

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Recommended Telephone Call [partial] (1 page)	04/21/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Staff Secretary
John Podesta (Chron Files)
OA/Box Number: 474

FOLDER TITLE:

May 16-22, 1993 [1]

2018-0662-S

rs3050

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CHRON

DATE: 5-22

NOTE FOR: Susan Baghy

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☒Action ☐

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5/22/93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1993

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Senator John Glenn

DATE: May 5, 1993

RECOMMENDED BY: Susan Brophy

PURPOSE: Thank him for successfully
managing the EPA-Cabinet status bill,
which passed the Senate 79 to 15.

BACKGROUND: Glenn is Chair of Governmental Affairs.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: Thank him for his efforts.

CONTACT PERSON AND
TELEPHONE NUMBER(S): Mary Jane Veno (224-3353)

DATE OF SUBMISSION: May 5, 1993

ACTION: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5-22

NOTE FOR:

E),

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☐

Action ☒

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

May 21, 1993

5/22/93

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a proposed letter from Eli Segal to General Colin Powell inviting the General to address the opening session of the Summer of Service program at the Treasure Island Naval Base on June 20.

We have circulated the proposed letter to relevant staff. George, Mark and Tony Lake all approve of the idea. No one has objected.

Approve ☒ letter

Disapprove ☐ letter

Discuss ☐

TDS
Todd Stern

DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1993

General Colin L. Powell
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Room 2E872
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20318-9999

Dear General Powell:

On behalf of the President of the United States, I would like to extend an invitation for you to speak to the Summer of Service participants at the opening ceremony at 3:00 p.m. on June 20, 1993. The ceremony will occur at Naval Station Treasure Island in San Francisco.

As you know, the national service initiative stems from the President's commitment to create a program whereby all Americans are provided the chance to rebuild their communities in exchange for expanded educational opportunities. As a precursor to this effort, the President has called for a "Summer of Service" program from mid-June through August to show what civilian national service can accomplish and to develop a corps of young leaders for future national service efforts. Sixteen programs at eleven sites across the country have been selected to put 1,500 seventeen to twenty-five year-olds (assisted by younger children and older volunteers) to work in their communities to address the needs of children at risk.

You have already made a tremendous contribution to the summer program by having your staff play a key role in coordinating the logistical and operational aspects of the program. We believe that your presence and words will further underscore the importance of national service and encourage these young Americans to commit themselves to serving their communities with vigor and dedication.

My staff will coordinate with your office to see if your schedule will permit you to speak at the opening ceremony. I would be most honored if you would.

Best regards,

Eli J. Segal
Assistant to the President and
Director, Office of National Service

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5/22

NOTE FOR: *RAHM, BRUCE*

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information



Action



Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Recommended Telephone Call [partial] (1 page)	04/21/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Staff Secretary
John Podesta (Chron Files)
OA/Box Number: 474

FOLDER TITLE:

May 16-22, 1993 [1]

2018-0662-S

rs3050

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

5/22/93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

93 APR 21 P4:41

April 21, 1993

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO:

Governor Jim Hunt of North Carolina
Office: (919) 733-4240
Mansion: (919) 733 3871
Car: (919) 971-8710
Home: (919) 237-5087

(b)(6) (private)

DATE:

Before Sunday, April 25

RECOMMENDED BY:

Rahm Emanuel R.E.

PURPOSE:

Governor Hunt has requested the call.

TOPICS TO DISCUSS: The Governor wants to discuss two (2) topics:

- 1) Cigarette Tax
- 2) Recommend Jeanette Hyde for an Ambassadorship

CONTACT PERSON:

Rahm Emanuel (ext. 1125)

SUBMISSION DATE:

April 21, 1993

RE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5-22

NOTE FOR:

Howard

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information	☐
Action	☒

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NO SIGNATURE HAS BEEN

5/22/93

93 MAY 21 P2:20

May 21, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ~~P~~RESIDENT

FROM: Howard Paster *HP*

SUBJECT: China MFN

Senator George Mitchell and Representative Nancy Pelosi called individually to express their expectation that they would have a chance to talk with you personally before you make your decision on China MFN policy. I told them they would be consulted by staff early in the week and I was hopeful they would be satisfied with the results of the consultation. But they did press me, and I told them I knew you would want to talk with them if there was a problem.

I have alerted the NSC and NEC.

1 should see them

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5-22

NOTE FOR: Howard, Christine, B. L. N

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/2-193

April 21, 1993

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO:

William H. Ford
Chairman, House Education and Labor Committee
(202) 225-6261 - O
(202) 547-4532 - H

DATE:

Afternoon of Wednesday, April 21 or Sometime
Thursday, April 22

RECOMMENDED BY:

Secretary Richard Riley
Christine Varney, Howard Paster, and Bill Galston
concur.

PURPOSE:

Secretary Riley suggests that you call Chairman Ford
to shore up support for the education reform bill,
Goals 2000: Educate America Act.

BACKGROUND:

The bill is the Administration's vehicle to establish
internationally competitive and challenging standards
for all students and to support state, local district and
individual school reforms designed to help all students
reach the standards.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. The bill will be transmitted to the Hill this week.
2. Thanks for the help he and his staff have given the Department of Education and for his co-sponsorship.
3. Ask for his continued strong vocal support and for his specific help in getting other Democrats to sign on to the bill.

4. Ask for his help in ensuring that the hearing before the Subcommittee on Thursday, April 22nd, be a very positive one.

CONTACT PERSON AND
TELEPHONE NUMBERS:

William Ford
(202) 225-6261 - O
(202) 547-4532 - H

DATE OF SUBMISSION:

April 21, 1993

ACTION:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5-22

NOTE FOR:

Bill Galston

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☐

Action ☒

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1993

5/20/93

MR. PRESIDENT:

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

I am forwarding a decision memo from Bill Galston recommending that you send the attached letter on your Goals 2000 Education Reform bill to the members of the House Education and Labor Committee in order to shore up support for the bill.

Secretary Riley, Mack and Howard Paster all favor your sending the letter.

Approve ☒ letter

Disapprove ☐ letter

Discuss ☒

Todd Stern

Handwritten notes:
Duly noted
Let's clear
Briefly
I'll agree to add
out subject on the
only need on even
Agree
D

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

93 MAY 20 P5:54

May 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BILL GALSTON

SUBJ: GOALS 2000 EDUCATION REFORM BILL

Your strong statement last Friday on behalf of the Goals 2000 bill was widely reported in the education press and energized the bill's supporters on the Hill. Secretary Riley believes (and I concur) that a letter from you to the members of the full House Education and Labor Committee could help shore up support among representatives who haven't been fully cooperative up to now.

Attached for your review is a draft of that letter. It identifies four key areas in which amendments proposed for consideration during full committee markup would weaken the bill by:

1. making opportunity-to-learn standards more binding on, and intrusive into, state decisions;
2. undermining the current bipartisan balance of the Goals Panel;
3. diminishing the appropriate authority of the Goals Panel;
4. altering the existing National Education Goals and adding new goals.

The letter offers what we believe to be the strongest arguments against these proposals. Once you have reviewed and amended this draft, we will prepare a final version for your signature.

On April 22 I transmitted to you my education reform bill, "Goals 2000: Educate America Act." As you approach full committee mark-up, I want to reiterate my strong support for the bill and the principles on which it is based.

Secretary Riley and I have both spent a tremendous amount of time and energy during our years in public service focusing on education reform. As Governors, we understood that in order to improve the economy of our states we had to improve the quality of education. We recognize your own longstanding commitment to improving education for every child. The question is how best to promote the goals we all share. Right now, many schools are not meeting the needs of our students or the demands of our economy for a more skilled, more adaptable work force. Without successful school reform across America, our nation's character and its economic strength is in peril.

The GOALS 2000 bill builds on the lessons we have all learned during the past decade of school reform:

- o It provides national leadership and sets national benchmarks, but it recognizes that education remains primarily a state and local responsibility. We believe that for reform to be successful, it has to be bottom-up and that the states must play the coordinating role. We have an obligation at the national level to support states and communities in their efforts to help all children, including those with special needs, but we can not mandate a state's fiscal priorities. We believe our approach to opportunity-to-learn standards achieves this balance. Amendments which require states, as a condition of federal support, to commit to specific corrective actions for schools that fail to meet these standards go too far. These requirements will impede states' efforts to focus accountability on results. In addition, they will require states to commit to specific actions even before the standards are developed and applied to schools, and therefore even before the nature of the problem is known. For these reasons, this type of requirement will be a disincentive for states to participate in reform efforts. I urge you not to support amendments that expand the definition or role of opportunity-to-learn standards.
- o Education is not a partisan issue. This bill sets out to forge new partnerships not only between the different levels of government, but between our two parties. Without bi-partisan support across all levels of government, our reform efforts will fail. The National Education Goals Panel, charged with measuring our progress toward reaching the National Education Goals, must remain a bi-partisan body. Any amendments to change its partisan balance will undermine the Panel's credibility and I urge you to oppose them.

Page 2

- o The National Education Goals Panel was established to hold States and the Federal Government accountable for their efforts to achieve the National Education Goals. As outlined in the bill, it is comprised of representatives from the Administration, Congress, the Governors and State Legislatures. It is the vehicle through which these representatives can agree on the credible measures that will be used to judge progress. I might add that I led the fight to establish this Panel, so that we could ensure that those responsible for establishing the goals could not walk away when it was time to judge progress toward achieving them. Any amendments which alter the composition or limit the responsibilities of the Panel, including its role in nominating members for the National Education Standards and Improvement Council, will undermine the Panel and I oppose them.
- o The six National Education Goals established in 1990 have served as a rallying point in communities all across this country. The goals have been widely accepted by states and communities as well as by education and business groups. Many of the major education and business organizations have adopted and are currently using the six goals as benchmarks for linking their own education reform efforts to a national framework. Over 2,000 communities have created task forces and their own action plans to reach the six goals. Changes in the goals at this time will unnecessarily disrupt these ongoing efforts. I urge you to endorse the six goals as they stand and allow the nation to continue its progress toward reaching them.

We have a tremendous opportunity to provide national leadership on education reform. Together, we can build the kind of education system that will help our students succeed. The "Goals 2000: Educate America Act" is a critical step in the right direction. I urge you to take prompt and favorable action on this legislation.

The President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 3-22

NOTE FOR: *Pony Lake*

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc: *Howard Pastar*

Bony Baker

Fyl-

B.

THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

5/22/93

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1993

Senator Bumpers called at 4:15 pm. He was not calling about anything specific, he just wanted to visit. He will be available today or anytime over the weekend at the following numbers:

office - 202-224-4844

home - 301-229-4906

-
- Don't resume testing.
 - timber men on yellow
 - French will stay
 - 30 wco will gear up.
-

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1993

93 MAY 18 48:00

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER
ROBERT RUBIN

5/17/93

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Wynn on Defense
Conversion Proposal RE: Military Personnel
and Law Enforcement

Purpose

To respond to Representative Wynn (D-Md) who wants your support for his defense conversion bill. The intent of the bill is to help discharged military personnel find jobs in law enforcement and health care by paying up to \$50,000 to the employers.

Background

The proposed bill is in some ways similar to last year's "troops to teachers" legislation. The reimbursement is expensive and would be funded from cuts in the defense budget. You should reiterate your strong support for helping discharged military members find work in teaching, law enforcement and health care, but we do not recommend support for this specific bill.

Along with the Administration's broader anti-crime and health care initiatives, you could cite the ongoing DoD "Troops to Teachers/Health Care/Law Enforcement Personnel" program and the NEC-led interagency efforts now underway to find the most effective way to develop and coordinate these programs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Wynn
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Albert:

Thank you for your letter supporting our efforts to help personnel leaving the Armed Forces find jobs in critical areas such as law enforcement and health care.

I appreciate your sending me a copy of H.R. 1245, the Defense Conversion Opportunities Act of 1993. I will give it careful review. As you know, my defense reinvestment and conversion program is seeking ways to help departing service men and women find jobs in teaching, law enforcement, health care and similar occupations.

The Department of Defense is currently developing with other agencies its "Troops to Teachers/Health Care/Law Enforcement Personnel." To assist this effort, the National Economic Council will be leading an interagency group to review how this and similar programs can better match our defense transition goals with our law enforcement and health care needs. We are fortunate to be able to build in this area on the solid foundation provided by the Congress.

Thank you for your support. I look forward to working with you to meet our anti-crime and health care goals.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Bill Clinton", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Albert R. Wynn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

015340

2992

93 APR 27 P2:26

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2004

April 21, 1993

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20050

Dear President Clinton:

I would like to begin by commending you on your efforts to attack crime by putting 100,000 police officers on the streets. It is a bold approach which will have the dual benefit of creating new jobs and making our communities safer.

A recent Washington Post article indicated that your economic stimulus package includes \$200 million in new Justice Department grants to re-hire laid off police officers. These grants, combined with local funding and future increases, will undoubtedly put thousands of needed law enforcement officers in our communities. Notwithstanding, additional programs will be necessary in order to reach your desired goals.


On March 4, 1993, I introduced H.R. 1245, the Defense Conversion Opportunities Act of 1993. The purpose of the bill is to assist members of the Armed Forces who are discharged or released from active duty to obtain employment with law enforcement agencies and health care providers. The bill would provide funding to local agencies that hire these highly skilled professionals with experience in these two areas. In addition to helping military personnel find good jobs, the bill will also have the effect of increasing the number of health care professionals and police officers.

While the cost of such legislation is not insignificant, the return on the investment can be realized within your first term as President. A portion of the savings derived from defense cuts can be earmarked to fund the cost. A copy of the bill is enclosed for your review.

I certainly hope that you will consider H.R. 1245 favorably, and include it in your overall defense conversion strategy. Moreover, I look forward to working with you and the Democratic leadership to make your law enforcement and health reform goals a reality. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can assist you on any matter.

April 21, 1993
Page 2

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Albert R. Wynn".

Albert R. Wynn
Member of Congress

ARW:smc

Enclosure

cc: Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1993

Hillary and I join with you in thought and prayer as you pay tribute to Major William S. Barkley, Jr., Captain Scott J. Reynolds, Staff Sergeant Brian D. Haney, and Sergeant Timothy D. Sabel. These four men served their country with high honor as United States Marines.

This tragedy touches me deeply. As Commander in Chief I feel a personal responsibility for each of the brave men and women serving our country. When a soldier falls, I share each family's deep grief and profound sense of loss.

I pray that you will find comfort in your memories of these fine men. They served their country with distinction and will always be remembered with respect and honor.

Bill Clinton

Chron



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5.21.93

TO: MACK MCLARTY
MARK GEARAN
BOB RUBIN

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary



The attached has been forwarded
to the President.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

May 21, 1993

3 21 P6:44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALAN BLINDER *AB*

SUBJECT: Interest Rates, Stock Market, and Money Supply,
Week Ending Friday, May 21, 1993

Long bond yields increased substantially for the second week in a row. The yield on 30-year notes climbed above 7 percent for the first time in over 6 weeks. Changes in Treasury borrowing rates over the week were as follows:

	Close 5/14/93	Close 5/21/93	Change
3-month bills	3.03	3.05	0.02
10-year bonds	6.03	6.16	0.13
30-year bonds	6.95	7.03	0.08

The stock market closed significantly higher for the week. The S&P index closed Friday (May 21) at 445.84, up 1.4 percent from the preceding Friday's close. The Dow Jones Industrial Average also increased 1.4 percent over the week. It hit record highs on both Wednesday and Thursday and closed at 3493.


This week the Fed announced that all three money measures rose sharply in the week ending May 10. Since April of last year, growth rates of the various M's have been:

M1: +10.6%


M2: +0.2%

M3: -1.0%

3-Month Treasury Bill Rate
(Weekly Average)



10-Year Treasury Note Yield
(Weekly Average)



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

May 21, 1993

21 P 6:44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALAN BLINDER *AB*
SUBJECT: Foreign Economic Developments

Exchange Rates: The deutschemark fell relative to both the dollar and the yen this week. The weighted-average value of the dollar against 10 major currencies ("multilateral exchange rate" in the table below) was up slightly.

	Week Ending 5/14/93	Week Ending 5/21/93	Percent Change
Deutschemark	\$1 = 1.602 DM	\$1 = 1.626 DM	+1.5%
Yen	\$1 = 110.8 Yen	\$1 = 110.2 Yen	-0.5%
Multilateral (March 1973 = 100)	90.22	90.73	+0.6%

Japan: Japan's trade surplus rose to \$11.2 billion in April from \$9.6 billion in March. Exports rose 3.3 percent, while imports fell 2.7 percent. Industrial production rose 2.5 percent in March. Wholesale prices fell 2.8 percent in April on a year-over-year basis.

Europe: ▶ Danish voters approved the **Maastricht treaty** in a referendum on Tuesday, with 57 percent of the voters favoring the treaty. The UK's House of Commons approved the Maastricht treaty on Thursday. It needs to pass the House of Lords before it becomes law.

▶ **The EC** revised downward its forecast of growth within the community in 1993 to zero or slightly negative.

▶ **Germany's** real GDP fell 2.5 percent in the first quarter of 1993 on a year-over-year basis. (The decline in West Germany was 3.5 percent.) The German current account deficit was DM5.3 billion in February, the same as January's figure, but the merchandise trade surplus fell from DM1.8 billion in January to DM1.2 billion in February.

▶ **The UK's** industrial production was up 1.5 percent in March on a year-over-year basis, but fell 1.3 percent on a monthly basis. Retail prices increased only 1.3 percent in April on a year-over-year basis. Unemployment was 10.5 percent in April, unchanged from its March level.

▶ **Italian** wholesale prices rose 5.5 percent in March on a year-over-year basis.

Other Countries: ▶ **Canadian** consumer prices rose 1.8 percent in April on a year-over-year basis.

▶ **China's** urban inflation rate was 17 percent in April on an annualized basis. Retail sales increased 25.4 percent in April on a year-over-year basis.

▶ **Brazil's** trade surplus fell to \$589 million in April from \$1,575 million in March.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

05/21/93
DATE: _____

NOTE FOR: HOWARD PASTER

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5/20

Dear Howell

We have all been keeping
close tabs on you and pulling
for you, & understand you
have a good report.

& need only remind
you that your doctor is not
like the President - you must
do what he asks!

Sincerely
Bob

The Honorable Howell Heflin
P.O. Box 228
Tuscumbia, Alabama
35674

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

33 MAY 19 08:48

May 18, 1993

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Mrs. Howell Heflin (Elizabeth)
Her nickname is "Mike"

DATE: May 18, 1993

RECOMMENDED BY: Howard Paster *HP*

PURPOSE: To let Mrs. Heflin know that you are pleased to hear that the Senator's heart condition has improved substantially, and to extend to the Senator your wishes for a speedy and complete recovery.

BACKGROUND: Senator Heflin underwent an experimental procedure yesterday which cleared his arteries 100 per cent. The procedure was done at the University of Alabama (Birmingham) Hospital, and was performed by the doctor who invented it. Essentially, the "stent" procedure consists of intravenously inserting a stainless steel spring into a blocked artery. This procedure replaces the need for by-pass surgery.

Part of the treatment includes having the Senator stay in the hospital bed under sedation for three days after the procedure, which is the reason why it is best for you to call Mrs. Heflin.

