

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM

TO: ~~THE PRESIDENT~~
FROM: LAURA LANCASTER TAYMAN
RE: BC THANK YOU'S AND GREETINGS
DATE: September 8, 1993

FRANK DALE AND CONNY LOU RISNER

Thank you for asking them to be your guests in the White House.

JAMES B. HEBENSTREIT

Thank you for your time at the Boys' Nation reunion.

BILLY GRAHAM

Thank you for your gift in honor of his anniversary.

MARCIA AND DAN GOODGAME

Thank you for the recent White House dinner and their photo w/the First Lady.

 **KATHY BICKERMAN NAUMANN**

Thank you for invitation to WH dinner for Commanders-In-Chief. Her son had cancer and she would like to be an advocate/spokesperson for NIH or National Cancer Institute.
cc: Carol Rasco

SAM C. HIGHSMITH

Thank you for your kind condolence note. Congrats on Economic plan. He shares your sorrow with the loss of Vince.

MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY

Thank you for nominating her to the US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. *Let her see*

MORE BIRTHDAY GREETINGS:

Arthadale and Dean Good -- invites you to her Mother's 80th Bday party in March → *Keep with - I must send greeting*

The Ricketts Family

Susan Ness and Lawrence Schneider

Harold and Donna Copeland

Ryan Gray Todd

Adam Sanders

L. M. Cook -- Chair of ARCO -- good luck with NAFTA and health care. He would love to tell you about his time in Africa and President Carter's work there. *- to Mark*

REVEREND AND MRS. LEMING RUTLEDGE

Thank you for invitation to Interfaith Breakfast.

WILLIAM AND CHRISTINE SCOPA

Thank you for invitation to the Easter Egg Roll.

L. M. Cook
Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer

August 20, 1993

President William J. Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I could not let your forty-seventh birthday pass without sending my sincere congratulations on such a special occasion. Your first birthday in The White House, celebrated with your family and close friends must have been one of the high points of your life.

I must confess some disappointment that you were not on the West Coast so that I could reciprocate for the wonderful treatment that you arranged on my sixty-fifth birthday on the occasion of the luncheon with you at The White House. I remember it as if it were yesterday and look forward to the opportunity to return your kindness at some future date.

When we last visited, you were approaching the critical vote on the economic plan and I was leaving for Africa with Jimmy Carter. Your budget victory was a significance to the U.S. and the world, a major success for you and your team. Congratulations on a job well done.

Perhaps sometime in the future I can tell you of President Carter's work in Africa while we were there. It was spectacular.

Best wishes for another forty-seven and good luck with Health Care and NAFTA. They are crucial to the nation's economic future.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. M. Cook". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

L. M. Cook

9-10-93

Nancy - your copy
copy sent to ^①Scheduling
② Grey Schroeder
③ Blumie
cc

9-10-93

Nancy-

7YI !

3/16

Terry

This needs to hook up w/
an outgoing to Dale Drake
from Hope, Arkansas.

Terry

MORE BIRTHDAY GREETINGS:

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The Ricketts Family
Susan Ness and Lawrence Schneider
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Ryan Gray Todd
Adam Sanders

→ Keep with - I must send agenting
She's my close friend

grey

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→ Keep with - I must send agenting
She's my close friend

grey

58 Mary Mabel! #081?

We are finally back
in Arkansas, and in
Hot Springs Village
building a new house.
Trying to get Mother
to sell her house and
move closer. Know she
would enjoy being
closer to Virginia and
Dick. She will be
80 years old in March,
so we are planning a
big blow-out. Hope
you and Hillary can
drop in.

Love to all.

A.

9/8 Scheduling
Scheduling.
Invite to March
'94 b'day for
Mother

Like you, for instance!

*Happy
Birthday!*

Arthurole & Dean

*Our family
believes in having
the best of everything!*





President Bill Clinton
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Good
P.O. Box 8088
HOT SPRINGS VILLAGE,
AR. 71909

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

9/28/93 db

John -

I've done some further follow up with Randy Jacobs - we'll stay in touch regarding possible activities which use his experiences to reach others. In addition, he will be hearing from the Northwest AIDS Foundation, a Seattle-based group which can help tie him into the AIDS/HIV network.

I'm glad the President was able to call him - it wasn't a great deal -

Cristine Gebbie

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

File

RM

THE WHITE HOUSE

9/28

KRISTINE -

Thanks for the update on
Randy Jacobs. I shared it
with the President.

JOHN PODESTA



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ^{5/2}

165 WEST 46th STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

November 10, 1993

Ron Silver
President

President's Advisory
Committee

The Hon. Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Jane Alexander
Blair Brown
Ellen Burstyn
Zoe Caldwell
Glenn Close
Stephen Collins
Tyne Daly
Whoopi Goldberg
Julie Harris
Charleton Heston
Dustin Hoffman
Anne Jackson
Raul Julia
Kevin Kline
Stephen Lang
Linda Lavin
Laurence Luckinbill
Kate Nelligan
Christopher Reeve
Cliff Robertson
Susan Sarandon
Frances Sternhagen
Sada Thompson
Kathleen Turner
Eli Wallach
Sam Waterston
Shelley Winters

Dear Mr. President,

Anyone reading A.M. Rosenthal's November 4, 1993 NEW YORK TIMES editorial, "Sidewalks: Clinton and Giuliani", might conclude that celebrity, thoughtfulness, and

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in formation

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING



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Shelley Winters

Dear Mr. President,

Anyone reading A.M. Rosenthal's November 4, 1993 NEW YORK TIMES editorial, "Sidewalks: Clinton and Giuliani", might conclude that celebrity, thoughtfulness, and political commitment are mutually exclusive.

New York's recent mayoralty race was a difficult one, and like many life-long Democrats, my support of Rudy Giuliani stemmed from the belief that the City's entrenched problems, like the Nation's, are largely the product of government practices and political formulae that no longer work. New alliances and new ideas are absolutely essential if we are to reverse the apparent erosion of our economy, quality of life and social institutions.

I believe that your campaign and Presidency were similarly motivated and the experts upon whom you continue to rely -- Elaine Kamarck on family issues, Andrew Cuomo on the homeless, Rob Shapiro on economics and Robert Reich on labor-- are the very same opinions to which the Mayor-elect is most likely to turn to inspire his policy prescriptions. I see in both of you the same independence of mind and pragmatism that respects diversity, yet, places a higher public value on quality of thought than ideological labels.

in formation

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING


Telephone: 212 869-8530 Fax: 212 719-9815

* || This intellectual honesty will serve you and the Country well in completing the challenging agenda you have set for us. In my opinion, far reaching efforts such as Health Care reform, and NAFTA, can succeed only if the traditional vocabulary of political debate is put aside. As the President of a 36,000 member labor union, I personally support both of these important initiatives and hope they signal a new period of National consensus building.

I deeply appreciate the consideration you have always shown me, particularly in light of the many important demands on your time. Please be assured that, whatever the potential implications of a Republican mayor in City Hall, they do not include any alteration of my enthusiastic support of your Administration. I hope, therefore, you will feel free to call on me if I can be of any assistance.

My very best to you and the First Lady for the coming Holidays.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ron Silver".

Ron Silver
President

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2/10/94

Tony/Sandy

U. H. H. H. H. H.

With making the
State obvious, it does
socially as help for
Nursing Home for
children -

The Question of Intervention

Michael Mandelbaum

December 6, 1993

Draft only. Not for quotation, citation, or publication.

Please do not circulate.

