



00 JUN 2 PM 5:49

JACK VALENTI
CHAIRMAN
AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

1600 EYE STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

TELEPHONE: 202/293-1966
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May 30, 2000

Dear Mr. President

I am writing to you on behalf of friends of mine, Lucy Fisher (Motion Picture Producer, and Former Vice Chairman of the Columbia TriStar Motion Picture Group) and Douglas Wick (Producer of *Gladiator* and *Stuart Little*). Their youngest child was recently diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes, and they are now heavily involved with the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation International (JDF).

My understanding is that on March 7th, White House Chief of Staff, John Podesta met with JDF volunteers Lucy Fisher, Leo Mullin (Chairman, President and CEO of 6-2-00
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respect

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Jack



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My understanding is that on March 7th, White House Chief of Staff, John Podesta met with JDF volunteers Lucy Fisher, Leo Mullin (Chairman, President and CEO of Delta Air Lines), Barry Sternlicht (President and CEO of Starwood Capital Group, Robert Wood Johnson (V (Owner of the New York Jets and Chairman of JDF), and James O. Robbins (President and CEO of Cox Communications) to discuss a proposal that would create a permanent extension of the Type 1 diabetes research program at \$100 Million per year. This program was originally created in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

I was delighted to hear of the Administration's support for this initiative, and truly hope this funding initiative succeeds and is enacted into law.

With great respect

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Office of National Drug Control Policy

Washington, D.C. 20503

00 MAY 26 PM 2:27

May 25, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH THURGOOD MARSHALL, JR.

FROM: BARRY R. McCaffrey, DIRECTOR ONDCP

Bob

PURPOSE: To nominate James Edward Burke for the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

BACKGROUND: As former chairman of Johnson & Johnson the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, James Edward Burke corporate and civic responsibility through his career in public remarkable contributions in both the private and public sector deserving of our country's most distinguished civilian award

CC: Burke and return to me

Through wisdom, dedication, and generosity of spirit, Mr. Burke stronger America. (Attachment A to this memorandum provides Burke's historic public service):

6/4/00 a Mr.

- **Building Corporate Ethics:** Mr. Burke led Johnson & Johnson through the Tylenol scare. Throughout this period, he put public health before corporate profits. J&J immediately pulled questionable products from America's store shelves on its own initiative and came out with a tamper-proof can. Burke's efforts became a case study in the ethics of corporate responsibility.
- **Protecting America's Youth:** After Partnership for a Drug-Free America public service advertising but became prevention for youth. Mr. Burke Administration's National Youth Administration serve as our partners in this historic assistance of this organization, reaching more than 90 percent of having similar success with parents and other adult caregivers. Recent studies show that the Campaign is strengthening youth attitudes against drugs and beginning to drive down drug use among young people.



ROBERT F. HOUSMAN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR - STRATEGIC PLANNING

Lisa: I'm the POC on this.

Best Rob

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (202) 395-7225
WASHINGTON, DC 20500 FAX (202) 395-6641

CC: STAFF SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE

Att: Lisa Loy



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

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FROM: BARRY R. McCaffrey, DIRECTOR ONDCP 

PURPOSE: To nominate James Edward Burke for the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

BACKGROUND: As former chairmen of Johnson & Johnson and current chairman of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, James Edward Burke has helped define corporate and civic responsibility through his career in public service. Mr. Burke's remarkable contributions in both the private and public sector make him uniquely deserving of our country's most distinguished civilian award.

Through wisdom, dedication, and generosity of spirit, Mr. Burke has helped create a stronger America. (Attachment A to this memorandum provides more details about Mr. Burke's historic public service):

- **Building Corporate Ethics:** Mr. Burke led Johnson & Johnson through the Tylenol scare. Throughout this period, he put public health before corporate profits. J&J immediately pulled questionable products from America's store shelves on its own initiative and came out with a tamper-proof cap. Burke's efforts became a case study in the ethics of corporate responsibility.
- **Protecting America's Youth:** After leaving J&J, Mr. Burke became chairman of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America where he not only helped set the standard for public service advertising but became one of the most important figures in drug-abuse prevention for youth. Mr. Burke was instrumental in helping develop the Administration's National Youth Media Campaign. Burke and the Partnership now serve as our partners in this historic public health education effort. With the assistance of this organization, scientifically proven anti-drug messages are now reaching more than 90 percent of America's children four times per week. We are having similar success with parents and other adult caregivers. Recent studies show that the Campaign is strengthening youth attitudes against drugs and beginning to drive down drug use among young people.

CC: STAFF SECRETARY 
WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE

Recommendation: Award James Burke the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Attachment A: Nomination of James Burke for Presidential Freedom Award

Defining Corporate Ethics: Burke's Tenure at Johnson & Johnson

After joining Johnson & Johnson as a product director in 1953, Jim Burke rose through the ranks to become president of the corporation in 1973 and chairman and CEO in 1976. Burke's early career at J&J was defined by risk-taking in introducing new products.

Mr. Burke's tenure at J&J came to be remembered not only for the remarkable growth the company enjoyed during his stewardship but for personal dedication to an enduring corporate credo, which still defines J&J's values today. Under Burke's guidance, J&J focused on corporate responsibility to customers and society at large. Burke's moral fortitude served J&J well in a tragic corporate crisis. Jim Burke's integrity and extraordinary talent were demonstrated repeatedly.

On September 30, 1982 initial reports reached J&J that three people had been killed as a result of ingesting Tylenol capsules laced with cyanide. The death toll soon rose to seven. Faced with a life-threatening situation of unlimited potential, Burke placed public safety over profitability and ordered the national recall of thirty-one million bottles of Tylenol. As J&J and federal officials worked furiously to locate the source of the tampering, Burke threw open the doors of Johnson & Johnson to the public -- providing news media, federal officials, and the medical community with hourly updates on the investigation. Burke's candor was unprecedented in corporate crisis management.

Mr. Burke's deft handling of the crisis prevented far-reaching public hysteria, the collapse of public trust in Johnson & Johnson, and perhaps a total loss of public faith in the safety of consumer products. Despite the introduction of safety seals, another poisoning death occurred in 1986. Immediately after the second and final incident, Burke halted the production of Tylenol capsules and forced the entire industry to adopt safety standards similar to the ones introduced by J&J.

Because Burke emphasized public health over profitability, J&J survived a major crisis and was able to reintroduce Tylenol successfully. Tylenol is today the market leader in its product category and a major source of profitability for Johnson & Johnson.

Johnson & Johnson's stellar handling of the Tylenol crisis is often attributed to the singular personality of then-CEO Jim Burke. While Burke played a critical role in the crisis, thousands of people throughout the corporation contributed to the positive outcome. Employees and management alike embraced a moral position that made such results possible. Without a shared set of values and guiding principles affirmed by the whole organization, Johnson & Johnson would have little chance of mounting such a rapid, cohesive, and ethically sound response. Jim Burke's role in cultivating J&J's value system was definitive.

An Outstanding Commitment to Safeguarding America's Youth: Burke's Leadership of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America

Jim Burke assumed the chairmanship of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America upon retiring from Johnson & Johnson on April 26, 1989. Today, at age seventy-five, Burke is still the organization's guiding force.

The concept of a Partnership for a Drug-Free America originated in the advertising industry. With a cocaine epidemic sweeping the United States during the 1980s, members of the American Association of Advertising Agencies realized that ads could play a critical role in the fight against drugs. If advertising could be used to *sell* products and services, surely it could *unsell* as well. Using the same techniques employed in the selling process, the Partnership set out to *unsell* cocaine and other illegal drugs. This national advertising campaign was launched in March 1987.

Upon assuming the chairmanship, Burke set an organizational goal of securing the equivalent of \$1 million a day in pro bono advertising for the Partnership's anti-drug campaign – an unprecedented level for any public-service effort. Tapping his own talent for marketing and extensive contacts in the media industry and business world, Burke rallied enough support to meet his goal within a year. Mr. Burke and the Partnership thus redefined public-service advertising, securing exposure for the anti-drug campaign in prime-time and prime media across the country.

Under Burke's leadership, the Partnership became the largest single public-service advertising campaign in history. To date, the Partnership has generated more than \$3 billion in pro bono media exposure for its anti-drug campaign. With roots in the advertising industry, the Partnership organized and sustained widespread support among America's most talented advertising professionals. To date, more than six hundred advertisements from scores of agencies have been donated to the Partnership's anti-drug effort. In thirteen years, Partnership advertising has won every one of the industry's major awards for creativity and effectiveness -- including the prestigious Grand Effie. (The Partnership's inner city campaign beat 126 commercial ad campaigns to win this particular award.)

Independent research shows distinctive correlations between changes in drug-related attitudes/behavior and exposure to the Partnership's ad campaign. While the Partnership doesn't bear sole responsibility for changes in the marketplace, tracking data show that the decline in overall drug use in America accelerated most when this advertising campaign was heavily aired. Experts believe the Partnership contributed greatly to the 48 percent reduction in U.S. drug use since 1985. Regular use of cocaine is down by an astonishing 77 percent and holding. Today in America there are 9.7 million fewer regular drug users than we had in 1985. While many factors contributed to this decline, the mass media – led by the Partnership under Jim Burke's leadership – surely played an important role.

The Partnership's public-service advertising model provided the intellectual foundation for the federal anti-drug campaign. Mr. Burke helped raise Congressional support for passage of this program.

Today, the Partnership for a Drug-Free America is literally ONDCP's most important partner in this ongoing advertising project. The Partnership provides all ads on a pro bono basis. We benefit enormously from the extensive pool of creative talent that produces advertising for the Partnership, which in turn donates this work to the federal government. While national funding has been required to pay for prime media exposure, the Partnership receives no federal funding for its role in this effort. The Partnership transformed its entire operational base to serve the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign and staked its name and reputation on this project's success.

After just two years, the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign is beginning to make a big difference in America's cultural climate relative to substance abuse. Drug use among teenagers is leveling off and beginning to decline; drug-related attitudes among young people are heading in the right direction. These changes were concurrent with the launch of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. Attitudinal shifts by youngsters suggest that adolescent drug use will continue declining over the next few years.

Jim Burke is responsible for stimulating an overwhelming amount of volunteerism that defines the Partnership for a Drug-Free America. Millions of people have been exposed to the Partnership's work, and millions more will encounter it in the future. The contribution Burke made to our country's fight against drugs is rare indeed.

Summary

Jim Burke retired in 1989 as chairman and CEO of one of America's greatest corporations, but he hasn't rested very much. Instead, he marshaled a wealth of talent and energy to build one of America's most effective non-profit institutions. Jim's dedication -- which has been unwavering through three administrations -- says a great deal about his character. This extraordinary corporate and civic leader has given great gifts to our nation -- in particular, to our youth.


JAMES E. BURKE

CHAIRMAN



The Partnership For A Drug-Free America has entered a new era as it participates in an unprecedented anti-drug media campaign with the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. This \$185 million annual campaign, backed with bi-partisan support in the U.S. Congress, will be matched with donated media -- and is in size and scope unlike any social marketing campaign ever undertaken. (PDFA receives no federal funding and donates its creative work to the effort pro bono.)

The Partnership has grown to have the single largest public service advertising campaign in history, generating close to \$3 billion in donated media exposure over the past 12 years.



**PARTNERSHIP FOR A
DRUG-FREE AMERICA**

405 LEXINGTON AVE.
NEW YORK, NY 10174

Mr. Burke is a past chairman of the President's Drug Advisory Council in the Bush administration and a founding board member of CASA, the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University. He was a board member of the Rand Corporation's Drug Policy Center, and a member of the Carnegie Corporation's Substance Abuse Advisory Committee.

Before joining the Partnership, Mr. Burke was chairman and chief executive officer of Johnson & Johnson, a post he held from 1976 until 1989.

Mr. Burke is a former trustee of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, is chairman of the Business Enterprise Trust and serves on the board of directors of the Washington Post Company. He has also served as a director of IBM and Prudential.

A native of Rutland, Vermont, Mr. Burke was born on February 28, 1925. He is a graduate of Holy Cross College and received his master's degree in business administration from Harvard Business School.



By Susan Szasz

**IBM director
James Burke
dubbed a
'national
asset.' 4B.**

Leader and gentleman drives IBM search

By Blair S. Walker
USA TODAY

Kudos flow so freely when James Burke's associates discuss him that one can't help but wonder: When he exercises in the pool at his New Jersey home, does he swim in it or walk on it?

Must be the former. If the latter were true, IBM probably would have kidnapped and cloned Burke by now.

IBM is looking for a miracle worker to succeed CEO John Akers, who has agreed to give up his seat before May. And Burke, who sits on IBM's board, is leading the search. He's also looking for non-IBM executives to join the board.

Sounds daunting? Not to Burke.

Corporate crises of the highest magnitude are old hat to Burke, who twice guided Johnson & Johnson through Tylenol-poisoning tragedies when he was its CEO.

He has said the IBM board is looking for a "visionary" leader and the field will be narrowed to about 30 candidates — 10 IBM employees and 20 outsiders. A background in technology isn't a job requirement, he said.

"He's anxious to install someone who has ideas and imagination and isn't going to be bound by old ways," says former Xerox chairman Sol Linowitz. "He knows how to get to the heart of a matter."

Those who sing Burke's praises repeat the same refrain: "Principled, thoughtful, a leader and a gentleman." Since executives and board members tend to promote like-minded individuals, might IBM's next CEO possess the morality of Mother Teresa, the wisdom of Solomon and Lee Iacocca's crisis-management skills?

"I would say that Jim Burke is a national asset," gushes Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett. "He is an absolutely top-quality person; he's a hell of a businessman, too. And a hell of a citizen."

Linowitz says Burke welcomes responsibility and can be impatient with those who dally. But Linowitz quickly adds, "I've never seen him be unpleasantly impatient."

Finally a chink — albeit a small one — in Burke's sterling aura: his impatience.



BURKE: 'He's not a hip shooter, but he doesn't'

"There's a certain briskness, not brusqueness, and a sense of enormous energy," says John Maguire, president of Claremont University, which gave Burke an honorary degree. "Talk about a goal-oriented person. He seems to know fairly quickly what those goals are. Then get out of his way because he's just dynamite."

Impatient — but efficient. "There are all kinds of people who have 500 horsepower motors who only get 100 horsepower of output," says Buffett. "But Jim has a motor with horsepower equal to anyone else's, and the efficiency is 100%."

And, Buffett adds, laughing: "He's not a hip shooter, but he doesn't waste time. He likes to work on problems; I try to avoid problems."

Burke, 67, doesn't take himself that seriously, associates say. In fact, he welcomes opposing points of view, which is not surprising considering his childhood in Slingerlands, N.Y. At dinner time, the "Burke Debating Society" materialized, with young James Burke, his two sisters, his brother and their parents partici-

pating in a freewheeling exchange of ideas and opinions.

