7	160	0	0	(7)	(160)		7	160	0	0	(7)	(160)
GUAM														
NAS AGANA	None	0	0	0	0	0	0	Rejected	1,936	339	0	0	(1,936)	(339)
ANDERSEN AFB	None	0	0	0	0	0	0	Rejected	0	0	1,920	321	1,920	321
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0		1,936	339	1,920	321	(16)	(18)
TOTAL		123,137	97,917	99,140	40,784	(23,997)	(57,133)	TOTAL	106,672	77,548	85,900	35,894	(20,773)	(41,654)

TAB 3

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS

State Installation	SECDEF		SECDEF		SECDEF		COMMISSION		DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
	NET GAIN/(LOSS)		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT		TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT		
	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	INDIRECT & INDUCED		INDIRECT & INDUCED		
ALABAMA									
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	30	587	0	(415)	597	1,194	(415)	(830)	(2,024)
FORT MCCLELLAN	(6,017)	(2,074)	0	0	(4,855)	(12,946)	0	0	12,946
REDSTONE ARSENAL	0	(1,245)	0	(1,245)	(1,245)	(2,490)	(1,245)	(2,490)	0
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, ANNISTON ARMY DEPO	0	166	0	0	166	332	0	0	(332)
NAVAL STATION, MOBILE	(524)	(126)	(524)	(126)	(520)	(1,170)	(520)	(1,170)	0
	(6,511)	(2,712)	(524)	(1,786)	(5,857)	(15,080)	(2,180)	(4,490)	10,590
CALIFORNIA									
PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY	0	0	0	(300)	0	0	(240)	(540)	(540)
DEF CONTR MGMT DIST, WEST	0	136	0	136	136	272	136	272	0
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, OAKLAND NSC	(4)	(270)	(4)	(270)	(274)	(548)	(274)	(548)	0
NCTS SAN DIEGO (DISA)	0	(170)	0	128	(170)	(340)	128	256	596
RPC McCLELLAN AFB (DISA)	0	(169)	0	101	(304)	(473)	182	283	756
BEALE AFB	0	243	0	243	97	340	97	340	0
MARCH AFB	(2,961)	(997)	(2,961)	(997)	(3,166)	(7,124)	(3,166)	(7,124)	0
McCLELLAN AFB	0	(243)	0	(243)	(437)	(880)	(437)	(880)	0
TRAVIS AFB	1,077	59	1,046	59	909	2,045	884	1,989	(56)
MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD	(1,963)	(7,567)	(1,963)	(7,567)	(15,248)	(24,778)	(15,248)	(24,778)	0
MCAS 29 PALMS	(3,225)	0	(3,225)	0	(2,580)	(5,805)	(2,580)	(5,805)	0
MCAS, CAMP PENDLETON	949	0	941	0	759	1,708	753	1,694	(14)
MCAS, EL TORO	(5,689)	(979)	(5,689)	(979)	(5,334)	(12,002)	(5,334)	(12,002)	0
NASA AMES (NAS MOFFETT)	348	105	110	0	362	815	88	198	(617)
NAS, ALAMEDA	(10,586)	(556)	(10,586)	(556)	(20,056)	(31,198)	(20,056)	(31,198)	0
NAS, LEMOORE	4,629	317	4,629	317	1,978	6,924	1,978	6,924	0
NAS, MIRAMAR	1,729	(254)	1,729	(254)	1,180	2,655	1,180	2,655	0
NAS, NORTH ISLAND	3,982	47	3,982	47	3,223	7,252	3,223	7,252	0
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, ALAMEDA	(376)	(2,672)	(376)	(2,672)	(5,486)	(8,534)	(5,486)	(8,534)	0
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, N. ISLAND	3	1,889	3	1,889	3,406	5,298	3,406	5,298	0
NAVAL HOSPITAL, SAN DIEGO	622	59	622	59	681	1,362	681	1,362	0
NAVAL HOSPITAL, OAKLAND	(1,472)	(809)	(1,472)	(809)	(2,281)	(4,562)	(2,281)	(4,562)	0
NAVAL PUBLIC WORKS CENTER, SF	(10)	(1,834)	(10)	(1,834)	(1,844)	(3,688)	(1,844)	(3,688)	0
NAVAL STATION, SAN DIEGO	4,423	111	3,459	100	4,534	9,068	3,559	7,118	(1,950)
NAVAL STATION, TREASURE IS	(637)	(454)	(637)	(454)	(1,091)	(2,182)	(1,091)	(2,182)	0
NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER, OAKLAND	(2,374)	(948)	0	0	(3,322)	(6,644)	0	0	6,644
NAVAL TRAINING CENTER, SAN DIEGO	(5,186)	(402)	(5,186)	(402)	(5,588)	(11,176)	(5,588)	(11,176)	0
NAWC CHINA LAKE	65	202	65	202	267	534	267	534	0
MCLB BARSTOW	0	0	0	(104)	0	0	(104)	(208)	(208)
	(16,656)	(15,156)	(15,523)	(14,160)	(49,650)	(81,462)	(47,168)	(76,851)	4,610
COLORADO									
FORT CARSON	(238)	(105)	0	0	(274)	(617)	0	0	617
	(238)	(105)	0	0	(274)	(617)	0	0	617
CONNECTICUT									
NAVAL SUB BASE, NEW LONDON	(1,113)	(1,114)	3,542	0	(1,782)	(4,009)	2,834	6,376	10,384
	(1,113)	(1,114)	3,542	0	(1,782)	(4,009)	2,834	6,376	10,384

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS

State Installation	SECDEF		SECDEF		SECDEF		COMMISSION		DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
	NET GAIN/(LOSS)		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		INDIRECT & INDUCED		INDIRECT & INDUCED		
	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA									
NCTS WASHINGTON	(20)	(301)	(20)	(301)	(321)	(642)	(321)	(642)	0
MISC. NAVAL ACTIVITIES NCR	(195)	210	(195)	210	15	30	15	30	0
NAVAL SECURITY STATION, WASHINGTON	(510)	(636)	(510)	(636)	(1,146)	(2,292)	(1,146)	(2,292)	0
	(725)	(727)	(725)	(727)	(1,452)	(2,904)	(1,452)	(2,904)	0
FLORIDA									
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, JACKSONVILLE NSC	3	256	3	256	259	518	259	518	0
NCTS PENSACOLA	0	(184)	0	(184)	(184)	(368)	(184)	(368)	0
HOMESTEAD AFB	(3,865)	(912)	(3,860)	(136)	(3,822)	(8,599)	(3,197)	(7,193)	1,406
MACDILL AFB	253	362	253	362	492	1,107	492	1,107	0
PATRICK AFB	0	156	0	0	125	281	0	0	(281)
NAS, CECIL FIELD	(6,833)	(995)	(6,833)	(995)	(6,262)	(14,090)	(6,262)	(14,090)	0
NAS, JACKSONVILLE	152	77	147	77	412	641	403	627	(14)
NAS, PENSACOLA	8,907	520	7,646	520	16,969	26,396	14,699	22,865	(3,531)
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, JACKSONVILLE	204	1,683	204	1,683	3,397	5,284	3,397	5,284	0
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, PENSACOLA	(297)	(3,107)	(297)	(3,390)	(6,127)	(9,531)	(6,637)	(10,324)	(792)
NAVAL HOSPITAL, JACKSONVILLE	92	12	92	12	104	208	104	208	0
NAVAL HOSPITAL, ORLANDO	(759)	(352)	(759)	(352)	(1,111)	(2,222)	(1,111)	(2,222)	0
NAVAL STATION, MAYPORT	2,138	8	2,138	8	1,717	3,863	1,717	3,863	0
NAVAL TRAINING CENTER, ORLANDO	(8,727)	(753)	(8,727)	(753)	(7,584)	(17,064)	(7,584)	(17,064)	0
NSWC PANAMA CITY	7	300	7	300	307	614	307	614	0
	(8,725)	(2,929)	(9,986)	(2,592)	(1,309)	(12,963)	(3,597)	(16,175)	(3,212)
GEORGIA									
NAS, ATLANTA	183	0	183	0	146	329	146	329	0
NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE, KINGS BAY	4,754	47	1,884	2	1,920	6,721	754	2,640	(4,081)
	4,937	47	2,067	2	2,067	7,051	901	2,970	(4,081)
HAWAII									
MCAS, KANELOE BAY	967	(508)	967	(508)	367	826	367	826	0
NAS, BARBERS POINT	(3,534)	(618)	(3,534)	(618)	(3,322)	(7,474)	(3,322)	(7,474)	0
NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE, PEARL HARBOR	147	5	147	5	152	304	152	304	0
	(2,420)	(1,121)	(2,420)	(1,121)	(2,802)	(6,343)	(2,802)	(6,343)	0
ILLINOIS									
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL (CECOM)	272	1,382	0	0	2,646	4,300	0	0	(4,300)
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL (OTHER)	(15)	883	(15)	883	1,389	2,257	1,389	2,257	0
DEF CONTR MGMT DIST, NO CENT	(6)	(266)	(6)	(266)	(272)	(544)	(272)	(544)	0
O'HARE IAP ARS	(5)	(757)	(5)	(757)	(610)	(1,372)	(610)	(1,372)	0
ROCKFORD (OR OTHER LOCATION)	5	757	5	757	610	1,372	610	1,372	0
NAS, GLENVIEW	(1,833)	(389)	(1,833)	(389)	(1,778)	(4,000)	(1,778)	(4,000)	0
NAVAL HOSPITAL, GREAT LAKES	632	58	632	58	690	1,380	690	1,380	0
NAVAL TRNG CTR, GREAT LAKES	8,077	251	8,077	251	6,662	14,990	6,662	14,990	0
	7,127	1,919	6,855	537	9,338	18,384	6,692	14,084	(4,300)
INDIANA									
DITSO INDIANAPOLIS IPC	(1)	(197)	(1)	(197)	(198)	(396)	(198)	(396)	0
	(1)	(197)	(1)	(197)	(198)	(396)	(198)	(396)	0

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS

State Installation	SECDEF		SECDEF		SECDEF		COMMISSION		DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
	NET GAIN/(LOSS) MIL CIV		NET GAIN/(LOSS) MIL CIV		INDIRECT & INDUCED	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	INDIRECT & INDUCED	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	
KANSAS									
MCCONNELL AFB	263	11	263	11	219	493	219	493	0
	263	11	263	11	219	493	219	493	0
LOUISIANA									
BARKSDALE AFB	779	6	779	6	628	1,413	628	1,413	0
NAS, NEW ORLEANS	122	1	119	1	98	221	96	216	(5)
	901	7	898	7	726	1,634	724	1,629	(5)
MAINE									
NAS BRUNSWICK	128	0	10	0	102	230	8	18	(212)
	128	0	10	0	102	230	8	18	(212)
MARYLAND									
FORT MEADE	486	160	486	160	646	1,292	646	1,292	0
NAF WASHINGTON	142	27	142	27	135	304	135	304	0
NESEC, ST. INIGOES	(33)	(2,786)	(33)	(2,786)	(2,819)	(5,638)	(2,819)	(5,638)	0
NSWC WHITE OAK	355	2,107	355	2,107	2,462	4,924	2,462	4,924	0
NAWCAD PATUXENT RIVER	514	1,841	511	1,497	2,355	4,710	2,008	4,016	(694)
NSWC ANNAPOLIS	(3)	(350)	0	0	(282)	(635)	0	0	635
NSWC INDIAN HEAD	0	254	0	254	254	508	254	508	0
	1,461	1,253	1,461	1,259	2,751	5,465	2,686	5,406	(59)
MASSACHUSETTS									
DEF CONTRACT MGMT DIST, NE	0	183	0	183	183	366	183	366	0
NAS, SOUTH WEYMOUTH	(653)	(365)	0	0	(814)	(1,832)	0	0	1,832
	(653)	(182)	0	183	(631)	(1,466)	183	366	1,832
MICHIGAN									
DETROIT ARSENAL	4	162	4	162	266	432	266	432	0
DLSC BATTLE CREEK	(4)	(420)	0	0	(254)	(678)	0	0	678
DRMS BATTLE CREEK	(5)	(396)	0	0	(241)	(642)	0	0	642
K. I. SAWYER AFB	(2,354)	(788)	(2,354)	(788)	(1,257)	(4,399)	(1,257)	(4,399)	0
NAF DETROIT	(523)	(24)	(523)	(24)	(438)	(985)	(438)	(985)	0
	(2,882)	(1,466)	(2,873)	(650)	(1,924)	(6,272)	(1,429)	(4,952)	1,320
MINNESOTA									
NAS, TWIN CITIES	230	0	230	0	230	460	230	460	0
	230	0	230	0	230	460	230	460	0
MISSISSIPPI									
NAS, MERIDIAN	(1,999)	(1,037)	0	0	(1,822)	(4,858)	0	0	4,858
NAVAL STATION, PASCAGOULA	465	3	465	3	281	749	281	749	0
	(1,534)	(1,034)	465	3	(1,541)	(4,109)	281	749	4,858
MISSOURI									
FORT LEONARD WOOD	5,742	220	0	0	2,385	8,347	0	0	(8,347)
DITSO KANSAS CITY IPC	(56)	(70)	(56)	(70)	(126)	(252)	(126)	(252)	0
	5,686	150	(56)	(70)	2,259	8,095	(126)	(252)	(8,347)

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS

State Installation	SECDEF		SECDEF		SECDEF		COMMISSION		DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
	NET GAIN/(LOSS)		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		INDIRECT & INDUCED		TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT		
	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV			INDIRECT & INDUCED	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	
NEVADA									
NAS, FALLON	194	9	194	9	81	284	81	284	0
	194	9	194	9	81	284	81	284	0
NEW JERSEY									
FORT MONMOUTH	(425)	(2,122)	(153)	546	(2,547)	(5,094)	393	786	5,880
MCGUIRE AFB	(3,289)	(374)	1,503	121	(2,930)	(6,593)	1,299	2,923	9,517
NAWCAD TRENTON	(8)	(448)	(8)	(448)	(456)	(912)	(456)	(912)	0
	(3,722)	(2,944)	1,342	219	(5,933)	(12,599)	1,236	2,797	15,397
NEW YORK									
STEWART ANNEX	396	0	396	0	317	713	317	713	0
GRIFFISS AFB	(3,338)	(1,191)	(3,338)	(1,191)	(3,623)	(8,152)	(3,623)	(8,152)	0
PLATTSBURGH AFB	2,845	257	(2,095)	(352)	1,861	4,963	(1,468)	(3,915)	(8,878)
FIRST MARINE CORPS DIST, GARDEN CITY	(60)	(40)	0	0	(80)	(180)	0	0	180
NAVAL STATION, STATEN ISLAND	(1,773)	(1,001)	(1,773)	(1,001)	(2,219)	(4,993)	(2,219)	(4,993)	0
	(1,930)	(1,975)	(6,810)	(2,544)	(3,744)	(7,649)	(6,994)	(16,348)	(8,698)
NORTH CAROLINA									
MCAS, CHERRY POINT	3,350	66	3,350	66	2,050	5,466	2,050	5,466	0
MCAS, NEW RIVER	207	0	207	0	83	290	83	290	0
NADP, CHERRY POINT	314	1,573	314	1,692	3,019	4,906	3,210	5,216	309
	3,871	1,639	3,871	1,758	5,152	10,662	5,342	10,971	309
NORTH DAKOTA									
GRAND FORKS AFB	320	10	320	10	198	528	198	528	0
MINOT AFB	214	3	214	3	87	304	87	304	0
	534	13	534	13	285	832	285	832	0
OHIO									
DEF CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY CTR	94	2,935	93	2,500	3,029	6,058	2,593	5,186	(872)
DEF ELECTRONIC SUPPLY CTR	(93)	(2,804)	(93)	(2,804)	(2,897)	(5,794)	(2,897)	(5,794)	0
RPC WRIGHT-PATTERSON (DISA)	0	204	0	204	204	408	204	408	0
NEWARK AFB	(92)	(1,760)	(92)	(1,760)	(1,111)	(2,963)	(1,111)	(2,963)	0
RICKENBACKER AGB	0	522	0	522	418	940	418	940	0
RMBA CLEVELAND	0	0	0	(197)	0	0	(197)	(394)	(394)
SPRINGFIELD BECKLEY MAP AGS	(54)	(312)	0	0	(293)	(659)	0	0	659
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	54	38	54	38	92	184	92	184	0
	(91)	(1,177)	(38)	(1,497)	(558)	(1,826)	(899)	(2,434)	(607)
OKLAHOMA									
ALTUS AFB	668	38	668	38	282	988	282	988	0
	668	38	668	38	282	988 *	282	988	0
PENNSYLVANIA									
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	(2)	(1,944)	0	(334)	(1,946)	(3,892)	(334)	(668)	3,224
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	15	362	15	362	377	754	377	754	0
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	69	619	69	30	688	1,376	99	198	(1,178)
CLOTHING FACTORY DEFENSE	(2)	(1,235)	(2)	(1,235)	(1,237)	(2,474)	(1,237)	(2,474)	0
DEFENSE CONTRACT MGMT DIST	(3)	(231)	(3)	(231)	(234)	(468)	(234)	(468)	0
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, LETTERKENNY	0	(400)	0	0	(240)	(640)	0	0	640
DEFENSE DISTRIB. DEPOT, TOBYHANNA	0	169	0	0	169	338	0	0	(338)