At first, the post-Cold War era appeared to be a golden age for American military power abroad. In the Persian Gulf, the Bush Administration responded to an act of naked aggression by assembling a great multinational coalition, gaining approval for a military campaign from both the United Nations and the Congress, winning a swift, decisive, cheap victory, and bringing the troops home quickly.

The Gulf War was, however, a false dawn -- less the harbinger of the future than the last gasp of a morally and politically clearer age. It was a replay of World War II, on a far smaller and less costly scale. The first glimpse of the real future of military intervention appeared only after the war was won, in northern Iraq. There the United States mounted an operation to protect the Kurds, who had risen in rebellion against Saddam and suffered a vengeful onslaught in retaliation. They had fled over the border into Turkey in the hundreds of thousands.

There followed two similar American interventions: one in Somalia, on the Horn of Africa; the other in Central Europe, in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia. Geographically disparate as these three episodes were, they shared several features and together they define the issues raised by question of intervention in the post-Cold War era.

All three had the approval of the United Nations. None bore any trace of the single great issue of the Cold War era -- the contest of political ideas and military power between the world's

two most powerful countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, the occasion for intervention in each case was a local conflict among the fundamental groups of organized social life: clans, tribes, nations. Each proved to be messy, confusing, and frustrating for the United States.

The reason was that all three lacked the clear, defining features of the Cold War. During the Cold War the purpose of intervention was clear: to defeat or contain the forces of Communism. Now the goals are more complicated. Similarly, during the Cold War the means appropriate for intervention were obvious. They were, for the most part, military; the conflict with the Soviet Union was, after all, a war. In each of the three cases of post-Cold War intervention, by contrast, force seemed insufficient, and sometimes even inappropriate. Finally, during the Cold War an all-purpose rationale for intervention was available. The various places in which the United States intervened, directly or indirectly, from Korea to the Dominican Republic to Afghanistan, were all theaters of a single, global conflict.

The Cold War can no longer provide a rationale for American intervention. In northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia the United States found what at first seemed a compelling substitute.

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* America was drawn into each place to alleviate the suffering of civilians, suffering that was brought into the world's living rooms by television. In all three, the heart of the mission was to bring food to people who were starving. In each case the

American armed forces were used for this purpose, but each operation relied on the military's transport and logistical capabilities rather than its firepower. The names given to the operations had a therapeutic rather than a martial ring: "Provide Comfort" in northern Iraq; "Restore Hope" in Somalia. And they had a common public justification.

"I want to emphasize that this effort is prompted only by humanitarian concerns" President George Bush said in announcing the mission to northern Iraq. "Let me be very clear," he stated at the outset of operations in Somalia, "our mission is humanitarian." Authorizing the dispatch of food to besieged Muslims in Bosnia, President Bill Clinton said that "These airdrops are being carried out strictly for humanitarian purposes."

In the wake of the Cold War a new American policy was born: humanitarian intervention. Its most important feature has proven to be this: there is, strictly speaking, no such thing.

Intervention for humanitarian purposes leads, inevitably, to one of two political tasks. Neither is outside the experience of the United States and its allies. But both are expensive to accomplish. And on the evidence of the post-Cold War era thus far, the American public is not inclined to pay the price for either.

II

Humanitarian intervention appeals to the best qualities in

Americans: empathy, compassion, the tradition of helping a neighbor in distress. It also raises the prospect that, with the end of the Cold War, American power can be devoted to good works rather than the grim purposes to which military force is ordinarily put. But humanitarian intervention -- that is, intervention in other countries free of the nasty, messy politics that interventions of the past inevitably entangled the United States -- is a mirage. It is the political equivalent of the economist's free lunch. Belief in both stems from the deeply rooted human impulse to have good things without paying for them.

The alleviation of suffering cannot avoid political consequences when, as in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia, suffering has political causes. On television, the victims of starvation appeared to be in the grip of stark and powerful forces. But those forces were created by political conflict, not by the whim of nature. The people in those unhappy places were victims of the breakdown of civil order. Reestablishing it -- deciding what kind of order to establish, who should govern, and how -- is the basic task of politics. Without addressing that task, humanitarian assistance is bound to be wasted. To put it differently, the cause of the breakdown of order in each case was war. To stop a war requires settling the questions -- political questions -- over which it is being fought.

In northern Iraq and Somalia, eschewing the political conflicts that had placed so many lives in jeopardy in favor of simply providing food and leaving risked keeping hundreds of

thousands of people alive today only to have them starve tomorrow.

Inevitably, in each case the noble humanitarian purpose of feeding people became caught up in the poisonous tangle of local politics. Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq turned into the maintenance of a de facto autonomous zone for the Kurds, who were protected from Saddam by the American military presence in neighboring Turkey and by the enforcement of a no-fly zone directed at Iraqi warplanes above the thirty-sixth parallel. Two years after it was established, the zone had all the appearances of a permanent arrangement, at least as long as Saddam remained in power. The alternative was to leave the Kurds to his tender mercies.

In Somalia, famine relief turned into counterinsurgency. Having warded off starvation, the United States and the United Nations were drawn into measures to prevent famine from returning. That meant trying to disarm the factions whose internecine wars had disrupted the food supply. Beyond that, it meant trying to construct a stable political order, a task that American envoy Robert Oakley called "total pacification and nation-building." This task was not a small one. But shirking it risked wasting the effort the international community had already made. It risked keeping thousands of Somalis alive in 1992 so that they could starve in 1993. In announcing the decision to remain in Somalia in August, 1993, (a decision that was reversed two months later after 18 American soldiers were

killed in a firefight with one of the factions), Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said that "the danger is that the situation will return to what existed before the U.S. sent in troops." That meant the return of starvation.

In Bosnia, the inevitable connection between the humanitarian and the political was on perverse display. There the United States confined itself to a humanitarian mission, declining, in the end, to plunge into the politics that had given rise to murderous ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslav republic. The American Air Force dropped food parcels, not paratroops, into Bosnia. Yet by the administration's own reckoning, military intervention was the only way to eliminate the suffering that the food packages were designed to ease. In the view of the American government, the conflict was the result of naked Serbian aggression against the internationally-recognized sovereign state of Bosnia. Upon taking office, the Clinton administration initially sought to help forces loyal to the Bosnian government. It proposed to lift the international arms embargo on all of the former Yugoslavia that, because Serbia had inherited the Yugoslav army, put the Bosnian government at a disadvantage. And it threatened to conduct air strikes against Serb positions in Bosnia.

But the administration refrained -- or was prevented -- from carrying out these measures because of the objections of the Western Europeans. Those objections rested in part on the fear that in response to American bombardment of their positions, the

Serbs in Bosnia would turn on the lightly-armed Western forces on the ground (they were mainly British and French; the United States had not sent any) that were providing aid -- food and medicine -- to Bosnian civilians. Here, then was the perverse effect. If in Somalia the failure to follow humanitarian with political intervention threatened a reversion to the conditions that had triggered the humanitarian intervention in the first place, in Bosnia the provision of humanitarian aid actually perpetuated those conditions. If only military pressure on the Serbs could relieve the suffering of the Bosnians, as the Americans believed, and if it was the fear of attack on those supplying food that blocked the application of such pressure, as the Europeans insisted, then the humanitarian measures arguably made life worse for those living in Bosnia than if they had never been undertaken in the first place.