Burke took his intellectual lumps just like everyone else, says sister Sidney Carroll. "I don't think we ever allowed anyone to prevail," she recalls. Their Wellesley-educated mother, Mary Burke, was a more vocal participant, while their father, New York Life Insurance executive James Burke, frequently took the fallback, moderator position.

Whatever the younger Burke and his siblings talked about, they should have recorded it for sale; the children have been very successful.

Brother Daniel Burke is now CEO of Capital Cities/ABC; sister Phyllis Burke-Davis is a former senior executive with Avon; and Carroll is a retired Manhattan attorney.

James Burke's business leanings surfaced early on. At 12, he was recruiting friends to pick and sell daffodils that grew near his family's home, Carroll says. Dubbed the "happy warrior" in his high school yearbook, Burke also made root beer that exploded in the cellar when his family forgot to drink it,

"It would be a shame if Jim Burke is a national asset. He is an absolutely top-quality person; he's a hell of a businessman, too. And a hell of a citizen."

— Warren Buffett, chief executive, Berkshire Hathaway

About James Burke

► **Born:** Feb. 28, 1925, Rutland, Vt.

► **Family:** Married to Diane W. Burke. Has two grown children from a previous marriage.

► **Education:** Bachelor's degree in economics from Holy Cross College, 1947. MBA from Harvard University, 1949.

► **Quote:** "I try to give people the feeling that it's OK to fail, that it's important to fail." From interview with *Fortune*.

► **Problem-solving approach:** "He does not seek confrontation. He negotiates to a point and then he's tough," says Robert Burnett, retired CEO of Meredith, a communications company.

► **Exercise regimen:** Swimming, running and tennis.



By Linda Pashoyes, Mark
THE BURKES: 'It's OK to fail, it's important to fail,' James Burke once said.

says Burke-Davis.

Following a Navy stint during World War II, Burke graduated from Holy Cross College with a bachelor's degree in economics, then got an MBA from Harvard University.

After Harvard, Burke hooked up with Procter & Gamble as a sales representative. Four years later, in 1953, Burke moved to Johnson & Johnson, where he worked as a sales representative for one year, then quit.

"The company was centralized and stifling, and I was bored," Burke told *Fortune* magazine.

Before cleaning out his desk, Burke suggested the company start a division to create products. His suggestion was acted upon, and Burke was back three weeks later, heading the unit.

He was promoted seven times the next 22 years, with the last being CEO. With Burke at the helm, low-profile Johnson quietly made money until 1982, when disaster forced its CEO into an incandescent national spotlight. Seven Chicago-area people died after taking cyanide-laced Ty-

lenol capsules, an over-the-counter analgesic that was a Johnson mainstay and accounted for 15% to 20% of corporate profit.

Rather than merely let the storm blow over or pull Tylenol from the Chicago market, Burke ordered a recall of all 31 million Tylenol bottles in stores and warehouses nationwide. The cost: \$250 million. Burke also reassured consumers in TV appearances. Tylenol's market share returned to the 35% it had been at before the deaths, after a precipitous drop. Remarkably, Burke pulled off the same feat four years later, when cyanide-laced Tylenol caused deaths in New York.

His straightforward response made Burke something of a business folk hero. "In recent days (you) have lived up to the very highest ideals of corporate responsibility and grace under pressure," President Reagan told Burke during a 1986 White House meeting of business executives.

A believer in taking calculated risks, Burke took his share at Johnson. One decision, the purchase of an

ultrasound diagnostic business, was dud that lost Johnson \$170 million.

Burke retired from Johnson 1989 and currently chairs the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, non-profit organization that produces anti-drug abuse campaigns.

"He has hurled himself into the Drug-Free America project. It's though he never slowed down or step from the chairmanship of Johnson," says Maguire of Claremont University.

In addition to Big Blue, Burke is on the boards of Prudential at Washington Post Co. and chairs Business Enterprise Trust, an organization television producer Norm Lear formed three years ago to set standards for corporate behavior.

A soft-spoken man, Burke does pound the desk. But he does so his fingers incessantly when discussing drug on.

"Nobody walks on water," Le says, laughing. But Burke is "one of the great men of the Western world. A spiritual person, one of Burke's favorite sayings is that 'you can well by doing good,' Lear says.

A Leader in a Crisis

James Edward Burke

By STEVEN PROKESCH

In the days since Diane Elstroth died after taking cyanide-laced Extra-Strength Tylenol, James E. Burke, chairman of Johnson & Johnson, once again has had to deal with a public crisis. In doing so in a forth-

right way and with his decision to stop selling Tylenol in capsule form, Mr. Burke is receiving praise from analysts, marketing experts and from consumers themselves.

"I give him high marks for the way he has handled the situation thus far," said Stephen Greyser, a marketing professor at the Harvard Business School.

Although the crisis is far from over, Mr. Burke is coming across both as a solid corporate citizen and an irrepressible corporate marketer, attributes that helped his rise to the top of the 100-year-old health-care company. And while most analysts predicted the demise of Tylenol and trouble for Johnson & Johnson's image after a wave of similar poisonings occurred in the Chicago area in 1982, they are much more optimistic this time.

Many predict that Tylenol will hold

on to its leading share of the over-the-counter, pain-reliever market. And some believe that Johnson & Johnson could turn the crisis to its competitive advantage by capitalizing on consumer worries about the safety of capsules to push its Tylenol caplets, a coated, elongated tablet that is supposedly easier to swallow than normal tablets.

Such talk is a tribute to the decisive leadership that Mr. Burke has exhibited during the crisis. He has left little doubt about who is calling the shots at the company.

Rather than delegating the responsibility of corporate spokesman to a division president or public relations officer, Mr. Burke has assumed that task himself.

The 60-year-old executive made his boldest move to date on Monday, when he announced that Johnson & Johnson would no longer sell Tylenol capsules over the counter and would recall all such capsules on the market. The decision will be a costly one: \$100 million to \$150 million after taxes, the company estimates.

'Sets High Standards'

Associates of Mr. Burke say that his expressed concerns about public safety are sincerely held. "He sets high standards for his company, for his people and for himself," said Robert S. Hatfield, the former chairman of the Continental Group and a Johnson & Johnson's director.

Company insiders say that corporate ethics have almost been an obsession for Mr. Burke. In a speech to an advertising trade group two years ago, Mr. Burke tried to convince his audience that companies with written codes of ethics, such as Johnson & Johnson, outperform other companies in both profitability and stock price.

In the nine years since Mr. Burke became Johnson & Johnson's chief executive, the company's profits have nearly tripled, to \$613.7 million in 1985. And its sales have soared from \$2.52 billion to \$6.42 billion. Last year, he earned about \$900,000 in salary and bonuses, a company spokesman said.

But despite this record and his handling of the Tylenol poisonings, Mr. Burke's tenure as chief executive has not been unblemished. He has come under persistent attack from Wall Street for attempting to move a company that made its mark in pharmaceutical and consumer products into sophisticated medical equipment. Since acquiring Technicare, a maker of CAT scanners and other diagnostic imaging equipment, in 1979, the unit has racked up huge losses.

Strict Standards Cited

The eldest son of an insurance salesman, James Edward Burke was born on Feb. 26, 1925, in Rutland, Vt. "Our father had strict ethical standards, and our mother was very creative," one of Mr. Burke's two sisters, Phyllis Davis, said in a recent magazine interview. Mrs. Davis is the top sales executive at Avon Products and a brother, Daniel Burke, is president of Capital Cities/ABC. Another sister, Sidney Burke Carroll, is a New York lawyer.

After commanding a landing craft tank in the Pacific during World War II, Mr. Burke completed his college education and graduated from Holy Cross College in 1947.

He then attended the Harvard Business School and after working for three years as a brand manager at the Procter & Gamble Company, Mr. Burke joined Johnson & Johnson in 1953. His first job was as a product director in the division now known as Johnson & Johnson Products, the unit that sells the company's original first aid products to consumers.

Rising through the marketing ranks, Mr. Burke became the unit's president in 1966. In 1971, he landed his first job at the corporate level: vice chairman of the company's executive committee. And in November 1976 he was elected to the top job.

Mr. Burke is married. He has two grown children from a previous marriage.

FORTUNE

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**America's
Most
Imaginative
Companies—
and How
They Turn
New Ideas Into
Big Dollars**



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**INSIDE:
THE
FORTUNE
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500**



FORTUNE



"I try to give people the feeling that it's okay to fail, that it's important to fail."

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"I'm not worried about any of these mob guys. What are they going to do, put a bullet in me? Look, I'm a survivor."

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"She is one of those people who break 2,000 eggs to make a three-egg omelet."

PAGE 173



"It was like pulling a pitcher in the ninth inning, when the team is behind, but just before they are about to win."

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"It's hard to rise above poverty if society keeps deriding the human qualities that allow you to escape from it."

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"Bathrooms are getting bigger and bigger. Tubs are getting bigger."

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Cover: James Burke was photographed by Abe Frajndlich in the employee cafeteria at Johnson & Johnson's New Brunswick, New Jersey, headquarters.

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THE INNOVATORS

America's most imaginative companies are turning new ideas into big dollars. As restructuring threatens to slow growth, more managers need to learn how they do it. ■ by *Kenneth Labich*

MY OLDER SON, now almost 7, was an exceedingly good-natured baby except at bedtime. He required two bulky diapers plus rubber pants to get through the night. He looked and, I suspect, felt quite silly, and even with all that swaddling sometimes suffered from fierce rashes. Poor Paul was simply born a bit too soon; Procter & Gamble and Kimberly-Clark, leaders in the \$5-billion-a-year disposable-diaper market, have been advancing the art and turning out new products at a sizzling pace. My younger son, soon to be 2, tumbles cheerfully into his crib each night wearing a thin, superabsorbent little number able to soak up lakes of what-

ever. His bottom is rashless, a thing of beauty. Lucky David.


One way or another thousands of product lines in every type of industry are being transformed. Innovating—creating new products, new services, new ways of turning out goods more cheaply—has become the most urgent concern of corporations everywhere. That is partly because restructuring has left many companies with a few core businesses that are solid but slow growing. Innovation is their best bet for revving things up. In addition, technology has forced the pace of change and sharply cut the effective lifetimes of all kinds of products. Long-playing records sold briskly for decades


before cassette tapes posed a serious threat; now compact discs are shaking the market, and a new technology, digital audio tape, is on the way. Consumers respond more quickly than ever to the latest rage, so fat market shares can shrink dramatically in almost no time. Little wonder that innovation is this year's hot word among management consultants and the subject of several new management advice books.

U.S. innovation has long been the envy of world competitors, especially the Japanese. A list of important products introduced by American companies in just the past five years is breathtaking, ranging from Lotus 1-2-3 software to Chrysler minivans, from Abbott Laboratories' AIDS antibody test to Apple's Macintosh, from Kodak's lithium batteries to Merck's cholesterol-lowering drug, Mevacor. Last year more than 25% of 3M's worldwide sales were generated by products new to the market in the past five years. Johnson & Johnson produced a similar percentage of U.S. sales with freshly minted products. James Burke, J&J's innovation-minded chief credits his company's success at product development to close contact with customers and a corporate culture that encourages risk. "We want change here," says Burke. "I try to give people the feeling that it's okay to fail, that it's important to fail." That philosophy goes back a long way at J&J, as Burke well remembers (see box).

Innovation is often elusive, a process Gordon F. Brunner, a P&G senior vice president, calls "the marriage between what is needed and what is possible." Some top executives feel the urge to keep their hands on. Monsanto Chief Executive Richard Mahoney

**Inventions that will bring in billions:
Procter & Gamble's popular Ultra
Pampers Plus (left) and Corning Glass
Works' gossamer optical fiber (right)**





To make a new plastic, GE's Joseph Wirth built a \$1 million plant—then told the boss.

spent several days working in his company's biotechnology labs to understand some of the problems in developing products in that field. He not only increased his knowledge, but also showed the troops that he is serious about new products. Mahoney still keeps within arm's reach of his desk a folder that outlines the step-by-step progress of each research project under way.

Other innovative companies seem to thrive in part because top managers have proclaimed the hoary ideal of entrepreneurialism—and then proved that they mean it. Researchers at General Electric's plastics division labored on Ultem, a durable, heat-resistant plastic used in everything from circuit boards to auto parts, for over a decade without getting or seeking approval from corporate headquarters. They even built a \$1 million pilot plant to turn out samples of the stuff before getting the nod from the top. Ultem sales are expected to reach \$100 million annually by 1990.

REPORTER ASSOCIATE H. John Steinbreder

Any company hoping to get into the innovation race has to pay some stiff entry fees. New products, whether variations on old designs or entirely original, often require enormous capital expenditures for plant and equipment. Procter & Gamble has spent more than \$500 million on new manufacturing equipment for its avant-garde diapers.

RESearch and development money also flows freely at innovative companies. Corning Glass Works, long known as a hotbed of innovation, spends about 5% of sales on R&D, above the average for U.S. industrial companies. "Scientists are a commodity—you buy ideas," says David Morse, a particularly inventive research manager at Corning. Spend enough in the labs, he says, and "even with average management, you are going to get some commercially viable notions." At GE, research expenses have risen 54% since 1982 to \$1.2 billion. J&J spent \$617 million on research last year, about 8% of sales and five

times the amount spent ten years ago.


Smart managers seek innovation outside their companies as well. When Mahoney wanted to shift Monsanto's resources from bulk commodity chemical businesses into more *haut* science fields such as biotechnology a decade ago, he invested heavily in joint ventures with small startups like Genentech. He also planted seed money with research scientists at leading universities all over the world. Monsanto expects to see the first fruits of these expenditures in the 1990s, when such products as proteins to stimulate milk production in cows and reduce fat in pigs hit the world market.

To get the biggest bang for their research bucks, innovative companies go to great lengths to guide their development teams into areas with the greatest commercial potential. The pitfall to avoid is spending too much time and money on what are known at Monsanto as "trombone oil projects": You may turn out the best product available anywhere, but the entire world needs only about a pint of the stuff each year. "Focus, focus, focus," chants Mahoney. "Let them know you're in the research business not for the pursuit of knowledge but for the pursuit of product."

A key to focusing research projects is developing the commercial instincts of company scientists. It is not always easy to get a biophysicist, say, to start thinking in terms of market share or return on equity. Cash can get his attention. Monsanto hands out an annual \$50,000 prize to the scientist or team of scientists who have come up with big commercial hits. Lester Krogh, 3M's vice president for R&D, says his company's efforts to get scientists attuned to commerce have been so successful that much of the hot talent gravitates to projects with the most obvious market appeal. "People in corporate research, who do the more theoretical work, are almost scorned around here at times because they aren't seen as knowing anything about business," says Krogh.

Most innovative companies provide their scientists with two possible ladders of advancement. They can stay in the lab and move up on the basis of scientific achievements, almost as they would in a university. Or they can move into management and head product development teams. When the system is working right, enough researchers choose each path so that good ideas and the people to channel them into specific products bubble to the surface with regularity.