The doctor's prognosis is excellent. As of now, the doctor recommends that he stay in the hospital until Friday or Monday. They have also recommended that he not return to Washington D.C. until after the next recess, the second week in June. He is expected to be at his home in Tuscumbia, Alabama until that time.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Please extend your wishes for his speedy recovery.
2. Express that you will be looking forward to seeing him back on the Senate Floor in June, after the recess.

CONTACT PERSON AND
TELEPHONE NUMBER(S):

Howard Paster
X 2230

Mrs. Heflin's room at the University of Alabama
Hospital: (205) 934-6460

DATE OF SUBMISSION:

May 18, 1993

ACTION:

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5/21



UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI
MARYLAND

May 19, 1993

Marius

The Honorable William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Deep in the bowels of the Secret Service lies a Treasure Chest for you and your family from the people of Ocean City, Maryland. But the real treasure is discovering Ocean City!

Sun, sand, golf, and the best crab cakes in the world are just a few of the baubles that the friendly folks in Ocean City would like to share with the Clintons this summer.

I hope you enjoy this sampler of Ocean City hospitality, and look favorably upon the invitation they have sent for you to visit this Maryland treasure. And if you need a guide for your expedition, or someone to share a few of the snacks from the Treasure Chest, I know a certain Maryland Senator you can call!

Best Wishes,

Barbara

Barbara A. Mikulski
United States Senator

BAM:mm

Please Come to Visit!

National Rainbow Coalition, Inc.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ^{5/2}

Reverend Jesse L. Jackson
President and Founder

May 19, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Buy - FY

Dear Mr. President:

Rarely does a man have the power, with the stroke of a pen, an act of good judgement, and a sense of conscience, to free a people. Today the opportunity presented itself. You acted. And generations yet unborn are eternally grateful to you. Today, the recognition of Angola sends a breath of fresh air across the continent of Africa. It resonates in South Africa and reverberates around the world. The new Africa policy, driven by your instincts and world view and by the sense of history reflected in the scholarship and activism of Tony Lake, has healing strength. Congratulations on a deed well done. If I can be of any service, feel free to call.

Keep hope alive,

Jesse L. Jackson
Jesse L. Jackson

cc: Thomas F. McLarty
Anthony Lake
Samuel Berger

National Rainbow Coalition, Inc.

Reverend Jesse L. Jackson
President and Founder

TO: The President

FAX NO. _____

OFFICE NO. _____

SENT BY: Jesse Jackson

DATE: 5/19/93

NO. OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE 2

P.O. Box 27385 • Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 728-1180 Fax (202) 728-1192

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5/21

NOTE FOR: *Tony Lake, Bob Rubin*

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information

☒

Action

☐

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc: 

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1993

93 MAY 20 A8:16

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*
HOWARD PASTER *HP*
ROBERT RUBIN *RR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Barcia RE: Wurtsmith
Air Force Base

Purpose

To respond to Representative Barcia's letter complaining about Air Force inflexibility and delays in approving interim leases for the reuse of Wurtsmith Air Force Base in Michigan.

Background

Wurtsmith AFB is scheduled to close on June 30 and the local community faces severe impacts. Rep. Barcia complains that the Air Force has not been responsive in approving interim leases for commercial contractors wanting to move on base.

NSC and NEC staff have had discussions and meetings with DoD officials regarding Wurtsmith, along with the broader problems of speeding military base redevelopment. There is no doubt that current DoD efforts -- while conducted in good faith -- are often hampered by excessive statutory, regulatory and bureaucratic restrictions *W*

We need to fix this
The response proposed at Tab A does not promise that we can solve all the immediate issues at Wurtsmith but assures Rep. Barcia that we have begun a process to address these problems and will consider the points he has raised. Within the NEC-led Defense Conversion Working Group, a subgroup is being formed to improve and accelerate our base reuse procedures.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A. *As do*

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representative Barcia
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter highlighting the difficulties the Wurtsmith community has experienced in implementing its base reuse plans. Despite the many challenges entailed, I am committed to adjusting our military infrastructure to ensure future U.S. military strength, while promoting our long-term economic objectives.

I can appreciate your frustration with the laws, regulations and bureaucratic obstacles that too often inhibit speedy and efficient economic development of our closing bases. My Administration is committed to working closely with Congress to improve this transition.

I have directed the National Economic Council, acting within our Defense Conversion Working Group, to lead an interagency review of the broad range of issues required to improve our base reuse policies. Secretary Aspin's appointment of a new Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security also will help focus our efforts on accelerating environmental cleanup of our installations. In particular, my staff has been in contact with DoD officials regarding Wurtsmith and other bases being redeveloped.

I appreciate your calling these issues to my attention. I will ensure they are incorporated into our review of ways to improve base reuse policies and to speed base redevelopment. I look forward to working with you to achieve our base conversion goals.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill Clinton".

The Honorable James A. Barcia
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

JAMES A. BARCIA
5TH DISTRICT, MICHIGAN

1717 LONGWORTH HOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2205
TELEPHONE (202) 225-8171

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives 4 P2:29
Washington, DC 20515-2205

28 April 1993

016710
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS
AND TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEES:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,
SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBCOMMITTEES:
SCIENCE
SPACE

Hon. William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to bring to your attention a grave situation surrounding the conversion of Wurtsmith Air Force Base (Oscoda, Michigan), which is in my district. What the communities have run up against is an attitude and disposition displayed by the Air Force, and more specifically the Air Force Base Disposal Agency (AFBDA), that is in direct contravention of the spirit of your policy concerning base conversion.

One particular episode that best illustrates this predicament occurred in early April. The Wurtsmith Base Conversion Authority (WBCA), a division of the Michigan Department of Commerce created to assist in the conversion, and the Wurtsmith Area Economic Adjustment Commission (WAEAC), the body representing the communities, attracted a manufacturer of roofing and plastic materials to locate a new facility on the base.

This firm, DuroLast of Saginaw, Michigan, was an extremely fitting acquisition for the reuse. This enterprise is a truly "green" firm. The process that will be employed at this new site will take scrap plastics from industrial processes, and use these by-products as the base material for the production of new products. Additionally, the chief executive officer of DuroLast committed to hiring three new employees from the surrounding communities for every employee brought to the new site. This new facility will initially have 40 employees, and in light of DuroLast's success at other sites in the United States could grow ten-fold.

The WBCA received a commitment from the AFBDA for the execution of an interim lease by 30 March 1993. This requirement was placed on the WBCA by DuroLast

DISTRICT OFFICE:
3741 EAST WILDER ROAD
SUITE 1A
BAY CITY, MICHIGAN 48706
☐ TELEPHONE: (517) 667-0003

DISTRICT OFFICE:
5409 PIERSON ROAD
FLUSHING, MICHIGAN 48433
☐ TELEPHONE: (313) 732-7501

DISTRICT OFFICE:
301 EAST GENESEE
SUITE 502
SAGINAW, MICHIGAN 48607
☐ TELEPHONE: (517) 754-6075

in accordance with the firm's production planning requirements. Being that this commitment was made six months prior to the date required, the WBCA believed a mutually beneficial interim lease could be negotiated. The result of the extremely lopsided negotiation process was the extraction of \$23,500 by the Air Force for the lease of the required facility.

I believe this is a patently unfair result, and a negative outcome of a highly bureaucratic and inflexible process. The local communities expended a great deal of limited resources - to include time, money and personnel - to attract a firm for reuse. This was a positive action in many ways. The Air Force was relieved of the need to pay the eventual caretaker of the facility because it would be occupied. And secondly, this action started the local communities down the road to reuse and further economic development.

I do not believe it was the intention of the Congress, in base closure legislation, or of your Administration to enable the Department of Defense, or its military departments, to enter into negotiations to basically raise revenue from the conversion process. I have had meetings with officials from both the Departments of the Air Force and Defense, and have found their explanations wanting. Their assertions are that policies to change the process are now being formulated, and will be implemented with all due speed. I fear this leaves bases, such as Wurtsmith, closing this summer (30 June 1993), in the vacuum between formulation and implementation.

The surrounding communities have all but suspended their activities to attract more firms to the base. I can see their rationale for doing this. The revenue they had hoped to raise in order to operate the base facilities, and to do what is necessary after the Air Force leaves, is being taken by the Air Force. If their efforts are going to produce revenue for the United States Air Force, instead of the local communities, they can not make sense of continuing to expend already limited resources until such time as the base reverts to state control.

What I believe is necessary is direct intervention with officials in your Department of the Air Force to come to terms with officials in Michigan. I, and officials in Michigan, have proposed numerous avenues for the accomplishment of the stated mutual goal of conversion. At this point, we have not received any acknowledgement from either Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) David J. Berteau or Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) James F. Boatright on these measures.


We are close to closure, and the local communities have several firms willing and able to locate on the base. One particular firm, AIA an aircraft maintenance firm, wishes to use a segment of the base to maintain large jet aircraft on the order of Boeing 737s and 747s. At this time, they have requested the use of a facility by mid-May for the retrofitting of two DC-9s. Knowing the long and drawn out process the AFBDA employed with the first interim lease the communities will not be able to accommodate this requirement, and the jobs will go elsewhere. These jobs will go elsewhere not because of some insurmountable barrier, but because of bureaucratic foot dragging (Please see attachment).

DC-8

To conclude on a brighter note, the communities surrounding the base are working cooperatively to make certain their future will be a secure one without Wurtsmith Air Force Base. The local communities have gone as far as retaining a noted economic development firm to draw up a comprehensive plan for the future of the area. This plan, if allowed to be carried forward, will enable the Wurtsmith Base Conversion Authority to break even on the operation of the base within three years of closure, and provide the people of this area a vibrant center of economic activity. This base, in my opinion, will be used in the future as a model for other base conversions.

I thank you for your time and consideration. In anticipation of your response, I am,

Sincerely,



James Barcia
Member of Congress

pdg

Attachment (1)

Letter concerning AIA Lease

STATE OF MICHIGAN



John Engler, Governor

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

P.O. Box 30004, Lansing, Michigan 48909-7504

Arthur E. Ellis, Director

Authority Members

Earl T. O'Loughlin
Robert Hunt
Dean P. Wiltse
Jack Matthews
Cecil Kennedy
Arthur E. Ellis
Roland Harmes
Vernice Davis-Anthony

James M. Storey, Executive Director

Wurtsmith Base Conversion Authority
P.O. Box 69
Oscoda, Michigan 48750-0069

Oscoda Office
Telephone: (517) 739-8900
FAX: (517) 739-9139

Lansing Office
Telephone: (517) 373-9851
FAX: (517) 373-3872

April 26, 1993

Mr. Alan Olsen, Director
Air Force Base Disposal Agency
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 2300
Arlington, Virginia 22209-2802

REF: Wurtsmith: American International Airways Lease Status

Dear Mr. Olsen:

On Friday, April 23, I visited the Willow Run (Ypsilanti, Michigan) headquarters of American International Airways, the identified air reuser for Wurtsmith AFB. I met with the senior management of that corporation, including the CEO, Mr. Connie Kalitta concerning the company's needs with respect to operating out of the Wurtsmith site.

It was disconcerting to learn that the company plans to add a 20,000 square foot addition to its large engine repair facility and is negotiating for space in a nearby hanger at Willow Run because of the growing business which the company is garnering. These are operations which were at one time slated for Wurtsmith, but the urgency of AIA's commitments cannot wait for AFBDA to complete pre-lease investigations — investigations which have been underway since early November, 1992.

In addition to these losses to the Oscoda economic impact area, as I outlined in a letter to Mr. Kempster last week, AIA is prepared to perform a major modification to two DC-8 aircraft at the Wurtsmith site if AFBDA can find a way to complete lease work by mid-May. This means roughly 100 jobs for the Oscoda economic impact area.

At this point, Wurtsmith Base Conversion Authority (WBCA) has yet to receive the following documents which will presumably be a part of the lease process (judging from their inclusion in the first interim lease): appraisals of the buildings AIA seeks;

Mr. Alan Olsen, Air Force Base Disposal Agency
April 26, 1993
Page 2

the environmental baseline survey; the physical condition report; and the operating agreement.


During the investigations which led to the execution of the first interim lease, these documents were withheld from WBCA until just days prior to the deadline established by the reuser. I would hope that AFBDA will not repeat that process which had the effect of forcing WBCA to surrender lease revenue it needs to operate.

The local elected leadership of the Oscoda area believes it is vital to capture the jobs which will be associated with the AIA operation at Wurtsmith. Obviously, this will not be done unless AFBDA is able to speed-up its deliberations with respect to the interim lease application which has been pending since last November.

AFBDA action to support a mid-May location of AIA at Wurtsmith would be greatly appreciated by the Oscoda-area communities which are declining daily as the Air Force drawdown at Wurtsmith continues toward base closure day, June 30.

If I can be of help in assisting that acceleration, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



James M. Storey
Executive Director

cc: General Earl O'Loughlin, Chairman-WBCA
Thomas Kempster, AFBDA
Lt. Colonel Michael Jones
Colonel William Campbell

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH / *KENNEY*
NSC Executive Secretariat
FROM: HOWARD G. PASTER *HP*
SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence

Attached is a copy of a letter that was sent to the President from James Barcia concerning the Wurtsmith Air Force Base.

Since this letter addresses a national security issue, we would appreciate your assistance in having drafts written.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call LeeAnn Inadomi at x7500.

Attachments

**THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 04, 1993

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JAMES BARCIA

SUBJECT: REQUESTS DIRECT INTERVENTION WITH OFFICIALS
IN PRESIDENT'S DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE TO
COME TO TERMS WITH OFFICIALS IN MICHIGAN
RE: CONVERSION OF WURTSMITH AIR FORCE BASE

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
HOWARD PASTER		ORG	93/05/05		C 93/05/05
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
ANTHONY LAKE		RSA	93/05/05		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:				/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:				/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:				/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:				/ /

COMMENTS: ENCLOSES COPY OF LETTER FROM JAMES M. STOREY,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
TO ALAN OLSEN, DIRECTOR OF AIR FORCE BASE
DISPOSAL AGENCY DATED APR 26 93

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) D MI (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		* OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY	*		*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE	*		*
*X-INTERIM REPLY	*		*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOb) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

SCANNED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5/21

HRC copy
Went to
Maggie
Williams

TO: MAGGIE WILLIAMS

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

Th
for

MAGGIE -
Carol told me that
the President already
checked this with Hilary
and she concurs in his
judgments, but on one issue
he left open his decision pending
her advice. Can you follow up with ^{Hilary} Carol.
tentative decisions and wants to know
whether a meeting is warranted.

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc: Carol Rasco

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5/21/93

THE VICE PRESIDENT
MACK McLARTY
NOTE FOR: HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☐

Action ☐

The President wants your views on his
tentative decisions and wants to know
whether a meeting is warranted.

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc: Carol Rasco

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/21

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a decision memo on abortion related issues written by Bill Galston on behalf of a Domestic Policy Council working group that includes representatives from the First Lady's Office, the Vice President's Office, Domestic Policy, Communications, Legislative, Political, Counsel's Office, Public Liaison, Cabinet Affairs, HHS and OMB.

The memo discusses various federal funding issues that are coming up -- including the Hyde Amendment and other appropriations issues -- as well as the Freedom of Choice Act.

Because the working group already includes representatives from the relevant departments and because this memo is highly sensitive, I have, for the time being, limited its circulation to Mack and the Vice President.

Carol Rasco wanted you to see this memo tonight so that she could discuss it with you tomorrow morning.

TDS
Todd Stern

cc: Vice President
Mack McLarty

*See show
up, have
g. try to
discuss - (HHS) memo*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1993

93 MAY 20 P8:52

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BILL GALSTON

SUBJ: ABORTION-RELATED ISSUES

Action-forcing Events

During the next few months, you will face a long list of decisions concerning abortion and abortion-related issues. Many of these decisions relate to federal funding, an issue that arises in at least half a dozen appropriations bills (see Tab A). Chairman Natcher has requested guidance from the White House concerning these bills by early next week. Other key decisions involve the Freedom of Choice Act, the content of the health care basic benefits package, and the Supreme Court nomination.

Many of the appropriations issues are likely to be narrowed, or eliminated altogether, when health care reform is enacted. Nonetheless, they must be addressed as freestanding issues this year in the context of the annual appropriations process.

In recent weeks, pressures to clarify our substantive positions and strategic intentions concerning abortion-related questions have been steadily intensifying. In response, the Domestic Policy Council has brought together an informal working group representing numerous departments within the White House as well as HHS and OMB. The members of this group include Ricki Seidman (Communications), Melanne Vermeer (Office of the First Lady), Charlotte Hayes (Office of the Vice President), Doris Matsui (Public Liaison), Christine Varney (Cabinet Affairs), Susan Brophy (Legislative Affairs), Joan Baggett (Political Affairs), Carol Rasco (Domestic Policy Council), Steve Neuwirth (Counsel's Office), Jerry Klepner (HHS), Harriet Rabb (HHS), and Nancy-Ann Min (OMB). This memorandum--the first of a series--contains background information on key issues as well as recommendations and options for your consideration.

Political Context

Within your administration, there is a broad consensus that while we should deal with choice issues in a principled and consistent manner, we must make every reasonable effort to lower their public profile for the remainder of this year. There are two principal justifications for this view.

First, it is essential, so far as possible, to keep focused on the economic plan until it has made it through the Congress. The last thing we need is an ongoing heated controversy that divides our energies and diverts the public's attention while reinforcing their view that we're not spending enough time on the economy.

Second, it is essential to regain our balance on cultural matters. During your campaign, you reassured the American people that you identified with mainstream/heartland values, but the first four months of the administration have sown some doubts on that score. There may be worse to come. We face the possibility of a summer in which the political dialogue is largely framed by issues such as gays in the military, political correctness on campus, quotas, and reproductive services contained within a health care proposal. For this reason, while the administration should remain true to its principles, we should not go out of our way to emphasize issues that reinforce the impression that we are somehow outside the cultural mainstream.

In this connection, it is worth noting that the people now distinguish fairly sharply between choice, which they support within broad limits, and public funding, which they are much less likely to support. Even when our position on public funding is carefully framed, we are sure to encounter substantial difficulties in forging sustainable majorities in the Congress and in the court of public opinion.

An Easy Case: Federal Employee Health Benefit (FEHB) Plans

Under current law, FEHB plans (affecting federal employees and dependents) may not cover abortions unless the life of the mother is in danger. The DPC working group recommends that this restriction be eliminated. The result would be that FEHB plans would be allowed but not required to cover a wider range of abortion services. In most circumstances, federal employees would be able to choose among several plans with varying levels of coverage.

Decision on FEHB Recommendation


Accept

Reject

Discuss

A Harder Case: The Hyde Amendment

A. Substantive Issues

Your campaign made a determined effort to subsume federal funding issues under the rubric of national health care reform. You recognized, however, that they would persist as free-standing issues until the enactment of that reform. You now face the question of how to deal with the Hyde amendment.

During the campaign you opposed laws that prohibit federal funding for abortion. At the same time, you favored substantial leeway for the states to chart their own course. That is why your proposed budget simultaneously deletes the Hyde amendment and declares that "the Administration will work with the Congress to facilitate an approach that is compatible with both Federal and State law."