When the United States discovered that suffering had political causes, in all three cases it proceeded to locate those causes at least in part in the misrule and aggressive designs of a tyrant: Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Mohammed Farah Aideed in Somalia, the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia. None, is true, was a particular credit to humanity. The world, and the small areas directly affected by them, would have been a better place if each had been removed from power, something that the United States tried, and in each case failed, to do.

But the political issues at the root of the suffering the

United States intervened in northern Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia to stop would not have been resolved even if these American efforts had succeeded. Those issues went far beyond a single personality to one of the fundamental issues of politics: sovereignty. The suffering the United States was moved to try to alleviate stemmed, in the end, from assaults on the basic unit of sovereignty: the state.

The assaults were of two related but distinct kinds, which created two different challenges. One came from the efforts of one or more groups within a state to secede and set up states of their own. This was the issue in Bosnia and Iraq. Suffering stemmed from wars of secession. Relieving the suffering required deciding which groups were entitled to sovereignty, fixing borders accordingly, and defending the borders that came under challenge.

In the second case there was agreement on the borders of the state in question but a struggle over who would govern it, a struggle that led to chaos. Somalia, as well as Cambodia and Haiti, were ethnically homogeneous nations in which the machinery of government had broken down. The task of repairing that machinery has come to be called "nation-building." That, however, is a misnomer. Nations -- peoples bound together by a common history and language -- are not built; they are created over long periods of time by the gradual accumulation of shared experience. What is involved is, rather, state-building.

So humanitarian intervention leads logically to two

quintessentially political tasks: guaranteeing the borders of countries under challenge; and constructing an apparatus of government in places where it is absent. These are familiar tasks. The first was the principal aim of American intervention during the Cold War. The second was a common practice of the European great powers for much of the modern era, particularly during the nineteenth century.

Despite these historical precedents, however, the two types of post-Cold War intervention present the United States with vexing choices. In the first case the main difficulty is conceptual. While defending a country is usually a straightforward (although not necessarily an easy) task, the threshold question of which groups ought to have their own countries is not easy to answer. In the second, the obstacle is a practical one. The desired end of effective government is clear enough, but mustering the means to achieve it is difficult, perhaps even impossible for the United States in the post-Cold War era.

III

The post-Cold War world has witnessed an explosion of claims for sovereignty. Borders almost everywhere are in question, as they were not when the Soviet-American contest dominated international politics. This is because several features of the Cold War enforced those borders. Now they are gone.

Communist power held together Yugoslavia and the Soviet

Union. With the collapse of Communist rule, they fell apart. From the ruins of the first have emerged five officially-recognized successor states; from the second, fifteen. The fate of these two erstwhile Communist countries is the latest episode in one of the ongoing dramas of the twentieth century: the disintegration of the great multinational empires that once governed most of the planet. The Communist empires of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union followed those of the Habsburgs, the Ottomans, the Hohenzollerns, the British and the French (not to mention the shorter-lived empires of the United States and Japan) into the dustbin of history.

Even beyond the reach of the Communist parties of Europe, the Cold War kept secessionist movements in check. It did so by making arms and money available to narrowly based governments in countries all over the world, which used them to suppress rival groups that might otherwise have been able successfully to challenge existing borders. The Cold War was a global contest. The United States and the Soviet Union were constantly in search of clients. Third World leaders were often eager to align themselves with one or the other and use the arms that came as a reward to sustain their own rule at home. The three countries in which the United States intervened for humanitarian purposes in the wake of the Cold War illustrate the pattern. Each was ruled by a dictator, none of whom could have remained in power without weapons to coerce his opponents. As it happened, each managed to get them from both Cold War rivals.

Iraq and Yugoslavia were multinational states, Somalia a collection of sometimes-feuding clans. The dictator of each one managed to become a client, at one time or another and sometimes simultaneously, of both east and west. Saddam bought arms from France as well as the Soviet Union and in the 1980s, during his war with Iran, received assistance from the United States. Tito of Yugoslavia looked to Moscow for military equipment but received generous economic aid from the West. Mohammed Siad Barre, the Somali dictator from 1969 to 1989, changed camps in the 1970s. When the Soviet Union abandoned him in favor of an alliance with Somalia's neighboring rival, Ethiopia, he found political shelter with and military support from the United States.

X { Politics in many states during the Cold War consisted of one group suppressing others. The end of the Cold War made the resources for suppression, once plentiful, suddenly scarce. The restraints on powerful centrifugal political tendencies were removed. The Cold War imposed what can be seen retrospectively as artificial loyalty -- or at least obedience -- to abstractions: to the principles of democracy and the market or to the precepts of Marxism-Leninism; and to sovereign states, many of them created by the victorious powers after World War I, that were just as remote in the eyes of many of their citizens as the ideologies at the heart of the Soviet-American contest.

With the end of the Cold War, primary group loyalties came to the fore. The governments of Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia might

have been considered legitimate by the international community, but not by the peoples who lived in them. These people identified themselves as clan members, not as Somalis; as Serbs, Croats and Muslims, not as Bosnians, Yugoslavs, or Communists; and as Sunnis, Shia, or Kurds, not as Iraqis.

These loyalties are commonly lumped together under the rubric of nationalism; and it is nationalism, rather than any ideology with universal claims, that has been the most powerful political force in the twentieth century. National groups have tended to seek their own states, or at least dominant power in the states in which they reside. The result has been the kind of conflict that drew the United States into Iraq and Bosnia, as well as secessionist movements in the former Soviet republics of Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan and the potential for similar conflicts in Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, the Balkans beyond Yugoslavia, and much of Central Asia and Africa.

To stop this epidemic of conflict, the international community would need to be able to bring to bear a single principle or set of principles on the various outbreaks of secession. A coherent international effort would require a rule that could be consistently applied to apportion sovereignty. It has not been possible to settle on one. One reason for this is that the drive for independence, often in defiance of borders recognized as legitimate and permanent during the Cold War, brings into conflict two powerfully held and widely supported international principles: the sanctity of existing borders and

the right to national self-determination.

The case for respecting existing borders is, at its heart, an argument in favor of order. International boundaries must be based on some principle. Support for the status quo is the simplest one available. If it is discarded, all borders are suspect, with the potential for chaos.

The sanctity of existing borders was a widely held principle during the Cold War. The international community shunned secessionist movements. The war of secession the Ibo tribe waged against the central government of Nigeria received little sympathy and less support. The Kurds enjoyed the patronage of the United States for a brief moment in the 1970s, but Washington soon abandoned them.

The international norm against changing borders also expressed the narrow self-interest of the members of the international community. That community, after all, is composed of sovereign states, none of whose governments wants groups it governs to break away and form their own states, and each of which therefore is comfortable endorsing a rule that effectively prohibits this.

But this norm has proven untenable in the post-Cold War era. Borders all over the planet were drawn arbitrarily and, in the view of many living within them, unjustly. Almost nowhere were they ever established with the consent of the governed. In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union they were often drawn specifically to divide ethnic and national groups, weaken them

and set them against one another rather than against the imperial power.

These borders were accepted grudgingly as long as there was no prospect of overturning them. The end of the Cold War made them vulnerable. Once some groups achieved independence -- and with the end of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union many did so -- others aspired to follow their example. So the Cold War principle for determining sovereignty -- accepting the legacy of history -- cannot be, and is not being, sustained. Moreover, national or other groups that seek to overturn what the vicissitudes of history have decided and to acquire their own states can invoke their own international principle, one just as powerful in the twentieth century as the sanctity of existing borders: the right to national self-determination.