The ideal employee, of course, is a highly inventive scientist with a firm grasp of the



A Monsanto technician checks disease-resistant tobacco plants. The company's biotech finds include proteins to reduce fat in pigs.

marketplace. Example: Corning's David Morse, 35. He is involved in fairly mundane administrative tasks, such as hiring new employees and hammering out budgets, but he also holds a doctorate in chemistry from MIT and still ponders arcane theories about the physical properties of glass and ceramics. A few years back his flights of fancy led him to a formula for glass with an especially porous surface. "I had just been thinking about surfaces, and this came up," he says. Morse's commercial instincts were honed well enough so that he soon realized this new glass might provide a physical anchor for various coatings, such as a layer of Teflon on the company's popular Visions line of cookware.

Morse, a shy, bespectacled man who looks very much the research scientist, knew the company had long hoped to introduce non-stick versions of the product, and he was convinced he had found the solution. He began tirelessly promoting his discovery—"I became obsessed with the product," he recalls—and eventually got top management of

the consumer products division to take a look. Next came years of test-marketing and fiddling with the concept in the lab. The finished product should be rolling out shortly, and its potential for boosting sales of the Visions line is big. About 65% of the skillet sold in the U.S. are nonstick.

FEW THINGS HAMPER corporate innovation more than lack of communication and coordination between divisions. SmithKline Beckman, the Philadelphia pharmaceutical giant, is a champ at introducing new products, but the company's experience in developing a vaccine for hepatitis taught management some painful lessons. The vaccine, a breakthrough in treating certain forms of hepatitis, was discovered by company researchers in the early 1980s. But SmithKline marketers turned the idea down because the company did not normally sell vaccines in the U.S.

The scientists persisted, siphoning money from various projects to conduct clinical tri-

als. Even after these tests succeeded, the marketers said no primarily because vaccines present serious risks of product-liability lawsuits. The researchers finally persuaded the company's international division, which already marketed vaccines, to give the product a try, and success was swift. SmithKline will sell about \$50 million of the drug overseas this year and is finally seeking FDA approval—a two-year process. "Too bad they didn't listen to us a couple of years ago," says Martin Rosenberg, a SmithKline research vice president. "They would have a \$100 million drug by now."

Innovative companies continually bring together the various divisions involved in product development. These contacts might be informal in the early stages of a project. Starting about five years ago, Xerox held a series of roundtable discussions and customer focus groups to find out what product planners, systems engineers, marketing people, manufacturing types, and others thought the next generation of duplicating machines



A cloth airplane: Imaginative designers at Beechcraft, a division of Raytheon, constructed a lightweight plane from graphite fabric impregnated with epoxy resins.

should be like. The company even brought in potential suppliers. "We want those vendors to see the insides of the machine, to really understand what it is we want them to make," says a chief engineer, William Drawe.

Lines of communication get busier when a project is far enough along to warrant a development team. In choosing members, it's usually smart to cast the net wide, beyond scientists, marketers, and manufacturing experts. Procter & Gamble, heavily reliant on products that must appear seductive on supermarket shelves, usually assigns a packaging engineer to a development group in the earliest stage. Most smart companies also make sure their patent lawyers are in the flow early. A successful patent strategy can make all the difference in a new product, and the complexities of patent law have increased nearly as fast as technical advances in many fields. A company's patent lawyers can protect the company's proprietary position without giving away too much in the application process. For instance, when GE's lawyers on the Ultem team determined that they could secure a "composition of matter" patent, which protects the material itself, the entire project made more sense. The lesser protection provided by a "process" patent, for example, often all but invites competitors to find alternative ways to

produce a similar or identical product.

When all hands are really pulling together, the process of discovering a product and getting it out can seem almost effortless. Procter & Gamble's recent introduction of calcium-enriched Citrus Hill orange juice showed unusually close coordination between seemingly diverse divisions. Researchers in the health care unit, in the course of developing drugs to treat bone disease, had become aware of rapidly worsening calcium deficiencies among U.S. adults. One obvious remedy was to put calcium into the orange juice marketed by P&G's food and beverage division. The problem was how to make the mixture palatable. The answer came from a third division, laundry and detergents, which had long before learned how to "sequester," or suspend, calcium particles in liquid soap products.

EVERYONE BUT the janitors seems to have joined in Corning's effort to produce an antipollution device for automobiles. The process started in the early 1970s, when marketers from Corning were trying to sell General Motors on a new line of safety windshields. No sale there, but GM did express an urgent need for some kind of antipollution device because Congress seemed intent on applying the new Clean Air Act to automobiles. Corning's law-

yers and lobbyists talked to everyone they could find—oil companies, auto manufacturers, chemical companies, even the legislation's champion, Senator Edmund Muskie—to determine whether a market was indeed looming. The answer came up yes.

Corning's scientists next began to look at the technical problems. At least four companies were working on diverse methods of trapping pollutants inside a catalytic converter. Corning's researchers favored a ceramic device honeycombed with hundreds of tiny chambers. They had discovered a material porous enough to do the job years before but they had no clue how to produce that complex, relatively delicate converters in quantity. The answer came from a Corning engineer who developed a radical new extrusion process to turn out the devices to precise specifications. Says David Duker, Corning's vice chairman: "Up to the moment we decided to go with the project, there were people who said we were crazy, that the Clean Air Act was going to go away."

Corning's top executives are now very pleased they took that risk. Last year they sold about \$150 million of the ceramic devices.

While the catalytic converter was a case of planned parenthood, happy accidents can take place when you have a lot of bright research scientists on the premises. The trick is recognizing the commercial possibilities of those accidents—and exploiting them. "You have to be alert to serendipity," says S. Allen Heininger, a Monsanto corporate vice president.

At companies where research employees think always of product, stories abound of scientists stumbling on big discoveries. A Raytheon engineer was working on experimental radar equipment in a lab one day when he noticed that a chocolate bar in his shirt pocket had melted. Intrigued, he went out, bought some popcorn, and cooked the bar too. Raytheon eventually transformed the discovery into the first commercial microwave oven. A chemist at G.D. Searle spilled some experimental fluid one day and cleaned it up rather haphazardly. Later he licked his finger to turn the page of a book and was surprised by a sweet taste. The result was aspartame. A researcher at 3M dropped a beaker of industrial compound and noticed after several days that her sneaker had stayed clean where the drops had landed. Out of that spill came the highly successful ScotchGard fabric protector.

One of the toughest decisions a manager faces is whether to pull the plug on an expe-



AR RANNOCH

Burke: "We love to win, but we also have to lose in order to grow."

TAKING CHANCES AT J&J

Jim Burke's first stay at Johnson & Johnson didn't last long. He had come to the company in 1953, but he left after just one year. "The company was centralized and stifling," Burke recalls, "and I was bored." In addition, he says, "we did not have a new-products division, and when I left I suggested we should have one."

It wasn't three weeks before Burke was back at J&J. His former bosses took him up on his suggestion and created a new-products division—and asked him to head it. Burke began developing a number of new ideas, but one morning he was summoned to the office of the chairman, General Robert Wood Johnson. The problem: One of Burke's first stabs at innovation, a children's chest rub, had failed dismally. Burke worried that his second stint at J&J might be as short as his first.

When Burke walked in, General Johnson asked, "Are you the one who just cost us all that money?" Burke nodded. The General said, "Well, I just want to congratulate you. If you are making mistakes, that means you are making decisions and taking risks. And we won't grow unless you take risks."

Some 30 years later, Burke, 63, is still spreading that word. "Any successful growth company is riddled with failures, and there's just not any other way to do it," he says. "We love to win, but we also have to lose in order to grow."

Burke believes that innovation can be

nurtured through creative conflict. "I have tried to encourage that sort of conflict without fear of retribution," he says. "You end up with a lot more ideas." That philosophy, like his entrepreneurial urge, appears to have been born during Burke's childhood in the hamlet of Slingerlands, New York, when he and his three siblings sat down for dinner with their parents. "We were encouraged to argue," Burke recalls. "The dinner table was always a very stimulating place to be."

Suppertime isn't much different around the Burke household these days. There is always a lot of discussion when bread is broken, and the discussion is often led by Burke. He has tried to fashion that same sort of dinner-table atmosphere in his office. Long ago he forsook a conventional desk for a more expansive conference table, made of wood from the floor of a room at the Palace of Versailles. Says Burke: "I do most of my work with people, so I needed something they could all sit around."

Burke is careful not to dominate. To do so would contradict his fervent belief in decentralization. "Those of us in top management often say to each other that we had more fun running a J&J company than anything since," he says. "If you are having as much fun running a big corporation as you did running a piece of it, then you are probably interfering too much with the people who really make it happen." —H. John Steinbreder

sive research project or faltering product line. Some rat holes should be abandoned. Monsanto spent millions trying to develop chemicals that regulate plant growth—imagine rows of corn ready for harvest at precisely the same time—but the researchers were never able to produce consistent results. Corning, which got into the light bulb business at the behest of Thomas Edison in 1880, pulled out in 1983 because of overwhelming competition. After years of market dominance, Raytheon has sharply scaled back microwave oven production because cheaper imports have stolen more than 90% of its market share. "They killed us," says Raytheon Chairman Thomas Phillips. "But don't feel sorry for us—we made a lot of money on this invention."

Some of the most valuable innovations don't create new markets for a company; they rescue old ones. Procter & Gamble's innovative skills have been continually tested in its diaper wars with Kimberly-Clark. P&G founded the disposable-diaper business in the early 1960s, starting with the Pampers brand, and later added a premium product called Luvs. As the market exploded through the 1970s, P&G's share in most years hovered near 70%.

KIMBERLY-CLARK mounted a challenge in the early 1980s with its Huggies brand. By concentrating its marketing effort on a single premium brand and introducing design changes such as elasticized waistbands, Kimberly-Clark seriously reduced P&G's dominance. The Pampers brand, perceived by consumers as a no-frills product, was hit especially hard. As the bloodletting continued into the mid-1980s the company urgently sought ways to improve the product and regain momentum. The stakes were sobering: Disposable diapers accounted for about \$2 billion, or 15%, of P&G's revenues in 1985.

The break came when research scientists, looking for ways to cut down on diaper rashes, began working with polymers able to hold at least 1,000 times their weight in water. After much experimenting, researchers turned out test diapers that were not only far more absorbent but also much thinner than previous models. The scientists considered the latter quality largely coincidental; the polymers happened to work better when the core of the diaper was compressed. But mothers who came in to use the new diapers in P&G's test labs were immediately taken with their babies' streamlined look. "We discovered that thinness had a special appeal

right away," says J. Richard Andre, a P&G vice president in charge of paper and diaper technology.

The company deployed the new technology as quickly as possible, rolling out Ultra Pampers nationally in 1986 and Ultra Pampers Plus, 30% more absorbent and 30% thinner, in the summer of 1987. P&G guards market-share figures ferociously, but industry analysts estimate the company's current total at 50%. Says Andre: "The deterioration has just stopped."

Heroic efforts to save a big product line make for dramatic chapters in a corporate history. But savvy managers know that over the long run squeezing every last bit of profit from every bit of business is at least as crucial—and requires at least as much innovative skill. Johnson & Johnson has introduced more than 200 new products in the U.S. over the past five years, but only two were legitimate home runs, with annual sales in excess of \$100 million. (The products: extra-strength Tylenol caplets and Ortho-Novum 777 birth control pills.) Says Burke: "Block-

busters help, to be sure, but they are not the most important element here."

Smart companies invest plenty in the vital if less glamorous work of batting out singles. At 3M, about 10% to 15% of the R&D budget is spent on relatively rudimentary backup work for the company's four major product sectors. Another 10% to 15% goes for joint projects with the manufacturing side in pursuit of better, cheaper production methods. Somewhere around 50% to 60% is specifically aimed at finding new products, both related and unrelated to the company's current lines of business. And about 15% is spent on long-term projects out at the technological edge. Monsanto tries to divide its research expenditures evenly according to when commercial results can be expected. Class I projects should bear fruit in a year or two; Class II work should pay off in three to five years; Class III efforts, the groundbreakers, are supposed to provide viable products in eight to ten years. Says Monsanto's Heininger: "The name of the game is to keep putting things through the pipeline."

Often the most reliable source of new revenue is a line extension. Johnson & Johnson has produced 17 versions of the Band-Aid since introducing the product in 1920. Corning has continually found a market for variations of that ceramic device first designed to clean up auto exhausts. The company makes a larger, modified version for diesel trucks, a smaller type used by steel-makers to filter molten metals, another that captures pollutants emitted by wood stoves, and an extra large variation to fit into factory smokestacks.

GE is especially aggressive in seeking new targets for its product arsenal. For Ultem, that heat-resistant plastic, the company has discovered close to 200 applications, ranging from airplane interiors to packaging for microwaveable food. The key was focusing the development team's energies on this product to the exclusion of all others. Says Jeffrey Immelt, a GE new-business manager: "These people live, sleep, breathe, and eat Ultem."

SAD BUT TRUE, many large U.S. companies have yet to perceive the importance of sharpening their innovative skills. At least some of those companies may require a complete cultural overhaul to open themselves to fresh concepts. "Too many big organizations have created a risk-averse environment," says John R. Rockwell, an innovation expert with the management consulting firm Booz Allen & Hamilton. "They have become market-share manipulators with no entrepreneurial flair."

It doesn't have to be that way, as some of the more innovative American organizations have shown by continually taking intelligent chances. "There's one thing you've got to keep telling yourself," says P&G's Gordon Brunner. "Virtually every success was a failure somewhere along the line."

At Corning, senior vice president James Riesbeck maintains one of those offices that all types of people from all parts of the company seem to pass through now and again. When research scientists have a particularly far-out idea, they like to make a model and put it on a long shelf in Riesbeck's office just in case someone from another part of the company might have a notion how to use it. These days the shelf contains a motley collection of glass pans, plates made from strange new alloys, an experimental photo lens. It doesn't look like much, but it represents a great deal: the dreams and energies of people committed to helping their enterprise prosper. E



In developing new copiers, Xerox brought together customers, product planners, engineers, marketers, manufacturing experts—even potential suppliers.



James Burke: A Career in American Business (A)

Research Assistant Wendy K. Smith prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Richard S. Tedlow as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

In 1989, James Burke's tenure as chief executive officer of Johnson & Johnson was drawing to a close. Burke's career at the company began when he became brand manager for Band-Aids in 1953. At first he doubted whether Johnson & Johnson was the place for him. Soon, however, he committed himself wholeheartedly to the company, and he was quickly promoted to important positions within it. In 1976, he became chairman and chief executive officer. With Burke at the helm, the company grew smartly in terms of both sales and earnings (see *Exhibit 2*).