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS

State Installation	SECDEF		SECDEF		SECDEF		COMMISSION		DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
	NET GAIN/(LOSS)		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT		TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT		
	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	INDIRECT & INDUCED		INDIRECT & INDUCED		
DEFENSE DISTRIB. REGION EAST	67	4,176	0	0	4,243	8,486	0	0	(8,486)
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CTR	(26)	(1,846)	0	0	(1,872)	(3,744)	0	0	3,744
DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER	(78)	(3,878)	0	(250)	(3,956)	(7,912)	(250)	(500)	7,412
AIPC CHAMBERSBURGH (DISA)	0	139	0	139	139	278	139	278	0
ASO PHILADELPHIA (DISA)	0	(136)	0	(136)	(136)	(272)	(136)	(272)	0
IPC PHILADELPHIA (DISA)	0	(143)	0	(143)	(143)	(286)	(143)	(286)	0
SPCC MECHANICSBURG (DISA)	0	177	0	177	177	354	177	354	0
NAS, WILLOW GROVE	157	(310)	157	1	(122)	(275)	126	284	560
NAVY AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE	(65)	(2,351)	0	0	(2,416)	(4,832)	0	0	4,832
NSWC PHILADELPHIA	0	200	0	0	200	400	0	0	(400)
PHILADELPHIA NSY (PERA)	(4)	(187)	(4)	(187)	(306)	(497)	(306)	(497)	0
SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER	122	1,903	60	286	2,025	4,050	346	692	(3,358)
	250	(4,916)	292	(1,521)	(4,590)	(9,256)	(1,375)	(2,604)	6,652
RHODE ISLAND									
NAVAL EDUCATION & TRAINING CTR	(810)	302	(810)	302	(305)	(813)	(305)	(813)	0
NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CTR	2	504	2	504	506	1,012	506	1,012	0
	(808)	806	(808)	806	201	199	201	199	0
SOUTH CAROLINA									
FORT JACKSON	293	52	293	52	276	621	276	621	0
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, CHARLESTON	(5)	(202)	(5)	(202)	(207)	(414)	(207)	(414)	0
CHARLESTON AFB	(253)	(37)	(253)	(37)	(232)	(522)	(232)	(522)	0
SHAW AFB	258	5	258	5	158	421	158	421	0
CHARLESTON NAVAL SHIPYARD	(74)	(4,837)	(74)	(4,837)	(7,858)	(12,769)	(7,858)	(12,769)	0
MCAS, BEAUFORT	111	0	111	0	67	178	67	178	0
NESEC CHARLESTON	(3)	(1,885)	74	4,377	(1,510)	(3,398)	3,561	8,012	11,410
NAVAL HOSPITAL, BEAUFORT	683	119	464	83	802	1,604	547	1,094	(510)
NAVAL HOSPITAL, CHARLESTON	(682)	(647)	0	0	(1,329)	(2,658)	0	0	2,658
NAVAL STATION, CHARLESTON	(8,634)	(1,194)	(8,634)	(1,194)	(7,862)	(17,690)	(7,862)	(17,690)	0
NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER, CHARLESTON	(26)	(408)	(9)	(39)	(434)	(868)	(48)	(96)	772
	(8,332)	(9,034)	(7,775)	(1,792)	(18,130)	(35,496)	(11,599)	(21,166)	14,330
SOUTH DAKOTA									
ELLSWORTH AFB	240	(1)	240	(1)	143	382	143	382	0
	240	(1)	240	(1)	143	382	143	382	0
TENNESSEE									
NAS, MEMPHIS	(6,710)	(250)	(6,710)	(250)	(5,568)	(12,528)	(5,568)	(12,528)	0
	(6,710)	(250)	(6,710)	(250)	(5,568)	(12,528)	(5,568)	(12,528)	0
TEXAS									
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	0	737	0	479	737	1,474	479	958	(516)
DEF DISTRIB. DEPOT, RED RIVER ARMY DEPO	2	240	2	240	242	484	242	484	0
BERGSTROM AFB	0	(625)	0	0	(500)	(1,125)	0	0	1,125
CARSWELL AFB	1,657	589	1,657	275	1,797	4,043	1,546	3,478	(565)
LACKLAND AFB	129	22	129	22	121	272	121	272	0
SHEPPARD AFB	(135)	(15)	(135)	(15)	(90)	(240)	(90)	(240)	0
NAS, CORPUS CHRISTI	176	19	176	19	195	390	195	390	0
NAS, DALLAS	(1,374)	(268)	(1,374)	(268)	(1,314)	(2,956)	(1,314)	(2,956)	0
NAS, KINGSVILLE	174	73	0	0	99	346	0	0	(346)
NAVAL STATION, INGLESIDE	396	7	396	7	322	725	322	725	0

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS

State Installation	SECDEF		SECDEF		SECDEF		COMMISSION		DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
	NET GAIN/(LOSS)		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		INDIRECT & INDUCED		INDIRECT & INDUCED		
	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	
	1,025	779	851	759	1,609	3,413	1,501	3,111	(302)
UTAH									
TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	(16)	(1,942)	(16)	(1,942)	(1,175)	(3,133)	(1,175)	(3,133)	0
DEF. DIST. DEPOT TOOELE	(1)	(230)	(1)	(230)	(139)	(370)	(139)	(370)	0
IPC OGDEN (DISA)	(1)	(114)	(1)	(114)	(115)	(230)	(115)	(230)	0
OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER	0	0	0	(116)	0	0	(209)	(325)	(325)
	(18)	(2,286)	(18)	(2,402)	(1,428)	(3,732)	(1,637)	(4,057)	(325)
VIRGINIA									
FORT BELVOIR	24	(427)	24	(427)	(403)	(806)	(403)	(806)	0
VINT HILL FARMS STATION	(407)	(1,472)	(407)	(1,472)	(1,879)	(3,758)	(1,879)	(3,758)	0
7TH COMMUNICATIONS GROUP	(108)	(41)	(108)	(41)	(149)	(298)	(149)	(298)	0
IPC RICHMOND (DISA)	0	(261)	0	(261)	(261)	(522)	(261)	(522)	0
NCTS NORFOLK (DISA)	0	(122)	0	(122)	(122)	(244)	(122)	(244)	0
NSC NORFOLK (DISA)	0	(125)	0	(125)	(125)	(250)	(125)	(250)	0
BUREAU OF PERSONNEL	(1,070)	(924)	(1,070)	(924)	(1,994)	(3,988)	(1,994)	(3,988)	0
FLEET COMBAT TRAINING CTR, LANT	948	126	948	126	859	1,933	859	1,933	0
NAS, NORFOLK	49	423	49	423	755	1,227	755	1,227	0
NAS, OCEANA	2,597	42	2,597	42	2,111	4,750	2,111	4,750	0
NAV SEC GRU ACT (NAVMASSO)	(221)	(431)	(221)	(431)	(522)	(1,174)	(522)	(1,174)	0
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND	(543)	(3,128)	(543)	(3,128)	(3,671)	(7,342)	(3,671)	(7,342)	0
NAVAL AMPHIB BASE, LITTLE CREEK	262	4	262	4	213	479	213	479	0
NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, NORFOLK	(104)	(4,295)	(104)	(4,295)	(7,918)	(12,317)	(7,918)	(12,317)	0
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING CMD	(36)	(485)	(36)	(485)	(521)	(1,042)	(521)	(1,042)	0
NAVAL HOSPITAL, PORTSMOUTH	603	59	603	59	662	1,324	662	1,324	0
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND	(360)	(3,439)	(360)	(3,439)	(3,799)	(7,598)	(3,799)	(7,598)	0
NAVAL STATION, NORFOLK	4,621	78	4,364	76	3,759	8,458	3,552	7,992	(466)
NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND	(89)	(291)	(89)	(291)	(380)	(760)	(380)	(760)	0
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER	5	175	5	175	108	288	108	288	0
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION, YORKTOWN	110	(191)	(7)	(205)	(81)	(162)	(212)	(424)	(262)
NAVMAC	(96)	(108)	(96)	(108)	(163)	(367)	(163)	(367)	0
NAVSEACYSENGST (NUWC)	(4)	(1,407)	(4)	(1,407)	(1,411)	(2,822)	(1,411)	(2,822)	0
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD	228	1,123	228	1,123	2,162	3,513	2,162	3,513	0
NESEC PORTSMOUTH, VA			(5)	(1,410)	0	0	(1,132)	(2,547)	(2,547)
SUPSHIP PORTSMOUTH	5	340	5	340	345	690	345	690	0
	6,414	(14,777)	6,035	(16,203)	(12,425)	(20,788)	(13,895)	(24,063)	(3,275)
WASHINGTON									
FAIRCHILD AFB	(1,181)	(98)	(1,181)	(98)	(1,023)	(2,302)	(1,023)	(2,302)	0
NAS, WHIDBEY ISLAND	1,026	13	1,026	13	416	1,455	416	1,455	0
NAVAL HOSPITAL, BREMERTON	154	31	154	31	185	370	185	370	0
NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE, BANGOR	400	660	400	660	848	1,908	848	1,908	0
PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD	4,643	(166)	3,300	(173)	7,163	11,640	5,003	8,130	(3,510)
	5,042	440	3,899	433	7,589	13,071	5,429	9,561	(3,510)

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS

State Installation	SECDEF		SECDEF		SECDEF		COMMISSION		DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
	NET GAIN/(LOSS)		NET GAIN/(LOSS)		TOTAL		TOTAL		
	MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV	INDIRECT & INDUCED	CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	INDIRECT & INDUCED	CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT	
WEST VIRGINIA									
NAVAL AIR FACILITY, MARTINSBURG	108	19	0	0	102	229	0	0	(229)
	108	19	0	0	102	229	0	0	(229)
MIDWAY ISLAND									
NAF MIDWAY	(7)	(160)	(7)	(160)	(67)	(234)	(67)	(234)	0
	(7)	(160)	(7)	(160)	(67)	(234)	(67)	(234)	0
GUAM									
NAS AGANA	0	0	(1,936)	(339)	0	0	(910)	(3,185)	(3,185)
	0	0	1,920	321	0	0	896	3,137	3,137
	0	0	(16)	(18)	0	0	(14)	(48)	(48)
ANDERSEN AFB									
TOTAL	(23,997)	(57,133)	(20,773)	(41,654)	(86,728)	(167,858)	(71,735)	(134,145)	33,713

TAB 4

EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF 1993 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

State	TOTAL DIRECT EMPLOYMENT IMPACT	PERCENT OF TOTAL DIRECT IMPACT	TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IMPACT	PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPACT
ALABAMA	(2,310)	-3.7%	(4,490)	-3.3%
CALIFORNIA	(29,683)	-47.5%	(76,851)	-57.3%
CONNECTICUT	3,542	5.7%	6,376	4.8%
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	(1,452)	-2.3%	(2,904)	-2.2%
FLORIDA	(12,578)	-20.1%	(16,175)	-12.1%
GEORGIA	2,069	3.3%	2,970	2.2%
GUAM	(34)	-0.1%	(48)	-0.0%
HAWAII	(3,541)	-5.7%	(6,343)	-4.7%
ILLINOIS	7,392	11.8%	14,084	10.5%
INDIANA	(198)	-0.3%	(396)	-0.3%
KANSAS	274	0.4%	493	0.4%
LOUISIANA	905	1.4%	1,629	1.2%
MAINE	10	0.0%	18	0.0%
MARYLAND	2,720	4.4%	5,406	4.0%
MASSACHUSETTS	183	0.3%	366	0.3%
MICHIGAN	(3,523)	-5.6%	(4,952)	-3.7%
MIDWAY ISLAND	(167)	-0.3%	(234)	-0.2%
MINNESOTA	230	0.4%	460	0.3%
MISSISSIPPI	468	0.7%	749	0.6%
MISSOURI	(126)	-0.2%	(252)	-0.2%
NEVADA	203	0.3%	284	0.2%
NEW JERSEY	1,561	2.5%	2,797	2.1%
NEW YORK	(9,354)	-15.0%	(16,348)	-12.2%
NORTH CAROLINA	5,629	9.0%	10,971	8.2%
NORTH DAKOTA	547	0.9%	832	0.6%
OHIO	(1,535)	-2.5%	(2,434)	-1.8%
OKLAHOMA	706	1.1%	988	0.7%
PENNSYLVANIA	(1,229)	-2.0%	(2,604)	-1.9%
RHODE ISLAND	(2)	-0.0%	199	0.1%
SOUTH CAROLINA	(9,567)	-15.3%	(21,166)	-15.8%
SOUTH DAKOTA	239	0.4%	382	0.3%
TENNESSEE	(6,960)	-11.1%	(12,528)	-9.3%
TEXAS	1,610	2.6%	3,111	2.3%
UTAH	(2,420)	-3.9%	(4,057)	-3.0%
VIRGINIA	(10,168)	-16.3%	(24,063)	-17.9%
WASHINGTON	4,132	6.6%	9,561	7.1%
TOTAL	(62,427)	-100.0%	(134,169)	-100.0%

TAB 5

CUMULATIVE EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF
1988 - 1993 ACTIONS

State	TOTAL DIRECT EMPLOYMENT IMPACT	PERCENT OF TOTAL DIRECT IMPACT	TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IMPACT	PERCENT OF TOTAL INDIRECT IMPACT
ALABAMA	(396)	-0.3%	(768)	-0.3%
ARKANSAS	(6,761)	-5.0%	(12,170)	-4.0%
ARIZONA	(916)	-0.7%	(1,649)	-0.5%
CALIFORNIA	(78,488)	-57.5%	(203,284)	-66.8%
COLORADO	(4,705)	-3.4%	(8,469)	-2.8%
CONNECTICUT	2,611	1.9%	4,700	1.5%
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	(1,407)	-1.0%	(2,814)	-0.9%
FLORIDA	(14,750)	-10.8%	(19,028)	-6.2%
GEORGIA	2,048	1.5%	2,949	1.0%
GUAM	(34)	-0.0%	(48)	-0.0%
HAWAII	24	0.0%	43	0.0%
IDAHO	749	0.5%	1,198	0.4%
ILLINOIS	1,031	0.8%	1,969	0.6%
INDIANA	(7,961)	-5.8%	(15,922)	-5.2%
KANSAS	274	0.2%	493	0.2%
KENTUCKY	58	0.0%	116	0.0%
LOUISIANA	(5,026)	-3.7%	(9,047)	-3.0%
MAINE	(2,931)	-2.1%	(5,276)	-1.7%
MARYLAND	3,236	2.4%	6,440	2.1%
MASSACHUSETTS	(2,721)	-2.0%	(5,442)	-1.8%
MICHIGAN	(4,845)	-3.6%	(6,831)	-2.2%
MIDWAY ISLAND	(167)	-0.1%	(234)	-0.1%
MINNESOTA	230	0.2%	460	0.2%
MISSISSIPPI	1,478	1.1%	2,365	0.8%
MISSOURI	(1,027)	-0.8%	(2,054)	-0.7%
MONTANA	181	0.1%	253	0.1%
NEVADA	249	0.2%	349	0.1%
NEW HAMPSHIRE	(2,650)	-1.9%	(5,300)	-1.7%
NEW JERSEY	1,951	1.4%	3,492	1.1%
NEW MEXICO	3,307	2.4%	4,630	1.5%
NEW YORK	(8,934)	-6.5%	(15,635)	-5.1%
NORTH CAROLINA	6,226	4.6%	12,141	4.0%
NORTH DAKOTA	547	0.4%	831	0.3%
OHIO	(3,228)	-2.4%	(5,133)	-1.7%
OKLAHOMA	706	0.5%	988	0.3%
OREGON	(164)	-0.1%	(262)	-0.1%
PENNSYLVANIA	(13,035)	-9.6%	(27,634)	-9.1%
RHODE ISLAND	676	0.5%	1,217	0.4%
SOUTH CAROLINA	(8,136)	-6.0%	(17,981)	-5.9%
SOUTH DAKOTA	239	0.2%	382	0.1%
TENNESSEE	(6,960)	-5.1%	(12,528)	-4.1%
TEXAS	7,707	5.6%	14,875	4.9%
UTAH	(2,523)	-1.8%	(4,239)	-1.4%
VIRGINIA	(9,242)	-6.8%	(21,904)	-7.2%
WASHINGTON	17,013	12.5%	39,300	12.9%
TOTAL	(136,466)	-100.0%	(304,458)	-100.0%

TAB D

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Les Aspin, The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: A Comprehensive Plan to Accelerate the Reuse of Closed Bases

Closing bases brings enormous economic hardship to communities and people. You have directed that our responsibility for base closure must extend beyond fair process of closing bases to include creating special programs to assist communities that are especially hard hit by base closures.

The history of rapid reuse of closed bases is not good. Only 13 of the 42 bases designated for closure in the 1988 and 1991 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission are closed. In addition, 15 of these bases are on the Superfund list of contaminated sites. The major barriers have been the time required for environmental clean-up of contaminated parcels at closed bases and the slow process for property disposal. We must do better at helping communities achieve rapid economic reinvestment based on locally developed reuse plans.

An interagency group has defined a comprehensive program to accelerate economic reinvestment at closing bases. We have developed a five-point program that will have a high pay-off. It will:

- (1) Establish \$1 million in planning grants for each community.** The DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) has effectively administered planning grants to encourage affected communities to assess preferred reuse plans. The OEA will now make these available on an accelerated basis once communities organize themselves in an effective manner to express their preferences for reuse options. The grants of up to \$1 million will go to communities that have been affected by the 1993 or prior BRAC base closures. The sooner a community gets organized and plans for reuse, the quicker base assets can be productively utilized.

(2) Provide transition coordinators. The greatest frustration communities encounter is dealing, at a time of great uncertainty, with a seemingly endless number of federal agencies and regulations that are concerned with federal facility reuse. The community needs to organize and the federal government needs to be coordinated.

We believe that each closing base should have a single individual to serve as "transition coordinator." This individual will serve as the ombudsman for the local community and act as the single point of contact to integrate all the community needs in relation to base closing planning and involved federal agencies. The transition coordinators will report to a central Office for Base Closure Transition Coordination in DOD.

(3) Ensure common sense clean-up. In the past, environmental clean-up and government acceptance of liability have been a major source of delay in base reuse. The DOD and EPA have created a common sense clean-up process that will dramatically speed the process of environmental assessment and clean-up at closed bases. A clean-up team composed of DOD, EPA, and state environmental officials will more rapidly make decisions on required environmental actions. Contaminated areas at bases will be rapidly identified and a remediation program undertaken. A single National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document will be issued for both clean-up and reuse. Finally, DOD intends to streamline the process for acceptance of environmental liability at parcels transferred to other use.

(4) Develop Fast Track Property Disposal. Base property should become available as soon as it is no longer needed for defense purposes. The DOD will delegate authority to approve interim leases and land transfer to lower levels to permit expedited transfer. The screening process prescribed in the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act will be resolved in a proactive manner. We will adhere to a thirty day screening of bases closure properties to other federal agencies. These steps will significantly reduce the time required for communities to formulate their reuse plans.

(5) Target Federal Assistance -- Many federal programs are available to assist communities that must struggle with base closures. The Administration must make more rapidly available the \$376 million of FY-94 resources from the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Labor and the Federal Aviation Administration that

are targeted to base closure communities. These programs will provide training grants for workers, economic development grants, and grants to assist in the conversion of military airfields to commercial use.