X

The concept has an American pedigree: Woodrow Wilson loosed it upon the world in the wake of the first World War, and it grew in strength during the course of the twentieth century. Like respect for existing borders, it, too, has a persuasive rationale. Sovereign states must have some principle of composition. Basing the state on the nation, or tribe, or other primary group, seems to offer the best prospect for internal cohesion and stability. It is this social grouping that commands the most intense political loyalty, loyalty of which modern history offers abundant evidence. Enormous suffering, ingenuity, and persistence have fueled the campaigns for self-determination of self-identified nations. The Germans and the Italians are the

most prominent instances of national self-determination in the nineteenth century; the Poles, Jews, and Eritreans perhaps the most dramatic of the many twentieth-century examples.

Yet this principle cannot be applied consistently. For if every distinct group were given its own state, the international community would divide and sub-divide until there were two or three or four times as many members of the United Nations as currently belong. That would be a recipe for chaos.

There is no widely-accepted criterion for deciding which groups deserve their own state and which do not -- nor is it likely that there could be. Historically, the prize of independence has gone to those powerful or clever or fortunate or merely numerous enough to achieve it.

Even if there were such a criterion, some groups are not concentrated geographically but rather dispersed among other peoples so that they cannot be given their own homogeneous state simply by redrawing lines on a map. This is the tragedy of Bosnia. Muslims, Serbs and Croats are scattered throughout that former province; partition would leave hundreds of thousands of people outside their national homelands. The only way to concentrate them is through the mass transfer of populations, a familiar and terrible feature of the twentieth century known, in the Balkans, as "ethnic cleansing." And even that may not eliminate large minority populations. On the Asian subcontinent, where the greatest of all partitions took place in 1947 (and where ethnic cleansing on a larger scale than in the Balkans

occurred thereafter), the creation of the Muslim state of Pakistan left a Muslim community in predominantly Hindu India that by 1993 numbered some 80 million people.

Thus a consistent policy on secession is not feasible; and where humanitarian intervention drew the United States into the midst of political conflicts over secession American policy has not been consistent. Washington accepted the territorial integrity of Somalia, although a secessionist movement was active in the northern part of the country, the former British colony of Somaliland. The United States initially insisted, indeed seemed prepared to use force to safeguard, the territorial integrity of Bosnia, which it recognized as an independent state within the borders it had had when it was a constituent republic of Yugoslavia. Yet the American government had accepted the disintegration of Yugoslavia itself, which had enjoyed international recognition for almost 75 years. And in the summer of 1993 the United States came to accept the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan for Bosnia, which effectively partitioned what the Clinton administration had previously insisted was a single sovereign state.

In northern Iraq, the United States never recognized any Kurdish claim to independence, in part because neighboring countries friendly to the United States, notably Turkey, objected. But the Kurds of northern Iraq were independent in all but name by the grace of American military protection. Washington supported Kurdish sovereignty in deed if not in word.

There is, in theory, a way to strike a compromise between these two principles of sovereignty, to sustain existing international borders while accommodating the desire of different groups for political self-expression. It is to make special arrangements for minorities within sovereign states.

This entails more than protecting the rights of individuals, which has become a universal norm, albeit one often honored in the breach. It involves dismantling sovereignty itself and parceling out its pieces among different groups. It reserves particular prerogatives for minority groups, who may be guaranteed, for example, the right to communicate with the government, and have their children taught, in their own languages.

This middle way between two powerful principles for apportioning sovereignty has not been much in evidence in the wake of the Cold War. One reason for this is that the concept of group rights is an alien one in countries where international norms usually originate. The United States is a nation of immigrants, all of whom, with the notable exception of Africans, arrived in North America voluntarily, as individuals, with the tacit understanding that they would accept a single citizenship and a single language. This is in contrast to the social and political pattern in much of the rest of the world. Hungarians in the United States are and always have been Americans. Hungarians in Romania are and always have been Hungarians.

America is a country of many ethnic groups but with no

constitutional distinctions among them. The concept of minority rights implies a status for some groups that is "separate but equal," something that is historically anathema in the United States. As for Western Europe, its principal states -- Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy -- were for most of their histories ethnically homogeneous. Although each has a significant population of non-European immigrants, none has historically thought of itself as a multinational state with the need to contrive special arrangements for minorities has had to contrive the kind of special status for minorities that seems warranted farther to the east.

Still, there is a history of special official provisions for particular groups within states; but it is not a particularly happy one. After World War I, a series of minority treaties, to protect minority groups in several of the newly created successor states to the vanished eastern empires, was ratified. These treaties were ineffective. (One group promised but not given special status was the Kurds.) Where the designated minorities resided governments did not, on the whole, honor the treaties. Nor did the international community did not enforce them.

Although the international community and the United States have not found, and are unlikely to find, a consistent approach to the question, "who is to be sovereign?", they can and do decide the question, albeit inconsistently, on a case-by-case basis. And where they decide, the issue of enforcing their decisions arises. As with the question of ends, so, too, on

matters of means they have not yet found a way to meet the challenge that the post-Cold War world poses.

In the post-Cold War era the world has a favored response to conflicts over sovereignty: the dispatch of United Nations "peacekeepers" to the site of the conflict. The number of peacekeeping operations and of troops involved in them, and the size of the United Nations budget to support them, have all increased substantially since the end of the Cold War. But peacekeeping has not, on the whole, enjoyed great success. Where it enjoyed any success at all during the Cold War -- in Cyprus, for example -- the task was altogether less demanding than what the UN is being called upon to do in the post-Cold War era. In Cyprus, the United Nations provided small, lightly armed forces whose job was to monitor compliance with the terms the parties had already accepted -- or at least were not prepared to fight to overturn. The peace-keepers themselves did not enforce these terms.

Thus United Nations peacekeeping has been most effective when it has not really been needed. Peacekeepers have played the role of an impartial witness, certifying that the two sides were doing what they had promised to do. When the parties in dispute are not prepared to carry out the terms of agreement, a far more formidable military force is needed to assure compliance than the United Nations is ordinarily able to field.

In that case, peacekeepers must act as police. In Bosnia, for example, peacekeeping would almost certainly require policing

contested borders, ensuring the free flow of traffic, controlling heavy weapons, and supervising the return to their homes of refugees numbering in the millions. If one group attacks the settlement at the expense of another, peacekeepers have to protect the party in jeopardy. Peacekeeping can thus turn into protection, an alliance between a weak new state and more powerful, established ones. This is what has happened in northern Iraq, where United Nations-sanctioned forces guarantee the Kurds against Saddam's regime. If peacekeepers were dispatched to Bosnia, they might find themselves protecting Muslims against Serbs and Croats. (If, on the other hand, Muslims were dissatisfied with the territory the international community had allotted them, it might well be they who attacked the settlement and the peacekeepers sent to enforce it.)

For these tasks the United Nations is plainly unprepared. By one estimate, monitoring the failed Vance-Owen Plan to divide Bosnia into ten cantons would have required 200,000 troops, which would have had to remain for years or decades rather than months. Its successor, the Owen-Stoltenberg proposal for safe havens, was said to require 50,000 troops to enforce.

Various reforms have been proposed to correct the U.N.'s shortcomings: equipping the organization with standing forces that could be sent rapidly to trouble spots around the world; strengthening the operations of its secretariat; equipping it with the capacity to gather information world-wide.

None of these, however, would do away with the fundamental

problem the UN faces in keeping the peace, which has its roots not in the organization's design but in its basic character. The UN cannot conduct military operations on its own. That is the business of sovereign states. It is states that command the resources to fight, because they have the authority to raise and deploy troops. Their authority springs from the political legitimacy of states, which is rooted in a sense of common history and destiny acquired over time that cannot be transferred by fiat to an international organization.

