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November 29, 2000

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RANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bruce Reed

CT: What You've Achieved in Domestic Policy

Here are a few key points to emphasize about your achievements in domestic policy over the last eight years:

- 1. Restoring the Vital Center:** Over the past decade, as a candidate and as President, you have set forth a new governing philosophy that has transformed the Democratic party and eclipsed conservatism as the majority American view. The Third Way has brought liberalism into the 21st Century, and shown how government here and abroad can use new means to achieve progressive ends. The enduring value of "opportunity, responsibility, community" is not just that it captures the hearts and minds of a majority of Americans who have no use for the old labels, but that it is the right way – indeed the only way – to solve the problems we face. The only way to turn around a failed welfare system was to reward and demand work at the same time. The only way to make crime rates go down instead of up was to put more police on the street and get guns off the street. The only way to build a new economy was to balance the budget and increase investment at the same time. The only way to raise educational achievement is to invest more and demand more.
- 2. The Basic Bargain: More Opportunity in Return for More Responsibility:** The core of your approach to domestic policy goes back to what you said in your announcement speech in October 1991: "Government has a responsibility to give people more opportunity. People have a responsibility to make the most of it." Everything you've done, from national service and expanding college opportunity to reforming welfare and turning around the inner city, has followed that basic principle. That new synthesis has provided a solid philosophical basis for activist government – to help those willing to help themselves – that may have greater staying power than either the New Deal or the Great Society.
- 3. Restoring America's Confidence in Solving Social Problems:** Eight years ago, many of the problems you inherited – record deficits, rising rates of crime, welfare, and illegitimacy, decaying inner cities – seemed impossible to solve. Experts across the political spectrum considered these problems to be a permanent and growing part of the social landscape. Over the last eight years, your efforts – along with a strong economy and persistent reforms at the state and local level – have restored America's confidence that we can overcome problems that once seemed intractable. As you said, everything

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Re - city + welfare
Chin - pol + priv
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Bruce Reed

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wrong in America really can be fixed by what's right in America. We have put the theory of "Broken Windows" to work in reverse: when a community makes progress on one problem, like crime, it gets easier to solve another problem, like attracting business, which not only helps reduce crime further but helps solve still other problems, like moving people from welfare to work. People come out from behind closed doors, individuals start to believe in themselves, and what's good about a community begins to outweigh any sense of disorder or despair.

4. **Ending Welfare as We Know It:** One part of the Times series will address your efforts on welfare reform, poverty, and race. Jason DeParle, who is writing that piece, seems to agree that you have fundamentally transformed the politics of poverty, by ending the debate over whether the poor should work and starting a new debate about what we should do to help those who work – from raising the EITC and the minimum wage to providing child care and health care. We have more to do, but so far, what may be the boldest social policy experiment of our time – rewarding and requiring work – is a remarkable success. The welfare rolls have been cut more than half, but more important, those still on welfare are five times more likely to be working than when you took office. We have restored work, not welfare, as the organizing principle for every American, which is a prerequisite for bringing all Americans into the economic mainstream.
5. **A Stealth Urban Agenda:** Without fanfare, you have helped transform American cities from decaying dinosaurs into a new source of economic strength. Again, we have a long way to go, especially in education. But by dramatically expanding inner-city access to capital through CDEIs and the CRA, giving cities a fighting chance against crime, rewarding work over welfare, and promoting empowerment zones, brownfields redevelopment, and other reforms to bring the private sector back into the inner city, you have succeeded where LBJ failed, and undone the damage Reagan did. You've even won bipartisan support to develop new markets in remote corners of America forgotten for decades. You did it all without ever talking about "urban policy" – because you were able to show suburban America that on most of these issues, its interests were the same.
6. **A New Approach to Fighting Crime:** Before you took office, the violent crime rate in America had more than quadrupled during the previous three decades. You've overseen the longest decline in crime on record, with violent crime down 25% and the murder rate at a 31-year low. Cities from New York to New Orleans are safe places to live again. You broke the political stalemate in Washington, helped transform policing in America, and made it possible to speak openly of common-sense measures on guns.
7. **Investing More, Demanding More on Education:** The two pillars of your education agenda – increased national investment, and a nationwide movement on standards and accountability – were barely on the radar screen eight years ago. Now they're at the center of both parties' agenda. Five years ago, the Republicans wanted to eliminate the Department of Education. Now education is their nominee's top priority. The standards movement has taken hold in every state. Both parties agree the national government should no longer tolerate failing schools. Charter schools have grown from 1 to 1700, and it is charters – not vouchers – that represent the real future of school choice and

competition. Math, reading, and SAT scores are up. Nearly all schools are connected to the Internet. College going is at an all-time high, helped by the largest investment in college education since the GI Bill. After-school help has grown 500-fold. The national government is two years into an historic effort to reduce class size, and Congress is on the verge of agreeing to an unprecedented national role in school modernization.

8. **Improving Public Health:** We may have lost the health care battle in 1994, but we are slowly winning the war. Thanks largely to CHIP, which now covers 2.5 million children, the number of uninsured Americans declined in 1999 for the first time in 12 years. Medicare would have gone bankrupt by now, but instead is secure for 25 years.
✓ Immunization rates are at an all-time high. A Patients' Bill of Rights is almost inevitable; a Medicare prescription drug benefit is within reach. While congressional Republicans are still too willing to bend to entrenched interests, we are slowly gaining bipartisan support around the country for targeted expansions of health coverage to working families.
9. **Balancing Work and Family:** You enacted a host of policies to help families, from the Family and Medical Leave Act to adoption incentives to the expanded EITC. You also introduced a whole new set of pro-family policies – child care, flextime, paid leave, protecting children from media violence – that represent the next frontier of social policy, as millions of Americans struggle to balance the demands of work and family.
10. **What's Left to Do:** The 2000 campaign highlighted the central challenge for the next decade: to make sure the hard-won surplus is used in a way that continues the prosperity of the last 8 years, addresses our urgent needs in education, health, retirement security, and helping families, and wipes out the national debt. You came into office with one of the most ambitious agendas of any President, achieved most of it, and helped give the country the confidence, the means, and the method to take on the equally ambitious agenda you leave behind.

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November 29, 2000

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: A Foreign Policy for the Global Age

End of Cold War/bipolar world, rise of global information society. Set out in '93 to chart a new course without a ready made roadmap. Challenge was to build a foreign policy for the global age, while restoring domestic vitality that allows us to have a strong foreign policy. Approach can't be summed up in a single slogan. Has rested on several fundamental principles.

1. Alliances with Europe and Asia still cornerstone of security, but needed to be adapted, applied to new challenges.

- Europe in '92: NATO static; Bosnia war raging, threatened US-Europe alliance. Since then: NATO adapted expanded; ended Bosnia war; acted in time in Kosovo; with Serbian democracy, peaceful, democratic undivided Europe within reach.
- Asia: maintained troops; renewed Japan alliance; Korea Agreed Framework, North-South dialogue; Taiwan Straits carriers in '96. US commitment not in doubt. *As For China*

2. Peace and security for U.S. depend on constructive relations with former great power adversaries, Russia and China, and integration of both countries into international system.

- Russia external: troops out of Baltics, into NATO missions; Kosovo end game; START II, nuclear threat reduction
- Russia internal: free elections, ended bread lines; economy in private hands, rise of civil society. Setbacks (Chechnya, free press), but no return to past, chance for better future.
- China: engagement kept peace with Taiwan, Chinese help on Korea, Chinese entry into non-proliferation regimes. WTO deal, PNTR - possibility for profound change.

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3. Local conflicts have global consequences

- In global age, arguments for peacemaking even stronger: to defuse conflicts before they escalate and harm our interests. America's dominant power is likely to be accepted if harnessed to the cause of peace. (Middle East, Balkans, Greece/Turkey, India/Pakistan, Northern Ireland, Peru/Ecuador, Eritrea/Ethiopia)

4. New dangers, accentuated by technological advances and permeability of borders, require new national security priorities.

- Defined a new security agenda that addresses contemporary threats: nonproliferation, terrorism, international crime, infectious disease, climate change.

5. Economic integration advances both our interests and our values, but also accentuates the need to alleviate economic disparity.

- 300 trade agreements (GATT, WTO, NAFTA, PNTR), financial stability (Mexico, Asia)
- Development/poverty: HIPC, education, Africa-Caribbean trade, infectious disease.

Attachment

Samuel R. Berger's Foreign Affairs Article
entitled "A Foreign Policy for the Global Age"

A Foreign Policy for the Global Age

Samuel R. Berger

Is the U.S. in an irreversible decline as the world's premier power?

— *Time*, October 15, 1992

The United States won the war against the "evil empire," but it is losing the battle against the forces of decline.

— *Le Monde*, October 20, 1992, in the first of a 12-part series on America in eclipse

Victory over Saddam Hussein, although incomplete, masked temporarily America's declining economic power and dwindling interest in the rest of the world and postponed moves to fill the vacuum created by America's retrenchment and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

— *U.S. News & World Report*, November 16, 1992

GUIDING LIGHTS

BILL CLINTON was elected president at a moment of both triumph and uncertainty for America in the world. The triumphs of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War will be long remembered. The memory of the uncertainty is already fading.

In 1992, the United States was widely seen as unlikely to sustain its global engagement in the absence of an overriding threat. It was lagging competitively. U.S. alliances were in jeopardy, with their missions undefined and with new threats—from the Balkans to a nuclearizing North Korea—being inadequately addressed. Japan and

SAMUEL R. BERGER is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

western Europe were considered increasingly likely to forge separate identities outside their alliances with America. U.S. foreign policy had barely come to grips with the emerging challenges of a globalized world, from the volatility of markets to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the spread of disease.

For 50 years, America self-assuredly had defined its leadership in terms of what it was against. In the years immediately following the victory over communism, America defined its "post-Cold War" policy in terms of what was ending. The Clinton administration's task was to renew our leadership in terms of what we were building, while restoring the domestic vitality that enabled us to lead in the first place. Historians may debate the choices we made, but there is no disputing their cumulative outcome.

America today is by any measure the world's unchallenged military and economic power, having completed the first peacetime expansion of our global reach since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. The world counts on us to be a catalyst of coalitions, a broker of peace, a guarantor of global financial stability. We are widely seen as the country best placed to benefit from globalization.

Indeed, our success is so apparent to others that one of our biggest challenges now is to manage the resentment it sometimes generates. This we must do with sensitivity and care—but also with perspective. After all, the same countries complaining today that America is a "hyperpower" were contemplating America's decline eight years ago. That, in my mind, is progress.

It did not come by accident. It happened because a president who believed America's strength abroad depends on our strength at home kept his promise to put our economic house in order, giving us the strength to lead and the credibility to lead by example. It happened because a president who shared his Cold War predecessors' internationalist philosophy fought to preserve our leadership in a radically different era, despite resistance to almost every international initiative that involved risk and cost.

With yesterday's road map obsolete, the big question we have faced repeatedly is how to use our renewed strength in a rapidly changing world.