This five-point program will accelerate the process of economic reinvestment of base closures by the 1993 and earlier BRAC Commissions. The actions that will result from your approval of this Accelerated Reinvestment for Closed Bases will help affected communities deal with the immediate hardships they face. The program is much more aggressive and helpful than past federal action and the assistance it brings will be most welcome by many thousands of families of this nation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Aspin". The signature is stylized with a large, circular loop at the top and a long, sweeping horizontal line at the bottom.

The President

By
Pls have this reviewed
B

Mr. President:

The League has worked with five administrations; I've been ED for over 15 years and know that this is a very critical time.

- I assume that you've read my paper on political versus economic signals to Vietnam. This was an attempt to maintain critical leverage with Vietnam, signaling them of a desire to improve relations in the long term, while showing France, Japan and others that your policy is not reactionary.
- There is no real imperative to move now to lift the ban on IMF funding.
- I realize the fears of appearing weak by losing the vote, but principle has no deadline.
- This step can be postponed until October, giving you time to send your own negotiator to Hanoi to outline POW/MIA expectations, as well as what the U.S. will do if they respond seriously.
- I believe Japan and France will wait, at least until the October meeting, if asked by a new administration, with a new approach and strategy to Hanoi.
- If Vietnam has not responded as we know they can by October, the US should still stand for principle, but a reading can be taken then.
- Lifting the ban now undercuts all U.S. interests - POW/MIA and American business.
 - On POW/MIA, it will be perceived by Vietnam as a reward for withholding remains and information which could account for hundreds of Americans, and very important leverage to achieve rapid accountability will be lost.
 - It would leave US business out in the cold, but support Vietnamese development to sustain foreign investment and weaken the remaining leverage of the bilateral embargo.
- Vietnam's priority is IMF first; they want the US embargo lifted and normalization of relations, but can do without both if they get IMF, World Bank and ADB development loans.
- You have said that you are more influenced by the families' POW/MIA concerns, than by commercial interests.
- You pledged that obtaining the fullest possible accounting is and will be the core issue of US relations with Vietnam.

- We believed you, and spread that message widely, unlike the bureaucracy which has virtually ignored your commitments while selectively leaking information to generate greater pressure on you to support removing the IMF ban.
- If the ban is lifted, fairly or not, the public perception will be that you have sold out the issue; Vietnam's perception will be that you are not serious about POW/MIA commitments and are not seriously concerned about their longstanding policy of intransigence.
- The League wants to be supportive, but you must understand that we must publicly oppose lifting the ban.
- We sincerely hope that you will make the decision to hold off, send Hanoi a clear signal that you mean what you say, that you intend to obtain the fullest possible accounting, and that you will be intolerant of any further manipulation on their part.
- And, finally, if you do decide to lift the ban, don't just let it be announced unilaterally. Use it by telling the Vietnamese and the American people what you are doing and state your intention to go no further until significant results which account for Americans have been obtained.

Bill Duffett
July 1, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TONY LAKE

From: Ann Mills Griffiths

Subject: POW/MIA Policy in the Context of US/Vietnam Relations

Date: June 30, 1993

U.S. acquiescence now in eliminating Vietnam's IMF arrears would reinforce to Hanoi that their consistent policy of purposely withholding records and remains of Americans, including those last known alive in captivity or close proximity to being captured, is succeeding. The Politburo would look at American actions: endorsement of their rhetoric and the activity level as "results" sufficient to gain one of their primary national objectives, while overlooking their ability to rapidly account for hundreds of Americans and consistent intransigence.

Once IMF access is assured, Vietnam will depend on the U.S. business community to pressure the Administration to lift the embargo, or, at a minimum, waive restrictions to enable U.S. firms to bid on IFI-supported projects funded with U.S. taxpayer dollars. At that point, holding the line for "results" would depend on the White House definition. Much of the bureaucracy (other than DIA) appears determined to reduce POW/MIA accounting expectations, despite substantive evidence that remains are currently being withheld; there is no evidence to the contrary. They seem tired, and that is what Hanoi desires. Are we confident, after more months of this, that the White House can hold the line?

Domestically, if IMF goes forward, the Administration can expect loud, adverse reactions from the POW/MIA and veterans communities. There will be accusations that the President has reneged on his commitments, that commercial interests do take precedence over POW/MIA concerns, the entire "Vietnam syndrome" controversy will resurface, and there likely will be renewed attention by the media, and others looking for opportunities to criticize, on the President's Vietnam-related sensitivities.

In lieu of moving now on IMF restrictions or the embargo, both tied directly to results on POW/MIA, a political step would be taken to signal U.S. willingness to move if Vietnam begins to provide the remains and information being withheld. This would simultaneously facilitate US-VN policy dialogue on POW/MIA, provide a vehicle for legal protections, political liaison with JT-FFA, and engage Vietnam on humanitarian concerns. A limited political presence would be supportable if accompanied by a comprehensive negotiations strategy toward Vietnam, conducted at the senior policy level, that 1) emphasizes as a core element POW/MIA expectations from unilateral Vietnam actions; 2) offers to decrease joint operations while subsidizing unilateral activities; 3) builds in review points to measure results; and 4) is constructed with an exit strategy of not accepting less and willingness to wait as long as required.

A public diplomacy strategy to accompany the negotiations would be necessary and should include 1) briefing friends/allies and requesting their support, to include encouraging Hanoi to respond; 2) domestic statements by the executive branch outlining in broad terms the new negotiations (policy level vice special emissary); 3) briefing IMF nations (especially Japan and France) and asking them to hold off to see if the initiative bears fruit; 4) announcement of organizational initiatives -- new DOD organization, new DASD/POW-MIA (very important), reformation of the IAG (or its equivalent) and policy guidance from Washington to the operational level; and 5) briefing key congressional committees/staff, the families (League annual meeting) and veterans organizations.

Such an initiative should make it clear to Vietnam that the President is in no position to lift the embargo or drop objections to IFI loans without serious unilateral efforts on their part; but, if they respond, the Administration will move. To show U.S. seriousness, offer to subsidize unilateral Vietnamese efforts and scale back the joint field activities to free up their manpower and organizational focus.

If carried out properly, a political presence could 1) buy time on the IFI's with France and Japan; 2) assuage concerns of the business community by not moving forward on the IFI's before steps on the bilateral embargo; and 3) Vietnam would have to welcome the initiative as a positive step, but would recognize that the U.S. is serious on POW/MIA and is not weakening real leverage on the embargo. The primary function, of any permanent presence must be, at least for now, humanitarian -- POW/MIA, etc.

An in-process review of actual progress must be built into the decision. If POW/MIA results begin to improve dramatically, i.e. accountability, economic steps would become supportable. If results increase and pressures mount to support the IMF loans, an incremental step would be to go along (in October), but waive specific embargo restrictions to permit U.S. firms to bid on IFI projects and allow U.S. banks to service only those American firms involved in such projects. If serious results are not then forthcoming, the U.S. should walk away, making clear its rationale, both to the Vietnamese and publicly.

Initially this presence should be consular-type offices, that could be upgraded over time to an interest section, as warranted.

POW/MIA COMMITMENTS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON/CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

- **May 31, 1993:** During his address at the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the President stated, "Today let us also renew a pledge to the families....We will do all we can to give you not only the attention you have asked for but the answers you deserve. Today I have ordered that by Veterans Day we will have declassified all United States Government records related to POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam War.... except for a tiny fraction which could still affect our national security or invade the privacy of their families. As we allow the American public to have access to what our government knows, we will press harder to find out what other governments know. We are pressing the Vietnamese to provide this accounting not only because it is the central outstanding issue in our relationship with Vietnam, but because it is a central commitment made by the American government to our people. And I intend to keep it."

- **April 23, 1993:** During White House news conference.

Question: Before the U.S. normalizes relations, allows trade to go forward, do you have to be personally assured that every case has been resolved...

The President: "A lot of experts say you can never resolve every case.... But what I would have to be convinced of is that we had gone a long way towards resolving every case that could be resolved at this moment in time and that there was a complete, open and unrestricted commitment to continue to do everything that could be done always, to keep resolving those cases, and we're not there yet. Again, I have to be guided a little bit by people who know a lot about this, and I confess to being much more heavily influenced by the families of the people whose lives were lost there or whose lives remain in question than by the commercial interests and the other things which seem so compelling in this moment. I just am very influenced by how the families feel."

- **March 22, 1993:** Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Question: What will be the U.S. approach to end the embargo in Vietnam?

Secretary Christopher: "As you know, the United States has had two primary preconditions to ending the embargo and to the normalization of relationships with Vietnam. First was their support for the United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia, and on that score, I would say that Vietnam has fulfilled its obligations."

"The second precondition was that we would be satisfied on the POW/MIA issue.... Our administration will be assessing that progress very carefully to determine whether we can move further down the road, or down the roadmap, to use the technical term, toward normalization with Vietnam...."

- **February 10, 1993:** During the regular White House briefing.

Question: President Mitterand today asked the U.S. to lift the economic embargo on Vietnam. Do you have any comment about that?

George Stephanopoulos (Communications Director): "All I can say is we've generally supported the roadmap policy. We want to make sure that we have a full accounting of all MIAs, and that's the policy we'll continue."

- **February 3, 1993:** White House official reaction on policy toward normalizing relations with Vietnam, responding to a Reuters News Agency inquiry.

"President Clinton has already stated we will only move forward when there's the fullest possible accounting of all those listed as missing."

PRE-ELECTION COMMITMENTS

- **November 11, 1992:** President-elect Clinton's address, Veterans Day Ceremony, Little Rock, Arkansas.

"...as I have pledged throughout my campaign, I will do my very best to make sure we have a final resolution of the POW/MIA issue...I have sent a clear message that there will be no normalization of relations with any nation that is at all suspected of withholding any information. We must have as full an accounting as is humanly possible."

- **September 10, 1992:** Issue paper, entitled "Clinton-Gore on Issues of Concern to Veterans."

"Make resolution of the POW/MIA issue a national priority by insisting on a full accounting of all POWs and MIAs before normalizing relations with Vietnam; working with the Russian government to reveal any information it has on Americans held; and declassify pertinent government documents."

- **March 17, 1992:** Signed letter from Governor Clinton to League Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths.

"Thank you for your thorough and helpful briefing on POW/MIAs. This issue is certainly due proper attention and timely action."



202/223-6846

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Washington, D.C.
July 1, 1993

Contact: Ann M. Griffiths
202/223-6846

POW/MIA FAMILIES OPPOSE IMF LENDING TO VIETNAM

The National League of Families is strongly opposed to any move by the Clinton Administration to lift restrictions on IMF loans to Vietnam. The League's Executive Director, Ann Mills Griffiths, stated, "Lifting the ban on IMF loans would reward Vietnam's long-standing policy of withholding POW/MIA records and remains, while giving up our most important leverage to get real results. It would even strike against U.S. business, while giving foreign companies, particularly Japanese and French, added advantage by helping finance Vietnam's ability to support foreign investment. It would seriously undercut American interests."

Noting that the POW/MIA families and many current and former U.S. Government officials recognize the political motivation of labeling increased activities as progress, Mrs. Griffiths stated, "Despite claims of some in Congress and the bureaucracy, we can count. Only one American has been accounted for this entire year from US/Vietnam efforts. Given Vietnam's ability to easily account for many Americans, such results cannot be labeled as real cooperation."

Citing President Clinton's repeated commitments to place POW/MIA concerns at the core of U.S. policy with Vietnam, Mrs. Griffiths stated, "We recognize that some may have misled the President, but we hope that he will see through the distortions and be steadfast in honoring his pledges."

Formed in 1970, the National League of Families is the only national organization comprised solely of family members (over 3,850) of Americans still missing from the Vietnam War.

U.S. ACTION COULD FREE FUNDING FLOOD FOR VIETNAM
(Eds: adds government reaction)

By John Rogers

HANOI, July 1 (Reuter) - An expected U.S. move to unblock IMF loans to Vietnam would release a flood of funding to modernise the communist economy, Western diplomats said on Thursday.

One predicted "a frenzy of infrastructure loans" if U.S. President Bill Clinton, as forecast by U.S. officials, removed Washington's veto on refinancing of Vietnam's \$140 million arrears to the International Monetary Fund.

But the diplomats said Clinton would also find himself obliged to take a further and more controversial step -- scrapping the economic embargo that prevents U.S. companies from doing business in Vietnam.

"I see that as automatic. He has to lift the embargo," a European diplomat said, predicting heavy pressure on Clinton from U.S. firms to let them compete for infrastructure projects like new roads, airports or ports that would otherwise go to other Western or Asian contractors.

"It would be absolutely pointless for him to allow the IMF and World Bank to come in with big project loans and let the work go to others," the diplomat said.

If Clinton says 'go ahead', he's got to say at the same time that U.S. companies can deal as much as they want or they're going to be frozen out of some major contracts, which he won't want, nor will Vietnam," said a senior envoy.

The decisions are so interlinked that to do one -- the lending -- without the other -- the embargo -- would be illogical."

U.S. officials said on Wednesday the United States would announce before a July 12 IMF board meeting that it would no longer block plans by France, Japan and other countries to refinance Vietnam's IMF arrears.

Vietnamese officials, anxious to boost progress towards a market economy by securing multilateral financing, said Hanoi had no official information about a U.S. decision but the news was positive.

"Any step forward in U.S.-Vietnamese relations is welcomed in Vietnam, the United States and many other countries in the world," a foreign ministry spokesman said.

Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh

Cam, on a European tour, were due in Brussels on Thursday.

Ending Washington's ban on refinancing of Hanoi's IMF arrears would unleash a chain of possibilities so far blocked by the embargo imposed in 1964.

"If indeed there were progress that would allow Vietnam to settle its fund arrears, this would remove a technical obstacle to request access to the resources of the fund," IMF Hanoi representative Erich Spittaller told Reuters.

Hanoi would also be able to apply for project loans from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which it has been unable to do so far because of Washington's attitude, diplomats said.

"It would also be a signal for other countries to extend loans on a bilateral basis," a foreign banker said. "It would make things easier for loans and for private direct investment."

The move could also lead to talks on rescheduling Vietnam's \$4.5 billion hard-currency debt to government and commercial lenders, diplomats said.

They said several Western countries had delayed major funding decisions because of U.S. influence. If Clinton now gave the go-ahead, more money would flow.

BC-VIETNAM-USA

CLINTON TO ALLOW IMF LOANS FOR VIETNAM ON FRIDAY

WASHINGTON, July 1 (Reuter) - President Bill Clinton will announce on Friday his decision to drop U.S. opposition to a plan to refinance Vietnam's \$140 million debt to the International Monetary Fund, a White House official said on Thursday.

The shift in policy is intended to show American appreciation for Hanoi's cooperation in accounting for missing Americans who fought in the Vietnam War, the official said.

Before making the announcement, Clinton was to discuss the move at the White House on Thursday night with members of the families of some of the Americans still listed as missing.

The end of U.S. objections to multilateral lending would represent the most far-reaching move to ease the U.S. trade embargo imposed on all of Vietnam after the communist victory in 1975.

Once Hanoi pays off its old IMF debt, it would be eligible for much bigger loans from the World Bank and others to finance major projects to rebuild its economy.

During an IMF meeting in April, France, Japan and other nations yielded to U.S. pressure to shelve plans to offer Vietnam a "bridge loan" to pay off its debt.

BC-VIETNAM-USA 1STLD (SCHEDULED)

CLINTON TO ALLOW IMF LOANS FOR VIETNAM ON FRIDAY

(Eds: Updates throughout)

By Laurence McQuillan

WASHINGTON, July 1 (Reuter) - President Bill Clinton, signalling a willingness to improve relations with Vietnam, will clear the way on Friday for Hanoi to revive its economy by refinancing \$140 million in debts, administration officials said on Thursday.

Accepting the advice of foreign policy advisers, Clinton will drop U.S. opposition to a request by Vietnam to refinance debts of \$140 million with the International Monetary Fund -- a move that would give a major boost to Hanoi's economic recovery.

"This is a step," said one administration official, saying an end to the decades-old trade embargo would not happen until Washington was satisfied Hanoi "has fully complied" with

efforts to account for missing U.S. servicemen from the Vietnam War.

The American refusal to give Hanoi access to IMF loans has been a pillar of U.S. policy towards Vietnam, crafted during the hostilities of the Vietnam War era.

It has been closely related to the U.S. trade embargo, first imposed against Hanoi in 1964 and extended to all of Vietnam in April 1975, following the Communist victory over the U.S.-backed government in Saigon.

A growing number of U.S. businesses have been calling for an end to the embargo, which they say only shuts them out of a foreign market with a high potential for growth.

The shift in policy is intended to show American encouragement for Hanoi's cooperation in accounting for missing Americans who fought in the Vietnam War.

Clinton planned a private meeting at the White House on Thursday to discuss the move with members of the families



June 21, 1993

AMG:100

CONCERNED CITIZEN NEWSLETTER

FIRST AMERICAN ACCOUNTED FOR IN 1993: The remains of a U.S. serviceman, unilaterally returned by Vietnam on February 8th of this year, were recently identified as those of Army SGT Raphael Collazo, lost in Vietnam on March 17, 1968. This is the first American accounted for in 1993 as a result of US/SRV cooperation.

Remains repatriated in July 1992 were recently identified as those of four American Marines known to have been killed in a helicopter crash in South Vietnam on July 30, 1967. The four Marines now accounted for are CAPT David Frederick, 1LT Craig Waterman, L/CPL Earnest Byars and L/CPL Robert Biscailuz.

The names of two additional servicemen, LTC James A. Branch, USAF and Warrant Officer Gregory S. Crandall, USA, were announced today by the Department of Defense. LTC Branch's remains were unilaterally turned over to the United States in March, 1992. WO Crandall's remains were repatriated in February, 1991 following joint excavation by the U.S. and Laos. The accounting for these servicemen brings to 2,253 the number of Americans still prisoner, missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War.

Comment: Despite the increased level of field activities by Joint Task Force-Full Accounting personnel, particularly in Vietnam, the number of unaccounted for Americans has now been reduced by only ten in 1992 and one in 1993, though some remains are still in the identification process. This lack of greater results is due to Vietnam's failure, thus far, to begin repatriating remains "recovered and readily recoverable," as called for in the context of existing U.S. policy before further easing of the embargo.