The difficulty is that these two bodies of law are frequently incompatible. For example, Medicaid requires states to provide all "medically necessary" services to eligible beneficiaries. Simply removing the Hyde amendment from federal legislation would almost certainly compel many states to fund abortions that they now exclude through either statutory or (as in the case of Arkansas) constitutional provisions. There is no way of fully harmonizing federal and state law as now written. The question, rather, is how they can be adjusted to reach mutual consistency.

Your DPC working group recommends that all states be required to fund Medicaid abortions in cases of rape, incest, and when the mother's life is endangered. Beyond these cases, each state should be left free to make its own determination.

The rationale is as follows: Even the Hyde amendment permitted abortions to relieve threats to mothers' lives, while rape and incest represent conditions for publicly funded abortion that enjoy substantial public support. A move to restore the original Hyde amendment would probably succeed in Congress if the alternative is simple deletion; substitute language that includes rape and incest would offer a better chance of defeating Hyde. Our proposal would establish that language as a federal baseline while not tying the hands of the states (now numbering 15) that want to go farther.

Decision on Hyde Language

✓
Accept

Reject

Discuss

*Any of them
to decide for
beyond Hyde*

B. Strategic Issues

There are two options for reaching this language as a legislative result. The first is to take the lead--to announce our legislative objective promptly and forthrightly, starting with Chairman Natcher, and to deploy our resources on the Hill to reach that objective during the next two months. The second is simply to restate our commitment to deleting Hyde and to working with the Congress to craft more satisfactory language. Under the second option, we would in effect be asking the Congress to make the opening bid, and we would be prepared to intervene later with our language as an alternative to reinstating Hyde.

OKC
1/11/79

The advantage of the first option is that it allows you to demonstrate leadership by acting clearly and decisively in a hotly contested arena. The disadvantage is that it could offend nearly everyone, at least initially. In particular, it would dismay many of your pro-choice supporters by putting you in the position of sponsoring abortion coverage that is arguably narrower than the criterion of "medical necessity" built into the Medicaid statute.

An advantage of the second option is that it preserves your freedom of action to forge consensus over time. Another advantage is when you offer your substantive recommendation during the course of the Hyde debate, it might well be seen, not as selling out our pro-choice supporters, but rather as rescuing them from a straightforward reinstatement of the Hyde amendment. A disadvantage of this option is that it could be seen, and represented, as evasive and lacking in principled leadership.

The DPC working group recommends option two, with two conditions. First, we cannot say that we are working with the Congress unless we are actually doing so. To implement option two, we would have to enter substantive discussions on this matter with key congressional leaders--promptly.

Second, you would need a public articulation of your position that takes account of the undeniable difficulties and that you could sustain until the actual legislative resolution. We recommend the following as a response to questions:

"As I made clear in my budget proposal, I don't think the Hyde amendment should be reinstated. I've also stated that my administration is committed to working with the Congress to find an approach that respects both federal and state law. I'm well aware of the fact that these bodies of law aren't fully consistent, but I'm confident that we can work out a solution that both protects the principle of choice and respects the deep and legitimate differences that exist among the states as well as among individual citizens. Discussions to achieve this result are now underway."

Decision on Hyde Strategy

What Dan Harkin
Thinks

Option 1

Option 2

Discuss

Other Appropriations Issues

The remaining appropriation bills differ from Medicaid in that they do not raise federal-state issues. (Some, such as DC appropriations, now restrict the use of local as well as federal funds.) Otherwise, the substantive and strategic issues are very similar.

Our recommendation concerning these bills is that we declare our willingness to work with the Congress and that we adopt as our practical objective (1) the relaxation of restrictions on federal funding to include rape and incest as well as the life of the mother, and (2) where appropriate, local choice in determining the use of local funds.

Two forthcoming bills raise special issues. We have just been informed that the Department of Defense is prepared to include a repeal of the Hyde amendment in its Authorization Bill. We will work with them to ensure, so far as possible, that the language respects the particular circumstances and sensibilities of the military.

Funding for abortion in foreign aid programs also raises a distinctive issue. As you know, the People's Republic of China has come under persistent criticism for alleged use of involuntary sterilization and forced abortion as part of a population control strategy. Your budget proposal deletes language that forbids U.S. funding for overseas programs that provide abortions as an element of voluntary family planning. But the remaining language is unequivocal in its rejection of coercive measures. Public testimony by AID officials and others should be crystal-clear on this point. And if, as some have suggested, the U.N. Population Fund is sufficiently disturbed by Chinese practices to consider withdrawing from that country altogether, we should be supportive of their decision to do so.

Freedom of Choice Act

As you know, the Freedom of Choice Act represents a major effort to codify the holding of Roe as interpreted prior to the Webster and Casey decisions. The Senate version of the bill has already been marked up by the full Labor and Human Resources Committee. It allows states to require parental involvement with minors' decisions and to decline to pay for the performance of abortions. It also includes a so-called "conscience clause" preventing states from imposing an obligation to perform abortions on individual doctors and institutions (such as Catholic hospitals) with principled objections to this practice. The House version of the bill, which was marked up and passed out this Wednesday, incorporates the conscience and parental involvement clauses but not the provision allowing states to decline to pay for the performance of abortions.

While these points are opposed by some advocacy groups, they are consistent with Roe and are supported by mainstream advocacy groups such as NARAL. (For additional details, see Tab B.)

During the campaign, you pledged to sign a Freedom of Choice Act along the lines of the bills reported out of the Senate and House committees. While there is a significant difference between the two versions, at this point the principal issue before us is one of timing and legislative strategy, not substance. Advocacy

groups who are longstanding supporters take the position that they refrained from bringing the bill to the floor last fall in deference to the campaign's request for delay. Now, they say, we owe it to them to intervene with the House and Senate leadership to move the bill quickly; the leadership is looking for a signal from the White House and is unlikely to move forward without one.

The counterargument runs as follows:

(1) We are already being criticized for an overly crowded agenda, and we don't need another big, controversial item that further diverts attention from the economic plan.

(2) You have already acted aggressively to further the pro-choice agenda, and you face a large number of abortion-related appropriations votes in the next few months. If you encourage a postponable abortion debate to surface during this period, it will rivet public attention on this issue and reinforce your emerging cultural disconnect with ethnic and other swing voters.

Could also do this A Point (3) We should focus our attention this summer on the unavoidable battle over the inclusion of reproductive services in the basic health benefits package.

(4) The principal reason why FOCA didn't come to the floor last year was that its backers didn't have the votes, and it's still not clear that they do. Speaker Foley has said that he will not bring the bill to the floor unless he is confident that it can pass without killer amendments. The number of close votes in the Judiciary Committee this Wednesday suggests that this is not yet the case and that more work needs to be done.

On balance, we believe that the arguments for delay are stronger than the arguments for moving forward at this time, and we so recommend. You should be aware, however, that many of your pro-choice supporters are likely to regard a decision not to proceed at this time as a deep disappointment--if not an outright betrayal. Should you choose to delay the bill significantly, they may go public with very vocal objections.

Decision on FOCA Strategy


Delay

Go Forward

Discuss

ABORTION-RELATED GENERAL PROVISIONS

<u>Appropriation Bill</u>	<u>Current Status</u>	<u>Affected Population</u>
Labor-HHS General Provisions Sec. 103	Federal funding allowed only when the life of the mother is endangered if the fetus is carried to term.	Medicaid, Indian Health Service, and PHS grantee clients
D.C. Appropriation Bill	Funding allowed only when the life of the mother is endangered if the fetus is carried to term. (Includes local tax funds).	D.C. residents who would otherwise receive non-Medicaid funding for abortions
State-Commerce-Justice General Provisions Sec. 103, 104, 105	Federal funding allowed only when the life of the mother is endangered if the fetus is carried to term. Also provides that "no funds shall be used to require any person to perform or facilitate an abortion; " but permits funds for escorting to abortion services outside the Bureau of Prisons.	INS detainees, sentenced and pre-sentenced prisoners, transitionally housed asylees, special witnesses and families protected by DOJ, and inmates
Treasury-Post Office appropriation bill, Sec. 513, 514 of Title 5	FEHB plans may not cover abortions unless the mother is endangered if the fetus is carried to term.	Federal employees and dependents
DOD-United States Code, Sec. 1093 of Title 10,	Federal funding allowed only when the life of the mother is endangered if the fetus is carried to term.	Military personnel and dependents
Foreign Aid--H.R. 5368 Foreign Operations, PL 102-391, Sec 524 and 534 (Kemp-Kasten Amendment)	No funds shall be used for : 1) abortions, 2) to lobby for abortion, or 3) involuntary sterilization as a method of family planning or as incentive to undergo sterilization.	Peace Corps workers and countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance

WASHINGTON UPDATE

Policy and Politics in Brief

THOSE WINDS OF CHANGE ARE TRICKY

BY ELIZA NEWLIN CARNEY

Just as abortion-rights groups should be relishing the fact that there is at last a President who supports their agenda, they're threatened with the loss of one of their most prized goals: a law ensuring women's right to abortion.

The so-called Freedom of Choice Act, which essentially would codify the Supreme Court's 1973 *Roe v. Wade* ruling that legalized abortion, may never reach the floor this year, House Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., said at an April 22 press conference. Foley cited lack of support for a rule that would limit amendments likely to weaken the bill.


ABORTION

The uncertain fate of the bill—which is scheduled to be taken up by the House Judiciary Committee later this month—points up deep divisions in Congress over how far the government should go in restricting abortion rights. It also signals a bitter struggle ahead over pending questions such as whether Congress should allow federal spending on abortions and whether abortion services should be included in a national health care plan.

"This is a very difficult issue still," said Rep. Don Edwards, D-Calif., chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and the Freedom of Choice Act's primary sponsor in the House. "The general public is in favor of choice for women, but to some extent they are ambivalent about certain limitations that the states want to put on it."

In theory, the 103rd Congress is a golden opportunity for abortion-rights advocates who've been frustrated for 12 years by an anti-abortion White House. On his second day in office, President Clinton signed five executive orders rolling back a slew of federal abortion restrictions, including the "gag rule" banning abortion counseling in government-financed clinics.

Clinton's also promised to work with Congress to repeal a law that bars medi-



cated-financed abortions for poor women; appoint a *Roe v. Wade* supporter to the Supreme Court; and include abortion financing in his national health care program. Congress and the Administration have also proposed measures to improve clinic access and safety, spurred in part by the March murder of David Gunn, a physician who performed abortions at a Pensacola (Fla.) clinic.

But instead of gaining momentum, abortion-rights advocates find themselves suddenly on the defensive, losing money, membership and support on Capitol Hill. In part, their struggle reflects the pitfalls of being on the winning side. "With the victor goes the spoils," Kathryn Colbert, vice president of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy in New York City, said wryly.

In part, groups like the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc. are hurt by public sentiment that the abortion battle is over.

"The greatest threat to choice is complacency," said Kate Michelman, president of NARAL, where donations from direct-mail fund raising are down a third from this time last year.

The abortion debate has also shifted ground from simple questions of legality to such thorny areas as whether taxpayers should foot the bill for abortions or whether parents must be notified before their underage daughters can obtain an abortion. Polls show that many voters who support abortion rights in general also favor some restrictions. A July CBS News-New York Times poll found that 56 per cent of respondents supported state laws limiting abortion's availability, and 52 per cent opposed using tax dollars to finance poor women's abortions.

On the Freedom of Choice Act, abortion-rights groups have been undermined by internal bickering. NARAL and Planned Parenthood lead a coalition that strongly backs both the House and Senate versions of the bill; the National Organization for Women (NOW), allied with several other women's and public-interest groups, opposes Senate provisions that would allow states to pass laws that require parental involvement and bar the use of state funds for abortions.

"Our position has always been that we wanted a bill that would not encourage the states to treat young women and poor women differently," said Ginny Montes, national secretary of NOW, which is joined by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Fund for the Feminist Majority in opposing the Senate bill.

But the legislation's supporters say it won't pass if language that allow states to restrict abortions is ruled out entirely. Edwards said he plans to introduce a measure clarifying that states may continue to require parental involvement, when the House Judiciary Committee marks up the bill. "All of our polls and whip checks indicate that the *Roe* provision on parental involvement must be in the bill, or we lose literally scores of votes," Edwards said.

And while abortion-rights advocates are fighting among themselves, the anti-abortion lobby is more organized than ever, presenting a unified front and flooding both chambers with mail. A well-organized postcard campaign by the Committee for a Human Life Amendment, a Washington lobby group backed by

U P D A T E

Catholic dioceses nationwide, contributed to a serious Capitol Hill mail backlog, House post office director Michael Shinay said. The campaign generated about 1.5 million postcards on the Freedom of Choice Act, he estimated.

"All the pro-life forces are united on at least three priorities: defeating the Freedom of Choice Act, preserving the Hyde Amendment [a proviso named for its sponsor, Rep. Henry J. Hyde, R-Ill., that bans medicaid financing for poor women's abortions] and preventing Clinton from imposing abortion coverage through the national health plan," said Douglas Johnson, legislative director of the National Right to Life Committee. "We're guardedly optimistic that the President may fail on all three of those fronts."

Freedom of Choice Act backers counter that Clinton's support, along with that of a new generation of women in Congress, bodes well for the measure. Many of the freshman women made abortion rights a central campaign theme, Rep. Nita M. Lowey, D-N.Y., said.

"The increase in women Members automatically brings a new perspective and urgency to the issue," said Lowey, who heads the Pro-Choice Task Force of the Congressional Women's Caucus.

But some Members of Congress admitted that sharp disagreements over strategy persist. Some bill backers want a closed rule that would allow no amendments once the bill reaches the floor. (The purpose would be to prevent anti-abortion lawmakers from weakening the bill beyond recognition.) Others say that lim-

ited amendments should be allowed. With no agreement, the legislation may die quietly.

Abortion-rights advocates admit that the bill faces an uphill fight and are pushing for quick action by House and Senate leaders. Some fear that debate over the legislation and over the Hyde amendment will be heated, possibly weakening the Administration's resolve to include controversial abortion provisions in its health care package.

"In my view, we have a challenge ahead of us," said the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy's Colbert. "We need to convince legislators that these restrictions are very pernicious and that they ought not to be enacted at the state level. The problem is that, that's not a 30-second soundbite." ■

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bover

93 MAY 21 All: 34

I have not received
a reply to my question
about Dan Harlin
saying he sent 9 of
sections of that hist. of
Hearon mounting Reagan
& Bush didn't do. Pls advise

JB

Doubts About Clinton's Leadership on Bosnia Are Similar to Those Faced by Bush in Gulf Crisis

By CARLA ANNE ROBBINS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON — Staring at the threat of a costly war, with American lives at risk, the president fails to explain U.S. policy to the public. America's closest allies, meanwhile, use Washington's lack of direction as a further excuse for delay.

That's a pretty accurate description of Bill Clinton and the Bosnia crisis today. It's also a good description of George Bush and the Gulf crisis two and a half years ago.

With telescopic hindsight, and a decisive victory, Americans tend to remember the run-up to the Gulf War as a straight and easy sprint. It wasn't. That suggests that President Clinton, already being battered by pundits and politicians for a lack of decisiveness, still has some chance of coming out of the Bosnia crisis looking like a leader. For that to happen, however, he must settle on a policy soon and the policy must work — a tall order in Bosnia where, at this late date, even the best settlement will be less than just. And time is running out, with the Bosnian Serbs seizing more territory each day the West procrastinates.

"About the same time in the Gulf Crisis... Bush was clearly in trouble, he was distracted by the budget deficit, he was having problems explaining to Americans what was at stake. Everybody was raising questions about his leadership," says David Hansen, a member of the Bush polling team during that time and now research director at Market Strategies Inc.

"He was able to rectify that by Jan. 17, 1991, when the war started," he adds. "Of

course, he got a lot of help from Saddam Hussein."

Comparable Approval Ratings

Mr. Hansen points out that public approval for the two presidents' handling of their crises is also roughly comparable, once you correct for Mr. Clinton's smaller electoral mandate. "At that time, Bush was getting in the high 50s for handling Iraq and Clinton's job handling on Bosnia is somewhere between 40% and 45%. He's lower overall, but he's also a guy that only won with 42-43% of the vote," he says.

Meanwhile, 55% of those polled in a survey by Penn & Schoen Associates, a Democrat polling group, said they thought it was in America's interest "to stop the ethnic cleansing because it is wrong and it threatens the peace in Europe."

For all that, Mr. Clinton has yet to explain his policy or his goals in Bosnia to the public and has so far failed to rally support abroad. If Mr. Clinton doesn't seize control of the Bosnia crisis soon, it could do lasting damage to his credibility at home and abroad. Meanwhile, it's not clear how much longer Bosnia's Muslims can hold out, with the Serbs seizing more territory every day the West procrastinates.

Bosnia's centuries-old ethnic conflict is far more complex than the Gulf crisis. In the Gulf the principles, and the stakes, were comparatively clear: A bullying dictator invaded a small defenseless neighbor, which just happened to have one of the world's richest oil deposits. While the suffering in Bosnia is at least as horrific, the boundaries are less clear. President Clinton so far has been unable to decide

whether Bosnia is a civil war or an international conflict, using alternate explanations on alternate days.

And even with clear principles, and an enemy right out of central casting, Mr. Bush still had a hard time articulating why Americans should go to war in the Gulf. Jobs, oil, nuclear weapons, and "Hitler revisited" were only a few of the tacks tried and discarded. Even the policy was confusing: The same U.S. troops sent to defend Saudi Arabia in August were charged by November with reversing Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.

Communications is clearly a big part of Mr. Clinton's problem as well. For more than a month now, the White House has led the public, the Congress and its closest allies on a roller-coaster ride, repeatedly promising a swift decision on Bosnia — and a public explication — only to back away, without explanations.

Late last week, Mr. Clinton called on the allies to join the U.S. in taking "swift and decisive" action, only to have his spokeswoman tell reporters a few days later that the policy was now "on hold." Two days after that, Mr. Clinton raised expectations again, telling a radio talk show: "I think that you'll see that over the next few days we will be able to take some more steps that will make peace more likely and will make the confining of the conflict more likely."

Mr. Clinton is aware that he has a problem, says Sen. Richard Lugar (R., Ind.), who warned the president in a White House meeting this week that mixed signals could make it harder for him to sell his policy both at home and abroad.

"The president understood what I was

saying, that the last few days could be characterized as a sense of drift and that's not a very good idea," Mr. Lugar says. He came away from the meeting, however, persuaded that the president has a clear policy for Bosnia, and that he will soon be ready to reveal it.

But some problems are peculiar to the conflict and Mr. Clinton's style of problem-solving, particularly his already-famous desire to always get it right — holding endless meetings to dissect the details of everything from health-care reform to the budget to Bosnia. While American presidents always say they want to "consult" their allies and the Congress before making tough foreign policy decisions, few, except Mr. Clinton, ever really mean it. And, as Mr. Clinton is finding out, more consultations rarely mean more agreement.

America's relationship with its closest allies is also far different on the Bosnia crisis than it was during the Gulf crisis — in good part because of President Bush, who pronounced the former Yugoslavia "a European problem."