President Clinton understood before most that the most pervasive force in our world is globalization. He also understood that, although

globalization is inexorable, its benefits are not. It can expand access to technology that enriches life—and technology that destroys it. It can equalize economic opportunity—and accentuate economic disparity. It can make dictatorships more vulnerable to the spread of liberating ideas—and democracies more vulnerable to the spread of terrorism, disease, and financial turmoil.

But globalization does have qualities that we can harness to advance our enduring objectives of democracy, shared prosperity, and peace. In this era, more and more nations are striving to join global networks

Although globalization is inexorable, its benefits are not.

of information, commerce, and cooperative security—because their economic well-being and national survival increasingly depend on it. America in many ways is a gatekeeper of those networks, and thus we have influence over the choices nations make. Some of the

world's most positive recent developments have occurred because of how we chose to use that influence, not because globalization preordained them.

For example, if China has begun to dismantle its command economy, despite the risk to its one-party state, it is not just meeting the abstract demands of global markets; it is fulfilling the terms we negotiated for its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). If people from Croatia to Bulgaria to Macedonia are rejecting hard-line nationalists and embracing democracy, it is not because they somehow have reached the end of history. They have reached the conclusion that this is the way to join NATO and the European Union (EU)—an opportunity made possible by our concerted effort to expand NATO and made even more attractive by NATO's victory in Kosovo. If the people of Mexico have built a multiparty system, it is not because democracy is unstoppable in a "dot com" world. It is partly because our joint embrace of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) empowered Mexico's reformers to open their system, and because America's support for Mexico during its financial crisis gave reforms time to prevail.

It is not enough for us simply to open our markets, hook up the world to MTV, and hope that people beat their swords into shares on the NASDAQ. The way for America to exercise its influence today is to build with our democratic partners an international system of strong

alliances and institutions attuned to the challenges of a globalized world. We must ensure that this system is genuinely open to all who adhere to clearly defined standards. And we must be ready to stand up for those standards when they are threatened.

Those are the broad outlines of a foreign policy for the global age. They can't be summed up on a bumper sticker. But they are reflected in the following principles that have guided the Clinton foreign policy and should guide his successor's:

1. *America's alliances with Europe and Asia remain the cornerstone of its national security, but they must be constantly adapted to meet emerging challenges.* That our alliances will endure is something we take for granted today; eight years ago, their survival was very much in doubt. This was true in Asia: Would we maintain a forward military presence there, and would our allies and friends continue to recognize its legitimacy? And it was particularly true in Europe, where NATO was stuck in its Cold War mission and makeup.

The Berlin Wall had fallen, yet NATO still treated the Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier; it seemed we would be allied with Europe's old democracies forever, but with its new democracies never. Central Europe feared becoming a "gray zone" of poverty and instability. Meanwhile, European security and the values NATO defends were threatened by an out-of-control war in the Balkans. Our European allies tried with good intentions to help the victims but found themselves shielding the victimizers. Shamefully, for the first time in 50 years, America claimed we had "no dog" in Europe's fight.

In both Europe and Asia, we broke new ground in 1993 by welcoming our allies' desire to play a more responsible role, whether through a stronger European role in NATO or the creation of the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But in both regions, we decided to maintain our troops and adapt our alliances. We formally updated our strategic alliance with Japan to define how we will respond together to post-Cold War threats. Following a period of recrimination and drift in the early 1990s, that alliance is now stronger than ever. Indeed, the stabilizing effect of our military presence in Asia now is recognized even by North Korea. In Europe, we revitalized NATO from a static Cold War alliance to a magnet for new democracies, with new partners, members, and missions.

Most important, we have backed with action our commitments to both regions. Doubts about America's commitment to Asian stability and security were erased by our decision to send aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and by our solidarity with South Korea in diminishing the North Korean nuclear threat and creating the conditions for eventual North-South dialogue. We proved our commitment to European security by leading NATO in its first military engagement,

Our alliances are more durable now than during the Cold War.

which stopped the killing in Bosnia, and leading an increasingly successful peace-keeping mission there. (Support for moderate and multiethnic parties has at least doubled in every part of Bosnia in the last three years.) Then, in Kosovo, we did what America should have done in Bosnia in 1992: We acted early enough to return the victims of ethnic cleansing to their homes in a way that protected southeastern Europe from wider catastrophe, preserved our relationship with Russia, and proved NATO could stay together during a sustained conflict.

Today, Europe is more peaceful, united, and democratic than at any time in history. Asia remains at peace despite continuing tensions. And our core alliances have been saved from irrelevance. They are arguably more durable now than during the Cold War, because they are clearly organized to advance a lasting set of shared interests, rather than to defeat a single threat.

The future challenge in Europe will be threefold: We must ensure that a strong EU—including a strong European defense policy—complements, not undermines, a strong transatlantic alliance. We must use our military presence to protect European security, which means, for now, maintaining a declining but still necessary force in the Balkans. And we must keep NATO's promise to admit capable new democracies to avoid new divisions and further disintegration in southeastern Europe.

In Asia, the challenges to our alliances are harder to predict. They could come in the form of a crisis in Korea or in the Taiwan Strait that will test our will. Ironically, they could also come in the form of success that will test our wisdom. Even if tensions ease in Asia's hot spots, we must maintain our alliances and military presence because

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A Foreign Policy for the Global Age

their purpose is not just to respond to danger, but to be a balance wheel that prevents danger from arising.

2. *Peace and security for the United States depend on building principled, constructive, clear-eyed relations with our former great-power adversaries.* The question is, Can we do that simply by marking the boundaries of acceptable external conduct for nations such as Russia and China, or must we also seek to influence their internal development?

In fact, we must continue to be wary of threats to peace, whether a Russian move against Georgia or Chinese use of force against Taiwan, because the stability of entire regions and the viability of new democracies depend on it.

But the way these countries manage their challenges at home is just as important as the way they relate to the world. No event in the last half-century has done more to advance our security than Russia's democratic revolution. If both Russia and China become stable, pluralistic, prosperous societies, the world will be safer still. Moreover, the threat we face from our former adversaries lies as much in their internal weakness or retrogression as in their external strength. Russia may be unable to establish the rule of law or to control the flow of technology across its borders. China may fail to fulfill growing popular aspirations for accountability and openness, dooming economic reform and inviting internal upheaval and disintegration.

An effective way to minimize both external and internal dangers is to seize on the desire of both Russia and China to participate in the global economy and global institutions, insisting that they accept the obligations as well as the benefits of integration.

We have brought Russia into the G-8 group of leading industrialized nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC), into a relationship with NATO, and into close engagement with international financial institutions. Russia's interest in deeper integration helped us negotiate the exit of its troops from the Baltics, to bring its troops into NATO missions in the Balkans, and to win its active support for a just end to the war in Kosovo. We pressed successfully for Russian ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), disproving critics who said it could never happen if NATO stood by aspiring allies in central Europe and stuck to its guns in the Balkans. Because we have worked to help destroy and safeguard the old Soviet

nuclear arsenal, the doomsday scenario of loose Russian nukes and scientists selling their services en masse to the highest bidder has not come to pass.

In the meantime, Russia has seen continued poverty, corruption, two cruel wars in Chechnya, and backsliding on protection of a free press. But nationalism and communism have not resurged, as many feared they would in 1993; in fact, Russians have repeatedly voted to keep pressing ahead. The privatization of the Russian economy, though deeply flawed, shattered the Soviet-era bureaucracy's hold on

Resistance to change puts China on the wrong side of history.

daily life. And outside support has bought Russia time, helping it conquer the agonizing bread lines, empty food shelves, and hyperinflation of 1993, and endure the transition from communism. Some Russian leaders may still be tempted to rebuild an all-powerful state, but today they face a country with

65,000 nongovernmental organizations, in which the state controls only 30 percent of the economy—as opposed to 70 percent in 1993. Some may still try to hide hard truths from public view, but their efforts are now exposed by a vigorous, if still vulnerable, media. A generation from now, I doubt anyone will be saying we did too much to support Russia's transformation. They may say we did too little.

With China, our challenge has been to steer between the extremes of uncritical engagement and untenable confrontation. That balance has helped maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, secured China's help in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, and brought China into many global nonproliferation regimes, by which it has largely abided. It has also allowed us to negotiate a deal to bring China into the WTO.

The WTO deal, along with the congressional passage of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR), represents the most constructive breakthrough in U.S.-China relations since normalization in 1979. It will also bind China more closely to a rules-based international system and change the country internally. To enter the WTO, China must speed the demise of the state-run economy through which the Communist Party has wielded much of its power. The activism that produced more than 120,000 labor disputes in China last year will likely rise. And China's leaders will be forced to make hard choices about political reform.



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
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
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
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
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To encourage them to make the right choices, we must keep saying plainly, as President Clinton has done repeatedly, that resistance to change puts China "on the wrong side of history." But we must also continue to integrate China into the global economy. Just as NAFTA membership eroded the economic base of one-party rule in Mexico, WTO membership, accompanied by external validation of the struggle for human rights, can help do the same in China.

3. *Local conflicts can have global consequences.* Like no president before him, Bill Clinton has dedicated the power and passion of his presidency to peacemaking. Like most presidents, he has had to contend with those who say America should do nothing about foreign conflicts unless we are directly threatened—those who say, in effect, "If it's over there, it's not our fight."

We have worked for peace because we believe in defusing conflicts before, not after, they escalate and harm our vital interests. With that in mind, we have advanced a comprehensive peace in the Middle East—with the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement, the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, Wye, and a Camp David process that put fundamental issues on the table for the first time. We ended the Balkan wars of the 1990s, freeing Europe from a potentially permanent refugee crisis and source of conflict. We helped Turkey and Greece move further from confrontation than they have been in years. We helped pull nuclear-armed India and Pakistan from the brink of what might have been a catastrophic war in 1999. We have used diplomacy where possible, force where absolutely necessary, not pretending we can solve all the world's problems, but rejecting the idea that because we can't do everything, we must, for the sake of consistency, do nothing.

We also have worked for peace for reasons unique to our global age. First, regions endlessly mired in conflict are increasingly likely to become breeding grounds for extremism and terror, which spread even if the underlying conflicts do not. This is especially true in regions containing major fault lines of ethnicity, faith, or ideology, such as the Balkans and the Middle East.

Second, as globalization has raised the strategic cost of indifference to local conflict, it has also raised the moral cost. Americans and their leaders increasingly confront both the images of distant atrocities and the dilemma of how to respond. Today we can choose not to act, but

we can no longer choose not to know. I believe that the United States should not send military forces into conflict where America's national interests are not at stake. And the reality is that we have not. (For all the talk about humanitarian intervention, the only instance where America has used force purely for humanitarian reasons was Somalia in 1992.) But when our interests and values are challenged, Americans expect their government to do what it reasonably can. Those who dismiss their idealism lack realism.

Finally, the disproportionate power America enjoys today is more likely to be accepted by other nations if we use it for something more than self-protection. It is fine to say Europeans should lead in the Balkans, Asians in East Timor, and Africans in Africa. But we are the only country capable of projecting power globally and often the only one with the impartial standing to mediate disputes. If we fail to support our friends and allies when they do take the lead, we will find ourselves alone when we need them. Indeed, nations will increasingly coalesce against us.