The United Nations is a trade association of sovereign states. Just as the trade association of, say, hospitals can issue resolutions on health care policy, so the UN is an appropriate forum for passing resolutions expressing the will of the international community on issues affecting it. Where the execution of what the UN decrees is at all difficult and costly, however, it is sovereign states -- often and increasingly acting under the authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly -- that must assume the responsibility.

In UN jargon, full-scale military operations like those conducted in its name in Korea in the 1950s and the Persian Gulf in the 1990s are episodes of "peace-enforcement." The more common term is, of course, war. In both cases the United Nations was represented by an international coalition in which the United States was manifestly the senior partner. In both cases the authorization of the UN had political significance, but both were, in the end, American wars. The United Nations itself can no

more conduct military operations on a large scale on its own than the trade association of hospitals can perform heart surgery.

IV

In Somalia, and in Cambodia and Haiti, where the United Nations has also been involved, borders were not centrally at issue. The conflict on the Horn of Africa that gave rise to the suffering that attracted American humanitarian attention was a civil war. The different factions were fighting not for their own states but for control of the state that would include all of them. The result was violence and social disruption that led to famine. Somalia, Cambodia, and Haiti are what the American Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright has called "failed states." Humanitarian intervention leads to the task of putting them back together. That in turn requires restoring order, which is a military, or quasi-military undertaking. But it also requires re-establishing functioning institutions of government, which have disintegrated under the pressure of war. That is a political matter.

The UN has chosen to call this "peace-building." According to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it entails "support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of democratic institutions." The United Nations is trying to accomplish all this in Cambodia. There the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is responsible not only for

policing the country but also for establishing a civilian administration including a judicial system.

As with any project beyond traditional peacekeeping, the UN has little experience and very modest competence at "peacebuilding." Historically, however, the task is not unfamiliar. When it was most widely and successfully practiced it was called by another name: imperialism.

Many of the functioning states outside Europe were built under western imperial tutelage. In the greatest of all imperial possessions, India, the British laid the foundations of a modern state. They unified the disparate linguistic groups of the subcontinent for the first time and bequeathed to its people a superior system of railways, a civil service of high quality, and a democratic tradition on the basis of which India has been governed for almost five decades.

International organizations have little experience in state-building, but the major powers have an impressive track record. After the two world wars the two were combined, first in the League of Nations mandatory system, then as United Nations trusteeships. These are precedents for what might be attempted if the international community were to decide to assume responsibility for uplifting the "failed states" of the post-Cold War era.

After World War I, some possessions of the defeated German and Turkish empires outside Europe were deemed unready for independence. They were assigned to one or another member of the

winning coalition. In part, this was simply the traditional postwar exercise of dividing up the territorial spoils among the victors. But it differed from that familiar practice in that it had the sanction of an international organization, and in that the territories were supposed to be held "in trust" for the welfare of their inhabitants. After World War II, the trustee power was committed to the ultimate independence of the territory for which it was given responsibility.

 The lesson of the mandatory and trusteeship systems for contemporary "peacebuilding" is the same as the lessons of the UN experience with peacekeeping and peace enforcement. While it may be approved by the international community as a whole, it is a task for individual states. Cambodia is an exception to this rule, but the genuinely multinational effort there is not at all certain to succeed; and even if it does, the United Nations will still lack the resources to replicate it elsewhere.

Where suffering is the result of the collapse of political and civil order, the task of alleviating that suffering by restoring order will have to be shouldered by individual countries. This can be costly, and it is inconsistent with the preferred American pattern of intervention. In the wake of Vietnam, the American public has come to expect military engagement in the affairs of other countries to correspond to surgery: it is for the United States to diagnose the problem, perform an operation -- the shorter, cheaper, and cleaner the better -- to fix it, and then to move on. State-building is more

likely to resemble psychiatry: long, frustrating, bringing only incremental change, and with no obvious date for termination.

V

Humanitarian intervention thus leads, ineluctably, to political intervention; and political intervention by the strong in the affairs of the weak is as old as international politics. Whether, when, and how the strong intervene all depend both on international norms concerning intervention and on national incentives to intervene. Intervention depends, that is, both on what the international community says and on what its member states want. The United Nations may authorize armed mediation, or the establishment of a protectorate, or a form of receivership once called imperialism and now known as nation-building; but it is individual states -- and in practice the most powerful of them, which means above all the United States -- that must assume the burden of carrying out such policies. Here a development both curious and dramatic is taking place. Both international norms and national incentives are shifting in the wake of the Cold War -- but in opposite directions.

International norms, especially when codified into international law, have a checkered history. Because there is no world government to enforce them they have always lacked the impact of laws within sovereign states. But they are not altogether irrelevant to the conduct of international politics. They denote what states expect of one another, even if these

expectations are often disappointed. Throughout modern history, countries have expected their neighbors to stay out of their internal affairs. The international norm has been against intervention. In international politics the word itself has come to have an unsavory connotation, as something illicit and illegal, an international version of assault or burglary. Sovereignty has been understood to include the right of governments to do what they wish within their own borders, without interference from others.

The origins of this norm are usually traced to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, by whose terms the governments of Protestant and Catholic Europe pledged not to attempt to overturn one another. The reason for the norm is the same as the rationale for the principle of the sanctity of existing borders: it is a way of preserving order, or rather of preventing disorder. Especially where the great powers have sharply incompatible visions of domestic order, they have powerful incentives to try to remake other regimes according to that image; but if they devote themselves to this, the result will be unceasing international conflict. The norm of non-intervention was intended to prevent, or at least moderate, the impetus toward such conflict.

In the second half of the twentieth century, as many new states have felt themselves vulnerable to the stronger ones, and especially as the world came to be dominated by two nuclear superpowers sharply polarized along ideological lines, the norm

of non-intervention became increasingly popular. It was all the stronger because of nuclear weapons, which gave great-power intervention the potential for global annihilation.

With the end of the Cold War, that norm is being reversed. A milestone came in the wake of the Gulf War when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding that Saddam Hussein's government, already evicted from Kuwait, end its repression of people whom the UN recognized as Iraqi own citizens. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Boutros Ghali's predecessor as UN Secretary-General, remarked that the world was "clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."

There are two reasons for that shift. One is the end of the Cold War, which eliminated one of the main purposes of the norm of non-intervention, the prevention of conflict among great powers trying to impose their own models of legitimacy outside their borders. Now, with the collapse of Communism, there is at least a temporary consensus on the proper domestic order. The beginning of the post-Cold War era is a rare, perhaps unprecedented, moment of ideological homogeneity in the international system. Russia does not object, as the Soviet Union emphatically did, to efforts to spread democracy. The Russian government is in fact trying to establish democracy within its own borders.

The second reason for the shift in the international attitude toward intervention is the increasing acceptance of the protection of individual rights as an international norm. It is a norm that is in conflict with the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Indeed it encourages intervention because the rights of individuals are often violated precisely by their own governments -- as in the case of Iraq.

The norm of non-intervention, however widely accepted in theory, was often violated in practice during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union intervened militarily, both directly and indirectly, all over the world. Indeed, the history of politics among sovereign nations is in no small part the history of intervention, which is a consequence of the perpetually unequal distribution of power in the international community. The strong have always intervened in the affairs of the weak, and for the same reasons. What is remarkable, perhaps even revolutionary, about the post-Cold War world is that the age-old motives for intervention are suddenly all but extinct.