One reason for this growth was an increase both in the number and the variety of products that the company marketed, as well as in the vigor with which they were managed. Tylenol, for example, was still a specialty product in 1976—little known outside the hospital setting. By 1981, it had become the leading analgesic in the country by a wide margin (see *Exhibit 8*).

Not all the company's products fared so well, however. Some, such as CAT scanners, met with failure.

James Burke's Early Life

James Edward Burke was born on February 28, 1925, in Rutland, Vermont. He spent his formative years in Slingerlands, New York, a small town near Albany. His father had served as an army officer before becoming an insurance and bond salesman. "My father had a wonderful view of the world," Burke said.

Note: A profile of all individuals in both this (A) case and the (B) case is provided in *Exhibit 1*.

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signed to help the students develop." These included:

- Ability to analyze business situations, recognize problems and determine issues, seek pertinent facts, develop alternatives, and reach reasoned decisions.
- Ability to organize.
- Ability to use oral and written communications.
- Ability to deal with people.
- Ability to train subordinates.
- Ability to use figures effectively for administrative purposes.
- Ability to establish standards and to control and judge performance.
- Ability to execute selected operating tasks, including those involving severe time pressures.
- Acquaintance with sources of business information.
- Understanding of the useful generalizations of political economy, and ability to develop at least the beginnings of an integrated social and economic philosophy.
- Understanding of ethical considerations as an integral part of business administration, and ability to develop a unified set of ethical concepts for personal guidance in administration.
- A spirit of vigorous and courageous enterprise.²

The committee also proposed a new program of instruction for all first-year students. Previously, first-year students were required to take several common courses, but had a choice among certain electives. In the new program, just one course—Elements of Administration (E.A.)—was required of all MBA candidates. Elements of Administration was divided into six "subjects": Production, Marketing, Finance, Control, Administrative Practices, and Public Relationships and Responsibilities. In addition, "E.A. General" was required for instruction in report writing.³ The more noteworthy innovations in the first-year program came about through Administrative Practices—which focused on the problems of executives in promoting teamwork and effective action in business organizations; Control—which combined

Accounting Principles and Business Statistics for the first time; and Public Relations and Responsibilities—which dealt with the relationship of business administrators to government and public institutions.

James Burke at the Harvard Business School

James Burke entered the Harvard Business School with the class of 1949, which was later to become famous for generating so many leading figures in the business world.⁴ For example, Burke's roommate at Harvard, Peter McCollough, eventually became the chairman of Xerox. Other well-known classmates included Sumner L. Feldberg, chairman of Zayre; Vincent L. Gregory, Jr., chairman of Rohm and Haas; Thomas Murphy, chairman of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; and John Shad, former head of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

"We were a bunch of exuberant and ambitious young veterans," Burke recalled, "trying like everyone else after the war to catch up with life in all respects. We were older than most when we went to the Harvard Business School, and we had seen more of the world than most of the students of today."

Burke enjoyed his years at the Business School for a number of reasons:

First of all, everyone I met I liked. Secondly, it was intellectually a real turn-on. I never worked so hard in my life and enjoyed every minute of it. And finally, the thing that amazed me, and was totally unexpected, is that in everything we did, we were reminded of the moral values—the importance of the moral values in our decision making. We all spent a lot of time talking about it, and many had the same doubts. It was not just me. I guess partly because of the way I was brought up, I had a set of values that I knew I was going to have difficulty compromising ever. And whether we like it or not, in our educational system, even at a place like Holy Cross, there is an underlying doubt about the enterprise system. I got the feeling from what I read in the papers and saw in the media that there was something a little bit corrupt about

2. Copeland, *Ers*, pp. 124–125.

3. Copeland, *Ers*, p. 126.

4. Marilyn Wellemeier, "The Class the Dollars Fell On," *Fortune*, May 1974, pp. 224–229, 340–352, passim.

thority over his own destiny. However, he felt there was something wrong with all of them:

I remember coming out to New Brunswick on the train with a lot of confusion in my mind. Johnson & Johnson offered me \$10,000 a year to start, which was less than any of the advertising agencies offered, and I wasn't very excited about going there. Finally, I decided to screw up my courage and tell them I'd come to work there if they gave me \$12,000. They did, and so I did. I did it in part because I felt it was the right thing for me to do, rather than with any great enthusiasm; but I can't say I did it with any great logic, or even common sense.

Johnson & Johnson's Early History

Johnson & Johnson was founded in New Brunswick, New Jersey, in 1886 as a medical products company by two brothers, James and Edward Mead Johnson. Later, a third brother, Robert Wood Johnson, joined the company and provided not only necessary capital but the kind of strong leadership the young company needed. Robert Johnson had been impressed by the theories of Joseph Lister, the English surgeon who founded modern antiseptic surgery. Antiseptic surgical dressings were among Johnson & Johnson's first products. Another early specialty of the company was the medicinal plaster, precursor of one of Johnson & Johnson's most famous products, the Band-Aid, which was first marketed in 1920.⁹

During his first year at Johnson & Johnson, Robert Johnson met Fred Kilmer, a pharmacist at a New Brunswick drug store. The two men shared an interest in Lister's ideas. In 1888, Kilmer compiled a booklet, which Robert Johnson published, entitled *Modern Methods of Antiseptic Wound Treatment*. "In many respects, it was a 'how to' manual, and soon it was being proclaimed as the most authoritative treatise ever presented on the subject. [W]ithin months, 85,000 copies were in distribution, . . . and in time over four million copies were in distribution all over the world."¹⁰ That same year,

Kilmer joined Johnson & Johnson as the director of Scientific Affairs.

Johnson & Johnson quickly gained a reputation as a major health products company. It was constantly searching for new products and over the years introduced sutures and ligatures, insect fumigators, dental specialties, and maternity and obstetric kits. In 1890, Johnson's Baby Powder was introduced. This was used originally to soothe skin irritation resulting from medicated plaster. The company expanded internationally shortly thereafter, signing on agents in Canada, England, Australia, and New Zealand.

Kilmer pursued his interest in surgical and first-aid products and techniques, making several scholarly contributions to medical literature, while Robert Johnson focused his attention on advertising. Shortly after the company was formed, Johnson retained the services of a young advertising man by the name of J. Walter Thompson. Every advertisement had to be approved by Johnson personally; and although he had a keen instinct for what would sell, his meddling was often trying on his agency staff.¹¹

Johnson involved himself in every aspect of the business. He began each day by presiding over the opening of the company's mail and often responded personally to customer complaints. He worked long hours and expected the same of others. Despite his sometimes dogmatic ways, he was well respected by his employees, and his enthusiasm was widely admired.¹²

Robert Johnson's sudden death in 1910 left a void in the company. Many of its 2,500 employees feared that it could not continue to be successful without his leadership. Johnson's younger brother, James, became the new president, but it was with Robert Johnson's eldest son—Robert II—that the future of the company lay.

Robert Johnson II was just 16 when his father died, but he had already shown interest in the business. Upon graduation from high school, the young Johnson joined the company full time. He started in the factory power plant and moved from department to department, staying just long enough to learn each one's function. Johnson eventually specialized in sales and marketing, areas for which he, like his father, had a natural affinity.

9. Lawrence G. Foster, *A Company That Cares: One Hundred Year Illustrated History of Johnson & Johnson* (New Jersey: Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, 1986), pp. 9–15.

10. Foster, *Cares*, p. 21.

11. Foster, *Cares*, p. 32.

12. Foster, *Cares*, pp. 34–35.

his tenure accounted for as much as 5% of total sales.²¹

The Credo brought together Johnson's belief in fair employee treatment, decentralization, and product quality; and it underscored what he viewed as his company's responsibilities to its customers, to its employees, to the communities in which it operated, and finally to its stockholders. In time, the principles embodied in the Credo, and particularly the strong emphasis on decentralization, came to represent major factors that shaped the Johnson & Johnson way of doing business. In the words of one consultant who has studied Johnson & Johnson's Credo:

The Credo is an extremely powerful document . . . [because it] is at all times tied in to the regular concerns of business management: product choice, delivery times, costs, employee compensation, corporate taxes, maintenance of company property, research and innovation, new equipment, and financial reserves. Equally important, profit is not a dirty word. The Credo puts forth a world view in which profit is obtainable through just and ethical behavior.²² [See Exhibit 3.]

A Rising Star

In James Burke's view, his first year at Johnson & Johnson was not very productive, in part because he was still working nights and weekends trying to salvage his own new products which were in the process of failing. In addition, he was discouraged because no one paid much attention to the consumer brands with which he was involved. "Nobody would show up for the Nielsen meetings," he said, "and we were losing share in 92% of our product categories. It was really a very small consumer business—and I didn't think it was going anywhere. I also wanted to start a New-Products Division, but I couldn't get anyone interested. I was bored. Finally, after a year of frustration, I quit."

A few days after he left, Burke got a call from Ed Gerbic, his boss's boss. Gerbic offered Burke a chance to set up a New Products Division, along with a 50% raise in salary. Despite his

resolution to leave the company, Burke could not turn down this opportunity. He realized only later that he had been caught in a political battle between his immediate boss, John McLaughlin, and Ed Gerbic. Gerbic had offered Burke the position because he wanted to prove to management that he could hold good people and that McLaughlin could not. (A few years later, both McLaughlin and Gerbic had left the company, and Burke was promoted to Gerbic's job.)

Burke returned to Johnson & Johnson and went to work establishing a new-product development plan. He quickly discovered that very few models existed in other companies. Burke recalled:

I did find HBS classmates of mine [Sam Johnson at S.C. Johnson, and Conrad Jones at Booz, Allen] who were interested in doing exactly what I was doing. So we had a lot of fun getting together and comparing ideas. There was also an advertising agency—now out of business—that had done a study on the life span of new products, and I did some research on my own to add to it. The study did a lot to remind people that there weren't too many new-product successes—you had to take a lot of shots before you had any successes. That was important to me and important to this company because most people believed if a person tries twice and fails twice with a new product, they're a failure as a manager. Now people are more sophisticated and realize that only about one out of ten of these efforts ever work, but it was helpful in the beginning to give courage to the organization to take the chances that I sensed needed to be taken.

One of Burke's notable successes from this time was a line of athlete's-foot remedies, which eventually sparked the work in R&D that created the product now marketed under the name *Micatin*. Also during this period, Burke began to upgrade the line of baby products to encourage more adult use. One product line in that category failed for an unexpected reason. As Burke explained:

A friend of mine, an entrepreneur, had come out with a liquid product for children. It was a substitute for aspirin, but in a liquid form. I thought the concept was good, so I bought the product—for \$15,000, think of it!—and called it *Liquiprin*. To go along with this product, we designed the first-ever

21. "Prescription For Growth," *Forbes*, June 26, 1978, p. 97.

22. Nash, *Ethics*, p. 83.

George Smith, Burke was promoted to vice president of product management for the Operating Company. At this time, Smith was thinking about moving the corporation into the pharmaceutical business. He wanted to market a broad range of pharmaceuticals—branded generics, in effect, under the name *Johnson & Johnson*. Burke felt that this was a flawed idea for two reasons. First, the company would be selling products with no improved end benefit, and Burke was concerned that this might injure the *Johnson & Johnson* name. Second, Burke's experience with children's medications had taught him that the *Johnson's* name suggested gentleness rather than potency and that the name would be more hindrance than help.

Bobby Johnson agreed with Burke's reservations. After two years of indifferent performance in pharmaceuticals, the corporation came around to their point of view, which was also shared by others in the company. *Johnson & Johnson* decided to purchase a pharmaceutical company in the United States and a research laboratory in Europe. The regulatory process in Europe allowed drugs to gain approval more quickly than in the United States, and a research laboratory in Europe would provide the corporation with an income stream. An established U.S. pharmaceutical company would provide a marketing channel once a compound had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

Johnson & Johnson acquired *McNeil Pharmaceutical* in the United States and the *Janssen Company* in Belgium. *McNeil* had a good reputation. It was a family company, run by two brothers who joined the board of directors at *Johnson & Johnson*. *Janssen* proved to be a boon for *Johnson & Johnson*. Through 1988, it had created more successful new compounds than any other comparable company in the world. Pharmaceuticals were among the many products that became independent of the Operating Company in the 1950s and 1960s.

Burke advocated separating the marketing function of the Operating Company into *Baby Products* and *First Aid Products*. The two would still share manufacturing, but Burke believed that the companies would grow faster if the marketing and research functions were independent of one another. In 1962, Burke was named president of the *Baby and Proprietary Products Company*.

Shortly after this reorganization took place,

the General let it be known that he thought results were so weak that he was considering putting this business back into the Operating Company and removing the managers in charge, including Burke. Burke felt that his team had been doing a superb job and that the General did not understand the investments that the company was making in advertising and new products.

"I was furious," Burke recalled. "I went to Gus Lienhard and told him I wanted the opportunity for my people to show the General what we had been doing. The General agreed, and we took about two months to prepare for that presentation. I was really convinced that the story we had to tell would put him away. I was super-confident." The presentation was for the General and the entire executive committee. It started at 9:00 A.M. and was to last throughout the morning. At 10:15 A.M. the General got up and walked out. "I almost followed him, I was so mad," Burke recalled. But he finished the presentation, and it was well received. Once the executive committee fully understood the nature of the investments, the numbers spoke for themselves.

Burke was too angry to speak with the General, so he went to see Gus Lienhard. Lienhard had already questioned the General on his sudden departure from the meeting. "It was perfectly obvious that the business is in complete control and very well managed," the General responded. "Why waste any more time on it? You know," the General continued, with a twinkle in his eye, "I don't think it really hurt Burke, do you?"

"That made me start thinking," Burke related. "Not only didn't it hurt us, the business was much better managed as a result of the General's challenge. We got rid of things we were doing as we started studying the business. We re-did our advertising and we changed prices. We did a whole series of things that never would have happened if the General hadn't challenged us, and I never forgot it."

In 1964, Burke was promoted to executive vice president for consumer products, with both the divisions reporting to him; and in 1965, he was selected to run the Domestic Operating Company, a position formerly held by George Smith. He also became a member of the executive committee. One particularly memorable occurrence during these years was the attempted introduction of a new product called *Baby*

Johnson & Johnson out of the U.S. market; but the company continued to sell diapers overseas. In 1977, largely as a result of Burke's earlier efforts with the product, Johnson & Johnson's baby shampoo became the best-selling shampoo in the country.

Nineteen eighty saw the introduction of a new painkiller called ZOMAX, thought to be as effective as injected morphine, but nonaddictive. It was an early success, but McNeil, which marketed the product, found that some patients suffered allergic reactions, some of them fatal, and in 1983 ZOMAX was removed from the market.