America's peacemaking has had the opposite effect. When a president goes the extra mile for peace in the Middle East or Ireland or South Asia or the Balkans, or flies, as President Clinton did in August, to join a fractious conference in Africa seeking peace in Burundi, where we have no strategic interests, it demolishes perceptions that an all-powerful America is an arrogant America. It earns us influence that raw power alone cannot purchase, while guarding against resentment that could erode our influence.

4. *New dangers, accentuated by technological advances and the permeability of borders, require new national security priorities.* For 50 years, we faced vertical proliferation: two nations piling their nuclear arsenals higher and higher. Today, we face horizontal proliferation, with arsenals at a lower level, but spread more pervasively. In response, President Clinton has brought sustained focus to nonproliferation—a wise break from the past. Information about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for example, had been available since the late 1980s, but little was achieved until we negotiated the Agreed Framework in 1994, which froze the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in the North and verifiably has held ever since. The United States also took little notice of Iraq's 20-year development of nuclear,



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Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance in the 21st Century

Carol Lancaster

The phenomenon of foreign aid began at the end of World War II and has survived the Cold War. How should the United States now spend its foreign aid to support its interests and values in the new century? In this study, Carol Lancaster takes a fresh look at all US foreign aid programs and asks whether their purposes, organization and management are appropriate to US interests and values in the world of the 21st century.

Lancaster finds that US aid in the new century, if it is to be an effective tool of US foreign policy, needs to be transformed. Its purposes need to be refocused and its organization and management brought into line with those purposes. Those purposes include support for peace-making, addressing transnational issues, providing for humane concerns and responding to humanitarian emergencies. Traditional programs aimed at promoting development, democracy and economic and political transitions in former socialist countries will not disappear but they will have less priority than in the past. These new sets of purposes, promoting both US interests and values abroad, also offer a policy paradigm around which a new political consensus can be created that will support US aid in the 21st century.

Transforming Foreign Aid is also the topic of an article by Lancaster in the September/October issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The book should be of particular interest to professors, students, and researchers of international affairs, foreign policy, political science, and political economy.

August 2000. 100 pages. ISBN: paper 0-88132-291-1. \$15.95.

"Lancaster provides new and thoughtful insights into the historical developments of U.S. foreign aid, and the institutional relationships guiding such aid. The book provides very innovative suggestions and should play a significant role in the ongoing and future debate about U.S. foreign assistance."

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chemical, and biological weapons until after the Gulf War. How many weapons of terror would Saddam have been left to build had he not invaded Kuwait?

Today, nonproliferation is and must be a central goal of U.S. foreign policy. For example, with unrelenting American engagement, China has joined and is complying with the Chemical Weapons Convention (cwc), the Biological Weapons Convention, and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). It has lived up to its 1998 commitment to the United States to provide no new assistance to Iran's nuclear program and has halted assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan, although more remains to be done. Nonproliferation has also been a centerpiece of our engagement with Russia and its neighbors, leading to the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the elimination of hundreds of tons of nuclear materials; tighter controls to prevent smuggling; and an intensified, if still inadequate, effort to halt the transfer of weapons technologies to Iran. We also have worked to strengthen global nonproliferation regimes because clear standards of international conduct help us mobilize global pressure against threatening behavior. Some people apparently believe that America should not join any treaty that others embrace. Fortunately, we overcame that sentiment to ratify the cwc and to renew the NPT. The next president must work with the Senate to do the same with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Reflecting the new security agenda, we have mobilized greater internal and international resources to fight terrorism. This effort helped us bring to justice the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing and the killings outside CIA headquarters, and to work with Jordan to foil planned attacks against millennium celebrations. We crafted the first national strategy to protect America's computer systems and critical infrastructure against sabotage and are working with local emergency and health providers to deal more promptly with biological and chemical weapons threats.

In a generation, we may remember the clarion call to reverse climate change as a critical turning point in U.S. foreign policy. The conviction

Peacemaking destroys perceptions that an all-powerful America is an arrogant America.

that economic growth and environmental protection are compatible has not yet been universally accepted. Fortunately, it has more than a fighting chance, thanks to the insistent voices of President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore. The next president must turn that conviction into a global consensus.

Finally, we have made the fight against deadly infectious diseases a national security priority. Some may think this goal stretches the definition of national security, but a problem that kills huge numbers, crosses borders, and threatens to destabilize whole regions is the very definition of a national security threat. Infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS are now responsible for one-quarter

of all deaths in the world. In some African countries, AIDS has cut life expectancy by more than 30 years; in South Africa it is expected to reduce GDP by 17 percent in 10 years. These countries cannot survive such an onslaught. Without concerted efforts to fight the disease, AIDS could also ravage India, Russia, and China, where the warning signs already

Vast disparities between rich and poor will become more and more of a powder keg.

exist. So we have exponentially increased funding to bridge the global health divide and to stimulate the development of drugs and vaccines needed exclusively in poor countries. President Clinton made this issue a centerpiece of his last G-8 summit, but this challenge will call for even greater resources and attention in the future. To dismiss it as a "soft" issue is to be blind to hard realities.

5. *Economic integration advances both our interests and our values but also accentuates the need to alleviate economic disparities.* As the first president who has understood the global economy, Bill Clinton has led the greatest world trade expansion in history—from \$4 trillion to \$6.6 trillion a year—with the completion of the Uruguay Round, the creation of the WTO, and the approval of NAFTA and PNTR with China. Our decision to keep our markets open during the Asian financial crisis, despite the inevitable result of higher trade deficits, is partly responsible for the recovery of the Asian economy, which again is fueling global growth. On the other hand, the loss of fast-track authority for the president in negotiating trade treaties was one of the most devastating wounds of the last eight years. Although the president

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
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has advanced a partnership with Latin America, he now lacks the full authority to exercise the most vigorous U.S. leadership there. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the next president.

Our general success in opening trade has coincided with growing fears about trade, motivated in part by concerns about labor and environmental standards in the developing world. We have the most basic obligation under the universal principles of human rights not to be complicit in slavery and child labor. But we must also guard against the arrogance of privilege. More than one billion people in the world live on a dollar a day or less. Nothing keeps them poor more than barriers and subsidies in wealthy countries, which cost the developing world more than it gains from aid. That is why President Clinton fought to enact trade bills for the Caribbean and Africa, which will give Africa, for example, more liberal access to our market than Europe and Asia enjoy.

At the same time, those who believe open markets alone can lift poor nations from poverty are deceiving themselves. No nation can compete in the global economy if it is crippled by debt, disease, or inadequate education. And helping impoverished nations overcome these obstacles is more than a moral imperative. In a world that increasingly operates as an integrated economic zone, in which everyone increasingly knows how the other half lives, vast disparities between rich and poor will become more and more of a powder keg.

We have successfully pushed the G-8 nations to reduce the debts of the poorest countries by 70 percent, to start tackling the AIDS crisis, and to invest more in basic education. We have had less success in building a bipartisan consensus in the United States to provide a reasonable share of that help. Unless we recognize that what is pocket change for America can foster a sea change in the rest of the world, humanity will be bitterly and violently divided a generation from now.

COMMON CRITICISMS

THE CLINTON foreign policy has drawn a number of criticisms. Some have been serious and constructive. Others have been more persistent than thoughtful.

The most common and, in my view, mindless critique is that the president has advanced no single foreign policy doctrine or framework—in other words, no successor to containment. I would take this argument more seriously if any one of its proponents actually articulated an all-embracing framework of his or her own. But the simple answer is that even the doctrine of containment was inadequate: It led us well in our dealings with the Soviet empire in Europe, but it led us astray in local struggles elsewhere. What we needed then and need now is not the lift of a driving slogan, but a clear understanding of the changing world and the right strategic objectives, which the president has consistently articulated.


Another cliché is that the Clinton foreign policy has been driven by politics—an assertion that allows critics to avoid substantive arguments. Instead of addressing, for example, what would have happened to NATO had it excluded qualified European democracies because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact, critics simply can reject NATO enlargement as a ploy to get Polish-American votes. Instead of confronting what might have happened to indispensable NATO unity in Kosovo had we pressed prematurely for a ground invasion, they can simply dismiss our strategy as a study in political caution. The truth is, a politically motivated president would not have bailed out Mexico against overwhelming congressional and public opposition, fought relentlessly for one trade agreement after another against the opposition of much of his political party, persisted with a winning strategy in Kosovo discounted by conventional wisdom, approved sustained deployments of American troops in Bosnia, or invested so much in building relationships with Russia and China.

Then there are critics who say our ability to lead our alliances again is at risk, pointing to a loss of French support in the Persian Gulf or to complaints about U.S. "hegemony" in Europe and Asia. These critics have a short and selective memory. Our relationship with Europe has always been a bit schizophrenic: we are either dominating or disengaged. Consider these news headlines: "Allies Complain of Washington's Heavy Hand," "France to NATO: Non, Merci," "U.S. Declares Economic Warfare on Allies," "Protestors Rally Against American Arms Plan." The first is from the Suez crisis in 1956. The second is from 1966, when France left NATO's military command.

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
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A Foreign Policy for the Global Age

The third is from the Siberian pipeline crisis of 1981. And the fourth is from the 1986 debate about deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Our alliances are in better shape today than they were during the Cold War. An expanding NATO has renewed purpose; the coalition we led in Bosnia was the broadest in European history; and the coalition in Kosovo held through the longest military engagement in NATO's history. We led a coalition into Haiti that helped spur an unparalleled degree of cooperation among Western nations to defend democracy where it is threatened. We worked with our Asian and Pacific allies to mobilize an unprecedented coalition to intervene in East Timor—something unthinkable a few years ago. After 50 years of estrangement, we engendered a historic thaw in relations with India—not a formal ally, but as the world's largest democracy, a natural one. In a recent poll, a remarkable 91 percent of urban Indians called relations with the United States good or better, a vast change in attitudes. President Clinton also moved our relationship with the countries of Africa to one of genuine mutual respect, traveling to that continent more than any president in history and changing African perceptions of the United States.

Because the president has consciously sought to mark the triumph of American ideals without triumphalism, the dominant view of America is one of a country that exercises leadership for the greater good. Opinion surveys, for example, show that the proportion of Europeans disturbed by America's growing power ranges from just 17 percent in France to 8 percent in Germany and Britain. With continued care, that attitude will endure.

WHAT NEXT?

WHAT FUNDAMENTAL questions will the next administration face? Some are self-evident extensions of questions we have already faced: how to influence Russia and China, consolidate peace in the Balkans and the Middle East, preserve our alliances, promote economic development. A few are less obvious or merit special mention.

For example, will the roots of democracy's post-Cold War expansion deepen with time or wither under corruption, inequity, and poor

governance? Even in 1999, more people around the world won the right to choose their leaders than in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell. But if new democracies don't deliver in such countries as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Ukraine, and if old democracies fail in countries such as Colombia, the pendulum that has swung toward freedom from Latin America to Asia to Africa to the former Soviet Union could swing back. Winning democracy's post-election contests requires our full attention and support.