The search for economic gain was one such motive. Wars of plunder have been recurrent features of international affairs. Empires have repeatedly been established to enrich their administrators and home countries. The Spanish domain in the Americas is the example closest to home but hardly the only one. One of Lenin's best-known theories held that the smooth working of capitalist economies necessitates imperial expansion and that imperialism is therefore the highest stage of capitalism. In

this the founder of the world's first Communist state was wrong. Empire ceased to be a paying proposition with the rise of capitalism. As Adam Smith observed in opposing the British war to retain the American colonies in the latter part of the eighteenth century, it is much more profitable for a country with a market economy to take advantage of the international division of labor through trade with and investment in other countries than to try to enrich itself by direct political control.

Another venerable motive for intervention is glory. For brave, energetic, bloodthirsty Europeans from Columbus to Cecil Rhodes the greatest of all adventures was the conquest of alien lands in the name of their sovereign. Larger and less self-interested versions of glory were also at work in the construction of Europe's overseas empires. A century after they were written, it is difficult to read Kipling's famous lines on imperialism with anything other than irony:

Take up the White Man's burden,
Send forth the best ye breed,
Go bind yourselves to exile,
To serve the heathen's need.

Yet some nineteenth century Europeans were genuinely devoted to spreading what they saw as the inestimable benefits of Christianity and western civilization to the peoples of Africa and Asia under the auspices of imperial rule. Imperialism was for them an act of altruism.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, however, the

task of state-building cannot draw upon the social currents that helped to construct the empires of the nineteenth century. The skepticism and cultural relativism of the decades after 1918 have sharply reduced the religious commitment and cultural self-confidence that sent nineteenth-century Europeans abroad to serve God and country by propagating their religious faith and their political institutions.

By far the most powerful and enduring motive for intervention has been security. The strong fear each other; in the great board game of international politics they treat the weak as lesser pieces, or as spaces to be occupied. Thucydides records that the Athenians mounted a campaign of conquest in fifth century B.C. Greece out of fear of rival Sparta. The British expanded their nineteenth century imperial frontiers in Asia to check Russian expansion, and in Africa to exclude the French.

American intervention beyond North America during the Cold War was driven almost exclusively by the great rivalry with the Soviet Union. Korea and Vietnam, where the United States fought the most protracted wars of the Cold War era, were spaces on the board of global geopolitics that the United States was attempting to defend for fear that, if the Soviet Union and its clients occupied them, they would be emboldened to challenge Western positions elsewhere. America's Cold War efforts at state-building -- the Marshall Plan, the Agency for International Development, the Alliance for Progress -- modest though they were

by the standards of the great European empires, were undertaken for strategic reasons, as part of the policy of containing Soviet power and resisting Soviet influence.

Now the contest is over. America's opponent first retired, then disintegrated. Regions that seemed vital during the Cold War have lost their importance. For the moment, the forces that have historically driven the governments of the powerful to intervene beyond their borders have all but vanished. The exception to the trend is Russia, which has adopted a proprietary interest in neighbors that only recently were its imperial provinces. Moscow has designated the non-Russian former Soviet republics -- known as Russia's "near abroad" -- as its own preserve. Russian troops remain in the new states to the south, in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The motive, as in the past, is fear -- not so much of a rival great power but of disorder. The Russians are concerned that turbulence in these regions, if not checked, could creep north into Russia proper.

For the United States in the post-Cold War era thus far, however, what lies behind intervention is neither gold, nor glory, nor strategic calculation. It is, rather, sympathy. The televised pictures of starving people in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia created a political clamor to feed them, which propelled the American military into these three distant parts of the world.

Sympathy is a powerful human emotion and a precious one. Whether it can be a decisive motive in the conduct of foreign

policy, however, remains doubtful. Americans approved of the dispatch of troops abroad to relieve suffering under the misapprehension that these forces would be able to steer clear of local politics. The public believed that these interventions would be costless, especially in the most valuable of all currencies, American life. The plain lesson of Iraq, Bosnia, and especially Somalia is that this is an illusion.

Throughout the Cold War, American foreign policy was driven by the sentiment that Hobbes identified as central to politics: fear. Whether in the post-Cold War era it will come under the sway of the one upon which Rousseau based his account of political life -- sympathy -- is doubtful. The record thus far suggests that it will not.

While the protectorate for the Kurds remained in place two years after it had been established, the cost of maintaining it was low. Saddam Hussein's armed forces, the principal threat to the Kurds, had been crippled by the Gulf War. A modest contingent of American forces in Turkey guaranteed the Kurdish autonomous zone. But these troops were deployed for a strategic purpose: to keep Iraq in check. The Kurds were the incidental beneficiaries.

More representative of the American public's attitude toward intervention in the post-Cold War era was its response to the death of eighteen soldiers in Somalia: an urgent, widespread demand to withdraw all American forces from the Horn of Africa.

On the age-old question of intervention, therefore, a

distinctive pattern has emerged in the international community:
agreement in principle, paralysis in practice. The United Nations is a font of resolutions authorizing international action, which would have been unthinkable during the Cold War. But the UN lacks the means to carry out its resolutions, and its member nations lack the will to do so.

This represents a notable transformation. During the Cold War the international community was divided on what to do, which, in its many forms, is the central issue of politics. Now it cannot reach consensus on how to apportion the costs of doing what all agree ought to be done; that is the problem of government. The locus of contention in international politics has shifted, in effect, from philosophy to public finance.

The world is ready for a government; or rather, it is ready for more international governance than ever before. But the UN is not a world government and it will not become one. The instruments of order are sovereign states. But there is no method of extracting resources from states to pay for governance, and the most powerful of them, the United States, has little interest in making contributions on a scale that would fulfill the international mandate that the end of the Cold War has made available.

Thus, for large parts of the world beyond the secure, prosperous triad of Western Europe, North America, and Japan, one of the great developments of the modern era is being reversed. The revolution in transportation that began with ocean voyaging

in the fifteenth century led to the expansion of European power throughout the world. In historical perspective that expansion is not universally regarded as having been a benign development, but there is no doubt that it brought order to much of the world. Tribes, nations, sects that had fought one another with primitive weapons submitted to the superior firepower of alien conquerors.

Now the Europeans and their North American offspring have gone home and are disinclined to return. To the ensuing disorder, the response of the West has been not to intervene but to try to wall itself off from the misery that disorder brings. For those parts of the world where Europeans once governed it will be as if they had never come, with two exceptions: the traditional sources of order have long since been destroyed; and the arms available are more numerous and deadlier than ever before. Saddam, Aided and Milosevic, the political descendants of premodern chieftains, have rocket-propelled grenades, long-range artillery, and jet aircraft, which can do far more damage than anything in the possession of their equally brutal predecessors. Thus, in much of the world beyond the secure, prosperous industrial triad, the prospect is for suffering and carnage of the kind northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia have experienced.

If some of the consequences of the centuries-long revolution in transportation are likely to be reversed, however, the result of the more recent but equally profound revolution in communications will remain. Life in the world's nether regions

may become nastier, more brutish and shorter than it was during the long centuries before the Europeans arrived; but this time, it will be televised.

SKIP RUTHERFORD THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11-12-93

11/8/93

MR. ~~V~~ PRESIDENT -

~~Rubin~~
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This article is right on message.

- Skip

U.S. economy back in the lead

Germany, Japan in trouble as American outlook improving

By Rick Gladstone

AP Business Writer

Sales of American homes and cars are surging. Factories are busier. Government number crunchers say the economic outlook should improve even more next year.

