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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

CC: LEON PANETTA

FROM: Harold Ickes (HI)

SUBJECT: Analysis of the 1994 election polls by Fred Steeper

Attached is a copy of an article by Fred Steeper entitled "This Swing Is Different: Analysis Of The 1994 Election Exist Polls," which was published in a *Cook Political Report* of 8 February 1995. Mr. Steeper is a partner in Market Strategies, Inc., a national research firm based in Southfield, MI that polls for Republicans.

Looking at the support of conservatives, moderates and liberals for Republicans in 1994, he concludes that the substantial increase of conservative votes for Republicans (up 19 points over 1990), compared to the substantial decrease for liberals (minus 8 points compared to 1990), with virtually no change for moderates, that, unlike most elections which he characterizes as "retrospective elections" which merely reward or punish the incumbent party based on whether the voters believe that times are good or bad, 1994 was a policy election.

He asserts that a conservative "mandate" must be looked at in terms of cultural conservatism rather than economic conservatism.

Based on the data, he argues that neither the middle class nor the "angry white males" drove the 1994 results.

Analyzing the moderates, he divides them into 2 groups. One are voters who distrust the extremism of both the left and the right. The second, however, place heavy weight on experience, integrity and other personal characteristics of the candidate, and, therefore, they tend to favor incumbents of both parties because they have more information about incumbents than challengers.

He divides conservatives into 2 groups, one the economic conservative, and the other the cultural conservative. The latter is concerned about traditional morality concerning belief in God, hard work, patriotism, frugality, personal and family responsibility and self-reliance. Cultural conservatism has

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become politically charged because many believe these values are threatened.

According to the author, conventionally religious Americans are the core of the constituency that believes traditional values must be revitalized. This constituency is not limited to evangelical or fundamentalist Christian, although they are part of it.

He claims that "Democrats are in total denial of any significant moral values component to their 1994 defeat."

He concludes that "1994 represents the first, deep change in the competitive situation between Republicans and Democrats in over 60 years."

Economic conservatives are an integral part of the Republican coalition, as are economic liberals in Democratic coalition. What is new is that the economic conservatives have been joined cultural conservatives, representing the conservative side of the new issues, to form a coalition, at least, equal to the Democratic coalition of the economic and cultural liberals. Id. at 12.

Violent crime, a permanent welfare population, and lagging student performance have led many to conclude that there has been a break down in important traditional values such as personal and family responsibility, self-reliance, individual merit and religious principles. Specific cultural issues such as capital punishment, school prayer, abortion, illegal immigration, gay rights and affirmative action together form a new continuum in our politics. Id. at 11.

Consequently, we must seriously consider the proposition that the New Deal party system came to an honorable but definite end this past November and was replaced by a new system with a different competitive relationship between the parties and with a new set of issues defining them alongside the older economic ones. Id.

THIS SWING IS DIFFERENT

Analysis of 1994 Election Exit Polls By Fred Steeper

We have had large swings in our national elections before. For the past 40 years, they have occurred more frequently for President than for Congress. For Congress, we've been having rather dull outcomes even in years of excitement at the top of the ticket. Occasionally, we have had noteworthy congressional swings; 1974, 1980, and 1982 were our most recent examples. However, all these swings, presidential and congressional, meant little for the next national election. Indeed, our series of elections have been like watching an NBA basketball game—whoever is ahead in one quarter is likely to fall behind in the next quarter. It is not without justification that some Democrats are already predicting the election of a Democratic Congress in 1996.

Usually our national elections are dominated by short term issues. As the description implies, the result they produce in one election means little for the next election. The large swings for Congress in 1974, 1980, and 1982 were all built on short term issues—Watergate, Carter's presidency, and a severe recession. Watergate did not mean the demise of the Republican Party as some speculated; the 1980 "Reagan Revolution" was not the precursor of a Republican U.S. House of Representatives in the next election as many Republicans believed in 1981; and the 1981-1982 recession did not mean a Democrat President in 1984. History was quite perverse.

A consistent feature of a short term tide is that it pushes virtually all groups in the same partisan direction. Some groups are propelled more than others, but they all move in the same pro or anti direction. In 1982, for example, the Republican congressional vote was down among liberals and conservatives, among women and men, among blacks and whites, and so on, virtually without exception. Some groups were down more than others, to be sure, but all were "down" nonetheless.

Much is made of differences in subgroup voting, sometimes too much. With some exceptions, U.S. voters do not fall into true voting blocs the way voters do in many European countries. The outcomes of our elections usually can be explained by common

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Fred Steeper is a partner in Market Strategies, Inc., a national research firm based in Southfield, Michigan that polls for Republicans.

perceptions, no matter what the subgroup. Watergate (1974) was a national disgrace. So was the holding of American hostages (1980) in Iran for 444 days. Double digit inflation (1980) and double digit unemployment (1982) were intolerable. All Americans shared or begrudgingly felt these sentiments. These common perceptions moved all Americans, in varying degrees, in the same direction on election day—toward Republican congressional candidates in 1980 and toward Democrat congressional candidates in 1974 and 1982.

All subgroups do not reach the same majority decision, of course. Different groups have different degrees of built-in biases that resist a trend, but the groups rarely move in different directions in a single election.² (When they do, it is called a "realignment.") It is a non-finding to report, for example, that the Republican vote is higher among Protestants than Catholics or higher in non-union households than in union households. These differences merely report group biases that have existed for decades, long past their original rationale. So, different groups, in any given election, start at different points in their inclination to vote Republican or Democrat. From their different starting points, American voters usually move in the same direction—as sensible people making sensible judgments about what is best for the country, in spite of the partisan biases learned from their parents and grandparents.

The Normal Pattern: Recent Presidential Elections

A normal subgroup pattern corresponding to short term tides can be seen in the exit poll data for recent presidential elections. Figure 1 uses self-identified liberals, moderates and conservatives as examples of subgroup movement across the last five presidential elections. All three groups, after 1976, move in tandem through the Republican victories in the 1980s, returning to a Democratic win in 1992. (The one point decline in the 1980 Republican vote of liberals compared to 1976 is a minor exception. It is partly due to the above average third party vote for Anderson. The Anderson vote also dampens the increase in the 1980 GOP moderate and conservative vote.)³

There are similar parallel movements across the five presidential elections by race, gender, party

identification, age, religion, and so on. The special interests of none of the subgroups defined by these variables were primary factors in recent presidential elections.

Substantively, Figure 1 nicely illustrates the two important components of short term swings. First, voters have different starting points as witness the large differences among liberals, moderates, and conservatives that are maintained in varying degrees across all five elections. Second, the three ideological groups move in the same direction, reflecting the same net consensus on the short term issues in a particular election year. When conservatives, moderates, and liberals all agree, the "meaning of the election" can hardly be ideological. The outcome of such an election is primarily the result of short term perceptions and issues that prevail across all groups and change by the next election.

Presidential elections (and congressional elections) have been more "retrospective elections" than "policy elections." In retrospective elections the voters reward or punish the incumbent party based on whether they believe times are good or bad. In so doing, the voters are judging the results of policies rather than the policies themselves. Rarely have our elections been determined by voters explicitly choosing one set of policies over another.

The retrospective pattern is clearly seen in the diagram of recent presidential elections. There was a net consensus by virtually all groups that "times were bad" in 1980, so the vote of the out-party, the Republicans, went up across-the-board. Times are better in 1984 and the vote for the GOP, now the incumbent party, goes up for all three groups; times are not quite as good in 1988 and the GOP vote of all three goes down, and times are worse in 1992 and the GOP vote of all three falls further. Place this retrospective voting along side the nation's economic growth rates or changes in real per capita income between these elections, and one can see that these are perfectly reasonable verdicts by the voters.

Retrospective elections do not carry much policy meaning even in the broad sense of voting for a liberal direction or a conservative direction. They are votes of punishment or reward of the party in power and offer no prediction for what will happen in the next election.

There have been important policy trends during this period. In the early 1980s, many voters did want a stronger national defense and less government spending. There seemed to be a national demand for the federal government to take action on health insurance in 1992. During this entire period, there has been growing

activism of cultural conservatives concerned about the threat to traditional values.

These policy and even ideological trends had some impact on recent presidential elections, but they did not define them in an emphatic way. And, they had no evident impact below President.

1994—This Swing is Different

1994 is different. Everyone did not move in the same direction. And, once these rare subgroup movements are sorted out, one is struck by the unavoidable conclusion that the voters made a policy decision in 1994, not just a retrospective "nature of the times" decision. Indeed, the retrospective model would not have predicted a sweeping defeat of Democrats—by conventional definitions, the economy was doing well and there was relative peace abroad.

1994 was a policy election. The voters perceived Republicans as representing a conservative direction and Democrats as representing a liberal direction and chose accordingly more than they have ever done in, perhaps, over 60 years. There is, indeed, a conservative mandate in the 1994 election result.

Of the myriad subgroup results reported in the exit polls for the U.S. House, the most significant is the one for liberals, moderates, and conservatives. (Among other things, the results for these three groups drive the results for all the other groups.) As seen in Figure 2, there has been a surge in conservative voting for Republican House candidates beginning in 1992. In that year, Republican House candidates won 72% of the conservative vote, setting a new high water mark in congressional elections for the GOP—only to be incredibly raised another eight points in the 1994 election. Liberals, on the other hand, have been setting new lows in Republican voting for the House in the last two elections. Moderates are mysteriously impervious to the liberal/conservative polarization. (See later section on "The Mystery of the Moderates.")

In 1994, self-described conservatives reported a huge 80% vote for Republican House candidates. In contrast, less than a majority of moderates voted Republican (42%), and only 18% of liberals voted Republican.

The 80% vote for House Republicans by conservatives is eight points higher than conservatives have "ever" voted for House Republicans, going back to 1980. Moreover, the conservatives' vote for Republicans is 13 points higher than their average 66% Republican House vote between 1980 and 1992.⁴

But, what makes the conservative result extremely important is that moderates and liberals did not move in the same direction. Even though

Republicans achieved their highest national proportion in decades, they did not exceed their previous highs with liberals or moderates. Moreover, Republicans did not exceed even the *average support* of liberals and moderates for Republican House candidates between 1980 and 1992.

Moderates have been voting for Republican House candidates in the surprisingly tight range of 40% to 43%. Their 42% Republican vote in 1994 indicates no Republican tide at all. In fact, their 1994 vote is equal to just *their average support* for Republicans between 1980 and 1992.

The comparison of conservative voters to liberal voters is truly dramatic. The 18% liberal vote for Republicans in 1994 is 11 points *under* their highest vote for Republicans (29% in 1986) and 6 points *under* their 24% average Republican House vote between 1980 and 1992.

Table 1.
1994 GOP House Vote Compared to Past Elections for Ideological Groups

(numbers represent % differences in their vote compared to their highest previous vote and their average vote from 1980-1992)

	Compared to Their Prior High	Compared to Their '80-'92 Avg.
Liberals	-11	-6
Moderates	-1	0
Conservatives	+8	+13

The pro-Republican movement of only conservatives means the 1994 election was not driven mainly by such non-policy factors as Clinton's personal unpopularity, anger with "politics as usual" and "gridlock," or unhappiness with the economy. This election is more than kicking the ins out because of an amorphous dissatisfaction with government performance. All such explanations would be supported by parallel movements of the three ideological groups. That did not happen.

What did happen was a rare policy reaction by the voters. Conservatives polarized toward the Republican Party; liberals toward the Democratic Party. The conservatives produced the Republican Congress. The content of their mandate is open to question. Republicans tend to interpret it as a call for smaller government. Democrats acknowledge this possible meaning, but they talk about making government "more efficient," not necessarily smaller. Significantly, both explanations interpret the conservative mandate in terms of economic conservatism rather than cultural conservatism. Whether this is a fair interpretation will

be discussed in a later section. (See section on "The Conservative-Cultural Realignment.")

The polarization of conservatives and liberals in the 1994 congressional election is responsible for many other subgroups either reaching new highs in Republican congressional voting or moving in a contrary direction. In every case, the groups that reached new highs contain a larger than average number of conservatives (and/or fewer liberals).⁵ Consequently, the following groups were part of the Republican surge in 1994: they voted above their prior Republican highs and, in most cases, *substantially above* their average Republican House vote.

Table 2.
1994 GOP House Vote Compared to Past Elections for Groups Joining the GOP Swing

(numbers represent % differences in their vote compared to their highest previous vote and their average vote from 1980-1992)

	Compared to Their Prior High	Compared to Their '80-'92 Avg.
Republicans	+2	+9
Whites	+3	+7
Southern whites	+9	+13
White men	+5	+9
White women	+2	+5
White Protestants/Christians	+3	+8
Catholics	+6	+9
Born agains	+9	+15
Married men	+3	+6
Married women	+3	+4

Similarly, every group that did not join the Republican surge contains a larger than average number of liberals (and/or fewer conservatives). In 1994, they voted below their prior Republican highs and even, in several cases, below just their average Republican House vote.

Table 3.
1994 GOP House Vote Compared to Past Elections for Groups Not Joining the Swing

(numbers represent % difference in their vote compared to their highest previous vote and their average vote from 1980-1992)

	Compared to Their Prior High	Compared to Their '80-'92 Avg.
White Democrats	-8	-3
Post college grads	-2	-2
Eastern whites	-1	+3
Jews	-7	-2
Blacks	-10	-4
Unmarried women	-4	-1

The importance of ideology in 1994 can be further illustrated within five of the groups that were not part of the Republican swing, i.e. post college grads, eastern whites, Jews, blacks, and unmarried women. Taking these counter-trend voters together, the conservatives among them still voted Republican by 75% to 25%. The problem for Republicans, if it is a problem (see later section on "The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion"), is that there simply are fewer conservatives in these five groups than in other groups of voters.

Table 4.
1994 House Vote of Counter-trend Voters
(Post college grads, eastern whts, Jews, blacks, and unmarried wmn)¹

	Conservative	Moderate	Liberal
Republican	75%	38%	12%
Democrat	25%	62%	88%

¹ Based on MSI cross-tabs of Mitofsky International '94 exit poll data.

What about the middle class? Didn't they drive the 1994 result? The exit poll data say "no." Liberal middle class voters voted 82% Democrat to 18% Republican in the House races. Conservative lower income voters voted 73% Republican to 27% Democrat. Indeed, overwhelming majorities of conservatives, regardless of income, voted Republican. Overwhelming majorities of liberals, regardless of income, voted Democratic. (See Figure 3.) The story of 1994 is not income, it is ideology.

What about "angry white males?" Didn't they drive the 1994 result? Again, the exit poll data say "no." Conservative white women voted 82% Republican to 18% Democrat in the House races, similar to conservative white men who voted 85% Republican to 15% Democrat. Liberal white men voted 83% Democrat to 17% Republican, similar to liberal white women who voted 80% Democrat to 20% Republican. (See Figure 4.) The story of 1994 is not gender, it is ideology.

The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion

While this analysis identifies a new Republican plurality in congressional elections, some Republicans will not be happy with the apparent "exclusion" of some groups from the new plurality. Our political parties naturally want to be "inclusive." The more voters and groups under the tent the more legitimate the governing majority. Political scientists describe this as the integration or aggregation function of out parties.

Pushing a single group's agenda is the function of interest groups; aggregating those interest into a governing majority is the function of parties.⁶

The point about 1994, however, is not about conventional interest group voting; it is about ideological voting. Conservatives voted Republican. Liberals voted Democrat. And, they did so for good reasons. Some social groups are disproportionately conservative; others are disproportionately liberal. Groups that have an above average number of conservatives or liberals, stand out as voting more or less Republican than before. They did so because of their conservative or liberal values.

It would be a huge mistake for Republicans to interpret these results as identifying groups the Party needs to target for improvement or "inclusion" by moderating its conservative message. That would be standing this analysis on its head. If Republican improvement is sought, it should be by convincing more people in the group that conservative policies are better for them, for the country, or for both. In attempting this, the Party needs to accept that many people believe in a liberal welfare state or rely on the opinions of those that do. Some people and groups may never be convinced otherwise. But, then, that is why we have a two-party system.