Burke also planned to lead the company into some high-technology health care fields, which he viewed as the wave of the future. In 1978, Johnson & Johnson acquired a manufacturer of kidney dialysis machines for \$35 million, and a heart valve laboratory for \$26 million. In 1979, the company acquired Technicare, a failing manufacturer of computerized axial tomography (CAT) machines and ultrasound scanners, for \$75 million in stock, and assumed its \$50 million in debt.²⁴ The technology allowed the creation of "a three-dimensional image of an object by taking multiple X-ray measurements of the object from different angles, then using a computer to reconstruct a picture from the data contained in hundreds of overlapping and intersecting X-ray slices."²⁵ The image could be used by a physician to make a diagnosis without the need for exploratory surgery. But Technicare never reached its full potential, and Johnson & Johnson had difficulty managing it. In 1986 Johnson & Johnson withdrew from the business and sold what assets there were to General Electric.

In 1981, Johnson & Johnson ranked 74 among the 500 largest U.S. industrials. It was made up of 150 subsidiaries manufacturing such disparate products as dental floss, blood analyzers, drugs to control parasites in cattle, and \$800,000 CAT scanners. Nearly half the company's sales and more than half its after-tax earnings were derived from its overseas markets.²⁶ The corporation owned some of the best-known brands in the world and was regarded as a blue-chip growth stock on Wall Street. In the words of a

former colleague at Johnson & Johnson, "Burke evolved from being a packaged-goods salesman to a man with a mission in health care."²⁷ (See Exhibit 5.)

The Tylenol Poisonings

On the morning of Wednesday, September 29, 1982, Mary Kellerman, a 12-year-old girl, and Adam Janus, a 27-year-old postal worker, both living in neighboring suburbs of Chicago, died of mysterious causes. Later the same day, Janus's brother died from the same mysterious cause, and his brother's wife fell into a coma from which she never recovered. Medical authorities were considering quarantining the entire area, when two paramedics noticed a strange coincidence. In all cases, the victims had recently taken Extra-Strength Tylenol. A spot check quickly confirmed authorities' worst fears. Cyanide, one of the most rapidly acting and deadly of poisons, had been placed into capsules of Extra-Strength Tylenol, and people were dying from taking the product.

History of the Product

Tylenol's rise was one of the headiest marketing success stories of the 1970s, and James Burke was regarded as the man most responsible for it. The product was developed by McNeil Laboratories, a pharmaceutical company that had been acquired by Johnson & Johnson in 1959. Until 1960, Tylenol was sold exclusively as a prescription drug. Its only active ingredient, acetaminophen, was a compound any drug company could make.

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Tylenol was advertised only through medical trade journals and directly to doctors and pharmacists as a gentler-to-the-stomach alternative to aspirin. It was not until the mid-1970s, however, that the drug really began to take off.

Although Tylenol fell outside of Burke's purview as general manager of the Domestic Operating Company, he closely followed the brand's growth during the 1960s.²⁸ By 1970, he was

24. *Fortune*, June 1, 1981, p. 66.

25. Christopher A. Bartlett, "EMI and the CT Scanner (A)," HBS No. 9-383-194.

26. *Fortune*, June 1, 1981, p. 58.

27. *Fortune*, June 1, 1981, p. 61.

28. Tylenol was controlled by the pharmaceutical arm of the corporation, at McNeil. The Domestic Operating Company controlled all U.S. products with the Johnson's name on them. Although Burke did not have line responsibility for Tylenol, he did have information concerning its progress, due to his position on the executive committee.

the trade for a 100-tablet bottle dropped from \$1.69 to \$1.19. If the trade took advantage of deals, the price would go as low as 69¢, compared with Datril's promotional price of 70¢.³³

The fact that every Datril advertisement gave almost equal exposure to Tylenol, coupled with the medical profession's familiarity with the Tylenol brand, indicated to Burke that Johnson & Johnson would not have to outspend Bristol-Myers in advertising. Nevertheless, it was apparent that the Datril advertisement could do a great deal of harm to Tylenol's market share if allowed to continue running.

On June 3, 1975, shortly before the Datril advertisement was scheduled to run nationwide, Burke telephoned Richard L. Gelb, president and CEO of Bristol-Myers, to notify him that Tylenol's price to the trade had been reduced 30%, effective immediately, and that therefore any advertisement claiming that Datril was cheaper would be misleading.³⁴ "He thanked me for the call," Burke related, "hung up, and increased the advertising budget for Datril. The commercial aired the following day."

Burke faced weeks of difficulty trying to convince the major networks to discontinue the Datril price-comparison advertisement since, in the opinion of Johnson & Johnson, it was no longer true. Bristol-Myers took the position that while Johnson & Johnson may have made a decision to cut the price of Tylenol, the decision had not yet been implemented. As long as this was true, Bristol-Myers felt the advertisement's claims were justified.

Johnson & Johnson submitted price-comparison surveys to the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the Council of Better Business Bureaus, showing that in stores where both Datril and Tylenol were sold, pricing patterns were erratic. Neither Datril nor Tylenol was consistently cheaper. Bristol-Myers, on the other hand, found in mid-July 1975 that the nationwide average price of Datril was \$1.57 while Tylenol's nationwide average price was \$2.23.³⁵

In an official complaint to the NAD, Johnson & Johnson's associate general counsel George S.

Frazza wrote:

When Bristol-Myers conceived its advertising scheme, it obviously concluded that Johnson & Johnson would not match its prices. It is undeniable that Johnson & Johnson has done so, but Bristol-Myers refuses to abandon its preconceived marketing plan of "cost less" advertising. It is indisputable that this campaign does not square with the realities of the marketplace, misleads the consumer, and causes irreparable damage to our business.³⁶

CBS ultimately decided to discontinue the Datril advertisement entirely, while the editors at NBC and ABC forced revisions that resulted in the weaker claim that "Datril can cost less, depending on where you shop."³⁷

One year after Bristol-Myers began its campaign to enter the acetaminophen field, and after an estimated expenditure of \$20 million, Datril had a 1% market share, while Tylenol's had increased to 11.5%. Bufferin and Bayer both showed slight declines.³⁸

When Burke became chairman and CEO of Johnson & Johnson in 1976, Tylenol took the offensive. Over \$4 million was spent that year to advertise it as a safer alternative to aspirin. The following year the figure tripled to over \$12 million. (Tylenol had an advertising budget of \$142,000 in 1975 prior to the Datril offensive.)³⁹

Tylenol sales did not drop from \$60 million to \$40 million with its price cut, as the McNeil people had feared. Burke explained:

The wonder and beauty of all this is that it's just another description of how the free-enterprise system works. Our business just took off, and our units made up for all the loss in dollars. Now we weren't making any money. We were spending a great deal of money. But it was obvious during all those early days that we had a winner and it was going to remain a winner.

Johnson & Johnson introduced Extra-Strength Tylenol after the results of a 1976 survey showed that consumers did not believe Tylenol to be as efficacious as other brands

33. Nancy Giges, "J&J Readies Effort to Protect Tylenol; New Datril Spot Aims," *Advertising Age*, July 28, 1975, p. 61.

34. *Business Week*, October 6, 1975, p. 80.

35. "J&J Slashes Tylenol's Price, Objects to Datril Ad Approach," *Advertising Age*, July 14, 1975, p. 1.

36. *Advertising Age*, July 28, 1975, p. 61.

37. *Business Week*, October 6, 1975, p. 80.

38. "A Pained Bayer Cries Foul," *Business Week*, July 25, 1977, p. 142.

39. "Advertising Expenditures of the Top 200 American Brands," *Marketing & Media Decisions*, July 1979, p. 116.

was that the contamination had somehow occurred in one of McNeil's plants.

Thursday, September 30: Crisis and Confusion

Reports out of Chicago were sketchy at best. The Cook County medical officials refused to release any data until they had finished performing autopsies on all of the victims.

At 11:30 A.M., the news arrived that Mary Reiner, a 27-year-old housewife and mother of four, had died earlier that morning. Her purse contained six capsules of Extra-Strength Tylenol, four of which tested positive for cyanide.

Burke decided to take charge of the management of the crisis at the corporate level.⁴⁷ Wayne Nelson, a company group chairman with corporate responsibility for McNeil, was in Australia at the time of the poisonings. "One of my first reactions," Burke recalled, "was to get him on the phone and try to find out what could have happened. I remember him saying that he would bet his bonus and a year's salary that the contamination did not occur in the plant because of the controls they had there. That made me somewhat relieved, but I was still very concerned because we did not know at that point in time that the poisonings were isolated to the Chicago area."

47. Thomas Moore, "The Fight to Save Tylenol: The Inside Story of Johnson & Johnson's Struggle to Revive Its Most Important Product," *Fortune*, November 29, 1982.

At noon, the Cook County officials held a press conference at which they confirmed that cyanide poisoning was the cause of death in all of the victims. They noted that cyanide had been detected only in random capsules in the bottles of Extra-Strength Tylenol found near the victims. All bottles found had been coded with the batch number MC 2880. The batch originated at a McNeil plant in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, and was made up of 93,000 bottles containing 4.7 million capsules.

David Collins, the 48-year-old chairman of McNeil Consumer Products, was on a helicopter heading for Fort Washington less than half an hour after learning of the crisis. Upon his arrival, he found managers were racing between banks of phones and the office of McNeil's president Joseph Chiesa. Collins's first mission at McNeil was to ascertain whether cyanide was used on the premises. Top executives assured him there was no cyanide anywhere in the plant, and he relayed this information to the corporate office. Later, however, Collins learned to his dismay that small amounts of cyanide were present as part of a quality assurance process, required by the FDA, which tested the purity of raw materials used in the manufacture of Tylenol. The Johnson & Johnson public relations office later had to clarify this with the media because of the earlier contention that there was no cyanide in use at the manufacturing site.⁴⁸

48. *Fortune*, November 29, 1982.

Exhibit 2 Johnson & Johnson's Sales and Earnings, 1976-1981 (\$ millions)

Year	Sales	After-Tax Earnings
1976	\$2,522.5	\$205.4
1977	2,914.1	247.3
1978	3,497.3	299.1
1979	4,211.6	352.1
1980	4,837.4	400.7
1981	\$5,399.0	\$467.6

Exhibit 3 Johnson & Johnson's Credo (as originally written by Robert W. Johnson)

We believe that our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses, hospitals, mothers and all others who use our products.

Our products must always be of the highest quality.

We must constantly strive to reduce the cost of these products.

Our orders must be promptly and accurately filled.

Our dealers must make a fair profit.

Our second responsibility is to those who work with us—the men and women in our plants and offices.

They must have a sense of security in their jobs.

Wages must be fair and adequate, management just, hours reasonable and working conditions clean and orderly.

Employees should have an organized system for suggestions and complaints.

Supervisors and Department Heads must be qualified and fair minded.

There must be an opportunity for advancement—for those qualified—and each person must be considered an individual standing on his own dignity and merit.

Our third responsibility is to management.

Our executives must be persons of talent, education, experience and ability.

They must be persons of common sense and full understanding.

Our fourth responsibility is to the communities in which we live.

We must be a good citizen—support good works and charity, and bear our fair share of taxes.

We must maintain in good order the property we are privileged to use.

We must participate in promotion of civic improvement, health, education and good government, and acquaint the community with our activities.

Our fifth and last responsibility is to our stockholders.

Business must make a sound profit.

Reserves must be created, research must be carried on, adventurous programs developed, and mistakes paid for.

Adverse times must be provided for, adequate taxes paid, new machines purchased, new plants built, new products launched, and new sales plans developed.

We must experiment with new ideas.

When these things have been done the stockholder should receive a fair return.

We are determined, with the help of God's grace, to fulfill these obligations to the best of our ability.

Exhibit 5 A Snapshot of the Business: Johnson & Johnson in 1976 and in 1981

Sales to Customers in 1976	\$ in millions	Sales to Customers in 1981	\$ in millions
Consumer Segment ^a		Consumer Segment ^a	
Domestic	\$448	Domestic	\$1,238
International	414	International	1,125
Total consumer	862	Total consumer	2,363
Professional Segment ^b		Professional Segment ^b	
Domestic	491	Domestic	1,128
International	284	International	607
Total professional	775	Total professional	1,735
Pharmaceutical Segment ^c		Pharmaceutical Segment ^c	
Domestic	366	Domestic	511
International	257	International	497
Total pharmaceutical	623	Total pharmaceutical	1,008
Industrial Segment ^d		Industrial Segment ^d	
Domestic	188	Domestic	149
International	75	International	145
Total industrial	263	Total industrial	294
Worldwide total sales	\$2,523	Worldwide total sales	\$5,400
After-tax earnings on income	\$205	After-tax earnings on income	\$468

Source: Johnson & Johnson Annual Report, 1976.

- a. Toiletries and hygienic products, including baby care items.
- b. Prescription and nonprescription drugs, diagnostics, therapeutics, contraceptives, and veterinary products.
- c. Surgical dressings, ligatures and sutures, surgical instruments, surgical specialties, and related items.
- d. Industrial tapes and adhesives, textiles, paper products, and other related items.

Source: Johnson & Johnson Annual Report, 1981.

- a. Toiletries and hygienic products, including baby care items, first aid products, and nonprescription drugs.
- b. Prescription drugs, including contraceptives and therapeutics, and veterinary products.
- c. Ligatures and sutures, medical wound closure products, diagnostic products, dental products, medical equipment and devices, surgical dressings, surgical apparel and accessories, surgical instruments, and related items.
- d. Textile products, collagen sausage casings, and fine chemicals.

AT JOHNSON & JOHNSON, A MISTAKE CAN BE A BADGE OF HONOR

CEO Jim Burke encourages risk-taking—and that keeps the new products flowing

Hank Green needed a new product. As president of Vistakon Inc., a \$13 million maker of specialty contact lenses, he had a problem common to small companies: A limited product line was holding back growth.

Green found his breakthrough in far-away Copenhagen. In 1983 he heard of a Danish ophthalmologist who had figured out how to make contact lenses cheaply enough that they could be thrown away after a week, freeing wearers from the woes of constantly cleaning and occasionally losing a lens. Green hopped on a plane and within three weeks had struck a deal. Vistakon introduced its Acuvue disposable lenses this summer, and stock analysts believe that annual sales could reach \$100 million by the early 1990s.

Your classic scrappy small company success story? Not quite. Vistakon is part of Johnson & Johnson, the health care conglomerate that this year should rack up more than \$9 billion in sales. Green, in fact, got his tip from another J&J employee who didn't even know him. A Danish salesman for Janssen Pharmaceutica, J&J's European drug company, had read about Vistakon in the annual report and called Green. Vistakon and Janssen are just two of the 166—yes, 166—individual companies producing a sweet flow of profits at the J&J beehive. In 1987 income reached \$833 million, more than double 1986's \$330 million.