In Japan, meanwhile, people are fretting about the demise of lifetime job security and the country's biggest bankruptcy in the postwar period. Germany's employers are cutting once-sacrosanct benefits and considering a four-day workweek to save money.

The United States, which once looked like a deteriorating powerhouse about to be overtaken by Japan and Germany, now seems to be enjoying a substantial growth spurt.

At the same time, its chief foreign competitors are stumbling and staggering through the kind of acute economic pain Americans began to feel years ago.

Some forecasters even see the makings of a U.S.-led global renaissance in the coming year, assuming American businesses and consumers grow more prosperous and confident.

Under that scenario, the United States will assume the role of the global economic catalyst, as it has done in the past, creating demand for goods and services needed to stimulate growth worldwide.

"You can look forward in mid-1994 to a world firing on all cylinders, where the U.S., Japan and

Europe are all growing simultaneously," said William Sterling, an international economist at Merrill Lynch & Co., the big Wall Street investment firm. "The process of growth becomes self-amplifying."

To be sure, this is not a prevailing view. Signs of American weakness still abound, from a near daily diet of corporate "downsizings" to the persistent recession in California and the Northeast.

Many economists remain extremely cautious, tempering optimism with reminders of false starts in the economy that followed the Persian Gulf War and the election of President Clinton a year ago.

They point to American family incomes, which aren't growing significantly. Unemployment—or fear of it—is a common theme around the office, assembly line and dinner table.

A monthly layoff tally released today by the Chicago job placement firm Challenger, Gray and Christmas Inc. showed that pink slip announcements surged 37 percent in October to an average of 3,200 per day.

"Workers at all levels, especially recent victims of mass layoffs, must be terribly confused by all the talk from economists about a growing economy while at the same time reading an increased number of layoff announcements," said James Challenger, the firm's president.

Still, anxiety over jobs has obscured signs of vibrancy. On

Tuesday, for example, the government reported that sales of new homes hit a seven-year high in September, strengthened by the tonic of lower interest rates that made mortgages more affordable. The key U.S. forecasting gauge of economic activity also rose for the fourth straight month, pointing to healthier growth in 1994.

On Monday, a survey of industrial purchasing executives showed that U.S. manufacturing expanded in October for the first time in five months. Last week, U.S. automakers reported the strongest sales rate of cars and trucks all year.

Why are we growing while Germany and Japan are stagnating?

"Our interest rates came down earlier than foreign interest rates," said Sterling. "It's kind of a first-in, first-out pattern. We went into recession earlier, interest rates came down, that helped restore growth."

The lower cost of borrowing in the United States, however, isn't the only reason for the reversal of fortune. Japan and Germany are confronting their own peculiar sets of problems.

The Japanese are suffering partly from the hangover of excessive real estate speculation in the 1980s, which inflated property values and made Japan look much stronger than it really was.

"We're still in a recession caused by the breaking of the bubble," said Arthur Alexander, head of the Japan Economics Institute, a Japanese

Fast facts

► Sales of new homes hit a seven-year high in September, while the key forecasting gauge of economic activity rose for the fourth straight month.

► U.S. manufacturing expanded in October for the first time in five months, and automakers reported the strongest rate of cars and truck year.

► Japan is suffering excessive real estate speculation in the 1980s; inflated property values made Japan look much stronger than it really was.

► In Germany, the reunifying east and west have led to a casual national economic recession marked by rising unemployment and a recession since 1990.

government-funding in Washington.

In Germany, the east and west of national economic marked by rising the worst recession.

This may be the Americans competing U.S. competitors' assumption in the economy. A many cannot jetliners, commercialize resorts.

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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Toxic Substances, Research and
Development, Committee on
Environment and Public Works, U.S.
Senate

September 1993

LEAD-BASED PAINT POISONING

Children in Public Housing Are Not Adequately Protected





CASA OTONAL

135 Sylvan Avenue • New Haven, CT 06519 • 773-1847
Fax Numbers • 772-1508 or 773-3045

Patricia McCann-Vissepó
Executive Director,

Send autographed
John son Omar

KC sent
pix!

PRESIDENT'S NOTE:

"SEND AUTOGRAPHED PICTURE
TO HER SON OMAR"

(KELLY CRAWFORD SENT)

RECEIVED IN OMU WEEK OF NOV. 15, 1993-

LEE

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THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 1994

The cause of meeting the most basic needs of all children must now be taken up with a new determination, both for its own sake and as an essential step towards resolving the problems of poverty, population growth, and environmental deterioration.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

EMBARGO

DEC 21 1993



United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF)

"PENNY PER POUND" UNICEF-Somalia Relief Drive
at Herndon Elementary School, Herndon, VA 22070
(Presented to Virginia Elementary School Principals
Student Leadership Conference, February 6, 1993)

All of us have seen the tragic faces of starving people, especially children, in Somalia. At Herndon Elementary School, our SCA wanted to do something to help, and we created a fund-raiser which we called "PENNY PER POUND". The idea was for each student to bring in money which was the equivalent of one cent per pound of his or her own weight. This money would then be sent to the UNICEF-Somalia Relief, and 100% of the money would go to Somalia.

To publicize the event, a notice was sent home to the families through our PTA newsletter, the B-Line, and a student wrote a poem "Penny-Per-Pound" which was used as part of the publicity. The SCA officers went into the classrooms and explained the fundraiser and read the poem to all the students. Each SCA classroom representative created a unique container so that his/her class would have a place to put their money. Families were encouraged to send in any amount of money they could, but we used the penny per pound as a goal. Of course, all money was appreciated. Our student body altogether weighed 62,744 pounds, so our goal was \$627.44. We reached our goal and actually exceeded it by a small amount by raising \$695. A local vending machine businessman volunteered to count our money which saved a lot of time.

We made our check payable specifically to the U.S. Committee for UNICEF-Somalia c/o Mr. Abe Pollin (Personal), Capital Centre, 1 Harry Truman Dr., Landover, MD. 20785 so that 100% of our donation will go to relief aid.

Our local papers were notified, and they gladly helped to publicize our efforts. This fund-raiser was even talked about over the Voice of America Radio and heard by billions of people all over the world after Julie Galloway, a reporter for VOA, read about our "PENNY PER POUND" campaign and interviewed members of the fund-raising committee.

A very exciting thing happened to cap the hard work. Mr. Abe Pollin, the owner of the Capital Centre, the NBA Washington Bullets and NHL Washington Capitals, is also a great philanthropist and Chairman of the Washington Metropolitan UNICEF- Somalia Relief Campaign, and when he heard what our school had done, he asked to come to our school to accept the check himself! At our assembly he spoke movingly of his personal experiences in humanitarian relief work, commended us for wanting to help those less fortunate than ourselves, and thanked Herndon Elementary for its heartfelt contribution. We gave him our check for \$695 so that he could put it toward helping in some small way those who need help so badly.

Now that the US has troops there, food is actually getting to the starving people in Somalia. But much more needs to be done. We think you might like to look at what we did and try it yourself. We are very proud that what we did will make a

difference in the lives of people so far away, and so much
in need. Would you like to have that good feeling, too?
Herndon Elementary SCA and student body will tell you
pennies add up to dollars and these dollars will put food in
many hungry mouths.