These results, also, strongly suggest that the old paradigm of the parties as aggregations of economic interest groups has been eclipsed by the politics of shared cultural values. Many, if not most, of the cutting issues of today defy an interpretation based on economic self-interest, e.g. school prayer, gay rights, gun control, abortion, and capital punishment. Other issues such as welfare reform, immigration, and affirmative action are more value issues than economic issues although many, especially liberal Democrats, will disagree. To the extent economic self-interest influences modern voting choices, the voter as "taxpayer" is more relevant than the old, New Deal era notion of the voter as a worker in a particular industry. "Taxpayer," however, is too broad a group to fit the old paradigm of parties as aggregations of competing economic groups.

Interestingly, the first counter-offensive by the Democrats after the 1994 election was an attempt to gain political leverage by dividing taxpayers into the middle class and the wealthy. Their middle class tax cut proposals reflect the way Democrats think about the electorate—in terms of economic conflict. But, the 1994 election was not about tax cuts or "classes." (See Figure 3.) Unfortunately, the Republican Party is being seduced by the Democrats into a monetary bidding war when its mandate was about broader issues than the materialistic issue of taxes.

The Mystery of the Moderates

One excluded group from the Republican plurality deserving special comment are the "moderates." This would appear to be a fairly significant exclusion. More voters identified themselves as moderate (46%) than identified themselves as either conservative (36%) or liberal (18%) on election day.⁷

However, it is the prediction of this analysis that the Republican Party will have a surge in moderate support in 1996 barring a Republican disaster with the voters overall.

To make this prediction, two types of moderates need to be considered. One is the voter who distrusts the extremism of both the left and the right. These voters could be pushed to vote even more Democratic than they have been if the Republican Congress goes "too far" in its conservative legislation. It is this first type that many have in mind when they use the term moderate voters.

However, a second type of moderate voter needs to be considered for it is they who probably represent most moderates and will account for the predicted surge in Republican voting in 1996. They are voters who say they vote for the "best person." They put a heavy weight on experience, integrity, and other personal characteristics. They, also, are less interested in policy choices compared to the first type of moderate and, therefore, are not as sensitive to policy controversies and extremes.

With the second type of moderate, incumbents of both parties have a distinct advantage. A moderate is much more likely to have the personal information, that he or she values most, about an incumbent than about the incumbent's challenger. All one has to assume is that most incumbents are, personally, good people to see the advantage incumbents have with the second type of moderate on election day.

Return to Figure 2 and what we should now characterize as the truly amazing flatness of the voting behavior of moderates in past congressional elections. Why would this be? The only thing that is a common thread through these eight elections is that most of the House candidates in a single election are incumbents, albeit not the same ones every election. This also will be true in 1996 but with a very important difference—most of the incumbents will be Republicans!

The Conservative-Cultural Realignment

There are two brands of conservatism in the country. One is economic conservatism. The other is cultural conservatism. Cultural conservatism is the newer of the two, and it is likely the reason for the historical result on November 8, 1994. An interesting ramification of the latter assertion is that all of the Democrats' post election counter-offensive and much of the Republicans' response to their victory miss the revolutionary meaning of the 1994 election.

Economic conservatism has been politically relevant since the beginning days of the FDR era. It is about the role of the federal government in the national economy and in individual financial situations. Liberals favor a large federal role; conservatives favor a small federal role. We are all familiar with this battle.

Cultural conservatism has been politically relevant for a shorter period of time and is less well understood. It is about traditional morality concerning belief in God, hard work, patriotism, frugality, personal and family responsibility, and self-reliance. Cultural conservatism has become politically charged because many believe these values are threatened. They are threatened, according to cultural conservatives, by a decay in society's commitment to traditional values and by government policies that are hastening the decay.

Conventionally religious Americans are at the core of the constituency that believes traditional values must be revitalized. The constituency is not limited to evangelical or fundamentalist Christians although they are part of it. Most religious Americans would not consider themselves part of the "religious right movement" or even know of the Christian Coalition. The impact of traditional religious values on the 1994 election are woefully understated if limited to those who describe themselves as evangelical Christians or part of the religious right. If, however, the term "religious right" covers people who are religious and conservative on cultural issues, then it covers a majority of Americans.

The Democrats are rationalizing their losses in 1994 by interpreting the election's message as one for a more efficient government and not necessarily for a government that does less. Their agenda of "reinventing government" combined with a "taxpayer's bill of rights" manifest an economic understanding of the election without yielding their liberal belief in a large, albeit more efficient, role for the federal government. Democrats are in total denial of any significant moral values component to their 1994 defeat.

The position of the Republican Party in all this is very intriguing. For decades, it has urged a government that does less and spends less although

sometimes zigzagging into the territory of advocating a "more efficient" government, as well. The Party would be most pleased and most comfortable with an election that finally embraced this brand of conservatism.

While the top of the Republican Party has been most focused on economic conservatism, the base of its voting support has been expanding and changing with the influx of cultural conservatives. Ironically, the cultural conservatives have sought out the Republican Party more than being solicited by it. Many lost their home in the Democratic Party that feels moral issues have no place in politics. So, they carried their moral concerns into the Republican Party.

Many cultural conservatives carry the controversial abortion issue in their bundle of moral concerns and/or unabashedly use the label "Christian." On the specific issue of abortion, there is close to a national consensus supporting a woman's basic right to an abortion.⁸ On the broader matter of the political activism of Christians, we have always had a party system that has remained neutral toward our nation's religious affiliations. The discomfort felt by the Republican Party about these features of its new adherents is understandable. However, the cultural conservatives have become an essential part of the Republican coalition, and they are probably responsible for the Party achieving what it could not achieve with economic conservatives alone, a Republican Congress.

The Republican Congress will most certainly act to create a government that will do less and costs less, or, together with the White House, act to create a more efficient federal government. What it does to restore traditional values in public policy is more problematic but equally important to maintain its new coalition.

A direct test of the role of cultural issues compared to economic issues in 1994 is not available in the exit poll data.⁹ However, a very suggestive test can be made by investigating the relative impact of religiosity (a surrogate for cultural issues) and income (a surrogate for economic issues) on the 1994 House vote. The Mitofsky International exit poll asked voters if they attended religious services at least once a week and if they were "born again/evangelical Christians." For analysis purposes, we will classify those who were affirmative to both questions as "high" on religiosity; classify those who were negative to both questions as "low" on religiosity; and classify those who were affirmative on one of the two questions as "medium" on religiosity. The voters' income levels are similarly collapsed into three groups: low, middle, and high income. The income groups are rough measures of the voters' economic expectations of government in so far as they are determined by one's own financial situation.

(Lower income voters presumably desire a larger economic role for government; upper income voters, a smaller role for government.)

Figure 5 shows the Republican vote for the nine combinations of income and religiosity. While the Republican House vote increases with income (the surrogate for economic conservatism), it increases even more across the levels of religiosity (the surrogate for cultural conservatism). Religiosity accounts for twice "the variance" in the House vote that income does. In layman's terms, religiosity was twice as important as income in the 1994 election.

Emergence of a New Party System

1994 may be more than a rare policy election or a one-time conservative mandate, as significant as those are. It may also mean the full emergence of a new party system.

Our country has had only five party systems in its entire history, two before the Civil War and three after.¹⁰ While the first four lasted 25 to 33 years each, the last was an amazing 62 years old on November 8, 1994. Party systems are defined by the competitive situation of the parties and the fundamental public concerns the parties represent or operate within. 1994 represents the first, deep change in the competitive situation between Republicans and Democrats in over 60 years. It is unlikely that such a sweeping change, including major changes in state legislative seats as well as for the U.S. Congress and state governors, was the result of short term concerns alone. It is also unlikely that the competitive change between the two parties was the result of voters finally accepting the position of economic conservatives after 60 years of debate.

When a new party system emerged in our past, it was because a new set of unresolved concerns came to the fore, commanding at least as much vote attention as the older issues. Violent crime, a permanent welfare population, and lagging student performance have led many to conclude there has been a breakdown in important traditional values such as personal and family responsibility, self-reliance, individual merit, and religious principles. Specific cultural issues such as, capital punishment, school prayer, abortion, illegal immigration, gay rights, and affirmative action, together, form a new continuum in our politics.

Consequently, we must seriously consider the proposition that the New Deal party system came to an honorable but definite end this past November and was replaced by a new system with a different competitive relationship between the parties and with a new set of issues defining them along side the older, economic ones.¹¹

Economic conservatives are an integral part of the Republican coalition as are economic liberals in the Democratic coalition. What is new is that the economic conservatives have been joined by cultural conservatives, representing the conservative side of the new issues, to form a coalition, at least, equal to the Democratic coalition of the economic and cultural liberals.

A new party system does not necessarily mean a new dominant party. It is too early to tell if the Republicans will be the dominant majority the way the Democrats were in the last system or will remain roughly equal or even slightly behind the Democrats. However, there does not appear to be much chance that the Democrats will have dominant status in the new system as they did in the last one.

While the data presented here paints a picture of a cultural realignment confined to 1992 and 1994, that is an overly narrow view. A cultural realignment began in the South in the 1960s and in the remainder of the country in the late 1970s. The Reagan election in 1980 was the beginning stage of the national emergence of the new party system.¹² The emergence, below the presidential level, was then blunted by several events, especially the 1981 recession, the Iran/Contra scandal, and the 1991 recession. All three events elevated short term, retrospective voting over longer term, policy voting. In addition, the Republican Party's communication of a provocative conservative agenda weakened substantially in Reagan's second term and in George Bush's term in office.

However, the most important reason for the decade-delay in the realignment may have been Republican control of the White House. Voters tend to believe that the party that controls the White House controls the federal government. Consequently, conservative voters wanting to vote for a change were in an ambiguous situation during the period of two Republican Presidents. They perceived the Republican Party as more conservative, but the Republican Party was in control of federal policies that they disliked. Not coincidentally, 1994 was the first election since 1980 when there was no ambiguity for conservatives wanting to vote for a change in policy. In this light, 1994 continued what happened in 1980. The new party system needed a Democratic President and a Democratic Congress to fully emerge in the nation's voting patterns.

The 1994 election does not represent a realignment in the conventional sense that there was a reversal in the voters' basic party loyalties. The 1994 exit polls show that the voting public was still more Democratic than Republican.¹³ The exit polls also record that the voting public was more conservative than liberal. But, even the latter finding is not new. What is

new is the ideological polarization of the vote for Congress.

In the wake of the 1994 election, national surveys have been published that give conflicting results on whether voters truly support the various parts of the conservative agenda, especially as represented by the Contract With America. The problem with this evidence is that policy questions in public opinion polls are notoriously biased, not necessarily in their wording, but in the information they include or do not include and in the context in which they are placed. Welfare reform, for example, is a hugely complex issue, both in substance and in the preferences of the voters. "Liberal responses" to welfare polling questions are easy to obtain. Such contrary findings only confirm the complexity of the issue. The big picture remains the same—the plurality of voters want a conservative policy direction.

Finally, the impact of the controversial 1992 Republican Convention needs to be reconsidered. In light of this analysis, its emphasis on traditional values did not harm the Party; it helped the Party. It did polarize voters but with a net gain, at the congressional level, for the Republicans. (see Figure 1, 1992 and 1994 elections.) The Republicans lost the White House in 1992 because of disenchantment with national economic policy, not because of the GOP Convention's conservative themes.¹⁴ An important irony in the 1992 election is that Republicans gained House seats that year while losing the White House—a very unusual event. We now see that 1992 was the beginning of a values polarization below the Presidential level that led to a Republican takeover of Congress two years later. The conservative messages of the 1992 GOP Convention may very well have played a key role in this process.

Comments on the Exit Poll Data

Two organizations conducted exit polls in 1994: Mitofsky International and Voter News Service. Both sets of data were reported in various publications after the election. To add to the possible confusion, the results of both exit polls have been or will be revised since their first appearance. The Mitofsky results were revised on December 1, 1994 and the VNS results will be revised in early 1995.

We used both exit polls for this analysis. We used the December 1 version of the Mitofsky International data and the November 9, 1994 version of the VNS data. In addition to copies of the complete cross-tabs from both organizations, we obtained the individual level data from Mitofsky International to run additional analysis.

The Mitofsky International and VNS results were remarkably similar for most subgroups including the reported vote of liberals, moderates, and conservatives that form the core of our analysis. Rather than choose one set of data over the other, we averaged the two together, with a weight of two on the VNS results as they are based on roughly twice as many interviews.

The historical House data is taken from a copy of the Voter Research and Surveys cross-tabs for 1992 and from a table published in the *New York Times* on November 13, 1994 for all other years. Some of the results in the November *New York Times* table were erroneous and corrections were made in consultation with the newspaper. The *New York Times* may run a revision of the historical table in a January edition.

Notes

1. "Down" can mean down from the Republican vote in 1980 or down from the average Republican vote for the group from 1980 to 1992, for which there is exit poll data. Both comparisons are true in describing the 1982 Republican vote as "down." There is one major exception—Republicans. The 1980 and 1982 Republican votes by Republicans for the U.S. House were the two highest in the seven elections between 1980 and 1992. This is part of 1980-1982 being precursors, not for 1984, but for 1994.

2. One of the rare and dramatic occurrences of groups moving in opposite directions was in the 1960 Presidential election. Protestants moved toward Nixon and Catholics moved toward Kennedy. This was a short term effect, unique to the candidates that year, and had no relevance for the 1964 presidential election.

3. Both 1980 and 1992 had significant third party votes that complicate comparisons to the other three elections in the series which had under 2% for all minor parties. However, if one uses the "major party" percentages (dropping the third party vote from the denominator) or uses a 50% allocation of the third party vote to each major party, a parallel movement of the three groups is still the predominate pattern.

4. The difference between 80% and 66% is 13% due to rounding.

5. Based on MSI cross-tabs of Mitofsky International 1994 exit poll data.

6. U.S. parties are driven to form large aggregations by our winner-take-all system. Some political parties in Europe are more like U.S. interest groups than U.S. parties. They place a priority on representing a group interest over forming a governing majority. They typically exist in parliamentary systems that reward minority parties with pieces of power. Our system does not.

7. Based on the average Mitofsky International and VNS exit poll results. The two exit polls are within two percent or less of each other in their respective estimates of the proportions of liberals, moderates, and conservatives in the 1994 election.

8. There is also a national consensus that abortion rights should have limits—as all our rights have limits.

9. The exit polls did not ask the kind of general questions needed to capture the voters' philosophical orientations beyond having the voters classify themselves as liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Instead, they ask issue and perception questions of a short-term nature. The one exception is in the VNS exit poll that did ask a single question about the role of government. Unfortunately, it does not include a philosophical question about moral values to properly classify voters in a two dimensional space of cultural issues versus economic issues.

10. See William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.) *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*. Oxford University Press (New York, 1967) for descriptions of party systems in our history.

11. Befitting a new party system, the parties, especially the Republicans, have developed, or had developed for them, a new way of communicating with large numbers of voters—partisan talk radio. Interestingly, partisan talk radio is a throwback to the partisan newspapers of the 19th century.

12. 1980 marked the first time in the University of Michigan's National Election Studies, going back to 1952, that frequency of church attendance was significantly related to partisanship and voting. See John R. Petrocik and Frederick T. Steeper, "The Political Landscape in 1988," *Public Opinion* (Sept/Oct, 1987).

13. In the Mitofsky International exit poll, 39% are Democrats, 34% are Republicans, and 26% are independents. In the VNS exit poll, 38% are Democrats, 36% are Republicans, and 26% are independents.

14. An RNC post election survey found "the Republican Convention showing the Republican Party was too right-wing" was only the 25th most important consideration in voting for President that year out of 33 items. Twenty-five percent of the voters rated this statement about the convention as "very much" on their minds when they voted.

Source: Election day exit polls: 1994 Mitofsky Int./NNS Average. 1990-1992 VRS. 1976 CBS News. Other years NYT/CBS News.





Figure 2.
Trend in Republican U.S. House Vote
by Ideology
(1980-1994)

Figure 1.
Trend in Republican Presidential Vote
by Ideology
(1976-1992)



Source: Election day exit polls: 1992 VRS. 1976 CBS News. Other years NYT/CBS News.