A second question is how to promote change in those nations that have been most hostile to the United States over the last decade, and how to manage that change when it comes. That question applies to Iran and to Cuba; with both countries, we must be unafraid to advance openness without being naive about how far either has come.

The question also applies to North Korea, which, thanks to the U.S.-South Korean policy of deterrence and diplomatic engagement, and the failures caused by isolation, may be rethinking its policy of confrontation. We hope that the North will gradually open until the massive task of reunification becomes manageable. But few totalitarian regimes have peacefully, smoothly, and gradually transformed into stable and open societies. And North Korea is the most perfectly constituted totalitarian society on the planet. What will happen when its people gain knowledge of the outside world and when its leadership begins to feel threatened by change? The policy we have pursued with South Korea offers the best framework for encouraging peaceful change while dealing with the military threat that remains. But we must be ready for potential crises down the road.

With Iraq, our policy has achieved its immediate goals. We have contained Saddam and prevented his rearmament, diverting 90 percent of his oil revenues from the production of nuclear weapons and anthrax to the purchase of food and medicine. In 1989, Iraq earned \$15 billion from oil exports and spent \$13 billion on its military. This year, it is projected to earn \$20 billion from oil-for-food exports but can spend none of these revenues on its military. But support for the policy cannot be sustained indefinitely, and Saddam will not be around forever. We need to intensify both our planning for a post-Saddam Iraq and our efforts to speed its arrival.

A third question is how to deal with both supernatural and sub-national threats to our security. A particularly troubling supernatural

threat is the growing globalization of grievance networks, including the transnational network of terror groups active from South and Central Asia to southern Russia to the Middle East and Africa. Coordination among these groups, which share a messianic hatred of open, tolerant societies, makes them a particular threat. But because they are loosely connected, they cannot be extinguished with one stroke. The solution is to reduce the economic disparities on which they breed; to resolve the Middle East conflict in order to delegitimize their grievances; and to beef up counter-terrorism cooperation even further, without assaulting civil liberties.

The subnational threat is the challenge to the nation-state from the potential disintegration of ethnically diverse societies, whether Nigeria and Indonesia today, or Russia and China tomorrow. How do we balance legitimate demands for self-determination against the danger of unleashing new grievances? In part, as the president has often noted, we must all recognize that in this new global economy, diversity can be a strength, a source of economic connectivity and therefore wealth, and that states and regions preoccupied by internecine conflicts will be left further behind. In part, the solution is integration among ethnically diverse states so that boundaries are less onerous—the experience of western Europe after World War II and the goal of the Balkan Stability Pact in southeastern Europe. In the short run, we need better international tools for maintaining peace in divided societies.

Which leads to a fourth question: How do we reconcile the growing need for global collective action with the inadequacies of our principal instrument of collective action, the United Nations? U.N. reform has made progress these last few years, but the Clinton administration has had to spend most of those years simply struggling to restore our dues payments. The next administration must help reinvent the U.N. into the kind of institution we would design today. And it must overcome American suspicion of the U.N. by arguing that an effective U.N. gives us options beyond putting out global fires alone and letting them burn.

A fifth question is how we should adapt our military to new challenges. The issue is not whether we must maintain the best-trained,

America cannot be a first-rate power on a third-class budget.

best-equipped, most ready military in the world. We have and we will. The real issue is how to match the capabilities of our armed forces to their missions. How can we ensure that our forces are simultaneously prepared for high-intensity conflicts and smaller-scale peace operations that require special skills and different rules of engagement? Each service is responding with its own transformation plan. The next president will have to build on those efforts.

The most fundamental question of all is whether we can continue to sustain America's leadership role in the world. The answer is yes, if we devote adequate resources to the task and convince other nations that their interests are served by joining us.

America cannot be a first-rate power on a third-class budget. We should not have to struggle to fund patently vital programs like our effort to secure nuclear materials in Russia. We should not have to respond to pressing needs in one part of the world by robbing money from pressing needs somewhere else. This damages our ability to lead. It is hard to explain to the Japanese, for example, why we can't fund our \$35 million share to help denuclearize North Korea (to which they have contributed \$1 billion) when they read of our \$2 trillion surplus. Some people argue we spend too much on foreign aid, yet America's entire budget for everything from diminishing the nuclear threat to preventing conflict to fighting AIDS to advancing democracy costs no more (at \$14 billion) than what Americans spend each year on dietary supplements.

Finally, we must squarely confront the sense among some that we can maintain our position either by diminishing our role in the world or by imposing our will on it. What threatens to alienate our allies today is not that we are wealthy and powerful, but that despite our wealth and power we do not meet our obligations to the U.N., or fully fund our commitment to the development banks, or devote as much of our GDP to the reduction of global poverty as do 16 countries not as wealthy as us, or ratify treaties we urge others to adopt. It is not that we consider initiatives to defend our soil from missile threats or terrorism, but that we sometimes seem to suggest they are the sum total of our approach to the world—that we'd rather fence ourselves off from a dangerous world than work with others to improve it. We should not apologize for being a "hyperpower." But to remain strong, we must be a hyperpower that our friends and allies can depend on.

We must remember that there is a difference between power and authority. Power is the ability to compel by force and sanctions; there are times we must use it, for there will always be interests and values worth fighting for. Authority is the ability to lead, and we depend on it for almost everything we try to achieve. Our authority is built on qualities very different from our power: on the attractiveness of our values, on the force of our example, on the credibility of our commitments, and on our willingness to listen to and stand by others. There may be no real threat to our power today. But if we use power in a way that antagonizes our friends and dishonors our commitments, we will lose our authority—and our power will mean very little.

In the last eight years, the United States has revitalized its alliances, begun to integrate its former adversaries into the international system, brought peace to regions critical to its security, adapted its global strategy to meet new challenges, and built the most open, dynamic world economy in history. But I believe President Clinton's most fundamental achievement is that he steered America from the Cold War era to the era of globalization in a way that enhanced not only our power but also our authority. That is the foundation on which we must advance our interests in a global age. 

00 DEC 7 AM 11:58
THE WHITE HOUSE

12.7.00

Mr. President -

For your information,
attached are

- a letter from
President Chirac
and
- a letter from Sen. Levin

regarding the Garza case
and the Federal death
penalty.

Also attached is a BJS
report we understood
you would like to see.

Reed

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Dec 11, 2000



MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES
ÉTRANGÈRES

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
aux
ETATS-UNIS

4101 Reservoir Road, NW
Washington DC, 20007

A l'attention de : *Mrs. Meredith Cabe*
White House Counsel's Office
Facs : (202) 456-1647
Tél. : (202) 456-2146

De la part de : *Philippe Autié, Premier Conseiller (Christiane 944-6132)*
Facs : 01 202 944-6166
Tél. : 01 202 944-6130

Date : *December 6, 2000*

Nombre de Pages : *1 + 3*

OBJET : *Death penalty.*

Text of a letter to President Clinton from President Chirac.

12-7-00

*Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis*

Le Ministre Conseiller

Washington, December 6, 2000

2717

Dear Mr. Berger,

Please find herewith the text of a letter to President Clinton from Mr. Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic.

I would be grateful if you would be kind enough to convey this text to the President.

The original letter will be transmitted as soon as it reaches this Embassy via diplomatic pouch.

Sincerely yours,



*François Barry-Delongchamps
Deputy Chief of Mission*

*The Honorable
Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs*

Washington, le 6 décembre 2000

Monsieur le Président,

En juillet dernier, l'Union Européenne est intervenue auprès de vous sur le cas de M. Juan Raul Garza, condamné à mort dont l'exécution était imminente. Vous aviez accordé à ce dernier un sursis aux fins d'examiner en connaissance de cause sa demande de grâce en vue d'une commutation de la peine. L'échéance de votre décision approchant, je souhaite, au nom de la présidence de l'Union Européenne et en mon nom personnel, faire de nouveau solennellement appel à votre clémence.

L'engagement déterminé de l'Union Européenne en faveur de l'abolition de la peine de mort vous est connu. Il s'appuie sur la conviction qu'il s'agit d'un châtiment contraire à la dignité humaine. Son abolition universelle contribuerait au développement des droits de l'homme auquel l'Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis sont également attachés.

L'Union Européenne est encouragée dans son combat par le fait que de nombreux pays ont aboli la peine de mort ou adopté des moratoires de droit ou de fait. C'est le cas de tous les pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe.

L'Union Européenne a salué une évolution sensible dans votre pays après la décision prise par le Gouverneur de l'Illinois, en janvier 2000, de décréter un moratoire sur les exécutions capitales.

J'en appelle aujourd'hui à l'homme d'Etat, mais aussi à l'homme de conscience et de conviction. En accordant votre grâce à M. Garza, vous confirmeriez le moratoire de fait observé depuis trente sept ans au niveau fédéral. Une telle décision aurait valeur d'exemple.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

(mention manuscrite : avec mes bien cordiales amitiés.

Signé : Jacques Chirac.)

Son Excellence Monsieur William J. Clinton
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

12 00 00 10 10 FAX 1 202 344 0100 FRENCH EMBASSY
Washington, December 6, 2000

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Dear Mr. President,

Last July, the European Union wrote to you about the case of Mr. Juan Raul Garza, a death-row inmate whose execution was imminent. You granted him a reprieve for the purpose of examining, in full knowledge of the case, his request for the sentence to be commuted. With the date for your decision approaching, I wish to make again, on behalf of the presidency of the European Union and in my own name, a solemn appeal for your clemency.

You are well aware of the European Union's determined stand on the abolition of the death penalty. It is based on the conviction that this penalty is contrary to human dignity. Its universal abolition would further the development of human rights to which the European Union and the United States are equally committed.

The European Union is encouraged in its struggle by the fact that many countries have abolished the death penalty or adopted de facto or de jure moratoriums. That is the case of all the members of the European Council.

The European Union welcomed an appreciable shift in your country after the decision by the Governor of Illinois, in January 2000, to order a moratorium on executions.

Today, I appeal to you as a statesman, and also as a man of conscience and conviction. In showing mercy to Mr. Garza, you would confirm the de facto moratorium on federal executions that has been observed for 37 years. Such a decision would set an example.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration.

[handwritten] With best regards,

signed: Jacques Chirac

*His Excellency Mr. William J. Clinton
President of the United States*

CARL LEVIN
MICHIGAN

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

December 5, 2000

Urgent
PersonalThe Honorable William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you know, the first of twenty-one federal death row inmates, Juan Garza, is scheduled to be put to death on December 12, 2000. He would be the first federal execution in nearly forty years. There are compelling reasons why you should intervene to delay this execution.

A recent Department of Justice report documents racial, ethnic and geographic disparity in the charging of federal capital cases. The findings are shocking. U.S. attorneys seeking the death penalty came from just a few states, including six from Texas and four from Virginia. Among the eight states where U.S. Attorneys have submitted 20 or more cases for consideration, the death penalty authorization rate exceeds 50 percent in only one state - Texas, and ranges from 15 - 38 percent in the rest.