Herndon Elementary School

Herndon, VA. 22070

Dec.2,1992

Penny-Per-Pound

The country called Somalia is like a tree,
Sheltering a poor endangered species.
But the tree is being cut
And the species I mentioned are running out of luck.
The tree is a country, ragged and poor,
And the species- brother humans- starved and at war.
Everyone needs to help, for all it's worth,
Or the tree called Somalia will be wiped off the Earth!
The warlords control it, control it indeed.
The people are suffering famine and need.
All hopes would be lost for building a home.
The Somalians must know they are not alone.
Their children look like X-rays, limbs skinny as nails.
Somalia might be lost, if this relief effort fails.
ATTENTION EVERYBODY! Food and medicine needs to be brought!
Talk to your neighbors, expressing this thought.
The country is desperate, there's no time to waste!
Be quick about it. Come on, make haste!
Give a Penny-Per-Pound of weight, kids everywhere.
Our many small contributions will show that we CARE.
Give a Penny-Per-Pound, adults too, of your desired weight
Because too many ate too much from their Thanksgiving plate.
Give at school, your office, your church.
UNICEF-Somalia Relief really works!
Give whatever you can, wherever you choose.

If we fail them now, all of us lose.
Spread this through town, the county, the states.
Somalia needs help, and we- and they- cannot wait!
Oh, what a loss it would be !!!

Roger Sollenberger

10 years old

SCA Treasurer

Chairman of the SCA Somalia-Relief Committee

Mrs. Hunsberger's Fifth Grade Class

Herndon Elementary School

Herndon, Va.

C. Lasco -

Do you want to draft
(Thanks or do you
want us to draft)
one ?

N.H.



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

December 16, 1993

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11/8/94

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Dear Mr. President and Mrs. Clinton,

On behalf of the Presidential Protection Division, I would like to thank you for the wonderful Christmas reception on December 9, 1993. It meant so much to all the personnel and their families. Everyone had a great time!

Each year the Presidential Protective Division has presented the President and First Lady with a Christmas gift. The gifts have been very traditional ranging from items for one's home to donations to a favorite charity. This year we wanted to be unique and "get with the program". We decided that the program to which we should be giving our attention has to do with guns, drugs and opportunity for the inner city youth. We hear much about these problems in the media and in your speeches, and God knows we hear enough of your speeches!

With all this in mind, the division has decided to adopt an inner city school, Kramer Jr. High School, in the Anacostia section of Washington, D.C. We have contacted the school and have been received with a great deal of enthusiasm. That enthusiasm is only matched by the enthusiasm exhibited by our detail. Everyone is excited and willing to volunteer their time and talents to prove that there are people who care. We plan to speak to all the classes, assist at sporting events, have them tour our training facility at Beltsville, MD, assist with tutoring after school and any other need that we can fulfill.

Further, members of your White House Staff have shown a great deal of interest in assisting with this program and we gladly welcome the help.

This past year has been an interesting and challenging time for the members of this division. It has also been very rewarding to us and we all have much for which to be thankful. We look forward to taking your lead and giving something back to our communities.

We hope that you and your family have a wonderful and happy Holiday.

Sincerely,

Rich Miller

*and all of the men
and women of PPD*

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

12/2
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

Paul M. Montrone
President and
Chief Executive Officer



**Fisher Scientific
International Inc.**

Liberty Lane
Hampton, NH 03842
Tel: 603-929-2650
Fax: 603-926-1152

December 1, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500-2000

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to provide a suggestion regarding the relationship of your Administration to the business community.

The NAFTA victory was a fantastic accomplishment for which everyone involved should be congratulated. In my opinion, we now have a unique opportunity to consolidate this advance with the business community and establish a solid, lasting foundation of support for your future programs. Like others, I have lent my personal help whenever possible (see attached news clip), but what is needed now is to unite and coordinate the efforts of your consistent business supporters and multiply their effectiveness by having them bring others into the fold.

To successfully execute this strategy, however, will require the precious time of someone in the White House. Ideally, that person should have the maturity to deal with business leaders and have some access to you. Is there someone you would suggest I work with on this matter? Please let me know at your earliest convenience as I would like to move ahead with this idea while the glow of NAFTA is still with us.

Very truly yours,


Paul M. Montrone

PMM/pls

He's a managing
trustee of DNC
Let's discuss!

President's Big 'Gift' To AMR Fliers Puts Some CEOs in Spin

* * *

Early Intervention in the Strike
At American Spurs Worries
About Excessive Intrusion

A WALL STREET JOURNAL News Roundup

President Clinton's intervention that halted the five-day strike at American Airlines may have pleased many holiday-bound air travelers, but it upset some corporate executives looking further down the road.

Several chief executives complained that the president's cajoling, which got American and its striking flight attendants to accept arbitration of their differences, so early in the strike bodes ill for future labor negotiations in general.

Resumption of Flights

American said 80% of its flights will operate today, but unions at United threatened to continue disrupting travel. Article on page A4. On Wall Street, AMR's stock fell, but some analysts said investors shouldn't be so quick to abandon it. Heard on the Street, page C1.

Please Turn to Page A5, Column 1

Clinton's Gift to Fliers on AMR Leaves Some CEOs Earthbound

Continued From Page A3

'I Applaud Bill Clinton'

Paul M. Montrone, president and chief executive of Fisher Scientific International Inc., a big maker of scientific instruments in Hampton, N.H., said, "I applaud Bill Clinton for helping to end the strike." Mr. Montrone doesn't see it as bullying corporations.

Some executives privately expressed surprise that Robert L. Crandall, chairman of AMR Corp., American Airlines' parent, agreed to accept intervention after earlier rejecting a proposal by its flight attendants' union to seek federal mediation. But Mr. Montrone said, "Bob Crandall is a big boy, and if he didn't see the president's encouragement as working in the best interests of his company, he wouldn't have caved."



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12/22

December 9, 1993

Mr. President

Wm. J. Clinton
WJC

President William Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President,

This letter is written to inform you that I will be returning to my farm in Utica, Ohio and therefore will resign my position as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Marketing and Inspection Services effective December 31, 1993.

✓ It was an honor to have your confidence in appointing me and it was also an honor to work with your effort in Ohio during the 1992 Presidential campaign. I am proud of the job you are doing as President and I believe you are gaining support and respect from the people as you lead this nation.

✓ Mary Jo and I wish you the very best in fulfilling your awesome responsibilities in these most challenging of times. We look forward to helping in any way we can for the campaign in 1996.


Sincerely,

Eugene Branstool

Eugene Branstool
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture
Marketing and Inspection Services

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

Rm



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 1/10/94

TO: BRUCE LINDSEY
JIM DORSKIND

FROM: JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

JIM: CALL TODD STERN
WHEN YOU RECEIVE THIS.



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 12/20/93



MR. PRESIDENT

6/5/97
ext 107
Hetermagier
Guests com - fr
TX -

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

12/20/93

December 18, 1993

Mr. President,

I just wanted you to know that at least one of your key supporters takes your commitment to change very seriously!

This picture was taken in the parking lot of the Kon Tiki/Ra Museum in Oslo, Norway when Garry and I were there in October. The '60s still live some places in the world!

On a more serious note, despite the grouching of some gay "leaders" to the contrary, most gay men and lesbians I know understand that you have done more to advance the cause of equal rights for all our brothers and sisters than any President in history. With seven more years like this one, homophobia and legal inequality may truly be a thing of the past.

(over)

- 2 -

For that and for your start on dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis we owe you a tremendous debt of gratitude.

Keep up the fight. Some day we shall overcome!

Best wishes for a very happy holiday season and an even better 1994 to you, Hillary and Chelsea.

With warmest regards,

Tom Henderson