What Mr. Bush asked of the allies in the Gulf was considerable: that they send their troops into battle. But what he offered in return was even more: The U.S. would provide the bulk of the military force and run the operation. Britain, under Margaret Thatcher's leadership, was on board for tougher action from the start. Even then other European allies temporized for months, arguing for sanctions and more negotiations.

Asking Same, Offering Less

When Mr. Clinton tries to rally allied support for limited military action in Bosnia, he is asking much the same, but offering a whole lot less. This time, it is the Europeans who already have the troops on the ground. And, as they point out, these forces would bear most of the risk if, as the president suggests, the arms embargo on

the Bosnian Muslims is lifted and air strikes are launched.

Given the higher stakes, the allies are unlikely to sign on until Mr. Clinton starts using pressure, rather than consultation, as his approach — a point Mr. Bush also

came to in the last weeks before the war. Judging from the polls and Mr. Bush's experience, President Clinton still has time to win public support for a stronger course of action in Bosnia, although Bosnia itself may not.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/21

~~Don~~ What's our
response to this B

AIR EXPRESS DELIVERY FORM

800 3405 034

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE INFORMATION. PACKAGES WILL BE RETURNED IF INFORMATION IS NOT COMPLETE. AIR EXPRESS <u>WILL NOT</u> DELIVER TO P.O. BOXES.			No. 000924	
SENDER INFORMATION				
Date: 5/20/93	Name: John Podesta / Fran Wessel			
Agency: WHO	Room: Gd Fl, WW	Extension: 2702		
Signature: Frank Wessel				
DELIVERY INFORMATION				
Addressee: Mr. & Mrs. Stanley Sheinbaum	Phone:			
Organization:	Bill Recipient Account No.:			
Street Address: 345 North Rockingham Avenue				
City: Los Angeles,	State: CA	Zip: 90049		
TYPE OF SERVICE (Select One)				
☒ Next Business Day Delivery		☐ Saturday Delivery (Extra Cost)		

SENDER COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tony
cc: AGO
GS

Yulebox piece
very good—

B.

Bosnia: A Cease-Fire, But No Ground Troops

An understanding of the situation we face in Bosnia must begin with a definition of what is not at stake there.

It is a three-sided civil war, not an invasion of a sovereign country by a neighbor. Croatia and Serbia support their nationals inside Bosnia, though Serbian assistance is the most flagrant.

It is not a holocaust in the German sense, and not only because the number of casualties is mercifully not comparable to the Nazi crimes. The Holocaust represented a Nazi attempt, in pursuit of warped racial theories, to exterminate a peaceful minority. The Bosnian atrocities—appalling and inexcusable as they are—represent the barbaric methods of Balkan civil wars which, with a few interruptions, have been going on for centuries.

It is not a trigger of a wider conflict. By itself, the Bosnian conflict has no potential for involving the great powers. What could trigger a wider war would be Serb attacks on Macedonia or Kosovo, which should be resisted locally. An equally great danger is that American military action could lead to an uprising in Kosovo and Croat attacks on the U.N. zones in southern Croatia.

Not is the issue between peace on the Vance-Owen lines and continued conflicts. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen have performed the miracle of negotiating in a vacuum amid petty complaints from the sidelines. But none of the parties is content with the plan's territorial aspects. The war will therefore resume unless Bosnia is flooded by foreign troops prepared to stay there indefinitely and to fight all the contenders. Even the foreign minister of the Bosnian Muslim victims has publicly affirmed Muslim determination to regain all of Bosnia by force if necessary. The international force will thus be not a peace-keeping but a peacemaking force, at times having to fight each party.

The United States has only two interests in Bosnia: to end the outrage against its moral values represented by Serbian atrocities and to keep the war from spreading beyond the borders of former Yugoslavia.

The way to stop the atrocities is to stop the war. But the exact dividing line between the contending ethnic groups in Bosnia does not involve a U.S. interest.

I strongly support the sanctions being applied to Serbia, and if a cease-fire is not reached rapidly, I would favor even stronger ones, including the interruption of all communications and the break-off of diplomatic relations. The controversial issue is whether America's justified moral outrage at Serbian conduct warrants military action to achieve the Vance-Owen plan followed by a prolonged U.S. combat presence in Bosnia to police it.

In making that judgment, it is important to understand that Bosnia has never been a nation; there is no Bosnian ethnic group or specifically Bosnian cultural identity. Located at the intersection of the Muslim, Greek Orthodox and Catholic religions and at the dividing line between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the no man's land where nationalities displaced by endless Balkan wars were thrown together. Serbs, Croats and Muslims—who are descendants of Slavic Christians converted to Islam during Turkish rule and are therefore considered turncoats by the other ethnic groups—have managed to coexist only under alien rule. The last time Bosnia was the subject of an international agreement was at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when it was organized on the basis of Turkish suzerainty, Austrian military control and local self-government—hardly a precedent for a modern national state.

The most irresponsible mistake of the current Bosnian tragedy was international recognition of a Bosnian state governed by Muslims. Blindly following the precedent of Germany's hasty recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the international community established all the republics of the former Yugoslavia as independent states (except for Montenegro, which chose to remain with the new Yugoslavia).

But whereas Croatia and Slovenia had their own identity, Bosnia was a Yugoslavia in microcosm. It is a



BY RANDY MACK BISHOP

Dispatching U.S. troops would be most reckless.

mystery why anyone could think that Croats and Serbs, unwilling to stay together in the larger Yugoslavia, could be induced to create a joint state in Bosnia—together with Muslims they had hated for centuries. To be sure, the various ethnic groups had coexisted under various alien repressions, but they have never accepted submission to each other. Once the issue moved from social coexistence to political control, civil war became inevitable. Instead of being established as a nation, Bosnia was a classic case for international trusteeship—by the United Nations, the European Community or even NATO.

Outside intervention must be in relation to three alternative, though not mutually exclusive, outcomes: stopping the fighting on existing lines while leaving the political outcome to later negotiations, imposing the Vance-Owen plan or a variation of it and forcing a return to the prewar lines.

The scale of the military effort will mount as the political objectives are raised. A cease-fire in place might be achievable by sanctions or a modest military effort, though even a modest effort may widen the war to Croatia and Kosovo. The Vance-Owen plan is resisted by all parties—especially the Serbs and Muslims. The Serbs feel it gives them too little; the Muslims feel it concedes too much. This is why the Muslims rejected it at first, accepting it in the end primarily only to enlist American support against Serbia. Finally, the restoration of the prewar lines would most likely require a war, probably with Serbia—a country whose history is rife with last-ditch wars against countries much more powerful than itself and always in the past supported by Russia.

If sanctions do not stop ethnic cleansing and if the

president opts for intervention, military action should be confined to imposing a cease-fire—provided our military leaders judge this to be feasible. Any attempt by the United States and its allies to go further and to insist on a specific political outcome—especially one based on a unified Bosnia—will involve them in the civil war whenever they try to enforce their political preferences.

It is not clear why the international community should insist that ethnic groups that hate each other must live together in the same state. It is unlikely, to put it mildly, that after all the destruction and murder, victims can be induced to live again in the same villages as their tormentors. The fact is that the warring parties will have to be separated, not resettled among each other. It would be best to accept this reality and use the Vance-Owen lines as a basis for creating a small Muslim state (perhaps with a corridor to the sea) while permitting the Serbs and the Croats to join their mother countries. Lines could be refuted on the basis of U.N.-supervised plebiscites.

Such a course, it will be argued, would reward aggression. But the fact is, only overwhelming outside power can induce the Serbs and Croats to live under a single central government with the Muslims. If such a government were imposed, the Serb and Croat regions would soon resume the fight for their autonomy. If we insist on a unified Bosnian state, we will become trapped in a cruel three-sided civil war and unforeseeable escalations. Of all the military moves being envisaged, the dispatch of 20,000 American troops for so-called peace-keeping to police such an outcome is the most reckless. Our troops will find themselves in a situation like the Marines in Beirut or the British in Northern Ireland; they could not be withdrawn for a long time, if ever; they would become hostages to indescribable passions.

In such a situation, whatever little cohesion exists in NATO in support of military action would evaporate. It is difficult to tell whether White House calls for collective action are intended to evoke allied support or to create an alibi for American inaction. But surely our European allies, all too familiar with Balkan wars, have no stomach for prolonged peace-keeping that turns into a shooting war. Moreover, in any prolonged military confrontation with Serbia, Russia will wind up on the side of Serbia, at least diplomatically. And even in peace enforcement, Russian troops will play a highly ambivalent role. We could be jeopardizing both NATO and our Russian relationship in a military effort.

The United States should set itself the following objectives:

- To produce a cease-fire, preferably by sanctions or, as an absolutely last resort, by force to stop ethnic cleansing.
- To avoid sending ground troops to Bosnia for any purpose including peace-keeping.
- To forestall an expansion of the war into Macedonia and Kosovo by establishing a NATO military presence in Macedonia.

I would strongly prefer that the use of military force be avoided. If the president invokes it, I would make two appeals. The president should remember that there are no awards for losing with moderation. We should state moderate political objectives, but we should be decisive in the conduct of military operations. At the same time, once the president has decided on military action, those of us with reservations should rally behind him. Then the only exit will be via victory.

President Clinton will blight his presidency if he goes beyond these principles. It is to America's credit that it cares for the plight of distant peoples. America must be prepared to spend its treasures to right wrongs. But American leaders have a moral obligation as well to American lives, and they must not risk them for vague objectives and ambiguous strategies.

© 1993, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

The writer, former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm with business interests in many countries abroad.

P.2/2 *meets a*
in fact, inside



BEYOND THE BELTWAY

*Engaging the Public
in U.S. Foreign Policy*

**DANIEL YANKELOVICH
and I. M. DESTLER, Editors**

→ *light blue*

→ *medium
blue*

→ *tan*

Chapter 1
THE RULES OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT¹

by

Daniel Yankelovich
and John Immerwahr

Even under ideal conditions, the relationship of the public to foreign policy is replete with difficulties. Compared to domestic issues, opinion polls show that average Americans know less about foreign policy, care less, are more volatile in their views, and base their attitudes more on slogan-like generalizations (e.g. no-more-Vietnams) than on the specific merits of the issue. So, except when war threatens, the challenge of engaging the public in foreign policy is formidable.

Today's conditions are far from ideal, and engaging the public is particularly daunting in the present post-cold war climate of opinion. As former Senator Mathias observed in a previous American Assembly volume, "The greatest problem that confronts American leadership with respect to future foreign policy is to achieve a new national .. consensus in the absence of a powerful threat." ²

For the past two generations our nation's adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union has been the framework within which all foreign policy initiatives were evaluated. Absent that framework, it is difficult for the public to know what criteria to bring to bear in making foreign policy judgments. For forty years, leaders and public alike were prepared to go to great lengths to contain a menacing Soviet power; today there is no consensus that

the country should spend even a fraction of the "peace dividend" to ensure a peaceful, democratic Russia.

Ever since the troubles of the economy have come to preoccupy the public mind, voters have pushed foreign policy issues to the rear of the national agenda. Although for much of the post-war period foreign policy ranked near the top of the public's concerns, the combination of mounting concern for domestic issues and the collapse of the Soviet Union has greatly reduced public interest in international problems. On the Gallup/USA Today index of fifteen issues for discussion and debate in the 1992 Presidential campaign, national defense ranked fourteenth out of fifteenth, with only 43 percent feeling that it was a "very important issue" (Gallup/USA Today, January 1992). When the goals of foreign policy are discussed, by two to one margins (62 percent to 31 percent), voters give greater priority to the pursuit of our economic interests than to more traditional political-military objectives. In brief, the gap between foreign policy leadership and the public--large under any circumstances--is particularly difficult to bridge under present conditions.

Traditionally, leadership has managed this gap by limiting the influence of the public in the foreign policy arena. Most foreign policy initiatives are taken without much public consultation. Even on issues that involve putting U.S. troops in harm's way, such as in Somalia, leadership sometimes does not bother to consult or inform the public until after the fact.

Increasingly, however, despite its low level of interest in foreign affairs, the public insists upon being in the loop, especially when sacrifice and hard choices are involved. The public has come to feel that foreign policy competes with domestic problems for attention and resources. As a result, the public is no longer prepared to delegate critical foreign policy decisions to the judgment of experts; there is a concern that foreign policy leaders will distract the country from more pressing domestic issues. As the nation struggles to find solutions to both its domestic and foreign problems, leaders can expect a new aggressiveness and insistence on the part of the public that it be directly engaged in shaping the new post-cold war foreign policy.

Here we bump up against an unexpected obstacle. In the past, foreign policy leaders may have been reluctant to go to the trouble of engaging the public in complex foreign policy issues. But they never doubted their ability to do so. Yet the sad truth is that the foreign policy community has little or no idea how to go about engaging the public under these new post-cold war conditions.

Selling the Public

What foreign policy leaders do understand is the conventional top-down method for winning public support. In this approach, leaders first get together and hammer out policy positions among themselves. This process, which might take months or even years on complex policies, is often characterized by extensive, open, and

Chapter 1

thoughtful debate. But once a position is reached, the process of winning public support for it is usually far less thoughtful and open. It then becomes largely a matter of selling the public on decisions that leaders already have made.

The techniques for selling the public are familiar. Leaders make speeches, brief reporters, write op-ed pieces, and appear on talk shows to convey their thinking and to share a tiny fraction of their knowledge with the public. In effect, leaders present a simplified version of a lawyer's brief to the public, justifying their policy recommendations in a one-way process of communication.

Let us hasten to add that the top-down method is quite appropriate for many issues. It works well when public interest and concern are low, either because the issue is highly technical or because it does not touch people's lives directly. The decision of the National Air and Space Administration (NASA) to implement the shuttle program, for example, was intensely debated within the expert community but, appropriately, most of the public discussion was focused on selling the program to the public. The traditional method also works well on issues where no special sacrifices or actions are demanded of the public. Many foreign policy decisions have no immediate impact on the public. There is no special reason to engage the public in a lengthy debate about our policy toward Namibia, for example. Finally, this process works well when the goals of the policy are widely shared by the public and the leadership community as in the cold war era.

Chapter 1

But the conventional top-down approach is surprisingly ineffective for other issues. It does not work well when the public has a real stake in the issue, such as military intervention in Bosnia or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It does not work well when the public does not share the leadership's assumptions and priorities. It is especially ineffective on issues where demands will be made on the public, and where the public is expected to accept sacrifices. As a growing number of observers have noted, the top-down approach has not even worked well for domestic policies; it is hardly likely to do much better for foreign policy.

The Need for a New Approach

So we are confronted with a prickly dilemma: foreign policy issues have grown more elusive and less clear-cut. The public is eager to focus on urgent domestic concerns but is unwilling to delegate the shaping of foreign policy to experts who might give foreign policy too large a share of the resources needed to fix our domestic problems. Foreign policy leaders are (more or less) willing to engage the public to win its support, but don't know how to do so, and, worst yet, don't know that they don't know.

What is needed, then, is a new method for winning public support for vital foreign policy initiatives, to substitute, where appropriate, for the more familiar and traditional approach. Let

us call this new method "engaging the public," to distinguish it from the top-down approach.

Engaging the public differs from top-down communication in a number of ways. Instead of seeking to persuade the public to buy into policy positions that leaders and experts have pre-packaged, the public is drawn more directly into the process of deliberation. Instead of one-way communication, there is dialogue between public and leaders. Instead of a public relations campaign, a more complex process of debate, discussion, and interaction between public and leaders is instituted.

Engaging the public is more difficult than persuasion or information sharing. It demands more time and energy from leaders, and greater sensitivity to the nuances of the public's thinking. The difficulty should not be minimized. The price of winning public support for issues that require this approach is the adoption of a new set of rules for public engagement in foreign policy issues. These rules of engagement are the principal subject of this chapter.

The Stages of Public Opinion


The key differences between top-down communication and engaging the public reflect radically different theories of how public opinion actually works, theories that are almost never made explicit. It is only when we clarify the difference between two

implicit theories of public opinion that a workable strategy for engaging the public becomes clear.

The top-down approach is based on the theory that public opinion is driven by information and persuasion. In this view, what prevents people from supporting a position is that they do not understand the issues. The appropriate role of leadership would appear obvious: leaders inform the public about the issues and present a cogent case for a policy solution. The theory leads to this three-step model schematized on Chart 1.

Chart 1

TOP-DOWN COMMUNICATION MODEL



On the face of it, this approach makes sense. Since leaders have much more information than the public, it is up to them to impart some of their information persuasively. Once the leader's arguments are absorbed, the public is expected to reach the same conclusion as the leadership.

Chapter 1

The engagement approach is based on a more complex model of how public opinion works. Over the last several decades, together with colleagues at the Public Agenda Foundation (in collaboration with the Charles F. Kettering Foundation), we have been studying how public opinion develops on a series of policy issues, domestic and foreign. What we have learned is that public opinion moves through a multi-stage journey, starting from ignorant, volatile, impulsive, initial responses to issues (which we call "raw opinion") to firm, thoughtful, and responsible judgments (which we call "public judgment").³ At certain stages the public does assimilate information, but the information component is often of secondary importance, as compared to cultural values and moral convictions. The main stages of the journey from raw opinion to public judgment primarily involve reconciling conflicting values and overcoming emotional resistances--a process in which information plays a relatively minor role.

Sending foreign aid to the Russians, intervening militarily in Bosnia, lifting the ban on gays in the military, endorsing the export of jobs to Mexico, putting American troops under United Nations command, encouraging Japanese investment in American businesses--these are matters of deep concern that engage our prejudices, emotions, and values, as well as our minds. In the end, these kinds of policies cannot be effectively sold to the public in the traditional top-down manner.

Chapter 1


Instead of seeking to inform and persuade, leaders need to stimulate people to be more thoughtful, to confront their own prejudices and resistances, to embrace long-term goals as opposed to the impulses of the moment, to weigh the pros and cons of policy choices seriously and responsibly. Average Americans are as capable of carrying out this difficult chore of citizenship as their leaders--if we cast the issues in their framework (not that of the experts) and if they are given the time, necessary incentives, and communicative leadership.

Those leaders who are willing to go to the trouble of winning public commitment to ensure that people will stick with a policy even when the going gets tough need to ground themselves in a better understanding of how public opinion works when peoples' feelings, prejudices, and moral values are engaged. In the balance of this chapter, we will set forth the various stages through which public opinion evolves and suggest what rules of engagement are appropriate at each stage.

Analysis of the public's response to hundreds of issues shows that the public moves through seven distinct stages in the journey from raw opinion to public judgment. These stages may sometimes overlap, but they warrant being distinguished here for a very practical reason: the rules for engaging the public are different at every stage. Leaders trip over themselves and defeat their own purposes when they take actions inappropriate for the stage the public has reached. The seven stages are schematized in Chart 2.

In what follows, then, we describe the seven stages of public opinion, and the rules of engagement appropriate to each.

CHART 2



THE SEVEN-STAGE JOURNEY FROM RAW OPINION TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT

STAGE ONE: DAWNING AWARENESS

The first stage of what we call the long journey to public judgment is the public's growing awareness that a problem is developing. What drives public awareness is a combination of events reported by the media, plus people's own responsiveness to the world around them. While this stage of the journey is somewhat more obvious than later stages, it is an essential point of departure for the journey. Unless people are aware of issues, they certainly are not going to make any hard choices associated with resolving them.