PRESIDENT RENEWS COMMITMENT: In his address on Memorial Day at the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial, President Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to press the Vietnamese to provide the accounting, "not only because it is the central outstanding issue in our relationship with Vietnam, but because it is a central commitment made by the American government to our people." The President also pledged that "by Veterans Day, we will have declassified all United States Government records related to POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam War."

Comment: The Veterans Day deadline on declassification should help expedite public release of U.S. records, beyond the nearly 1 million already turned over to the National Archives.

The President is expected to soon establish a clear policy for his Administration to follow in dealing with Vietnam. Based upon his many public commitments, the embargo should be maintained and access to International Monetary Funds should continue to be restricted until Hanoi decides to seriously cooperate on the POW/MIA issue. A strong, unified message now hopefully would prompt the Vietnamese leadership to act without further manipulation of this issue.

KERRY CODEL APPLAUDS VIETNAMESE COOPERATION: Senator John Kerry (D-MA) recently returned from a Memorial Day recess trip to Vietnam. Senator Kerry was accompanied by Senators John McCain (D-AZ) and John Glenn (D-OH), Representatives Pete Peterson (D-FL), Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Lane Evans (D-IL), as well as VFW, VVA and AMVETS representatives. With assistance from CINCPAC/JTF-FA, Kerry staff member Nancy Stetson and Virginia Foote, US-Vietnam Trade Council, advanced the visit.

On June 11th, the delegation met with the President and provided their assessment regarding the level of Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA. Immediately following the meeting, Reuter News Service quoted Senator Kerry as stating, "We talked about the accounting process. You know, the accounting in Vietnam can only happen through either first hand evidence or through documents, through photographs, oral history. We're getting access to all of that now. So, I think it was good for the President to hear, from those of us who've been involved in the issue, the enormous progress that is being made. We've gone from 196 priority cases down to 92. That's progress. It's very, very significant and Americans need to know that there is progress being made." (Emphasis added)

Later in the same interview, Senator Kerry repeated that "cooperation has been enormous" and went on to urge steps by the U.S. in response stating, "There's still some things we want, but this has got to be a two way street. You can't just demand and demand and demand from somebody when you also want something. There's got to be two ways in the reciprocity and I think we have to continue that."

According to AP, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) also stated that "enormous progress" had been made toward a full accounting of all MIAs, adding that he believes it "is time for us to now consider moving ahead with normal relations" with Vietnam. In a June 4th release, Congressman "Pete" Peterson (D-FL) stated he was pleased to "report that significant positive progress has occurred" and that he was "optimistic that we can achieve closure on the MIA/POW issue in the months ahead."

Comment: Senator Kerry's efforts to advocate greater U.S. "reciprocity" have become so transparent in his public statements that any objectivity or effectiveness on accounting for missing Americans has disappeared. This former Chairman of the Select Committee on POW/MIAs has repeatedly portrayed the level of field activity and movement around Vietnam, plus Vietnam's reluctant provision of long-withheld documents, as sufficient to warrant further steps by the U.S. on IMF assistance and lifting the U.S. embargo. Whether deliberate or from inadequate understanding of the facts about Vietnam's knowledge and unilateral ability to provide answers, it is increasingly obvious that some (legislative and executive branches) are dismissing well-founded U.S. Government intelligence which form the basis of family member, veteran and public expectations on POW/MIA accountability.

The League does not hold the view that accounting for a total of 12 Americans in two years is "enormous progress," particularly in light of known evidence about the extent to which Vietnam is withholding remains and information. Those who try to dismiss basic facts have offered no evidence whatsoever to support their claims, ignoring Vietnam's record of manipulation and citing assurances by the Vietnamese Government which has consistently withheld accountability.

Hopefully, Senator Kerry's efforts to apply pressure on the Clinton Administration to lift the trade embargo, despite the lack of real progress in terms of accounting, will fall on deaf ears. President Clinton has made numerous commitments that concrete results on POW/MIA are required to move forward with Vietnam. The League has confidence that the President will honor his pledges, but he needs support from all to help withstand the visible lobbying. If Vietnam responds in real terms, we should support reciprocity, but not now.

Last Known Alive Discrepancy Cases: Senator Kerry asserted that "196 priority cases (are) down to 92." That statement is incorrect; the Senator failed to mention some basic facts. In 104 of the last known alive (LKA) discrepancy cases, death has been confirmed by convincing evidence; however, there is also evidence that the Vietnamese Government long ago recovered remains, not yet returned to the United States. These cases are not resolved; they are discrepancy cases, in the broader sense long understood by the families.

The League and U.S. Government definition of accounting is the individual alive, his remains, or convincing evidence of why neither is possible. That is what the families have a right to expect, particularly in those cases where information existed that the individual was alive, in captivity, or in close proximity to capture (the definition of LKA discrepancy cases).

Joint Documents Center in Hanoi: Reportedly, a "Joint Documents Center" was established during the Kerry Delegation's visit. Initially proposed by Senator Kerry during his mid-May visit to Hanoi, little is thus far known about its real purpose or potential usefulness. Reportedly, this project was undertaken by Senator Kerry, without coordination with or approval by Clinton Administration officials. The "center" is located at the Vietnamese Army's War Memorial Museum (where the joint research team is located) in a rear building where Vietnamese and American documents are to be housed. Except for privacy considerations of returned POWs, such information is to be made available to the public. (If such a "center" causes the few remaining experienced linguists/specialists to be pulled from the province and district level to Hanoi-based document access, it could undercut obtaining concrete results in terms of accountability.)

New Documents? According to preliminary analysis, the 12 "new" documents provided to the Kerry Delegation, as well as the films reviewed, again relate primarily to returned POWs and other accounted for U.S. personnel. Some of the documents and films are new to the U.S. Government, and all new information is welcome, but new information on missing Americans, rather than those already accounted for, would truly be significant. This latest turnover of documents further indicates the extent to which Vietnam can help account for missing Americans.

Vietnamese MIAs? . On June 3rd, NBC'S TODAY SHOW, (in an incredible twist of logic) Senator Kerry cited Vietnamese appeals for help in accounting for their "300,000 MIAs" by stating that the U.S. "cannot produce what we are asking the Vietnamese to produce." (The implication was that relevant information or remains of Vietnamese are being withheld by the United States or the American people). In 1986 and 1988, to demonstrate humanitarian reciprocity, the U.S. Government searched its archives for relevant information and turned over records located. The League and veterans organizations also appealed to their respective members to provide any specific information retained by individuals.

The fact is that Vietnam's purported "300,000 MIAs" do not exist. The tragic loss of Vietnamese lives is well known and far exceeds 300,000. As the Vietnamese were informed in 1982 during the League's official delegation, if any of their alleged 300,000 "MIAs" were alive, they would return to their families. If buried in unknown locations, exhumation would likely be fruitless; Vietnam has no records for comparison to identify their KIA/BNR personnel. The U.S. has responded to wartime suffering by the Vietnamese and has facilitated official humanitarian aid, as well as incredible subsidies to underwrite Vietnam's POW/MIA efforts in our behalf.

Attempts to equate the accounting for America's POW/MIAs to a bilateral remains identification effort are not sustainable. There are no cases of Vietnamese citizens last known alive in captivity in the United States, nor are there identifiable remains to be recovered here. The U.S. has no record of manipulating accountability for Vietnamese, nor are remains and information being withheld as a matter of policy. Unfortunately, some have their own agenda; others have little historical background which offers potential for Vietnamese exploitation.

TECHNICAL EFFORTS: In early June, technical meetings were held with the Vietnamese and Lao to review results of recently concluded joint field activities and plan for future such endeavors. Joint field operations in Laos and Vietnam took place in late-May, early-June. U.S. team members reported improved cooperation by both governments and increased Lao flexibility in pursuing investigations.

REMAINS REPATRIATED: On June 8th, the Vietnamese turned over to U.S. officials remains that could be those of missing Americans. The precise number is unknown; however, most were turned over by local villagers or recovered during field operations. (These "clearing the battlefield" remains recoveries are not included in the official expectations of "hundreds" of recovered or readily available remains, the basis for POW/MIA criteria in the Bush Administration's "roadmap.")

MORE ON THE RUSSIAN REPORT: Recently, another series of publicly released documents appear, at least on the surface, to lend credence to the content of the Russian document. Of great interest are the equally large number of American POWs held by the Vietnamese and their strategy of withholding information from the U.S. The Defense Department is evaluating all related information and reportedly plans to publicly release their assessment. Additional information from the archives supports some of the facts in the original document.

Comment: To really get to the facts on the Russian document, it is crucial that further access be obtained to Central Committee and Presidential archives of the former Soviet Union. Repeated denials by Vietnamese officials mean little in the context of their past behavior.

ADMIRAL LARSON RESPONDS ON DOCUMENT SHREDDING: Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), responded by letter to the League regarding the shredding of former JCRC documents at the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok. The results of the CINCPAC Inspector General investigation found that nothing had been shredded that would impact adversely on accounting for missing Americans.

Comment: There is no way to know the precise content of the files (originals, not copies) destroyed, but there appears little else which can be done except to question the judgment of ordering destruction of any POW/MIA records. Hopefully, CINCPAC's judgment, based upon the IG investigation, is correct. The "cross-references" and marginal notes which were judged relatively unimportant by CINCPAC officials were potential leads which serious, experienced investigators might have found useful, (i.e. possible correlations which "analysts" at the former JCRC did not make). We will never know; what has been destroyed cannot be recovered. One positive result of the IG investigation is that it prompted a search of all U.S. Government files for documents which were not then held by JTF-FA Headquarters in Hawaii, but have now reportedly been located.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S ASSESSMENT OF WHERE THE ISSUE STANDS: For quite some time, the League's newsletter has expressed increasing concern in terms of official POW/MIA activities and implementation of policy. Some have indicated that they are pleased to see the "old Ann" again at the forefront of criticizing the U.S. Government. Others, more newly involved, don't recall the often harsh, but objective criticisms, League-sponsored demonstrations at the White House, State Department, etc., before President Reagan came into office and decided to give the issue priority.

I have always believed that commendation, as well as criticism, should be applied when warranted and carefully considered. As we have learned, unfounded accusations and claims tend to undermine the credibility and basic facts on which League policy has consistently been based. The League's willingness to stand for principles, relying on FACTS rather than speculation, has subjected the League to severe attacks by the "conspiracy crowd," unjustified lawsuits, malignment by individuals or groups which sought to speak for us and undeserved attempts at character assassination of long-serving, dedicated members of the board.

Throughout this internal turmoil, I felt it necessary to concentrate solely on obtaining answers -- on accounting for our missing relatives -- no matter what the distractions. That deliberate focus has allowed me to evaluate the direction being pursued by various departments and agencies of the U.S. Government who have ultimate responsibility for sound policy. Hanoi's policy is well known and consistent.

Essentially, we now have an operational approach which is "rolling through" Vietnam. After a visit, and nothing is found, "no further action" or "case pending" becomes the norm unless or until new information comes to light. At the same time, there are mounting pressures from all sides to dismiss solid evidence that Vietnam continues to withhold remains and information which could account for hundreds of our missing relatives.

Increasingly, comments are heard, especially from Members of Congress, that evaluations are changing, that there is no longer policy-level, Defense and State Department agreement concerning Vietnam's knowledge of missing Americans and their ability to repatriate remains at will. Officials truly dedicated to valid POW/MIA objectives are increasingly being removed from issue-related responsibilities. They are replaced by undoubtedly fine personnel, but individuals who have no historical knowledge, understanding of the complexities or cultural/linguistic background to best serve the real objective - accountability.

Moving from an approach which included balanced, well-coordinated scrutiny and planning through the POW/MIA Interagency Group, there is now near-total centralization of the effort in CINCPAC/JTF-FA without policy supervision. The transfer of critical responsibilities to JTF-FA has placed operations, intelligence collection, reporting and analysis under the same command, to the near-exclusion of known talent. The result is activity without results, commended as "enormous progress" which leaves the uninformed with a perception that real accounting is either being achieved, or that it does not exist.

We have a declaratory policy from President Clinton which is positive. Unless the President's stated policy is reversed, our job is to remain responsible and help the President's policy become an institutionalized reality throughout the government. This should create an environment where serious policy-level negotiations with Vietnam can resume and the enormous resources and personnel of JTF-FA can be more effective.

LEAGUE ANNUAL MEETING: As all were informed in the last newsletter, the League's 24th Annual Meeting will be held at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, July 15-18th. All family members, whether or not League members, are invited to attend. Veterans and other concerned citizens who wish to attend should now have contacted the League's national office, 8:30 a.m. - 5:30 p.m. daily, at 202/223-6846.

LEAGUE RAFFLE: This year, in lieu of sending 10 tickets to each League member with a request for a \$1.00 donation for each ticket, the board decided to send out only one ticket. The donation, \$10.00, will be money well spent to keep the League operational, and each contributor could win the grand prize of \$1,000. Please do your part by donating at least the \$10.00 cost of the raffle ticket. Your donations will be used to fund the continued operations of the League. Without the League, literally nothing would have been accomplished to account for our missing relatives. What the League has managed to accomplish is little short of a miracle, including the world-wide acceptance of our logo as the international symbol of POWs and MIAs.

- **February 10, 1993:** During the regular White House briefing.

Question: President Mitterand today asked the U.S. to lift the economic embargo on Vietnam. Do you have any comment about that?

George Stephanopoulos (Communications Director): "All I can say is we've generally supported the roadmap policy. We want to make sure that we have a full accounting of all MIAs, and that's the policy we'll continue."

- **February 3, 1993:** White House official reaction on policy toward normalizing relations with Vietnam, responding to a Reuters News Agency inquiry.

"President Clinton has already stated we will only move forward when there's the fullest possible accounting of all those listed as missing."

PRE-ELECTION COMMITMENTS

- **November 11, 1992:** President-elect Clinton's address, Veterans Day Ceremony, Little Rock, Arkansas.

"...as I have pledged throughout my campaign, I will do my very best to make sure we have a final resolution of the POW/MIA issue...I have sent a clear message that there will be no normalization of relations with any nation that is at all suspected of withholding any information. We must have as full an accounting as is humanly possible."

- **September 10, 1992:** Issue paper, entitled "Clinton-Gore on Issues of Concern to Veterans."

"Make resolution of the POW/MIA issue a national priority by insisting on a full accounting of all POWs and MIAs before normalizing relations with Vietnam; working with the Russian government to reveal any information it has on Americans held; and declassify pertinent government documents."

- **March 17, 1992:** Signed letter from Governor Clinton to League Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths.

"Thank you for your thorough and helpful briefing on POW/MIAs. This issue is certainly due proper attention and timely action."



May 21, 1993

NEWSLETTER

AMG:98

RUSSIAN DOCUMENT INDICATES 1,205 US POW'S HELD BY VIETNAM IN 1972:
A recently released Russian translation of a reported 1972 Vietnamese document states that 1,205 Americans were being held at the time Vietnam was publicly admitting to holding only 368 U.S. POWs. The document was discovered in Russian files by Harvard researcher Dr. Stephen J. Morris. The report's author was identified as Lt. General Tran Van Quang, cited as Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army.

According to the document, the purpose of the Vietnamese Politburo decision to withhold the correct number of American POWs was to keep the U.S. Government guessing, giving Vietnam a negotiating advantage. Official Vietnamese spokesmen promptly denied the validity of the document, terming it "a clear fabrication" and implying that it was originated by individuals who wish to delay or prevent improved bilateral relations between the U.S. and Vietnam. The document was judged to be authentic by several experts on the former Soviet Union, including Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, and Dr. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State and chief U.S. negotiator in Paris of the agreements which ended active U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

White House Reaction: White House spokesman George Stephanopoulos reacted by stating, "We are going to continue to look into this matter and look into the report and have a complete review, but the President is determined not to move forward on normalization with Vietnam until there is a full accounting of the POWs and MIAs."

Comment: The League welcomes this strong commitment from the White House. The document is an authentic Russian document; however, questions exist about the accuracy of the translation from Vietnamese into Russian and other specifics. Efforts are underway through the U.S. Government's Task Force Russia to obtain a copy of the original Vietnamese version for direct translation into the English language and subsequent analysis by U.S. specialists or, if not available, to locate and interview the author of the Soviet document, as well as those who "endorsed" it.

From the content of the English-language translation, it appears that Americans are the subject, not other nationalities; however, as was noted publicly by Senator Bob Smith (R-NH), the document does not prove that 600-800 Americans are alive today. Regardless of whether this document is accurate, i.e. that several hundred more U.S. POWs were held in 1972, it reinforces the fact that it was then Vietnam's policy and strategy, as it is now, to withhold POW/MIA information.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger also confirmed that the statements in the Russian translation pertaining to negotiating strategy matched what he faced in Paris in 1972. The important question is, how many times does evidence of Vietnamese manipulation of the POW/MIA issue have to surface before all Americans, including those advocating immediate lifting of the embargo, are convinced? Vietnam has consistently withheld, and still withholds, information on Americans missing from the Vietnam War.

In view of this fact, assistance to Vietnam by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and further easing of restrictions on the embargo are premature. It was reassuring that the Clinton Administration withstood international and domestic pressures to resume loans to Vietnam during the mid-April IMF meetings in Washington. The ball is now in Vietnam's court; Hanoi must recognize that unilateral actions are required, now.

PRESIDENT CLINTON ON POW/MIA: In his Town Hall meeting in San Diego on May 17th, President Clinton was asked about the POW/MIA issue. In responding, the most important aspect was his commitment concerning normalization of relations with Vietnam. After stating that some important information had been provided during General Vessey's April trip to Hanoi, the President stated, "they (Vietnam) want to do business with us..... and the United States has no intention of doing that, at least I don't, until we have a full accounting of the POWs and MIAs." (The League welcomes this pledge, the latest of many since President Clinton assumed office.)

FURTHER FROM THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: In a May 18th hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Warren Christopher reacted to a question regarding POW/MIA and improved relations with Vietnam by stating, "The President is determined that we will get satisfactory answers with respect to the MIAs and POWs before we proceed to normalization of the relations." This affirmation of the President's policy is also welcome.