When this report was made public by the Department of Justice on September 12, 2000, the Attorney General said that the report shows "minorities are over-represented in the federal death penalty system." She also said that the Department of Justice could not explain the disparities and because of this a "broader analysis must therefore be undertaken to determine if bias does in fact play any role in the federal death penalty system." The Deputy Attorney General added at the press conference on September 12 that "no one reading this report can help but be disturbed, troubled, by this disparity."

It is the understanding of my staff that the "broader analysis" Attorney General Reno said *must and would* be undertaken is not completed. I urge you to delay the execution of Juan Garza until the broader study is completed by the Justice Department.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Respectfully,



Carl Levin

CL/jp

Mr. President - your decision will have
a major impact on the approach of your
successor to capital cases. 

California's Health Care Crisis

Today, California faces a major crisis. Simply put, our health care system is on the verge of collapse. **California needs Congress to pass a Balanced Budget "add back" bill this session**

- **California's uninsured population has exploded.** Over 7 million Californians currently do not have health insurance. More than 50,000 Californians join the ranks of the uninsured monthly.
- **Hospitals, nursing homes, home health agencies, emergency departments, and physician groups are closing their doors.**

Forty-five California hospitals have closed since 1995. Ten more are likely to close in the next few months. In Plumas County alone, three hospitals are slated to close.

Today, 64 percent of California hospitals are losing money.

*copied
podesta
Jennings*

California's emergency rooms are also strained to the breaking point as 19 statewide have closed since 1997.

California physician groups are going bankrupt at the rate of one every two weeks. More than 300 physician groups have gone bankrupt or closed since 1996.

In 1997, California had 819 home health agencies. Over 300 have closed in the last three years.

Approximately 12 percent (167) of the 1,376 nursing home facilities in California filed for bankruptcy in 1999 and 2000.

- **Doctors are leaving the State in droves.** Physicians in California are paid less than other States. The average income for doctors in California fell by more than \$20,000 between 1995 and 1997.

California has fallen from 8th in the nation to 12th in terms of the percent of doctors per population.

- **California receives less in Medicaid spending than virtually all the other states.** California ranks 48th nationwide in Medicaid spending per beneficiary and last among the ten most populous States.

XEROCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

*JP/Jennings
B. Jensen*

- **Californians are much more likely to be enrolled in a managed care plan.** Today, 53 percent of all insured Californians are enrolled in an HMO compared to 28 percent nationwide.

Californians pay 10 percent less for health care premiums than other Americans.

California's capitation rate is one of the lowest in the nation. The average capitation rate in the State reached its peak in 1993 at \$45 per month. Last year, the rate sunk to \$29, while the cost of living jumped 25.2 percent.

According to the California Medical Association, most monthly payments to physicians by plans in California are 40 percent less than those in the rest of the nation.

DALE BUMPERS

12-7-00 1050 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-5339
(202) 857-8951

11-28-00

~~Bill~~
I told Hallay to tell you that the
next time somebody says "He ain't
done nothin' for Arkansas," send
him to me. You kept an
unmitigated disaster from happening.
I have made certain every person
@ WAMS knows who deserves
credit.

Dale

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

WHITE HOUSE
RECEIVED SECTION

200 NOV 30 PM 2:44

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500-2000

PERSONAL

20300-0004



OK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 6, 2000

*gave to Brenda
12-6-00*

00 DEC 6 PM 1:47

MEMORANDUM FOR LISEL LOY

FROM: ROBERT A. BRADTKE *Bob*
SUBJECT: Pens for Credentials Ceremony

On Thursday, December 7, the President will receive the credentials of foreign Ambassadors from the following countries:

Barbados
Oman
Liechtenstein
Belize
United Arab Emirates
Nicaragua

Request that six presidential pens be made available for this event.

Deb

*Pls. make these
available
to Bob Bradtke.
Cathy Sullivan
able to tell you
they are - may be
which*

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12-6-00

JP
for Kennedy

PRESIDENT CLINTON – GRASSLEY-KENNEDY DISABILITY BILL
December 5, 2000

We have an opportunity to build on your historic achievement for disabled Americans last year by passing the Family Opportunity Act of 2000 before Congress adjourns. It's part of the end-game negotiations, and a significant push from the White House can help overcome the remaining GOP holdouts.

Last year, you signed into law a bill to enable disabled adults to take jobs without losing their health care and other assistance. Now, we have an opportunity to extend the same Medicaid helping hand to families with special needs children. Our bill will enable over 250,000 disabled children and their families to reach their potential and fulfill their dreams by providing affordable health care and other assistance.

The legislation has solid bi-partisan support with 79 co-sponsors in the Senate and 142 in the House. We have adjusted the bill to target its help to lower income families who need it most – under \$50,000 for a family of four – thus cutting the cost in half, to \$2 billion over five years.

Enacting the bill this year will add to your achievements and enhance your impressive record on Americans with disabilities.

copied
Podesta

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12-6-00

JP
to Kennedy

PRESIDENT CLINTON – FINAL BUDGET
December 5, 2000

The FY 2002 budget provides one last opportunity to challenge the next Congress and next Administration in key areas that reflect your priorities. You could accomplish this by proposing specific spending levels that show where you believe the nation should go on education, health care, and other top issues.

In the past, when budgets were due earlier, departing Presidents routinely submitted full budgets. President Carter did so, and he made it easier to challenge incoming President Reagan for his harsh budget cuts. In 1990, we pushed back the due date for budgets to February. So President Bush submitted only a baseline budget when he was leaving in 1993.

I gather it's not feasible at this late date to submit a full-dress budget based on this principle. But there's nothing to prevent your Administration from submitting its best view of the nation's budget priorities for the future in key areas such as education, prescription drugs, health coverage for the uninsured, Medicare solvency, job training, civil rights, crime, and immigration services.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

12-12-00

Returned to USC to prepare
Response per Adam Rosman.

Carol Cleveland

OK Nancy
Hirschberg

→ Nancy
this is not
necessary a advisable
to President. In fact
budget fight over
\$60 million which
30% has involved half
the cabinet. (P)

FAX TRANSMITTAL
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NEW YORK, NY 10022
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212-319-6155 (FAX)

through
stop see
7545

To Cohen for reply?
Yes ☒ No ☐
TO NSC for reply
Coordinate with
USG? Yes ☒ No ☐
C. Sperling? Yes ☒ No ☐
cc: scheduling B. - Not in
RED DOT
PICKLE

Ms. Nancy Hirschberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
FAX: 202-456-6703

CC: Jeff Hirschberg
Rob Odle, Esq.

FROM: Ms. Pat Cloherty BMC
Special Limited Partner, Patricof & Co. Ventures, Inc.

DATE: December 6, 2000

SUBJECT: Meeting With President Clinton on Funding re the U.S. Russia Investment Fund

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER PAGE: 2

Appointed by President Clinton in 1995, I presently Chair The U.S. Russia Investment Fund, one of a family of Enterprise Funds operating in Eastern European countries and Russia.

The President is aware of the enormous difficulties our Fund has had over the past 18 months in securing promised funding from the USG. This is against superior performance of the 80 person staff in Russia and of the board of directors, appointed by the President, most of whom have served for the six-year life of the Fund.

We are now out of funds. State and AID indicated last week that we may receive \$30 million of the \$60 million we need to meet present obligations for the Russian portfolio companies and employees.

Jeff Hirschberg, whom you know, is a Director of the Fund, also. We urgently are seeking an appointment with the President to see if we can resolve this issue. It is especially critical, because pursuant to our USG mandate, we are beginning to raise a private successor fund to the enterprise fund. This will not be possible if lack of USG funding now forces the Fund to renege on its existing obligations. This will be an important agenda item at our Board of Directors Meeting on December 14 in New York.

Should President Clinton be available, Messrs. Berger, Talbott and Podesta are in this policy's chain of command, and we clearly would make ourselves as available as we can to meet with them.

Please advise. And thank you for your consideration.

cc Herman
✓
only



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

December 18, 2000

Loy
From:
Sylvia Mathews

00 DEC 19 PM 12:25

MEMORANDUM FOR SYLVIA MATHEWS

FROM: Mac Reed *MR*

SUBJECT: Pending Executive Orders, Memoranda, and Proclamations

Listed below are the 11 Executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations ("documents") that I believe are of highest priority. I've tried to be fair in my selection. I chose those documents that are of the greatest interest to the various proponents. I've also inserted a tentative completion period for each of the documents, though I realize that the periods can change depending on White House plans and priorities.

1. (12/15 - 1/4) **Task Force on Puerto Rico's Ultimate Status** (Podesta/WH Intergovernmental Affairs) - The proposed order would create a task force to address ongoing issues concerning Puerto Rico's ultimate status.
2. (12/15 - 1/4) **Adjustments to Certain Rates of Pay and Allowances** (Lachance/OPM) - The proposed order sets out the pay rates and schedules for all employees of the Federal Government (including the Armed Forces).
3. (12/15 - 1/4) **To Strengthen the Federal Government - University Partnership** (Lane/OSTP) - The proposed order sets out principles to strengthen the Federal Government - University partnership.
4. (12/15 - 1/4) **To Protect the Privacy of Protected Health Information in Oversight Investigations** (Katzen, Swire/OMB) - The proposed order would tighten controls on the use of protected health information for law enforcement purposes.
5. (1/4 - 1/20) **Government Accountability for Merit System Principles** (Lachance/OPM) - The proposed order would establish two new civil service rules to make agencies more accountable to the President for effective human resources management.
6. (1/4 - 1/20) **Amendment to Executive Order 13111, Extension of the President's Advisory Committee on Expanding Training Opportunities** (Lane/OSTP) - The proposed order extends the life of the President's Advisory Committee on Expanding Training Opportunities.
7. (1/4 - 1/20) **Federal Leadership of Historic Sites** (Lovell/WH Millennium Council) - The proposed order would direct agencies to take actions to further protect their historic and cultural sites.

8. (1/4 - 1/20) **Lifting and Modifying Measures with Respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)** (State) - The order lifts trade sanctions against Yugoslavia.
9. (1/4 - 1/20) **Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act and United States Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act** (USTR) - The order lifts tariffs in connection with African and Caribbean products.
10. (1/4 - 1/20) **President's Disability Employment Partnership Board** (President's Task Force on Adults with Disabilities/Becky Ogle) - The order establishes a Board to provide advice on public-private partnerships and economic incentives as they relate to employment of individuals with disabilities.
11. (1/4 - 1/20) **Prohibiting the Import of Rough Diamonds from Sierra Leone** (State) - The order would prohibit the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone in order to sanction the Revolutionary United Front whose actions have harmed the peace process in Sierra Leone.

cc: Rosalyn Rettman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

After several searches, we have been
unable to determine the sender of
this document.

Mildred C. Alston

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12-30-97

This book examines the social and intellectual origins and consequences of the great racial struggle of the 1950s and 1960s. The title comes from a speech in which Martin Luther King identified the task of his generation: "to hew a stone of hope from a mountain of despair."