The methods for creating public awareness at this initial stage of the journey are identical for both the top-down and engagement approaches. In both, it is the job of experts and the media to sound the "wake-up" call. Leaders traditionally have understood this as an important part of their role. Since this stage of the journey is well understood, it is not surprising that our culture has developed highly effective means for calling people's attention to an issue. Indeed, this stage calls for precisely the kind of one-way communication (with an active leadership and a passive public) that leaders are most comfortable with. It is only when we get into the later stages that new and less familiar communication approaches are called for.

Examples: Competitiveness and Developments in the Former Soviet Union

An excellent example of an issue that has grown gradually in public awareness is the competitiveness problem. One indicator is awareness of the trade deficit. In 1977, only a bare majority (53 percent) was aware of the trade deficit (Roper, September-October, 1977). But as the trade deficit grew, as more and more attention was directed toward it by the media, and as people experienced the impact of stagnant economic growth on their own lives, consciousness of America's competitiveness problem grew accordingly. By the mid-1980s, awareness of the trade deficit had reached the 75 percent level, and by the end of the decade

awareness exceeded 80 percent (Los Angeles Times, 1985; Gallup/Times Mirror, January-February 1989). By now, awareness and concern about the competitiveness crisis is nearly universal. One survey found that 84 percent of the population reports that they "really get upset" about America's falling behind other countries economically (Analysis Group, February 1990).

Turning to another theme of this book--the future of the former Soviet Union--we can see that leaders have led a large majority of the public to at least this first stage of awareness. Sixty percent of the public says that it has been following political developments in the former Soviet Union (CBS News/New York Times, March 1993).

It is important to note that the growth of public awareness on issues is not always automatic; there have been spectacular examples where important issues failed to capture public attention. The key factor here is almost always the role of the press. (As political scientist Bernard Cohen observed a number of years ago, "The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."⁴) When the media falls down on its job of bringing an issue to the attention of the public, public awareness is inevitably stalled. The savings and loan (S&L) crisis, for example, developed gradually and was well known to many in the banking community, but the media paid relatively little

attention to it until the problem reached an advanced state. Had the media been more alert, taxpayers might have been saved hundreds of billions of dollars.

STAGE TWO: A GROWING SENSE OF URGENCY

To gain public support for a solution, it is not enough for people just to be aware of a problem. Before beginning the hard work of deliberating about it, people must be convinced that an issue has some urgency. They must believe that unless something is done about the problem soon, the consequences will be dire.

The shift from awareness to urgency is rarely automatic. The public can be aware of a serious problem for years without assigning a great deal of urgency to it. For example, people have been aware of many environmental threats for decades without developing a sense of urgency. People were aware of rising health care costs and the growth of the federal budget deficit for many years before concluding that action was urgently needed.

Example: Aiding Russia

A good example of awareness without urgency in foreign policy is the issue of giving aid to Russia. For several years, the nation's leadership has been concerned about the dangers of potential instability in the former Soviet Union. As we have seen, leadership has succeeded in making people aware of the issue. But

attempts to give the issue of aid to Russia some real urgency for the public have so far been less successful.

Survey results show that people are well aware of potential problems in Russia:

- 79 percent express some degree of concern that if the former Soviet Union does not receive enough help from us, their nuclear weapons and technology will spread to other countries, and an equal number is concerned that if the former Soviet Union does not receive enough help there will be serious food shortages there (Gallup, April 1992).
- 67 percent express some concern that if the former Soviet Union does not receive enough aid from us, an unfriendly government may seize power there (Gallup, April 1992).

These concerns would suggest a certain amount of urgency regarding the need to help Russia. But despite that, there is little support for actually doing much more to help. The vast majority of the public (75 percent) thinks that we are already helping Russia to move toward capitalism and democracy (Gallup, March 1993). Fifty-four percent oppose giving more aid to encourage Russia to adopt a democratic government and a market economy; only 38 percent favor doing this (Yankelovich Partners/Time/CNN March 1993).

This example shows that the public is able to play back concerns expressed by foreign policy experts but obviously does not give them the same weight. Although these worries may be urgent

Chapter 1

for leaders, for the public they remain low-level concerns. They lack urgency because the possible dire consequences that are required to give an issue real urgency remain remote and theoretical, rather than real and pressing. Soviet nuclear technology does not seem to be spreading, and places like Iraq seem to get what they need from other sources. While people may be waiting in longer lines than ever in Russia, the public is not deluged with daily pictures of starving stick-figure babies (as they see in the coverage from Africa).

In fact, for the vast majority of people, the real danger is that we will give so much aid to Russia that we will not have enough left for our own domestic needs. Three-quarters of the public says that what concerns them is that the United States will give too much financial aid to the former Soviet republics when we badly need it here at home; only 15 percent say that they are concerned that we may not provide enough aid (Los Angeles Times, January 1992). The dire consequence that people worry most about, in other words, is that the United States might sacrifice its own wellbeing for the Russians.

Focus group respondents express, for example, fear that if we help the Russian economy, the result will be a loss of U.S. jobs. People are worried that goods produced by low-wage workers in the former Soviet republics will undercut U.S. products. For many people, the idea of helping the Soviet Union evokes memories of

helping other former enemies such as Japan and Germany, countries that are now seen as taking away American jobs.

Rules of Engagement

At this stage, the top-down and the engagement approaches begin to diverge from one another. Leaders often assume that if the public does not see the urgency of a problem, it is because people do not have enough information about it. But, as we see from the example above, people are aware of at least some of the consequences of failing to come to Russia's aid, and they still are not convinced of its urgency or even its desirability.

How should leaders go about the task of imparting a sense of urgency to the public on issues such as this one? We propose that leaders keep in mind two rules of engagement. There is no guarantee that these will work every time; even under the best of circumstances, the public may simply not share leadership's priorities. But following these two rules will give leaders a much better chance than will the top-down approach.

1. Identify the reasons for the urgency gap. There are many possible reasons why, on any particular issue, the public may not share leadership's sense of urgency. One reason is different priorities. With respect to aid to Russia, for example, the foreign policy community is still mainly focused on the military and political aspects of foreign policy while the public is much more concerned with its economic aspects. This difference in

emphasis is not surprising. It is difficult for the foreign policy community to shed habits of thought ingrained over several generations. The reality is that the public has probably made the transition from the cold war era faster than the experts have. In any event, the two groups--the experts and the public--are in different stages of the transition, and consequently do not see things in the same light.

Another reason the public may not share the experts' sense of urgency is that the threat may be too abstract and, therefore, not real enough to rouse people to action. For decades people felt no urgency about rising health care costs, because the costs were paid by others through the third-party payment system. It was only when the problem grew so serious that employers were demanding higher co-payments for fewer services that people demanded action.

A third reason for the urgency gap is more subtle. Most people feel excluded from foreign policy decisions. Looking in from the outside, they adopt the stance of critics rather than participants. The attitude is, "It is their problem, not our problem." When people feel excluded, it is not easy to stir up feelings of urgency.

These are only a few of the causes of an urgency gap, but perhaps they are enough to indicate why it is imprudent for foreign policy leaders to guess at the public's frame of mind. The likelihood is that the guess will be wrong, since the public and the foreign policy community rarely think alike. There is a

variety of research techniques available for revealing the public's mindset, but policy makers should be wary about relying on "quickie" media-sponsored polls. They are rarely subtle enough to dig beneath the surface, nor are they usually concerned with the reasons that urgency may be lacking.

2. Stimulate grass-roots demand for action. Ideally the demand for action should well up from below rather than be imposed from above. When the demand for action does come from the public, people feel ownership in the issue and engage it as participants rather than as critics.

What would make aid to Russia assume greater urgency for the public? The best solution would be for leaders to credibly attack the public's zero-sum assumption: "aid helps them, hurts us." This assumption may be unfounded but it has to be understood and responded to sympathetically, even to the point of acknowledging that, at first glance, it seems plausible. The argument that we might, putatively, save defense dollars in the future will not be persuasive. The case can be made persuasive if the policy itself can be broadened so that it results in direct economic benefit to the United States. Could Russian oil make us less dependent on the Middle East? Could American jobs be created in helping Russia to build a new infrastructure? Could access to vast new markets help to simulate our own economy, as happened in Western Europe after the war? A positive answer to these questions could transform what

appears in the mind of the public to be a zero-sum strategy into a win-win strategy.

In brief, if the policy context of aid to Russia were shifted from a military-political one to an economic one, and if this shift were both real and credible (and not merely spin control), then thoughtful segments of the public would begin to demand action rather than brush it aside as a deflection from the nation's real priorities.

STAGE THREE: FIRST RESPONSE TO SOLUTIONS

As an issue becomes more urgent, there is a growing desire for action. At this stage, people start to look for solutions. In some cases ideas for solutions rise up from the grass roots, such as the nuclear freeze movement of the 1970s. But typically solutions are shaped and presented by leadership.

What is characteristic of this stage is that people are often groping for an answer to a problem they have only just begun to take seriously, and which at the same time causes them acute anxiety. Not surprisingly, they may overreact to proposals even though they may not have thought through the complexities of the issue and the consequences of their views. As a result, at this stage of public opinion development, people's responses are usually unstable and given to rapid fluctuation.

What makes both this stage and the following one difficult to grasp is that the public's decision-making process diverges from

the more systematic process that leaders adhere to in their formal analysis of issues. When leaders in the military, government, business, or think tanks deal with a problem formally, they follow a systematic approach that starts with the analysis of a problem and concludes with the development of an array of options for dealing with it.

In the hurly-burly of political life, however, decision making is far different. It is much less systematic, and much more based on trial and error. Culturally, Americans react to a problem by moving quickly to action, giving short shrift to lengthy and laborious analysis. The tendency is to leap to solutions without pausing to formulate alternatives and without deliberating on which solution would be optimal. Instead, people consider one solution at a time, and move on to alternatives only when serious doubts about it develop. This may not be the ideal way to approach a problem, but research shows that it is the way the American political process actually works. It also helps us understand how Americans react to possible solutions when they first encounter them.

Example: NAFTA

One example of this trial-and-error style of thinking is the public's reaction to NAFTA. People have a sense of urgency about both the problem of immigration and the potential threat to American jobs. As leaders tossed out ideas about how to deal with

this issue, the public initially reacted dogmatically, eagerly seeking a solution to the problem.

The early reactions to a North American free trade agreement thus tended to more emphatic than what developed later.

- A March 1991 question found that an overwhelming majority (72 percent) thought that a North American free trade agreement would be good for this country (Gallup, March 1991).
- In more recent surveys, however, people are saying that they have not heard enough about the agreement--49 percent felt this way in early 1993 (ABC News/Washington Post, March 1991).

In other words, people seemed surer of their position in 1991 before they had really had a chance to think about the subject. Two years later, in 1993, after the issue had been ventilated in the 1992 Presidential election, we found people saying that they have not heard enough about it. Rather than starting with a need for more information and gradually moving toward a solution, people sometimes start with the solution, and only later come to realize that they need more thinking and information about the problem.

Rules of Engagement

An understanding of how public opinion works at this stage suggests a number of implications for communication with the public.

1. Assume that poll results about solutions are soft. It is at this stage that public opinion polls are most liable to misinterpretation. Policy makers need to learn, therefore, to interpret the findings for what they are: initial reactions rather than either final support or ultimate rejection.

* { When people are first reacting to a solution, their opinions are highly unstable, and poll results can shift dramatically based on small changes in the wording or order of questions. In some of the early opinion polls on NAFTA, for example, support for the agreement could change by large margins based on small changes in question wording. The reason for this is clear: sometimes people are saying yes to a solution when all they really mean is that they want someone to deal with the problem; they are not yet focusing on the details of that particular solution. At other times, the public reacts violently against a proposal, because it has not yet realized the unattractive implications of that proposal may be necessary. In both cases, what it is registering is an initial reaction, rather than a firm public judgment one way or the other.

The danger is that policy makers will over-react in two different ways. If the public opinion survey results show that the public opposes a promising solution, policy makers may throw up their hands in disgust, and assume that the public is completely hopeless (rather than working to facilitate the public's movement through this stage). In other cases, leaders make the opposite mistake: they seize upon the favorable early opinion polls as a

mandate and rush ahead, only to find that public support evaporates when the implications of the choices become clearer.

2. Use policy proposals as "trial balloons." Leaders can also accelerate the public's journey to sound judgment through the use of trial balloons. If leaders know that a policy will encounter serious public resistance, for example, military intervention in Bosnia, the sooner the resistance can be brought into the open, the sooner it can be confronted and dealt with. This is the subject of stage four, which follows below.

STAGE FOUR: RESISTANCE

When people start to consider new policies seriously (rather than merely as "trial balloons" as in the previous stage), the journey to public judgment hits its first real bump in the road. Any serious foreign policy initiative is bound to meet resistance. The question is, how serious is it, and how can it be countered.

Sometimes the resistance is mild; other times it is fierce and unyielding. The key point to keep in mind is that resistance always indicates strong feelings. People don't resist a new proposal because they don't have the facts. They resist either because the proposal is seen to conflict with cherished values and beliefs, or because it seems to collide with their interests (raising their taxes, threatening their jobs, causing them inconvenience). These perceptions may be erroneous or exaggerated. If so, factual information can help to dispel the misconceptions.

But when strong feelings are involved, simply giving people the facts can be an ineffective and alienating tactic for those whose feelings are being ignored.

During the presidential campaign of 1992, for example, there was some discussion about lifting the ban on gays in the military. But it wasn't until after the election, when the proposal to lift the ban began to loom as a real possibility, that serious resistance started to emerge; only then did the conflict come to the surface. On the one hand, there is in the culture a general movement toward acceptance of alternative life styles. Majorities of the public are comfortable, for example, with the idea of a gay person serving in the president's cabinet (Gallup, June 1992). (Indeed, only a minority of the public says that being gay would disqualify someone as a presidential candidate.) But, on the other hand, many people still harbor a deep-seated emotional antipathy toward homosexuality and a lingering conviction that it violates moral values. Their emotional resistance is triggered when they imagine themselves sharing close quarters with a gay or lesbian person. When the proposal to lift the ban on gays in the military is taken seriously, it causes these conflicts to come to the surface.

In politics, we are most familiar with conflicts between groups of people, such as the bitter and irreconcilable conflict between pro-choice and pro-life groups on the abortion issue. But most conflicts regarding public policy issues take place within the

individual psyche. Most of the time, these conflicts lie dormant until events force them to surface. (For example, in good economic times an individual might support both affirmative action and a seniority system; economic cutbacks cause a conflict between these values as society makes hard choices about who will be laid off first.)

People find it difficult enough to deal with emotional conflict in their personal lives. When it comes to public policy, they are usually under less pressure to resolve the conflict. If they can avoid doing so, they will.

Example: United States as the World's Policeman

One good example of inner conflict is the public's view of the proper role of the United States in world affairs. On the one hand, people say that they want the United States to assume a lower profile in world affairs, but on the other hand, they are not quite ready to relinquish or share American power with our allies or with international organizations such as the UN. What is at stake here are two conflicting value systems that people wish to embrace simultaneously. On the one hand, voters want to focus on the domestic economy and limit our commitments abroad. At the same time, the appeal of a special leadership role in world affairs--moral, political, military--is deeply embedded in our national identity. There is a deep suspicion of our allies and a sense

that, when the chips are down, the United States must ultimately act on its own.

Survey findings document this conflict. Some of the most interesting findings surround the concept of the United States as the world's policeman. Only a small minority of Americans (21 percent) endorses this concept in principle, while 75 percent oppose it (Yankelovich, Clancy Shulman/Time/CNN, March 1991).

On specific issues, however, there is strong support for the United States playing the role of world policeman. Some examples:

- Eighty percent support U.S. air strikes inside Iraq, because of Saddam Hussein's violations of UN resolutions (Harris, January 1993). Nearly six out of ten (59 percent) think that we should continue military actions until Saddam Hussein is removed from power (Gallup, January 1993).
- Fifty-seven percent say they favor using U.S. ground forces to restore peace and humanitarian aid in Bosnia (Gallup/Newsweek, January 1993), and 54 percent say they think the United States has an obligation to use military force in Bosnia if there is no other way to get humanitarian aid to civilians and prevent atrocities (Los Angeles Times, August 1992).
- As many as 70 percent support the general principle that "the U.S. and the United Nations should take clear actions" to stop all sorts of human rights violations against dictators such as General Rodriguez in Paraguay (Market Strategies/Americans Talk Security, November 1991).

Chapter 1

The conflict crystallizes when people are asked about relations between the United States, the UN, and our traditional allies. One side of the public's thinking resonates with the idea that the United States should not attempt to "go it alone" in foreign policy:

- Eighty-seven percent believe that the United States should commit its troops only as part of a UN operation (Gallup, December 1992).
- Seventy-three percent believe that the United States should commit troops only in concert with allies (Gallup, December 1992).

But when people are asked questions that evoke the other side of the conflict (namely that the United States must stand up for its own interests), large majorities support the notion of unilateral U.S. action. For example, almost two-thirds of the public (63 percent) believe that the United States should be willing to commit troops on its own in some cases (Gallup, December, 1992).

When both values are directly pitted against each other, the result is a kind of stalemate, as we can see in the following question:

Now that the Soviet Union no longer exists, do you think the United States should share world power with other nations, or should we use our power to ensure that no other nation can challenge our dominance in world affairs? (Yankelovich, Clancy Shulman, March 1992.)

Chapter 1

Responses:

Share world power	46%
Ensure no one can challenge us	43
Not sure	11

This example helps to illuminate the nature of what we mean by resistance: the presence within the same individual of two conflicting values. In this instance the two values are a belief in the "special mission" of the United States to act unilaterally to protect its own interests and to impose its own moral standards, coexisting with a belief in the need to act in concert with allies and to delegate the world-policeman role to international bodies such as the UN so that we can pay more attention to urgent domestic concerns.

People are reluctant to give up either value. This reluctance gives rise to a variety of forms of resistance: wishful thinking ("Surely we can do both if we put our mind to it."), avoidance ("Why can't we just ignore the conflict?"), contradictory thinking (support of mutually exclusive policy options), and procrastination ("Maybe if we are lucky it will just go away.").

Rules of Engagement

This stage and the next highlight the most important differences between the two models. The greatest limitation of the top-down model is that it is often ineffective in dealing with resistance caused by conflicts in values because it either ignores

them or rides roughshod over them. The reason it does so is because the top-down theory of public opinion assumes that the public's thinking process is driven by information and persuasion. Most resistance, however, cannot be overcome by giving people more information or even by providing a more persuasive argument. Rarely do the arguments of policy makers address the fundamental value conflicts that are at the root of resistance.

By contrast, the engagement model takes seriously the emotional resistance caused by conflicts in values. Three rules of engagement are important here:

1. Allocate time and attention to resistance. The first principle is simply that foreign policy leaders recognize that such conflicts exist and cannot be ignored. Acknowledgement of this reality should take several forms. Leaders should give people plenty of time to "work through" these conflicts; they cannot be resolved overnight. Leaders should also make sure they understand the public's inner conflicts and how these might differ from their own. The foreign policy community has its own subculture and value system. It is sufficiently removed from the general culture that leaders should never assume that their own value conflicts (or lack thereof) are shared by the general public. It is always worth making the extra effort to learn the precise nature of the public's inner conflicts when resistance makes itself felt.