LEAGUE OPPOSITION TO IMF AND EASING TRADE EMBARGO: On April 13th, at a press conference hosted by Senator Bob Smith (R-NH), a letter to President Clinton, citing reasons for opposing premature lifting of the embargo and IMF assistance to Vietnam until concrete POW/MIA results are obtained, was made public. Written before the release of the "Russian document," the letter was signed by Senator Smith, League Chairman of the Board Sue Scott and officials of The American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, the Vietnam Veterans of America and the American Ex-POWs.

Comment: This unified position on the IMF and embargo issues is extremely important, and sincere appreciation is expressed to Senator Smith and the veterans organizations which participated. President Clinton's recent statements, placing priority on the families' concerns over commercial interests, sent a clear signal to Vietnam that the U.S. expects concrete results which account for Americans before IMF assistance or any further steps to lift the embargo or establish diplomatic relations.

AMERICANS ACCOUNTED FOR: Since the last League newsletter, the Defense Department announced that the following Americans had been accounted for through remains identifications by the Army's Central Identification Laboratory.

Lt. Ralph E. Foulks, Jr., USNR, missing January 5, 1968, Vietnam, unilaterally repatriated by the SRV in December, 1988

Major Douglas C. Condit, USAF, missing November 26, 1967, Vietnam, unilaterally repatriated by the SRV in June, 1992

Mr. Welles Hangen, civilian NBC correspondent, captured in Cambodia on May 31, 1970; remains were recovered during a joint US/Cambodian excavation which concluded on March 23, 1992.

Sergeant Raphael L. Collazo, USA, missing March 17, 1968, Vietnam; remains were unilaterally returned by Vietnam on February 8, 1993.

The remains of an American previously unaccounted for in Laos were also returned and identified; however, the family requested that no information be publicly released. The remains of this American were recovered in April, 1992, during a joint US/Lao excavation. This brings to 2,259 the number of Americans still prisoner, missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War.

Comment: Despite the increased level of JTF-FA field activities, particularly in Vietnam, the number of unaccounted for Americans was reduced by only 5 in 1992 and 1 in 1993, though some remains are currently in the identification process. This is due to Vietnam's unwillingness, thus far, to begin repatriating remains "recovered and readily recoverable," as called for in the context of existing U.S. policy before further easing of the embargo.

ADDITIONAL REMAINS REPATRIATED: Remains recovered during joint field excavations in Laos were turned over April 7th to US officials in Vientiane. Also, following joint forensic review in Hanoi, some remains turned over by local citizens and recovered during field activities were repatriated to US officials. All were flown to the Army's Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. These remains are undergoing extensive review in an effort to establish individual identification.

GENERAL VESSEY VISITS VIETNAM: General John W. Vessey, Jr., emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs, returned to Vietnam April 18-19th, along with 17 U.S. Government officials. The visit was initially planned "to assess Vietnamese cooperation on accounting of American POW/MIAs and to seek further progress" according to a White House release which also affirmed that "President Clinton has pledged that the fullest possible accounting for our service personnel must lie at the core of our policy toward Vietnam."

A "Joint Communiqué" was issued in Hanoi at the conclusion of talks. On the Russian/Vietnamese document, "the Vietnamese side rejected the information contained in it as completely inaccurate and not reflecting the reality which existed during the war." On access to SRV archives, "the Vietnamese side provided important documents from the archives of the General Political Directorate and other archives listing American POWs held during the war as well as American servicemen who died in captivity in southern and central Vietnam. The U.S. side indicated these documents will assist in its efforts to account for U.S. servicemen. They also appear to shed light on the Russian document, but further analysis is required."

On an assessment of bilateral POW/MIA efforts, "They agreed that substantial progress is being made and agreed that further action was necessary in order to increase this progress." On future actions, "Both sides agreed they would join officials of the Government of Laos for trilateral talks on POW/MIA cooperation to be held May 6-8 in Hanoi. Both sides also agreed to establish a new joint team to accelerate investigation of the remaining American discrepancy cases. There also was agreement in principle on the work plan for activities to investigate cases of missing Americans during the remainder of 1993."

Comment: Little was learned which clarified the content of the Russian document, the first priority subject of discussions. This visit, however, provided Vietnam with another opportunity for unilateral POW/MIA action, the first in the Clinton Administration. At this point on the issue, the League defines real progress as results which account for missing Americans; on that score, little was accomplished. In earlier years, it could accurately be stated that some "progress" occurred each step along the way to sporadic remains repatriations and greater access to information. In view of repeated Vietnamese agreements and commitments, none of which were implemented fully, realistic measurement must be the number of Americans accounted for as a result of specific answers.

KERRY RETURNS TO VIETNAM: Senator John Kerry (D-MA) just returned from another trip to Vietnam, during which he met with Vietnamese President Le Duc Anh and other senior officials. Reportedly, Senator Kerry provided the Vietnamese with requests for archival documents and a list of witnesses to be interviewed.

Comment: This trip closely followed that of General Vessey in which a few more documents were provided, largely in response to public release of the Russian document. Officials in Hanoi agreed to cooperate on all requests, as they have for so many years; the League awaits concrete results.

Another Trip Planned: Senator Kerry plans to return to Vietnam May 29-June 3, over the Memorial Day recess, accompanied by Senators John Glenn, D-OH, and John McCain, R-AZ, (who had scheduled a trip to Cambodia on the heels of elections there) and senior officials of some national veterans organizations.

ORIGINAL POW/MIA DOCUMENTS DESTROYED: On March 24-26th, original POW/MIA documents were destroyed by personnel assigned to the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting. The files, compiled primarily by the former Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), covered a span of over twenty years, including original notations of investigators and interviewers. Despite efforts to stop the shredding, it was discovered too late, and the damage had been done.

Comment: Although the League has no firsthand information on the actual content of the files nor the precise timing of events which occurred, the League made clear to senior military and civilian officials the potential gravity of this action. An objective inquiry was suggested, noting that the families' greatest concern is the potentially adverse impact of destroying irreplaceable records which could help bring answers on POW/MIAs. Reportedly, these wartime and post-war files were of significant value, currently and historically. Unlike the Department of Defense and CINCPAC, the White House reaction was that the shredding incident was "under review," a welcome attitude of objectivity.

Admiral Charles Larson, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (CINCPAC), provided personal assurance that he knew nothing of this incident, nor did any senior Clinton Administration officials, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, USA, or U.S. Ambassador to Thailand David Lambertson.

An official Inspector General (IG) investigation was ordered by Admiral Larson. Questions should include the actual content of the files, the extent to which they were in current use by JTF personnel, DIA analysts and others, plus any potential damage to the accounting effort. It is also very important that evidence be obtained on why even possibly irreplaceable documents and records on this issue were ordered destroyed.

Sworn statements are routinely obtained in IG investigations, and there are procedures inherent in this legal process to protect witnesses (active duty, civilian capacity or retired) from any retribution or harassment. The League awaits the release of the investigation's outcome but, obviously, cannot predict the official findings. Whatever the outcome of the investigation, the shredding took place in an extraordinary hurry, and the poor judgment involved in the JTF-FA decision to destroy these unique POW/MIA files is obvious.

FAMILY MEMBERS REACT: Family members have voiced strong objections to field reports, originated by JTF-FA, which recommend placing a case in an "inactive" category, effectively terminating further active effort unless additional leads arise. Initially portrayed as a mechanism to help in scheduling future field activities, "recommendations" being made included "case closed." The Defense Department has clarified that such terms will no longer be used, noting that JTF-FA has no authority to close cases, and that the term "pending" will be substituted.

Comment: The U.S. Government defines accountability as returning the man alive, his remains if deceased, or convincing evidence why neither is possible. The JTF-FA, assigned to investigate cases in the field, is not authorized to decide when efforts have been exhausted. The League strongly objects to any action to dismiss real accountability for which the League has fought so many years.

TRILATERAL TALKS HELD: On May 7-8th, trilateral technical talks took place in Hanoi between U.S., Vietnamese and Lao representatives. Discussions focused on establishing a workable mechanism for cooperation between the three governments to account for Americans lost in areas of Laos controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war, including along the Lao/Vietnam border. Of the 516 Americans still missing in Laos, nearly 80% were lost in such areas. The U.S. is seeking Vietnam's cooperation through the trilateral talks to obtain archival documents and access to Vietnamese eye-witnesses to enhance the success of US/Lao field operations. Technical cooperation in the field between the three governments was delayed until policy level discussions can be held to deal with sensitive territorial questions involving cross-border trilateral operations.

FIELD OPERATIONS ONGOING: On May 8th, U.S. and Lao technical specialists began field operations in Khammouan and Savannakhet Provinces of Laos. The joint operations, expected to end on May 22nd, are the 3rd in Laos this year. Joint field activities are also ongoing in Vietnam where some 70 JTF-FA personnel are again working in several provinces.

ARCHIVAL RESEARCH IN VIETNAM: There are now three U.S. teams, led by experienced, language-capable JTF-FA personnel, conducting archival research in Vietnam for documents and material related to missing Americans, one team is in Hanoi, one in Da Nang and one in Saigon. Unfortunately, most photographs and other data thus far obtained by U.S. specialists relates to accounted for Americans. It is hoped that Vietnam will make available information which will help account for Americans still missing, rather than returned POWs and those whose remains have been repatriated.

POW/MIA SPECIALISTS WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA: Due to hostilities (attributed to the Khmer Rouge) encountered during joint field operations, POW/MIA field operations in Cambodia have been suspended for now. It is not yet known when the political situation will stabilize enough to permit such activities to resume.

POW/MIA SPECIALIST REMOVED FROM IN-COUNTRY INVESTIGATIONS IN VIETNAM: Mr. Garnett "Bill" Bell, respected by POW/MIA family members, veterans and other concerned Americans for his dedicated efforts to account for American POW/MIAs, has been effectively side-lined by the Commanding Officer of JTF-FA, Major General Thomas Needham, USA. Although given the title of Special Assistant to the Commander and still involved in a support role (providing insights and advice based on years of direct involvement), Mr. Bell no longer personally conducts interviews with Vietnamese witnesses nor participates in in-country investigations into the last known alive discrepancies or live sighting reports.

Comment: Mr. Bell's knowledge and expertise, fluency in Lao, Thai and Vietnamese, as well as many tribal languages used in Vietnam, had been well utilized until formation of the JTF-FA in early 1992. An original member of JCRC, Mr. Bell was the long planned, first Chief of the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi. When Bell was replaced by LTC John Donovan, USA, assigned by MG Needham as Commander of JTF-FA's Detachment I in Hanoi, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs stated in writing to Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Senator Bob Smith that as Special Assistant to the Commander, JTF-FA, Mr. Bell "will have more time to devote to working closely with his Vietnamese counterparts and functioning as our premier investigator and linguist in Vietnam." Bill Bell's many years of experience, knowledge and commitment to accounting for America's POW/MIAs have earned him the respect and confidence of the POW/MIA families. It is the League's conviction that he should be utilized for in-country efforts to get answers on and account for our missing loved ones.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA FINAL REPORT: The most important aspects of the Committee's conclusions were 1) reinforced Reagan/Bush policy on the live POW issue, including the possibility that some could still be held, though in much more negative terms; 2) affirmed that, in terms of accountability, real answers are in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, primarily Vietnam, and flagged China, Russia and North Korea for attention; and 3) reconfirmed earlier findings that despite policy-level inattention, lack of technical effort, etc. by the U.S. Government, particularly before 1982/83, there is no evidence of past or present conspiracy or coverup.

Comment: The League's board of directors reached a consensus that they were "disappointed" at the Committee's failure to focus adequately on Vietnam's level of knowledge and ability to unilaterally account for hundreds of missing Americans and viewed the overall effort as not sufficiently comprehensive.

24TH ANNUAL MEETING SCHEDULED: The National League of Families 24th Annual Meeting will take place July 16-17th at Andrew's Air Force Base, Maryland. This yearly meeting provides an excellent opportunity to receive current information on the issue from League and U.S. Government representatives. As in the past, all family members are invited to attend the League's annual meeting, whether or not currently League members. Concerned supporters and friends who are interested in attending should contact the League's national office or League officials throughout the country. Important briefings will be provided, guest speakers will address sessions, and an official League business meeting will be held.

NOW POW/MIA WRIST WATCH PROJECT: The firm of NOW Marketing, Inc., has designed a Gruen-made wrist-watch which bears the League's official logo, underneath which is N O W in large letters. At a cost of \$39.95 per watch, NOW Marketing has committed to providing a portion of the proceeds from sales to support the League financially. Orders can be placed by writing P.O. Box 5045, Station A, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18710.

Call the League's 24-hour UPDATE LINE at 202/659-0133.

STATISTICS

* Firsthand Live Sighting Reports from Indochina

As of April 15, 1993, 1,687 first-hand live sighting reports in Indochina have been received since 1975. 1,663 of these reports have been resolved: 1,177 pertain to individuals who have since left Indochina (returned POWs, known missionaries or civilians detained after Saigon fell, and later released); 45 reports correlate to wartime sightings; 441 are fabrications. The remaining 24 first-hand sightings are still unresolved and are under priority investigation using all available intelligence assets. The 24 can be further divided; 14 deal with reported Americans sighted in a prisoner situation, and 10 in non-prisoner situations. The years during which the 24 first-hand unresolved live sightings took place is outlined below:

Year	Before 75	76-77	78	79-80	81	82	83-89	90	91	92	TOTAL	
POW	3	0	1	3	0	0	3	0	0	1	3	14
NonPW	2	1	1	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	10

At the end of the Vietnam War, there were 2,583 Americans who were listed as prisoner, missing, or killed in action/body not recovered; 2,260 are still missing. The following is a breakdown of the 323 Americans accounted for since the end of the Vietnam War:

from 1974-1975, post war years:	28
from 1976-1978, US/SRV normalization negotiations:	47
from 1979-1981, US/SRV talks break down:	4
from 1982-1984, Reagan/Bush priority, 1st term	20
from 1985-1988, Reagan/Bush priority, 2nd term	145
from 1989-1992, Bush/Quayle priority:	79

Over 90% of the 2,260 missing Americans were lost in Vietnam or in areas of Laos and Cambodia controlled by the Vietnamese during the war. While unilateral Vietnamese repatriations of remains have accounted for the vast majority of the returned Americans, 45 of 48 Americans accounted for in Laos have been the result of joint excavations.

Total Americans accounted for since 1973:

Vietnam	271 (2 lost in Laos; returned by Vietnam)
Laos	48 (three by non-government indigenous Lao)
China	2
Cambodia	2 (1 lost in Cambodia; returned by Vietnam)

* Statistics from Defense Intelligence Agency

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ^R
HOWARD PASTER ^{HN}

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Feinstein

3 JUL 1 12:46
Letter to Doria

Purpose

To reply to Senator Dianne Feinstein who urges you to raise with Prime Minister Miyazawa the concept of a Presidio Pacific Center to promote our links to Asia.

Background

The Presidio is being turned over by the Army to the National Park Service, which in turn has solicited applications for use of the Presidio. One application is from a group of San Francisco citizens organized to promote the establishment of a Presidio Pacific Center which would serve as a cultural, business and educational center to promote U.S.-Asian ties. The citizens group is seeking Japanese involvement and support for the project.

Your reply thanks the Senator for her interest, notes the important contribution the center could make, but points out that it would be premature for you to mention the proposal until the National Park Service is further along in the solicitation process.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Feinstein
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dianne:

I appreciated receiving your letter in support of the establishment of a Presidio Pacific Center. The vision of an international center designed to anchor the United States in the Pacific is exciting and could offer a unique opportunity to bolster economic and cultural cooperation with our Asian allies.

As you know, the Presidio Pacific Center is only one of the applicants for use of the Presidio. As the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is recommending the U.S. Sixth Army Headquarters remain at the Presidio, I think it would be premature for me to mention the project to Prime Minister Miyazawa. I will, however, keep this very interesting proposal in mind and I wish you the best of luck.

Sincerely,

Barack Clinton

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0504

93 JUN 25 P1 : 56

June 21, 1993

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to inform you of my strong support for maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco where it is currently located. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission currently recommends that the 6th Army Headquarters be relocated to the NASA Ames facility at Moffett Field, California.

I have shared my views with the Base Closure Commission, in writing as well as in my most recent testimony before the Commission here in Washington. I have enclosed my letter to Chairman Courter on this issue for your review. In this letter I point out that the move to NASA Ames will cost in the range of \$10-\$17 million, while the operating costs at both locations are estimated to be comparable. Former Secretary of the Army Michael Stone, in his testimony before the Base Closure Commission on April 25 called the plan to move the 6th Army "an economic loser."

The idea for maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters is supported by myself, Secretary Stone, and Representative Nancy Pelosi among others. Perhaps most importantly, the idea has received strong support from the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service who will be the landlords of the Presidio by the end of next year.


As you may know, the Presidio of San Francisco, as mandated by federal law, will be transferred to the National Park Service as a valuable addition to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. This transfer will not be affected by the Army remaining at the Presidio. It is our hope that this park will soon become an international center for education and research, and many organizations are involved to make this vision a reality. Maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio will provide the Park Service with a valuable tenant, as well as a source of needed revenue, as the Army would likely enter a lease agreement with the Park Service for the buildings it would utilize.

Your support for maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio is important not only for the money it would save, but for the long-term benefits it would provide to the Park

Page 2

Service. As the base closure process draws to an end, I urge you to give this plan your most serious consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dianne Feinstein". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Dianne Feinstein
United States Senator

DF:msm
Enclosure

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

WASHINGTON D.C. 20500

July 1, 1993

JUL 1 P7:07

*Thinking
the same*

THE CHAIRMAN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


FROM: LAURA D. TYSON

SUBJECT: Employment and Unemployment in June, Labor
Department Release, Tomorrow Morning, 8:30 a.m.


The employment report for June came in worse than expected, with the unemployment rate rising and nonfarm payroll employment increasing only slightly.

- o The unemployment rate rose to 7.0 percent in June from 6.9 percent in May, just as private analysts had expected. It was the first increase in the unemployment rate since June of last year.
- o The closely-watched nonfarm payroll employment figure rose by just 13,000 in June, well below the 150,000 increase expected by private analysts. The small increase in June followed upwardly-revised increases of 215,000 in May and 255,000 in April. In total, the upward revisions accounted for an additional 45,000 jobs. So far this year, nonfarm payroll employment has increased by ~~969,000~~ *****
- o The average workweek fell in June to 34.4 hours from a revised 34.7 hours in May, which was the highest level in over 4 years. Aggregate production hours also fell in June, but for the second quarter as a whole were up 4.0 percent at an annual rate from the first quarter.
- o Average hourly earnings fell 0.1 percent in June. The decline in hourly earnings coupled with the decline in hours indicates that wage and salary income fell in June.