Wit
✓ see in letter —

Be

cc. Turing
S. Martin
~~Begala~~
Bowles
Alston

Miller
Lyle

copied.
Herrnreich
Winston
Mathews
Begala
Bowles
Alston

12-31-97 —
Will send
original to
Miller after
you have seen.
Copies have
been sent
del

Table of Contents

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
Introduction.....	iv
1. Niebuhrisms and Myrdaleries: the Intellectual Roots of the Second Reconstruction Re-examined.....	1
2. Hip Like Me: Racial Cross-Dressing in Popular Music before the Advent of Elvis.....	87
3. The Civil Rights Movement as a Religious Revival.....	128
4. The Mind of the Segregationist: Why the Second Recon- struction Did Not Require a Second Civil War.....	153
5. Blackening Martin Luther King.....	178
6. Race and Rights in the American Moral Imagination since the 1960s.....	213
7. Explaining the Civil Rights Movement: National Trends and Local Initiative.....	246
Notes.....	271

A Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair:
The Civil Rights Movement in American Cultural History

By David L. Chappell

Introduction

As we approach the millennium, leading voices in American political culture--left, right, and center--all invoke the myth of the civil rights movement. The boycotts, marches, and sit-ins of the 1950s and 1960s have become frequent touchstones for popular music and film. Scholars give the movement great attention, too, though most of what they write either serves tired polemical purposes or (in the case of historians) simply describes what happened in great detail. In the news and in cultural arenas, there are strong voices of dissatisfaction with the movement's legacy--some saying the movement went too far, some saying it got squashed before it had a real chance, and some saying it lost sight of its original ideals as it assumed institutional and legal power. The historical literature on the civil rights movement is vast, but most of it does not answer these voices of dissatisfaction. Nor does it explore the deep symbolic and even subconscious significance the movement has for most Americans--who, for all their conflicting dissatisfactions, seem united in their desire to claim the movement as something whose true spirit they still believe in.

The main theme of this book is that what we currently know,

or think we know, about the civil rights movement gives too much emphasis to liberalism and not enough to religion.

By thinking of civil rights as one more aspect of American liberalism, writers and readers get caught up in indirect attacks upon and defenses of that embattled ideology. They miss a crucial part of the story: the way that liberals, like all Americans, were caught off guard by the movement in the 1950s. Though liberals were accustomed to power for over twenty years before the movement began, they suddenly found themselves on the back of the historical bus, so to speak, with respect to civil rights. At the same moment, civil rights became a central issue not only in domestic politics but also in the international competition for allies among decolonizing nations. Yet liberals took no great initiatives in civil rights. They reacted to southern black protesters they only dimly understood, formed an alliance of overlapping interest with some of them, and ultimately claimed (partially deserved) credit for the protesters' achievements. But the ultimate sources of the civil rights movement lie mostly outside of liberalism.

Religion gets some attention in scholarly and media treatments of the movement, but not nearly in the depth and complexity it deserves. No one has noticed, for example, the conflict (documented in **Chapter 1** and **Chapter 3**) that the movement, grounded in evangelical Christian dogma, had to have with modern liberalism--which leading liberals in the 1940s and 1950s still defined as a faith in human reason and "progress" through education and economic growth. Postwar liberals embraced

one of the great statements of that faith, Gunnar Myrdal's American Dilemma (1944), as their program for coping with racial discrimination. At roughly the same time, liberals claimed to embrace the pessimistic "realism" about human nature associated with the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, but Niebuhr affected liberals' foreign policy more than their understanding of social problems at home. On racial discrimination and other key matters, liberals continued to believe in gradual progress as a more or less automatic function of economic growth and education. In fact, liberals became more devoted to growth as a domestic cure-all after World War II than they were in the New Deal days, when many of them tried to restructure economic institutions. The true Niebuhrians on domestic issues were the southern black civil rights leaders, whose Prophet-like rejection of the normal course of history as sinful and corrupting led them to rise away from liberal gradualism and voluntarism. The civil rights leaders adopted immediatist, coercive strategies in the mid-1950s.

Liberals could never fully embrace Niebuhr's emphasis on dark, irrational forces, which Niebuhr said were as much a part of doing good as of doing evil. But even in their most confident days in the 1930s, liberals sensed that something was missing from their faith in the future. Committed secularists like John Dewey (godfather of the independent liberals of the 1930s) began to stretch their basic beliefs to accommodate the creeping realization that the public needed more than employment, health care, social security, and education. Even achieving those goals

would require more solidarity and more willingness to sacrifice than liberals could muster among the public. The public needed a cohesive and inspiring faith--something even stronger than the faith many liberals had in Franklin Roosevelt. Dewey tried to divorce "religious feeling," which could be useful to liberals, from "religion" as traditionally practiced, which was "super-natural" and antithetical to liberalism. In his 1934 book, A Common Faith, Dewey tried to conjure up a surrogate religion for thoroughly modern, scientific liberals.

In a similar vein, the liberal Malcolm Ross (who later became head of the first federal anti-discrimination agency, the Fair Employment Practices Committee), wistfully reflected on the appeals that evangelists like Billy Sunday could make. Ross had covered Sunday's revivals as a young newspaperman, and remembered his exasperation at the way the popular preacher always diverted people's attention from social problems. If only someone with Sunday's gift would turn it around and make the people pay attention to social problems, Ross wrote in his memoir, Death of a Yale Man (1939), then we might find a democratic way to address those problems. Without exhortation to inspire the masses, the business of social change seemed too daunting or too dull for any but experts and opportunists. This feeling, which could be called pulpit-envy, grew among liberals as their confidence waned in World War II and the Truman Administration.

Though liberals lost a couple of key elections in the 1940s and 1950s, historians rightly give them credit for dominating American political culture throughout the postwar period. Dwight

Eisenhower at the time of his first election was seen as a liberal; his only strong political passion was a hatred for the conservative wing of his own party. Whatever conservative impulses he had on budgetary matters he shared with the late FDR and with Adlai Stevenson, and at any rate he never managed to translate those impulses into policy. Liberals, with their experience in saving the country during the Depression and World War II, were well-prepared for battle with conservatism, and until the late-1960s, they held the field. What they were not prepared for were cultural forces that later came to be identified with them--the various forms of black liberation and related developments in mass culture.

Historians have noted the obvious racial implications of rock and roll, one of the great forces of postwar mass culture, but they have failed to see how, as **Chapter 2** shows, racial mixing in popular music was deeply entrenched in popular music long before rock and roll. Much of the enthusiasm in popular music came out of the churches, especially in marginal sects such as the Pentecostals, which expressed themselves in eclectic (and increasingly electrified) music by the middle of the 20th century. That enthusiasm could not be contained by religious institutions. Church musicians were carried away from the church by their evangelical impulse to reach unconverted masses, as well as by their irreligious egotism and cupidity.

When the booming industries of mass culture harnessed the new music, one of the things they were doing was secularizing religious ecstasy. Superficially Freudian habits lead many

writers to see the energy in this music as sexual; ultimately that may be all it was. But that energy had been sublimated for centuries in religious revivals, and that historical background did not fade away altogether, even when singers with no evangelical background caught the spell of the music. Critics in the late 1940s and early 1950s often compared Frank Sinatra and Johnny Ray concerts, with their riotous crowds, to the great historic religious revivals. Years later they said the same about the concerts of Elvis Presley, James Brown, Little Richard, and eventually the Beatles and their countless epigones.

The standard histories of the dawn of rock and roll emphasize the vast boredom and restlessness that an expanding population felt with suburban, white-collar normalcy in the Eisenhower years. Yet rebellious boredom with standardized, superficial culture did not originate with the Elvis Presley generation. Frank Sinatra and other "pop" musicians of the 1940s and early 1950s anticipated the exasperated outbursts of the rock and rollers, complaining frequently and heatedly about the Tin Pan Alley "crap" their contracts required them to sing. They broke away from the crap whenever they could, nearly always drawing inspiration from forms of black music that had not yet been made respectable--"jump" blues and R&B, which are distinct from the older forms of pure blues, ragtime, gospel, and jazz.

White imitation of these forms was well established long before Elvis, producing occasional "pop" hits in the mid-1940s. Black musicians made the jump easier by meeting their white imitators half-way. Louis Jordan, Ray Charles, Chuck Berry, and

others alternated their own innovations in black genres with virtuoso imitations of white forms, especially "hillbilly" music. Existing histories of the roots of rock assume that racial crossovers in music took place only on the margins of white society in the years before the mid-1950s (jazz having mostly died out by then, in the sense that whatever was artistically alive was commercially dead and whatever was commercially alive was artistically dead). The histories also assume that racial crossovers consisted of one-way white appropriations of black styles, ignoring how mainstream white "pop" musicians (not simply marginalized working-class rebels like Presley) prided themselves on their imitations of black styles. The histories also ignore how authentic black musicians (not simply assimilationist crooners like the Ink Spots and Nat Cole) prided themselves on their imitations of white music.

The most mature and sensitive liberal thinkers expressed boredom and frustration with postwar culture too, and they linked their exasperation to their own liberalism. Lionel Trilling, for example, lamented in The Liberal Imagination (1949) how his fellow liberals failed to tap the emotional currents that conservatives were so good at tapping. After the death of FDR, liberals fretted about their inability to inspire collective action and popular enthusiasm for liberal programs. They also continued to express envy of the power that nonliberals had to inspire people to action through irrational appeals. After WWII many liberals saw the tepid, desiccated culture around them as the unfortunate but inevitable result of liberalism's triumph in

politics (which two Republican Congresses and two Republican presidential victories failed to undo). A political philosophy too devoted to man's reason, man's innate goodness, and the benefits of education and productivity growth was the dream of Aunt Polly combined with that of Pollyanna. It lacked sturm und drang, tragedy, irony, passion, humor. Though the world might be a better place with liberals in control of public life, it was a duller place.

Liberals did not deal creatively with their restlessness; they were too busy reacting to the excitement generated by others. Because popular musicians were breaking down racial barriers long before rock and roll, music provoked a white supremacist reaction. Defenders of the white southern "way of life" were fighting a quixotic battle against the distant popular music industry, and to some extent Hollywood, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, before they had to face a disciplined mass movement of black southerners in their own cities and towns.

The funny thing is that black clergymen were as hostile to the racially liberal popular music as white supremacists were.

Martin Luther King expressed a longstanding feeling among black preachers when he wrote in his advice column in Ebony in 1958 that rock and roll is "totally incompatible" with gospel since it "often plunges men's minds into degrading and immoral depths." More than traditional Protestant morality was at stake. As the record companies found black performers increasingly acceptable, which is to say profitable, they threatened to drain black churches of their richest resource. Since the singers were one

of the biggest attractions for crowds in black churches, this had financial significance for the churches. Black religious authorities condemned blues and jazz, and they condemned black people who performed for white dollars in what black clergymen and churchwomen considered an undignified manner reminiscent of minstrelsy. This condemnation was sincere and deep-rooted: nearly every commercially successful black performer in the period (along with formerly religious white ones like Jerry Lee Lewis) tells of being denounced, disowned, disdained, or guilt-mongered by parents and preachers for playing "devil music." Gospel performers who remained within the fold said the same thing, referring to social pressure from their parents and preachers to keep God's gift of music in church. Mahalia Jackson, for example, was tempted by blues and jazz and integrated some of those forms into her style, but her church members persuaded her to resist secularizing her lyrics.