2. Bring the conflict into the open. Leaders must be prepared to bring the conflict into the open where it can be confronted and

discussed. One reason the race problem continues to fester in the United States is that the real nature of racial conflicts is rarely made explicit. As long as white Americans are reluctant to discuss the sources of tension with black Americans as openly as they do among themselves in private, then the processes of reconciliation, compromise, and resolution cannot proceed. Making conflicts explicit, and giving both sides of the conflict their proper weight and dignity are important leadership functions, without which procrastination and resistance will persist indefinitely.

3. Create the conditions for public resolution to occur. Finally, leaders must recognize that the public has to do the heavy lifting here. Leaders alone cannot overcome these resistances. Leadership needs to provide a format for people to work through the conflicts themselves. But if an issue has real urgency, and leadership has successfully identified the resistance that stands in the way of facing the issue squarely, then the public itself can do the hard work of resolving its own value conflicts. And, with some leadership support, it will do so. If people can get together (literally or figuratively) and deliberate, they will almost always gravitate toward balance and compromise.

It is this deliberative process that in recent years has been almost totally absent from American life, due partly to the dominance of the top-down model.

STAGE FIVE: CHOICEWORK

Once people have worked through their resistance to dealing with an issue, they are ready for the hard work of sorting out various choices, weighing the pros and cons, and beginning to make the hard trade-offs. We call this stage "choicework," emphasizing both the process of wrestling with choices and the fact that this is a very arduous task for the public.

In one way this is the easiest of all the steps for policy makers to understand. This is how leaders themselves come to grip with an issue when they are being systematic: an array of options is developed, their costs and consequences thought through and discussed. What is new and different about the engagement model is not the process itself, but the idea that--at least on certain issues--the public must take part in a similar process.

One of the advantages of involving the public in the process of deliberation is that this is an excellent way to transfer a sense of ownership. If foreign policy leaders want people to make a real commitment to policies so that they stand behind them even when they involve hard choices or sacrifices, leaders need to find a way to help people become invested in those decisions. Obviously, many foreign policy issues do not require this level of public ownership. But for the few that do, there is no better way to bring the public toward a stable and responsible position.

In practice, this stage and the preceding one often overlap. Weighing alternative choices is a good way to bring people's

resistances to the surface to work them through. But while these stages may overlap in time sequence, the business of seriously weighing alternatives usually does not begin until people's emotional resistances have been confronted.

In other words, there are two analytically distinct tasks the public must accomplish once an issue has been fully engaged. One involves resolving value conflicts--a task for the heart as well as the mind. The other is more purely cognitive (weighing pros and cons). The relationship between the two tasks is often complex. Deciding among competing alternatives is hard work intellectually, especially when choices involve difficult-to-assess tradeoffs. Decisions become even harder when there are deep-seated conflicts of interests and moral values to be worked out.

Rules of Engagement

The engagement model and the top-down approach differ strikingly at this stage. The essential contrast is between including the public in the deliberative process versus simply giving people information or selling them on a previously decided option.

For the public to share fully in the deliberative process, a number of conditions must obtain. All of them revolve around the concept of "choicework"--the empirically grounded discovery that the single best mechanism for advancing public deliberation is to give people real choices to mull over.

Research on public thinking about scores of public policy issues shows that presenting choices is a far better method for advancing deliberation than merely laying out the arguments for a single solution: presenting choices gives people a systematic way to consider the consequences of alternative solutions so that they can be weighed against each other thoughtfully and judiciously. Examination of choices is the essence of the deliberative process; it is the one that leaders themselves follow when they are serious about solving a difficult problem.

The message to foreign policy leaders is this: a solid public consensus for new policies is most likely to flow from including the public in the consideration of choices. This means that leaders must give up their double standard, which has traditionally meant presenting options to each other but single solutions to the public.

The rules of engagement for this stage dictate that special effort is required in preparing the conditions for public choicework:

1. Enough choices. The choices have to be the right ones, and there must be enough of them. It is not enough to present choices if they are all inadequate.

In some cases the choices can be confined to two alternatives. In the national debate about the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the country eventually focused on two fairly clear choices: direct military intervention or continued sanctions. In

Chapter 1

most cases, however, such as improving trade relations with Japan, the issues are tremendously complex. Unless the choices presented to the public include at least one credible solution to a problem that people feel is urgent, the deliberative process will be aborted.

2. The public's framework, not the experts'. The choices must be defined in the public's terms rather than in the terms experts favor. Frequently experts use terms that mean something very different to the public. During the cold war, for example, there were countless discussions of arms control. By arms control, most experts meant achieving a balance of arms, usually at a high level. To the public, however, the idea of arms control meant arms reduction. In effect, the two groups were talking past each other, thinking that they were speaking to each other but not really communicating. In fact, the public's conception of arms reduction was not employed until the very last years before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

3. Allocate sufficient time. Deliberation takes time. It is not enough to present choices, do an instant poll, and expect that the process has been completed. It takes an irreducible minimum amount of time to accomplish any difficult form of working through choices, especially if strong feelings are also involved. Even when an issue does not stir emotional conflicts, it takes time to grasp and absorb all of its implications. It often takes leaders themselves months or even years to come to a consensus or

compromise; it is hardly reasonable to expect the public to do it overnight.

4. Give the public an incentive. Because deliberation is hard work, people must have be motivated to do it. One of the most effective incentives is to convince people that leaders will actually listen to them and take their thoughts seriously after they have gone to the trouble to debate and work their way through an issue.

A national election forces leaders to listen. In a presidential election, a debate on foreign policy will draw seventy to eighty million viewers. This same debate, in a non-election context, might have only one or two million viewers. The main reason people follow debates in presidential elections more closely than debates at other times is that an election offers them an incentive; at some future date they will vote, and their vote may make a difference.

Elections on specific issues, however, are neither practical nor even desirable. People must have an incentive, but it need not be as tangible as an election. Any sign that leaders are heeding the public's concerns will serve as an incentive. Informally, through their speeches and interviews with media, leaders may invite the public to debate various choices. More formally, other mechanisms can be invented to give the public a sense that leaders are really listening. The Public Agenda Foundation, for example, has experimented with what it calls "public choice campaigns,"

where leaders and the media work together at the city or state level to present a range of choices on a controversial issue. The final step of the process is a mail-in "ballot" where citizens register their final opinion, with some assurance that leaders will take what they say seriously. The public is hungry for any sign that leaders are responsive to their views. A great deal has been said about public apathy, but our experience has been that as soon as the public comes to feel that leadership is genuinely interested in what it has to say, the apathy melts away as if by magic.

5. Make leadership debates meaningful to the public. Our research suggests that indirect and vicarious methods of expediting the public's choicework can also be used to great effect, if done well. For example, congressional debates carried by the media sometimes work well. When they do, people feel that they are participating in the debate themselves.

Unfortunately, most congressional debates seem remote from the public's concerns and fail to expedite the public's choicework. Debates fail to engage the public when they are pursued in either a lawyer-like or a partisan manner--the usual style of congressional debates since most people in Congress are lawyers and partisans.

On rare occasions, however, leadership debates do engage the public. Here again, the national debate in 1991 over the proper response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provides an excellent example of how the public can become vicariously involved in the

deliberative process. The debate in Congress over military intervention or continuing non-military sanctions was strikingly different from the usual partisan, lawyer-like format. The voters appreciated the difference and were helped by it. In this case their elected representatives were seen to be honestly deliberating and searching for an answer to a very difficult problem. The legislators agonized over the issue and were honest in expressing their own doubts and reservations. Rather than advancing interest group positions or offering lawyers' briefs, they drew on their own personal experiences and values, and the public was able to identify with them.

This form of public deliberation (which was widely covered by the media) creates a climate where the public feels it is participating in an extended process of debate and deliberation. The public nature of the debate helped people to do the choice work associated with stage five. As a result, Operation Desert Storm developed strong public support.

STAGES SIX AND SEVEN: INITIAL ACCEPTANCE AND FULL COMMITMENT

In the final stages of the process, people sign on, having worked through both their emotional resistances and the weighing of pros and cons. Full resolution moves through two distinct stages, as people advance from an intellectual assent to a full commitment of both heart and mind. Empirical research shows that the cognitive aspects come first, while the moral and emotional aspects

lag behind. People form a resolution first in their heads; it takes a while for their hearts and consciences to catch up.

Example of Initial Acceptance: Women in the Military

One area where people have come to at least an intellectual resolution is on the question of women in the military. The public has thought this through and is ready to accept the idea of women in the military, at least on an intellectual level. In this connection it is interesting to contrast attitudes today with attitudes a decade ago.

- In a 1981 survey, for example, the clear majority (59 percent) opposed the idea of women serving in combat positions. Only 36 percent favored this concept (NBC/Associated Press, July 1981).
- Today the numbers have completely reversed. In one survey, 74 percent said that "qualified women" should be allowed to serve in combat positions (Gallup, April, 1992).

Once again, there is a striking contrast between attitudes toward women in the military and attitudes toward gays in the military. (The issue of gays in the military, as we have already noted, is still caught in stage four--resistance.) A January 1993 survey showed that people oppose lifting the ban on gays in the military by margins of 48 percent opposed to 43 percent in favor (Yankelovich Partners, Time/CNN, January 1993).

Although Americans have intellectually accepted women in the military, it is far from clear that they have internalized this concept. Americans have not yet dealt clearly with the reality of women in combat positions, and remain uncomfortable with the idea of women in the front line. It will take time for this new reality to be emotionally internalized.

Example of Full Commitment: Support for a Strong Defense

One area where Americans have made a full stage seven commitment is to the maintenance of a strong defense. Given the concern that people have with the economy, one might expect that deep cuts in the defense budget would be enormously popular. But there is strong support for moderate cuts. People have thought this issue through, and support intellectually, emotionally, and morally the concept that America must remain strong, even though the cold war has ended.

Rules of Engagement

Here are the rules of engagement that are useful to observe in these last stages of resolution.

1. Synthesize conflicting values. When two conflicting values are both important to the public, resolution can be enhanced by compromises that preserve at least some elements of each of the conflicting values. Political leaders are usually comfortable with

reaching compromises among themselves, but some degree of inspired tinkering has to be carried out with the public as well.

Cutting the defense budget is a good demonstration of this principle. People want to devote all available resources to the domestic economy, but they also value a strong America. If the country were to pursue either radical cuts in the defense budget or no cuts at all, one or the other value would be flatly rejected. The idea of moderate cuts preserves elements of each conflicting value.

2. Make the context explicit. To ensure final resolution, leaders must relate policies to a broader vision. Whether it be working with the UN to achieve the world policeman role, or U.S.-Japan trade, policies must be articulated in a way that stresses their place in the broad context of America's interests and ideals. The issue of a strong defense has such powerful support precisely because it has been attached to a broader vision of America's role in the world.

In foreign policy more than domestic policy, people think in terms of general principles (often encapsulated in slogans and code words). People easily forget the specific pros and cons of an argument, but they remember the general principles (e.g., "protect American jobs," "create a level playing field," "keep America strong") and relate policies to them. The key here is to find and articulate the general principle that will reinforce resolution.

3. Celebrate the result. Finally, leadership needs to find occasions to pause to recognize and celebrate a genuine accomplishment of democracy. Reaching public judgment on an important issue is not a small task, and everyone deserves--and needs--to be congratulated on achieving it. This includes leaders, experts, and the public alike.

CONCLUSION

The top-down model grows out of a concept of leadership implicit in representative democracy where leaders take responsibility for solutions, and the electorate holds leaders accountable for results. Taking their case to the public may help leaders to inform people and win their support, but the main avenue of public accountability is at election time when leaders who have not done a good job can be replaced ("Throw the rascals out."). The division of tasks is clear: the leaders do the thinking, the public judges the results.

This concept has great strengths, but time has shown that it also has certain limitations. In today's complex world, accountability only at election time is frustrating to the electorate. For one thing, our governance system has evolved ingenious ways to insulate itself from the public, and the public, excluded from the process, fights back by blocking solutions that require it to make sacrifices. As a result, the country is increasingly trapped in a far more serious gridlock than that

between the legislative and the executive branches, much discussed in the 1992 presidential election.

Not surprisingly, the top-down model of leadership is now being challenged in many quarters, not just in government. Nowhere has the top-down model been more deeply entrenched than in large corporations. Traditionally in business the boss makes the decisions; the employees are informed and expected to carry them out. But some corporations have discovered that in today's brutal economy, there are serious limits to this traditional style of leading and communicating with employees. In virtually all major business corporations today, the management styles of the mass-production era are being transformed to fit the new age of information.

The old techniques work well enough when conformity will do the job; they don't work well when what is needed is dramatic change--not just better compliance with the rules, but genuine commitment from the entire workforce. Companies are discovering that if they need to reinvent the company so that it can survive and prosper in today's world, they must shift from the old top-down form of management to one where people are wooed rather than ordered around, and where a vision of the future is shared by all rather than being the exclusive concern of senior management. The result is a form of leadership essentially political in nature. Instead of the boss dictating the direction, managers have to find ways to make people think for themselves and internalize the goals

of the institution. There is still a boss; indeed the CEO function becomes more important than ever. But his or her role is different.

In the world of theory scholars, including philosophers such as Germany's Jurgen Habermas, and American social thinkers such as Jane Mansfield, Amitai Etzioni, and James Fishkin, have also been exploring the concept of deliberative democracy based on new principles of communication and leadership. A number of research institutions and foundations such as the Public Agenda, the Kettering Foundation, the Markle Foundation, and more recently The American Assembly, are also exploring these concepts.⁵

This way of thinking has yet to penetrate the world of foreign policy. In the cold war era, it was not needed. The foreign policy community was entrusted with carrying out a goal--contain communist expansion--which virtually all Americans accepted. Today there is no comparable single threat and no widely shared goal. There is, in fact, a disparity in emphasis, with the leadership continuing to stress America's political-military-moral objectives, while the public has shifted its emphasis to the economic domain.

As a result, foreign policy leaders need to find new ways to work with the public. What is called for is not just new communication techniques, but a new concept of leadership, one that shifts from the traditional "we do the thinking" style to one that encourages a more deliberative public. This will not be required

all the time, or for every issue. On most decisions, foreign policy leadership can continue as usual, with most of the decisions made outside of the spotlight of the public. But on a few critical issues where real public commitment is required, a new deliberative form of leadership is needed. The seven-stage theory of public opinion presented here should give leaders a practical method for seizing upon it and making it work.

DANIEL YANKELOVICH is the author of numerous books and articles on social-political trends and public opinion. His book, Coming to Public Judgment, diagnoses today's policy gridlock. In a recent Fortune article, "The Seven Stages of Public Opinion," he discusses how policy makers can do a better job in building public support. He is also the author of the lead article in Foreign Affairs (Fall '92), "Foreign Policy After the Election." Mr. Yankelovich is the founder of Yankelovich, Skelly and White and The Public Agenda Foundation (with Cyrus Vance), and is currently Chairman of the business research firm DYG, Inc. He is a director of various corporations and non-profit organizations, including US West, The Meredith Corporation, the Kettering Foundation, Educational Testing Service, Inc., and Trustee Emeritus of Brown University.

JOHN IMMERWAHR is a Senior Research Fellow at the Public Agenda Foundation; he is also Chair of the Philosophy Department of Villanova University. He is the author of a number of Public Agenda Reports, including The Speaker and the Listener: Public Perspectives on Freedom of Expression, Crosstalk: The Public, the Experts and Competitiveness, Faculty Diagnosis: Public Misconceptions about Health Care Reform, and (with Daniel Yankelovich), Putting Forth the Work Ethic to Work. He has also written numerous other articles on philosophy and on public policy. He received a BA from Princeton University and a Ph.D from the University of Michigan, where he has also served as Visiting Professor of Philosophy. He lives in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania with his wife and children.

Chapter 1

NOTES

¹ This chapter is based on research conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation, with support from the Bohen Foundation.

² Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler, eds., 1992. From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 77.

³ For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see Daniel Yankelovich, 1991. Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.

⁴ Quoted in Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "Structuring the Unseen Environment." J. of Communication 26:2 (Spring 1976), p. 13.

⁵ For more elaboration, see Daniel Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment.

Chron



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 05/20/93

TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT
SANDY BERGER
BERNIE NUSSBAUM
BRUCE LINDSEY

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached memorandum deals with the disposition of the remaining HIV-positive Haitians at Guantanamo.

Bruce strongly disagrees with both options presented. He is of the view that we should do nothing in advance of a court ordering entry, which may occur in the near future. Alternatively, he would favor entry of very limited classes of spouses of previously admitted Haitians or pregnant women and children, but he opposes admitting as broad a group as all those with T-cell counts at 500 and below. This probably merits your meeting with Sandy, Bernie and Bruce to get direction on this.

John Podesta

cc: The Vice President
Sandy Berger
Bernie Nussbaum
Bruce Lindsey

THE WHITE HOUSE

2475

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1993 3:17 P8:10

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Remaining HIV-positive Haitians at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba

You asked us to explore whether there are groups or categories of Guantanamo Haitians who could be brought into the U.S. without fanfare on medical or other distinguishable grounds. You also asked us to consult on how these Haitians would be supervised in the U.S. Following are some ideas:

I. CURRENT SITUATION

There are now 179 Haitians left at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. There are some 157 adults, nearly all of whom are HIV-positive, and about 22 children. The small numbers of HIV-negative Haitians on Guantanamo include spouses and children of those who are HIV-positive.

Lawyers for the Haitians informed them some time ago that a decision was expected on May 15 in the New York Federal District Court case regarding their status. This apparently raised expectations, which were frustrated when the lawyers later informed the Haitians that the decision would not be made on that date.

These mixed signals have apparently heightened the sense of frustration for the Haitians. According to the Guantanamo camp commander (an Air Force colonel), the current mood at the camp is tense. On May 9 or 10, camp residents began another hunger strike. Although pregnant women and children are not part of the strike, all others were refusing to take food at the camp mess as of May 14 (camp officials note that some may be eating food stocked in their huts). The camp commander reports that camp residents have said they will enter "Phase II" of the hunger strike on or about May 17, but have not indicated what that means. The camp commander has told NSC staff that he is quite concerned by this threat.

Over the past month, there have been several threats of suicide (including one threat that a group of 50 would commit suicide). The camp commander also reports two or three suicide "gestures", actions he seems to regard as something short of credible suicide attempts (e.g., one migrant was reportedly found on the ground in

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

a latrine and claimed he had tried to hang himself, but there was no sign of a rope or marks on his body).

II. ENTRY OF HAITIANS FROM GUANTANAMO BAY SINCE JANUARY 20, 1993

Since you assumed office, about 90 of the Haitians at Guantanamo have been permitted entry into the United States to pursue asylum claims. Between January 20 and March 26, the Attorney General permitted entry for Haitians who could not obtain adequate diagnostic treatment or medical care at facilities on Guantanamo, for women in the latter stages of pregnancy, and for those with severely advanced deterioration of their immune system.