NO BIG SECRET. What's more, Acuvue is just one of an impressive list of new products that will help boost earnings a further 16% this year and is likely to keep them growing at a healthy double-digit rate for at least the next few years. There's sucralose, a high-intensity sweetener jointly developed by J&J with Britain's Tate & Lyle PLC and under review by the Food & Drug Administration. Unlike sweeteners already on the market, sucralose stands up to heat and could be used in baked

goods, such as low-cal cookies. Recent studies suggest that Retin-A, an acne cream from Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., repairs sun-damaged skin. J&J has broad marketing rights for EPO, a product from Amgen Inc. that promotes the growth of red blood cells. J&J also has rights to a bacteria fighter that treats infections resistant to other drugs. Analysts estimate that those four products alone could produce a total of \$500 million to \$700 million in sales by 1995. No wonder J&J's stock has jumped 12%, well above the 8% rise in the Standard & Poor's

500-stock index, since the beginning of the year.

Johnson & Johnson's secret is no secret. The company encourages people to take risks, creating a corporate culture where even mistakes can be a badge of honor. Mistakes, you see, are the inevitable byproduct of innovation. The seemingly endless list of operating companies is crucial, too. "Innovation is built into decentralization," says Chairman and CEO James E. Burke. Decentralization makes J&J the most broad-based company in the health care field, prospering from products as ubiquitous as Band-Aids or baby oil and as exotic as Orthoclone OKT3, a monoclonal antibody that keeps the body from rejecting a kidney transplant. The myriad subsidiaries let managers focus their energies and

imagination on a small group of related products, while the parent company's resources provide the funding for research and the marketing clout to turn good ideas into blockbusters.

Not that every new product has to be a blockbuster. The hundreds of new products that were introduced during the previous five years accounted for about 22% of J&J's sales last year. That compared favorably with 3M Co., one of the most innovative industrial companies, which generates 25% of its sales from new products.

A FAILURE. Overseeing this vast effort from J&J's headquarters in New Brunswick, N.J., is Burke, at 63 one of the most admired executives in America and a 35-year veteran



of J&J. He's a native Vermonter who was dubbed the "Happy Warrior" in his high school yearbook and graduated from Harvard business school in 1949. Burke, an avid poker player in his younger days, showed an early willingness to take risks. He quit J&J in 1954, disappointed at the company's indifference to product development. Lured back by a promise that he could take chances on new products, Burke launched a chest rub for colds. It failed.

Nevertheless, General Robert Wood Johnson, then chairman, congratulated Burke on taking a risk, and the young executive started to rise through the ranks. In the 1960s, Burke masterminded the campaign to sell J&J's baby products, particularly baby shampoo, to adults. Later, as president of J&J, he put together a team of consumer marketing specialists to devise a new, more aggressive sales plan for Tylenol. The acetaminophen painkiller from J&J's McNeil Consumer Products Co. had been available over the counter since 1960, but the new campaign, which featured lower prices, broad distribution to supermarkets, and the first massive consumer advertising for the product, turned Tylenol into the country's best-selling branded analgesic. "Burke is simply the best marketing man I've ever seen," says Edward N. Ney, the former chief of ad agency Young & Rubicam Inc., which has handled J&J's baby products since the 1920s.

CASE STUDY. Burke has also had his share of setbacks. One was the poisonings as a result of tampering with some bottles of Tylenol on store shelves in 1982. Burke personally handled the costly episode, making his recall of all Tylenol capsule products and his forthright explanations of the incident a case study in effective crisis management. He fared worse with Technicare, a struggling maker of medical diagnostic imaging devices he had bought a year earlier. Burke saw Technicare as a way of entering a related business where J&J had no experience. Today he says simply: "If I had to do it over, I wouldn't

buy Technicare. After persistent problems with the company, he sold it in 1986, along with an ultrasound diagnostic business, and took a \$170 million hit to earnings.

Technicare's failure has not dulled Burke's passion for urging people to take risks. A demanding boss who can shout his way through a rowdy staff meeting, he has spent years encouraging his managers to be daring. Francis J. Aguilar, a professor at the Harvard business school and the author of several studies on J&J, explains: "What Burke

exhibits is not a sense of bureaucratic inertia, but of initiative. Burke's response? 'I hate hearing those comments, but they're probably valid.' He has recently broadened a bonus program that will reward entrepreneurial accomplishments and strong performances with cash. But ultimately he sees encouraging innovation as an unending process in which the reward is the new products delivered by the people who take his message to heart.

Biotechnology is one area where J&J's companies are taking plenty of risks. Ethicon Inc., a subsidiary that makes

sutures, is working with Chiron Corp., an independent California company. Chiron can now produce epidermal growth factors, which appear to speed healing in various wounds. The growth factors, combined with sutures, could help patients recover faster from surgery and provide an area of dramatic growth for Ethicon.


STRENGTHS. The Chiron deal is one of more than a dozen alliances J&J's companies have forged with outside biotech firms. Says Kurt H. Kruger, an analyst for Hambrecht & Quist Inc.: "J&J has probably done a better job at integrating into biotech than any other big drug company." One such partnership, with Amgen, is about to pay off. Amgen produces human recombinant erythropoietin (EPO), the protein that boosts production of red blood cells. J&J has the exclusive marketing rights outside the U.S. for EPO and can sell EPO in the U.S. for applications not related to kidney dialysis, such as

anemia in chemotherapy patients. World-wide annual sales of EPO for J&J could reach \$300 million.

Investment in biotechnology is just part of J&J's effort to find more drug products to sell. Although the company does not have the status of a Merck & Co. in pharmaceuticals, it does have considerable strengths. Under the direction of Dr. Paul A. Janssen, J&J's Janssen Pharmaceutica in Belgium has developed some 70 new drug compounds since 1953. Ortho Pharmaceutical is No. 1 in the U.S. in oral contraceptives. Analysts

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: A PICTURE OF HEALTH

A NEW-PRODUCT REGIMEN...HELPS REJUVENATE GROWTH



DATA: JOHNSON & JOHNSON, BROKERAGE HOUSE ESTIMATES, DW



J&J RESEARCHER WITH COMPUTER-GENERATED MODELS OF PROTEIN

does is crucial—he continually energizes the system."

Not all of the seeds sown by Burke find fertile ground. Burke's message, says one ex-manager, "gets messed up on the way down. It isn't worth it to stick your neck out." Another former J&J man explains his decision to quit: "It wasn't fun to come to work anymore. I'm more of a risk-taker." From the perspective of these employees, the sheer size and complexity of the company result in some operations being run by risk-averse managers who encourage bu-

The Corporation

estimate that sales of Ortho's Retin-A have already more than tripled, to \$70 million, so far this year.

Burke and President David R. Clare have long been pushing to capitalize on these assets. They have pumped funds into the pharmaceutical sector, where operating margins are 33% and operating profit is growing at a compound annual average of 18%. That's far better than the consumer division, where margins are one-third as wide and growth averages 10%. Since 1982, when drug division R&D amounted to 14% of sales, spending has doubled, to \$336 million, or about 17% of sales.

Burke is acutely aware that he must keep up the flow of innovation in older parts of J&J's empire, too, and he has stepped up spending on research and advertising. Tylenol, while still the single biggest-selling painkiller, has lost several points of its market share under pressure from ibuprofen and aspirin and is suffering as researchers find new therapeutic effects from aspirin. The baby products company has put extra spin on its offerings with such things as a sun block for babies and baby oil in a mousse gel. As a result, annual sales growth of baby products in the U. S. has

doubled, to about 10%, since 1983. That's impressive, but not as impressive as what a hot-selling new drug can do.

The consumer sector has one potentially exciting product in sucralose. Depending on the speed of FDA approval and the quality of competitive products from Hoechst and Pfizer, the sweetener could end up generating sales in the

One potential problem
for J&J: It will
have to find
new leadership by 1990

hundreds of millions of dollars. Besides standing up to cooking, sucralose has a long shelf life, which is good for soft drinks.

The consumer businesses, like all of J&J's operations, also enjoy good prospects for overseas expansion. About 49% of the company's 1988 sales should come from abroad, up from 40% five years ago. Besides providing an outlet for new products, overseas markets offer new

growth areas for existing products and even provide J&J with a second chance now and then. In Brazil, for example, J&J is No. 1 in disposable diapers, years after it was clobbered in the U. S. diaper market by Procter & Gamble and Kimberly Clark.

PROVEN FORMULA. While seeking new products and new markets, J&J will soon have to find new leadership as well. Burke and Clare, who have run J&J since 1976, will step down by the time they reach 65 in 1990. Burke says his successor will be one of the company's three vice-chairmen: Ralph S. Larsen, head of the consumer products sector; Robert E. Campbell, who runs professional products; and Robert N. Wilson, who is in charge of pharmaceuticals.

Whoever succeeds Burke will command a well-financed organization that even after 102 years holds tremendous promise. But the new man will need the instincts of a poker player, a flair for marketing, and the ability to learn from his mistakes. Jim Burke has already proved it's a formula that works.

By Christopher Power, with Joseph Weber in New Brunswick, Joan O'C. Hamilton in San Francisco, and Jeffrey Ryser in Sao Paulo

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Our Credo

We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients,
to mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services.
In meeting their needs everything we do must be of high quality.

We must constantly strive to reduce our costs
in order to maintain reasonable prices.

Customers' orders must be serviced promptly and accurately.
Our suppliers and distributors must have an opportunity
to make a fair profit.

We are responsible to our employees,
the men and women who work with us throughout the world.

Everyone must be considered as an individual.
We must respect their dignity and recognize their merit.
They must have a sense of security in their jobs.

Compensation must be fair and adequate,
and working conditions clean, orderly and safe.
We must be mindful of ways to help our employees fulfill
their family responsibilities.

Employees must feel free to make suggestions and complaints.
There must be equal opportunity for employment, development
and advancement for those qualified.

We must provide competent management,
and their actions must be just and ethical.

We are responsible to the communities in which we live and work
and to the world community as well.

We must be good citizens – support good works and charities
and bear our fair share of taxes.

We must encourage civic improvements and better health and education.


We must maintain in good order
the property we are privileged to use,
protecting the environment and natural resources.

Our final responsibility is to our stockholders.

Business must make a sound profit.

We must experiment with new ideas.

Research must be carried on, innovative programs developed
and mistakes paid for.



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http://www.johnsonandjohnson.com/who_is_jnj/cr_usa.html



The Partnership for a Drug-Free America (A)

The largest public service ad campaign in history grew from a bold idea and a modest start-up grant. Estimated at \$1.5 billion in total donated media placements as of 1992, the Partnership for a Drug-Free America (PDFA) started in 1986 with \$300,000 in seed funding from the American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA).¹ Just six years later, the PDFA could report that it was leveraging its \$3.1 million annual operating budget to \$362 million worth of donated media placements per year, as well as over \$50 million in creative production value. The donors—its industry "partners"—included hundreds of ad agencies, media organizations, production companies, public relations firms, and individual volunteers.

The essential idea was to use the professional selling techniques of marketing communications to help reduce the demand for illegal drugs. Inherent in the idea was a focus on the consumer and his or her decision to use an illicit drug, conceived of as a "product." Such a decision would be determined ultimately by individual and social attitudes about benefits and/or risks. Once these attitudes were understood, media communications could be an effective and very efficient means of delivering messages that could help change the balance of perceived benefits and risks.

In service of a stated executional goal to deliver at least one anti-drug message into every American household every day, the Partnership had developed 135 ads for television, 70 for radio, 95 for newspapers, 145 for magazines, and 15 for outdoor signboards, with many more in process.

Partnership ads often used visceral imagery. One illustrated the anti-drug warning, "you should know what you're diving into," with a girl diving into an empty swimming pool. Another portrayed a cocaine-sniffing woman at work—as a school bus driver. A third revealed a drug pusher as a hissing reptile. Some had more positive themes, like the message "encourage your kid's habit," accompanied by a line sketch of a trumpet. And of course there was the famous

Professor Diana Chapman Walsh, Ph.D., Barbara Moeykens, M.S., and Rima Rudd, Sc.D. of the Harvard School of Public Health prepared this case under the supervision of Professor V. Kasturi Rangan as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Abby Hansen, Ph.D. participated as Case Development Consultant.

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1. From *PDFA Newsletter Supplement*, Special Anniversary Edition, Vol. 6, Issue 1, Spring, 1992, by Patty Cabot. Data on the history of the Partnership are also drawn from this account.

Joanou envisioned a massive anti-drug ad campaign. His inspiration came in part from a series of anti-cigarette ads that had run on TV in the 1970s under the Federal Trade Commission's "fairness doctrine." Several of those ads "burned into your brain" and "changed attitudes," Joanou remembered. One portrayed a small boy following his father's every move in their home workshop. The father hammered a nail; the child hammered a nail. Then the father lit a cigarette, and the child reached for the pack. "What guilt!" Joanou exclaimed. "A father teaching his child to smoke." In another ad, a well-known supporting actor from the popular Perry Mason show, obviously ill, ended a brief smoking warning with the observation: "By the time you see this I'll probably be dead from lung cancer." The ad then revealed the news that the actor had, in fact, died shortly after the filming.

Joanou decided that the advertising industry could, and should, mount a concerted campaign against illicit drug use. He imagined a volunteer effort: "It would be easy if everybody played a little role and nobody had to do anything huge. Each advertising company in America would do *one* thing—a print ad, a commercial, an outdoor signboard, a brochure, a matchbook cover—and pay for it. Then the AAAA would take it to the media." Unlike "traditional public service ads, which tend to be small—a quarter-page in the back of a magazine or a commercial that runs at 2 or 3 a.m.," the anti-drug campaign he had in mind would "go after prime time television, whole page magazine ads, whole page newspaper ads—everything, in every medium." His goal was, "\$300 million a year, and a minimum of three years."

In 1985, Joanou proposed his idea to the executive board of the AAAA. "It was a difficult sell: the largest public service campaign in the history of this (or any) country. Nobody had ever done anything like it." While the AAAA board considered the proposal, Joanou described his idea to acquaintances. One of these was a respected consultant to the advertising industry named Richard O'Reilly. Joanou recalled O'Reilly's reaction: "He said, 'This is the greatest idea I've ever heard!'"

In 1986, the chairman of the AAAA executive board told Joanou that the association had hired a consultant to conduct a feasibility study of his anti-drug proposal. Six months later, Joanou flew to New York to hear the consultant's report. He recalled being "angry on the plane, expecting some damn fool consultant to say it couldn't be done. But when I got to the meeting, in walked Dick O'Reilly. He was the consultant they had hired! O'Reilly said, 'It's not only doable, you've got to do it!'"

Getting Started

In 1986 the AAAA granted its \$300,000 award for research and start-up to the Media-Advertising Partnership for a Drug-Free America (which later dropped the first two words of its name). O'Reilly was the founding president and recruited a small staff of experienced advertising account managers including Ginna Marston, Thomas Hedrick,³ and (later) Jonathan Cohen.

Marston emphasized that the Partnership was launched at a time when national concern about the drug problem was running high.

3. See Exhibit 1 for biographical sketches of Partnership executives.

Advisory Board included top marketing, advertising, and media executives.⁵ (See exhibits for organizational charts and profiles of key Partnership figures.)