Black preachers found a more respectable way to deal with the urge to gain access to the privileges and opportunities of white culture than black musicians found. Civil rights demonstrations in the 1950s and 1960s, though they spoke of "integration," can be understood as yet another reaction against a tepid, desiccated liberal culture--a culture which denied the human tragedy of intractable injustice, or to use a word black preachers used for segregation, "sin." The same year that RCA signed Elvis Presley, marking the point when the permeation of racial barriers became the dominant trend in commercial music for the foreseeable future, masses of black protesters in Montgomery,

Alabama, took to the streets, setting off the largest, most disciplined, and most successful mass movement in African American history (arguably in all of American history).

Suddenly, the white supremacists had to fight on a new front. The new front was very difficult, because it was important to the white supremacist ideology to say (and many of the ideologues no doubt believed) that "our" black folks are satisfied and would not rebel unless "outside agitators" stirred them up. It was also difficult because the structure of the movement--which white supremacists assumed was poorly organized and ephemeral--was well-hidden from white eyes in institutions that had for generations cornered the market on black organizational, oratorical, and fund-raising skill: the churches.

The movement's leaders (as will be documented in **Chapter 3**) drew on the tradition of religious revivals in organizing and promoting the new form of protest. Civil Rights leaders rounded up "sinners" in pool halls, juke joints, and dives, finding that they suddenly had something more exciting to offer them, and at the same time a more plausible promise of practical benefits, than they could ever offer before the movement or after it.

Religious revivalism, which scholars of civil rights have so far failed to recognize in the movement, is central to the way the movement operated. Historians and sociologists have amply documented the way religious revivals in the past ushered in radical social change, often serving to break ingrained habits of deference and to justify new ways of life to fundamentally

conservative masses. But they have failed to make the connection to the racial changes of the 1950s and 1960s, when masses of black people poured into the churches, underwent fearsome psychological transformations, and spilled out of the churches to disrupt community life with their new attitudes. As is typical during revivals, church attendance during civil rights demonstrations increased dramatically while crime and other indicators of normal, unorganized social discord decreased. Many participants described their experiences in the movement in the language of religious revival and conversion.

One of the hardest things to understand about the civil rights movement when it is conceived as part of the history of American liberalism is the relationship between Martin Luther King and the other great evangelist of the age, Billy Graham. The two had political and theological beliefs, as well as organizational tactics, in common. King's advisers sought Graham's advice on logistics for huge mass meetings. Graham refused to preach to segregated congregations, telling white followers that racism was sinful and that Jesus' skin was probably a lot darker than their own. Graham and King swapped pulpits and toured together. The Protestant revivalist tradition, though often dismissed as the most potent form of the opiate of the masses, had broken down social barriers in the past; it contributed more to black liberation in the 1950s and 1960s than any other single source.

A related religious theme that no historian has noticed before is the huge difference (documented in **Chapter 4**) between

segregationists in the 1950s and their predecessors, the defenders of slavery a hundred years earlier. The leading religious figures of the pre-Civil War South were defenders of slavery, and they were politically important because they justified slavery with cogent and inspiring references to the Bible. But a hundred years later, only a handful of southern religious leaders, generally from marginal sects, helped white southerners defend their peculiar racial institution. The regional associations of southern Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists (as well as the national organizations that covered southern Catholics and Episcopalians) officially decreed that their members should obey the Supreme Court's desegregation decision.

The segregationists were extremely vocal and violent, and they won elections. But the support they had from the majority of white southerners was only skin-deep, as the stance of their churches indicates. All the election data and all the opinion polls indicate overwhelming white southern support for segregation. But elections and polls did not gauge the depth of commitment to the cause; the civil rights movement discovered that very few white southerners were willing to make the sacrifices that a successful defense of segregation would have required. A hundred years earlier, the majority of white southerners (even non-slaveowners) were willing to fight the bloodiest and most destructive war in American history to defend their "peculiar institution." Segregationists of the 1950s and 1960s never came close to that example of commitment to their

cause. As bad soldiers often do, segregationists expressed envy of the endurance, courage, and solidarity of their enemies--and the endurance, courage, and solidarity of black southerners in the 1950s and 1960s were unprecedented. The great confidence that black southerners gained from the rare unity of their religious leaders in the 1950s-1960s is the key to why that minority was able to beat a hesitant and divided majority.

Segregationists spent almost as much time attacking their own southern white preachers for their "lukewarm" or "apathetic" attitude toward segregation as they spent attacking black leaders. It is striking how much segregationist leaders anticipated Martin Luther King's indictment of the white southern clergymen, in his famous 1963 Letter from the Birmingham Jail. Segregationists complained, as King did, of white southern preachers' failure to take a stand, not of their opposition. The difference is that King had greater confidence in his ability to win converts among those preachers (and he did win a few--not enough, surely, to command racial peace, but more than his enemies won). White supremacists succeeded in silencing and evicting a number of white southern preachers who had doubts about segregation, but they failed in their larger, more important goal of converting a significant number to a militant crusade for the cause. Segregationists' attacks on their own clergymen only divided their movement and exposed how segregationism lacked leadership and cultural authority.

Rivalries and conflicts within the black movement did not

become destructive and publicly visible until the mid-1960s. The young generation of protesters, increasingly independent from their elders and increasingly prominent in the public appearances of the movement after the formation of SNCC in 1960, showed obvious signs of battle fatigue by 1965. Though there were conflicts within the older generation, two growing differences between young and old leaders stood out as most significant. First, the young leaders were no longer willing to see the humanity of white liberals, who were fair-weather allies of the movement. The student group was quick to condemn liberals, who never shared the movement's redemptive vision and never sacrificed anything but their political enemies for black rights. The older leaders tended not to expect anybody, black or white, to be perfect, and they had been willing to find common ground where and when they could. Second, the young leaders were no longer willing to exploit and manipulate liberals (and others) to their own advantage. Where the young leaders inclined to moral purism, Martin Luther King's generation saw tactical and even moral value in those who might do the right thing for the wrong reason.

The most extreme purists in SNCC (the "floaters") left themselves open to condemnation not just from their elders but from their own ranks for their impractical resistance to the hierarchy, discipline, and authority that any organization needs. And yet the SNCC faction that favored organization and discipline also shunned compromise with the liberals--thinking, with a naïveté as spectacular as that of the floaters, that they could

destroy the system by disengaging from it. The "Stalinists," as some floaters called their rival faction, showed more devotion to the rhetoric of organizational discipline than to the unobtrusive drudgery needed to maintain it.

The mass media encouraged such rhetoric by paying attention to it and encouraging certain young black leaders to think they had more influence than they had. As SNCC lost hope in voter registration and direct action, many of its members found hope in the slogan of "black power." While this slogan did not improve SNCC's relations with white liberals in the North or with the unorganized black masses in the South, it did improve its visibility in the media. The media no longer had enough black authenticity from the music of James Brown and Aretha Franklin. The riots in American cities every summer of the late 1960s impelled the media to seek some sort of philosophical gloss on black anger, and black "militants" provided it. In addition to denouncing the white liberals who dominated the political system, the militants turned on the one black leader who could claim to be a national leader, Martin Luther King. To "militants," King became the symbol of all that was wrong with the older generation of black leaders. They said King was a naïve optimist who appealed to the goodness of white liberals, who failed to recognize that black people would only get freedom when they had "power."

As will be documented in **Chapter 5**, the image of Martin Luther King that prevails in current-day scholarship owes more to this black militant voice than to any other single source. In

the years after King's death, black militants shrewdly began to reclaim King as their own. Like the rest of America, they grew fonder of the martyred leader without understanding him any better. By the 1980s, they had convinced much of the academic world that, as King matured, he had become more and more like a black militant. Partially retreating from their denunciations of King, militants in the 1980s said that King began his career as a naïve optimist, who believed in the good will of white leaders and had faith in moral appeals to them. But they added to their story that King began to see how naïve he had been, just before he died, and adopted a deeper critique of American economic structures and a more coercive strategy. King's late speeches supplied some material for this new interpretation, for he sometimes painted a rhetorical figure of himself as having once taken white liberals' professions of good will too seriously. Unfortunately, most scholars of civil rights have bought into this, ignoring or failing to credit the evidence of King's own early writings that he was never a naïve optimist and never expressed faith in moral suasion.

Like most popular leaders, King's utterances are full of inconsistencies and contradictions. There were certainly changes of emphasis in his public statements over the years. But the emphasis on the structural economic injustices of capitalism and the consequent need for coercive strategies to right social wrongs were not, as black militants and virtually all scholars of civil rights now claim, new discoveries for King near the end of his life. Those things were part of King's intellectual

framework at least from the time he wrote his "Autobiography of Religious Development," in divinity school in 1950. The religious basis of his rejection of the normal drift of society as corrupt and sinful--the antithesis of naïve optimism about moral "progress"--is clear even earlier, in his essay on Jeremiah in 1948. That prophetic rejection of the normal course of things (including the recourse of oppressed peoples to violence throughout history) is what prepared King for Gandhian resistance --a strategy that King, like Gandhi, always understood as coercive, as having more in common with war than with Tolstoyan nonresistance.

The picture of a King who evolved from optimistic faith in liberal good will to eleventh-hour realism not only ignores King's intellectual history but also ignores the coercive tactics he and his followers practiced from Montgomery in 1955 forward. King was condemning American society as sinful, and he always recognized that redeeming it would require radical changes in basic economic structures, changes that powerful interests would never make voluntarily. His acceptance of piecemeal reforms was diplomatic and tactical, never wholeheartedly optimistic. His moral appeals, as prominent at the end of his career as at the beginning, were a handmaiden, not an alternative, to boycotts and other forceful forms of disruption.

Though most scholars who deny King's early insistence on structural economic change and coercive tactics place themselves on the left, their picture of the early King is useful to people on the right as well. Critics of affirmative action today often

cite the fictional early King as a supporter of their own particular version of a "color blind" society. Yet although King did not live to see the uses to which affirmative action would be put, he endorsed the philosophical case for affirmative action as a temporary means to make up for lingering effects of discrimination.

The struggle for black rights did take a new direction in the late 1960s and 1970s when affirmative action became its principal strategy, but (as will be documented in **Chapter 6**) the philosophical arguments to justify the new turn have a firmer grounding in the liberal tradition than critics of affirmative action claim. The critics, reluctant to blame King, absolve the martyred black leader of complicity in affirmative action and cite Lyndon Johnson's 1965 Howard University speech as the great wrong turn. Johnson declared that equality of opportunity was insufficient, announcing--more forthrightly than any civil rights leader--that equality of result was now a legitimate goal of policy. To the critics, equality of opportunity was the noble aim of the "early" civil rights movement, consistent with American liberal traditions. Critics say Johnson's speech allowed the movement, which was being institutionalized in federal agencies as it evaporated in the streets, to abandon opportunity in favor of bureaucratically demonstrable results. But Johnson's emphasis on equality of results is not the watershed that critics claim. The notion goes back to FDR's "freedom from want," if not indeed to the social democratic notions that became part of American liberalism in the

Progressive Era.