On March 26, a New York District Court judge found that a larger class of Haitians was being denied "adequate" medical care on Guantanamo: those with "T-Cell" counts (a measure of the strength of the immune system) below 200 and with T-Cell percentages of 13 percent or below. (According to the Center for Disease Control, such persons are considered to have AIDS.) The judge ordered that the Government provide adequate care. Rather than seek a stay of the Court order, you chose to permit entry for the entire class affected by the order. There has been little reaction from the Congress, the press or the public about the entry of this population.

III. NEXT STEPS IN THE LITIGATION

A final decision and order in the New York Federal District Court case involving the Guantanamo Haitians is pending. A negative court decision could provide you with an opportunity similar to that presented by the interim court order: to permit entry to some or all the Haitians in compliance with an order, while keeping open the Government's option to appeal the legal issues in the case. However, it is unclear when the District Court will rule.

IV. PERMITTING ENTRY FOR ONE OR MORE ADDITIONAL GROUPS OF HAITIANS FROM GUANTANAMO

You have asked for information on additional groups of Haitians who might be admitted for medically-related reasons. We have identified a number of categories that relate to medical and other humanitarian considerations. (Note that some of the Haitians will be members of more than one of these groups.)

A. HIV-positive Haitians with T-Cell counts below 500

The judge's interim order resulted in entry for all Haitians with T-Cell counts of 200 or below, as well as for those with T-Cell percentages of 13 percent or below. As a matter of policy, we could expand the category of Haitians permitted entry to those with T-Cell counts of 500 or below (or the equivalent T-Cell percentages). At this level, the immune system already has deteriorated significantly and most AIDS' researchers maintain that active anti-HIV treatment should be sought. (Note that such treatment is available on Guantanamo.)

At last report, there were 57 Haitians on Guantanamo who would be included in this category.

The Government litigators point out that if we provide entry based explicitly upon this or other medical factors, it could be construed as an admission that we cannot provide adequate care at Guantanamo for the group in question (in this case, those with T-Cell counts below 500). The litigators note that this could conceivably affect the government's arguments in the current case and in future litigation. On balance, however, they seem to feel that the litigation risk is manageable, especially if granting entry is portrayed as a humanitarian policy decision, and not as one taken as a matter of law.

B. Children of HIV-positive Haitians

There are now about 22 children on Guantanamo. The children have not been tested for HIV, but some probably have the virus. General policy has been to avoid family separation and thus to keep the children on Guantanamo if their parents are HIV-positive. Permitting entry for this entire group of children with their parents or guardians (who number about 15) would result in entry of about 37 Haitians.

C. Spouses of Haitians who have already entered the United States

There are at Guantanamo about 12 HIV-positive spouses of Haitians who have been permitted entry into the U.S. Some of the latter have entered to receive medical care. Others are HIV-negative and made the difficult decision to separate from their spouses and come to the U.S.

D. Other medical/humanitarian categories

Two small categories include HIV-positive pregnant women in the early stages of pregnancy (about 4) and unaccompanied minors (about 2).

Any or all of these groups could be permitted entry pursuant to the Attorney General's parole authority, without formal announcement. Obviously, the fact of further paroles could become public and critics could claim the categories chosen were arbitrary.

V. DISPOSITION OF HAITIANS PERMITTED ENTRY

A resettlement task force made up of the Justice Department's Community Relations Service (CRS), the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Health and Human Services and other agencies has organized the process of resettling most of those who have been granted entry thus far. The task force has worked with voluntary resettlement agencies (including the U.S. Catholic Conference) and AIDS and Haitian-American support groups. These organizations take responsibility

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

for settling Haitians (often with family members), and providing access to counselling and financial and medical assistance.

The voluntary agencies and support groups have been requested to provide assistance for one year. During the first three months after entry, CRS asks that voluntary agencies and support groups have intensive contact with the entrants (nearly every day, according to a CRS representative), and the voluntary groups report to CRS on a continual basis throughout the year.

If a decision were made to permit entry of some or all of the remaining Haitians, we could increase contact and communication between the voluntary organizations and the Haitians. CRS maintains that the current resettlement program includes "safe-sex" counselling, but we could review such counselling to ensure that it is systematic and comprehensive.

Special "Fascell-Stone" (Cuban-Haitian Entrant) legislation provides benefits to Haitians paroled into the United States for the purpose of seeking asylum. This includes costs of initial resettlement, as well as SSI and Medicaid benefits. Though states participate in funding these programs, the effect of Fascell-Stone is to make the federal share of benefits larger than for other similarly situated entrants.

According to HHS estimates, the cost to states of the extraordinary medical care required by those who are now at Guantanamo would probably be about \$5 million over the lifetime of this population, assuming that all the Haitians were to fully access Medicaid and other public benefits. This is roughly equivalent to the cost of operating the camp at Guantanamo for 12-18 months. As you know, the Immigration and Nationality Act provides for an Immigration Emergency Fund that contains \$31.4 million and has never been accessed. This fund could be used to reimburse states if large numbers of Haitians were admitted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you authorize the Attorney General to exercise her parole authority to allow entry for a small group of Haitians -- e.g. those with T-Cell counts of 500 or below -- as determined by the Attorney General.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

2. That you authorize us to develop a plan (political, economic, humanitarian) for entry of all the remaining Haitians from Guantanamo.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Act
Fyl - B.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE P. BAKER FOUNDATION

MICHAEL E. PORTER
C. Roland Christensen Professor
of Business Administration

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02163
TELEPHONE: (617) 495-6309
TELEX: 6817219 HARBUS SCH. BSN.
FACSIMILE: (617) 547-8541

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM

TO: President-Elect Bill Clinton
Vice President Elect Al Gore

FROM: Michael E. Porter

DATE: January 14, 1993

The following are some further thoughts on my memos of January 6 and 11 on deficit reduction strategy.

1. The energy tax is an idea whose time has come. A \$20 billion tax is likely to have minimal effect on growth and employment. The United States will still have very low energy prices, and the impact on consumers will be modest. Low income individuals can receive tax credits.

Not only is this among the least objectionable, broadly based taxes, but it also has compelling benefits in terms of encouraging energy efficiency, reducing pollution, lowering imports, etc. The Japanese case provides a vivid example of the economic benefits of greater energy efficiency. ★

2. The effect of a deficit reduction plan instituted this year on calendar 1996 employment is most dependent on three things:

- 1) The effect of the plan on consumer business confidence. Consumer spending, especially, has been holding back recovery.
- 2) The direct incentives for private sector investment provided in the plan.
- 3) The indirect effect of a lower deficit on private investment via lower interest rates.

In my judgment, the effect of federal spending itself will be outweighed by these factors, provided that the budget plan is credible and makes genuine progress toward meeting the tests of my January 11 memo. The upside leverage of 1) and 2) are far greater than the drag of a drop in federal spending. Less certain is 3), which cannot be judged independently of the nature of the plan. If economic growth keeps up, moreover, interest rates may well face upward pressure.

A lesson here is that taking the heat and dealing with entitlements, cutting tax breaks, and shifting spending toward investment is the only way to address the administration's dilemma. The deficit

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE

MARKING INITIALS: MB DATE: 5/8/8

~~Confidential~~ Memorandum

Page 2

January 14, 1993

number is not as much the issue as convincing the American people that finally there is a plan that is honest and sensible. Fudging is no longer possible, given the reality of today's budget numbers. If the plan spares no group, it will appeal most to the nation.

3. Besides a credible plan, as outlined above and in my January 11 memo, the best way to increase the probability of a lower unemployment rate in calendar year 1996 is by reallocating outlays and tax expenditures toward incentives for private sector investment. Hiring will be driven by confidence that sustained demand growth has resumed and by investments in new products and new companies.

4. Genuine investments are those federal outlays and tax expenditures that encourage private sector investment, underpin future economic growth, or produce future (as opposed to current) social benefits. The most attractive investments have multiplier effects, which means that their ultimate impact is greater than the dollar outlays because they call forth much greater private sector investment, create new technologies, or provide other effects with broader benefits.

The following spectrum provides examples of investments according to their degree of leverage and qualification as genuine investments:

Most

Leveraged

Construction of high speed rail systems

Finance energy conservation efforts of federal buildings

Fully fund the Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991

Clear Investments

Increase funding to meet Safe Drinking Water Act requirements

Construction of additional sewage and wastewater treatment plants

Not Very Leveraged

Fund the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery program, more generally restore degraded coastal and wetland ecosystems

Not Investments

Charge market prices for mineral rights on public lands

Reduce below cost timber sales

Phase out export subsidies

Reform federal flood insurance program

Rationale

Potentially stimulates new technology, private sector investment,

Produces lasting benefits and reduces energy usage, with its negative externalities.

Produces lasting benefits; cost effective; may stimulate new technology

Leveraged if health effects are significant and the program reduces health care costs.

Lasting benefits, though minimal multiplier effects.

Lasting benefits, but little, if any, economic or budgetary multipliers

Subsidies, which benefit special interests and work against innovation (such as low gas prices); no lasting benefits.

Same rationale as above.

Same rationale as above.

5-12-93

BRUCE C. RATNER

(Letter handed to you while in New York)

He introduced you at the DNC dinner in New York.

Raises concern regarding the Haitians at Guantanamo, Cuba. Believes problem can be solved with no political risk. He has discussed his concerns with David Wilhelm, Kent Marcus and Alexis Herman. DNC arrangement meeting with Dept. of State.

Suggest using the Attorney Generals Parole power to reduce population. also, government agree not to appeal court order that may close the camp. Attorney and doctors given access to clients at the camp.

Grace Lindsey

fyi

Tom Holister

F.A. COARD, M.D.
6222 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
SUITE NO. 501
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90048

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5/20

Tony ban
Need to discuss
R.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 720

F.A. COARD, M.D.
6222 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
SUITE NO 501
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90048
TELEPHONE (213) 937-4467

May 18, 1993

Dear President Clinton:

I immigrated to the United States from a small, third world country many years ago, as did all my siblings except one. I am now a physician practicing in Los Angeles, California. My brother, Robert M. Coard, has been Director of a large social service agency in Boston, Massachusetts, for the past 26 years. Another brother is a computer analyst in Boston. Yet another brother, living in New Jersey, holds a Ph.D. in chemistry from UC Berkeley. Our only sister is an attorney at law in Cambridge, Massachusetts. We were all born on the tiny island of Grenada, West Indies (pop. 95,000). We are now all U.S. citizens and very, very proud of it. I received an honorable discharge from the U.S. Army in 1953 after returning from a tour of duty in Korea.

Our youngest brother, Bernard Coard, who remained in Grenada, is an economist with degrees from Brandeis University and the University of Sussex in England. He was the Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in a revolutionary government which was overthrown by force in the U.S. invasion of 1983. All the surviving political leaders, including my brother and his wife, who was a cabinet member for Women's Affairs, were seized by U.S. forces, then turned over to the American-installed government.

The U.S. then paid all the expenses of the rather bizarre "trial" which followed (members of the jury joined a hostile crowd in chants of "Murderers! Hang them!" BEFORE the trial began). There were no defense lawyers. They are still being kept in prison today, nearly 10 years later, by the Grenada government, which has since been democratically elected. We fervently believe, and the evidence, including several recently obtained affidavits, is overwhelming that they are innocent. The youngest of my brother's 3 children was 4 years old when his parents were both taken from him.

These 16 men and 1 woman are among the brightest that their tiny country has produced. It is a bitter irony indeed that these victims of the Cold War continue to suffer the terrible burden of imprisonment long after the Cold War itself has ended. The time has clearly come for Grenada to move beyond the bitter divisions and hatreds of the last several years. But social, political and economic stability and progress will not come to Grenada, or to the adjacent Caribbean region, as long as these 17 political prisoners remain behind bars.

They are certainly no threat to the Grenada government. They have no desire to engage again in any political activity whatsoever. They want merely to return to their families and to pick up the broken pieces of their lives as best they can. We Americans, whatever our faults, have a reputation for believing in fair play, for helping the underdog, for compassion, for generosity, even to those we have defeated. I am appealing to you, Mr. President, to use the considerable influence which our government has with the government of Grenada to secure the release, in the very near future, of our brother and his wife, as well as their colleagues.

I will be deeply grateful for any help you can afford me in a matter which is very close to my heart. Rest assured, Mr. President, that I will continue to be an ardent supporter of your administration in the years ahead.

Respectfully,

Floyd A. Coard

JULY 28, 91

Boston Sunday Globe

Founded 1872

WILLIAM O. TAYLOR, *Chairman of the Board and Publisher*
 JOHN P. GIUGGIO, *Vice Chairman* JOHN S. DRISCOLL, *Editor*
 RICHARD C. OCKERBLOOM, *President* KIRK SCHARFENBERG, *Editor, Editorial Page*
 DAVID STANGER, *Executive VP & General Manager*
 BENJAMIN B. TAYLOR, *Vice President* ARTHUR KINGSBURY, *Vice President*
 STEPHEN E. TAYLOR, *Vice President*
 GODFREY W. KAUFFMANN JR., *VP Circulation*
 OLIVER H.P. RODMAN JR., *VP Advertising*
 FRANK E. GRUNDSTROM JR., *VP Human Resources*
 GREGORY L. THORNTON, *VP Employee Relations*
 WILLIAM B. HUFF, *Treasurer*
 HELEN W. DONOVAN, *Managing Editor*
 THOMAS F. MULVOY JR., *Managing Editor / News Operations*
 ALFRED S. LARKIN JR., *Managing Editor / Administration*
 GREGORY L. MOORE, *Deputy Managing Editor / Daily*
 THOMAS E. ASHBROOK, *Deputy Managing Editor / Sunday*
 H.D.S. GREENWAY, *Senior Associate Editor*

LORETTA McLAUGHLIN, *Associate Editor, Editorial Page*

<i>Publishers</i>		
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, 1873-1922	WILLIAM O. TAYLOR, 1922-1955	WM. DAVIS TAYLOR, 1955-1977
<i>President</i>	<i>Editor</i>	<i>Editor</i>
JOHN I. TAYLOR, 1963-1975	L.L. WINSHIP, 1955-1965	THOMAS WINSHIP, 1965-1984

Abetting a perversion of justice

The news item from the Caribbean evoked the most gratuitous military venture of the Reagan years. A temporary Court of Appeal on the island of Grenada upheld convictions of 17 persons tried for the murder of the island's revolutionary leader, Maurice Bishop, and others. The bare facts told nothing about a travesty of justice, nor about US responsibility for a judicial proceeding that would never be tolerated by Americans for Americans.

The 14 defendants who were sentenced to death and the three sentenced to long prison terms were denied the basic rights of due process and fair proceedings.

They were not represented by defense counsel. They were not apprised of most of the evidence against them, and they were not able to cross-examine witnesses and present their own evidence. Neither they nor their representatives took part in selecting the jurors. The jurors were selected from a panel chosen by a member of the prosecution team. Before the trial, members of that jury panel

had reviled the defendants in the courtroom, shouting "Murderers!" and "Criminals!"

The appeals process was equally unfair. Three lawyers were appointed as appellate judges specifically for this case by the same authorities who had prosecuted the original trial.

Because the Grenadian constitution replaced by Bishop's revolution permitted an ultimate appeal to the Queen's Privy Council (the British Commonwealth's equivalent of the Supreme Court), the authorities delayed their return to the old constitution. And when they did renew the pre-revolutionary constitution, they stipulated that it could not apply to the defendants and their right of appeal to the Privy Council.

This perversion of justice was financed by the US government, prepared by psychological-warfare operations of the US Army, and pursued under Washington's political guidance. At a moment when communist regimes are finally being replaced by the rule of law, America ought not to be promoting kangaroo courts on Grenada.

5/19/87

The Daily News - May 19, 1987 *U.S. Virgin Islands* Grenada's appalling charade

Last Dec. 4, a Grenadian jury brought in a guilty verdict against 14 fellow Grenadians charged with the murders of Maurice Bishop, two other Grenadian cabinet ministers and others who were at Fort Rupert in St. George's, Grenada, on Oct. 19, 1983.

The 14 included Bernard Coard, his wife Phyllis, General Hudson Austin, and three Grenadian military officers, Leon Cornwall, Ewart Layne and Liam James. Coard and his wife had been members of the Central Committee of Bishop's Marxist-oriented New Jewel Movement.

The murder verdict automatically means the 14 are sentenced to hang.

Three soldiers were convicted of manslaughter, which means 30-to-45 years in prison, and one Bible-toting soldier was acquitted. Early in the eight-month trial, one soldier was freed and one turned state's (crown's) evidence.

Coard was the leading defendant, having been Prime Minister Bishop's finance minister and chief planner from the time of Bishop's March 1979 coup — which overturned the corrupt government of Eric Gairy — until Bishop's murder and the U.S. invasion of Grenada six days later.

It is now nearly four years since the U.S. invasion, then so heartily applauded — even by many among the 95,000 or so Grenadians who populate a southeastern Caribbean island whose land area is the same as that of the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Grenada's unemployment rate runs around 30 percent of the work force; very little of the new industry the Reagan administration pledged has been delivered; per capita income is still around the 1977 mark, \$500 a year.

But the worst thing that's happened in Grenada since October



William Steif

1983, is the so-called murder trial of Coard and his associates. I have read the 107-page, single-spaced statement that Coard was allowed to make at the trial's end and I have read former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark's 14-page summation of this "kangaroo court" and I, as an American citizen, am appalled.

Every American citizen living in the West Indies should be similarly appalled. Is this the U.S. idea of justice? Or is it, as I am becoming convinced, a U.S. government cover-up, using Uncle Toms, to do away with 14 inconvenient people? Let us examine a few items:

■ The trial court was convened under the doctrine of "temporary necessity," and otherwise would have been unconstitutional under Grenada's 1974 constitution. The temporary judge, Dennis Byron of St. Kitts, was on a three-month contract renewed over and over again. Because of the "necessity" doctrine, there may be no right of appeal to Britain's Privy Council.

■ One of the prosecution team was selected to choose prospective jurors, who were picked in the absence of defendants or defendants' lawyers.

■ Because of the judge's arbitrary acts, the defendants asked their lawyers to withdraw from the case to demand a fair trial from an appellate court.

■ The only defense lawyer remaining was Ian Ramsay of

Jamaica, retained by Phyllis Coard's family in Jamaica. He received death threats, was cited for contempt and harassed constantly.

■ The defendants were held in a bus outside the courtroom through all the prosecution testimony, and during the trial's early days were beaten severely in prison, had their heads shaved and were denied the right to confer. All notes, writing paper and pencils were seized and families were denied access. Some defendants were put in solitary confinement; Coard was kept in an unlighted cell most of the trial and got only bread and water for weeks.

■ Forced confessions were illegally admitted into evidence.

■ The prosecution, which claimed the Central Committee ordered Bishop's death, never put the Central Committee members near the murder scene nor produced any evidence of murder orders.

■ No one was permitted to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.

■ Many documents the defendants needed, such as Central Committee minutes or minutes of the New Jewel Movement's general meetings, are in U.S. government repositories, unavailable to anyone, apparently.

Coard's basic argument is that, contrary to what the U.S. media reported at the time, Bishop remained the leader of Grenada's revolutionary government during that government's September-October 1983 "crisis."

He says the crisis was the result of weariness, of trying to do too much with too few leaders, aggravated by growing psychological and military pressure from the United States, specifically the CIA.