The Creative Platform Debate: Unified or Diversified?

The Partnership began with a clear mission: to change attitudes toward illicit drug use throughout the American population by applying the techniques of persuasive communication. As media professionals, Partnership principals knew these techniques well. The problem was how, exactly, to apply them.

A debate that arose early over the basic strategic platform for the whole campaign brought this implementation problem into sharp relief. Tom Hedrick explains:

In marketing it is almost universally agreed that once you understand the consumer, the product, and the market, the best thing you can do is develop a single-minded appeal to the consumer within that marketplace.

A classic example of the unitary approach, he said, was the "ring around the collar" campaign for Wisk laundry detergent.

One basic idea—"This is the toughest laundry detergent because it works against the toughest problem, ring around the collar"—influenced every aspect of the product: packaging, the concentration of the liquid, the way it was applied. All the ads in the campaign either delivered that single message or a spin-off: "Wisk cleans the whole wash as well as it cleans ring around the collar."

The Partnership might have organized itself around one sharply-focused theme. Hedrick used the Reagan administration's anti-drug slogan, "Just Say No," to illustrate how this might have worked:

We could have executed "Just Say No" differently for different segments of the market. For six to eight year olds, it would have been: "Just say no to the 13-year-old drug pusher." For parents: "Here's information to help you tell your kids just say no," and so forth. All the ads would have focused on what we wanted the consumer to do: "just say no."

A single-focus campaign held many attractions. Among them, Hedrick cited "visual simplicity, audio simplicity, and simplicity in explaining what you're doing" to potential volunteers and supporters, and to the media, who would run the ads.

Allen Rosenshine, chair of the Creative Review Committee, spoke of his own and others' uneasiness about deviating from advertising's bedrock commitment to consistency and focus:

5. The group recruited the Association of National Advertisers, the American Advertising Federation, the Advertising Council, and the Market Research Association as supporters, and organized an Advisory Board headed by Herb Baum, President of Campbell Soup. The Board's executive committee included people like Dan Burke, president of Capital Cities/ABC, Lou Hagopian, chairman of the AAAA Executive Committee, Len Matthews (another former chairman of the AAAA), and Dick McLaughlin (of *Reader's Digest*).

A Basic Strategic Decision: Which Market Segments?

Having settled, however uneasily, on a multidimensional platform, Partnership executives faced another related strategic issue, namely what market segments to target and why. Earlier, they had decided to stress prevention more than intervention and to stay away from issues related to treatment of drug dependence.

Hedrick explained:

We recognized that we would have very little effect among heavy drug users. From a marketing point of view, if I market Tide and you are a Wisk user, and the next person is a once-a-month Tide user, it's much more efficient for me to spend money to get that next person to use more Tide than it is for me to try to get you to switch away from Wisk.

When Partnership executives applied this efficiency rule to the drug problem, it was quite apparent to them that they would obtain the best results from their efforts (and those of their volunteer "partners") by excluding drug addicts and heavy users from the list of potential target audiences and focusing on non-users, occasional users, and people in a position to influence their use.

Marston recalled the difficulty of that choice:

The whole application of marketing probably would not have been as effective had we not focused where we could do the most good through a media campaign. It was a very important choice, and it was a hard decision because emotionally you are more drawn to the people who are in trouble.

In the early months of 1986, the Research and Strategy Task Force began in earnest to segment the market. They reviewed the literature, examined available data on the drug problem, and conducted preliminary consumer research, including focus groups, to identify the most suitable target audiences for the marketing plan. As a first cut, they divided the target audience into two categories: primary targets and influencers. Primary targets included pre-teens and 12-17 year olds (first priority), and 18-25 and 26-34 year olds (second priority). Influencers included (in descending order of priority) parents, peer groups of youth targets, top managers, and health care professionals. Gender was also considered a relevant cross-cutting dimension, and strategies were further subdivided according to type of drug (marijuana, cocaine and crack). Over time, market segments were elaborated more fully. As one PDFA Executive described working within a given target segment:

We break [the target groups] further, into 6 to 8 and 9 to 12 year olds, teens, parents, college kids, adults, the health care profession. Then, within those universes, we have developed specific campaigns aimed at Hispanics and African Americans.⁶

6. Richard Bonnette, PDFA executive director, in interview.

Strategy Task Force, the Gordon Black team planned an annual survey of attitudes toward drug use (the Partnership Attitude Tracking Survey, or PATS). The PATS would have three purposes: (1) to create an ongoing mechanism for tracking shifts in attitudes and use; (2) to provide "fodder," as one PDFA executive put it, for creative development; and (3) to function as a "monitoring service" of PDFA progress over time.

The Gordon S. Black group developed and pretested questionnaires, designed for anonymous self-administration, in collaboration with the PDFA. These questionnaires covered "fundamental dependent variables" such as "reported drug use, present and future," including marijuana and cocaine use during the past 12 months, as well as likely use of both drugs during the next 12 months. The independent (predictor) variables included over 100 factors, organized into "logical groups." Among the items were 37 "concerning attitudes and beliefs" about drugs; eight "on the first use of drugs," 12 "about risk of using substances under different conditions," 5 "concerning friends using substances," 5 "about difficulty of obtaining substances," 17 "on appeals of use," and 26 pertaining to "reasons for not using drugs."

To administer the surveys at 150 malls and "other central locations," the Gordon Black Corporation assembled a group of nearly 100 field service organizations from across the country—all volunteers. Baseline PATS data were collected in February, 1987, and six follow-up waves have been completed since, with a sample size of roughly 8,000 respondents in each new cross-sectional sample.⁸

The PATS research targeted five subgroups as respondents: children from 9 to 12, teenagers from 13 to 17, college students, adults, and parents. Individuals from these subgroups were intercepted in public places and asked to fill out questionnaires that included basic demographic questions. Because the goal of the sampling strategy was to "obtain the closest possible approximation to a fully representative national sample," the data were weighted in the final analysis by region, race within region, age, gender, and type of school, to project the counts to the total population.⁹ (See Exhibit 5 for summary of key PATS findings.)

To augment the PATS research, the PDFA continued its program of extensive qualitative research, much of it through focus groups (over 200 focus groups had been conducted as of 1993). Issokson-Silver enumerated some of the kinds of questions that drove the qualitative research:

We spent a lot of time conducting focus groups that involved dialogue about kids' perceptions of life—what they did after school; how they spent their time; how they explained periods of boredom; how they talked about drugs and drug choice; where and when they saw drugs; how they handled an offer of drugs; what they would tell a friend who used drugs. There's no substitute for sitting down with kids and getting first-hand, gut reactions to these situations.

8. The Gordon S. Black Corporation provides annual results in a series of *Partnership Attitude Tracking Study* (PATS) reports.

9. G.S. Black, "Changing Attitudes Toward Drug Use: The Effects of Advertising," in *Persuasive Communication and Drug Abuse Prevention*, L. Donohew, H.E. Sypher, W.J. Bukoski (eds.) (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991).

We spend at least two hours with them in our first meeting, providing them with "a brief." We review our mission and our objectives. . . . Then we really delve into the specific audience and message area that we're asking them to develop. We have a list of experts that we rely on for up-to-date, accurate information; we pass on those names to the agency so they can, first hand, pick the brain of an expert.

Partnership staff often gave the agencies tapes from focus group research that had been conducted with members of the target audience, "so that they could go back and listen, and watch their body language." Agency "creatives" were then expected to prepare themselves further by conducting their own research, and pretesting their ads with members of their target audience.

The Partnership's Creative Development and Research (CD&R) Group oversaw this process of developing new campaign areas. Issokson-Silver characterized it as a continuous interchange:

The dialogue between the Partnership and the agency is constant. We provide them with basic information as a launching point; we help them explore new areas. After many weeks, the agency is prepared to develop some rough work.

The CD&R Group provided overall strategic direction but *not* oversight of the executional quality of productions. That was the domain of the Creative Review Committee (CRC), another structural element essential to the Partnership's operation and guiding philosophy. Allen Rosenshine, the Committee's chair, explained:

We determined that, in order for this to be a meaningful long-term project . . . we had to be doing the same quality work that we would do for Pepsi-Cola or Coca-Cola; we had to be doing high-quality advertising work, the kind that the networks and the media would put in the **mainstream** of their work. Advertising that looks cheap doesn't have the same impact—we wanted people to know that this was serious, and serious means doing it with quality and care.

To ensure quality, the Partnership recruited the very top creative talent in advertising as volunteers on the Creative Review Committee to assess all advertising proposed to the Partnership for creative and executional merit. Behind this process lay the principle of "competitive volunteerism."

The Creative Review

At a typical CRC meeting, one heard comments like:

"The irony may get in the way here—being ironic is risking miscommunication."

"Not exciting enough."

"It looks like you're going to tell a story . . . then there's no story!"

"Take out the slogan—or anything that sounds 'slogany.'"

"Selling" the Partnership to the Media

No matter how powerful and compelling the creative work, however, the quality and quantity of media time and space would ultimately determine the impact of the messages. What the Partnership was looking for was prime time television placement and the size-equivalent advertising "budget" of McDonald's or Ford Motor Company. Without media space, nothing else mattered. A \$365 million national media plan, constructed by Backer Spielvogel Bates, was the blueprint for the Partnership's media solicitation efforts. The Partnership labelled its PSA reels, and "made detailed suggestions about when to run particular ads but, since this is a volunteer effort, we couldn't dictate terms or monitor all of our exposure," Issokson-Silver explained.

The management team took the delivery of the PDFA message to these various groups very seriously. They made the "sell," and did it personally. This was an innovation—one, Marston believed, that had affected other organizations in the public service advertising "business":

[Other organizations] are now actively, assertively, positioning what they are offering as being (in a timely way) one of the most important things that the media could be looking at . . . and they're getting better space and time.

Another Partnership executive¹⁰ agreed: "That kind of plan-based, aggressive, and personal sales approach to a public service campaign had never been done before." He described a typical "sale":

We say, "Look, the most important issue for you . . . is drugs. Here's the reason why." We play them a reel of messages. The work is so good, it literally sells itself. We found that we could get more by doing it face-to-face . . . so we became very aggressive.

Timing Is Everything

The salesmanship paid off. By the fall of 1987, 30 television, 64 print, and 14 radio messages had been produced on behalf of the Partnership. Three television networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) and 13 cable networks were contributing free air time. Thirteen radio networks had broadcast over 2,600 spots, and 3,600 full-page print ads had appeared. The Partnership's visibility in the public eye earned them a ranking of 18 in the top 25 most popular TV ads of 1987.¹¹

From a marketing perspective, the perpetual challenge was to stay with the issue as it evolved. Marston depicted the marketer's mind set:

You're always looking ahead with strategic planning to try to see, "Where is the market headed?" You're anticipating. . . . "What way is the public experiencing the issue now?" Then you evolve accordingly.

In 1989, the Partnership stood at a crossroads. The three-year window originally envisaged for the Partnership would close in another year. Just three months after the launch

10. Michael Townsend, director, Communications Group.

11. *Wall Street Journal*, February 23, 1989, p. B1.

List of Exhibits

- Exhibit 1 Biographical Information
- Exhibit 2 Members of Partnership Board of Directors
- Exhibit 3 Organizational Chart
- Exhibit 4 Sample Focus Group Guide Outline
- Exhibit 5 Summary of Partnership Attitude Tracking Study Findings
- Exhibit 6 Sampling of Partnership Ads

Ginna Marston (Executive Vice President, Director, Inner City Initiative)

Ginna Marston was on the four-person team which managed the Partnership during its launch and early years. As its marketing director, she then devised and supervised volunteer creative development, research and media placement processes. Ms. Marston now directs the Partnership's Inner City Initiative. She worked previously in account management at Backer Spielvogel Bates.

Allen Rosenshine (Chairman and CEO of BBDO Worldwide)

Allen Rosenshine is chairman and chief executive officer of BBDO Worldwide, Inc., one of the world's largest advertising agencies. Until the beginning of 1989, Mr. Rosenshine was CEO of Omnicom Group, Inc., parent company of BBDO. He assumed that post in 1986 when Omnicom was formed as a result of the merger of BBDO, Doyle Dane Bornbach and Needham Harper. Mr. Rosenshine was chief executive of BBDO at the time of the merger.


Mr. Rosenshine has served on the National Advertising Review Board and the board of directors of the American Association of Advertising Agencies. He is currently a member of the board of the Advertising Council and the International Advertising Association as well as the board and executive committee of the Media-Advertising Partnership for a Drug-Free America, also serving as chairman of its creative review committee.

Michael Y. Townsend (Executive Vice President and Director of Communications)

Mr. Townsend leads the communication group which is responsible for all national and local media solicitation, monitoring and advertising materials distribution. His responsibilities also include the Volunteer Network Program and the State Alliance Program. Before joining the organization in October 1989, he was senior vice president, management representative, and directed the Warner-Lambert and General Foods accounts at Backer Spielvogel Bates.

Exhibit 3 Organization Chart, November 25, 1992

594-028 - 19



- Which of these do you *accept* as really being risks to you? (E.g., do you really think *you* would die from taking drugs?)
 - Probe specifically for social consequences of using drugs
- What is the *one* biggest risk to you personally?
- In your mind, have the risks changed in the past year or so?
 - How?
 - What prompted this change?
- Many people your age tell us that peer/social pressure is one reason people take drugs. What do you think would help you to resist this type of pressure?
- What are some of your sources of information about drugs?

IV. Advertising (Show commercials)

- What is the main idea that these commercials are trying to communicate?
- What else are they trying to tell you?
- Is the message meaningful/relevant to you?
- What are your overall reactions to these commercials?
 - Likes?
 - Dislikes?
- Was there anything that was said or shown that was confusing? Unbelievable?
 - Situation?
 - People?
 - Language?
- If you were to describe these commercials to a friend, what would you tell them?
- Is there something else they could have told you that would have been more meaningful to you?

- The percentage of children reporting having *no* friends who use marijuana rose from 86% in 1987 to 92% in 1991.

Teenagers

- Overall, use of illicit drugs has declined among teens between 1987 and 1991. Lifetime prevalence of marijuana use declined significantly (nearly 23%). In 1991, 92% said they'd never used cocaine compared to 87% in 1987 (corresponding figures for crack use were 96% and 92%, respectively).
- Exposure to drug use has remained high over the course of the study, but reported drug use among *friends* has declined (27% more teens reported in 1991 that their close friends do not smoke marijuana than had done in 1987).
- Attitudes toward drugs and drug users are becoming increasingly negative. Significant increases in anti-drug attitudes were observed between 1987 and 1991 in agreement with five anti-drug statements (see Table 5C).