Figure 4.
1994 Republican House Vote by Ideology and Gender

Figure 3.
1994 Republican House Vote by Ideology and Income Groups



HOW THE REPUBLICANS CAPTURED THE HOUSE An Assessment of the 1994 Midterm Elections

By David W. Brady, John F. Coogan, and Douglas Rivers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 1994 midterm elections sent shock waves throughout the U.S. political system. The Republican Party sweep was of historic proportions. The GOP gained 53 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, eight seats in the U.S. Senate, eleven governorships, and nearly one in every five state legislative chambers. Particularly surprising were the results in the House of Representatives, where Republicans took control for the first time in 40 years. Not only will Newt Gingrich be the next Speaker of the House but Speaker Tom Foley will be out of the House after January. Moreover, almost no one predicted it. Pundits, pollsters, and political scientists badly underestimated how large the swing toward the Republicans would be. In most cases Democratic losses in the House were predicted to be in the range of 25 to 30 seats—making the average forecast off by almost 100 percent.¹

What explains the Republican victory? This essay provides a partial answer by examining the factors that influenced the most extraordinary of the election outcomes: Republican control of the House of Representatives.

Our principal finding is that voters in moderate and conservative congressional districts overwhelmingly rejected President Clinton and those House members who supported the president's policies. The impact of these voters was particularly important in the Rocky Mountain, Rust Belt, and southern states. Normally, about 95 percent of incumbents are re-elected. In 1994, in districts where the vote for Clinton had been low in 1992 and the Democratic incumbent supported Clinton's program in 1993, only 30 percent were returned to office. We find powerful statistical evidence that Democratic incumbents from these districts paid a heavy price for their support for the president's program. The more the Democratic incumbent voted to support the president's policies, the more likely he or she was to be defeated. Although all elections are to some extent about policy issues, the direct link between incumbents' congressional voting records and their re-election prospects is striking. In contrast to the recent House elections, where incumbency advantages insulated most incumbents from national electoral tides, national policy issues dominated the campaign.


The results of the 1994 U.S. national election are by all accounts extraordinary. The depth and

breadth of the Republican Party victory was historic. The party gained 53 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, eight seats in the U.S. Senate, eleven governorships, and nearly one in every five state legislative chambers. Particularly surprising were the results in the House of Representatives, where Republicans took control for the first time in 40 years. Not only will Newt Gingrich be the next Speaker of the House but Speaker Tom Foley will be out of the House after January. Moreover, almost no one predicted it. Pundits, pollsters, and political scientists badly underestimated how large the swing toward the Republicans would be. In most cases Democratic losses in the House were predicted to be in the range of 25 to 30 seats—making the average forecast off by almost 100 percent.¹

The natural question is how to account for the Republican victory. Was it, as President Clinton argued the day after the election, that the American public believed that congressional Democrats had not gone far enough in enacting his policy agenda? Or was it that they had gone too far? Was it because Republicans had better candidates? Did the republicans benefit from a wave of anti-incumbent sentiment or was this the long-awaited party realignment that would reorganize the American party system?

This essay tries to provide answers to these and other related questions. Our most important finding is that the large Democratic Party losses in the House were due to voters' rejecting President Clinton's legislative agenda. We find powerful evidence that, in moderate and conservative districts, the more a House Democrat supported the president's agenda, the more likely that she or he would be removed from office. The key to understanding the 1994 midterm election is that the swing to Republicans was regionally and ideologically concentrated. In Democratic strongholds where Clinton ran well in 1992, such as New England, there was a relatively small swing toward Republican congressional candidates. Here, if incumbents were hurt at all by their votes in support of the Clinton program, traditional Democratic advantages were generally enough to insulate them against the Republican tide. It was in the South and the West where Republicans made the greatest inroads, for a large number of seats in those regions were represented by Democratic incumbents but were, at best, marginally Democratic. In those districts, incumbent Democrats who had supported the Clinton

Figure 5.
1994 Republican House Vote by Religiosity
and Income Groups
(White Voters)



Based on MSI cross-tabs of Mitofsky International exit poll data.

program were defeated at historically high rates. Normally, about 95 percent of incumbents are re-elected; in those districts, the incumbent re-election rate was around 30 percent. Republican gains represented the confluence of three factors: districts that were marginal to begin with, an usually large swing toward the Republicans, and incumbents who were out of step with their districts.

Our results show that a number of factors commonly used to explain those results did not, in fact, significantly affect the election. Turnout was definitely not a factor. Neither the level of turnout in 1994 nor the difference in turnout from 1992 to 1994 was related to electoral change. The Perot factor prominent in many analysts' interpretation of the Republican victory, in our analysis is at best a minor factor and statistically an insignificant predictor of Republican victories. There appears to be a modest decline in incumbency advantages—the Democratic freshman class of 1992 received a smaller than usual boost from incumbency—but this effect by itself was too small to account for the large Republican gains.

Our essay begins with a regional breakdown of the House election results and an analysis of these results. Data regarding the importance of voter turnout, Perot voters, and incumbency are examined. To sharpen the evidence, this analysis is followed by a more detailed statistical analysis that provides surprisingly powerful evidence that Democratic incumbents paid a heavy electoral price for supporting the president's policies and contradictory explanations that factors such as voter turnout played an important role.

Regional Breakdown

Let us begin with a brief description of the swing in popular vote and the change in seats for and against the Republicans from 1946 to 1994 and the corresponding gain or loss in House seats (see table 1). (Swing is measured by the difference in Republican vote percentages by district between the current election and the previous election and averaging the result across districts.)

Countrywide, the swing to the Republicans was 5.7 percent, which is the second highest pro-Republican swing since the Second World War. In 1946 and 1952 Republicans also won a majority of seats, but the comparable vote swings were both below 5 percent. In the 1966 midterm elections, Republicans gained 6.3 percent of the vote but did not gain control of the House. Republican or Democratic vote swings of about 5 percent or more generate major seat shifts. The lowest seat change, when there was a vote swing of at least 5 percent, was 36 for the Democrats in 1964, and the

highest was 74 for the Democrats in 1948. Republican seat swings of around 5 percent or more have generated seat changes from 48 (in 1966) to 55 (in 1946). Thus, given the vote swing, the change in seats is not out of line—a 5.7 percent swing and a gain of 53 seats.

The vote swing to the Republicans varied by region. In New England Republicans gained 0.5 percent and in the North Atlantic states, 2.4 percent. The other regions where Republicans gained less than the national swing were in the West-North Central farm states and the Pacific West (including Hawaii and Alaska), where the gain was slightly less than 5 percent. Republicans made their greatest gains in the southern and border states, with a shift away from the Democrats of more than 8 percent. The mountain West, with 7.1 percent, and the East-North Central region, with 6.8 percent gains, were right behind. In sum, Republican congressional candidates benefited from a national swing to the party of about 6 percent, and the swing was strongest from the regions bordered by Montana and Nevada in the West and Ohio through North Carolina in the East.

Table 1.
Popular Vote Swings and Seat Gains: 1946-1994

Year	POPULAR VOTE FROM PREVIOUS ELECTION	GOP GAIN IN SEATS FROM PREVIOUS ELECTION	PARTY CONTROLLING HOUSE AFTER ELECTION
1946	5.0%	55	Republican
1948	-7.4%	-74	Democratic
1950	2.7%	28	Democratic
1952	2.5%	22	Republican
1954	-4.0%	-15	Democratic
1956	2.1%	0	Democratic
1958	-6.7%	-42	Democratic
1960	2.8%	22	Democratic
1962	1.0%	2	Democratic
1964	-5.0%	-36	Democratic
1966	6.3%	48	Democratic
1968	0.2%	5	Democratic
1970	-3.4%	-7	Democratic
1972	1.9%	15	Democratic
1974	-6.7%	-43	Democratic
1976	1.7%	-2	Democratic
1978	2.0%	13	Democratic
1980	3.3%	33	Democratic
1982	-3.2%	-26	Democratic
1984	3.8%	15	Democratic
1986	-3.2%	-3	Democratic
1988	0.7%	-2	Democratic
1990	-0.9%	-8	Democratic
1992	1.2%	10	Democratic
1994	5.7%	53	Republican

Gaining votes does not, of course, always translate into gaining seats. The major impediment to translating votes into seats is the often-mentioned "incumbency phenomenon": that is, incumbent House members win re-election and do so with large margins—on average almost 70 percent of the vote. A swing of 6 percent to the Republicans in a district with a Democratic incumbent with 70 percent of the vote will not generate a new Republican seat. To analyze where Republicans gained seats, we need to look at the geographic distribution of Republican seat gains (see table 2). Going into the 1994 elections, the Republicans were the minority party in every region; coming out, they were the majority party in the three most populous regions. Republican gains in the Northeast were small—a pickup of only three seats. In contrast the Republicans gained 15 seats in the Midwest, 19 seats in the southern and border states, and 16 seats in the West, making them the majority in each of these three regions.

The major question is, what accounted for the Republican victory? Immediately following the election, pundits filled newspapers and television with interpretations of both the causes and the meaning of the Republican victory, prominent among which were incumbency, voter turnout, better Republican candidates, strong anti-Clinton policy reaction, and Perot voters going Republican. We now analyze each of these factors.

Table 2.
Republican Gain in Seats from 1992 to 1994, by Region

Region	Seats	GOP SEATS 1992	GOP SEATS 1994	GAINS '92-'94
Northeast	89	38	41	3
Midwest	105	44	59	15
South/border	148	57	76	19
West	93	38	54	16*
Total	435	177	230	53

*This number counts Susan Brooks (California 36) as the winner over Jane Harman (*National Journal*, November 12, 1994). Harman has since been named the winner.

Incumbency

Political scientists have for some time accounted for Democratic control of the House by arguing that the best predictor of any House race is, if an incumbent is running, he or she will win. Between 1964 and 1992, more than 95 percent of incumbent House candidates have won. Thus we begin our analysis by

breaking down the 435 House districts by incumbency status.

The swing in popular vote does vary by incumbency status. Previous research has shown that incumbents have a personal vote that is independent of the partisanship in the district. When incumbents retire, their party's vote share declines (retirement slump), and in incumbents' first run for re-election, their vote total increases (sophomore surge). Over the last 20 years, retirement slump has averaged about 10 percent whereas sophomore surge has been about 8 percent.² Both figures were down in 1994, with slump at about 8 percent and sophomore surge at about half its average. The data in table 3 reflect these incumbent advantages. Swing to the Republicans was more than 7 percent in districts where senior incumbents were running, whereas the comparable figure for freshman Republicans (running for the first time as incumbents) was about 11 percent. Senior Democrats lost 5 percent on average, whereas freshman Democrats lost only about 3.1 percent, indicating a slight sophomore surge. Thus it is fair to say that, although incumbent members still retained a personal vote, it was somewhat reduced from previous years. One interesting phenomenon is that in open-seat districts (where the incumbent was not running for re-election) held by Democrats the swing to the Republicans was more than 12 percent; in Republican open seats there was almost a 7 percent swing to the Democrats. The only gains Democrats made in the House were in four Republican open seats; everywhere else they lost seats.

Table 3.
Average Republican Vote Swing by Incumbency Status Between 1992 and 1994

Party Holding Seat Before	FRESHMAN INCUMBENT AVG VOTE	SENIOR INCUMBENT AVG VOTE	OPEN SEATS AVG VOTE
1994 Election Swing (N)	Swing (N)	Swing (N)	Swing (N)
Democrat	3.1% (61)	5.0% (149)	12.4% (31)
Republican	10.8% (42)	7.4% (87)	-6.5% (21)

Perot

Post-election analyses have pointed to exit polls showing that about two-thirds of self-identified Perot supporters voted for Republican congressional candidates. Exit polls do not, of course, distinguish between Republican- and Democratic-held districts. We divided the districts into open-Democrat and Democrat-incumbent running districts and computed the percentage of votes cast for Perot in 1992. In districts

taken from the Democrats, the Perot vote was about 21 percent; in districts held by Democrats, the comparable figures are slightly more than 16 percent. Thus, Perot did run slightly better in 1992 where Republicans made inroads in 1994, but the difference is not very large. When all factors are analyzed together (see table 6 below), the Perot factor appears to be relatively minor.

Turnout

Those who argue that turnout determined the 1994 election results claim that the Democrats who voted for Clinton and other Democrats in 1992 did not turn out at the polls on election day and that Republicans did. Thus, the claim is that, where Republicans gained seats, Republican turnout was high. We looked at percent turnout in 1994 by open and incumbent Democratic districts to determine if that was the case. The results show that indeed, Republican turnout was higher where Republicans took seats from Democrats. In open-seat, changed districts, turnout was 40.9 percent; in changed incumbent districts, turnout was 40.1 percent. The comparable figures were 35.0 for nonchanged open districts and 35.1 percent for incumbent districts. Again this is compatible with some analysts' claims that turnout was a factor in the Republican victory. This result is suspect, however, because we are comparing districts that vary greatly by race, socioeconomic status, income, and so on. In short, turnout must be included in a multivariate statistical analysis because we need to know its effect while controlling for other relevant characteristics. In fact, the multivariate analyses described below show that turnout had virtually no impact on Republican seat gains.

Better Candidates

Another explanation of why Republicans have not won control of the US. House is that Democrats have had better candidates. Professor Gary Jacobson of the University of California at San Diego has measured challenger quality for House elections since 1946 and shown that Republican candidates for Congress are not as experienced as their Democratic opponents. The Sunday after the election the New York Times featured an article claiming that the Republican victory was in part due to better Republican challengers and quoting Professor Jacobson's work. Professor Jacobson graciously provided us with his candidate experience data. Our analysis using his data for the 1994 election shows that in open districts won by Republicans, 50 percent of the victors were experienced whereas in open seats retained by Democrats only 11 percent of the

challengers were experienced. The same difference obtains in the incumbent-held seats, with 46 percent of seats won by Republican challengers with experience; in seats retained by the Democrats the comparable figure is 9 percent. Again our data are comparable with the challenger-quality thesis. Note, however, that, as in the case with the Perot and turnout variables, we need to ascertain where and under what conditions the quality of challengers makes a difference.

The Clinton Factor and the 1994 Election

The final variable is in some sense the most important given the anti-Clinton interpretation of the election put forward by many commentators. As shown above, the swing to the Republicans across the country was significant, and some interpreted the swing as a reaction against President Clinton or his policies or both. One simple way to account for the Republican victory would be that the swing to Republicans caused the Democrats to lose in districts that were marginal. That is, if there were 50 or so districts where the winning Democrat in 1992 had won by 10 percent or less (a margin of victory less than 55 percent), then a 6 percent swing to the Republicans would make the Republican candidate the winner. For example, in a district where the Democrats had won with 54 percent (to 46 percent Republican) in 1992, a 6 percent swing would result in the vote being 52 percent Republican (46 percent + 6 percent) and 48 percent Democratic (54 percent - 6 percent). In sum, to see if an anti-Clinton mood caused Democrats to lose marginal districts, we need to look at the won and lost percentages by marginal 1992 totals (less than 55 percent Democratic in 1992) in open and incumbent Democratic districts (see table 4).

The results are instructive. Most of the Democratic incumbents who were defeated came from marginal seats, while Republican gains in open-seat races were equally likely to come from marginal and nonmarginal Democratic seats. In marginal Democratic seats with a running incumbent, almost half—45.9 percent—of the incumbents were defeated, while only 10.1 percent of running Democratic incumbents from nonmarginal seats were defeated. In contrast, Republicans won approximately 30 percent of the open Democratic seats regardless of whether these seats were marginal or not.