NONFARM PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT



CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ^{7/2}

Good - to Tony Blair
- (need to say)
- we should seriously consider
his idea - B

ch 119 ✓

President William Clinton
The White House
Washington D.C.

1 July, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

As Russia evolves, so U.S. policy toward Russia must evolve. Events in Russia are evolving rapidly. Therefore, it is timely to consider refinements in our policy to accommodate these changes.

First, the base for democracy is broader than the base for Yeltsin. Therefore, we should broaden our political contact base.

The successful referendum at the end of April represented at least a temporary extension of Yeltsin's general reform mandate. Even more, however, it represented a triumph for democracy over the forces of revanchism.

The Russian political landscape is more complex than a simple division between the pro-and anti-Yeltsin forces. There are a number of thoughtful democrats, including in the current parliament, who do not identify Russia's hope as clearly with Yeltsin as does the United States.

In almost all countries, including among our staunchest allies, we maintain informal contact with opposition elements. This is normal diplomatic practice for democracies. We should be listening to and talking with a broader cast of characters here.

Second, we should be willing to tolerate political and economic experimentation in Russia. Correctly or incorrectly many thoughtful Russians see U.S. policy as monolithic commitment to a kind of market economic orthodoxy. The impression is that "reform" for us means a form of pure capitalism that exists nowhere in the world, including in the U.S., and that we will be satisfied with nothing less. Our total satisfaction on this score is crucial in that it is seen as the key to much-promised but never delivered financial aid.

Russian must adopt systems which suit its history, experience and culture. It will not be a replica of the U.S.A. and it will resist being forced into an abstract model. We continue to make unrealistic demands and condition our assistance too much on the fulfillment of those demands. Instead we should encourage democracy with a Russian face.

Third, we must also not expect Russia uniformly to endorse our foreign policy agenda.

You are aware, I know, of the sensitivity Russians feel, especially as a failed super-power and former great imperial power, to any impression they might be evolving into a U.S. puppet. Care must be taken to respect their sovereign integrity.

A particularly useful notion might be to find some problem in the world where their leadership could be quietly solicited and promoted and where we and our allies might then find it convenient to follow. Statesmanship occasionally involves the elevation of others.

Fourth, almost two years after the anti-perestroika coup, Cold War barriers to trade, commerce and full-scale economic development are still maintained by the U.S. Virtually all technology transfer limits, including those on telecommunications equipment, should be removed.

Traditionalist elements of the national security and intelligence apparatus will tell you this is unwise. As a veteran of the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees and as one who has fought this barrier for five years, I wish to argue vehemently that Russian communication systems can be fully modernized without jeopardy to our national security objectives.

Indeed, if inadequate communications jeopardizes economic reform in Russia, then it also jeopardizes our national security.

Fifth, Western support for Russia should be more sharply focused on infrastructure modernization.

To build a modern economy Russia must have modern communications, modern airports and seaports, modern highways and roads and modern, safe energy supplies. Much of U.S., G-7 and I.M.F. policy now focuses on macro-economic reforms and small-scale entrepreneurship.

Productivity leaps will not and cannot take place without wholesale attention to modern infrastructures. We and our Western allies must not expect grass-roots entrepreneurship to pull an economy as vast, complex and backward as Russia's out of the ditch without communications, transportation and energy.

Sixth, new off-budget financing methods must be utilized to modernized infrastructure and convert military production.

Through a system of government loan guarantees, favorable credits and project financing incentives, both private and public capital can be attracted to the rebuilding of Russian's public infrastructure and major productive assets. None of this is "foreign aid" in any traditional sense. None of it, except for deferred or reduced taxation on investing would even appear on federal accounts.

Long-term oil purchase contracts, preference in international telecommunications rates, unimpeded technology transfers and many other unilateral steps like these could be of immense help at little or no cost.

There are a host of creative ways to help Russian development that avoid budgets and bureaucrats.

Some general observations: spring has sprouted green grass and optimism. There is much bustle in Moscow and, I gather, around

the country.

Hotels are full of foreign business people, but, alas, too few Americans. You should host a lunch for C.E.O.s and encourage them to explore Russian and C.I.S. markets.


Although crime and corruption flourish (I was told it is impossible to find an honest judge), people whose judgment can be trusted believe the bottom has been sounded and things are beginning to rise.

Many people are finally beginning to sense enormous opportunity here. Reportedly vast sums of hard currency secreted in foreign accounts are searching for ways back into the country.

Finally, there is Hart's toilet paper test. Countries with hard currency have soft paper and vice-versa. Soft paper is beginning to turn up here.

As always, please let me know if I can be helpful, especially in small, quiet ways.

Sincerely,



Gary Hart

Moscow, Russia

PS SAW AMB. PICKERING YESTERDAY
AND HE IS DOING VERY WELL.

Jim Hoagland

The Trust Gap

PARIS—Bill Clinton resorted to thunderbolt diplomacy twice last month, dispatching missiles and attack helicopters to rain deadly punishment from the skies of Iraq and Somalia. But it will take more than these displays of U.S. firepower to overcome European doubts about Clinton's global leadership abilities.

European officials and journalists have asked an American visitor one question with revealing consistency since the missile attack on Baghdad. A French official framed it this way Tuesday: "Did Clinton launch the attack to boost himself politically at home?" In Britain over the weekend that question was asked more politely but with equal concern.

The Baghdad raid helped Clinton at home and delivered a useful punch in the nose to Saddam Hussein. But in London, Paris and Bonn the raid fed an image of a young, embattled president chasing political success and higher poll ratings by any means available. In contrast to his improved standing in America, the Comeback Kid is not yet in evidence in Europe.

The poll-chasing image is far from universal in Europe and in my view it is far from fair. But the image is widespread enough to be a problem that must be tackled by the administration now. Five months of uncertain U.S. leadership in European affairs have taken a toll on the trans-Atlantic relationship. The experience has been especially hard on the special ties that have existed for half a century between Washington and London.

"The danger is not of a spectacular alliance collapse," says a British official. "The danger is a hollowing out of the relationship. What is missing with the new administration is the constant, boring day-to-day dialogue on key problems that enables us to know exactly what we each mean when a moment of action or crisis comes. That dialogue stopped months ago on Yugoslavia."

Adds a senior allied diplomat: "The disagreement on Bosnia is so large that we have basically stopped talking to or even shouting at each other. Now we present our positions, disagree and then shrug as if to say, 'What else could you expect?'"

Washington and its European allies have been operating at cross purposes on Bosnia for months. My sense is that Washington underestimates how much the administration's advances and retreats on Bosnia have undermined confidence abroad in Clinton's vision and determination and how big a repair job America faces.

The Slick Willy image that was conquered in the U.S. presidential campaign has found new life abroad. Both Clinton's strong rhetoric on Bosnia and his sudden backing away from U.S. intervention are seen by some key European officials as politically driven moves. They fear that the swings are related more to polls and advice from the presi-

dent's political consultants than to a diplomatic or military strategy. A trust gap is opening up across the Atlantic.

"The American insistence on lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia when it is clearly too late for that to work is a way to make people feel good, but it is not effective strategy," said a European official. "All it does is encourage the Bosnians to hold out for a miracle. We think the administration is preparing to wash its hands of Bosnia and looking for a way to blame it on us."

The Bosnian case has become so desperate that anyone who touches it now risks embarrassment. Both Bonn

In London, Paris and Bonn the image is of an embattled president chasing higher poll ratings.

and Washington came away with egg on the face when Clinton wrote to Helmut Kohl asking the German chancellor to urge the European Community summit in Copenhagen 10 days ago to support ending the embargo.

Kohl, who watches polls as closely as Clinton ever has, quickly used the letter to justify a German initiative on Bosnia at the EC summit, a move that was popular at home even though it produced no results. But the State Department, for reasons never explained to the Germans, discounted the importance of the Clinton letter in a press briefing in Washington. The sequence of events suggested that the letter was not intended to be made public—or taken seriously.

Did Kohl misunderstand? Or did he decide for his own gain to force the hand of an inexperienced U.S. president? Either way, the incident reflects the static on the trans-Atlantic leadership line.

The European doubts about Clinton, even when he does something worthy, are really doubts about America. They are part of a nasty mood that grips a continent shaken by the wars in ex-Yugoslavia and heading deeper into recession. With average unemployment approaching the 12 percent mark for the 12 EC nations, a mood of scapegoating and xenophobia is developing here.

But that is reason for the administration to handle the European connection with greater care—not reason for Washington to discount the mistaken reactions to the strike on Baghdad as Euro-gas. A steady course on Bosnia and a new determination to talk rather than shrug would help avoid the hollowing out of the key international relationship in which America is involved.

Bray
Thinks
won
discussing
members
follow up
W. Kohl
Tell
1 member
to Clinton
B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

choi

DATE: 7/1/93

NOTE FOR: *Tony Lake*

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you for your:

Information ☐

Action ☒

Only top sheet with President's note enclosed. You should have received the entire packet earlier today. If you want a copy of the entire packet, please call Paul Richard at 2702.

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc: *Mc Ginty*
Rubin

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7/11/93

JIMMY CARTER


June 24, 1993

To President Bill Clinton

At the Tokyo Economic Summit next month, you and the other G-7 leaders have an opportunity to take decisive action to promote sustainable development and to demonstrate your ongoing commitment to the objectives endorsed by world leaders at the Earth Summit last June. In general, I recommend that G-7 leaders endorse World Bank and Global Environment Facility (GEF) reform, and that they adopt an international policy to achieve debt reduction, which can significantly contribute to environmental reform. Similarly, G-7 commitment is necessary to decommission dangerous Russian and Eastern European nuclear and coal-fired plants and to provide safe, efficient replacements. Another necessary component of a sustainable reform package is G-7 support for Southern-led environmental initiatives. An Executive Summary detailing these recommendations is enclosed.

The enclosed background documents also include recommendations on climate change and population, which I endorse. Please share this information with the appropriate persons as you prepare for the Tokyo Economic Summit. I hope that you and other G-7 leaders are able to come to consensus at the Summit about the need for swift and decisive action on these concerns.

Sincerely,



Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington D.C. 20500

cc Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert Fauver, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
Economic Policy

Enclosures: 2

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE G-7 ECONOMIC TOKYO SUMMIT**

World Bank Reform:

There is mounting evidence, substantiated by the recent reports by World Bank Vice President Willi Wapenhans and former UNDP Director Bradford Morse, that significant reform is required if the World Bank is to contribute meaningfully to poverty alleviation or to socially and environmentally sound development. G-7 nations should put forward a bold agenda to:

- Strengthen and enforce existing Bank policies on environmental assessment, resettlement, wildlands protection, and forestry, and institute staff career incentives that reward project quality and adherence to these policies
- Create a permanent Independent Appeals Commission to investigate complaints and recommend suspension of Bank projects which exacerbate poverty or environmental degradation
- Establish a new information policy by December, 1993, to dramatically increase transparency and freedom of information in the World Bank and the GEF
- Reorient the Bank's energy portfolio toward energy conservation, efficiency, and least-cost planning, and reform agricultural lending to promote land reform and discourage over-reliance on export-oriented cash crops.

Global Environment Facility (GEF) Reform:

G-7 and other donor nations should not endorse the GEF as a permanent financial mechanism to implement the Climate and Biodiversity Conventions until it has demonstrated that it is effective, transparent, and accountable. The G-7 should:

- Advocate an independent evaluation of GEF's pilot phase before determining the future role and administrative mechanisms of GEF
- Insist upon full public access to information, and advocate that GEF projects be approved only if supported by a broad consensus within the Participants Assembly
- Work to ensure that, in addition to meeting the above criteria, GEF projects translate the biodiversity and climate conventions into practical actions that incorporate local concerns and recognize the links between poverty and environmental degradation.

Debt Reduction:

The external debt burden faced by many countries of the South is one of the worst manifestations of global injustice and inequity in today's world. Current debt burdens are a major obstacle to sustainable development: debt servicing precludes many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, from meeting the most basic human needs of their people. This debt must be addressed by a comprehensive international policy. The G-7 countries should:

- Call for adoption of the "Trinidad Terms" for relief of non-concessional official debt proposed by John Major in 1990
- Call for immediate cancellation of concessional debts of low-income countries and cancellation of at least half the bilateral debts of the heavily indebted middle-income countries
- Initiate revision of cut-off dates for loan forgiveness/debt reduction within the Paris Club
- Pursue mechanisms for reducing multilateral debt and revising IMF and World Bank conditionality to reflect the principles of equity, participation, and sustainability while promoting long-term economic development
- Develop policies for commercial and domestic debt reduction.

Nuclear plants and energy efficiency in Russia and Eastern Europe:

As Russia and Eastern Europe struggle to achieve market-oriented reform in the face of extreme economic hardship and political upheaval, the risks posed by their aging and unsafe nuclear reactors and coal-fired plants continue unchecked. G-7 leadership is crucial to eliminating these hazards while improving energy efficiency and reducing the devastating pollution which destroys forests and harms human health. The G-7 should agree jointly to:

- Provide funding to decommission the most dangerous plants in the region, including constructing a new sarcophagus around the failed Chernobyl reactor
- Create a \$10 billion fund to help replace nuclear and large coal-fired plants with high-efficiency gas turbines and to modernize key industries to gain energy efficiency and sharply reduce transboundary air pollutants such as CO₂.

Need to respond to Southern-led initiatives:

The G-7 leaders should support cooperative regional approaches by Southern nations to prevent environmental degradation and promote sustainable development. An example of such an initiative is emerging from a coalition of NGO and government heads in eight nations of the Amazon, known as The Amazon Cooperation Treaty initiative. This initiative combines environmental and developmental objectives, including both ecological reserves and a focus on agriculture and forestry. G-7 financial support could build upon early support to Brazil's Pilot Rainforest Project and would provide encouragement for additional South-South initiatives.



Rekki

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April 6, 1993

Andrew Agle
Director of Operations, Global 2000
The Carter Center
1 Copenhill Ave
Atlanta GA 30307

RECEIVED
APR 12 1993
Ans'd.....

Dear Mr. Agle:

The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) would like to lend its support to the letter sent to you on 5 April 1993 by the National Wildlife Federation, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club, regarding international environment and development issues at the upcoming Tokyo G-7 Economic Summit.

As an addition, we would like to highlight two other themes, climate change and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which were discussed in the attachments to the previous letter.

In the coming decades, rising levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere threaten to induce changes in climate, which will disproportionately affect the inhabitants of developing nations, especially those who depend on the land for their survival. The Climate Convention signed at the Earth Summit specifically recognizes that the world's industrialized nations have generated the majority of global greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore bear a greater responsibility for ensuring that global warming is minimized. Yet these countries have not yet made commitments to take concrete actions to reduce their emissions, in the Convention or otherwise. It is therefore critical that the G-7 countries, which emit nearly 40% of the world's carbon dioxide, use the Tokyo Economic Summit as an opportunity to discuss multilateral actions to reduce their impacts on the global atmosphere. A recent statement by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright signalled the intent of the Clinton Administration to act more forcefully on this issue (see enclosed).

A related issue is the urgent need to reform the Global Environment Facility, which is identified as the interim financing mechanism for the Climate Convention. At present, the GEF's lack of transparency or accountability, as well as its projects' close linkages to environmentally destructive World Bank loans, call into question its appropriateness as a primary financing mechanism under the Convention. As the primary donor countries, it is vital that the G-7 demand fundamental reforms in the GEF's operations, and strongly support a meaningful and effective independent evaluation of the GEF before it is made a permanent financing mechanism.

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Andrew Agle
April 6, 1993
Page 2

We believe that U.S. and Japanese leadership is essential for the G-7 countries to take collective action on these critical issues. President Carter's assistance in bringing the need to act on climate change and environmental reform of the Global Environment Facility and World Bank to the attention of the Japanese government would be greatly appreciated.

Enclosed, please find some additional information which I hope you will find useful. Please do not hesitate to call if you would like some additional information, or if you would like to discuss these issues further. Thank you very much for your time and assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Scott A. Hajost". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "S".

Scott Hajost
International Counsel

**ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND — FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION — SIERRA CLUB**

WORLD BANK REFORM ISSUES FOR THE TOKYO G7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

April 27, 1993

I. Introduction

The G7 countries have chosen the World Bank as a key institution for financing and implementing much of what was agreed at the Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992. However, there is mounting evidence of fundamental institutional problems that make the World Bank unsuited for carrying out environmentally sustainable programs and projects. The World Bank lacks the transparency and accountability needed to carry out the mandate of sustainable development. For example, the Bank's withholding of most the information it generates in the preparation and implementation of projects both from its own Board of Executive Directors and from people affected by its projects, its failure to provide for local participation on the part of its putative beneficiaries, and the steady, long-term decline of the quality of its projects are causes for concern and urgent action among key donor nations.

Last year two special reports--one conducted by a special Independent Commission headed by former United Nations Development Programme Director Bradford Morse, and another issued by World Bank Vice President Willi Wapenhans (known as the "Wapenhans Report") present a disturbing picture of an institution whose overwhelming priority is to move money quickly whatever the costs, in systematic violation of its own environmental, economic and social policies.

The Morse Commission revealed a failed appraisal process and systematic failure over a seven year period to enforce minimal environmental and social standards in a single project, while the Wapenhans Report revealed that these problems are widespread in Bank operations. The Wapenhans Report stated that the credibility of the appraisal process in the Bank is under pressure because appraisals are seen as "marketing devices" for securing loan approval and achieving personal recognition. The result is a promotional, rather than objective approach to appraisal which has contributed to 37.5% of World Bank funded projects being rated as unsatisfactory for fiscal year 1992, a dramatic increase from only 15% in 1981.

Without major institutional reforms to make the World Bank more accountable and transparent, and to push the Bank to focus on project quality rather than meeting pressures to lend, the Bank will be a totally inappropriate, and indeed, a counterproductive institution to finance and carry out the mandate of UNCED. The pressure to move money quickly will not lessen without strong, clear directives from the World Bank's major shareholders.