Adults

- Adults reported that the Partnership's media campaign has had a positive impact on their decisions not to use drugs. There are significantly higher anti-drug attitudes among adults who recall seeing at least five Partnership messages compared to those who recall seeing two or less (see Table 5D).
- Use of marijuana, cocaine and crack by adults has decreased. Lifetime prevalence of marijuana and cocaine decreased significantly between 1987 and 1991 (decrease of 6.5% for marijuana and 7.6% for cocaine).
- The percentage of adults reporting that they have *no* friends who use drugs has increased (by 16% for marijuana; by 9% for cocaine and crack).
- Between 1987 and 1991, there was a trend toward anti-drug attitudes and away from attitudes tolerant of drug use (see Table 5E).

Table 5C Anti-Drug Attitudes—Percent Somewhat and Strongly Agree (Teenagers 13-17 years)

	1987	1991	Proportional Percentage Changes 1987-1991
1. Marijuana is a stepping stone to harder drugs. N =	66.7 791	72.0 1,613	7.9% ^b
2. I don't want to hang around people who use drugs. N =	53.9 790	64.0 1,613	18.7 ^b
3. People on drugs act stupid and foolishly. N =	63.9 787	68.9 1,624	7.8 ^a
4. Taking drugs scares me. N =	66.3 787	73.6 1,610	11.0 ^b
5. Drugs make you do worse at school, work or athletics. N =	72.5 792	78.3 1,618	8.0 ^b
6. It's easy to become hooked on marijuana. N =	64.4 791	67.2 1,620	4.3
7. People who use drugs are boring. N =	30.0 786	33.4 1,609	11.3

Question: For each statement, please indicate the responses that best represent how you feel about the statement.

^aIndicates significance of $p < .05$ level.

^bIndicates significance of $p < .01$ level.

Exhibit 6 Sampling of Partnership Ads




Exhibit 6 (continued)

SAATCHI & SAATCHI DFS COMPTON
300 LEXINGTON AVENUE NEW YORK, NY 10174

CLIENT: MEDIA ADVERTISING PARTNERSHIP
PRODUCT: DRUG-FREE AMERICA
TITLE: "CIRCLES"
COMML No.: DECA 3257
DATE: 1/8/88

TIMING: 45 SECONDS



1. (SFX: SNIFF)



2. MAN: I do coke, uh, so I can work longer,



3. so I can earn more,



4. so I can do more coke.



5. So I can work longer,



6. so I can earn more,



7. so I can do more coke.



8. So I can work longer,



9. so I can earn more,



10. so I can do more coke.



11. So I can work longer,



12. so I can earn more,



13. so I can do more coke...



14. (MUSIC UP AND UNDER)
SONG: I'm always chasing rainbows.



15. waiting for a little bluebird in vain.

PRINTED COURTESY OF RADIO TV REPORTS

Exhibit 6 (continued)

NW Ayer Incorporated

CLIENT: PARTNERSHIP FOR A
DRUG-FREE AMERICA
PRODUCT: DFA/MARIJUANA

TITLE: "NOTHING HAPPENS"
COMM'L. NO.: DEBA 2036

LENGTH: 30 SECONDS



1. EDDY: Look at this,



2. "marijuana can mess you up."
Right.



3. We've been getting high for
what; 15 years?



4. Nothing's ever happened.



5. Did I get into other drugs, start
mugging people?



6. Naaah. Didn't do anything.



7. In fact, I'd say I'm exactly the
same as when I smoked my first
joint.



8. MOM: Eddy, did you even look
for a job today? EDDY: No,
Ma...



9. ANNCR: Marijuana can make
nothing happen to you, too.

Exhibit 6 (continued)




Exhibit 6 (continued)

PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA

"PERCEPTIONS"



(MUSIC UNDERNEATH THROUGHOUT)
TOMMY: Whoa,



look at ...



GIRLS: Tommy. He's so stoned.



TOMMY: This is totally ...
happening.



GIRLS: Look what's happened to him.
TOMMY: You know I look like ...
GIRLS: ... such a mess. What a loser.



TOMMY: Yeah, this weed is definitely ...



GIRLS: Gross. Ever since he started
smoking pot, he's gross.



TOMMY: Like, everybody's doing it.



GIRLS: and it's so uncool.



TOMMY: They're really into me.



TOMMY: They think I'm so ...
GIRLS: out of it.



GIRLS: He's really out of it.

Exhibit 6 (continued)

The Partnership for a Drug-Free America (A)

594 029

LEO BURNETT COMPANY, INC.
AS FILMED AND RECORDED

(1/92) "Penny" :30

DEA5011

PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA



(MUSIC: UNDER THROUGHOUT)
1. (SFX: VARIOUS SFX THROUGH-
OUT)



4. have stripes.



7. Drugs can get you in big
trouble.




10. Or go to jail.




2. PENNY: Hello, my name's
Penny. I think people shouldn't
do drugs. They can make you
forget things...




5. And then your body might,
um, get clumsier...




8. You could go to the principle's
office.



6. so you can't jump rope as
good.



9. ...



12. Recess is good.



15. ...



14. Drugs are bad. I wouldn't
do drugs.



13. Hamsters are good. Birthday
parties are real good.

Exhibit 6 (continued)

DMB&B

909 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.
(212) 758-6200

Product: PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA
Length: 30 SECONDS (DEAA-4016)
Title: "LIKE FATHER/FP REV.)



1. (SFX: MUSIC PLAYING IN HEADPHONES)



2. (SFX: MUSIC PLAYING IN HEADPHONES)



3. FATHER: This yours?
BOY: No I...



4. FATHER: Your mother said she found it in your closet.



5. BOY: I don't know. One of the guys must have...



6. FATHER: Must have what?



7. BOY: Look Dad it's not mine.
FATHER: Where did you get it?



8. BOY: Dad I...
FATHER: Answer me. Who taught you how to do this stuff?



9. BOY: You! All right?



10. (SILENT)




11. BOY: I learned it by watching 12.



ANNCR: (VO) Parents who use drugs have children who use drugs.

Exhibit 6 (continued)



**UNFORTUNATELY, SIGNS OF DRUG USE
AREN'T THIS OBVIOUS.**

Fortunately, they're not invisible, either. That's why it's so important that parents know what these signs are. The problem is that most parents don't know. And, as so often happens, their child's drug problem goes undetected.

It's senseless. Especially when the signs of drug use are right in front of the parent's eyes. Signs such as excessive secrecy, fewer visits home from college or a drop in school performance. Other signs are irritability,

weight loss, pupil dilation, and heavy usage of eye drops or nasal sprays.

These are only a few. There are many others.

If you're a parent, you must get involved. You can learn more about the signs of drug use by contacting your local agency on drug abuse.


Knowing these signs isn't a cure. But at least it's a start.

© 1987, SmithGreenland Inc.

PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA

Exhibit 6 (continued)

A DRUG TEST FOR PARENTS.



Wild mood swings, or a dramatic change in behavior, is often a sign of a drug problem.

Poor concentration and memory may be signs of marijuana, cocaine or crack use.

Bloodshot eyes may be caused by marijuana.

Enlarged pupils may be caused by cocaine or crack.

Serious lack of sleep, or an unusual sleep pattern, may result from cocaine or crack.

A frequently runny or stuffy nose, or regular nosebleeds, may indicate use of cocaine.

A dramatic increase of appetite may signify marijuana use.

A dramatic decrease of appetite may signify use of cocaine or crack.

No parent wants to believe his kid is using drugs. A good way to know if he is, is to know your kid. If he displays some of the symptoms above, talk to him. Ask him about the symptoms. He may not be on drugs. He may simply be ill, or going through a tough emotional stage.


But if the signs are strong and you need advice, call 1-800-662-HELP or contact a local drug abuse agency. People there are trained to spot drug problems, and can recommend a treatment program if it's needed.

So study this drug test. For the good of your child, it's one exam you must not fail.

PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA

Exhibit 6 (continued)

ENCOURAGE YOUR KID'S HABIT.



KIDS NEED SOMETHING
BETTER TO DO THAN DRUGS.
LIKE SPORTS. DANCE. OR MUSIC.
BECAUSE GOOD THINGS CAN BE

HABIT-FORMING, TOO. SO GET THEM INTO A GOOD HABIT.
TODAY. OR THEY MAY GET INTO A VERY BAD ONE.

PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA

Exhibit 6 (continued)

Partnership For A Drug-Free America

"Baseball" :10

Television

DEAA-4041




VO: Kids need something better to do than drugs.
Like sports.
Because good things can be habit-forming too.
So why not encourage your kid's habit.

Exhibit 6 (continued)

PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA

"THE MESSAGE"



SFX: BEEP MOM VO: Hi Chris. it's Mom.
Look honey, I've got a lot of work to do,
so I won't be home until late again.


Just do the usual, you know.




fix yourself a little something. Anything
you want.




Oh, and I left some money for you



on the counter.




Use it for



whatever you like.



Now Dad won't be home until
Tuesday- he says hi.



Oh and somebody told me you quit
soccer. Is anything wrong?



Well, just leave me a note. Love you
bye.



Partnership for a Drug-Free America

SFX: MACHINE CLICKS OFF.

Exhibit 6 (continued)

Hágalo por sus hijos
hoy. Mañana
es tarde.



Crecer Libre de Drogas es una guía para los padres sobre la prevención de drogas.
Para pedir su copia gratis, llame al 1-800-624-0100. No pierda ni un instante.

Asociación Pro América Libre de Drogas

Exhibit 6 (continued)

Partnership for a Drug-Free America

Deal 30



MAN: Hey, man, wanna taste something make you feel good?



BOY: Leave me alone!

DEAA 7380




MAN: Try it out. You don't know what you're missing. Little crack won't hurt you.



BOY: It'll make me a crackhead.



MAN: Won't cost you nothing. This one's on me.




Absolutely free.



BOY: I said no, man.



(SFX: STREET NOISE)



MAN: Good job, son. That's just what you do if that ever happens.



BOY: OK, Dad.



ANNCR: Deal with your kids. Tell them the truth about drugs.



It could be the most important role you ever play.
MAN: I like how you handle yourself.

Exhibit 6 (continued)

Partnership for a Drug-Free America

"VOICES"-DF/LC

:30 TV



(MUSIC UNDER)
1ST MAN: (VO) ... Yo, come over here. I
ain't gonna hurt you.



You wanna get high?



NEWSCASTER: ... a series of violent crimes
as the drug epidemic continues to plague our
inner cities.



2ND MAN: (VO) These kids in the ghetto,
they're all on drugs.



GIRL: (VO) What, are you scared?
Come on girl.



WOMAN: (VO) You're no good and you'll
never be any good.



Jeanette Timmons, Queens, N.Y.
ANNCR: (VO) Hey, the only voice you have
to listen to is your own.



New York State Gold Medalist
(MUSIC)



Partnership for a
Drug-Free Greater New York
Partnership for a Drug-Free America
(MUSIC OUT)

Volunteer Agency: Wanning & LaRosa Advertising, Inc.



The Partnership for a Drug-Free America (B)

Playing in a New League

Confronted with the question of whether to try to rebuild the momentum that had begun to dissipate in 1988, core members of the Partnership turned to the broader network that had always been the source of the organization's success. Hedrick remembered going to a meeting of its executive committee in 1988 with a short list of candidates for a new chairman of the Advisory Board.¹ He had put James Burke's² name at the head of his list, as "the supreme health marketer of our time and one of the most respected leaders of our generation."

Other PDFA executives agreed:

Jim was one of the outstanding CEOs in this nation for 12 years at Johnson & Johnson. He had been honored by literally every organization in the country, offered cabinet seats in the administration. He was the foremost private sector corporate expert on the drug issue.

Throughout his career, particularly as president and CEO of Johnson & Johnson, Burke had been at the forefront of national issues related to health, health care products and pharmaceuticals. He sat on numerous boards of health-oriented organizations, and had been a strong advocate of Johnson & Johnson's pioneering employee wellness program, "Live for Life." Burke recalled:

Out of ["Live for Life"], I became very interested in cigarettes and began to get very interested in alcohol and illegal drugs. . . . We put a very sophisticated drug program into Johnson & Johnson. I became involved with all of the

Professor Diana Chapman Walsh, Ph.D., Barbara Moeykens, M.S., and Rima Rudd, Sc.D. of the Harvard School of Public Health prepared this case under the supervision of Professor V. Kasturi Rangan as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Abby Hansen, Ph.D. participated as Case Development Consultant.

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
-
1. See case (A) Exhibit 2 for the list of the Partnership's board of directors.
 2. See case (A) Exhibit 1 for biographical sketch.
-

Exhibit 6 (continued)

Partnership for a Drug-Free America

"ABSENT" :30


DEAA-6022



(SFX:PHONE RINGING THROUGHOUT)
ANNCR: (VO) This is a drug problem.
An order unfulfilled, a complaint
unanswered, an opportunity missed.
You see, drug users have almost double
the absentee rate. That's the problem.
Your problem.



So pick up your phone and
call for a free guide on how to set
up a drug-free workplace.



It's surprisingly simple. And it's
one call that can help get
more calls answered.

has gone *way* up. 3) How many people do you know who have used in the past year or past month? This has gone *down* dramatically. If I had to pick one piece of research that shows what we've done, this would be it.⁶

Burke associated that success with the marketer's unique perspective :

We have a collective marketing wisdom here, from years of being in the business, that nobody else has. Here the discipline of trying to create a product through marketing techniques, marketing knowledge, and experience is being applied in reverse to "de-market" something. That's the right way to do it.

Seven years after Phillip Joanou's germinal insight—that the advertising industry could have impact on the demand for illicit drugs by mounting a massive volunteer ad campaign to de-glamorize drug use—the PDFA had survived and grown in size, leverage, prestige, and power. Instead of folding, as it might have done after its first three years, it recruited one of the most respected health marketing executives in history as chairman, exceeded its initially quixotic-sounding million-dollar-a-day target, and initiated ambitious, unprecedented programs, in Hollywood, in New York's inner city, and with state governments.

Changing public attitudes, Hedrick pointed out, requires patience and persistence—a broad social perspective and a long-term view:

Marketing is . . . taking advantage of opportunities . . . and understanding that these things happen over years and years. In public health you always seem to want to have these very quick outcomes just like they do on Wall Street, but it doesn't work that way. Marketing is a long term proposition, and marketing works over time and when timing is right. Let's recognize where the public is on some of these issues. Why isn't the public health field out there doing major polling research?

6. See Exhibit 1 for a Partnership slide used to illustrate these trends with respect to cocaine.

Exhibit 6 (continued)



It's amazing how Dave's car broke down for the fifth straight Monday.

Dave doesn't really have a car problem. He has a drug problem. And if he works for you, it's your problem. Drug users have almost double the normal absentee rate, which you certainly can't afford.

So call 1-800-843-4971 for a free guide on how to set up a drug-free workplace.

It's surprisingly easy. And a lot cheaper than Dave's car problem.



1 - 8 0 0 - 8 4 3 - 4 9 7 1

Partnership for a Drug-Free America