Table 4.
Percentage of Republican Victories in Seats
with Democratic Incumbents

	<i>Incumbency Status</i>	
	Running	Open
1992 Democratic	Incumbent	Seat
Vote Percentage	45.9%	30.0%
Marginal (less than 55%)	10.1%	29.6%
Nonmarginal (more than 55%)		

What could account for the difference between open and incumbent-held seats? In open seats, the Republican and Democratic candidates are on an equal footing. Neither has a House voting record to defend. Given President Clinton's low popularity ratings and the national swing against him and his party, it is likely that in districts where the Clinton vote in 1992 was lowest (conservative to moderate constituencies) Republican candidates would run against Clinton, rather than against their Democratic opponents' voting records. In more liberal districts, such as Michigan's 13th or Pennsylvania's 2nd, where Clinton received more than 60 percent of the vote, running against Clinton would not be as potent a factor. The result is striking. In every Democrat-held open seat where Clinton got less than 47 percent of the 1992 vote (22 total), the Republicans won. In contrast, in every seat held by the Democrats (nine), Clinton got more than 50 percent of the 1992 vote. In short, in conservative-to-moderate open Democratic seats, Republican candidates, by making Clinton and his policies the issue, were victorious (moreover, Democratic candidates in these districts tried to distance themselves from Clinton).

A few examples from *Congressional Quarterly's* pre-election issue make our point. In North Carolina's 2nd district, the Republican winner, David Funderburk, linked his Democratic opponent to Clinton's policies. In North Carolina's 5th district *Congressional Quarterly* said, "Here again, the Clinton card is played early and often. Richard Burr claims Sandy Sands (Dem.) is just like Clinton. David McIntosh (Rep.) [in Indiana's 2nd district] has focused almost exclusively on Clinton. His first ads criticized Clinton on crime, health care, welfare reform and the budget. Matt Salmon (Rep.) [in Arizona's 1st district] has aired an ad similar to those seen in other states in which a computer 'morphs' a photo of Chuck Blanchard (Dem.) into Clinton. [In response] Blanchard has sought to distance himself from Clinton. In Tennessee's 3rd, when the Democrat, Randy Button, tried to make Republican Zach Wamp's conservatism the issue, Wamp retorted, 'this race is not about him [Button] but about Clinton and his Democratic agenda.' "And so it went across the open seats taken by Republicans. In

sum, it seems clear that, in the 22 open-seat races captured by the Republicans, a strong anti-Clinton swing away from Democrats accounts for the Republican gains.

Republicans took 35 seats from incumbent Democrats, and there must be a different explanation for these losses than for open seats. With Democratic incumbents running for re-election, Republican candidates could use the incumbent's voting record as a campaign issue. As many commentators have noted, the president campaigned in 1992 as a moderate Democrat and, once elected, proposed a legislative agenda that in many respects was on the left of the political spectrum. For the many congressional Democratic incumbents from relatively liberal districts, voting for the president's policies was not a risky venture because the president's policies were in accord with their constituents' preferences. Consider, for example, Julian Dixon, an eighteen-term Democrat from California's 32nd district. In the 1992 presidential election, an overwhelming 86 percent of the vote in that district went to President Clinton. Congressman Dixon supported the president's legislative agenda 94 percent of the time and advertised this loyalty en route to an easy re-election.

For many other Democrats, especially those representing more conservative districts, the choice was more difficult: vote for a decidedly liberal legislative agenda, and risk offending constituents, or vote against the party leadership. Those who decided to support the president's legislative agenda risked providing Republican challengers with an obvious line of attack. Take the case of Neal Smith, who represented Iowa's 4th district for 36 years. In 1992, the 4th district cast only 53 percent of its vote for candidate Bill Clinton. In the ensuing two years, Congressman Smith supported the president 93 percent of the time. He paid dearly for his voting record; after 17 successful re-election races, he was defeated in 1994.

Many Democrats tried to distance themselves from the president and their voting records by emphasizing those occasions when they voted against the president's program. Freshman Ohio Rep. David Mann is a case in point. Congressman Mann represents the 4th district, a marginally Democratic district that has a 30-year history of contested congressional elections, that split its vote in the 1992 presidential elections evenly between George Bush and Bill Clinton, and that gave George Bush a 10 percentage point vote margin in the 1988 presidential election. Despite the district's middle-of-the-road position, Congressman Mann voted with the president 81 percent of the time. During the campaign, however, he repeatedly stressed his opposition to the president's agenda. As one of his campaign ads put it: "Clinton and the congressional

leadership's tax increase—against. Clinton and the leadership's pork barrel program—against. Clinton government takeover of health care—against." Despite these claims of opposition, Mann lost his re-election bid.

These anecdotal pieces aside, the question still remains, how important was support for the president's legislative agenda in contributing to the large loss of Democratic seats among incumbents in the House? The claim is that support for the president's policies affects election results differentially depending on districts' characters and that the more moderate to conservative the district, the more a high pro-Clinton voting record hurts.

The claims turn out to be true. Where Clinton ran poorly in 1992, Democratic incumbents with pro-Clinton voting records in Congress were much more likely to be defeated than those with lower levels of presidential support (see table 5). In districts where Clinton got less than 40 percent of the vote in 1992 (conservative districts), the higher the incumbent's pro-Clinton voting record, the greater the percentage of defeats. Only 17 percent of incumbents with a low presidential support score (less than 60 percent) were defeated, whereas 75 percent of those with a pro-Clinton voting record (greater than 75 percent) were defeated. In districts where Clinton got 40 to 50 percent of the 1992 vote (moderate districts), the percentage of incumbents' losing is lower than in the conservative districts, but the higher the pro-Clinton voting record, the higher the probability of an incumbent being defeated. Where Clinton did well in 1992—winning a clear majority of the total vote—only one Democrat was defeated.

Table 5.
Relationship between 1992 Clinton Vote,
1993 Rollcall Support for Clinton Program,
and 1994 Democratic Defeat Rates

Incumbent's 1993 Congressional Quarterly Presidential Support Score	1992 Clinton Vote in District*		
	Less than 40%	40%-50%	More than 50%
Less than 60%	17% (5)	0% (4)	0% (1)
60% to 75%	31% (16)	19% (3)	0% (10)
More than 75%	75% (28)	29% (75)	1% (84)

* Entries are percentage of Democratic incumbents in each category who were defeated in 1994. The number in parentheses is the total number of Democratic incumbents who were seeking re-election.

Statistical Analysis

To obtain a clearer picture of the importance of members' voting records and to pinpoint the effects of other factors in the sizable loss of House Democratic Party seats, we use statistical methods that allow us to compare several possible factors simultaneously. The statistical procedure, which is analogous to standard regression analysis,⁴ enables us to isolate what effects members' voting records and other factors have on the likelihood of a Republican challenger beating a Democratic incumbent.

The primary data used for our statistical analysis consist of all 214 House seats held by Democratic incumbents who sought re-election.⁵ Later, to test the robustness of our key finding, we enlarge our sample to include the 31 open House seats from which incumbent Democrats retired before the 1994 elections.

The variable we are seeking to explain is the Democratic incumbent being defeated by a Republican challenger. To explain this electoral outcome, we have included three variables that serve as controls for the characteristics of voters in the district: the percentage of the district's 1992 presidential election total vote for Ross Perot, and the district's voter turnout in the 1994 House race. As an additional control, we have also included whether the Republican challenger had any prior electoral experience. We have assigned this variable a value of one if the Republican challenger had held any elective office before the 1994 election and zero otherwise.

Incumbents' voting records are measured by the *Congressional Quarterly's* presidential support score, which measures the degree of support for the president's agenda. This score is based on voting for the president on 102 votes including motor voter, striker replacement, grazing fees, the budget, abortion rights, crime, general support for the president's position (see table 6). In column 2, table 6, we see the impact of each variable on the probability of the Republican challenger's winning the House seat and in column 3, the standard error of the estimated impact.

As our earlier discussion emphasized, the importance of the incumbent's voting record in influencing his or her election outcome can only be assessed in conjunction with voter preferences in the incumbent's district. The percentage of the district's vote for President Clinton serves as a measure of voter sentiment in favor of "Bill Clinton, the candidate." As a candidate, President Clinton campaigned on a platform of promises that appealed to a large number of voters in the middle of the political spectrum. These moderate-to-conservative policies included requiring welfare

recipients to work, reducing taxes for middle-income families, shrinking the size of the federal bureaucracy, and lowering health care costs by encouraging competition through managed-care systems. The higher the district's 1992 electoral vote for candidate Clinton, the greater are voter preferences for these moderate policies.

Table 6.
Variables Affecting the Probabilities of a Republican
Challenger Winning a House Seat

Variable	Impact of Variable	Standard Error
Presidential election vote	-16.3%	4.08
Incumbent's voting record	11.6%	2.33
Perot vote	12.4%	3.35
Voter turnout	-0.6%	12.00
Challenger's electoral experience	18.7%	14.03

NOTE: Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of each variable on the probability that the Republican challenger will defeat the incumbent Democrat, evaluated at the sample means. The coefficients of the variables in the probit equations are displayed in appendix A along with auxiliary statistics for the likelihood function.

Thus, the likelihood that a Republican challenger would capture a congressional seat is inversely related to that district's support for President Clinton, the candidate (see table 6). A 10 percentage point rise in the vote for President Clinton in 1992 is associated with a 16 percentage point decrease in the probability that the seat would turn Republican.⁶

The coefficient on the presidential support variable captures the *partial* effect of voting for the president's program, *holding constant the initial degree of support for the president's campaign promises*. This interpretation is crucial, for using this presidential support variable in conjunction with the district's 1992 vote for president isolates the impact on Democratic incumbents of voting for the president's legislative program. If Democratic incumbents' voting records harmed their chances of re-election, we would expect the coefficient on presidential support to be positive.

Our statistical analysis shows that, indeed, the greater the Democratic incumbent's support for the president's legislative program, the higher the probability that the Republican challenger would win the seat. The estimated impact is significant from a statistical standpoint and quantitatively important. A 10 percentage point increase in presidential support increases the likelihood that the seat will go Republican by 11.6 percent.

It is possible that our presidential support variable is capturing the effects of factors other than a rejection of Democratic incumbents' voting records. For example, we may be capturing the effects of generalized voter anger with the president's party because of the policies he has been pursuing. As a check on this possibility, we also analyzed the 31 open-seat races in which the Democratic incumbent chose not to stand for re-election. Using both types of race, we re-estimated our equations, allowing the retiring Democrat's voting record to have an independent effect on likelihood that the open seat turned Republican. If voters were expressing their opposition to actual voting records, then we should not find any relationship because the Democratic candidate did not cast these votes. Evidence of a relationship, by contrast, would suggest that voters were expressing more generalized opposition.

Our statistical results show no evidence that retiring Democratic incumbents' voting records harmed the prospects of Democratic candidates seeking to replace them. To be more precise, holding constant support for the president in the 1992 election, there is no statistical relationship between retiring Democratic incumbents' presidential support score and the probability that the Democratic candidate seeking to replace him or her fails.

This result considerably strengthens our finding that Democratic incumbents' voting records contributed importantly to the dramatic loss in House seats. The more that incumbents from moderate-to-conservative districts supported the president's liberal agenda, the worse were their re-election prospects.

To illustrate the quantitative importance of our finding, we use the statistical results to estimate the probabilities that Democratic incumbents with high presidential support scores (80 percent) would lose re-election in three different districts (see table 7). The districts are identified as conservative, moderate, or liberal depending on the degree of the district's support for Clinton in the 1992 election. In the conservative district, voting with the president was extremely costly in that an incumbent Democrat who consistently voted with the president (80 percent of the time) had only a 48 percent chance of being re-elected. In contrast, an incumbent with the same voting record but who represented a liberal district had a 76 percent chance of holding on to his or her seat.

Table 7.
Democratic Incumbents' Re-election Probabilities

District Type	Re-election Probability
Conservative	47.7%
Moderate	62.8%
Liberal	76.2%

With these results in hand, we attempted to determine if there were crucial votes that contributed to the Republican landslide. If any single vote mattered, we expected that it would be the vote on the 1993 Budget Resolution because it was the hardest fought and most ideological battle of Clinton's first two years. The results show that a vote in favor of the president's budget had a significant negative impact on incumbents' chances of re-election. Put another way, where Clinton received less than 40 percent of the total vote in 1992 and the incumbent supported the president on the budget in 1993, 70 percent of such Democratic incumbents were defeated. In similar districts where the incumbent voted against the budget resolution, only 30 percent lost.⁷

We also examined the effects of votes taken on several other prominent issues—gays in the military, the Hyde amendment to prohibit federal funding for abortion except in cases involving incest and when the life of the mother is in danger, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The only other vote for which we found weak statistical evidence of an effect (and it was weak) was the Hyde amendment. The other votes do not seem to have affected the election results.

The coefficient on the variable measuring candidate experience among Republican challengers is positive and significant. As with our earlier finding—that the more experienced Republican challengers were more likely to defeat their incumbent opponents than inexperienced candidates—these results show that having previous electoral experience increased a Republican challenger's probability of unseating the Democratic incumbent by a sizable 23 percent. In view of the fact that, in the 1994 House races, the Republican Party fielded fewer candidates with prior electoral experience than they did in 1992, their sizable gains are even more striking.

The effect of voter turnout, measured by the fraction of the voting-age population that cast votes in House elections in 1994, is small and not statistically significant. Even if the estimated impact had been two standard deviations larger, its quantitative impact would have been negligible. Hence, we conclude that voter turnout in 1994 was by itself an unimportant factor in influencing the House elections.⁸ Finally, the estimated

impact of the Perot vote is that it increased the likelihood that Democratic incumbents would lose, but the effect is quantitatively small and not statistically reliable. Considerable attention had been paid to the Perot vote by the popular press, with the sizable Republican gains in the House attributed at least in part to Perot voters. It is unclear, however, what importance should be attached to those attributions. The real questions regarding Perot voters are whether or not the act of becoming a Perot voter caused the person to cast a vote, when in the absence of a Perot opinion he would not have done so, or whether the act of becoming a Perot voter altered the way the voter cast her ballot. If the 68 percent of Perot voters who cast ballots for Republicans in the House would otherwise not have voted or would have punched the Democrats' ticket, it means one thing. It means something else entirely if that 68 percent would not have voted for George Bush had Ross Perot not been around in 1992. The low reliability of the coefficient and the conceptual problem of understanding exactly what a Perot vote means lead us to conclude that the Perot effect was at best marginal.

Conclusion

The Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1994 came as a surprise to most election observers. In this essay we sought to account for the election results using the explanations most frequently put forward—shifts by Perot voters, differential turnout, and anti-incumbent sentiment. It is, of course, too early to tell whether the vote shifts in this election will be permanent, but it is difficult to see how Democrats will be able to reverse Republican gains in conservative areas. Incumbency advantages and campaigns focused on local issues allowed Democratic incumbents to survive in districts that had been voting Republican at the presidential level for some time. Clinton did better in these areas in 1992 than other recent Democratic presidential candidates (presumably because he was a Southerner running against an incumbent in a weak economy), but it does not appear that there was any fundamental ideological shift in 1992. In fact, support for the Clinton agenda turned out to be costly for many Democratic incumbents from marginal districts. The losing Democratic incumbents, ironically, tended to be relatively moderate or even conservative ideologically (though apparently not conservative enough for their districts). With the loss of these moderates, the Democratic caucus in the House will be more liberal in 1995-96 than it was in 1993-94.

The difficulty facing Democratic congressional candidates from moderate and conservative districts in

the South and West is clear. Democratic challengers will not only be running against Republican incumbents (the incumbency advantage is now with the Republicans), but they will have to distance themselves even farther from the liberal image of congressional Democrats. In many of the districts captured by Republicans in 1994, Democrats will find this a difficult task.

Appendix A

Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimates of Probability that a Republican Challenger Will Win

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Constant term	-0.41	1.57
Presidential election vote	-0.08	0.02
Voting record	0.03	0.02
Challenger's electoral experience	0.04	0.03
Voter turnout	-0.00	0.02
Perot vote	1.00	0.27
Log likelihood	-67.5	
Percent correctly predicted	84%	
Number of observations	224	

NOTE: Sample includes only seats held by Democratic party incumbents.

Notes

1. The most accurate forecast we are aware of was made by Martin Anderson, who predicted, publicly and frequently, a Republican pickup of 46 House seats.
2. John R. Alford and David W. Brady, "Personal and Partisan Advantages in U.S. House Elections, 1846-1996," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), pp. 141-57.
3. We used district-level support for Michael Dukakis in 1988 as a measure of a district's preferences and obtained similar results. The idea is that the higher the support for either Dukakis or Clinton, the more liberal the district. In this essay, we use the Clinton vote.
4. The statistical method is called *probit analysis*. Appendix A contains the actual probit estimates.
5. This excludes one new Democratic member for whom we did not have voting data.
6. The magnitude of the impact of a change in any of the explanatory variables depends on the levels of the remaining explanatory variables. In all our calculations, we have evaluated the impact at the mean values of the explanatory variables.