II. World Bank Reforms to be Promoted During the G7 Tokyo Summit

In Tokyo the G7 nations should put forward an agenda for change at the World Bank in which the Bank makes project quality its first, and over-arching priority through the following initiatives:

1. There should be dramatic improvements in World Bank transparency and freedom of information in Bank operations.

There are clearly a few legitimate policy reasons to keep some information confidential, but

the World Bank has invoked the principal of national sovereignty as a justification for virtual blanket confidentiality, including, for example, the withholding of information on major Bank projects with which grants from the Global Environment Facility are associated. Consultation with, and participation of affected populations in the development process is impossible without public access to documents and information. A compromise must be struck between those who advocate full public access to Bank files and reports and the Bank's current highly restrictive approach to information access.

Therefore, the G7 nations should promote the establishment of a new information policy by the World Bank by December 1993. The new policy should precisely define categories of information that will be treated as confidential in both Bank generated documents and in country generated documents which the Bank requires to be prepared. Each category of document which is designated as confidential should be justified by compelling policy reasons, such as national security, or prevention of procurement abuses. All information not specifically listed as confidential should be made available in its entirety to the public in borrower and donor countries. Such documents must include complete environmental impact analyses and cost-benefit studies, their appendices, and all supporting studies.

2. The G7 nations should promote the creation of a permanent Independent Appeals Commission to oversee the World Bank.

An Independent Appeals Commission is needed to promote greater transparency and public accountability in World Bank operations. The Appeals Commission would operate independent of the World Bank and would be empowered to investigate specific complaints of environmental and human rights abuses in Bank operations including violations of World Bank policies, procedures, and loan and credit agreements. The Commission would also be empowered to investigate violations of international human rights law associated with World Bank financed projects or programmes.

The Commission would be competent to recommend suspension or cancellation of a specific project or programme. Judgements of the Commission would be final unless vetoed by two thirds of the Board of Executive Directors.

The Commission would have access to all relevant Bank documents during the course of investigation into any specific project or programme. All judgements of the commission would be published independently of the World Bank and made available to the public.

3. Staff career incentives should be put into place that reward project quality and conscientious incorporation of bank environmental and resettlement directives and policies in project and loan preparation.

An important lesson of the Wapenhans report is that pressure on employees to lend money and push projects has often overwhelmed all other economic, social, and environmental considerations.

4. The Bank should strengthen, implement and enforce its existing policies on environmental assessment, involuntary resettlement, wildlands protection, and forestry.

Despite the existence of workable Bank policies on these issues, there is overwhelming evidence that these policies are not enforced. In order to be effective, these policies must

be fully integrated into Bank operations.

5. The G7 should instruct Bank management to reorient its energy portfolio toward least-cost investments in energy conservation, end-use efficiency and integrated resource planning.

Such a change in Bank energy lending priorities would contribute to international efforts to ameliorate global warming as well as free up scarce capital resources in developing countries for alternative uses. In order to accomplish this, the Bank will have to stop using outmoded planning tools, such as the computer model WASP, which invariably favors the construction of large hydroelectric, nuclear, oil and coal plants. In its place, the Bank should use up-to-date computer models which give appropriate weight to cost-effective investments in demand-side energy efficiency measures, renewable energy supply, and small-scale, decentralized energy systems.

6. Bank agriculture lending and policies should be reviewed and reformed to incorporate and promote environmentally sustainable practices.

In particular, the Bank should promote land reform, in order to promote economic equity and ensure a sustainable food base at the local level; and should discourage over-reliance on export-oriented cash crops, which require heavy use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides for profitability.

February 25, 1993

OPEN LETTER
TO THE GEF PARTICIPANTS'
MEETING ON GOVERNANCE AND
REPLENISHMENT
(Rome, March 4-5, 1993)

Dear Participant,

We welcome your ongoing efforts on the restructuring of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to ensure that it may become a transparent and accountable financial mechanism that is able to effectively help address the growing global environmental crisis.

We would like to reiterate some of our central concerns with regard to GEF Governance, which have so far not been successfully addressed by the GEF. In addition we describe the areas that should be covered by the terms of reference for the evaluation of the GEF pilot phase. This paper is focused on the World Bank's role because of its present control over most aspects of GEF management. **The 80 organizations from 26 countries which have signed this letter look forward to a productive dialogue with you about our concerns and proposals.**

Governance Issues:

(1) Transparency

Discussions on restructuring the GEF began at a special meeting of participants in Geneva in February 1992. A central request put forward by participants at this meeting was for GEF activities to be carried out in a transparent manner, with open disclosure policies and with full and timely availability of information. As a result, the World Bank prepared a draft information disclosure policy which was distributed to the participants at the last regular Participants' Assembly meeting in Abidjan in December 1992. That draft outlined an information policy that would have upheld the World Bank's current practice of withholding project documents that are critical for informed decision-making from the participants, the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel, and the communities directly affected by the projects. Several participants objected to the proposed information policy and prevented it from being adopted as official GEF policy in early January 1993.

Now, more than a year after participants first called for transparency, no progress appears to have been achieved on this critical issue. We urge the participants to demand that the World Bank formulate a policy that will grant full access to information on GEF projects and associated World Bank loans throughout the project cycle to the participants, the STAP and affected communities. The World Bank as trustee of the GEF, should not be blindly trusted with managing GEF funds without public scrutiny, consultation and input.

Beyond examining the options for NGO cooperation with the GEF at the central level, such as consultations that provide NGOs, participants and Implementing Agencies with the important opportunity to interact, it is our hope that the paper will focus on the useful role that local communities and developing country NGOs must play in project identification, design, implementation and review at the country level. We also urge you to support NGO observer status in the Participants' Assembly.

Basic Parameters for Evaluation of GEF Pilot Phase:

We welcome the GEF's decision to proceed with an evaluation of the GEF pilot phase. In view of the inevitable institutional interests that the implementing agencies have in the outcome of the evaluation, it is crucial that it be conducted in an independent and open manner. At the Rome meeting participants will be presented with draft terms of reference (TOR) for the evaluation. We strongly recommend that there be an open discussion of the TOR with representatives from both governments and NGOs before the evaluation is commissioned, in order to ensure that its results will be broadly accepted as a solid basis for a post-pilot phase GEF.

The GEF has stated that the evaluation will focus on process and not on projects, since the implementation of projects is not advanced. We agree with the focus on process only if process is very broadly defined and includes a field-based evaluation component. We do not believe that the evaluation of the GEF pilot-phase can be limited to a desk study in Washington, D.C. or other capital cities. The Wapenhans Report identified lack of attention to the projects in the field as one of the underlying causes of a project failure rate of almost 40%. **The evaluation of the GEF pilot phase cannot afford to ignore the reality of projects on the ground, even if the projects are in a very early stage.**

The following section outlines the main areas and questions that we recommend be included in the Terms Of Reference of the evaluation.

(1) Decision Making Processes

We suggest the following questions:

- * How are GEF projects chosen? Do they form part of an overall strategic framework that is aimed at making significant progress in protecting biodiversity, alleviating the threat of climate change, protecting marine ecosystems, and avoiding ozone depletion?

- * As participants have access only to limited documentation on GEF projects in the work program and no information on associated World Bank loans, who takes decisions on both the projects to be chosen and the levels of funding?

- * How have the STAP and the partner implementing agencies been able to evaluate the 80% of World Bank GEF projects which are attached to larger World Bank loans, if they had no access to documentation on the associated loan?

- * Who is ultimately responsible for GEF project quality control and can be held accountable should the project have negative environmental and social impacts?

* What measures do GEF projects take to assist national institutions in building long-term technical and institutional capabilities to ensure project viability once foreign assistance has been reduced or ended?

(3) Impact of the GEF on Overall World Bank Lending

When public doubts first were raised about the GEF being too closely dominated by the World Bank, the response was that the GEF would help induce reforms at the Bank and make the Bank's overall lending operations consistent with global environmental goals. We suggest the following questions:

* The Wapenhans Report identified the emphasis on rapid loan processing and insufficient attention to the sustainability of projects in the field as the underlying causes for the World Bank's deteriorating loan portfolio. What lessons has the GEF drawn from this to avoid the same mistakes?

* What indications are there that the GEF has led to more transparency at the Bank and in Bank operations?

* How have GEF projects affected associated World Bank loans?

* How have the GEF's program areas affected overall Bank lending for energy, industrial development and natural resources management?

* Has the centralized GEF management at the World Bank (the GEF chairman, administrator and coordinator are all World Bank staff, the Bank is the trustee of the core fund and in charge of all GEF investment projects) been conducive to transparency and accountability with regard to both GEF and regular World Bank projects?

(4) Scope of the GEF

We suggest the following questions:

* Will the evaluation include an assessment of the choice of topics for the GEF, including protection of the ozone layer, which was already addressed by the Montreal Protocol? By whom, how and why were these topics chosen? What comparative advantage does the Bank have on biodiversity projects, protection of international rivers, or limiting greenhouse gases, for example?

* Will the evaluation assess the utility, efficacy and need for a restructured GEF in relationship to the global conventions, as compared to other alternatives?

Respectfully submitted,

FUNDACION PARA LA DEFENSA DEL AMBIENTE (FUNAM)
Argentina

PAVANI
Argentina

ECOROPA
France

SOLIDARITE FORET
France

NATURSCHUTZBUND DEUTSCHLAND
Germany

WELTWIRTSCHAFT, OEKOLOGIE UND ENTWICKLUNG (WEED)
Germany

BUND FUER UMWELT UND NATURSCHUTZ DEUTSCHLAND (BUND)
Germany

URGEWALD
Germany

PRO REGENWALD
Germany

REGENWAELDER KAMPAGNE
Germany

GERMANWATCH
Germany

WALHI (FRIENDS OF THE EARTH)
Indonesia

CAMPAGNA NORD/SUD
Italy

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH - ITALY
Italy

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH - AMAZONIA PROGRAMME
Italy

GREENPEACE - ITALY
Italy

CENTRO INTERNAZIONALE CROCEVIA
Italy

TERRA NUOVA
Italy

MANITESS
Italy

NORWEGIAN RAINFOREST FOUNDATION
Norway

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
Norway

FIVAS
Norway

GREEN FORUM
Philippines

PHILIPPINES RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT (PRRM)
Philippines

THE PHILIPPINE-CORE GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Philippines

SWISS AID AGENCIES COALITION
Switzerland

ERKLAERUNG VON BERN
Switzerland

WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE - WWF INTERNATIONAL
Switzerland

EARTH DAY TAIWAN
Taiwan

GREEN CONSUMERS FOUNDATION
Taiwan

TAIWAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNION
Taiwan

ENDA INTER-ARABE
Tunisia

THE ECOLOGIST
United Kingdom

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
United Kingdom

OXFORD RAINFOREST NETWORK
United Kingdom

SURVIVAL INTERNATIONAL
United Kingdom

ATTACHMENT

To Open Letter to the GEF Participants' Meeting
March 4 and 5, 1993, Rome

LIST OF GEF PROJECTS CALLING EXPLICITLY FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

First Tranche

Algeria - El Kala National Park
Brazil - Conservation Units Project
Congo - Wildlands Protection and Management Project
Kenya - Conservation of the Tana River National Primate Reserve
Laos - Forest Management and Conservation Project
Mexico - Biodiversity Conservation
Poland - Protecting Forest Biodiversity
Uganda - Bwindi Forest Gorilla Reserve

Second Tranche

Argentina - Patagonian Coastal Zone Management Plan
Belize - Sustainable Development and Management of Biologically Diverse Coastal Reserves
Costa Rica - Conservation and Sustainable Development in La Amistad and La Osa
Cuba - Protection/Sustainable Development in the Sabana-Camaguey Archipelego
Czechoslovakia - Planning and Management of Czech and Slovak Reserves
Ghana - Coastal Zone Protection and Management Project
India - Optimizing Development of Small Hydel Resources in Hilly Regions
Malawi - Lake Malawi Biological Diversity Project
Myanmar - Biodiversity Conservation Project
Nepal - Makalu-Barun Conservation Area - National Biodiversity Action Plan
Papua New Guinea - National Conservation and Resource Management Program
Peru - Trust Fund for Conservation Units (CU)
Photovoltaics for Household and Community Use in Zimbabwe
Regional - Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect Biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika
Regional - Promoting Biodiversity Conservation in African Ecosystems Through Integrated Pest Management
Seychelles - Biodiversity Protection and Abatement of Marine Pollution
Sri Lanka - Wildlife Conservation and Protected Area Management

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND — FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION — SIERRA CLUB

Mr. Robert Fauver
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security and Economic Affairs
The White House
Washington DC 20500

RECEIVED

MAY 21 1993

Ans'd.....

April 27, 1993

Dear Mr. Fauver:

When the leaders of the Group of Seven nations meet next July at the Tokyo Economic Summit, just over a year will have passed since the Earth Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro. They will face the important task of demonstrating with concrete actions their continuing dedication to the commitments and objectives they endorsed in Rio. By asserting bold, creative leadership, the G-7 can ensure that the Earth Summit's agenda of promoting sustainable development in both industrialized and developing nations will continue to possess sufficient momentum to move forward throughout the world.

The G-7 leaders have widely recognized, including at the Munich G-7 Summit, the need for aggressive follow-up to UNCED in order to render the Conference a true success. We urge that in your discussions with the other sherpas leading up to the Tokyo Economic Summit, you discuss specific, multilateral actions the G-7 is prepared to take on environmental issues. Below are some of our key recommendations; more detailed position papers are attached.

World Bank Reform

At present, the World Bank and the other public international financial institutions tend to act as impediments to, rather than catalysts for, sustainable development in developing countries. Outdated development strategies and poor design and implementation quality are resulting in many environmentally and socially damaging projects, and exacerbating the developing world's already crippling debt crisis. In this context, we are disturbed by indications that the Bank is weakening and reissuing its operational directives as more general, less-rigorous operational policies.

The G-7 nations should put forward an agenda for environmental reform and accountability at the World Bank in which the Bank makes project quality and sustainable development its first, over-arching priorities through the following initiatives:

- ⇒ Dramatically improving World Bank transparency and freedom of information in Bank operations, with establishment of a new information policy incorporating these changes at the Bank by December 1993. All information not specifically defined as confidential should be made available to the public in borrower and donor countries.
- ⇒ Promoting the creation of a permanent Independent Appeals Commission to oversee the World Bank, to hear appeals of citizens groups, and to investigate specific complaints of environmental and human rights abuses associated with World Bank financed projects or programs. The Commission would have access to Bank files, and would be competent to recommend suspension or cancellation of specific projects or programs.
- ⇒ Creating staff career incentives that reward project quality and conscientious incorporation of bank environmental and resettlement directives and policies in project and loan preparation, rather than the dollar amount of loans approved.

far few concerted, substantive measures have been taken. At the 1993 Tokyo Economic Summit, the G-7 should convert the declarations of the past into action, leading the way towards prompt implementation of the Climate Convention.

- ⇒ The G-7 should call for the immediate commencement of negotiations to implement and strengthen the Climate Convention. These talks should have the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from industrialized countries, e.g. by 25% from 1990 levels by the year 2005, and should proceed on an aggressive timetable.
- ⇒ The G-7 leaders should announce that as a first step until the Convention is strengthened, they will institute policies to cap their countries' emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2000, and will also undertake measures to reduce emissions below these levels.
- ⇒ The G-7 should discuss and adopt multilateral efforts to strengthen energy efficiency standards, by an average of 5% per year, and to shift towards renewable sources of energy supply. They should also act cooperatively to ensure that the price of energy more accurately reflects its environmental and social costs, including by harmonizing their energy-related tax policies, i.e. by increasing energy taxes an average of 5% per year. The G-7 should also work to ensure that GATT does not become an obstacle to the implementation of these types of measures at the national level.
- ⇒ The G-7 governments should agree to realign their bilateral development assistance with the goal of enhancing the implementation of the Rio accords and improving access to energy and transportation services in an environmentally sound and equitable manner. This would require replacing the current emphasis on large-scale construction of road projects and coal, hydroelectric, and nuclear power plants with a new emphasis on energy efficiency, renewable energy supply, non-motorized transport, and public transit systems.

Population

UNCED's most glaring omission was its failure to address the critical issues of uncontrolled growth in population and consumption. World population, now at 5.5 billion, will double to over 10 billion within the next century, with most of this growth occurring in developing nations. The populations of the G-7 countries, despite their slower growth, have disproportionately high impacts on resources and the global environment because of their high levels of per capita consumption and pollution. The combination of rapid population growth, poverty, and wasteful consumption results in deforestation, migration pressures, and local resource depletion.

- ⇒ The G-7 should ensure that population and consumption implications are considered in economic deliberations, with the goal of attaining long-term sustainable development. Towards this end, the G-7 should increase aid to levels sufficient to meet the goals of the U.N. Amsterdam Declaration by the year 2000 to provide full access to family planning for all people, and address related issues of women's status, education, health care, and economic opportunities.

Nuclear Plants and Energy Efficiency in Russia and Eastern Europe

There exists a particularly urgent need for G-7 countries to provide economic assistance to Russia and other young democracies in Eastern Europe as they struggle with the difficult objective of market-oriented reform. At the same time, international leadership is crucial in the effort to eliminate the hazards of unsafe nuclear reactors within these countries,

**ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND — FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION — SIERRA CLUB**

CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES FOR THE TOKYO G7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

April 27, 1993

Background

The Group of Seven nations collectively emit nearly 40% of the world's carbon dioxide, contributing disproportionately to the threat of global warming. In order to ensure the success of the Climate Convention, it is therefore critical that the G-7 undertake a leadership role in reducing their own carbon dioxide emissions. It is vital that the member countries take concrete measures at home to limit emissions of greenhouse gases; promote energy-sector reforms of both multilateral and bilateral financial institutions; and lead the way to the next stage of negotiations and implementation of the Convention.

Although every G-7 economic summit since the Summit of the Arch in 1989 has stressed the importance of addressing climate change in a cooperative manner among the Group of Seven nations, so far few concerted, substantive measures have been taken.