He says the governments of Barbados, specifically the late Tom Adams, and of Jamaica, specially Edward Seaga, played along for their own purposes. He says all of Grenada's leaders, with the exception of those suborned by the CIA, specifically George Louison and Cletus St. Paul, agreed Bishop was the heart and soul of the island-nation's new Marxist government and wanted him to lead on.

Last Dec. 12, the defendants filed a notice of appeal, which means the thousands of pages of court record have to be produced. This hasn't yet been done but when it is, the defense has up to six weeks to examine the record and an appeal date, probably in mid-summer, will be set.

Meantime, the conditions in prison for the 14 have worsened: In mid-February Coard was badly beaten, food for all has been cut in half, underwear taken and all forced to wear scratchy jail denims.

All are locked in their cells 24 hours a day — no exercise. The idea is to break them. Ramsey Clark says:

"The power that is forcing this incredible assault on justice is the Reagan administration . . . to validate its criminal invasion."

I don't share Coard's Marxist outlook, but I hate this judicial charade.

William Steif, a veteran journalist and foreign correspondent, writes a weekly column for The Daily News.

I've been told that this writer, now retired and living in the U.S. Virgin Islands, is a former reporter for several very prestigious U.S. periodicals.

W. Coard

AIR EXPRESS DELIVERY FORM

800 3405 006

No. 000918

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE INFORMATION.

PACKAGES WILL BE RETURNED IF INFORMATION IS NOT COMPLETE.

AIR EXPRESS **WILL NOT** DELIVER TO P.O. BOXES.

SENDER INFORMATION

Date: 5-19 93	Name: John Podesta		
Agency: White House	Room: Gr Fl-ww	Extension: 2702	
Signature: Sharon E Wagner			

DELIVERY INFORMATION

Addressee: Mr. Walter Shorenstein	Phone:	
Organization: The Shorenstein Co.	Bill Recipient Account No.:	
Street Address: 200 Park Ave.		
City: New York	State: NY	Zip: 10166

TYPE OF SERVICE (Select One)

☐ Next Business Day Delivery☐ Saturday Delivery (Extra Cost)

SENDER COPY

S. A. LUDSIN & Co.
INVESTMENT ADVISER
555 MADISON AVENUE
31ST FLOOR
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

212-319-9010
212-319-9011
FAX 212-319-3264

May 17, 1993

William J. Clinton
President of the U
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania
Washington, D.C. :

Re:

Betty Currie
for the B.C. memo?
ask N.H. if he knows
him well.
John Rockefeller

Dear President Cl.

I thoroughly enjoyed participating in the events during your visit to New York last Wednesday May 12, 1993. Your Presidential Address was inspirational, particularly the end of your speech when you spoke about the power of faith.

I am doing my part to further the cause of small business. I appreciated your letter of May 5, 1993 which I have enclosed for your reference. Needless to say the autographed photo is displayed proudly in my apartment, office and home in East Hampton.

I have contacted Roger C. Altman to discuss my marketing ideas for the RTC and I have tried to keep other Administration economic policy makers informed.

The enclosed letter from Steve Haweeli is an example of the enthusiasm and optimism your presidency has already created. Steve is a public relations entrepreneur who also tends bar at a popular restaurant in East Hampton, New York called Nick & Toni's. Stan Shuman would be happy to bring you there in the event that you can break away and visit the East End of Long Island. I live down the road a piece and would be eager to join you. You can be assured the service will be Presidential.

Sincerely,

Steven A. Ludsin

John
Podesta

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1993

Mr. Jim Rogers
Inside Washington Publishers
P.O. Box 7167
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

RE: FOIA Request

Dear Mr. Rogers:

Bernard W. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, asked me to reply to your January 28, 1993 letter to John Podesta requesting documents on the transition that were developed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Your letter arrived in my office on May 20, 1993.

I apologize for the time it has taken for your letter to arrive in Counsel's Office where we can provide you with an answer, even though it is not the complete answer you want.


Unfortunately for your request, FOIA does not apply to the documents you have requested. The requirements of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act do not apply to the Office of the President, his assistants or offices whose sole function is to aid or assist the President. In general, the purpose of this exemption is to encourage the free exchange of ideas during the process of Presidential deliberation and policymaking. Consequently, neither FOIA nor the Privacy Act establishes a statutory right to the documents, if such documents in fact exist, that you have requested from the Office of the President.

For further information on the Presidential exemption, refer to the following sources: Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971); H.R. Conf.Rep.No.9393-1380, p. 15 (1974); and Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980). An array of other court rulings has supported the exemption over the last two decades, but Soucie provides the reasoning accepted by both the courts and the Congress in upholding the exemption.

Bernie —
This is pretty outrageous.
I sent you, ~~me~~ i.e. Counsel's office,
this issue on February 6. Sobol's reply implies I
sat on this for 4 months. That's B.S. John U.S. FRANK SOBOL

I will suggest another possibility for your search. One other technical aspect of FOIA is that, under certain circumstances, documents prepared by one agency for another entity or agency may become "FOIA-able" documents of the preparing agency. Thus, if the documents you are seeking became part of the system of records of the agencies that prepared them, then they may be available to you through a FOIA request to the FCC and the NTIA.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Francis Thomas Sobol".

Francis Thomas Sobol
Special Counsel to the President
Office of the Counsel to the President

cc: B. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 6, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR BERNARD NUSSBAUM

FROM:

JOHN PODESTA 

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FROM INSIDE WASHINGTON PUBLISHERS

Attached is a Freedom of Information Act request addressed to me from Jim Rogers, Associate Editor of Inside Washington Publishers. I think you should handle this request. It appears that he should have directed the request to the Federal Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration rather than to the White House Office. You may want to include that in your response to Mr. Rogers.

You should be aware that in my past life I was a leading public interest advocate of public access and a strong FOIA, and therefore, a lot of individual requests, as well as attempts to influence access policy, are likely to find their way to me.

Inside Washington Publishers

PO Box 7167, Ben Franklin Station • Washington, DC 20044 • 703-892-8500
Toll-free: 800-424-9068 • Facsimile: 703-685-2606

PS: 58
January 28, 1993

The White House
ATTN: John Podesta, Staff Secretary
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear sir:


I am a reporter for a publication based in Arlington, VA, called Washington Telecom Week. I am requesting, under the Freedom of Information Act, a copy of the transition papers prepared by (1) the Federal Communications Commission, as well as (2) a copy of the transition papers prepared by the National Telecommunications & Information Administration. These documents, I am told, were turned over to representatives of the Clinton Administration sometime in December.

I understand there may be costs associated with this request. You are authorized to bill me for fees up to \$25. If costs should go above that, please contact me at (703) 892-8509. My facsimile number is (703) 685-2606. Following is my address:

Jim Rogers
Associate Editor
Washington Telecom Week
1225 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1400
Arlington, VA 22202

Thank you for your assistance in responding to this request.

Very sincerely,



Jim Rogers
Associate Editor

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5/20

NOTE FOR:

*Lawrence Tyson, Bob Rubin, Marcia
Harris*

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☐

Action ☐



Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc: *The Vice President*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

I've copied the Vice
President, Mack and Bob
Rubin.


John Podesta

Handwritten note:
Unrelated to
Meeting with Bob Rubin
R



THE CHAIRMAN

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

93 MAY 19 P5:52

May 19, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LAURA TYSON AND ALAN BLINDER
_{LT} _{AB}

SUBJECT: The Economy

There is reason for concern (but certainly not for panic) over the state of the economy.

- * The surprisingly large merchandise trade deficit announced Wednesday morning means that the 1.8% growth rate for 1993:1 will very likely be revised down when the Commerce Department publishes its first revision next Friday morning. (We will have those data next Thursday night.)
- * Furthermore, the large inventory buildup in 1993:1 does not bode well for GDP growth in 1993:2. Even if final sales grow in the 4% range, GDP may come in in the 2% range because the rate of inventory accumulation will almost certainly decrease. Thus, growth in the first two quarters of 1993 may well average below 2%.
- * Such news will further erode confidence, which is already slipping away. While we do expect the second half of 1993 to be better than the first, our official forecast of 3.1% growth for the year as a whole is starting to look rather optimistic. As you will recall that forecast was based on the assumption that our stimulus was passed. Without it, our forecast was for growth in the 2.8% range.
- * Our stimulus package is gone, and it now appears quite unlikely that the starting date of the tax increases will be delayed to January 1994. (As you will recall, the CEA always strongly favored such a delay.) This means that fiscal policy is contractionary right now and will become strongly contractionary in 1994.
- * So the burden of carrying the economy forward rests squarely on interest rates, that is, on the bond market and the Federal Reserve.
- * Here the recent bad (and puzzling) inflation news complicates matters in a most unfortunate way.

- The adverse inflation reports have spooked the bond market. Long term rates have jumped about 25 basis points in the last week or so. We think (and certainly hope) that the recent data are aberrant, and that the market will snap back on better inflation news in the next month or two. But no one can be sure.
- The high inflation numbers are putting pressure on the Fed to tighten. While the Fed always has a strong "tight money" constituency, it has been held at bay up to now by the pro-growth constituency. However, if inflation stays on the north side of 4%, it will be very hard for the Fed to hold short-term interest rates at 3%. Already, they are hearing a chorus of complaints from Wall Streeters about holding short-term interest rate below the inflation rate.

* In sum, there is at least a possibility that the economy will go into the second half of 1993 and first half of 1994 carrying little forward momentum, while both fiscal policy and monetary policy tighten. That would not be a good mix.

Chen

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 05/19/93

TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT
MACK MCLARTY
BOB RUBIN

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

I've copied the Vice
President, Mack and Bob
Rubin.

John Podesta



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

THE CHAIRMAN

93 MAY 19 P5:52

May 19, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LAURA TYSON AND ALAN BLINDER
SUBJECT: The Economy

There is reason for concern (but certainly not for panic) over the state of the economy.

- * The surprisingly large merchandise trade deficit announced Wednesday morning means that the 1.8% growth rate for 1993:1 will very likely be revised down when the Commerce Department publishes its first revision next Friday morning. (We will have those data next Thursday night.)
- * Furthermore, the large inventory buildup in 1993:1 does not bode well for GDP growth in 1993:2. Even if final sales grow in the 4% range, GDP may come in in the 2% range because the rate of inventory accumulation will almost certainly decrease. Thus, growth in the first two quarters of 1993 may well average below 2%.
- * Such news will further erode confidence, which is already slipping away. While we do expect the second half of 1993 to be better than the first, our official forecast of 3.1% growth for the year as a whole is starting to look rather optimistic. As you will recall that forecast was based on the assumption that our stimulus was passed. Without it, our forecast was for growth in the 2.8% range.
- * Our stimulus package is gone, and it now appears quite unlikely that the starting date of the tax increases will be delayed to January 1994. (As you will recall, the CEA always strongly favored such a delay.) This means that fiscal policy is contractionary right now and will become strongly contractionary in 1994.
- * So the burden of carrying the economy forward rests squarely on interest rates, that is, on the bond market and the Federal Reserve.
- * Here the recent bad (and puzzling) inflation news complicates matters in a most unfortunate way.

- The adverse inflation reports have spooked the bond market. Long term rates have jumped about 25 basis points in the last week or so. We think (and certainly hope) that the recent data are aberrant, and that the market will snap back on better inflation news in the next month or two. But no one can be sure.
- The high inflation numbers are putting pressure on the Fed to tighten. While the Fed always has a strong "tight money" constituency, it has been held at bay up to now by the pro-growth constituency. However, if inflation stays on the north side of 4%, it will be very hard for the Fed to hold short-term interest rates at 3%. Already, they are hearing a chorus of complaints from Wall Streeters about holding short-term interest rate below the inflation rate.
- * In sum, there is at least a possibility that the economy will go into the second half of 1993 and first half of 1994 carrying little forward momentum, while both fiscal policy and monetary policy tighten. That would not be a good mix.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 05/19/93

NOTE FOR: BRUCE LINDSEY

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you
for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐

Thank you.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:

Bl snows su
Verley's letter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


May 21, 1993

Mr. William Fletcher
School of Law (Boalt Hall)
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720-2499

Dear Willy:

Thanks so much for your letter. It was great to see you, too. Thank you for letting me in on the secret; it's good to know what really happened. I am glad your meeting with Bernie went well. Please stay in touch.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill", written in dark ink.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO



SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

SCHOOL OF LAW (BOALT HALL)
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720-2499
FAX NO. (510) 643-6171
TELEPHONE (510) 642-4050

Monday, April 26, 1993

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

It was wonderful to see you on Friday. It had been quite a week for you, and you were very generous to make time. Linda was delighted I saw you, and sends her very best wishes.

At Justice Brennan's birthday and clerks' reunion Saturday night, I read the letter I mentioned when I saw you at the movies Friday. The Justice was enormously touched. He refused to let the letter out of his hands at the end of dinner.

You should be in on a white lie. The Justice's wife, Mary, asked, "Did the President really sign this?" I said you had. She asked, "Where was he when he signed it?" Mary was the Justice's secretary when I worked for him, and she is nothing if not direct. Just so you know: You were right outside the movie theater, and signed it on the table with the sodas. That's your story, so stick with it. I've heard that line somewhere. If you ever meet Mary, there is a 50 percent chance she will ask you.

I attach a copy of the letter. I hope you like it.

X I saw Bernie Nussbaum (as well as Walter Dellinger and Ron Klain), and the question of the Ninth Circuit came up. The only position now open on the Circuit comes as a result of Judge Alarcon's taking senior status in Los Angeles. I feel quite strongly that you should give that position to a Southern Californian who brings diversity.

X When a position comes open in San Francisco, I would be very flattered to be considered. But that time is not now. You do not need to replace a Latino from Los Angeles with a Caucasian FOB from San Francisco.

Marsha seems to be doing a great job in Carmichael.
Don't worry about the past couple of weeks. There are
some good ones coming up. All my best.
Will

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1993

The Honorable William J. Brennan, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543

Dear Justice Brennan:

Greetings to you and to your family and friends gathered with you to celebrate your 87th birthday. I am grateful for the occasion to join with your clerks in wishing you well and in honoring your matchless contribution to our constitutional jurisprudence.

At the core of your decisions are a profound faith in our democratic system and an equally profound conviction that individuals are to be honored and protected in their beliefs and private decisions. I remember reading, when I was in law school, your great opinions in Baker v. Carr and New York Times v. Sullivan and teaching these cases with pride during my short career as a law professor. These decisions are among the most magnificent achievements of our Constitution.

You are an inspiration to all of us. You have never lost your faith in the ability of the law to make our country and our lives better, and you have never lost your faith in the power of reasoned exposition to bring our great Constitution to life.

You are one of the great Justices of our time -- or any time. Although I never had the privilege of clerking for you, at least I have the privilege of saying what I am sure your law clerks, indeed the entire country, would say:

Happy birthday to a truly great American, and a truly great Justice.

With all good wishes, and the greatest respect,

Bill Clinton

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 05/19/93

TO: BOB RUBIN

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

FYI.



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

WILLIAM H. ORTON
THIRD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
UTAH

May 19, 1993

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

It was an honor to see and visit with you at the Democratic Caucus this morning. After the meeting, you asked me to send you some specific details on my recommendations for lowering taxes on the middle class.

Before election to the House of Representatives in 1990, I spent eleven years with the Internal Revenue Service and ten years as a tax attorney. I will not burden you with all of the complex background, legal analysis, or specific provisions of my proposals unless you request more detail. Below is a basic encapsulation of the concept which I would be happy to expand and explain to you or staff at your convenience.

REDUCE FICA TAX BURDEN:

As you are aware, over the past decade the tax burden that increased most significantly is the FICA tax. Most lower and middle income Americans pay a higher social security tax than income tax. Since this tax is only imposed on "earned income" beginning with the first dollar and capped currently at \$57,600, it is also the most regressive tax imposed by the federal government.

I favor Senator Moynihan's proposal to reduce the FICA tax rate across the board and only raise the amount of tax necessary to pay for the current benefits to recipients. The \$70 Billion annual surplus generated from the FICA tax does not insure the future safety of the trust fund, but rather masks the true size of the current deficit and cruelly imposes an additional burden on lower income working Americans to pay a disproportionate share of our nation's taxes. However, I am a pragmatist and I understand why that is probably not possible in today's political environment since the bottom line result would be to increase the already intolerable annual deficit.

It is possible, however, to reduce the FICA tax burden on lower and middle income Americans and continue to raise the same tax revenue. There is no justifiable policy basis for requiring only "working" Americans to carry the entire economic burden of our Social Security System.

I recommend that all income, both earned and unearned income, be subject to the FICA tax, and that the income cap be removed. As a result, the FICA tax rate could be reduced and continue to generate the same FICA revenue. Although CBO has not yet scored this proposal, our initial projections indicate that the tax rate (currently at 6.2% on employees and 6.2% matching tax on employers) could be reduced down to approximately 4.5% on each. This would result in a tax cut of \$500 to \$600 annually for a worker earning \$30,000, and a similar \$500 to \$600 per employee tax cut for business. Such a tax cut would be more than double the tax increase you have proposed in the BTU tax.

The obvious opponents of such a proposal reside on Wall Street. It will be argued that imposing another tax on investment and savings is the opposite direction from which we should be moving. I tend to agree, but spreading the FICA burden across the entire American public and not just workers has tremendous appeal and would have insignificant economic impact on savings. Also, there are numerous changes in our tax and banking laws which could encourage savings, investment, capital growth, and credit markets which would more than offset any potential impact from realigning the FICA tax burden.

ELIMINATE THE BTU ENERGY TAX:

I will not recite here all of the reasons to eliminate the energy tax, but would be happy to respond if you would like a comprehensive list. The most compelling reason is the promise not to raise taxes on the middle class.

The energy tax raises slightly over \$70 Billion in five years. The tax losses from the Investment Tax Credit, Earned Income Tax Credit, Food Stamp increase, and increase in Low-income Energy Assistance Program equal the amount of new revenue raised by the BTU tax. If the BTU tax were eliminated, the offsetting increases in programs to help lower income persons pay for the tax (EITC, LEAP, and Food Stamps) would be unnecessary. The net loss in revenue without the BTU tax would then be approximately \$40 - \$50 Billion over 5 years, and could be offset with other cuts. I have specific recommendations which Congressmen Penny Stenholm, McCurdy, myself and others have developed. However, our cuts are not acceptable, spread ratably over the jurisdiction of the various committees, each committee would only have to find less than \$500 Million annually to reach this level of cuts. Politically, this would be much easier than the energy tax, which is an ugly puppy very difficult to sell.

As another option, the increase in Earned Income Tax Credit, which is extremely important to you, could be deferred and included as part of comprehensive Welfare Reform. This would be a perfect fit since the EITC is designed to help low-income working people avoid the welfare trap. In addition, the EITC has numerous problems (such as eligibility of non-resident aliens) which should be amended, and would reduce the total cost of the program.

I want you and your program for America to succeed. I believe that the majority of the public will support the majority of your program. However, I believe that we can disarm our opponents by taking affirmative action on key "pocketbook" issues which we can win and are consistent with your economic plan. If you or staff would like me to expand on any of these topics, my office telephone is [D.C. 225-7751; Utah (801)379-2500] and my home telephone is [D.C. 547-7665; Utah (801)226-7866].

Sincerely,



William H. Orton,
Member of Congress