7. The relationship is largely the result of the fact that the best predictor of a high presidential support score is a probudget vote.

8. We also used the difference in turnout from 1992 to 1994 because it could be argued that, where the falloff was greatest, the Republicans would do best. Not only were the results insignificant, but the sign of the coefficient was wrong.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1995

95 APR 10 P3:53

to POTUS
4/8 via
George S.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT & THE VICE PRESIDENT

From: George Stephanopoulos, Christopher Edley, Jr. & Peter Yu

Re: Affirmative Action: Themes and Hard Questions

This memorandum summarizes our evolving thoughts regarding policy and communication choices arising out of the Review. Part I outlines the central issue and Senator Dole's response; Part II offers an alternative response, building on our earlier conversations and on the Review. Attachment A presents seven "hard cases" that may facilitate your deliberations. We plan to discuss this memorandum and the cases with you on Monday. On Tuesday, we will discuss the more specific policy options, some of which are presented in rough draft in Attachment B.

I. The Central Issue: Questions about "Preferences"

The central and most difficult questions--substantively and politically--concern group-based preferences: what are those preferences and when are they appropriate?

In public statements, Senator Dole has expressed support for affirmative action as a remedy for "proven past discrimination against individuals" and for expanded outreach and recruitment of "qualified minorities and women to give them an opportunity to compete without guaranteeing the results of the competition." However, he has expressed his opposition to "*quotas, set-asides, and other preferences that favor individuals simply because they happen to belong to certain groups.*"

The most likely construction of Dole's opposition to preferences implies opposition to several existing policies identified in the Review, for example:

- Contracting programs, including: the 8(a) program; sheltered competition among small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs); and the 10-percent bid preference for SDBs. (Some of these could be saved, perhaps, if Dole's phrase "simply because" is satisfied by the current requirement that SDB's demonstrate "economic disadvantage"; this, however, requires a somewhat tortured construction.)
- Race-specific and gender-specific scholarships and fellowships motivated by inclusion rather than remediation. Examples include an academic scholarship program for minorities that Secretary Shalala established at the University of Wisconsin and an NSF program designed to support women in basic research.

- Clinton-style judicial and Cabinet appointments, assuming consideration of race, gender, or ethnicity amounts to a "preference."

II. An Alternative Approach

There is an alternative approach to the question of preferences, one more consistent with the President's rejection of the "colorblindness" and "pure remediation" visions and his embrace of a broader justification which includes remediation, opportunity, and inclusion. This approach would emphasize five points.

- 1■ We oppose quotas and numerical straitjackets (outside of narrow remedial contexts).
- 2■ We oppose the use of set-asides in employment and contracting (outside of narrow remedial contexts).
- 3■ We oppose giving group-based preferences to unqualified persons in the name of affirmative action.
- 4■ We oppose group-based preferences when need-based preferences would be just as effective at creating genuine opportunity.
- 5■ We oppose group-based preferences when the benefits or burdens of those preferences are unduly concentrated.

This Part summarizes the approach, proposing definitions and central propositions, and then discussing the most significant implications of such a position.

A. Definitions

- A **quota** is a rigid numeric or proportional measure that must be attained or that cannot be exceeded, without regard to the number of potential applicants who meet necessary qualifications. *Example:* Before the *Bakke* decision, the UC-Davis Medical School maintained a two-track admissions policy reserving a minimum of 16 of 100 spaces for minority students.
- A **set-aside** is a reservation of a set of opportunities or benefits for a particular group of potential candidates that effectively excludes members of other groups. *Example:* Under the "rule of two," procurement contracts meeting certain requirements may be reserved for small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). This set-aside is not a quota because it does not involve "a numeric or proportional measure that must be attained or cannot be exceeded"; in other words, set-asides respect minimum qualifications, but quotas need not.
- A **preference** is an advantage assigned to a candidate solely on the basis of his/her

gender, race, or ethnicity. A preference does not include consideration of such characteristics, when consideration is essential to the effective operation of the institution or enterprise. *Example:* DOD provides a 10% bid preference to SDBs in certain situations. Because status as an SDB is not "essential to the effective operation" of DOD contracting, this advantage is a preference. In the case of the police force of a racially-diverse city, race may be a bona fide consideration and thus positive consideration of race would not constitute a preference. Similarly, race, gender, or ethnicity may be a bona fide consideration in university admissions if diversity is essential to the effective functioning of the institution.

In sum, the concepts as illustrated in **Exhibit 1:**

All quotas are set-asides, but not all set-asides are quotas.

All set-asides are preferences, but not all preferences are set-asides.

All preferences are considerations, but not all considerations are preferences.

B. Central Propositions

- **Proposition 1: Discrimination in every sector of our society and economy must be eliminated root and branch.**

Corollary: Affirmative action practices may be more aggressive and, if necessary, intrusive in settings in which there is a demonstration of present discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination.

- **Proposition 2: Our paramount aspiration is complete equality of opportunity. We do not guarantee equality of results.**

Corollary: We must distinguish among affirmative action in different contexts. Education is more closely related to opportunity-creation than is federal contracting; thus, minority scholarships differ from procurement set-asides.

Corollary: We must distinguish among affirmative action tools. Some tools enhance opportunity and level the playing field, others come closer to ensuring certain results; thus, a targeted surety bond program differs from a procurement set-aside, and multi-factor admissions differ from admissions quotas.

- **Proposition 3: Affirmative action remains necessary, but must be transitional. Inequality of opportunity persists, as illustrated by the persistence of both discrimination and severe social and economic inequalities.**

Corollary: Affirmative action should be transitional for individual participants: these programs should be entryways, not entitlements. Each program should have graduation requirements and related supports.




Exhibit 1

Corollary: Affirmative action should be transitional for society: when each program accomplishes its objectives, it should end.

- **Proposition 4: We must recognize--and limit--any harm that these essential programs cause.** We must do the right thing, but in the right way.

Corollary: Affirmative action programs must respect individual merit. Quotas--in virtually all contexts--are unacceptable because they subordinate individual merit to rigid numerical objectives.

Corollary: Affirmative action programs must not unduly concentrate burdens. The burdens that affirmative action imposes on vested interests (such as seniority rights) or on particular regions or sectors of the economy must be limited.

C. Policy Implications

Fully developed, these propositions have significant policy implications, particular as concerns set-asides and preferences.

- **Implication 1: In general, we are opposed to set-asides in employment¹ and government procurement because they are exclusionary; alternative tools should be used.** We oppose excluding any person from an employment or contracting opportunity on the basis of race, gender, or ethnicity. There are two options for when this general rule should not obtain:

Alternative 1(a): Oppose set-asides except in court-ordered or -supervised remedies. Under this alternative, we would oppose the "rule of two" procurement set-aside and the 8(a) program as currently constituted.

Alternative 1(b): Oppose set-asides except as a remedy for specific findings of discrimination (by court, Congress, or agency). Under this alternative, we would examine procurement practices to determine whether set-asides are necessary.

- **Implication 2: Preferences and set-asides in education and preferences in employment are appropriate to maximize equal opportunity and inclusiveness but only if they**

(a) are never awarded to unqualified persons;

(b) are transitional--establish objectives and terminate when those objectives are met;

¹We know of no formal "set-asides" in the employment context, but there is some anecdotal evidence that majority candidates sometimes feel that certain positions are set-aside by "bean counters" for minority candidates only (e.g., university faculties).

(c) *are flexible*--are neither actually or effectively quotas; and
(d) *are narrowly tailored*--are the least race-conscious means of maximizing equal opportunity and inclusiveness.

Example: Race, gender, and ethnicity are often bona fide considerations in education and employment. For example, scholarships set aside for women, if appropriately designed, are justified by the values of inclusion and equal opportunity.

- **Implication 3: Contracting is on the "results" end of the continuum because receipt of a contract seems in significant measure a commercial success rather than a mere entrepreneurial opportunity. Preferences in procurement, therefore, may be appropriate only if the above conditions are met and only when necessary to remedy demonstrated present discrimination or the lingering effects of demonstrated past discrimination.**

Example: Procurement preferences, such as the §1207 bid preference, must be appropriately designed and justified by the demonstration of past discrimination or lingering effects. Race- and gender-neutral advantages--such as competitive advantages based on "opportunity creation" as measured by employment and entrepreneurship for disadvantaged groups--need not be justified in this way.

In sum, as illustrated in **Exhibit 2**, we are opposed to certain practices (the shaded area). In addition, we believe other practices must be both tailored and justified by past discrimination or lingering effects (the cross-hatched area).

III. Conclusion

The Attachment presents seven "hard cases" and outlines both a "Dole" perspective and an "alternative" perspective on each case. The cases are:

- 1■ SDB set-asides: the "rule-of-two" for reserving contracts exclusively for SDB bidders
- 2■ The *Adarand* case: bonus payments for subcontracting with SDBs
- 3■ The *Piscataway* case: race as a consideration in layoffs
- 4■ Chicago Police Department promotions (Rep. Lipinski's example)
- 5■ Banneker Scholarships: black-only merit scholarships at the University of Maryland
- 6■ Admissions to the University of California at Berkeley
- 7■ Remedial education: a black-only community college course

Selected Affirmative Action Efforts

Opportunity ----- Results

Opportunity ----- Results

	Opportunity Enhancing Assistance	Advantages & Flexible Preferences	Set-asides	Quotas
Education	Compensatory ed Outreach & recruiting HBCUs	Multifactor admissions policies	Minority-specific scholarships (limited competition among qualified candidates)	Two-track admissions policy
Employment	Outreach & recruiting Apprenticeships Training Second look programs	Multifactor hiring (e.g., judicial selection)	Exclusive job listings	Race-norming
Contracting & Procurement	Technical assistance Mentoring Bonding assistance	10% bid preference SCC program (the Adarand case)	8(a) program Rule of two (limited competition among qualified bidders)	Numeric set-asides

Attachment A: Seven Hard Cases

Case 1. Government Contracting: Sheltered Competition.

Scenario:

As part of a larger effort to reach its Department-wide goal of obtaining 5% of all procurements from small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), the Department of Defense has promulgated regulations that direct that a "contracting officer shall set aside an acquisition for small disadvantaged businesses when there is a reasonable expectation that --

- (1) offers will be received from at least two responsible [] SDBs...
- (2) the award will be made at not more than ten percent above fair market price..."

Each year about \$800 million in procurements (20% of all SDB procurement by DOD) are awarded under this so-called "rule of two."

Such set-asides are viewed by some majority-owned contractors as exclusive, race-based quotas. Moreover, in some regions and industrial sectors, large proportions of the acquisitions are set aside under this rule. For example, during one period, Barksdale AFB set aside all of its construction contracts for SDBs under the rule of two.

The "Dole" Perspective:

"This is a preference because it limits the competition that minority-owned firms must face. While I support efforts to reach out to minority contractors, I do not support preferences."

The "Alternative" Perspective:

"While I believe preferences are sometimes appropriate in the contracting arena, set-asides are only appropriate in [narrow] remedial contexts. Here's why: a set-aside effectively says: 'No white-owned firms need bid.' That is unnecessary. I support assisting disadvantaged firms through preferences, but I don't believe we should ever bar a firm from bidding on a contract simply because of the race or gender of its owner.

"I have two other concerns about these set-asides. First, they have been implemented in a way that has had a disparate impact on certain industries and regions. That's unfair. Second, the program has no graduation requirement and so is not transitional--it encourages dependency rather than diversification and growth.

"There's a better way that includes: (1) outreach and technical assistance to SDBs to enhance opportunity; (2) narrowly tailored preferences to SDBs to redress discrimination; and (3) a broader race-neutral program focusing on the creation of opportunity through race-neutral preferences for companies that create opportunities for disadvantaged workers and communities."

Case 2. Government Contracting & Subcontracting: Incentives.

Scenario:

Based on its finding of discrimination, Congress has established certain goals with regard to minority contracting and subcontracting. To make progress toward those goals, the Department of Transportation has provided its prime contractors with incentives to use minority subcontractors (typically, these incentives total 1.5–2.0% of the contract price). This incentive is referred to as a "subcontractor compensation clause" (SCC).

In 1989, an agency within DOT awarded a \$1 million prime highway–construction contract to Mountain Gravel (in most cases, DOT awards are administered through state or local entities; this project happened to be on federal land). Adarand bid for a subcontract to construct a guardrail. Although Adarand's bid was the lowest, Mountain Gravel selected a "disadvantaged business entity" (DBE) with a slightly higher bid. Under the SCC, Mountain Gravel qualified for a bonus of approximately \$10,000.

The "Dole" Perspective:

"The SCC is a preference based the race of the owner of the subcontractor. I'm generally opposed to such preferences. Let me just say that race seems truly irrelevant to the business of road–building. If there is discrimination in contracting, it should be prosecuted and eradicated. But contracting takes place in a market in which the bases of competition are clear: quality and price. Why should a minority–owned firm get a special break?"

The "Alternative" Perspective:

"This is not a set–aside; Adarand was free to bid on the contract.¹ These efforts are appropriate only if they are transitional, flexible, narrowly tailored, and necessary to remedy demonstrated present discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination.

"While I believe the SCC is flexible, I would revise it to ensure it was transitional—to make clear that the program ends when SCCs are no longer needed. I support these programs as an effort to remedy past or lingering discrimination, to level the playing field. These bonuses encourage the rethinking of old prejudices and the opening up old–boy networks."

¹Analytically, this program is a preference but not a set–aside.

Case 3. Public Employment: Layoffs.

Scenario:

Although Piscataway's Board of Education had never been found to have discriminated on the basis of race or ethnicity, the Board has long maintained an aggressive -- and effective -- affirmative action policy. Piscataway schools have hired the most qualified candidates, but, in cases in which candidates were otherwise comparably qualified, have favorably considered minority status. As a result, by 1985, 9.6% of Piscataway's teachers were minorities, compared to 7.4% of all New Jersey teachers and 12.1% of the statewide labor pool. More than 40% of the school district's students were minorities.

In 1989, budget cuts required Piscataway to dismiss one business education teacher at Piscataway High School. The two most junior teachers had been hired on the same day and (it is stipulated) were of equal qualifications. Rather than follow another tie-breaking procedure (such as drawing lots), the Board looked to the racial composition of the business education department and found that one of the most junior teachers (Williams) was the only African-American in the department. Based on this fact, the Board decided to layoff the white teacher (Taxman) and sent her a letter explaining the use of affirmative action as a tie-breaker.

The Third Circuit is currently considering whether Title VII permits the Board to act as it did; the Justice Department has argued that it does. The further issue is whether we would, *as a policy matter*, agree with the Board.

The "Dole" Perspective:

"This is a preference, plain and simple. Except in the remedial context (which this isn't), I don't think race should be a preference in hiring, and, as the Supreme Court has recognized, layoffs are even more problematic: the costs of any affirmative consideration of race or ethnicity in layoffs fall directly and solely on the losing employee."

Two "Alternative" Perspectives:

A: "Race seems to be a legitimate consideration, particularly in light of the demographics. Thus I don't think of the Board as assigning a 'preference.' Race favored Williams in this case, but in another setting, such as in an effort to desegregate a black school in a dual system, Taxman might well have benefitted from the same consideration."

B: "A tie-breaker that favors one party *feels* like a preference. Group-based preferences can be appropriate in the employment context if they are transitional, flexible, and narrowly tailored. My concern with this case is that it seems to unduly concentrate the burden on Ms. Taxman. That's why *layoffs* are different from hiring decisions."

Case 4. Public Employment: Promotions.

Scenario:

Chicago's population is diverse: 39% African-American, 38% white, 20% Hispanic. Its police force is less diverse: 66% white, 34% minority (even in the Department's higher ranks). These facts have been the subject and source of litigation and court-ordered remedial hiring and promotion. In addition, the Department has undertaken extensive efforts to redesign its written tests to reduce disparate impact.