Still, the critics have made a strong moral case against affirmative action. Their case is especially strong against continuing emphasis on purely racial considerations when many black beneficiaries (perhaps a majority) now come from middle class homes; their parents might have deserved racial preferences, but it is hard to believe that racism wounds well-off black children in any way that government can effectively address, or in any way that government can democratically defend. Although racism certainly continues to offend middle-class blacks and often to damage their careers, it is hard to think their children deserve prima facie promotion over the many white children who have been trapped in poverty.

King (and Johnson and all the early advocates of affirmative action) endorsed a temporary regime of racial preferences. Given King's consistent class-consciousness, we might guess that he would be more sympathetic to the proposals now being made by William Julius Wilson, Richard Kahlenberg, and others for changing the basis of affirmative action from race to economic hardship. Poor whites, now disproportionately burdened by racial affirmative action, would be as eligible as poor blacks. These proposals answer all of the philosophical objections raised by critics (excluding libertarians who oppose all government intervention). They would also seem to address the more general criticism that liberals have abandoned disadvantaged white people, a criticism that has become a political liability of liberals as well as a moral indictment.

Regardless of what King might have thought of these new class-based schemes of affirmative action, there is something missing from the current debate, something the history of civil rights ought to remind us of. Liberals can justify continued adherence to affirmative action, but they cannot generate popular support for it. They still do not have the cultural resources to inflame passions and inspire sacrifices. They have had a worse time of it since the 1960s, because they lost the inspiring speakers they had allied themselves with in the civil rights movement. Confident of their power, and of the moral righteousness they acquired by associating with those speakers, liberals imposed the costs of affirmative action (and busing) on those least able to afford it--working class whites and blacks. Liberal leaders, mostly upper middle class, had secure jobs, educational attainments, and neighborhoods. Liberal programs undermined the security, educations, and neighborhoods of working class whites at a time when crime and social disorder, along with the Vietnam war, were imposing unprecedented costs of government and sowing unprecedented doubts about the liberals who controlled government. Meanwhile the mass culture industries, which liberals tolerated and encouraged when they broke racial barriers in the late 1940s, found new taboos to break. In doing so, they offended a much larger population than southern racists; yet liberals were still constrained by their principles to defend these industries. Liberals suffered from all that as well as from the growing unpopularity of affirmative action.

Liberals often used "democracy" interchangeably with

liberalism, but the association came to a hard test here. Democracy--majority rule--usually did lead to liberalism from the Depression through the mid-1960s. Even when liberals began pushing integration against the wishes of white majorities in the South, they could claim they had a majority of the rest of the nation behind them. But that was no longer true of what liberals were pushing, or asking tolerance of, by the 1970s. Liberals no longer had the most brilliant black ministers of the age, with their disciplined ranks of self-sacrificing nonviolent Christian soldiers, to keep the conscience of the majority on its toes. It was bureaucrats and aloof federal judges, not a groundswell of dignified, deserving, and disadvantaged Americans, who pushed affirmative action and busing.

Whatever the moral justifications for affirmative action--and there are very good ones, even if they are not all consistent with one another--its growing unpopularity poses a moral difficulty for those who continue to support it. (Affirmative action is even unpopular among a significant number of black voters now.) Supporters of affirmative action can claim to be liberals, but they cannot claim to be democrats--people who hold majority rule in one form or another to be a supreme moral principle. For democrats, the reform of affirmative action ought to balance the liberal claims of justice with something that can be justified to the majority and accepted by the majority. Class-based affirmative action seems worth a try, since it would answer the complaints of those who were abandoned by liberalism and therefore stopped voting for liberals.

But sooner or later, even with a new appeal to the old ethnic white working-class swing voters, the liberals are going to have to confront what they saw as missing from their faith back in the 1930s and 1940s: that core of inspiration, of irrational commitment and enthusiasm. Depression and war gave liberals crises to react to, and a charismatic leader to rally around. Then the civil rights movement gave them new crises and a new leader, which gave them confidence, commitment, and allies. Since then, liberals have hung on--nobly in many instances--to a vision of justice, but they have lost the urgent, powerful drama that brought voters to their feet, and to their knees. That is related to their loss of popularity.

X (What liberals lack now is not good a philosophical justification for their programs, but the confidence to go out and seek popular support. That is what they always lacked, as John Dewey, Malcolm Ross, Lionel Trilling, and others regretfully noted. The demand to which liberals hitched their wagon in the mid-1950s, for desegregation and voting rights, gave them what they had lacked--a mass movement, with a firm resolve that its demands were ordained by God and worth years of sacrifice--but only for about ten years. Affirmative action, to which many liberals now cling, has nothing like that force behind it. It is the remnant of the old movement's demand for justice domesticated by liberals who have little credibility as voices of the oppressed, largely because they have little connection with the oppressed.

Philosophical justification cannot be completely unrelated

to popular appeal. The American public likes a good argument as much as a good Jeremiad. But philosophical justification is not enough. Liberals' concentration on it grows out of the primal liberal faith in rationality, which sees all social problems, especially "prejudice," as susceptible to teaching and learning. Though the much decried "rights culture" of our notoriously litigious society owes a lot to this faith, one of the reasons trials remain great spectacles is that, as any good courtroom advocate could tell liberals, good arguments are not enough, not even in law courts, the one arena controlled by educated people and governed by formalistic rules of argument. It is as though liberals learned all of Socrates's noble condemnations of rhetoric (speech that goes beyond reason to persuade) without getting around to Aristotle's more realistic recognition of the unavailability of rhetoric and the ability of rhetoric to serve virtue as well as vice.

Reinhold Niebuhr's phrase, "emotionally potent oversimplifications," captures what is missing from the liberal case for affirmative action. Knowing that he was dangerously close to justifying dishonest propaganda and mass manipulation, Niebuhr said that "emotionally potent oversimplifications" are not merely the weapons of oppressors. The oppressed (and others who seek justice) have to employ emotionally potent oversimplifications as weapons against oppressors, and employing them up is morally dangerous because the temptation will always be strong to become morally complacent about one's own oversimplifications. That is a temptation that oppressed people cannot afford to yield to, for

tactical as well as moral reasons. Yet it is a temptation that is especially great for the oppressed while they are engaged in a fight for justice. Niebuhr noted that the oppressed must rely on emotionally potent oversimplifications even more than their oppressors do, precisely because the oppressed lack the power to compel consent. In other words, social justice, which can only come through coercive action, is more difficult than liberals or even revolutionaries imagined. Propaganda is necessary to the struggle for justice yet threatens to thwart it every moment. Liberals seem to agree with Niebuhr on the dangers of propaganda, but they do not heed him on the necessity for it. At present, all the emotionally potent oversimplifications--"reverse discrimination" and the like--are on the other side of the debate.

What liberals--or whoever else will claim the mantle of the civil rights movement--need are supple philosophical minds, like Martin Luther King's, who can translate philosophical justifications into ringing phrases that call upon the best of American tradition. That tradition may contain some liberalism, but it must draw from something deeper, as Dewey, Trilling, and many others sensed. It may be that affirmative action--even if "mending" it turns out to mean extending its benefits to deserving white people--can only inspire emotionally impotent oversimplifications. If that turns out to be the case, those who believe in democracy (or in the public efficacy of social struggle, which may boil down to the same thing) may have to abandon affirmative action altogether and seek something that can

be effectively justified to the majority.

Among those trying to claim the mantle of the civil rights movement today are scholars (many of them former activists) who write about it. Like everybody else, today's academic experts on civil rights use their narratives to score points against their perceived enemies. The present study will not be able, and will not pretend, to transcend that human tendency. But it will try to stretch beyond the current terms of debate, including (**in Chapter 7**) the special choices scholars make, which shape public discussion, though the non-specialist public rarely sees these choices presented as choices.

Social scientists have fallen into two camps over how to explain the civil rights movement. Other writers on the subject, without being explicit or necessarily consistent about it, fall more or less on either side. The first camp adopts an external explanation: economic development forced poor black folk out of the rural South; by moving cityward, black folk enfranchised themselves; competition between the two parties for the black vote in a period of close elections forced concessions to black voters. The second camp adopts an internal explanation: black organizations, especially church-based ones, carefully planned and initiated the movement, without regard to the white world that excluded them; they developed charismatic yet participatory leadership styles; they formed diffuse structures of communication that were invulnerable to surveillance; and they produced a defiant culture of collective self-respect that can outlive

political change.

The ideological overtones of the two explanations have grown stale: the external model appealed to Marxists and liberal modernization theorists, the internal model to black nationalists and to postmodernists who think oppression begins and ends with language and symbols. Chapter 7 ends with a plea to scholars--and others who would understand civil rights--to combine the best of both models together. That may help get the debate out of its current rut, in which it has been stuck for too long.

Lest there be any doubt left, **The Conclusion** (to be added to this manuscript after revision) will attempt to make explicit what the author thinks his position is in the broad political and cultural discussion of race today. Inevitably, reviewers of A STONE OF HOPE will put it into prefabricated pigeonholes; the conclusion will remind readers how poorly it fits. The author has no wish to conceal the fact that he considers his country to be in a moral crisis over race, and that he hopes to clarify what to do in the future by shining a particular light from the past onto the confusion of the present. He will not make the old academic presumption of neutrality above the fray; nor will he make the equal and opposite presumption, more common among academics today, of speaking for a particular camp--black people, oppressed minorities, "progressives," "critical theory"--as if any of these categories are monoliths with implicit programs of salvation written into them.

The ideological framework that grew out of the movement's death-throes--"militant" black nationalism vs. muddle-through

liberalism vs. the silent majority--no longer defines the nation's differences of opinion on race and poverty. To clarify the intellectual debate of today, I propose a new framework of three categories, enlisting myself in the last: there is the party of despair (represented by Patricia Williams, Jonathan Coleman, and the former liberal Derrick Bell, sometimes aided and abetted by Andrew Hacker--though he has been inconsistent); there is the party of complacency (Shelby Steele, Dinesh D'Souza, and others); and there is the party of hope (William Julius Wilson, Jim Sleeper, and others, including the former black nationalist Vincent Harding). This framework is not rigid; it is not even stable yet (Richard Rodriguez, for example, seems to have drifted from the party of complacency into the party of hope; Randall Kennedy convincingly rejects despair and complacency, yet revives a radical individualism that offers no visible ground for building solidarity, which hope seems to require; Cornel West cannot seem to make up his mind; Henry Louis Gates seems to be everywhere at once). I am not saying all the principals understand yet where they are in the lineup. It will be a tentative offering, to invite if not incite better classifications.