"Decisive action is urgently needed to understand and protect the earth's ecological balance. We will work together to achieve the common goals of preserving a healthy and balanced global environment in order to meet shared economic and social objectives and to carry out obligations to future generations.... Therefore, environmental considerations must be taken into account in economic decision-making." (Paris, 1989)

"We are committed to undertake common efforts to limit emissions of greenhouse gases.... Work on implementing protocols [to the future Climate Convention] should be undertaken as expeditiously as possible...." (Houston, 1990)

"We will seek to expedite work on implementing protocols to reinforce the [future Climate] convention. All participants should be committed to design and implement concrete strategies to limit net emissions of greenhouse gases." (London, 1991)

"...Ministers commit themselves to substantial action on the enhancement and protection of greenhouse gas sinks and limitation of emissions of greenhouse gases aiming in particular, as a first step at a stabilization, individually or collectively, of CO₂ emissions...." (OECD Ministerial Meeting on Environment and Development, Paris, 1991)

"Rapid and concrete action is required to follow through on our commitments on climate change...." (Munich, 1992)

At the 1993 Tokyo Economic Summit, the G-7 nations should convert the declarations of the previous economic summits into action, leading the way towards prompt implementation of the Climate Convention. In doing so, they would take a step towards achieving the Convention's objective of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at levels that would prevent rapid climate change. They should also aim to achieve other long-term sustainable development objectives, as described in Agenda 21.

The case for immediate action to prevent rapid climate change has grown increasingly compelling. New evidence indicates that strong positive biological feedbacks could accelerate

Address Energy and Transportation Prices

G-7 leaders should agree to pursue measures, individually or jointly, to address energy and transportation pricing, so as to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants while simultaneously improving economic efficiency. In no G-7 country do consumers pay the full environmental and social costs of the energy they use. Society subsidizes huge environmental "externalities" by shouldering the burdens of increased health care costs, decay of physical infrastructure, and degradation of ecosystems. Appropriate policy options for eliminating these types of subsidies include G-7 countries acting in harmony to adopt annual, multilateral increments in carbon or energy taxes, e.g. \$1/barrel of oil equivalent per year over a period of 20 years. These taxes should supplement the taxes that individual G-7 countries are now considering, and should exempt renewable sources such as wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal energy. In addition, G-7 countries should also consider other market-based mechanisms to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. Such measures would be important steps in the implementation of the Climate Convention, as well as Chapters 8 and 9 of Agenda 21.

Implement Aggressive Efficiency Standards

At the Summit, G-7 leaders should also discuss how to improve the efficiency of the basic machinery which runs their industrialized economies. New standards for enhancing the energy efficiency of lighting, refrigeration, electric motors, automobiles, building heating and cooling systems, and other appliances will drive technological innovation, save consumers money, and reduce carbon dioxide emissions well into the future. Options for regulating energy efficiency within individual product categories include establishing minimum standards for each individual item; "corporate average" standards for similar products by each manufacturer; "fleet average" standards for entire product categories; and combinations of these. In order to promote ongoing gains in efficiency, the G-7 countries should multilaterally increase these standards 3-5% annually over a 10-15 year period. Governments should also consider "feebate" and other incentive programs which encourage consumers to purchase the most efficient products on the market.

Develop and Deploy Renewable Energy Technologies

In the long term, industrialized nations must shift their patterns of energy consumption away from fossil fuels and towards renewable sources of energy supply (wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal). G-7 leaders should commit to a shared set of goals for the development and utilization of renewable energy supply technologies, including specific commitments to derive at least 5% of electricity from non-hydro renewable sources by the year 2000.

Reinvent Foreign Assistance

In the short- and long-terms, developing countries will need assistance in preparing greenhouse gas inventories; developing national plans; providing training to government employees, communities and the private sector; promoting sustainable energy development; and adapting to climate changes. At the 1992 Munich Economic Summit, the G-7 nations pledged "additional financial and technical support to developing countries for sustainable development through official development assistance (ODA)...." In order to fulfil this pledge, the G-7 countries must cooperate to ensure that effective mechanisms exist for delivering this aid in a manner which satisfies the requirements set down in the Climate Convention, as discussed below. At present, no adequate mechanisms exist.

Russia and other young democracies in Eastern Europe as they struggle with the difficult objective of market-oriented reform. At the same time, international leadership is crucial in the effort to eliminate the hazards of unsafe nuclear reactors within these countries. During the 1992 Munich Economic Summit, G-7 leaders emphasized their concern over the safety of these reactors, and expressed interest in establishing a program "for replacing less safe plants by the development of alternative energy sources and the more efficient use of energy...." Now is the time for the aggressive implementation of such a program. Elements of this program should include:

- Adequate funding to help close and decommission the most dangerous nuclear power plants in Russia and other former Soviet republics;
- Creation of a \$10 billion fund to help build the gas turbine units needed to replace these nuclear plants, as well as the largest coal-fired power plants; and
- Establishment of a loan guarantee program, operated out of the above fund, which would finance modernization of key industries, with the goal of achieving massive gains in energy efficiency.

The provision of low-interest loans to the emerging private sector in these countries for modernization of factories would have huge environmental, economic, and political benefits. It would save jobs and promote market-oriented economic growth by helping these industries become competitive on world markets. And it would dramatically reduce energy use in the extremely inefficient industrial sector, freeing up enough energy production capacity to enable dangerous nuclear reactors to be permanently closed.

**ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND — FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION — SIERRA CLUB**

POPULATION ISSUES FOR THE TOKYO G7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

April 27, 1993

If current trends continue, world population, now at 5.5 billion, will double to over 10 billion within the next century. The G-7 nations have acknowledged the importance of population issues at previous summits:

"High priority should be given to efforts to cope with population growth and to existing United Nations and other programs for supporting these efforts" (Venice, 1980)

"Supporting the efforts of developing countries to [achieve sustainable development by balancing population growth with expanding resources] is a priority. Improved educational opportunities for women and their greater integration into the economy can make important contributions to population stabilization programs" (Houston, 1990)

"We endorse the increasing attention being given to population issues in devising strategies for sustainable progress." (London, 1991)

"Global challenges such as population growth and the environment can only be met through cooperative efforts by all countries." (Munich, 1992)

Participants at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, including all G-7 countries, further delineated the importance (and interrelatedness) of population and consumption issues:

"The growth of world population and production combined with unsustainable consumption patterns places increasingly severe stress on the life-supporting capacities of our planet. The interactive processes affect the use of land, water, air, energy and other resources." (Agenda 21, 1992; ch. 5)

The populations of the G-7 countries have disproportionately high impacts on resources and the global environment because of high levels of per capita consumption and pollution. While the G-7 countries comprise only 12% of the world's population, they consume 44% of its commercial energy: the average per capita energy use in G-7 nations is nearly 4 times the global average. The United States, with 5% of the world's population, is responsible for using 25% of the world's commercial energy, for producing more garbage than any other country in the world, and for generating 21% of the world's total carbon dioxide emissions -- the major contributor to global warming.

The results from the combination of rapid population growth, poverty, and wasteful consumption include deforestation, migration pressures, and local resource depletion, amongst others. These problems may exacerbate existing regional and national conflicts, and put excessive demands on agricultural, water and energy resources.

Affording all people a dignified quality of life requires that population and consumption issues be addressed. Population sizes and locations, poverty, women's status, children's health and survival, and the well-being of the environment are all interconnected. All G-7 nations should demonstrate leadership on population and consumption issues by adopting or reaffirming policies which:

Working for the Nature of Tomorrow.



NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

1400 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-2266 (202) 797-6800

April 5, 1993

Bekki Johnson
Global 2000
The Carter Center
Atlanta, GA

Dear Bekki:

We represent a consortium of groups working to ensure that the upcoming July Tokyo Summit of the Group of Seven Industrial Nations (G-7 Summit) advances the international consensus on the need for improved international development policies. In particular, we see the upcoming summit as a critical opportunity to have the G-7 countries, in their capacity as the major donors to international financial institutions, call for greater accountability and reforms of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

We have prepared a book of position papers explaining our positions for important international meetings for 1993 for the new Clinton Administration. The accompanying excerpts concerning the Group of Seven Economic Summit and the Development Committee Meeting of the World Bank and IMF explain our positions related to the World Bank and the opportunities the G-7 Summit offers.

As you know, in the year or so since the Rio UNCED Conference and the last G-7 Summit held in Munich, disturbing revelations have arisen regarding the performance of the World Bank. In particular, the findings of the first ever independent review of a World Bank project, the Independent Review or so-called Morse Commission concerning the Sardar Sarovar Projects in India, uncovered that Bank guidelines and directives are not being properly implemented. An internal audit by Bank Vice President Wapenhans also concluded that Bank projects are not performing as planned. There is a serious crisis of accountability in the World Bank. This must be addressed before the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which is administered and controlled by the Bank, can take up the role many countries plan for it as the funding mechanism for the post-UNCED agreements on climate and biodiversity.

We are writing to you because we understand that President Carter will be in Japan April 12 - 15, in part to speak at a meeting of the Japan-America Society of Toyama to discuss U.S.-Japan bilateral relations. We are aware of the importance of U.S.-Japan ties, especially the prospects for U.S.-Japan partnership on promoting global sustainable development. We feel that the most urgent step that the U.S. and Japan could take toward this end would be to work


for a consensus among the G-7 leaders to push for implementation of reforms of the World Bank and IMF.

That the World Bank and IMF can be reformed is by no means certain; many governments, including Japan, have failed to call for implementation of reforms supported by the reports listed above. Thus, we as NGOs, had been hoping to enlist the assistance of an "eminent person" who could communicate to the Japanese government the views shared by NGOs around the world on the urgent need for these reforms. The Japanese government, serving as the host of the Summit, will be preparing the draft communique.

Knowing of President Carter's passionate dedication to the alleviation of poverty and the promotion of environmentally sound and sustainable development, we would like to request his assistance in approaching the Japanese hosts of the Tokyo Summit in order to urge their cooperation in promoting World Bank reforms. President Carter has participated in similar summits, and his opinion as an elder statesman affiliated with the new Democratic Administration, will be given great weight. Moreover, President Carter's participation and keynote statement supporting the struggling Japanese non-governmental organization (NGO) movement at the April 1993 Tokyo Kenijin Kaigi, or "Eminent Persons Meeting on Financing International Environment and Development" was an important watershed event in raising the profile of citizen groups urging reform of development policies. President Carter could significantly help us and the Japanese NGOs we are working with on this project if he could communicate our views during his upcoming visit to Japan.

The accompanying documents will provide you with more information; please feel free to contact us if you would like any further assistance or information. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,



Barbara J. Bramble
on behalf of:

Jim Barnes/Brent Blackwelder, FOE-US
Larry Williams, Sierra Club

THE PRESIDENT WAS SEEN

7/1/93

TO: THE ~~P~~RESIDENT
FROM: NANCY HERNREICH
RE: PHONE CALL FROM CONG. GENGRICH
DATE: JULY 1, 1993

*Howard
in m m m*

Cong. Newt Gingrich just called - would like for you to return the call.

*** Return Call*

Howard said you should know that he has been very helpful on foreign issues recently (Iran, Japan, Russian aid, and G-7). David Dreyer said Gingrich helped on another issue, which I'll discuss with you.

202-225-2800
Staff Contact: Rachel
9:30 a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1993

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO:

Secretary Donna Shalala

o: (202) 690-7000

h: (202) 333-7164

DATE:

July 1, 1993

RECOMMENDED BY:

Christine Varney

Bruce Lindsey

Carol Rasco

PURPOSE:

To discuss the confirmation of Dr. Joycelyn Elders.

BACKGROUND:

Secretary Shalala would like your advice regarding certain difficulties she is having with Dr. Elders' confirmation.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. To discuss your views regarding Dr. Elders' confirmation.
2. To discuss your preference for Social Security Commissioner.

CONTACT PERSON AND
TELEPHONE NUMBERS:

Secretary Donna Shalala

o: (202) 290-7000

h: (202) 333-7164

DATE OF SUBMISSION:

April 27, 1993

ACTION:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1993

The Honorable Jack Valenti
Chief Executive Officer and President
Motion Picture Association of America
1600 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Jack:

I have sent the enclosed letters to the leaders of the broadcast networks applauding the action they have taken today to begin addressing the problem of violence on television. I want to take this opportunity to applaud your personal efforts in encouraging the industry to make needed changes.

Sincerely,



930630

✓ Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1993

Mr. George Vradenburg
Executive Vice President
Fox Television
10201 West Pico Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90035

Dear George:

I applaud the action taken today by Fox and by the other major broadcast networks to begin addressing the problem of violence on television. Millions of parents are rightly concerned that their children are exposed to far too many graphic pictures of murder and mayhem. The announcement of voluntary violence warnings is an important, commendable first step in dealing with this crucial issue.

For the health of our society and the American family, we must continue to find ways to limit the excessive portrayal of violence in our television programming. In the past, the television industry has responded to public concerns and has dealt in a responsible manner with issues such as drug use, alcohol, and smoking. I encourage the broadcast industry, the creators and producers, as well as the advertisers who support network programming, to take full responsibility in limiting the amount of televised violence.

Again, I commend the networks for this initial effort and encourage you to continue to find ways to make your programming suitable for the children and youth of this nation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "B" and a long, sweeping underline.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1993

Mr. Warren Littlefield
President
NBC Entertainment
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10112

Dear Warren:

I applaud the action taken today by NBC and by the other major broadcast networks to begin addressing the problem of violence on television. Millions of parents are rightly concerned that their children are exposed to far too many graphic pictures of murder and mayhem. The announcement of voluntary violence warnings is an important, commendable first step in dealing with this crucial issue.

For the health of our society and the American family, we must continue to find ways to limit the excessive portrayal of violence in our television programming. In the past, the television industry has responded to public concerns and has dealt in a responsible manner with issues such as drug use, alcohol, and smoking. I encourage the broadcast industry, the creators and producers, as well as the advertisers who support network programming, to take full responsibility in limiting the amount of televised violence.

Again, I commend the networks for this initial effort and encourage you to continue to find ways to make your programming suitable for the children and youth of this nation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Bill Clinton".

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1993

Mr. Howard Stringer
President
CBS Broadcast Group
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York 10019

Dear Howard:

I applaud the action taken today by CBS and by the other major broadcast networks to begin addressing the problem of violence on television. Millions of parents are rightly concerned that their children are exposed to far too many graphic pictures of murder and mayhem. The announcement of voluntary violence warnings is an important, commendable first step in dealing with this crucial issue.

For the health of our society and the American family, we must continue to find ways to limit the excessive portrayal of violence in our television programming. In the past, the television industry has responded to public concerns and has dealt in a responsible manner with issues such as drug use, alcohol, and smoking. I encourage the broadcast industry, the creators and producers, as well as the advertisers who support network programming, to take full responsibility in limiting the amount of televised violence.

Again, I commend the networks for this initial effort and encourage you to continue to find ways to make your programming suitable for the children and youth of this nation.

Sincerely,

Barack Obama

Reagan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1993

Mr. Thomas S. Murphy
Chairman of the Board
Capital Cities-ABC
77 West 66th Street
New York, New York 10023

Dear Thomas:

I applaud the action taken today by ABC and by the other major broadcast networks to begin addressing the problem of violence on television. Millions of parents are rightly concerned that their children are exposed to far too many graphic pictures of murder and mayhem. The announcement of voluntary violence warnings is an important, commendable first step in dealing with this crucial issue.

For the health of our society and the American family, we must continue to find ways to limit the excessive portrayal of violence in our television programming. In the past, the television industry has responded to public concerns and has dealt in a responsible manner with issues such as drug use, alcohol, and smoking. I encourage the broadcast industry, the creators and producers, as well as the advertisers who support network programming, to take full responsibility in limiting the amount of televised violence.

Again, I commend the networks for this initial effort and encourage you to continue to find ways to make your programming suitable for the children and youth of this nation.

Sincerely,

Barack

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1993

Mr. Ted Turner
Chairman of the Board and President
Turner Broadcasting System
1 CNN Center
Post Office Box 105366
Atlanta, Georgia 30348-5366

Dear Ted:

I applaud the action taken today by TBS and by the other major broadcast networks to begin addressing the problem of violence on television. Millions of parents are rightly concerned that their children are exposed to far too many graphic pictures of murder and mayhem. The announcement of voluntary violence warnings is an important, commendable first step in dealing with this crucial issue.

For the health of our society and the American family, we must continue to find ways to limit the excessive portrayal of violence in our television programming. In the past, the television industry has responded to public concerns and has dealt in a responsible manner with issues such as drug use, alcohol, and smoking. I encourage the broadcast industry, the creators and producers, as well as the advertisers who support network programming, to take full responsibility in limiting the amount of televised violence.

Again, I commend the networks for this initial effort and encourage you to continue to find ways to make your programming suitable for the children and youth of this nation.

Sincerely,




Duke University
Durham
North Carolina 27708-0871

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6 29 93

Main
Re

Terry Sanford
President Emeritus

June 22, 1993

Dear Mr. President,

✓ Thank you for your letter. I make the case once more for Senator David Pryor.

✓ The people of Arkansas are generous and always glad to help the Nation. They would be delighted to have their Senator helping their President in the White House in a crucial period--when, among other things, we need to balance the budget and reduce the debt, to develop a sound medical care program, to make the U.N. the instrument of real peace, to challenge poverty and crime in America, and to get our economy humming.

The citizens of Arkansas would be pleased to be an even greater part of all that, and the Democratic Governor could find another good Arkansas Democratic Senator.

With best wishes always,

Sincerely,

Terry Sanford
Terry Sanford

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500-2000

THE PRESIDENT W/C SEEN

6-29-93

4649 Garfield Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

June 29, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President

Newspaper photographs of and interviews with the informant in the case of the arrested terrorists in New York outraged me. If operational methods and identities of sources are permitted to be made public in such cases, the tools our intelligence people need to fight terrorism will be struck from their hands. Security service collaborators in foreign countries will be loath to share sensitive information with us. In short, the boastful announcement about the identity of the informant in New York should be the last of these "he stuck in his thumb and pulled out a plum" gestures. Who in the gaggle of law enforcement authorities in New York is responsible this time, I do not know, but the Justice Department and the FBI must take responsibility.

As I mentioned to you when we talked at baseball opening day in Baltimore, our country has been enormously lucky not to have had serious terrorist problems before this. The only defenses we have are CIA and FBI operations. They need secrecy, particularly on methods. The scourge is both domestic and foreign. Please give orders to your team to clam up.

Respectfully yours,

Richard Helms