Earlier this year, after administering a promotion test, the Department announced 67 promotions from sergeant to lieutenant. Most of the promotions (54) were awarded to those with the highest scores on the promotion exam. Only 3 of these 54 new lieutenants are African-Americans. Probably in response to this imbalance, the Department also announced 13 "merit" or performance-based promotions to persons, none of whom scored in the top 67 on the exam. Of the 13, 5 are white, 5 are African-American, and 3 are Hispanic. It is widely assumed that race and ethnicity were considered in the merit promotions. A white sergeant with the 56th-highest score on the exam has sued the Department.

The "Dole" Perspective:

"The Department ignored qualifications in the name of race. The Department promoted some sergeants simply because they belong to certain racial and ethnic groups. This looks like a quota to me: the 5-5-3 ratio of 'merit' promotions precisely tracks the City's population.

"Clearly, minorities did poorly on the promotion exam. The racial composition of the group receiving 'merit' promotions indicates to me that certain candidates received a preference--they had lower test score than white candidates but were nonetheless promoted."

The "Alternative" Perspective:

"This is a classic situation in which race is a bona fide consideration; the racial composition of a police force can be essential to its effective performance. Even if one were to regard this as a preference, it is an appropriate preference. First, there is no indication that the 13 candidates were unqualified; the fact that they had slightly lower scores is insignificant. Moreover, the fact that five of the merit promotions were awarded to white sergeants indicates that this was a flexible preference and not a quota or set-aside.

"The Department's real error was in ever assuming that a written test could somehow capture the full richness of what it means to be a good police officer. The initial list should have been based on the test scores and other relevant considerations."

Case 7. Public Education: Remedial Education.

Scenario:

Twenty years ago, San Bernardino Valley College created two special programs. The Bridge Program is designed to serve African-Americans students who are having academic problems but wish to attend a four-year college. The Puente Program is designed to serve Hispanics facing similar difficulties. Both provide specialized classes and curricula targeted at minority students and offer personal, academic, and career advice. The programs have been successful: 66% of the Puente students go on to attend four-year colleges (compared to 7% of all Hispanic students).

Earlier this year, a 25-year old widowed mother of three was denied access to an English 101 class that was part of the Bridge Program--the only class that fit her schedule. The precise reason for this rejection is disputed: she claims she was not admitted to the class because she was not African-American, the school suggests otherwise.

The "Dole" Perspective:

"This is simply a case of 'separate but equal.' Schools are, of course, free to design courses however they wish -- but they cannot exclude a student from a course simply on account of her race. One possible justification for such classes is a desire to build strong ethnic communities -- but must such classes be segregated? African-Americans may have distinct needs, but those could be served through specially trained counselors to provide services outside of the classroom. Moreover, the programs are based on crude stereotypes: why should a privileged African-American be allowed in these classes, but not a disadvantaged white?"

The "Alternative" Perspective:

"I oppose this program as an unnecessary race-based set-aside.

"I'm generally opposed to 'set-aside' programs in employment and procurement -- I believe that no one should ever be barred from applying for a job or bidding on a contract on the basis of race, gender, or ethnicity. In education, these sorts of set-asides are a little different, but still must be narrowly tailored. The Bridge and Puente programs are designed to meet the special needs of disadvantaged minority students by using familiar curricular material and new educational techniques. I support that objective entirely. It is not, however, necessary to exclude non-minority students in order to achieve these important objectives."

Attachment B

DRAFT PROCUREMENT OPTIONS

OPTION (A) -- Remedial Preferences and Empowerment Set-Asides

- **Eliminate race/sex-based quotas and set-asides, including "rule-of-two" set-aside**
- **Remedial Preferences:** Use § 1207-style bid price preferences only in modified *Croson* situations only, i.e., where there is a legislatively or administratively determined factual predicate of discrimination or lingering effects of past discrimination, and race- and sex-neutral means will be inadequate.
- **Empowerment Contracting:** Set-asides for "Most Favored Businesses" who are periodically recertified based on objective performance in a combination of (i) hiring targeted disadvantaged workers and (ii) activity in distressed communities.¹ Reform 8(a) to be focus sheltered competition and sole-source contracting for Most Favored Businesses. (Transition for current 8(a) firms.)

OPTION (B) -- Reform Current Programs to Address Perceived Unfairness and Abuses

- **Transitional:**
 - **Graduation:** Graduation requirements for all contracting programs. Link graduation to size, experience. Link "graduation" issue to the individuals, as well as to the firm; avoid churning in corporate form.
 - **Sunsets and Rheostats:** With introduction of electronic commerce, growth of the surety program, and sophistication of the technical assistance, create "rheostats" to moderate the terms of procurement preferences as conditions change. For example, electronic commerce may justify converting the preferences for small SDB contracts into technical assistance and a very short duration in sheltered competition.
- **Curb abuses:**
 - **Anti-Fraud:** Increased enforcement resources against shams and fronts; increased penalties.
 - **Need:** Economic disadvantage: tighten the test to exclude millionaires.
- **Deconcentrate Burdens and Benefits:**
 - **Disaggregate Goals:** Refine goals to incorporate concern for sectoral and regional integration - opening up opportunities outside of the customary fields, and outside of the customary regions.
 - **No Concentrated Burdens:** Limit regional set-aside "crowding," as at Barksdale AFB. No contracting entity may apply preferences to more than a set percent of contracts.
- **Enhancing the effort:**
 - **Pool Outreach/Technical Assistance:** Better linkage of technical assistance efforts with procurement opportunities. Better technical assistance for prime contractors looking for subcontractors (in part to avoid pressure to rely on fronts and shams); expand the OFCCP/GSA pilot program.
 - **Reorganization:** SBA's 8(a) program and Commerce's MBDA program at Commerce.
 - **Subcontracting Plans:** Strengthen requirements/incentives for large primes to develop plans for outreach to SDB subcontractors.

¹ This recasts the Labor Surplus Area program to make it far more effective and aggressive, focused on structural distress rather than countercyclical assistance.

DRAFT EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS

■ ***Strengthen Enforcement:***

- More enforcement resources for OFCCP -- both for compliance and for reverse discrimination.
- More enforcement resources, and added dispute resolution flexibility, for the EEOC to eliminate its backlog over three years.
- Update the statistical labor market data base used by OFCCP to determine the reasonableness of employment goals.

■ ***Reduce burdens:***

- Raise the OFCCP threshold to \$100,000 as part of paperwork reduction and procurement reform. [DOL strongly opposes.]
- Eliminate "flowdown" of OFCCP requirements to subcontractors on commercial procurements. [DOL strongly opposes.]
- Eliminate the 30-day delay for pre-contracting surveys (since adverse survey result does not, by court order, result in delay or modification of the procurement action anyway).
- Scale the reporting and audit "burden" to the size of the enterprise or the magnitude of the contract, or both. [DOL questions.]
- Relaxed paperwork and audit burden for good performers. Reduce paperwork burden otherwise -- form simplification, etc.

■ ***Clarify rights and responsibilities:***

- Revise E.O. 11246 or the regulations to require that plans expressly prohibit hiring unqualified individuals in order to achieve a plan's goals.
- Revise regulations so that, for the largest employers, plans should provide for EO training of personnel officers to prevent abuses of reverse discrimination and numerical straight jackets.
- Balanced notice. Ensure that employees receive notice about the legal limitations on affirmative action plans, and of their right to redress for discrimination *and* reverse discrimination.

■ ***Research on Diversity and Merit Selection:***

- Interagency development of alternative job-related selection devices as alternatives to, or in addition to, paper-and-pencil tests. The goal would be to develop a variety of mechanisms that would provide broader criterion on which to base merit selection, without disparate impact.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4113195

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

95 APR 11 P3:37

10 April 1995

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

CC: LEON PANETTA
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS

FROM: Harold Ickes (HBI)

SUBJECT: Affirmative Action

Attached is a confidential memorandum from the Mellman Group,
dated 16 March 1995, regarding affirmative action.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING



~~CONFIDENTIAL:~~
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE

MARKING INITIALS: MM DATE: 2/5/20

204-0990-5

MEMORANDUM

TO:

FROM: Mark Mellman

RE: Affirmative Action

DATE: March 16, 1995

The affirmative action issue threatens to do greater long term damage to our party, both internally and externally, than any other issue in recent memory. It is a classic wedge issue that splits our base voters from our swing voters. It also splits our activist core from the majority of our rank and file voters.

The issue is highly emotional and likely to become much higher profile. Note the cover headline in U.S. News and World Report a couple of weeks ago: "White Males Need Not Apply." Polling data from California indicates that two-thirds (66%) of voters support the anti-affirmative action initiative that stimulated the national debate. (The initiative will likely be on the ballot in 1996). Nearly three-quarters of whites (71%) support this anti-affirmative action initiative. Yet, our historic commitments, together with our base constituency and activist core, do not allow us to just give up.

In the end, of course, this is a fundamental policy decision. However, below I have outlined some political/communication strategies that could be employed in dealing with affirmative action. This memo is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather it is designed to stimulate further thought. Very little research has been done on this delicate issue, so I cannot say with any real confidence how well any of these strategies might work.

Defend -- To have any hope of defending affirmative action, I believe one must start by stating unequivocal opposition to quotas and reverse discrimination of any kind. Only then is

it even potentially possible to talk about the continuing need to make certain every effort is made to insure that opportunity is open to all.

Change the Terms of Debate -- This can be done in law or in communications efforts. Changing the criterion for affirmative action from race and gender to economic disadvantage is the most commonly discussed change in law that might alter the terms of the debate. There are three potential problems with this. First (as with most of these points), we have no research to indicate that this kind of affirmative action is any more acceptable than current law. Second, the activists adamantly oppose such a change because they say it will not do enough to help minorities. Numerically, they say, there are a lot more poor whites than poor blacks. Finally it is not clear what it would mean to give preferences to businesses owned by poor people or provide a tax deduction to people who sell radio stations to the poor.

From a message/communications point of view, the clearest way to change the terms of debate is to talk about affirmative action in gender rather than race terms. Preliminary data suggests that voters are 10-15 points more supportive of affirmative action when women, as opposed to racial minorities, get the extra help.

Trade -- One may be able to trade the elimination of some programs for the preservation of others. For example one might be able to develop a compelling message around ending minority set asides (or other programs that smack of quotas), while preserving programs that "require efforts to expend the availability of opportunity." Again the activists will find this problematic, but they may find part of a loaf is better than none.

Substitute -- It may be possible to develop a message around eliminating affirmative action, but instead significantly increasing the penalties for discrimination, along with an increase in enforcement. Perhaps, even turn discrimination into a felony. The same caveat and rejoinder applies to the activists as above.

Again, we do not have clear evidence that any of these strategies are sufficient or even workable. We also do not know from a political view, which would be best. We do have enough evidence to know that some coherent strategy is necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4/12

95 APR 10 P8:43

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Doug Sosnik

SUBJECT: Weekly Report

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

1996 PRESIDENTIAL NEWS

New Hampshire. An American Research Group poll released this week reports that you have a 59% approval/34% disapproval ratio among New Hampshire Democrats. A clip from the *Manchester Union Leader's* "Granite Status" is attached. Phil Gramm and Lamar Alexander were in the Granite State this week.

Iowa. Jesse Jackson was in Iowa this week and said he will make a decision whether to run for president again "before the summer's out." He added that running as a third-party candidate "is a very live option." Clips are attached.

Bob Dole was endorsed by Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA) this week. In the wake of the endorsements from Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) and Gov. Terry Branstad (R-IA) last week, it did not make a big splash. Dole, meanwhile, scored first in an Iowa Project 1996 poll of 300 likely caucus attendees. He was the favorite of 51%, Gramm was a distant second with 10%. Alexander and Pat Buchanan were also in Iowa this week.

Phil Gramm. Frank Luntz has signed on as a senior consultant with Gramm's campaign and Gramm is negotiating with Bill Kristol as well. Kristol has hinted for a few weeks now that Gramm is his kind of candidate. Gramm picked up the endorsement of second-term Rep. Ernest Istook this weekend and won the straw poll at the Oklahoma Republican State Convention last weekend. He won 50% of the vote, followed by Alan Keyes with 22% and Bob Dole with 15%. Gramm and Keyes addressed the convention; Dole did not.

Pete Wilson. Pete Wilson visited Arizona and Texas this weekend. In Arizona, he attacked the administration's environmental policies and defended his affirmative action stance. He also likened his support of abortion rights to Barry Goldwater's position.

Robert Casey. If former Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey decides to make a formal bid for the Democratic presidential nomination, the 1988 Kemp presidential campaign manager, Jeff Bell, will serve as a senior advisor. Bell has said he would stress issues of concern to "social conservatives" in the campaign, such as abortion, gay rights, school prayer and the "role of the family."

A recent poll conducted by the Harrisburg *Patriot News* showed Casey receiving little Democratic support in the central, more conservative region of the state. The poll showed that Casey would receive

only 25% of the vote from midstate Democrats while forty-nine percent said they would vote for you and 26% were undecided. On April 5th, Pennsylvania state Representative David Wright (D) sent a letter to all Democratic House and Senate Members asking them to support your re-election bid.

Wisconsin Primary Date. The Wisconsin state legislature voted this week to move its 1996 Presidential primary from the first Tuesday in April to the third Tuesday in March, joining Illinois, Michigan and Ohio. The legislation moved the primary on a one-time basis for 1996 only. Referring to a possible presidential bid by Gov. Tommy Thompson (R-WI), Assembly Minority Leader Walter Kunicki (D) scoffed: "This is for boss Tommy."

Delaware Primary. It looks likely that the Delaware Republicans will continue plans for a February 24th state-funded presidential primary without participation by the Democrats. DNC rules prohibit states other than New Hampshire and Iowa to hold a primary or caucus prior to March. Delaware Democratic Party Chair Gary Hindes has tried unsuccessfully to urge the GOP leadership to move the state's presidential primary date to early March. In anticipation of Delaware second-in-the-nation primary, the state GOP will host a fundraiser April 8th featuring five of the announced presidential contenders. Gramm, Specter, Lugar, Dornan and Keyes will all participate in Saturday's program.

Louisiana Caucus. The Louisiana House Committee on Government Affairs has approved a measure to change the state's presidential primary to a caucus system. The change was initiated by the state's budget crisis; abolishing the presidential primary would save the state approximately \$3.5 million. For the change to take effect, the full House, Senate Committee on Government Affairs and full Senate will also have to approve the measure. The full House is expected to vote on the measure April 20th or 21st. While the Louisiana Democrats do not view the proposed caucus system as advantageous to their party in 1996, they find it difficult to argue against the spending cut.

1995 ELECTIONS

Louisiana Gubernatorial Race. Senator Bennett Johnston just completed a 12-day tour of the state that included 45 stops in an effort to "test the waters" for a possible 1995 gubernatorial bid. According to the Louisiana press Johnston was "encouraged" by results from a recent poll. He is expected to conduct another poll in May which should be key to his final decision regarding the race. Should he decide to run, Johnston is expected to announce in June.

Kentucky Gubernatorial Race. The Kentucky AFL-CIO endorsed Lt. Governor Paul Patton (D) in the '95 gubernatorial race. The 400 delegates to the state AFL-CIO convention who endorsed Patton represent approximately 90,000 workers across the state. Kentucky labor leaders are fearful that a GOP victory this year could lead to the passage of a right-to-work law and the repeal of the minimum wage law.

Mississippi Gubernatorial Race. Governor Kirk Fordice (R) vetoed a telecommunications bill Thursday because he did not like its optional set-aside for minority contractors. His veto will result in lawmakers returning to the Capitol on Monday to renew debate on the bill. The Molpus Campaign (D) is reluctant to engage Fordice in a debate on affirmative action and has not crafted a clear message regarding the issue.

Los Angeles City Elections. Two all-Democratic city council elections will be held tomorrow in Los Angeles. County Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky's wife, Barbara, is the favorite in the largely Jewish west

side seat, while respected attorney Stan Sanders challenges iconoclastic incumbent Nate Holden in a largely African American district.

Denver Mayor's Race. City Councilwoman Mary DeGroot has closed the margin on Mayor Wellington Webb and is threatening to force a run-off. She trails Webb 44%-30%, according to a bullet poll released this week. Although automated bullet polls are generally less reliable than standard polls, these numbers basically reflect Webb's internal polling from three weeks ago. DeGroot received a boost last week from the *Rocky Mountain News* endorsement, and the *Denver Post* is unlikely to endorse Webb. Webb will soon begin spending his \$200,000 war chest, which is more than all three of his opponents have combined.

San Francisco Mayor's Race. Assistant HUD Secretary Roberta Achtenberg is likely to announce her candidacy for mayor this week, further splitting liberal opposition to incumbent Mayor Frank Jordan. County Supervisor Angela Alioto announced her candidacy on Saturday and pledged to contest Achtenberg for the city's large gay vote.

Buffalo, New York Primary Splitting Clinton Supporters. On April 6, Erie County Chairman Vincent "Jim" Sorrentino (D) announced his support for Buffalo City Clerk David Swarts (D) who is running a primary challenge against Erie County Executive Dennis Gorski (D). Gorski is unpopular at the moment because he raised taxes and the public thinks he failed to make good on his promises. Because both Gorski and Sorrentino were early and strong Clinton '92 primary supporters, this decision is seriously dividing previously united Clinton-Gore support in Erie County. When the County Democratic Committee meets Saturday, April 8th, Sorrentino's endorsement, added with Swarts' early local labor support in Erie County, will give Swarts a safe margin to win the county party endorsement. Swarts will then run with County Committee support against Gorski, the incumbent, who still has strong fundraising support. The battle is expected to be the ugliest in Erie County in three decades.

Party Change in Yonkers, New York. On March 28th, Vincenza "Vinnie" Restiano (D), the City Council President of Yonkers, the fourth largest city in New York, switched parties from Democrat to Republican. Political insiders believe the Republican Party promised her the nomination for Westchester County Executive, a seat solidly in the Republican column. Yonkers Mayor Terry Zaleski (D), who is up for reelection this November, may be in trouble, and we face a potential loss of his seat to Republicans as well. Although he does not yet have a primary challenger, he is unpopular because of a series of tough battles with the City Council and is seen as ineffective. Zaleski has also been hurt because of some legal and ethical problems that have surfaced regarding his wife. Democrats in the state think that if a primary challenger emerges, Zaleski is likely to prevail, but will then lose to one of the Republicans who is eyeing the race.

1996 RACES

Illinois Senate Race. The *Chicago Sun-Times* and sources close to former Attorney General and 1990 gubernatorial nominee Neil Hartigan (D-IL) report that Hartigan plans to run for the Senate. A sizeable portion of the potential Democratic field, including Rep. Dick Durbin (D), former Senator Alan Dixon (D) and David Wilhelm, is expected to defer to Hartigan if he does run.

Nebraska Senate Race. Businessman Chuck Hagel (R) officially announced his candidacy this week while Attorney General Don Sternberg (R) filed papers with the FEC. Bill Hopner (D), who challenged Ben Nelson (D) in the 1990 gubernatorial primary, is eager to run and is already meeting with

prominent Democrats to discuss a possible candidacy. Senator Bob Kerrey planned to meet with Nelson and Hopner individually last weekend to discuss the race. We will let you know when we have received feedback from the meetings, if they were held as scheduled. Nelson still has not yet shut the door but says that he still is leaning against making the race. This weekend he said that "I have set a time frame for a decision. I know it can't go on indefinitely."

Representative Sid Yates (D). The Chicago Sun-Times reported this week that the Chicago Democrat will likely retire this year. Local Democrats are eyeing hotel executive J.B. Pritzker as a possible replacement. The seat is solidly Democratic.

North Carolina Gubernatorial. House Majority Whip Robin Hayes (R), who is affiliated with the radical right, is considering a challenge to Gov. Jim Hunt (D) in 1996. Hayes says he is encouraged by a recent poll reporting that 61% of North Carolinians consider themselves evangelical or born-again Christians.

Senator Claiborne Pell. Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell recently disclosed that he suffers from Parkinson's disease. The senator has not displayed symptoms of the disease, such as loss of intellectual ability. Despite speculation that he will retire in 1996, Pell has not made a commitment regarding next year's race.

OTHER POLITICAL NEWS

Nevada Nuclear Waste. The letter you sent to Governor Miller declaring opposition to an interim storage facility in Nevada garnered major media coverage this week.

Administration Travel. Vice President Gore was the keynote speaker at the Ohio Democratic Party's Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner last weekend and Secretary Babbitt keynoted the Wisconsin Party's dinner. Both received rave reviews for their performances. Clips are attached. Political Affairs also arranged a reception for Carol Browner during her travel to Utah last weekend. George Stephanopoulos will attend the Arizona Jefferson-Jackson dinner this weekend.

Affirmative Action. The California State Assembly will hold hearings on the state's affirmative action constitutional amendment the first week in May. The measure already failed in a state Senate committee. The state Democratic party unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the proposed anti-affirmative action initiative, but failed to adopt a measure denying party support to candidates who endorse the initiative.

Anti-Discrimination. The Rhode Island State House passed a bill Wednesday that would grant protection to homosexuals in employment, housing, public accommodations and credit. The bill has a good chance of approval in the Senate, and Governor Lincoln Almond (R) has said he will sign it. Similar legislation has failed four times in the state since 1990.

Nathan Deal. Georgia Representative Nathan Deal (CD09) announced today a switch in his party affiliation to the GOP. Deal had previously denied his intentions to switch parties; in fact, he stated to the press in January that he was elected as a Democrat, and would seek a special election should he ever change his affiliation.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

NATION & WORLD

California

Clinton's tough stance pays off

His sidetracked speech wins over hecklers

By TOM RAUM
Associated Press

SACRAMENTO, California — President Clinton told a Democratic audience including many vocal affirmative action activists yesterday that the party must be sensitive to grievances of "so-called angry white males" and be prepared to abandon minority preference programs that don't work.

Jumping into the battle for public opinion for the next 100 days, Clinton gave the strongest defense yet of his decision to order a top-to-bottom review of such programs — already under fierce assault from the Republican majority in Congress.

"We have to realize that there is a real problem out there. We can't deny that," Clinton said.

Clinton had been expected to focus his speech, to a meeting of the state Democratic

Don't scream, let's talk. That's just what they want us to do. They want to get this country into a screaming match. . . . We have to lower our voices."

— President Clinton, to chanting affirmative action activists

party, on a repetition of his problems with remaining items in the GOP Contract with America, and his vow to veto programs that make large cuts in education, environmental and other social programs.

He did that at first. But, confronted with hundreds of activists in the audience waving green signs proclaiming "No Retreat — Stand up for Affirmative Action," Clinton launched into an impassioned defense of his decision to review affirmative action programs.

"We don't have to retreat from these programs. . . . But we do have to ask ourselves — are they all working? Are they fair?"

"This is psychologically a difficult time for a lot of white males, the so-called angry white males . . . most of them are working harder for



Clinton yesterday defends his stand on reviewing affirmative action programs.

less money than they were making 15 years ago."

His words at first drew chants of "no retreat, no retreat" from the sign-waving activists.

"Don't scream, let's talk," he said at one point. "That's just what they want us to do. They want to get this country into a screaming match. . . . We have to lower our voices."

As he spoke on, making his case, the chants receded and finally his words drew widespread applause from the audience of several thousand Democrats.

An initiative proposed for the 1996 ballot in California would repeal state affirmative action laws for government employment, contracting and university admissions. The proposal, drafted by two college professors and supported by Republican Gov. Pete Wilson, requires 600,000

signatures to qualify.

Supporters want the Legislature to vote to put the issue before voters next March — at the time of California's newly shifted presidential primary. Failing that, supporters say they will qualify it themselves for November 1996.

Early polls show it has strong support.

Clinton said Democrats can't allow themselves to be forced into a position by Republicans of defending programs that may be indefensible; and should recognize that there are many examples of reverse discrimination in the country against white, often middle-aged males.

"What we have done is to give more opportunities to women and minorities. This is a very good thing and we should not stop doing it," Clinton said. At the same time, he told the audience, "we do not need to say that we're insensitive" to the concerns of those who feel they have been the targets of reverse discrimination.

Clinton said it was time to have a "national conversation" on the issue and not permit Republicans to maneuver Democrats into a "screaming match" in defense of programs that may have outlived their usefulness.

At issue are over 100 programs, many of them begun in the Nixon administration, that give preference to women and minorities in housing, education and employment.

Clinton had planned to deliver a major affirmative action speech later in the month.

But his spokesman, Mike McCurry, said Clinton wanted to "speak to the frustrations of the angry white male" population sooner rather than later. "Ninety-nine percent of the people we've talked to in the last 24 hours were ready for him to address that issue today," said McCurry.

Later, in a speech to the National Education Association in Los Angeles, Clinton lashed out at House-originated proposals to cut education programs, including one to promote "safe schools."

Noting a new Center for Disease Control study that said one in 12 students carried guns into school in 1993, Clinton said in prepared remarks: "This is a national crisis that requires a national response."

The president was on a three-day swing through California — which is crucial to his 1996 re-election hopes, with its 54 electoral votes, one fifth of the 270 needed for election.

Even though it went for him in 1992, the state is becoming increasingly conservative and Republican. And Democratic strategists were particularly worried about a GOP challenge expected to be mounted by Wilson.

EDITORIALS

CLINTON SPEAKS

Faith and works must be companions

President Clinton the Re-Newed Democrat showed up in Dallas Friday for a major address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Why Re-Newed? Because the "New Democrat" values of "work, family, community" repeatedly came tumbling out of the president's mouth. Those were the themes that helped the president get elected, and now, tellingly, he is again singing the anthem of reform-minded Democrats, which is not all that far from reform-minded Republicans on many issues.

Indeed, the president pledged to work with Republicans where he can and part company where he must. In a workmanlike address, the president's first since House Republicans completed work on their Contract With America, Mr. Clinton presented his interpretation.

He enumerated each contract item, supporting some — reducing federal mandates — and differing with some — saying tax cuts are too generous. He said he'll fight where he disagrees, but promised he wants to "lead the quiet, reasoned forces in both parties" to "keep alive the momentum of change."

Well and good. But first run President Clinton's words through history's prism. The president has had chances to lead in a consistent, centrist fashion.

But he hasn't. While he pressed for New

Democratic items like free trade, he reverted to big government form with a gargantuan health plan. Appropriately, the heavy-handed approach spiraled downward in a fiery crash.

So before we all assume Bill Clinton has been truly reborn as a New Democrat, let him prove himself. Does it profit a man to say he has faith but not works?

Let us suggest some tests. Mr. Clinton says he wants to keep reducing the deficit. Good. But where is his plan to reform entitlement spending, the budget's largest driving force?

Moreover, he doesn't want \$189 billion in new tax cuts. Good again. But will the president provide cover for the Senate to trim down House Republicans' huge tax cuts?

Also, the president wants lobby reform and campaign financing changes. Great. But will they be minus wide-tire loopholes?

The next 100 days will not only be important congressional days. They also will be critical for Mr. Clinton.

Paradoxically, he could learn from Texas Gov. George W. Bush, who is impressing many Texans with his disciplined ability to "stay on message." Odd, isn't it, that Mr. Clinton must learn from the son of the man he defeated to become president? To save himself, Mr. Clinton must discipline himself to match his New Democrat message with New Democrat deeds.

Gore hits GOP pact in pep talk to Ohio faithful

By MARY BETH LANE

PLAIN DEALER BUREAU

COLUMBUS — Vice President Al Gore lit into House Republicans' first 100 days last night, portraying portions of their "Contract with America" as a sop to the rich at the expense of middle-income Americans.

"When you hear all the hoopla about the 100 days, remember who wins and who loses," Gore told 1,000 Ohio Democrats who gathered for their party's annual spring dinner and fund-raiser. "Middle-income families would lose and the privileged and powerful would gain."

He heaped special scorn on what he called House Republicans' attacks on the popular college student loan and elementary school lunch programs upon which so many working families rely.

"I sure wouldn't be bragging about it," Gore said. "They did the wrong thing in student loans and school lunches. We're not going to let them get away with it."

In addition, he suggested the \$187 billion tax cut passed by the House is nothing for middle-income families to cheer about. Families making more than \$200,000 a year will receive an average tax cut of \$11,000. But families making \$30,000 a year will get a cut of \$124, he said.

"The basic difference between our philosophy and the Republican Party's is we believe the way to bring our country to economic health is to focus on working families," he said.

Gore appealed to Democrats in Ohio — the state that put Bill Clinton over the top at the 1992 presidential nominating convention — to redouble their efforts in 1996.

"Let's don't fool ourselves. It's going to be a tough fight," said Gore, who made his entrance last night from the Columbus-made bus that he and Clinton used to travel the country during the 1992 campaign.

Referring to that "bleak Tuesday" last November when Democrats suffered massive losses in Washington and lost the Ohio Statehouse, Gore urged hope.

To those who think the Democratic Party is dead, he said, "Not so fast."

That message got a warm reception from the Democrats who paid \$150 per person to attend the fund-raiser, which is expected to raise between \$150,000 and \$200,000 for the party. Others paid \$1,000 for a chance to mingle with Gore at a private reception before the chicken pesto dinner, which was washed down with bottles of Ohio wine.

"There's tremendous enthusiasm out here," said Cuyahoga County Commissioner Mary O. Boyle. She joined other Clevelanders at the dinner, including Ohio House Minority Leader Patrick A. Sweeney; former Attorney General Lee I. Fisher; defeated U.S. Senate candidate Joel Hyatt; and State Sen. Dennis Kucinich.

"We're building toward the next election, and we're going to come back strong," Boyle said.

Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Boggs, an Ashtabula Democrat, shared her optimism.

"The turnout is great," he said. "The mood is upbeat. We're going to go to war. We're like the phoenix rising from the ashes of last year's election."

Sen. John Glenn, who flew in on Air Force Two with Gore, also appealed to his fellow Democrats to stand tall.

"Let me suggest to everyone here tonight that it's time we stopped wringing our hands and hanging our heads," he said. "We are not a hang-dog party. We are Ohio Democrats."

Glenn brought special cheers from the Democrats in recognizing their state party chairman, Harry Meshel, who is recovering from heart surgery. Glenn quipped that Meshel has a heart, unlike the House Republicans who he said are waging heartless war on working families.

Union Leader 4/7/95
Bob Cut-a-Deal Dole
 New Hampshire Taxpayers Are Watching

Has Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole received the November 1994 elections' clear message that the American people demand sharply reduced government spending?

Sure he has.

The senator from Kansas heard it.

He apparently just doesn't believe it.

As of this writing, Cut-a-Deal Bob, who doesn't regard the GOP "Contract with America" as applicable to the elitist political prima donnas in the U.S. Senate, is already busy cutting some interesting deals with Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle.

The two huddled Wednesday night and agreed to:

- Restore \$800,000,000 worth of Republican-proposed spending cuts.
- Preserve \$275,000,000 worth of Clinton-forgiven U.S. loans for Jordan.
- Set aside a Republican senator's attempt to stop short of the line of scrimmage President Clinton's arrogant end-run around Congress, by terminating Clinton's \$20 billion bailout of the Mexican economy.

It sounds to us that affable Bob Dole has been cutting deals in Con-

gress for so long from a minority position that he is slow to adjust to the fact that he is now in the majority leadership position in more respects than title identification only.

But perhaps someone will eventually alert Senator Dole to the probabili-



ity that conservative taxpayers in New Hampshire, host of the nation's first Presidential Primary, are watching closely and that they are not the sort of people who forget easily.

BOB DOLE

They surely know that if Dole can't, or won't, dig in and resist the Spendocrats from his top position in the U.S. Senate, then he surely couldn't, or wouldn't, do it from the White House.

—Jim Finnegan

Wilson blows through

Calif. gov. stumbles in first N.H. touch-and-go

California Gov. Pete Wilson was in New Hampshire for less than two hours Tuesday, just long enough to get two strikes against him.

First, Wilson portrayed himself as a cheerleader for small government. There are great similarities between California and New Hampshire," he said. We are in many respects kindred souls." Yeah, right.

Campaign '96

A friendly word of advice for the governor: people here don't see many similarities between California and New Hampshire. Quite frankly, California is an anathema.

Now admittedly our perceptions are based on the overwhelming social impact Southern California has on the rest of the country, but Wilson's state isn't considered to be a bastion of conservative thought - politically or socially.

It sounded patronizing to suggest we're kindred souls when you obviously know so little about us.

That ignorance caused strike two. When asked if he was willing to take the pledge," Wilson responded, I don't know what the pledge is. Sounds like something to do with alcohol."

Not quite governor.

It sounds odd saying this 11 months before the primary, but Wilson is getting a late start. Many Republican Party activists have already picked sides. Sen. Bob Smith is backing Sen. Phil Gramm and Sen. Judd Gregg is set to embrace Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole. The big holdout is Gov. Stephen Merrill, but he's more likely to back someone he thinks can win.

Wilson will appeal to socially moderate Republicans in the state who are pro-choice on abortion and pro-control on guns. There are many Republicans in New Hampshire with such leanings, but probably not enough.

Daily Democrat

3/30/95

P. 10

Jackson joins 'classic fight'

By JIM POLLOCK

REGISTER STAFF WRITER

Jesse Jackson may not be running for president now, but he offered some presidential campaign advice Thursday afternoon in a speech to striking Bridgestone/Firestone workers.

"When (Bob) Dole and (Phil) Gramm and that crowd come to town, make them tell you where they stand," he said, referring to two leading Republican presidential candidates. "Dole, which side are you on? Gramm, which side are you on?"

Earlier on his visit to the site of the long, bitter strike, he put it this way: "Those who would be president must make a decision for or against these workers."

Workers Cheer

Jackson, who twice ran for president himself, also gave the crowd at the United Rubber Workers union Local 310 hall his opinion on Gov. Terry Branstad's reluctance to get in-

involved in the strike: "The governor's non-involvement is involvement," he said to the cheers of the workers.

"When the governor says nothing, the governor says everything."

Jackson's speech to the union capped a busy day in Des Moines, which followed a trip to Memphis, Tenn., on the 27th anniversary of the assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr.

"The perception then was that he was fighting for black workers. He was fighting for workers," Jackson said. "Twenty-seven years later, the workers are becoming whiter and more middle-class every day. The fundamental issue is not black and white, it's wrong and right."

Calls for Boycott

Jackson called for a national boycott of Firestone products and also tried to enlist support for his Rainbow Coalition.

"We need picket signs boycotting Firestone in about 10 major cities around the country," he said. "This is a national fight."

When the Rainbow Coalition holds a march this spring in Atlanta from House Speaker Newt Gingrich's office to King's tomb, "That's where the rubber should meet the road," he said, inviting URW members to take part in the demonstration.

"Fight With Dignity"

However, he spent most of his time encouraging the union to stand firm in its strike.

"It's better to fight in dignity than to go back and duck your head in shame," he said, echoing King's words to civil rights pioneer Rosa Parks. "If the baseball players could hold out, you can hold out."

Jackson first stopped at the picket line, where security guards declined his offer to shake hands. He and his son, Jesse Jackson Jr., then spoke briefly with the pickets.

"These workers must be strong enough not to let their spirits be broken," he said. "Nelson Mandela was in prison for 27 years."

"This is becoming a classic fight. When the presidential candidates come to Iowa, they must make a decision. They must take a stand."

Des Moines
Register

Casey's presidential bid unlikely to go unnoticed

By Chuck Raasch
Gannett News Service

WASHINGTON: Although he is given little chance of unseating President Clinton, former Pennsylvania Gov. Robert Casey could be more than just a nuisance in next year's Democratic primaries, even if he is identified primarily as an anti-abortion candidate.



Casey

Casey formed a presidential exploratory committee Friday. He has

been harshly critical of his party since being denied a speaking opportunity at the 1992 Democratic Convention in New York City.

He has little name identification or proven fund-raising ability beyond his state and the national anti-abortion network. And taking on an in-office president, particularly one with the political skills of

Analysis

Clinton, is daunting.

G. Terry Madonna, director of the Center for Politics and Public Affairs at Pennsylvania's Millersville University, said Democratic primary voters are "overwhelmingly pro-choice."

But challenger candidates in an era of political cynicism do not have to win to have impact.

Just ask Patrick Buchanan, who drew first blood on George Bush in 1992. Or Ross Perot, who siphoned off disaffected moderates to help give Clinton the White House.

Casey's challenge could have an impact on the 1996 primaries by:

- Giving the Christian Coalition an opening to get involved in the Democratic primaries.

- Giving Republicans some cover on the contentious abortion battle that looms in their primaries, with anti-abortion and pro-choice candidates in the field.

- Cutting into GOP arguments that anti-abortion candidates have nowhere to turn because Democrats won't allow debate on the issue.

THE UNION LEADER, Manchester, N.H. — Tuesday, April 4, 1995

GOP Strategist Bell

By JOHN KING
AP Political Writer

WASHINGTON — Jeffrey Bell, a veteran Republican operative, is crossing party lines to take a leading role in former Pennsylvania Gov. Robert Casey's likely primary challenge to President Clinton.

Bell said he agreed to serve as a senior adviser to Casey primarily because of the Democrat's unwavering opposition to abortion.

"This is where I think that cause can go," Bell said in an interview. "I think the Republican Party has gone at least inactive on the pro-life issue."

Casey, 65, last month formed a committee to explore a 1996 campaign campaign. Bell said the former governor was "moving clearing in the direction" of running, but would not make a final decision for several weeks.

Bell said Casey's fundraising efforts "are at very early stages

Joins Casey Camp

but show a lot of promise."

Bell was a senior strategist in Jack Kemp's 1988 Presidential campaign and has long been associated with conservative Republican causes.

He said he was "still a Republican" but unhappy because most of the GOP's leading Presidential candidates, "while nominally pro-life aren't really interested in pushing the issue. A kind of collective decision has been made at the top level of the party to not

talk about the pro-life issue."

When asked if it might raise eyebrows that a Democratic primary challenge to a sitting President was being orchestrated by a longtime Republican, Bell said, "life is getting very confusing."

Casey began feuding with Clinton in 1992, when Clinton denied Casey's request to speak — and air his anti-abortion views — to the Democratic National Convention.

"I think the Republican Party has gone at least inactive on the pro-life issue."

Jeffrey Bell

**REPRESENTATIVE
DAVID R. WRIGHT**

April 5, 1995

Pennsylvania

SUBJECT: Message

TO: All Democratic House and Senate Members

FROM: David R. Wright 

If you are willing to have your name added to the list of Democratic Members who support this message to the President, please call me at (717) 787-2651.

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As Democratic members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly who have supported Bob Casey in his campaigns for Governor, we wish to reaffirm our commitment to your nomination and re-election as President of the United States.

In a world of complexity and uncertainty we believe it is unwise for a candidate to seek the Presidency of the United States on a single issue, not withstanding the fact that many of us agree with his position.

Bob Casey has no claim to the loyalty and support of Democrats. In every election of state-wide consequence he has sabotaged Democratic candidates with the exception of Pro-Choice Senatorial candidate Lynn Yeakel - and that in opposition to his own Lt. Governor.

The election of 1994 makes clear the necessity of a progressive voice in the White House. That can only happen if Democrats rally around the issues that unite us rather than those that divide us.

A Bob Casey candidacy is a blueprint for reversing every gain we have made for the working men and women of America.

We earnestly hope that our former Governor will not undertake his quixotic errand but if he does, you can be assured of our support.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

A18

THE UNION LEADER, Manchester, N.H. — Tuesday, April 4, 1995

Candidate Wilson's Position

By JOHN HOWARD
Associated Press Writer

SACRAMENTO, Calif. — Gov. Pete Wilson promised he wouldn't run for President. He's running.

He said he likely would sign a homosexual-rights law. He vetoed it in 1991.

He opposed raising taxes. Then he raised them \$7 billion during his first year as governor.

He bashed former Gov. Jerry Brown for doing the same thing Wilson's doing now — leaving the state to campaign for President.

As Wilson begins his first foray into national politics, his contradictory record — which has excited little comment in California — offers a juicy target.

He opposes affirmative action policies he once supported as mayor of San Diego in the 1970s.

He criticized Ronald Reagan in 1976 as a big-spending governor who raised taxes three times. Four years later, he supported Reagan for President.

He describes himself as fiscally responsible. But on his watch California issued \$3.8 billion

worth of IOUs for the first time since the Great Depression.

"He has got to get control over it because it can spin out of control," Republican consultant Sal Russo said of the flip-flop perception. "The problem is, he hasn't spent the last two years preparing to be President, he's been preparing to be governor."

Wilson only became serious Presidential material after his stunning comeback last year to defeat Democrat Kathleen Brown and win a second term as governor. He recently formed an exploratory committee to study a run for the White House.

Suddenly, the governor of the nation's most-populous state is under a national spotlight.

Wilson's spin: Yes, he raised taxes \$7 billion, but he matched them dollar-for-dollar with cuts, closing a \$14 billion budget gap that was the largest ever in any state. In four years he's cut \$30 billion from state spending.

He did favor affirmative action policies as mayor, but says now the need for them has passed.

IOUs were issued, but it was

the fault of an intransigent Legislature.

Wilson attacked Reagan in 1976, but it was because he was already backing incumbent President Gerald Ford.

"He's way behind in getting his story told, and if you don't tell your story, somebody else will with a different spin," said Russo, who directed media campaigns last year for New York's Sen. Alfonse D'Amato and Gov. George Pataki.

Opponents Bob Dole, Phil Gramm, Pat Buchanan and Lamar Alexander already depict Wilson as out of touch with a party tilting to the right. They also bring up his 1994 promise not to run for President.

That promise was made most publicly last October during his televised campaign debate

Shift on Key Issues

against Brown, when a reporter noted that Wilson left his mayoral job early to go to the U.S. Senate and his Senate seat early to be governor. Wilson promised he would complete a gubernatorial term.

The possibility that Wilson would leave his office to Democratic Lt. Gov. Gray Davis has upset some supporters, said John Kern, a member of the San Diego County Republican Central Committee.

"I have been extremely surprised at the intense reaction to breaking his promise," Kern said.

"Pete has this image of unshakable integrity, and this has been damaged."

However, he added: "Those same people will still vote for Wilson."

Kern says Wilson's changes show that Wilson is a pragmatist willing to change positions to solve problems.

"For example, he was a big supporter of affirmative action at one point, and now he's not," Kern said. "The fact is, the issues have changed and he has changed; it makes him an extremely competent administra-

tor."

One of Wilson's closest advisers, Larry Thomas, agreed.

"Let's talk about the real world we're in: Gramm voted for a George Bush tax package that Wilson voted against. You have Bob Dole who is moving to the right now in the assault weapons ban repeal."

"There is this standard imposed by the media and others that there is supposed to be some rigid, dogmatic consistency over a period of decades," Thomas said. "I don't think that's realistic."

Government/Politics

Gramm Message: Less Government, More Opportunity

By WARREN HASTINGS
State House Bureau

CONCORD — U.S. Sen. Phil Gramm of Texas who calls himself a "foot soldier in the Reagan revolution" took his less government-more opportunity message to employees of Chubb Life of America yesterday.

The Republican Presidential hopeful, whose professional background includes teaching economics at Texas A&M University, told Chubb employees that if the nation doesn't get spending and regulation under control this won't be the same country 20 years from now that it is today.

Either change the way government does business dramatically or lose the American dream, warned the former Texas Democrat-turned-Republican.

"But the good news is that we don't have a problem that we can't fix," Gramm added.

With a Ph.D in economics, Gramm focuses his conservative message on the cost of government which he feels has gotten out of control.

Yesterday Gramm promised to work hard to see that the Reagan

"... the good news is that we don't have a problem that we can't fix."

U.S. Sen. Phil Gramm


revolution comes to fruition.

Gramm said that government needs to start making economic decisions the same way that families and businesses living in the real world do. Government hasn't lived in the real world for 40 years, Gramm said.

Gramm said the federal Department of Education should be eliminated and that the money should be redirected toward allowing parents and local schools to set their own priorities.

Gramm also supports the concept of a flat tax and reduced capital gains taxes. Gramm has consistently taken the view that a lower capital gains tax would help corporations create more jobs.

Congress also needs to say no when the right answer is no



STUMPING — Republican Presidential hopeful Phil Gramm of Texas addresses New Hampshire sheriffs and police chiefs at a breakfast in Concord yesterday. On the right is New Hampton Police Chief Nathaniel H. Sawyer Jr.

AP Photo

Gramm said. "In President Clinton's case 'no' is generally the right answer," Gramm quipped.

Gramm chided Clinton on his economic thinking, promising to rewrite the President's crime bill which he said was half-social programs. Gramm said he would like to redirect that money toward direct enforcement help for police.

Gramm suggested that federal prisons be restructured to offer inmates education programs on a mandatory six-day-a-week basis

"Holiday Inn" type prisons.

Acknowledging that government has a role to play in national life, Gramm said that decisions, such as those made in the area of environmental protection, should be based on actual necessity.

He cited several cases of extremes in environmental regulations.

Gramm criticized land-taking by regulation and supported the concept of compensating land-

usefulness directly because of regulation.

He cited the case of a California farmer who couldn't farm his land because a rat killed on it was deemed part of an endangered species.

Gramm was elected to Congress in 1978 as a Democrat. After a philosophical battle with the House Democratic leadership, he was expelled from the Budget Committee, switched parties and won a U.S. Senate seat from

Specter faces dubious

Iowan Republican Party

DES MOINES (AP) — Not long ago, Arlen Specter peered out across a cavernous Des Moines convention center and delivered a stern call for moderate Republicanism. Scattered boos rolled back.

On Saturday, amid rare flowering plants in a botanical garden, Specter said he wants the party's presidential nomination so he can save the GOP from an "intolerant right."

From afar, the boos rolled in. "I think he's a fine gentleman and has a lot of good things to say, but I don't think he's going to be taken very seriously in Iowa," said Brent Siegrist, a Council Bluffs Republican.

Siegrist, majority leader of the state House of Representatives, concluded: "I would dismiss him as a real serious candidate."

"I don't think it's going to work very well," said Steve Roberts, a Des Moines lawyer and member of the Republican National Committee.

Specter was in Iowa, which holds the nation's first test of presidential strength with precinct caucuses next February, to formally announce he'll seek the party's nomination.

The heart of the Pennsylvania senator's campaign is an appeal to centrist Republicans. He warns that the increasing power of religious conservatives threatens to drive the GOP out of the political mainstream and hand re-election to President Clinton.

"We need to keep religion out of politics," said Specter, at a rally attended by about 100 people.

"Neither this nation nor this party can afford a Republican candidate so captive to the demands of the intolerant right that we end up re-electing a president of the incompetent left," said Specter.

In Iowa, he'll make that case to a party that has drifted steadily to the right and where religious conservatives have gained effective control of the party machinery.

Iowa Republican Chairman Brian Kennedy acknowledged the importance of religious conservatives as a force in the party.

"There's a lot of activism here," he said.

Roberts added, "In state central committee elections, in state chair elections, in precinct caucuses, they play a major role."

Steve Scheffler, a leader in the

Sen.
Arlen
Specter
Seeking
presidency



state's Christian Coalition, labeled Specter's message "divisive." While religious conservatives will likely migrate to more than one GOP candidate —

Scheffler is with Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole — they are likely to be united in opposition to Specter.

One of Specter's main issues is his support for abortion rights. He is pledging to lead the charge to delete the strict anti-abortion plank from the Republican platform.

Kennedy said that's a settled issue for Iowa Republicans.

"I really don't believe the nomination fight and the caucus fight is going to turn on that issue," he said.

Siegrist, a backer of former Education Secretary Lamar Alexander, conceded that Specter is raising issues that may come back to haunt Republicans.

"The influence of certain segments of our party, the people you would see in the religious

right, have had the effect of pushing our candidates to the right," he said. "If we allow

ourselves to get shoved too far to the right it is going to cause us problems."